Introduction and the Idea of Supererogation
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SUPEREROGATION FOR A VIRTUE ETHICIST A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Claire Michelle Brown _________________________________ W. David Solomon, Director Graduate Program in Philosophy Notre Dame, Indiana January 2011 SUPEREROGATION FOR A VIRTUE ETHICIST Abstract by Claire Michelle Brown The contemporary discussion of supererogation and how it fits within particular moral theories is strikingly thin when it comes to the question of whether or how virtue ethics can make room for supererogation. Indeed, whereas the debates about how utilitarianism and Kantianism ought approach the supererogatory are well-developed, although by no means exhaustive, to date there is but one article-length treatment of the topic of virtue ethics and supererogation. Given the above gap in the literature, the primary goal of this dissertation is to develop a satisfying account of supererogation that fits well within a virtue ethical framework. A second (and secondary) aim is related and enables the dissertation to make a modest contribution to the larger debate in moral philosophy about the relative strengths and weakness of the major moral theories. This second aim is to argue that the developed virtue ethics account is, as an account of the supererogatory, superior to the accounts of supererogation that have been offered on behalf of both Kantianism and utilitarianism. A third and minor aim is to show how virtue ethics can deepen our Claire Michelle Brown understanding of the supererogatory, shedding light on certain aspects of actual cases of supererogation that the contemporary discussion of the topic tends to miss. Chapter One provides an introduction to the concept of supererogation with a brief history of the academic discussion of it up to the present, introduces five ―central cases‖ of supererogation, argues for the import of the supererogatory, and offers an outline of the project. Chapters Two and Three assess some of the more prominent utilitarian (Chapter Two) and Kantian (Chapter Three) accounts of supererogation that appear in the literature. Chapter Four introduces and provides a defense a new virtue ethics account of supererogation. Chapter Five brings together the accounts of supererogation introduced and assessed in Chapters Two, Three, and Four for the purposes of determining how successful utilitarians, Kantians, and virtue ethicist have been at accounting for supererogation. For my parents ii CONTENTS Acknowledgments................................................................................................................v Chapter One: Introduction and the Idea of Supererogation ................................................1 1.1 A Brief History of Supererogation .................................................................... 5 1.2 Supererogation Today .....................................................................................19 1.3 Five Central Cases ..........................................................................................24 1.3.1 The Grenade Case ............................................................................24 1.3.2 The Torture Case...............................................................................25 1.3.3 Paul Kocheleff‘s Work in Africa .....................................................25 1.3.4 Babette's Feast ..................................................................................27 1.3.5 Bishop Myriel and the Candlesticks ................................................28 1.4 Is Supererogation Possible? ............................................................................32 1.5 The Import of the Central Cases for Moral Theory ........................................37 1.6 Thesis and Outline of the Project ....................................................................43 Chapter Two: Beyond Maximizing: Utilitarianism and Supererogation ...........................46 2.1 Urmson and Basic Duty ..................................................................................47 2.2 Attfield and Low Stakes Cases .......................................................................61 2.3 Portmore and Total Adjusted Wellbeing ........................................................65 Chapter Three: Kantianism and Supererogation ...............................................................80 3.1 Hill and Wide Imperfect Duties ......................................................................83 3.2 Jokic and Moral Luck .....................................................................................96 Chapter 4: Virtue Ethics, Optional Virtue, and Supererogation .....................................113 4.1 Defining Virtue Ethics ..................................................................................115 4.1.1 The Priority Claim .........................................................................115 4.1.2 Two Types of Virtue Ethics ...........................................................123 4.2 Supererogation for the Moderate Virtue Ethicist? ........................................126 4.2.1 Jason Kawall‘s Ideal Observer Account ........................................127 4.2.2 Better than Virtuous? .....................................................................135 4.2.3 Lowering the Obligation Bar .........................................................139 4.2.4 Magnificence and Optional Virtues ...............................................144 4.3 Virtue as Optional .........................................................................................152 4.4 Defending the Optional Virtue Account .......................................................157 iii Chapter Five: Recognizing the Morally Extraordinary ...................................................173 5.1 Paring Down the Accounts ...........................................................................173 5.1.1 The Utilitarian Accounts ................................................................174 5.1.2 The Kantian Accounts.....................................................................178 5.1.3 The Virtue Ethics Accounts ...........................................................184 5.2 A Side-by-Side Comparison .........................................................................186 5.2.1 Fit with Moral Theory ....................................................................187 5.2.2 Sensitivity to the Central Cases .....................................................190 5.2.3 Specificity ......................................................................................199 5.3.4 Additional Considerations .............................................................204 5.3 A Victory for Virtue Ethics............................................................................206 5.4 What about the Radicals? ..............................................................................209 5.5 Extravagant Love in the Morally Extraordinary ...........................................212 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................219 iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation would not have been possible without the contributions of many others. I thank my parents for introducing me to the beauty of books, valuing my education and encouraging me to do the same, and sacrificing so that I could receive a Christian liberal arts education. My high school English teacher, Mona Beverly, did more than anyone else to help me to learn how critically to edit my own writing, a skill not easily taught to high school honors students who often feel entitled to praise and exempt from serious criticism. I thank my Asbury professors for introducing me to the wonders of the liberal arts. My philosophy professors, Mike Peterson and Ray VanArragon, deserve particular thanks for inculcating in me a love of philosophy, for encouraging me to go to graduate school, and for giving me the tools to do so. Once I was there, the philosophy department at Notre Dame gave me an outstanding education, all the while making clear I was valued as both a student and a person. The support that my church and my friends gave me over the past several years has been invaluable, but I am particularly and deeply grateful for all that they did for me in the summer of 2010, when I needed and received encouragement and love of a sort I had never before known. To turn more directly to the development of the actual document, I am extremely grateful to Robert Audi and Jim Sterba for so carefully reading multiple drafts of the chapters here included and, each time, offering new, insightful questions, criticisms, and v suggestions aimed at making my work both more cogent and more philosophically interesting. Their repeated generosity with their time and expertise is most appreciated. Many thanks, also, to Neil Delaney for agreeing to serve as a reader so late in the game. Finally, the debt of gratitude I owe to my advisor, David Solomon, I will likely never be able to repay. When I started working with David about four years ago, my philosophy classes had done much to hone my analytic skills, but my philosophical work and thinking was, I now know, woefully shallow, and I was unable to appreciate much beyond a very narrow style of analytic philosophy. Through classes, reading suggestions, and, above all, much careful, patient discussion, David enabled me to see that,