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NIT-2011-Uzbekistan.Pdf Uzbekistan by Bruce Pannier Capital: Tashkent Population: 27.8 million GNI/capita, PPP: US$2,910 Source: The data above was provided by The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011. Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Electoral Process 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 Civil Society 6.75 6.50 6.50 6.50 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 Independent Media 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 Governance* 6.00 6.25 6.25 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a National Democratic Governance n/a n/a n/a 6.50 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 Local Democratic Governance n/a n/a n/a 6.25 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 Judicial Framework and Independence 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.25 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.00 7.00 7.00 Corruption 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.75 6.75 Democracy Score 6.46 6.46 6.46 6.43 6.82 6.82 6.86 6.89 6.93 6.93 * Starting with the 2005 edition, Freedom House introduced separate analysis and ratings for national democratic governance and local democratic governance to provide readers with more detailed and nuanced analysis of these two important subjects. NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. 606 Nations in Transit 2011 Executive Summary n what has become an annual tradition, President Islam Karimov chose August 31, 2010, the eve of the 19th anniversary of Uzbekistan’s independence, to speak Iabout democracy. “Our noblest aim,” said the Uzbek president, “is to be among developed and democratic states in the world.” Appearing on state television, Karimov said one of the keys to accomplishing this goal would be to “continue modernization and liberalization of the country, democratic renewal of political, judicial, and economic systems, and building a strong civil society.”1 In reality, 2010 was characterized by no more democratic renewal than the previous years of Karimov’s rule. Since 1991, Karimov has exercised authority over all aspects of Uzbekistan’s governance and much of its public life. Using his security services, Karimov first eliminated all secular opposition to his government and then set about doing the same to the underground Islamic opposition that emerged. The executive branch of government dominates the legislative and judiciary bodies, whose sole purpose is to carry out the will of the president. Having silenced nearly all critics and perceived opponents of the regime—including independent journalists, rights activists, and political opponents—in 2010, the state went after individuals who spoke about or showed aspects of the country that the government felt damaged Uzbekistan’s image both domestically and abroad. These so-called threats included artists, writers, and documentary filmmakers. The Uzbek government implemented these policies with near impunity. President Karimov faces no significant opposition within the country, nor is he compelled to submit to pressure from international organizations. Uzbekistan’s role as a transit country for NATO supplies to Afghanistan restricts the ability of many Western democracies to press for reform and greater respect for basic human rights in the country. 2 For economic and security reasons, Russia and China also need stability in Central Asia, and value Karimov as a guarantor of order in a potentially volatile region. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan’s significant deposits of natural gas, uranium, and oil have caused many governments to focus on meeting energy needs at the expense of pressing Tashkent on moral issues. The ouster of Kyrgyzstan’s President Kurmanbek Bakiyev in early April 2010, and the ethnic violence and carnage in southern Kyrgyzstan in mid-June played directly into President Karimov’s hands. He received international approval when he chose not to send troops into southern Kyrgyzstan during the June violence as ethnic Uzbeks took the brunt of the brutality. Karimov also allowed 100,000 of some 400,000 ethnic Uzbek refugees from Kyrgyzstan to cross into Uzbekistan. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres thanked Uzbekistan for its timely humanitarian assistance, as did individual countries.3 Nearly all the refugees returned to Kyrgyzstan within a month, many claiming they had been forced out.4 Uzbekistan 607 Domestically, politics in Uzbekistan remain static. There has been no national push to increase harvests or industrial productivity, to reform healthcare, or to build an education system capable of training future leaders. Authorities made a pledge to provide more than 900,000 new jobs in 2010, but a similar program in 2009 forced small businesses and farm owners to employ people at a financial loss in order to meet the quota. So far, sales of uranium and revenues from oil and natural gas pipelines represent only a small boost to the economy, since the volume of these energy resources remains low. Neighboring Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have far greater resources and a combined population 35 percent smaller than Uzbekistan’s. National Democratic Governance. No efforts to reform Uzbekistan’s political system were discernable during 2010. President Karimov and his inner circle continue to rule the country as they wish, while state security forces keep the regime in place. Average citizens have no legal means of expressing discontent or effecting change in the country. Uzbekistan’s national democratic governance rating remains unchanged at 7.00. Electoral Process. Uzbekistan held a by-election to the lower house of parliament and an election to the upper house of parliament at the start of 2010. As usual, neither ritual provided an opportunity for popular input on the choice of public officials. Uzbekistan’s registered political parties are all pro-presidential, and the system was altered in 2008 to deny any individuals or initiative groups an opportunity to participate in elections. No steps were taken during 2010 to liberalize these regulations, therefore Uzbekistan’s electoral process rating remains unchanged at 7.00. Civil Society. Vestiges of civil society that are sanctioned and tolerated by the state do exist but operate within a very confined space. The government has allowed a few independent rights organizations to carry out some activities. Most so-called nongovernmental organizations were created by the government, and as such, they work within boundaries laid out by the authorities. Harassment of the few remaining independent journalists and rights activists in Uzbekistan continued, as did raids, fines, and imprisonment of non-traditional religious groups; thus, Uzbekistan’s civil society rating remains unchanged at 7.00. Independent Media. Uzbek authorities purged the country of independent media outlets years ago. The state continues to chase, harass, and jail individuals whose version of events in Uzbekistan challenges the information disseminated by Uzbek officials and the state media. In 2010, the state focused particularly on suppressing topics such as poverty or immorality, which it considers damaging to Uzbekistan’s international reputation. As the state retains its monopoly on information and would-be independent voices face systematic suppression and often dire consequences, Uzbekistan’s independent media rating remains unchanged at 7.00. 608 Nations in Transit 2011 Local Democratic Governance. Officials at the regional, municipal, and other local levels are chosen by the central government, without input from Uzbek citizens. The loyalty of these officials is to the state and their task is to maintain order. Local administrations are powerless to act on virtually any matter without permission from Tashkent. No measures were taken to allow citizens an opportunity to choose their village, city, district, or regional representatives during 2010; appointed officials continue to serve the interests of the government in Tashkent over those of their constituents. Uzbekistan’s local democratic governance rating remains unchanged at 6.75. Judicial Framework and Independence. The judiciary of Uzbekistan is entirely subordinate to the executive branch, existing solely to legitimize the decisions of the central government. This is most clearly shown in the trials of activists, independent journalists, and members of suspect religious groups, all of whom are charged, brought to trial, and convicted by Uzbek courts despite irregularities in their detention and prosecution. There is evidence of physical abuse of detainees, and at times dubious witnesses have recanted testimony with no redress by the courts. There was no attempt at judicial reform in Uzbekistan in 2010, and courts continued to provide a legal basis to quash perceived enemies of the state; thus, Uzbekistan’s judicial framework and independence rating remains unchanged at 7.00. Corruption. The opaque nature of Uzbekistan’s system of governance and business climate makes it impossible to know just how far corruption has penetrated society. Assets of a leading business allegedly connected to President Karimov’s eldest daughter were seized in May, but results of the financial investigation were not released and no one was arrested. A number of other wealthy entrepreneurs were arrested in March, while others fled the country. The arrest of two mid-level regional officials was not accompanied by evidence of corruption being rooted out at the highest levels of government.
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