2017 ASEAN SYMPOSIUM OF CRIMINOLOGY: CONFERENCE PROCEEDING An Inquiry into Ethics, Theories, Culture and Practices Terrorism as (Extra-) Ordinary Crime: Some Anthropological Notes on the “Noble Crime” of Terror Chains in Indonesia, 1999 – 2017 Al Chaidar Department of Anthropology, Universitas Malikussaleh, Lhokseumawe, Aceh Burhanuddin Gala Department of Antropology, University of Indonesia, Depok Achmad Fedyani Saifuddin Department of Anthropology, University of Indonesia, Depok M. Akmal Department of Political Science, Universitas Malikussaleh, Lhokseumawe, Aceh Abstract This paper examines the basic socio-cultural of terrorism morality of guilty feeling before or after committing terror attacks. Terrorism is moving forward from etic point of view that is a legitimate form of resistance against an occupaying powers to emic millenarian insurgency movements against all beyond their cult. Transnational organized crime and international terrorism increasingly share both organizational and operational characteristics, and at times even partner with one another. The nexus of organized crime and terrorism could prolong these challenges and lead to further disruptions and threats to global security. As terror groups transform into hybrid criminal/terror entities and partner with criminal syndicates, the threat to the Indonesian Government and other nations rises in complexity, demanding a highly fl exible, tailored response. This article argues that terrorism should be defi ned and criminalized because it may be a threat to human rights, the stability of governance and to international peace and security. There is also better conceptual value diff erentiating political violence from other crime which causes fear. Key-words: terrorism, Indonesia, transnational ideological organized crime, noble crime, jihad

Background: Lanscape of Nexus Many terrorist groups will never partake in organized criminal activities, but the merging of transnational ideological organized crime and international terrorism is nonetheless on the rise, expressed as heroism and martyrdom. The main argument of this paper is: that terrorism is increasingly expanded and incorporated other non-ideopolitico crimes into its actions. It’s a kind of miximization the impact of terror action. Terrorism is also a simply noble crme in the emic point of view of the terrorist groups. No matter what the means, the sentence meted out cannot send the message that if you think your ends were noble then the means you choose are going to be mitigated by your ends, no matter what your ends may be, crime is not the means you should choose. The rising tide of terror attack towards police offi cers in Indonesia and elsewhere has raised a theoretical question about what value of morality did the terrorism stand for? Expression of moral sentiment, then police offi cers stand as instruments of that morality. Although appearing as paramilitary organizations, modern police agencies actually perform specifi c functions within communities through individual police offi cers acting largely without supervision or direct control. Unlike a military unit, which operates cohesively as a team, the cop on the beat enforcing the law. Often, the result constitutes an individual utilitarianism, a sense of electing a course of action based on a self-perception of what is good for the greatest number. This personal interpretation of the law inevitably leads to questions of conduct (the means: an offi cer’s methods to elicit cooperation from another) versus a desired outcome (the end: apprehension of the guilty and protection of the community).

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The threat is seen from the actions of terrorists who began to commit criminal acts in support of planned terror activities, such as justifying robbery to support terrorism. The suspected terrorists from Majalengka, West Java, namely Rio Priatna Wibowo, Eep Saiful Bahri, Bahraini Agam, and Hendra became acquainted through Facebook® social media and met directly in June 2016. From the introduction they plan to create a narcotics laboratory to produce and do business sabu whose profi t Will be used for operational acts of terror in Indonesia. They are acquainted online Facebook, they gathered since June 2015. Confi rmed from the examination, they make narcotics (sabu-sabu) it is sold to be able to get the funds of terror acts. They changed their intentions after meeting with Bahrun Naim a terrorist convicted in a bomb attack in the Sarinah area, Central Jakarta, some time ago. They were trained how to assemble bombs via internet and Telegram® groups. But, fi nally they turn the bow into explosives, learning by online training with Bahrun Naim. They have not succeeded in making shabu and selling shabu but it’s the initial plan revealed.

It is suspected that Majalengka terrorist who was caught by Anti-Terror Squad12 was classifi ed as an expert in assembling bombs. The reason, they are able to assemble bombs of female beauty materials. They include creative, kutek serve as one of the raw materials of assembly. The off ender gets other chemicals by buying online and the rest is obtained from sellers in Scouting Area, Central Jakarta. While the results of the assemblies were also traded to gain profi t. Online purchases. So these bombs are traded, in addition to doing their own actions. Noted there are four people suspected terrorist network Majalengka arrested team Densus 88. Fourth of the Rio Priatna Wibowo, Eep Saiful Bahri, Bahraini Agam and Hendra are still under investigation. One of the four suspected terrorists is astute in assembling bombs. Even the explosive power was greater than the Bali Bomb 1 and 2.13 The data on the disclosure of the two threatening activities can be seen from Fadli Sadama’s arrest, which was mentioned by the brain of a series of bank robberies in Aceh and Medan. The last action that caused the uproar was a robbery at Bank CIMB Medan that killed a security guard and a member of Brimob, August 18, 2010. in addition to Fadli robbery making money from the business of narcotics. Ansyaad did not mention what narcotics Fadli circulated. Interestingly, from the sale of narcotics, the Fadli group bought weapons in the region of Southern Thailand. Another surprising example is when the National Narcotics Agency (BNN) in cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), captured an Afghan citizen who became a central fi gure in the circulation of world heroin, 2008, at Soekarno-Hatta Airport, Cengkareng. 96 per cent of the world’s heroin from Afgan, and one of the key fi gures caught in 2008. Offi cers investigating the case were shocked. The reason, when they investigate the phone lines of mobile phone suspects found a lot of numbers directed to terrorism networks in Indonesia. Another fact expressed is the shifting of narcotics circulation disclosure. If the last few years have been dominated by African nationals, the disclosure now shows Afghan and Iranian citizens who are starting to dominate the illicit narcotics market. Moreover, Afghanistan and Iran are part of narcotics circulation or commonly referred to as the crescent moon. As is known, the circulation of the crescent lane (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran) dominates the supply of drugs. After slowly distribution of poppy (opium) in the Golden Triangle (Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos). Meanwhile, in connection with the development of terrorists following the capture of terrorist network cells, Ansyaad said the scale of terrorist forces will remain as long as the ideological fi gures still exist. Until now, there is no complete explanation of Narcoterrism. The simplest meaning is the combination of narcotics and terrorism and / or criminal acts and narcotics and crime and terror. According to the Head of the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT), Inspector General (Ret) Ansyaad Mbai, nacroterrorism is the most dangerous trend. Criminals commit criminal acts in favor of planned terror activities, such as justifying robberies to support terrorism. From the results of the investigation, investigators get phone numbers that indicate that apparently narcotic agents have links with our terrorist fi gures.14 Thus, narcoterrorism is (inexplicable) as a merger-combining criminal (criminal) acts of narcotics and acts of terror and terrorism. Both are interconnected and needy; The criminals (criminals) of narcotics use the network - terrorist cells to distribute narcotics; And the proceeds of the sale, are 12 Detasemen Khusus Anti Terror 88 or Densus 88 of Indonesian Police. 13 From the arrest of the four suspects, the offi cers con scated six pieces of evidence made from chemicals, namely RDX, HMTD, ANFO, Black Powder and also found a ri e. Kompas, 12 June 2009. 14 detik.com April 18, 2012.

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used to fi nance terror acts. Could be, the villain as a narcotics dealer as well as terrorists. Not a few of the narcoterrorism actors, masked in marriage (with good women), so that their wives (and extended families) as masks; Or they at the same time become the sellers of human (women), and so forth; Or even as a female abductor and raped her. Thus, there has been a merger of narcotics crime - terrorism - and sexual crimes, resulting in sexual narcoterrorism.

The use of Cyber for crimes is usually done by those who have high skills and expertise in computer science, the Cybercrimeumum actors master the algorithms and computer programming to create script / malware code, they can analyze the workings of computer systems and networks, and are able to fi nd loopholes in the system Which will then use these weaknesses to be able to enter so that crime actions such as data theft can be successfully done. Cyber is currently used also to conduct terror (cyber terrorism). The indoctrination of dogma through Cyber that is capable of infl uencing many people for jihad as well as the recruitment guided by the ISIS network to come to Syria is a form of crime through Cyber media. Propaganda techniques that generate fear and fundrising ways illegally to obtain funds are forms of Cyber’s use for terror crimes.

Currently Cyber Terrorism crime has increased to Cyber Narcoterrorism, thus becoming one of the potential future crimes capable of threatening the stability of a country. Cyber Narcoterorism is a new phrase in the world of Cyber that needs to be watched by the Indonesian security authorities. Cyber Narcoterrorism is a term conveyed by TNI Commander-in-Chief TNI Gatot Nurmantyo and asks all levels of TNI, Regional Command and Intelligence apparatus to be wary of such threats. Cyber Narcoterrorism is a new kind of crime in cyberspace but has a broad impact on the security and national sovereignty of a nation. Cyber Narcoterrorism can be defi ned as eff orts, work, activities and actions undertaken by certain parties / groups both state and non-state actors circulate narcotics for the benefi t of fi nancing terrorism activities through the use of cyber media. The defi nition is a fl atform of understanding that is used as a reference for the TNI in observing the development of Cyber Narcoterrorism. The term Narcoterrorism was originally termed by former Peruvian President Fernando Belau’nde Terry in 1983 when he described the opposition of a group of narcotics syndicates against the National Anti-Narcotics National Police of Peru. The original context of Narcoterrorism is understood to mean the attempt of a narcotics syndicate to infl uence government or community policy through violence and intimidation and hinder the eff orts of anti-narcotics law enforcement by systematic threats or the use of other violent endeavors. The violence perpetrated by Pablo Escobar is the largest example in the world of narcotics and is known as narcoterrorism. It then became a controversial issue within the US and made a discussion for the US government in the fi ght against narcotics. The term narcoterrorism is also pinned to a terrorist organization that conducts illegal narcotics trade activities to facilitate their operations and recruit and improve the expertise of terror organizations. Its use is growing also used for terrorist organizations to counter narcotics trading activities. Thus, the question arises, or is it possible that the active cells are being put to sleep and will act at the right time and momentum ?. This Surabaya network before being caught has prepared three bombs and two fi rearms and will actually attack the police in the holy month of Ramadan on June 22, 2016 (17 Ramadan). What is clearly closed is not impossible there has been a collaboration between the two. A very clear indication and need to dii is the joining of a convicted drug tycoon Freddy Budiman with terrorist groups in Nusakambangan Prison. He is now dressed like a Muslim fi gure. The fact of radical distribution of interesting radical in the case of Freddy is in detail the author discussed with Deputy of BNPT Repression Inspector General Pol Arief Dharmawan during Binpuan Apkam program in West Kalimantan last Sunday. Where when the white sandstone in Nusakambangan is under renovation, there are some terrorist prisoners who were moved and combined with the drug inmates in drug prison. In just three months they have succeeded in spreading radicalism of terrorism so that 21 drug inmates are infected and become radical, including Freddy Budiman. How dangerous and easy is the virus to spread among prisoners. Those who contracted later separated themselves from other prisoners’ activities. And it turns out the suspect arrested in Surabaya is one of the infected. There is a dark side that, although not real but has been stretched, the collaboration of drug syndicate crimes with terrorism groups. The fl ow of drugs from outside or produced domestically is now like a fl ood that is very diffi cult dammed. Terrorism needs drug funds, so space must be narrowed so

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they do not get rich. This is dangerous. Indeed Narcoterrorism is very dangerous and must be prevented before escalated. Although terrorism was excluded as a specifi c provision from the ICC Statute, there are several elements suggesting that it may nevertheless be prosecuted under the heading of crimes against humanity. In particular, it could be addressed as the sub-off ence of murder, torture, deportation, or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law, persecution, enforced disappearance, and, more generally, as an inhumane act. Terrorism Reperceived

In recent Anthropological studies, terrorism is still defi nited as ‘violence against nonmilitary or civilian targets that is designed to create fear outside the immediate circle of victims, in order to promote a political objective’ (Miskel, 2010: 1007). Terrorism is limited to the act of political and ideological violence in the name of relegion, and more recently many cases were linked to Islamic theology. There is no universally accepted legal defi nition of terrorism, yet. In some people’s view, this is due to the fact that terrorism is a subjective notion, which “exists in the mind of the beholder, depending upon one’s political views and national origins ”. However, when the media and the politicians use this term, the average people seem to think of a violent and intimidating act – usually directed against innocent targets – aimed at coercing a government or a community to comply with the perpetrators’ political requests. The issue is whether this common understanding may provide the basis for a universal legal defi nition of “terrorism” in spite of “Western” hypocritical one. In a diff erent forum it was discussed whether international humanitarian law (IHL) may provide for one. The conclusion was that acts of terrorism referred to in Article 33 IV Geneva Convention of 1949, Article 51(2) Additional Protocol I of 1977 and Article 3 and 14 Additional Protocol II of 1977, indicate an act of violence in breach of the principles of military necessity, proportionality and distinction, which is primarily aimed at spreading fear among the civilian population. The outcome was that the notion provided by IHL contains the same elements of the defi nition used in the common language: the element of innocent victims (civilians), a violent act and the existence of a political end which, however, does not justify the means, because of their disproportionality. Thus, since the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 amount to customary law, it could be argued that the meaning of “terror” under Article 33 IV GC could be used universally. However, the focus of this paper is not on the defi nition of terrorism. The one just being referred to will be simply adopted as a “working defi nition” to assess whether “so-called” terrorist acts may be prosecuted as crimes against humanity. Terrorism is a criminal act, sometimes symbolic in nature, intended to infl uence an audience beyond the immediate victims.”Key words are “criminal” and “political”. Concepts have not changed since Thucydides. Technology and globalization has changed. Today terrorism is linked to transnational organized crime through narcotics, weapons, people, training, and commerce (money). The Maritime Terrorism Research Center defi nes Maritime Terrorism as “the use or threat of violence against a ship (civilian as well as military), its passengers or sailors, cargo, a port facility, or if the purpose is solely a platform for political ends. The defi nition can be expanded to include the use of the maritime transportation system to smuggle terrorists or terrorist materials into the targeted country. Maritime terrorism is motivated by political goals beyond the immediate act of attacking a maritime target”. The above mentioned lanscape of nexus criteria is important for distinguishing among “ordinary” crime, psychotic behavior, and terrorism. The defi nition also allows us to distinguish between terrorism and insurgency or guerrilla warfare, although in practice there is overlap, as insurgents often use terror tactics. For our purposes, though, an insurgency is an organized attempt by a group of people to confront the military forces of a state and to secure control over a specifi ed territory. Insurgents usually are also organized in an overt and military-like manner. Terrorists typically avoid direct confrontation with military forces and are organized more like criminal gangs—secretive and smaller in number—and rarely chose to directly confront military forces. Terrorists also ordinarily do not seek to directly control and administer territory (Miskel, 2010: 1008). The high use of (Consumer) Narcotics in the archipelago and the relatively easy movement of radicals (which continues on the actions of terrorism) in RI, seems to have been a fertile fi eld of growth narcoterrorism and sexual narcterrorism. Lay people, now, can clearly assess that, almost every day there are arrests of terrorists and drug dealers, not even a few are shot dead. However, the criminals are, like endless, always dealers-narcotics agents and new terrorist cadres, as if one died, growing up. All of

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that, shows that the network-the narcoterrorism cell has penetrated deep into the community. They can appear as good and devout people (though this is just a mask), but at the same time a hungry wolf that can destroy and destroy the community with acts of terror and drug traffi cking. We, the nation and people of Indonesia, the entire archipelago, should not turn a blind eye to the narcoterroirsm villain. Now they can emerge from Afghanistan and Iran and Pakistan; Territory called Narcotics from the crescent lane (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran); Then opium in the Golden Triangle (Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos). The criminals, can also use the women of the archipelago as a wife (and later used as a member of the criminal network). Now, the people are waiting for the assertiveness of the state; Assertiveness capable of suppressing all radicalism that gave birth to terrorism; Also need government assertiveness to eradicate poverty, so that people are not easily tempted as narcotics agent and then become terrorist. The existence of Cyber Narcoterrorism although not yet found any cases in Indonesia it is a special challenge, especially for the TNI as the front guard for defense and state security. The massive use of social media by many must be a serious concern and have the ability to fortify the negative eff ects of the use of medsos by groups that are not responsible to the community. The minimal eff ort that can be done for the current condition is to fi lter / block as the initial counter-intelligence action to confront the threat of Cyber Narcoterrorism. The era of globalization that no longer recognizes the boundaries of the Cyber Narcoterrorism state is one model of war without troops so that in the TNI is required “Cyber Army” as a combat soldier in the face of the non-military threat. Crime against humanity is a serious tragedy of human kind. Crimes against humanity are certain acts that are deliberately committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack or individual attack directed against any civilian or an identifi able part of a civilian population. The fi rst prosecution for crimes against humanity took place at the Nuremberg trials. Crimes against humanity have since been prosecuted by other international courts – such as the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court, as well as in domestic prosecutions. The law of crimes against humanity has primarily developed through the evolution of customary international law. Crimes against humanity are not codifi ed in an international convention, although there is currently an international eff ort to establish such a treaty, led by the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative. Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity can be committed during peace or war. They are not isolated or sporadic events, but are part either of a government policy (although the perpetrators need not identify themselves with this policy) or of a wide practice of atrocities tolerated or condoned by a government or a de facto authority. War crimes, murder, massacres, dehumanization, genocide, ethnic cleansing, unethical human experimentation, extrajudicial punishments, use of WMDs, state terrorism or state funding of terrorism, death squads, kidnappings and forced disappearances, military use of children, unjust imprisonment, enslavement, cannibalism, torture, rape, and political, racial, or religious repression may reach the threshold of crimes against humanity if they are part of a widespread or systematic practice.

The term “crimes against humanity” is potentially ambiguous because of the ambiguity of the word “humanity”, which can mean humankind (all human beings collectively) or the value of humanness. The history of the term shows that the latter sense is intended. The diff erent types of crimes which may constitute crimes against humanity diff ers between defi nitions both internationally and on the domestic level. Isolated inhumane acts of a certain nature committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack may instead constitute grave infringements of human rights, or – depending on the circumstances – war crimes, but are not classifi ed as crimes against humanity. The term “crimes against humanity” was used for the fi rst time in 1915 by the Allied governments (France, Great Britain and Russia) when issuing a declaration condemning the mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. However, it was only after World War II in 1945 that crimes against humanity were for the fi rst time prosecuted at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg. Both the Charter establishing the IMT in Nuremberg as well as that establishing the IMT for the Far East in Tokyo included a similar defi nition of the crime. Crimes against humanity have not yet been codifi ed in a dedicated treaty of international law, unlike genocide and war crimes, although there are eff orts to do so. Despite this, the prohibition of crimes against humanity, similar to the prohibition of genocide, has been considered a peremptory norm of international law, from which no derogation is permitted and

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which is applicable to all States. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7, Crimes Against Humanity, stated that for the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (1) Murder; (2) Extermination; (3) Enslavement; (4) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (5) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (6) orture; (7) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (8) Persecution against any identifi able group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defi ned in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (9) Enforced disappearance of persons; (10) The crime of apartheid; (11) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suff ering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. For the purpose of paragraph 1: ‘Attack directed against any civilian population’ means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack. The plan or policy does not need to be explicitly stipulated or formally adopted and can, therefore, be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.15 In contrast with genocide, crimes against humanity do not need to target a specifi c group. Instead, the victim of the attack can be any civilian population, regardless of its affi liation or identity. Another important distinction is that in the case of crimes against humanity, it is not necessary to prove that there is an overall specifi c intent. It suffi ces for there to be a simple intent to commit any of the acts listed, with the exception of the act of persecution, which requires additional discriminatory intent. The perpetrator must also act with knowledge of the attack against the civilian population and that his/her action is part of that attack. Taken in the former sense, “crimes against humanity” suggests that the defi ning feature of these off enses is the value they injure, namely humanness. The law traditionally distinguishes between crimes against persons, crimes against property, crimes against public order, crimes against morals, and the like. Here, the idea is to supplement the traditional taxonomy of legally protected values-property, persons, public order, morals-by adding that some off enses are crimes against humanness as such.

The terminology chosen by the framers of the Nuremberg Charter suggests that they were thinking of crimes against humanity in this sense. In Article 6, which enumerates the crimes under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, we fi nd the traditional category of war crimes 5 supplemented by two new categories: crimes against peace6 and crimes against humanity. The parallel wording suggests that crimes against humanity off end against humanity in the same way that crimes against peace off end against peace. If this parallelism holds, then “humanity” denotes the value that the crimes violate, just as “peace” denotes the value that wars of aggression and wars in violation of treaties assault. An argument of Hannah Arendt provides an illustration of how this sense of the phrase “crimes against humanity” fi gures in legal and moral argument. In the Epilogue to Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt describes the Holocaust as a “new crime, the crime against humanity-in the sense of a crime ‘against the human status,’ or against the very nature of mankind.” She borrows the phrase “crimes against the human status” from the French Nuremberg Prosecutor Frangois de Menthon, and explains it thus: “[Genocide] is an attack upon human diversity as such, that is, upon a characteristic of the ‘human status’ without which the very words ‘mankind’ or ‘humanity’ would be devoid of meaning.” 9 To attack diversity, in other words, is to attack humanness. This is an intriguing and important argument, to which I will return. For the moment, I wish merely to note that Menthon’s phrase and Arendt’s explication of it adopt the “crimes against humanness” reading of “crimes against humanity.” The crime, for Menthon, is an attack on whatever it is that makes us human. “Humanity” refers to the quality of being human, that is, to an abstract property, not to the human race or a set of individual humans. The discourse of the revision of the Anti-Terror Law has long since rolled out since 2003 which is still being debated. Anti-Terror Law Number 15 Year 2003 is considered obsolete while acts of terrorism increasingly sophisticated and massive. If terrorism had often been linked to bombing, then now organized crime ideologically emerged in a variety of possible ways, with increasingly convergent 15 http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.html

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targets, and recruited players from diverse backgrounds of age, occupation and gender . If the fi rst target of attack on the centers of progress of capitalism and the location where liberalism blossomed, then now the target is more convergent to one institution that is the police. In the future, it is possible that the target of terrorist attacks will lead to other institutions that are considered as thogut (enemy) by the terrorists. Military institutions will be a target too and so far the terrorists have started to make plans (plots) that lead to the army. Civil institutions are also not escaped from the target of the terrorists, especially in Indonesia. The progress of terrorist groups in Indonesia has spread to several provinces, at least 16 provinces are save houses for terrorist cells. This development is certainly very threatening the security and sustainability of collective life and peace of society that had been awake. This threat requires the government to act quickly to anticipate the spread and control of the situation and conditions by terrorist groups. After the Santoso or Abu Wardah group was pursued and captured until the end of this terrible terror group, then another terrorist group emerged attempting to control secretly an island in North Maluku. Although the eff orts of terrorist groups to make certain parts of Indonesia as qaidah aminah (base areas) are unsuccessful, the development of this plot should be systematically anticipated by the government. This systematic eff ort requires the government to think to utilize all potential and existing resources, including TNI involvement in the fi ght against terrorism. Many people respond negatively to TNI’s actual inevitable engagement plans. The inevitability of TNI involvement is seen to undermine the legal structure of the extra-ordinary crime handling so far. In addition, the military element is regarded as the culprit of human rights violations in the history of Indonesia during the New Order era. In fact, all institutions have the same chance to commit human rights violations if the offi cers are not professional in performing their duties.

The involvement of TNI in combating (not just overcoming) terrorism is inevitable. Theoretically, the typology of terrestrial-based and non-territorial-based terrorist groups and networks of terrorists forces the power system to divide the managerial tasks proportionately. Theoretically (Al Chaidar: 2015), judging by spatial analysis, there are two types of terrorists: (1) tanzhim terrorists, and (2) tamkin terrorists. The network of tanzhim terrorist groups is a very dynamic ideological organization; Move around and do an attack at a location far from where it came from. The network of terrorist groups is a statist ideological organization that is millennially sure and tied to a particular location. Santoso terrorist group in Poso, Central Sulawesi, is a terrorist group that moves territorially and invites foreign terrorist fi ghters from abroad and domestic terrorists to take part in this noble crime. The tanzhim terrorist group is a mobile unit that moves from place to place, highly mobile and dynamic and has exceptional technical capabilities. Terrorist groups are, for example, static units and are centralistic and live in certain areas by shifting-occupancy. Terrorist groups try to control one base area on land, sea or air. On land these groups sometimes resemble shifting cultivation in forests and remote areas. This terrestrial group is usually very much in areas untouched by civil administration management. Only the military can control every inch of the perceived territory as this “no-man’s land”. It is in this area of punishment that terrorists may cultivate seeds of ideological separatism in secret. At sea this tamkin group controlled the marine area from several water routes. The large number of piracy of trading ships and tourists in the waters of the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea indicates the presence of terrorist groups that would only be eff ective if handled by the military. Maritime terrorism such as in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea is increasingly growing and it is expanding its operational area to the Malacca Strait, the Timor Sea, Banda Sea and the territorial waters of Papua. However, no single institution can monopolize the handling of terrorism thoroughly. It takes institutional co-operation to secure the territory and people from this extraordinary crime. If the crime of corruption, pedophilia and drugs alone can not be monopolized solely by the Police alone, then the task of combating and tackling terrorism should be shared. Institutional cooperation is the key to the settlement of crimes everywhere. If management is seen as the art of delegating authority, then the anti- terror task authority that has been monopolized must be delegated to various other institutions that have resources and networks that have been considered idle. This managerial consideration should be the main reason for the involvement of the TNI in handling terrorism. TNI involvement will impact not only on the concerns of human rights abuses and other juridical implications, especially on criminal procedural laws that have to be changed. Obviously TNI offi cers involved in terrorist pursuit and capture must be present in civil courts by abandoning the attributes of

36 2017 ASEAN SYMPOSIUM OF CRIMINOLOGY:CONFERENCE PROCEEDING An Inquiry into Ethics, Theories, Culture and Practices

their military corps. While opportunities for human rights violations must be addressed wisely by using harsh humanitarian law through military courts. There is not a perfect crime that can be hidden except in war. The TNI’s Mind-set now in the face of the situation in the war zone with the peaceful territory is certainly diff erent from the political military during the New Order era. Concerned about the human rights violations that the army will carry out in dealing with terrorism is irrational. The success of the TNI in pursuing and capturing Santoso terrorists in Poso is evidence that demonstrates the power that has been idle for the most eff ective and highly respected rights of terrorist prisoners.

Extra-Ordinary Crime, War and Crime Against Humanity With wide span of terror targets and crime ground, terrorism has reached peaks of extreme of ordinary crime in piracies, drugs, undeclared wars, homicides, political assasinations and other political violences with ideology. Much of the international legal debate about defi ning terrorism has focused on the ideological disputes, or technical mechanics, of defi nition, rather than on the underlying policy question of why-or whether-terrorism should be internationally criminalized. Since most terrorist acts are already punishable as ordinary criminal off ences in national legal systems, it is vital to explore whether-and articulate why-certain acts should be treated or classifi ed as terrorist off ences rather than as ordinary national crimes such as murder, assault or arson. Equally, it is important to explain why terrorist acts should be treated separately from existing international crimes in cases where conduct overlaps diff erent categories, particularly the existing sectoral treaty off ences, war crimes and crimes against humanity (starr, 2007: 1257). The JI from 1999, through the lens of Imam Samudra and Amrozi, tried to give any religious legitimation by saying that taking hostage, kidnapings and other atrocities towards Western is legally accepted by the religion. There is Islamist self-justifi cations of its right to take non-Muslims hostage, and decapitate, ransom or enslave them and still unabandoned till 2017 now. The possibility to prosecute acts of terrorism under the heading of crimes against humanity may prove to be a valid alternative to the existing antiterrorism law enforcement mechanisms, which have often proven to be impeded by the lack of international cooperation in penal matters, or by the hurdles created by extradition law. This holds true both for member and non-member states to the ICC, since the heading on crimes against humanity is based on customary law, i.e. it is applicable universally. Thus, such acts could be prosecuted universally by every state who has adopted legislation on crimes against humanity. Additionally, particularly where a state would feel uneasy about prosecuting himself a case because of its political sensitivity, it may address the case to a partial, independent and international court, where also the judicial guarantees of the accused would be guaranteed. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacifi c (CSCAP) Working Group has off ered an extensive defi nition for maritime terrorism: “…the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fi xed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities.” This defi nition, however, does not defi ne what terrorism is and whether it would only include maritime attacks against civilian (merchant) vessels or also attacks against military crafts. I defi ne maritime terrorism, therefore, as the use or threat of violence against a ship (civilian as well as military), its passengers or sailors, cargo, a port facility, or if the purpose is solely a platform for political ends. The defi nition can be expanded to include the use of the maritime transportation system to smuggle terrorists or terrorist materials into the targeted country. Maritime terrorism is motivated by political goals beyond the immediate act of attacking a maritime target (Aukerman, 2002: 39). Maritime terrorism has reared its ugly head again—this time in Southeast Asia where a Vietnamese cargo ship was attacked by supposed members of the dreaded Filipino terrorist outfi t, Abu Sayyaf. Days later, Jürgen Kantner, a German national captured off the coast of southern Philippines in November 2016, was beheaded by members of the same group, sparking international outrage and all- round condemnation. These incidents come only a month after Houthi militants—another vicious band of ralicalised mercenaries in Yemen—carried out an attack on a Saudi Arabian navy vessel, killing two service personnel and injuring many others. The Saudi warship is supposed to have had over 150 sailors and

37 2017 ASEAN SYMPOSIUM OF CRIMINOLOGY: CONFERENCE PROCEEDING An Inquiry into Ethics, Theories, Culture and Practices

offi cers onboard, as well as a combat helicopter at the time of the attack, which US military experts concluded involved the use of a small unmanned remote-controlled attack boat. The latest incidents in the waters off the Philippines reveal another pattern. According to media reports, the strike on the Vietnamese cargo ship wasn’t meant so much to cause death and injury, as it was aimed at capturing hostages. While only one crew member was killed in the attack, six others were abducted, in a manner similar to recent attacks by ISIS-affi liated groups in Southeast Asia. As the beheading of Mr Kantner demonstrates, militants are increasingly prone to using hostages as bargaining chips to extract concessions out of regional governments. Abu Sayyaf, one of the most signifi cant terror organisations in Southeast Asia to have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS), is said to hold over 27 people, including many Malaysians, Indonesians, and Vietnamese. Alarmed Filipino offi cials are now warning of a Somalia-type situation in the Southeast Asian littorals. West of the Malacca, Indian observers too worry over the possibility of a similar terror tactic at sea. After the 26/11 attacks, India’s maritime agencies have been on high alert looking for signs of another terrorist infi ltration into Indian waters. Last week, reports surfaced that there had been a sudden rise in the number of abandoned Pakistani fi shing boats in the Rann of Kutch region, causing many to speculate a sustained bid by Pakistan-based terror groups to cross-over into Indian Territory. Some of these, Indian analysts surmise, could well be connected to the Islamic State. n IS-inspired maritime terror attack on the Indian seas might seem far-fetched, but isn’t beyond the realm of conception. India’s security managers are being forced to confront the possibility of a terrorist attack on Indian ports on the west coast, and even cruise ships on the high seas. As IS-motivated attacks in Asian waters rise, analysts say the number of reported violations of India’s territorial seas by smaller boats and crafts continues to be high. There’s also the possibility that militant cadres could use new methods to strike maritime military facilities. One such tactic could be the targeting of maritime infrastructure, in particular naval operational and residential complexes, and logistical hubs. In December 2015, Australian police arrested two young men in Sydney for planning an attack on a maritime facility. The troublemakers are said to have been radicalised and were attempting to carry out strikes on multiple targets in the Woolloomooloo naval base in Sydney, home to Australia’s principle naval assets. A few days earlier, there was a bomb blast at a mosque in a naval base in Dhaka, Bangladesh that killed two people and injured many more. Since the early 2000s, when a series of terror attacks riled the waters of Asia, regional maritime forces have been on high alert. The most famous of those was the attack on the USS Cole on October 12, 2000 that killed 17 sailors. That was a follow-up to a failed attack on the USS Sullivan that’s supposed to have hardened the resolve of al-Qaeda to launch a successful attack on a US warship. It was carried out by a small boat in harbour and considered by far the biggest breach of security on a commissioned US warship. It was shortly followed by the attack on the MV Limburg in 2002, which left the supertanker blazing off the Yemeni coast. It’s the Pakistan Navy’s (PN) vulnerability to maritime terror, however, that most worries Indian watchers. In July 2015, radicalised elements of the PN colluded with al-Qaeda to give eff ect to a diabolical plan to forcibly take-over two Pakistani warships in Karachi Harbor. The plan—foiled only on the nick of time—was to use the hijacked ships to carry out attacks on US and Indian naval warships. So rattled was the Indian navy after that incident that it ramped up security measures in the Arabian Sea, instituting special security procedures to deal with a threat of terror related violence at sea. The most high-profi le attack on a naval facility was the strike on PNS Mehran, a premier Pakistani naval base at Karachi, where a group of well-trained militants carried out a full-fl edged military assault, killing scores of people and infl icting severe damage on Pakistani military assets. Analysts surmise a future terror hit on a port facility could well involve a lone wolf. Over the years, terrorists have shown themselves to be remarkably enterprising in planning attacks and it’s entirely possible for radicalised individuals to carry out a covert strike. Cargo containers arriving from ships, some say, off er the perfect opportunity to terrorists to carry out an attack on a port facility. A jihadi inside a container could detonate a vast quality of explosive or a low-grade nuclear device. In premier container and trans-shipment ports across the Indian Ocean and Pacifi c, port authorities follow a layered risk-based approach to security where specifi c kinds of cargo is comprehensively scanned.

38 2017 ASEAN SYMPOSIUM OF CRIMINOLOGY:CONFERENCE PROCEEDING An Inquiry into Ethics, Theories, Culture and Practices

Unfortunately, regional maritime forces seem not to have kept pace with the evolving threat. Little has been done to develop a comprehensive doctrine or even a coherent plan to guard against a terror strike at sea, or stop militant infi ltration from the sea. Instead, precious time has been wasted developing measures that are either too costly to implement or logistically unfeasible. Darul Islam proliferated and rebuild a radical ideology in managing its survival movement in Indonesia in a new form of revivalism and how the groups of Darul Islam, Jamaah Islamiyyah and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid perceived jihad as an instrument to revive Islamic state and also on how theological and eschatological (millenarian) factors played a central role in the organizations.

Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (1979) very serious in Fundamentalism Project, states that fundamentalism always follow a pattern. They are the “embattled forms of spirituality,” which emerged as a response to a crisis of mistrust (perceived crisis). Fundamentalists engaged in confl ict with secular enemies suspected of making policies frontally opposed to religion. Fundamentalists do not regard this as a contradiction frontal “playground”, but rather a “battlefi eld” are serious , which is not just a conventional political dissent, but consider it as a kind of “cosmic war” between the forces of truth and falsehood strength. They’re afraid of —and have always felt the threat to exterminate the unbelievers— those from secular Western powers; hence they try to fortify themselves with the doctrine and practice of ever living in the past (the doctrine and practice of jihad). To prevent themselves from “ bad world” and shut themselves from contamination “cosmic war” that fundamentalists often backwards and became splinters from mainstream society to create a counter-culture, and the fundamentalists are not daydreaming. Imam Samudra wrote: “... Jihad Bom Bali? With the destiny of Allah, this will dig into recesses of the hearts of all mankind. He will soon be bombard the brain of the decision maker. The warlords-aggressor-Zionists and the Crusaders will immediately panic, dizziness, loss of consideration, then soon will collapse”(Imam Samudra, 2004:171). After the New Order, Indonesia entered a phase of very sharp ideological confl ict. Religious ideology, often accompanied by violence and other forms of emotional expression, became ideological opposition is strong enough, even with a relatively small number of supporters. Indonesia’s Islamic ideology in this period appeared in its roughest form: terrorism. Recognition of an act of terrorism suspects Bali Bombing 12 October 2002, a clear expression of religious emotion. Ali Gufron, one of the Bali bombing terror perpetraitors, a member of Jamaah Islamiyyah, even expressed his attitude to the fi rm and simple: a reply to injustice and US tyranny and its allies against Muslims with the intention that they stop their tyranny. There is a value work and dictating the way their minds. Ali Ghufron for example, stated that the bombing was act of devotion to God. Ali Ghufron, Imam Samudra, Amrozi, and the group felt a delusion of grandeur, a feeling of having or representing or get the word and be part of the elements of greatness which believes itself to carry special mission from God. The terrorists, the Jamaah islamiyyah or the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) or other factions the Darul Islam, always feel themselves as “God’s warriors” who are called to act in the name of God and religion , a “hand of God” on earth to “realize” his wrath in the form of resistance: the bombings and other terrorist acts. Result of interpretation and expression of religious emotion delusif this, the tragedy took place and a large number of speculation arose in the midst of the public. Transnational Ideological Organized Crime

Maritime piracy represents an area where the mixing of militant Islamic terrorism and crime can converge with potentially severe consequences for global military and economic security. Given heavy concentrations of al Qaeda cells and radical Islamic sympathizers, shipping lanes and pre- existing criminality, it comes as no surprise that Indonesia experience most of the world’s maritime piracy attacks. Particularly alarming is the fact that criminals and terrorists not only steal lucrative cargoes, but also have the resources to commandeer lethal cargoes such as chemicals, gas, arms, and specialized dual-use equipment. The kidnapping of Westerners for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front is another demonstration of how the lines between crime and terrorism have become blurred. Both organized crime and terrorist groups run in the same circles— they already operate outside of the law and they often need the same resources, including: false identifi cation, shipping documents, operators, transportation networks, and counter-surveillance techniques. Terrorist groups just beginning to develop their own revenue generation enterprises often come into contact (sometimes hostile) with criminal elements who generally have reliable revenue streams. Apart from narcotics traffi cking, there are a number of other notable examples of cooperation between terrorist and

39 2017 ASEAN SYMPOSIUM OF CRIMINOLOGY: CONFERENCE PROCEEDING An Inquiry into Ethics, Theories, Culture and Practices

organized crime organizations. Combating women and children are prohibited if they are not involved in the war. But when they at war, then there is no doubt about possibility to kill and fi ght them “(Imam Samudra, 2004:146-147). While criminal and terrorist groups do appear to be moving closer together and have shared strategies, tactics, and resources, signifi cant roadblocks to further cooperation exist. There remain cultural, operational, and practical diff erences between the two groups. No organized crime group is built around adherence to religious or ideological tenets, while groups like al Qaeda or Hamas are fundamentally based on religious beliefs and motivations. Terrorist and organized crime groups are more responsive and agile than the governments and multilateral organizations which pursue them. Financing the act of terror from the sale of narcoterrorism or narcotics has not been found in the country. As far as I know there is no direction towards narcotrorism. That’s just BNPT’s statement a few years ago and that’s just an assumption. The case of narcoterrorism is still foreign in Indonesia. They are also not all the way justifi ed. If talking narcotics then can not be separated from the network. He considered, the network is not owned by those involved in acts of terror. On that basis he said, narcoterrorism not yet developed in the country. Nevertheless, he asserted it is the responsibility of BNPT and BNN to overcome the problem narcoterrorism. Moreover, if it is said that in Malaysia has found a link between the sale of narcotics with acts of terror. Found in the fi eld is a virtual crime to fund acts of terror. One of them, breaking into the bank’s network security system to divert a certain amount of money to a particular account. The virtual crime that should be a serious concern of the government and law enforcement agencies today, if it wants to break the fl ow and from terrorist networks in the country. Distribution and abuse of narcotics and then the results used for terrorism activities is a serious crime (extraordinary crime). Cyber narcoterorism becomes a transnational crime.

On 8 June 2016, Special Detachment (Densus) 88 Antiteror Police managed to arrest three people suspected terrorists in Surabaya, East Java. In the raid, Densus arrested Priyo Hadi Purnomo (PHP), BRN aka Jeff rey ustad (JF) alias F, and Ferry Novendi (FN). Three suspected terrorists who were captured in the whole raid were recidivists. Priyo Hadi Purnomo was imprisoned for drug involvement. Ferry Novendi was once a criminal case, while JF was jailed for terrorism. Ferry Novendi and Priyo Hadi Purnomo recognize radicalism movements and are recruited into terrorist networks while in prison. From the location of the raids, the Densus Team managed to confi scate three homemade bombs, two units of long barrel guns, complete assembled fi rearms with live ammunition, bayonet, cell phone as a trigger tool, as well as bomb-making materials. Badrodin Haiti Police Chief explained,16 that the terrorist network of Surabaya is planning to spread high explosives bombs at fi ve separate points in Surabaya on 17th of Ramadhan or 22nd of June 2016. Their target is a member of the Police. Badrodin explained to the media that their existence had been detected since a month before the arrest. “We have monitored their existence before I go to Australia (state duty), I collect Cadmus and troops, I say that in this month of Ramadhan we should not be missed, if there is evidence, then we must arrest immediately” he asserted. Priyo Hadi Purnomo is a resident of Surabaya (34), had twice entered prison in Porong Jail due to cases of embezzlement and drugs. In the Porong Jail he was recruited by convicted terrorist Sibgotulloh and Muhammad Sholeh. Sibgotulloh was the bomber in Cimanggis, captured in Malaysia while going to Syria. Priyo Hadi Purnomo is a member of a terrorist network in Kalimantan with Maman Abdurrahman. He was involved in terrorism activities between 2011-2012. PHP itself previously also been moved to LP Madiun and isolated, separately. Meanwhile, Ustad Jeff ry (BRN) is a resident of Malang (27). BRN is an old player who is believed to be the guardian of a house belonging to Salim Mubarok alias Abu Jandal. BRN is recorded as a recidivist. He was once entered the list of DPOs from the Polres Malang on domestic violence, robbery and mistreatment. Once free, he often communicates with Abu Jandal who is in Syria, through social networking media. In the terror network in Surabaya, Priyo Hadi Purnomo has recruited two other suspects namely; JF (Jeff ry) and FN (Ferry). The three suspects had also served as bomb-making experts, providers of materials as well as prospective executor later. While SL alias AB provides a place for making bombs. SL was previously known in April 2016 and once put a bomb under the police car in Polsek Genteng, Surabaya but failed to explode due to technical problems. PHP in the investigation is known to be actively 16 Kompas, 8 June 2016.

40 2017 ASEAN SYMPOSIUM OF CRIMINOLOGY:CONFERENCE PROCEEDING An Inquiry into Ethics, Theories, Culture and Practices

in contact with Bahrun Naim who is believed to be the brain of Thamrin bomb attack in January 2016. Bahrun is now in Syria, becoming one of IS / ISIS high offi cials. They communicate via FaceBook’s social networking media. This Priyo Hadi Purnomo is taught Bahrun Naim ways of assembling and making bombs. Also prepare the materials needed to make the bomb taught Bahrun Naim through social networking. The capture of the terror network in Surabaya is the result of an increasingly mature mapping of Densus 88, where the most important aspect is the unveiling of plans from Priyo Hadi Purnomo , JF and FN that have succeeded in making high explosives bombs or high explosive bombs. It is inconceivable that if they could blow up a bomb at the police station in Surabaya, it is certain that the eff ect of the news will be enormous. Another thing to note is that the three suspects arrested are recidivists and highly suspected to be included in the drug network. According to the authors, security forces should cut off the links of terrorist networks with drug networks, because that is a huge source of funds. Islamic State in Syria is able to organize forces up to tens of thousands due to the very strong fi nances the results of bank robbing and the sale of spoils. Actually narcoterrorism in Indonesia has started with the arrest of terrorist fi gure Fadli Sadama who was involved in robbery case of CIMB Bank Medan and assault of Mapolsek Hamparan Perak, Medan in August 2010. Fadli Sadama, one of the relatively young terrorist (29 year old) who escaped during riot in LP Tanjung Gusta Medan on July 8, 2013, successfully arrested by Malaysian Royal Police on November 20, 2013 when he was going to smuggle weapons to Indonesia. Fadli convicted 11 years in the case of terrorism CIMB Niaga managed to escape when riots broke out in Lapas Tanjung Gusta, Medan, where 200 inmates escaped including four people listed as terrorist prisoners. In the times of DI, JI and JAT were born, the concepts of Islamic state (daulah Islamiyyah), i’dad, jihad, and khilafah were and are not in fi t of modern popular secularism ideology. Recently, anthropologists and historians have been concerned with the concept of nation-state and the prospect of its development in non-Western societies. When the Islamic terrorism came into arena, anthropologists remain sceptical. The category of “terrorism” is one more example of conceptual objectifi cation of a psychic state of sudden momentary fright. The comparison with the history of some anthropological categories prompts us to question whether the real theoretical issue is not that of simply dropping the category altogether as unsound (Douglass and Zulaika, 1990: 256). The Bali bombing events was considered as jihad, and according Imam Samudra, the bomber, it was done on the basis of faith, where faith can be accounted for truth, can be tested the validity of the sources of law ... I mean the belief that Islamic shariah sourced from al Quran and sunnah of the prophet of Allah. The process of understanding towards the source was not undertaken haphazardly or randomly... My understanding patterns are ahlus sunnah wal jama’ah with manhaj salafus shalih.”(Imam Samudra, 2004:198-199). The Noble Crime and Jihad The 21st century has seen large-scale, well-organized terrorist attacks by Islamist terrorists on nearly every continent. They believe in the deed of jihad. Jihad is considered a sixth pillar by some Sunnis, and all Muslims recognize jihad as a requirement, but there are diff erent interpretations of jihad among Muslims (Miskel, 2010: 1008). These same terrorists and terrorist organizations have leveraged the cyber domain to support recruitment, training, and attacks. The maritime frontier, however, is perhaps the one that has continued comparatively untouched throughout the history of modern Islamist terrorism. Attacks on maritime targets currently account for less than 1% of all terrorist attacks. Since al-Qaeda’s attack on the USS Cole in 2000, there have been few signifi cant asymmetric terrorist attacks against maritime targets. Although piracy is a continuing threat in this domain, especially in highly- traffi cked strategic choke points like the strait of Malacca, there are no well-documented cases of pirates colluding with Islamist terror organizations to carry out a maritime attack. Emerging evidence suggests that these relationships are being developed and that a sharp increase in terrorist attacks on maritime targets is possible. Such attacks have the potential both to infl ict heavy casualties and cause widespread economic havoc. Jihad is a noble ideology in Muslim radical movements elsewhere. Radical Islamist geopolitics is another factor that may encourage the prioritization land-based attacks while de-emphasizing maritime equivalents. To al-Qaeda and similar groups, the world is divided into the Houses of War and of Islam (Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam), terms that have been in use since the fi rst Muslim invasions.

41 2017 ASEAN SYMPOSIUM OF CRIMINOLOGY: CONFERENCE PROCEEDING An Inquiry into Ethics, Theories, Culture and Practices

Moderate Muslims have more peaceful and nuanced conceptions of these terms. These radical group’s conceptions, however, are black and white, focusing on governments, land, and people. These groups exist to fi ght until all territory and persons are within the dar al-Islam and under the rule of the restored caliphate. Because these goals are land-centric, the world’s seas and oceans are merely alternate paths to their goals, of varying strategic value but of little importance in and of themselves. Although there has been little collusion between groups and comparatively few attacks, the ideology and methodology supporting terrorist attacks against maritime targets is already in place. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, leader of the attacks behind the deadly bombings of the USS Cole and the Limburg, developed a four-part strategy for al-Qaeda’s maritime terrorist attacks. These four parts include suicide attacks on vessels, the hijacking of ships for use as weapons against port or transportation infrastructure, attacking supertankers using explosive-fi lled aircraft, and attacks on vessels with underwater demolition teams. Spread by al-Qaeda, these recommendations have a far-reaching eff ects. Simple bomb placements or fl otilla attacks (explosive-laden craft driven into the target, the maritime equivalent of a car bomb) do not require anything more than would an inland attack. In 2004, a simple eight pound bomb brought down the SuperFerry-14 in the Philippines, killing 116 in the world’s deadliest maritime terrorist attack. As the US and other governments continue to crack down on terror networks, these attack methods available to individuals and small groups will increase in use as the ideology and tactics continue to spread and their offi cial strategies adapt.17 The threat of terrorism at sea raises new policing and prevention dilemmas for states accustomed to fi ghting traditional piracy. Pirates attack maritime targets for economic gain. A means of escape is essential in achieving the purpose of their attacks. As policing turns piracy within certain areas into suicide missions, pirates will cease to attack those areas. The nearly eradicated piracy off of the Somali coast is a prime example. Unfortunately the calculus for terrorist attacks, particularly suicide attacks, is fundamentally diff erent. Terrorists on suicide missions with the goal of mass casualty or economic destruction cannot be eff ectively policed using tactics and strategies designed for pirates. Whereas pirates can be deterred by ensuring that they cannot escape following an attack, maritime terrorists must be deterred before an attack even takes place. This is exceedingly diffi cult on the expansive seas and among thousands of ships of diff erent builds and function.

Southeast Asia is fast becoming the world’s maritime terrorism hot spot, because of a very high incidence of piracy and a burgeoning threat of terrorism. Southeast Asia is the region most prone to acts of piracy, accounting for around 50 percent of all attacks worldwide. This situation is aggravated by indigenous terrorist groups with strong maritime traditions. The growing nexus between piracy and terrorism makes maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia a regional security concern. For the terrorist groups, this is a kind of jihad. The term is interpreted to mean both the struggle to live a good life consistent with the faith (the so-called greater jihad) and a struggle against the enemies of Islam (the lesser jihad), in eff ect a holy war. Holy war can be off ensive, for the purposes of spreading the faith or expanding a Muslim state. It can also be defensive—defending the believers and their state against invaders, as during the Crusades. The most common usage is defensive holy war, but terrorists have creatively interpreted the concept in ways that attempt to justify violence against nonmilitary, civilian targets. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), and the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are three terrorist groups in Southeast Asia with the intention and proven capability to wage maritime terrorism. Of these groups, Abu Sayyaf is the best known but least understood. One terrorist group that has developed a capability to wage maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia is the Abu Sayyaf Group. Various analysts have already discussed its historical and fi nancial ties with Al Qaeda and then subsequently to ISIS. Yet little is known about its organizational structure, strategy, tactics, or maritime terrorist capabilities. In his book ‘Inside Al-Qaeda’, Rohan Gunaratna describes how Al-Qaeda’s modes of attack range from ‘low-tech assassinations, bombings and ambushes to experiments with explosiveladen gliders and helicopters and crop-spraying aircraft adapted to disperse highly potent agents. Al-Qaeda has no compunction about employing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons against population centres. The variety and innovation of the tactics and equipment used by this terrorist network

17 Michael Brooks, http://www.neptunemaritimesecurity.com/the-growing- threat-of-maritime-terrorism/

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highlight the importance of lateral thinking when trying to estimate the future threat posed by Al-Qaeda. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) meaning ‘bearer of the sword’ in Arabic, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) are both separatist groups active in the Philippines. MILF is currently the largest Islamic separatist group, with an estimated 15,000 members. Since the late 1990s, the MILF has been in peace negotiations with the Philippine government. However, the talks have been punctuated with violent outbreaks on both sides. The MILF have mounted attacks against both military and civilian targets, resulting in the deaths of over 210 people in 2003.45 One such attack took place on April 2003 in a busy seaport in Davao City in the Philippines, 17 people were killed in the attack. The group has also carried out attacks on Philippine shipping, mainly by placing bombs on domestic inter-island ferries being used to transport members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Christians to and from Mindanao. The ASG was formed by a group of terrorists who split from the MILF. It committed its fi rst major attack in 1991. The ASG has been responsible for abducting foreign nationals and holding them to ransom, bombings and assassinations. It has also made threats against the global petroleum industry. Because of their nonstate status and the fact that their violence is illegal, terrorists ordinarily organize into conspiratorial groups with internal discipline necessary to evade the authorities in the states where they commit their acts of violence (Miskel, 2010: passim). Piracy off the coast of Somalia has raised the cost of transporting goods through the Gulf of Aden considerably. It is perceived as a potential threat to world trade, given the importance of the Gulf of Aden route for oil and general cargo shipments to Europe. Of even greater concern is its potential impact on international security and regional stability. It is feared that Somali piracy might supply weapons to or become a source of fi nance for (regional or international) terrorist organisations such as Al Shabab and Al Qaeda and fund Islamist insurgencies across Africa. As a worst-case scenario, sea- borne terrorists could use boats with

volatile cargo to devastating eff ect in crowded shipping lanes and harbours or create major hazards by sinking large ships in narrow shipping lanes (Murphy, 2007; Menkhaus, 2009; Alexander and Richardson, 2009; Stephenson, 2010). Conclusions

The purpose of most violent crime is, obviously, fi nancial gain for the perpetrator. Other violent crime may be intended to satisfy some personal agenda or emotional need—for example, revenge against someone for a real or perceived slight. Clearly, such forms of criminal violence can instill fear in the victims, their families, and perhaps entire neighborhoods, but unlike the case with terrorism, this fear is not created in order to serve a political purpose. Violence by a mentally unbalanced individual ordinarily can also create fear, but it is not designed to achieve a rational political goal. Another form of politically motivated violence against civilian targets is terror practiced by the state against its own population or the population of an occupied territory (Miskel, 2010: 1008). The threat from the terrorist groups located in Indonesia and the Philippines and the vulnerability of vessels passing through Southeast Asia’s strategic sea-lanes. there are inherent weaknesses present in the maritime transport industry. It also fi nds that there are terrorist groups in the region with maritime capabilities who possess the motives to target Western and economic interests. This necessitates the conclusion that maritime terrorism is a threat to commercial ports and shipping. the extent of the threat from maritime terrorism has increased in recent years, especially since the terrorist attack against the US on 11 September 2001. The incident that fi rst brought the phenomenon of maritime terrorism to the world’s attention, was the hijacking of the cruise liner Achille Lauro by Palestinian terrorists in 1985. The incident took place in Egyptian territorial waters. The crew and passengers were held hostage, and were threatened with death if a group of Palestinian prisoners detained in Israel were not freed. The terrorists surrendered after two days and were captured through US military intervention. The absence of similar statements by other U.S. and world policymakers suggests that the classifi cation of these terrorist attacks as a crime against humanity is not yet policy. Equally surprising is the fact that these policymakers have not used the word “genocide,” a separate crime from crimes against humanity, to describe these terrorist attacks even though it seems fi tting. Besides providing politicians with new superlatives in their rhetoric, there are two benefi ts to classifying terrorism as either a crime against humanity or genocide. 2 First, it allows large-scale acts of terrorism to be viewed in

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their proper light - as crimes against humanity or as genocide - when the requisite elements are present. Indeed, all of the elements for these crimes are satisfi ed in the September 11 attacks in 2001. Second, it facilitates the prosecution of terrorists by all states because universal jurisdiction is available with crimes against humanity and genocide, whereas it is unavailable with terrorism since it lacks a universal defi nition. 4 As states gain access to universal jurisdiction by redefi ning terrorism in this manner, the chances for prosecuting and deterring terrorists improved.18 References

Sanderson, Thomas M. “Transnational terror and organized crime: blurring the lines.” SAIS Review of International Aff airs 24.1 (2004): 49-61.

Michael Brooks, http://www.neptunemaritimesecurity.com/the-growing-threat-of-maritime-terrorism/

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Hobsbawm, Eric. Primitive rebels. Hachette UK, 2017.

Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds. The invention of tradition. Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Hobsbawm, Eric J. Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality. Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Box, Steven. Recession, crime and punishment. Hong Kong/London: Macmillan Education, 1987.

John Brandon, “Terrorism on the High Seas,” International Herald Tribune, 05 June 2003. (John Brandon directs the international relations program of the Asia Foundation in Washington, DC.)

Julian Bray, “Piracy Thrives on the High Seas,” Reuters News Agency, Washington Times, 10 November 1997.

Mark Huband, “Terrorist Network Likely to Link to Organised Crime,” Financial Times, 09 September 2002.

David Johnston, “Terrorist Groups Sell Sham Consumer Goods to Raise Money,” International Herald Tribune (via New York Times), 17 July 2003.

Greg Krikorian, “Link Suspected Between Terrorists, U.S. Drug Ring,” Los Angles Times, 10 May 2002.

James D. Fry. Comment: Terrorism As A Crime Against Humanity And Genocide: The Backdoor To Universal Jurisdiction, Spring / Summer, 2002, 7 UCLA J. Int’l L. & For. Aff . 169

Roman Kupchinsky, “Bankrolling Terrorism: A Special RFE/RL Report on Terrorist Financing,” RFE/RL Crime and Corruption Watch 2, no. 40 (November 2002).

Roman Kupchinsky, “The Merger Between Crime and Terrorism,” RFE/RL Crime and Corruption Watch 2, no. 33 (September 2002).

Reuven Paz, “Targeting Terrorist Financing in the Middle East,” Paper presented at the International Conference on Counter Terrorism through Enhanced International Cooperation, Italy, September 2000.

Starr, Sonja. “Extraordinary crimes at ordinary times: international justice beyond crisis situations.” Nw. UL Rev. 101 (2007): 1257. Aukerman, Miriam J. “Extraordinary evil, ordinary crime: A framework for understanding transitional justice.” Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 15 (2002): 39. Miskel, James F. “terrorism”, in James Birx, 21st Century Anthropology A Reference Handbook, London: Sage Publication, 2010.

18 James D. Fry. Comment: Terrorism As A Crime Against Humanity And Genocide:  e Backdoor To Universal Jurisdiction, Spring / Summer, 2002, 7 UCLA J. Int’l L. & For. Aff . 169

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