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Ethical Theor CENTRAL MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY GLOBAL CAMPUS COURSE SYLLABUS I. IDENTIFYING INFORMATION Course: PHL 218 Course Title: Ethical Theory EPN: 22246636 Term: Spring I Location: Southfield Center Course Dates: 1/15, 1/22, 1/29, 2/5, 2/12, 2/19, 2/26, 3/5/2014 Course Days and Times: Wed 5:30PM-10:00PM; Prerequisites: None. Blackboard: Blackboard is a web-based learning management system licensed by CMU. Within Blackboard, a course website, also known as a shell, is automatically created for every CMU course. Face-to-face courses may or may not incorporate Blackboard, whereas Blackboard course shells are always used for online courses and will be available to you prior to the course start date. Seeing the course shell listed in Blackboard with unavailable adjacent to its title is an indication that your instructor has not made it available and is in no way indicative of registration status. To access Blackboard, open a web browser and enter https://blackboard.cmich.edu/webapps/login/. After the site loads, enter your CMU Global ID and password in the respective spaces provided. Click the "login" button to enter Blackboard and then the link to the appropriate course to enter the course's Blackboard shell. If you need assistance, contact the IT Helpdesk at 989-774-3662 / 800-950-1144 x. 3662. Self-guided student tutorial resources are also available at https://blackboard.cmich.edu/webapps/login/. Instructor: John Ouko Primary Phone Number: 517-402-3601 (Email is the best way to contact me) Secondary Phone Number: N\A E-Mail Address: [email protected] Availability: By arrangement Academic Biography: Dr. Ouko earned his Ph.D. in Philosophy at Michigan State University in 2011. He teaches and researches in the areas of Social and Political Philosophy, African and African- American Philosophies, and Ethics. II. TEXTBOOKS AND INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS Order books from MBS at http://bookstore.mbsdirect.net/cmu.htm Textbooks and Course Materials: Title: Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings Author: Louis P. Pojman & James Fieser Edition: Sixth ISBN: 13:978-0-495-80877-0 Publisher: Wadsworth Cengage Learning Required: Yes Course Reserves: N\A Required Materials: N\A Recommended Materials: N\A III. COURSE DESCRIPTION The following problems will be discussed: What is the good life? Is there any such thing as right and wrong? Can we justify our moral beliefs? IV. COURSE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 1. To familiarize students with the basic concepts and distinctions in the area of ethics; 2. To acquaint students with some of the major ethical systems (historical or contemporary); 3. To help students develop a critical awareness of how values function in our lives; 4. To help students critically examine these values; 5. To start students thinking about what constitutes the best sort of life for a human being. V. METHODOLOGY The course will be conducted in a discussion format. There will be some lecture, but there will be a lot of discussion and debates (sometimes in small groups). All students are expected to complete the required readings that are assigned for each meeting and participate actively in classroom discussions. No cell phones, pagers, or texting please. VI. COURSE OUTLINE/ASSIGNMENTS Pre-Class Assignment: Read pp. 20-25 and pp. 38-55 of Ethical Theory and summarize each article in 200-250 words. Course Outline: Unless otherwise stated, the readings are from Ethical Theory by Louis Pojman & James Fieser. January 15 : Ethical Relativism versus Ethical Objectivism What is Ethics, pp. 1-7 Plato: Objective Moral Forms, pp. 20-25 Ruth Benedict: A Defense of Ethical Relativism, pp. 38-42 Louis Pojman, A Critique of Ethical Relativism, pp. 43-55 January 22: Utilitarianism Jeremy Bentham: The Utilitarian Calculus, pp. 194-196 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, pp. 197-2330 J.J. C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism, pp. 230-236. Bernard Williams: Against Utilitarianism, pp. 245-254. Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality, pp. 269-276. January 29: Kantian and Deontological Systems Immanuel Kant: The Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 281-317. W.D. Ross: What Makes Right Acts Right? p. 319-327 Onora O' Neill, Kantian Formula of the End in Itself and World Hunger, pp. 328-338 Judith Jarvis Thompson: Killing, and Letting Die, and the Trolley problem pp. 353-361 February 5: Contractarian Ethical Systems Thomas Hobbes: The Leviathan, pp. 367-379. David Gauthier: Why Contractarianism? pp. 380-389 John Rawls: Liberal Contractualism: Justice As Fairness, pp. 390-398. Writing Assignment #1 due. February 12: Virtue- Based Ethics Aristotle: The Ethics of Virtue, pp. 403-440 Bernard Mayo: Virtue and the Moral Life, pp. 440-443 Susan Wolf: Moral Saints, pp. 471-482 Louis P. Pojman: In Defense of Moral Saints, pp. 483-490 February 19: Feminist Ethics - All articles marked with an asterisk * will be handed out in class Classical, Difference, Equity, and Radical Feminisms* Simone de Beauvoir: The Second Sex* Christina Hoff Sommers: Who Stole Feminism?* Andrea Dworkin: The Politics of Intelligence* February 26: Contemporary Challenges to Classical Ethical Theory Charles Darwin, Ethics and the Descent of Man, pp. 624-637 E. O. Wilson: Sociobiology and Ethics, pp. 637-640 J. L. Mackie: The Law of the Jungle: Evolution and Morality, pp. 668-674. March 5 Revision Final Exam Writing Assignment # 2 due. Assignment Due Dates: 1. Papers: Each student is required to write two papers on topics that will be designed by the instructor. Each paper will be 4-5 typed pages (double-spaced,normalfont and margin) and each worth 15% of the total grade. Due dates for the papers are February 5, and March 5. These papers will be evaluated on the following criteria: (i) understanding and mastery of the course material; (ii) organization; (iii) persuasion, including attention to logic. Your essays must include:1) a clear thesis,(2) sound arguments,(3) relevant supporting evidence,(4) at least one strong objection to the thesis, and (5) a response to the objection(s). 2. Class Presentation: A presentation paper (approximately 2 pages) accompanied by a 20 minute oral presentation. The presentation is worth 10% of one’s total grade. At our first class meeting each student will assume responsibility for a class period in which to present. The presentation paper and oral presentation will be based on the student’s reactions and analyses of the reading the presentation is based on. You may wish to object to some aspect of the reading or you may decide to explore further questions raised by the author- and raise critical questions for discussion. By noon before the day on which you are to present, the presentation paper must be emailed to me. These papers should not exceed 2.25 typed pages (double-spaced, normal font and margins). You will receive one grade for this assignment, which will be a combined assessment of your written work and oral presentation 3. In-Class Group Assignments: Every week (except on March 5) there will be an in-class group assignment. The purpose of the assignments is for you to demonstrate( a) your ability to analyze and assess the readings as well as (b) your own thinking about course issues.There will be a total of seven in-class group assignments but only five of them will count toward your final grade. Each assignment is worth 8% of the total grade. Missed in- class group assignments cannot be made up but the two lowest quiz scores, including "0's" for absences, will be dropped for all students at the end of the semester. 4. Exams: There will be a final exam on March 5th worth 20% of your total grade. The exam will be essay-type test whose questions will ask you to analyze, synthesize and evaluate the material from the course. In the exam you will answer two questions chosen from a longer list. The longer list will be given to you at least one week in advance. NOTE: The final exam is cumulative; i.e., it will cover material from lecturers and readings for the entire semester. Post-Class Assignment: None Student Involvement Hours: A minimum of 3-4 hours for each session's assignment and 5-6 hours for the papers. VII. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION Evaluation Criteria: Two papers 30% (Each worth 15%) One class presentation 10% Five in-class group assignments 40 % (Each worth 8%) Final Exam 20% The purpose of the assignments/exams is for you to demonstrate (a) your ability to analyze and assess the readings (i.e., to write critically much more than simply summarize) as well as (b) your own thinking about course issues. It is not enough to simply and clearly articulate your views about the issues but you must also be able to give reasons (evidence, justification) for your views. Grading Scale: A 100- 93 A- 92.5- 90 B+ 89.9- 87 B 86.5- 83 B- 82.5- 80 C+ 79.5- 77 C 76.5- 73 C- 72.5- 70 D+ 69.5- 67 D 66.5- 64 D- 63.5- 61 E 60.99-00 Late Assignments: If you know that you will be unable to hand in a paper at the scheduled time, the best thing to do is to make arrangements to turn it in early. If an emergency prevents you from turning in the paper at the scheduled time, please contact me as soon as possible. I will require some kind of official verification of the emergency before I can allow you to turn in the paper. Make-ups and Rewrites: Missed presentations will be rescheduled in extreme circumstances—documentation of some kind will probably be necessary. I will review your draft essay if you email it to me at least three days before due date.
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