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University Microfilms, a XERD\Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan f : 72-4451 CHRISTMAN, Calvin Lee, 1942- FERDINMD EBERSTADT AND ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION FOR WAR, 1941-1943. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1971 Histoxy, modem University Microfilms, A XERD\ Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan © Copyright by Calvin Lee Christman 1971 : I THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED | FERDINAND EBERSTADT AND ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION FOR WAR 1941-1943 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Calvin Lee Christman» A.B., M.A., M.A.T. ***** The Ohio State University 1971 Approved by A d v iser Department of History PLEASE NOTE: Some Pages have indistinct print. Filmed as received. UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The preparation of a doctoral dissertation usually involves the help of many people. This dissertation was no exception, for I was indeed fortunate in the caliber and amount of aid given me. My first expression of thanks must go to Dr. Harry 1. Colest under whom this dissertation was prepared. He gladly gave both his valuable time and advice. Further exceptional aid was provided by the staffs of The Ohio State University Library, the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and the Oral History Project at Columbia University. In Washington, Mr. John E. Taylor was particularly helpful with War Production Board records, as was Mr. Harry Schwartz with Navy records. In New York, I was extremely fortunate in having the assistance of Miss Rita Higgins, Ferdinand Eberstadt's secretary. Without her help and inter­ est, my research in Mr, Eberstadt's private papers would have been far more difficult. Mr. Eberstadt gave me permission to use these papers before his death. Neither he nor his family placed any restrictions on my use of these papers or on the conclusions I could draw from them. The Franklin D. Roose­ velt Library also aided me by searching for documents bear­ ing on Eberstadt*s career. In addition to this help, I was i i very fortunate in the large number of people who w illingly gave their time to write or to speak to me concerning their recollections. I thank them. As all doctoral students know, research rarely in­ volves only time and energy. Without the financial help of the History Department and the Mershon Center for Education in National Security at The Ohio State University, much of my research could not have been done. Moreover, I was helped by the wonderful hospitality of the Sedrick Harris family, who so cheerfully opened their home to me while I was in New York. Last and foremost, my thanks go to Nina, my wife, for all those reasons that she knows and I treasure. Columbus, Ohio Calvin Lee Christman A ugust 1971 i i i VITA 12 J u l y 1 942 • • • • Born - Lakewood, Ohio 1964 ....... A.B., Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 1 9 6 4 -1 9 6 5 .........................University Scholarship and Research A ssistant, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee 1966 •••••••• M.A., M.A.T., Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee 1 9 6 6 - 1 9 6 8 . ..... Instructor of History, Middle Tennessee State University, Murfreesboro, Tenn­ e s s e e 1 9 6 8 - 1 9 7 1 . ..... Mershon Fellow, Mershon Center for Education in National Security, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio PUBLICATIONS "The Chaco Wan A Tentative Bibliography of Its Diplomacy," The Americas: A Quarterly Review of Inter-American Cultural History, XXVI. No. ifjuly 1969), 54-65. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: United States M ilitary History United States Political History, 1913 to the Present. Professor Robert H. Eremner i v United States Diplomatie History. Professor Marvin R. Z a h n is e r Colonial Latin i\merican History. Professor Donald B. C ooper TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................. ü VITA................................................................................................................ i v LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS IN FOOTNOTES.................... v i l LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS IN TEXT ............................................ v i i i C h a p te r I . EARLY LIFE............................................................................... 1 I I . A CAREER ON WALL STR EET.............................................. 11 I I I . PORTRAIT OF AN INNER-DIRECTED M i\N ..................... ^3 IV . THE ARMY AND NAVY MUNITIONS BOARDi BACK­ GROUND 59 V . THE ARI4Y AND NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD* OPERATIONS.............................................................................. 101 V I. THE WAR PRODUCTION BOARD Aim THE CONTROL OF MATERIAIE.............................................................................. 157 V I I. THE CONTROLLED Mi\TERIAI5 PLi\N ....... 205 VIII. DISMISSAL............................................................................... 251 IX. EPILOGUE.................................................................................... 313 APPENDIX A................................................................................................................ 323 B................................................................................................................ 324 C................................................................................................................ 325 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................ 331 VI LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS IN FOOTNOTES CPA Civilian Production Administration EP Eberstadt Papers FDRL Franklin D. Roosevelt Library NA National Archives OHM# CU Oral History Memoir, Columbia University PARS Policy Analysis and Records Branch PAS Policy Analysis Staff WPB Records of the War Production Board v i i LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS IN TEXT ANI/IB Army and Navy Munitions Board CCFM Committee on the Control of the Flow of M a te r ia ls CMCP Committee on a Materials Control Plan CMP Controlled Materials Plan FCB Facility Clearance Board FRC Facility Review Committee JCS J o i n t C h ie fs o f S t a f f NDAC Advisory Commission to the Council on National Defense CCS Office of Civilian Supply 0PM Office of Production Management OP&RÎ Office of Procurement and Material PAC Program Adjustment Committee PEC Production Executive Committee PRP Production Requirements Plan SOS Services of Supply SPAB Supply Priorities and Allocation Board WPB War Production Board WRA War Resources Administration WRB War Resources Board Vlli CMPTER I EARLY LIFE For Ferdinand Eberstadt, as for millions of other iUnericans, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in a call to service. Unlike some men who would receive their call through a draft notice, Eberstadt received his call by telephone on the same night as the Japanese attack. On the other end of the long-distance line was Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, an intimate friend of long standing. Acting also for Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, Forrestal requested that Eberstadt accept the chairmanship of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. As he had done in two earlier national emergencies, Eberstadt heeded this call and accepted the position. For Eberstadt, then fifty-one years old and the head of his own very successful New York investment firm, his acceptance started him on a new career of government service, a career that would continue interm ittently until the very day of his d e a th . Eberstadt was born 19 June I 890 in New York City. His parents, Edward F. and Elenita Lembcke Eberstadt, were both Geîrman, though his mother had been born in Venezuela of a German father and Spanish mother.^ Although both of Eberstadt*s parents grew up in Germany, they immigrated to the United States shortly after his father finished his education at Heidelberg. After settling on the east coast, his father became a moderately wealthy commission merchant. When Eberstadt was two years old, the family moved to East Orange, New Jersey, where he spent his youth. One of four children, his older sister gave him the nickname "Manny,” which was short for "little man." Though given to him as a baby, this name stuck throughout his childhood and, within the family, long beyond. He undertook his college preparation at Newark Academy, a school he remembered for its strict standards of discipline and scholarship. As with a number of his classmates at Newark, Eberstadt enrolled in the fall of 1909 at Princeton University. Not everything went smoothly, for shortly after his entrance, the universi­ ty expelled him for roughhousing. Soon reinstated, he set­ tled down long enough to be elected president of his class for the second semester.^ Considering his early expulsion. ^Much of the material for this chapter is from an interview the author held with Eberstadt on 17 and 18 July 1 9 6 9 » Additional information comes from personal m aterial, filed under letter E, in Eberstadt’s private papers which the author viewed in New York City. These papers are now housed at Princeton University Library. Hereafter material from the Eberstadt Papers w ill be cited as EP. ^L etter(ltr.) of Eberstadt to William Horne, 1 Dec 1 9 6 7 , EP. he finished strongly, becoming football manager and member of the editorial board of the Daily Princetonian and grad­ uating with a Phi Beta Kappa key. In addition, his class­ mates had tagged him with the nickname "The King" in re­ sponse to his influence on campus.^ One undergraduate incident demonstrated a character­ istic that Eberstadt would repeat in the future. On the day of a wrestling meet with Cornell, the regular
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