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EDITORIAL
THE HORN OF HOPE
IQBAL JHAZBHAY
Since the previous edition of the African tively “South Africa’s status as a force for Security Review, four critical foundational ini- strengthening democracy and good gover- tiatives of the African Union (AU) have come nance in Africa”.1 into effect. Along with this up-beat continental mood, In Addis Ababa, for the first time, repre- recently, the historic signing of a peace accord sentatives of the ruling and opposition parties between the Government of Sudan and the were represented at the newly launched Pan- Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement African Parliament (PAP); the AU Peace and (SPLA/M), mediated by Kenya, gave a ray of Security Council (PSC), with an able hope to the Horn of Africa2. Hopefully, the Commissioner, got to the chase by tackling people of this region will no longer carry the key human security questions on the conti- dubious distinction of hosting Africa’s oldest nent. Importantly, the move from the dis- conflict. quieting concept of “non-interference” to that The successful, yet fragile and little known of non-indifference of human tragedies, was transition to democracy in the north-western introduced. Equally affirming was the founda- area of Somalia, now known as Somaliland, tional work for the establishment of the provides further hope to the Horn of Africa. African Court of Human and Peoples Rights Somaliland conducted district local (2002) and, the civil society arm of the AU, the and presidential elections (2003), under the Economic Social and Cultural Council gaze of key international observers, from (ECOSOCC). Correctly, the AU Secretary- countries such as Ethiopia, South Africa and General, Alpha Konare, declared that the AU Norway. One of Somaliland President Kahin’s is not the OAU. first decisions was to appoint Edna Adan as Closer to home, as this edition of African Minister of Foreign Affairs, the most senior Security Review was being edited, South Africa position yet held by a woman in any Somali held its third successful democratic elections government and in the Horn of Africa. All with a record number of election observers three elections were the first to be held in this from Africa. In an unprecedented move, at region since the military coup of 19693. least in Africa, the UN, the European Union Parliamentary elections in Somaliland are now and the Commonwealth stayed away from the scheduled for 29 March 2005. South African elections in a show of confi- The AU Chairperson, Alpha Konare, in his dence in the country’s ability to deliver a free recent report on Somalia alerted the world poll. African election observers viewed posi- with his resonating point that this new seces-
IQBAL JHAZBHAY University of South Africa • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 2
2 African Security Review 13(2) • 2004
sionist state, “Somaliland has continued to mitment and political will of all related groups experience relative peace and stability, com- to implement stability and governance on the pared to the other regions of Somalia” and ground and, notably, to come to grips with “welcomed the continued stability of the larger interests of the country. The emer- Somaliland”.4 This report has a refreshing ging government of Mogadisho will do well to approach away from that of the clumsy diplo- thread carefully in dealing with the function- matic purgatory5, which encircles the ing government of Somaliland and to preserve Somaliland situation in all its irresolution. their hard earned peace and stability. Clearly, amidst the brutish instability of poli- Against this backdrop, where creative ideas tics, and the resultant pulvarisation of the and commitment will be required, this edition region’s infrastructure, it is really the sheer of African Security Review could not be more political will of the people of Sudan and perfectly timed. It is appropriately framed Somaliland to press on, that has led to the around the scholarly inquiries and holds a refreshing breakthroughs. special treat, which will challenge policy ma- Fortunately, refreshing leadership that kers as they grapple with possible political and embraces the ethos of reconciliation, has put diplomatic solutions in the Horn of Africa. into place an emerging continental security In this respect, Ian Spears, in his rigorous- architecture, which will do all that is possible ly researched article considers the challenges to ensure that the bad echoes of history are African states present in terms of develop- not repeated. ment and conflict resolution. He brilliantly The recent Darfur humanitarian crisis in examines both the arguments in favour of and Sudan, a bizarre debacle which could threaten against reforming Africa’s borders, and recog- Sudan’s best hopes for peace in a decade, nizing new states. It argues that the current all- highlights once again that mistrust runs deep or-nothing calcified approach to recognition in Sudan. More sustained work by the govern- obstructs a satisfactory resolution of this ment of Sudan will be needed to address the debate. New and varied approaches to states economic and political marginalisation of this and boundaries need to be considered. This region, which is fuelling discontent and con- article is of particular value to the Horn of flict. International attention, including the Africa debates in Sudan and Somalia on suc- visit of the AU chairperson, the South African cession and recognition. Spears concludes by led AU Post Conflict Reconstruction assess- proposing four approaches to dealing with ment team, the UN Secretary-General’s visit dysfunctional African states. The effort and and that of US Secretary of State, is a wel- scope of Spear’s work are evidence of the come sign in the constantly evolving tract of scholarly intent to explore an exhaustive and peace building, democratic consolidation and creative way towards nurturing stability and new ways of thinking and acting. development. These are difficult questions, On a related front, Ambassador Kiplagat, not best dealt with in tart formulas. Intergovernmental Authority on Develop- Matt Bryden engages the most ardent and ment’s (IGAD) chief negotiator and special emotive question among Somalis: that of envoy to the Somali National Reconciliation Somali unity. Bryden offers readers insight Process, has his work cut out for him. In the into the roots of contemporary political reali- coming months, Ambassador Kiplagat and his ties in both Somaliland and Somalia. It serves Nairobi team will attempt to establish a work- to de-mythologize the sweeping conclusions able Somali Transitional Government. After so much in vogue, which has taken over some 18 months of negotiations in Nairobi, thought and action concerning possible unity the AU has thrown the gauntlet by calling for and dialogue between Somaliland and targeted sanctions on any spoilers to this Somalia. With thoughtful analysis of realities already foundering conference. Needless to and options, Bryden calls for urgent preventa- say the critical test, judging from the previous tive diplomacy while the rare window of 13 conferences, will lie in the quality of com- opportunity is open. He examines possible • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 3
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models of integration and summarises the Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Somaliland, and political dilemmas of Somali leaders, with Sudan. 6 3. Somalia, The Untold Story, The War Through the Eyes concise acuity. of Somali Women. Edited by Judith Gardner & Judy Khalid Ali El Amin analyses the texture of El Bushra. London: Pluto Press. 2004. page 221. Eastern Sudan’s indigenous peace methods, in 4. “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission conflict resolution. This timely contribution on the Situation in Somalia”, African Union, 29 adds to the scant literature on African indige- April 2004, PSC/PR/2/(VI), page 11 point 44. 5. For more about this form of diplomatic purgato- nous peace systems. The humane engagement ry, see Jhazbhay, “Somaliland: Africa’s best kept of the Sudanese Beja peoples provides us with secret, A Challenge to the international commu- another sparkling narrative of hope. This puts nity”, in African Security Review, Volume 12 (4), to bed the assertion that “No end is in sight to 2003, page 77. 7 6. Matt Bryden’s earlier version of this paper was the crisis in the Horn” and, challenges the well received by scholars and diplomats at the sweeping claim that “Until the Kenyan gene- Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA) seminar ral elections of 2002, not a single IGAD me- “Somalia Peace Briefing”, in Pretoria on 27 May mber state had undergone a legitimate transfer 2004. A similar briefing by AISA on Sudan was of power”.8 arranged in February 2004. Another key South African round-table on: “The Horn of Africa: The valuable and excellent articles in this Understanding Somalia and Somaliland” was edition of ASR are likely to inspire more hosted by the University of South Africa, Institute debate and more research among scholars and for Global Dialogue in conjunction with the political activists, for whom the Horn of African National Congress (Kwa Zulu-Natal province), on 4 July 2003, on the margins of the Africa holds a dear place in their minds and African Political Studies Association Conference hearts. Sudan is scheduled to host the next and of the International Political Studies African Union Summit in July 2005. That will Association’s conference in the city of Durban. be another appropriate occasion for us to re- See also another South African initiative by the assess developments on the Horn of Hope. Institute for Security Studies: “Strengthening the Role of IGAD in Regional Peace Initiatives and Post Conflict Reconstruction”
FEATURE
EASTERN SUDAN INDIGENOUS CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION MECHANISMS Effectiveness, Continuity and Change
KHALID ALI EL AMIN
Introduction tions in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts of all types. Of all the regions of the world, Africa is one of As the following cases from Eastern Sudan those most devastated by violence. In one show, conflict itself, when it occurs, and its sense Africa’s bloody conflicts could be containment and settlement are seen as a col- viewed as outbursts of accumulated grievances lective responsibility, drawing the participa- generated, but not accommodated, by socio- tion of leaders and members of the economic and political change. They are community participate. Most importantly, the expressions of unsettling tensions brewing resolution of conflict may take the form of beneath the surface, only to erupt in sudden forgiveness and reconciliation instead of pun- upheavals that shake fragile African nation ishment. states to their foundations. The resultant vio- This paper deals with the conflict preven- lent ruptures signify not only moments in the tion, management and resolution mechanisms continuing process of socio-economic and the Beja have adopted to resolve different political change, but also the loosening of cul- forms of disputes and conflicts. The main tural traditions, values, customs and norms thrust of the argument is that, despite socio- that for so long have maintained the coher- economic and political changes, traditional ence, harmony and stability of Africa’s local conflict prevention, management and resolu- communities. tion mechanisms among the Beja peoples of In some cases, cultural values seem to have eastern Sudan have not only shown resilience survived socio-economic changes and, despite but have also proved more effective than the disruption of Africa’s socio-economic and those provided by the modern state. political structures, the continent remains Available sources on the Beja are meagre home to powerful values, norms and tradi- and, though some use of these is made for the tions that support effective mechanisms which main theme of the paper — cases of conflict, preserve, promote and restore harmony and procedures and norms and values — resource social tranquillity. The persistence of norms persons from the area, who have worked there and values that support indigenous conflict for a long time are the principal source of prevention, management and conflict resolu- information. tion mechanisms in eastern Sudan provides an In the first section a brief background to the example of how indigenous African cultures Beja and their region is given, followed by a and institutions may be more effective than, discussion of the Rashaida-Hadandawa con- and even superior to, modern state institu- flict and how this was dealt with using tradi-
KHALID ALI EL AMIN is attached to the Development Studies and Research Institute at the University of Khartoum. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 8
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tional and government conflict management mashaykhas for such small tribes not belong- mechanisms. The third section is devoted to ing to a tribal nazara. Prior to the erosion of inter-Beja conflicts, their most common cau- the formal administrative power of local lea- ses and the manner in which they are dealt ders these divisions represented geographic with using indigenous mechanisms. In turn, units as well as administrative ones. In the Red the fourth section is devoted to Beja intra-tribal Sea area of eastern Sudan, and with the excep- conflicts and the mechanisms used to deal tion of the Rashaida who are relative new- with them. In all instances there is a brief comers and of almost pure Arab origin, the description of the case or procedure, followed entire population is ethnically virtually by a brief analysis. Finally a number of con- homogenous. All tribes belonging to the Beja clusions are drawn and recommendations group claim a common ancestry with both made. Arab and Hamitic blood. Also, with the exception of the Rashaida, all Beja tribes speak different versions of the same language, Eastern Sudan: Background and con- TuBedawiye, which functions as a common text denominator holding together the different Eastern Sudan is inhabited principally by the Beja tribal groups.2 These similarities and Beja, one of the most ancient of Sudan’s popu- differences are significant when considering lation groups. They occupy the area of the the Hadandawa-Rashaida issue. Red Sea Hills and the eastern desert that The main economic activity among the extends northwards from the Eritrean and Beja is the rearing of camels, sheep and goats. Ethiopian borders to that of Egypt; to the east Although dura (sorghum) farming is practised the area flanks the Red Sea and to the west the on some wadi land, settled peasant farming Atbara and Nile Rivers. communities with agriculture as their main Sources differ as to the origin and tribal economic activity are rare among the Beja; composition of the Beja, and the categories of most Beja are nomads and animal rearing is tribes and sub-tribes that comprise this ethnic the principal economic activity. The homo- group. However, the Beja of the Red Sea Hills geneity of livelihoods is an additional factor may be grouped into four main tribes, each that minimises the incidence of violent con- with a nazara1 of its own: Basharin, Bani Amir, flict, which would be more likely to arise from Hadandawa and Amar’ar. A nazir heads each friction between pastoralists and peasant of the four tribes, which are subdivided into a farmers. Although conflicts may be fairly fre- number of hierarchical sub-divisions. Below quent, the similarities of economic existence, the apex of the tribe are sub-divisions of khats, combined with the potency of conflict pre- each of which is headed by a sheikh elkhat. vention, management and resolution mecha- Each khat, in turn, is divided into a number of nisms, contribute to the infrequency and low omodyyas, each headed by an omda. The intensity of these conflicts. omodyya is further sub-divided into smaller sub-sections composed of a village or number The origin of conflict in eastern of villages each headed by a sheikh. These sub- Sudan tribal political offices constitute a systematic hierarchy of power structures, labelled in Before entering into a discussion of the causes Arabic in descending order, nazara, khat, of local conflicts, and the mechanisms omodyya, and mashaykha. In addition there are designed to prevent, manage and resolve smaller tribes that been have the independent them, two important observations must be office of omodyya: Urtega; Ashraf; Mihieliktab made about the situation in the area of the and Habab. Red Sea compared with that in Darfur. Inter- Tribal divisions among the Beja are very tribal conflicts in the Red Sea area are rare, blurred, and sometimes smaller sub-tribes are and when they occur they are not as severe in referred to as tribes and there may be separate terms of scale, weaponry used and loss of • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 9
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human life or property. The reasons for this sources, but not to the construction of per- have to do with demographic factors, patterns manent installations such as wells. The con- of economic activity, ethnic homogeneity, the struction of wells and other fixed installations traditional approaches applied to deal with by members of the tribe or outsiders is con- conflicts and the extent to which the latter sidered an attempt to establish exclusive own- have remained effective. ership claims to communally owned and used Because the Beja are predominantly pas- land. The lineage group claiming the commu- toralist, competition over natural resources, nal ownership of land usually resists such chiefly land and water, is the major cause for attempts to establish exclusive ownership and virtually all forms of inter-group, inter-com- use of rights, and this can lead to conflict. munal and intra-communal conflict. Land use The differentiation in access to land and and claims to its ownership are governed by other resources according to customary rules certain customary rules, the violation of is related to tribal and lineage communal which also brings about the eruption of con- claims to land ownership and whether the flict. user is a member of the group. The group col- As in Darfur, claim to the right of land lectively maintains ownership over land, but ownership is vested in the tribe. Tribal sub- there are cases in which individual ownership divisions (branches of the tribes: lineage rights to certain lands and wells are also groups or clans) claim the right of ownership recognised. Land and trees in the vicinity of to specific areas of tribal land. Clan, lineage villages called damar are collectively owned and household use of communal land is regu- and thus the group also collectively uses pas- lated by customary rules (salif) overseen by the ture and firewood in the proximity of vil- traditional tribal leadership. Tribal leadership lages.3 is hierarchically structured, with the nazir of Although, according to custom, outsiders the tribe at the apex assisted by a number of could have free access to land and water, they khats sheikhs; each of the latter supervises a have to follow tradition in certain circum- number of omdas. Each of these, in turn, stances, as an acknowledgement that they do supervises a number of sheikhs: each omda is not claim the ownership of the land they use. responsible for the supervision of a lineage or There are certain symbolic gestures outsiders a clan occupying a number of villages. This must perform in accordance with tradition to hierarchy is based on the native administra- demonstrate recognition of the right of own- tion system instituted by the British during ership of the group or household claiming the 1920s, which, despite modifications dur- this. In the case of land being cultivated or ing the post-colonial period, has remained wells used by outsiders or non-group mem- very effective in some parts of the Sudan, par- bers, the latter have to pay a small amount of ticularly in the east. The British empowered produce or money to those claiming the own- traditional tribal leaders with an administra- ership of land; this is called gudab.4 Normally tive, economic and judicial authority they the amount is very small and is a symbol of enjoyed till the early 1970s when the Nimeri recognition of ownership rather than tribute regime abolished the native administration or rent. The importance assigned to the recog- system. nition of land ownership is such that if a Lands under communal ownership at dif- camel or a goat is slaughtered in a particular ferent levels (nazara, omodyya and mashyakha) place, part of the meat is given in gudab to the are vaguely demarcated. Customary rules gov- individual or group claiming ownership of the erning the right of access to land and water land. There are also customary rules that resources by community members and out- organise access to water. According to custom siders (non-community members) emphasise (urf) individuals (tribesmen and outsiders), the communality of land ownership. riding camels and passers-by may have access Members of the tribe and outsiders have the to water from any well. However, camel herds right of free access to pasture and water may have access only to wells owned by the • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 10
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tribe or sub-tribe, and only by arrangement to Rashaida have only the lesser ranking tradi- wells owned by other tribes. tional tribal political offices of omodyya and Forms of conflict in eastern Sudan can be mashyakha to solve problems among them. subdivided into three main categories: Because they do not have tribal lands (one • Inter-tribal conflicts; between Beja tribes vast land area said to be communally the and tribes other than Beja; principally the whole tribe) of their own, the Rashaida do not Rashaida. have the office of nazara and their political • Inter-tribal conflicts among the Beja tribes. position is subordinate to that of the Beja • Intra-tribal conflict: conflicts that occur tribes in whose land they move.6 Their omdas within the tribe between clans and lineage fall administratively under the jurisdiction of groups belonging to the same tribe. the nazir of the Hadandawa.7 With certain exceptions, these three forms of Conflict between the Hadandawa and the conflict are usually associated with land own- Rashaida who live among them has usually ership, land use, land borders and conformity been about pasture and water.8 In recent years to the rules governing access to land and its this has become a political conflict over the use. In the inter-tribal conflict between the Rashaida’s demand for the independent tribal Beja and Rashaida, between the different Beja political office of nazara. Until now, however, tribes and within the Beja tribes, land is the there has never been a major outbreak of vio- major factor. Inter-tribal conflict between the lence between the Rashaida and other Beja Rashaida and the Beja has arisen principally tribes, including the Hadandawa. So far, and over tribal land ownership and the political partly this could be attributed to the mecha- office of nazara associated with it. Land own- nisms adopted to prevent conflict and the ership and the political position of the tribe respect for values and norms governing con- are intimately interrelated and the tribe that flict prevention, management and resolution, owns or has established claim to land has its despite tension between the Rashaida and recognised political position relative to other other Beja tribes, friction has been resolved tribes reflected in the political office of peacefully and has not turned into large scale nazara. violence.
Tribal Conference and the 1933 agreement The inter-tribal conflict of the Peaceful coexistence between the Rashaida Rashaida and Hadandawa and Hadandawa was confirmed by an agree- Claims to tribal land ownership date back cen- ment between the two tribes signed in 1933.9 turies among the Beja tribes. Historically The aim of the agreement, which was nego- speaking, the Rashaida are recent migrants to tiated and signed by both the Hadandawa and the Red Sea Hills who entered Sudan from Rashaida leaders and notables, was to safe- Hejaz (Saudi Arabia at present) by the end of guard the interests of the two tribes and main- the 19th century.5 They are ethnically distinct tain peace and security between them. from the Beja and have maintained a different Although more than half a century has passed culture, traditions and values and so remained since the agreement was signed, it is worth dis- somewhat isolated, having little interaction cussing in some detail for three reasons. First, with the Beja. Although as pastoralists they the principal terms set out by the 1933 agree- graze on the land of other Beja tribes, the ment have constituted the basis for the rela- Rashaida live mainly among the Hadandawa. tionship between the Hadandawa and The Rashaida, however, are considered out- Rashaida to the present day.10 Second, com- siders who do not have land. But as pastoral- mitment to abide by its terms has led to the ists, and in line with the customary rules preservation of peace between the two tribes governing land use, they have continued to for almost half a century; and, third, the 1933 enjoy the right of land usage and access to agreement is highly relevant to the present water, with other Beja tribes. Politically, the potential for conflict, and is essential to • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 11
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understanding the situation. The 1950 agreement modified that of 1933, to The Rashaida agreed to the following terms allow the Rashaida a measure of flexibility in of the agreement: terms of their access to land and water. The •They recognise Hadandawa ownership of key stipulations of the 1933 agreement the land and water the Rashaida use and remained intact, however, including the that have no objection to this arrangement. emphasis on the Rashaida’s lack of land own- •They concede that they have access to ership rights, and the general restrictions water only from certain wells. maintained in terms of access to pasture and •They agree to graze their livestock only on water and the conditions attached to cultiva- certain pasturelands. tion. Nonetheless, the 1933 agreement and •They accept that if they are allowed to cul- the modifications of 1950, which gave the tivate the rain-fed lands of the Hadandawa Rashaida a little more flexibility in accessing they must pay to the owner (be it a sub- water and pasturage, remained the basis that tribe or an individual) a specified amount has governed the Rashaida-Hadandawa rela- of money and a certain amount of produce tionship until today. according to custom (gudab). Occasional tension and minor clashes •They agree to abide by the instructions of occurred between individuals from both the Hadandawa tribal leaders with regard tribes, and the nazir of the Hadandawa com- to wadi cultivation. They must obtain per- plained that the Rashaida violated the agree- mission from the owner of the land, the ment. In 1959 pressures increased and two tribal leader in the area or the deputies of meetings were held between the nazir and the the nazir. khat sheikhs of the Hadandawa on the one •The Rashaida have no right to pasturage, hand and the omdas and sheikhs of the arable land or water in times of drought.11 Rashaida on the other.14 The complaints and In terms of this agreement the Rashaida arguments of both sides were heard in the accepted that the Hadandawa tribe owns the presence of a district commissioner and an land and conceded any land ownership claims administrative officer. Wagab (postponement of their own. In addition to other restrictions, of the dispute for a specified period of time) which emphasise the Hadandawa’s domi- was agreed and another meeting scheduled for nance and land ownership rights, the May 1960 to discuss Hadandawa complaints, Rashaida resigned themselves to the fact that the reasons for clashes and to finalise solu- during droughts, when land and water are tions to outstanding issues. scarcer, they enjoyed rights neither to pas- The meeting of the leaders of both tribes turage nor to water. For the Hadandawa, the was held in Aroma on the date specified by agreement emphasised and reaffirmed what the wagab, one year after the previous meet- they regarded as their indisputable land own- ing. The district commissioner and the ership rights. For the Rashaida the signing of agaweed attended the meeting; the agaweed the agreement was a recognition of the de facto included the nazir of the Bani Amir, the nazir situation that they have no permanent rights of the Amara’ar, the nazir of the Shukryya, the in land and that the right of access to land and nazir of Dar Bakr and several other notables. water they enjoy is permitted only by the gen- The meeting, which was based on the agaweed erosity of the Hadandawa.12 principle, was a small tribal conference, in In 1950 the Rashaida asked permission to which the Rashaida expressed dissatisfaction extend their grazing areas and to dig some for the first time with their position in relation wells because they were unable to graze their to the fundamental issue of land. This was one livestock in Eritrea as a result of the deteriora- of the issues that had led to tension prior to tion of the latter’s internal political situation. the 1959 meeting when the Rashaida had That same year an agreement was negotiated refused to pay gudab in recognition of and signed by the leaders of the two tribes Hadandawa land ownership rights. Land own- together with government representatives.13 ership and the extent of the Rashaida’s adher- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 12
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ence to the 1933 agreement were the main that its members are descended from the same issues discussed in the meeting. The Rashaida ancestor. Tribal land, which has been passed wanted to be granted nazara and land rights. from one generation to the next, has to be In the words of one of their leaders, “If the protected and preserved according to culture country is for certain people the government and tradition. This also applies to sub-tribal has to transfer them to where there are no units, which are as jealous as the tribe itself in people.” 15 protecting the land they claim to have inher- By focusing on maintaining stability and ited as their own from their forefathers. Thus avoiding conflict, the agaweed worked to pre- claim to land ownership, even to unused land, serve affirmed tradition and customary rules. is jealously maintained by tribes and sub-trib- Apart from various measures agreed upon to al divisions and clans. Although outsiders reduce tension and prevent clashes between may enjoy the right of use as much as the the two parties, the major decision of the members of the tribe, rules that distinguish mediators was to reaffirm support for the 1933 between land ownership and the right of use agreement, emphasising Hadandawa land have to be observed, including the payment ownership rights and treating the Rashaida as of gudab and claims to nazara, both of which guests16. The Rashaida’s recent persistent chal- are closely associated with land ownership. lenge to this principle, which was incorpora- The Rashaida’s attempt to have nazara or a ted as the first clause of the 1933 agreement, tribal dar of their own, which intensified after could have led to violent conflict between the independence in 1956, could not be settled by two tribes. In reaffirming the existing princi- the traditional mechanisms for dealing with ple, the agaweed demanded that the Rashaida disputes. The Rashaida were keen to get the pay gudab according to custom. government’s support for their demands for The resurgence of the conflict in recent equal treatment with other Sudanese.18 The years, which has taken a political form, began effect of government intervention, however, in the 1980s, when the Rashaida demanded a raised regional tensions without resolving the nazara for their tribe. During that period, the root cause of the problem. Rashaida’s political position improved consi- Shortly before it was overthrown in a coup derably as a result of their association with at the end of June 1989, Sadiq el-Mahdi’s gov- Saudi Arabia and their involvement in smug- ernment declared the creation of nazara for gling.17 The Rashaida made huge efforts to the Rashaida in the eastern region in May that match their growing economic power with a year.19 The declaration of the creation of parallel improvement in their relative political nazara for the Rashaida further aggravated power. This was reflected in their attempt to relations with the Hadandawa. Clashes in obtain the appointment of a nazara of their Kassala and the surrounding areas were avert- own, independent of the Hadandawa. ed when the government rescinded this deci- The Hadandawa and Bani Amir objected to sion and announced the creation of the the Rashaida’s claim, arguing that the latter Rashaida Administration as a separate admin- did not own land, a precondition for them istrative entity, but without land ownership. being allowed an independent nazara. In Political parties became involved in the con- other words, for the Hadandawa, if the flict between the Rashaida and Hadandawa, Rashaida were to be allowed a nazara it would with the two major parties, the Democratic imply a claim to land. For the tribe and other Unionist Party (DUP) and the Umma, ranged sub-tribal entities, ownership of, or claim to, themselves behind the opposing groups. The land involves more than just the productive vacillation in government policy partly use of land. For the tribe, tribal land owner- reflected these opposing positions. All Beja ship is strongly associated with the recogni- tribes fiercely resisted the creation of a tion of the position of the tribe as an Rashaida Administration and a large demon- independent entity. Land ownership symbo- stration was planned for June.the 30th, 1989. lises cultural identity, history and the myths That same day, however, the military seized • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 13
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power in Khartoum, a move that eclipsed Islamic Front (NIF ) war effort, particularly in local differences for the time being.20 the east. The NIF government has reciprocat- Over the following decade, local and ed by recognising the role of the Rashaida and national power politics interacted closely over created West Kassala Local Council as a the dispute as to whether nazara should be reward. appointed for the Rashaida. In 1990, the new regime partly retained the power of the tradi- The Rashaida-Hadandawa conflict: Functioning tional tribal leaders and the Rashaida conflict prevention, management and resolution Administration was re-established following mechanisms: negotiations between the government and In contrast with the stresses experienced in tribal leaders. The new Rashaida recent years, the mechanisms for conflict pre- Administration has a structure similar to that vention, management and resolution func- of the nazara. During the period 1992-1996, tioned effectively prior to the 1970s in dealing however, a West Kassala Local Council for the with disputes between the Rashaida and Rashaida, with demarcated borders, started to Hadandawa. The earlier success was largely take shape on land the ownership of which is the result of the Rashaida accepting traditions claimed by other Beja tribes including the relating to tribal land ownership and the asso- Hadandawa and Bani Amir.21 While this ciated tribal political authority: the office of process virtually created a de facto nazara for the nazir (nazara). The Rashaida’s acceptance the Rashaida (an administrative body inde- of tradition, and their respect for the outcome pendent of the Hadandawa having powers of indigenous conflict prevention, manage- over a territory with demarcated borders), it ment and resolution mechanisms based on also created a situation of potential conflict. those traditions, enabled them to share eco- The issue must still be finally resolved with nomic resources with the host tribe harmo- the consent of all tribes concerned, and with- niously. In short, the Rashaida’s general out undue pressure from the government, if conformity to tradition since they entered conflict is to be avoided. Sudan in the 19th century led to their accept- The Rashaida have been partially successful ance among the Beja, and the avoidance of in drawing government intervention on their significant conflict. The Rashaida’s ability to behalf. Khartoum granted them administra- adapt to the limitations set on their access to tive independence from the Hadandawa and land and water resources contributed to their certain territorial rights, creating a political willingness to adhere to traditions and con- office in effect equivalent to nazara: the form to the 1933 agreement. Rashaida Administration and West Kassala In more recent years, however, the tradi- Rural Council. tional mechanisms preventing conflict There were a number of reasons for this. between the two tribes have come under Sudan’s military governments, dominated as severe stress. This tension has been aggravated they were by a modern elite, particularly by the Rashaida’s renewed attempt to demand under Nimeri’s rule, tended to try to weaken the tribal political office of nazara separate traditional tribal leadership. This favoured the from, and independent of, the Hadandawa. A attempt of the Rashaida to loosen its bonds to partial explanation for this development was the Hadandawa. Democratic governments the increase in the Rashaida’s economic controlled by the Khatmiyya and the DUP power, which promoted their aspirations to supported the Rashaida, who were seen as the tribal political office of nazara in violation loyal Khatmiyya supporters. The emergence of of tradition and the 1933 agreement. The a small but vocal Rashaida educated elite also interrelationship between tribal land owner- publicly articulated Rashaida demands at ship and the tribal political office of nazara, regional and national levels. In recent years, led the Hadandawa resolutely to resist the the growing economic power of the Rashaida Rashaida’s attempts. has been used in support of the National Contributing to the growing stress on local • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 14
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conflict prevention mechanisms in recent Inter-tribal conflict between the Beja times was the heavy involvement of the cen- tribes tral government in the Rashaida-Hadandawa dispute. State involvement brought with it the Conflict over land borders adoption of a top-down approach to conflict resolution in place of the bottom-up approach The principal causes of conflict between the that had proved so successful in the past. The Beja tribes are also related to land and com- Rashaida exploited the struggle for power at petition over resources, though this does not the centre of the state to win the support of amount to the denial of the right to land own- Khartoum for their cause. Subsequent govern- ership, as in the case of the Rashaida. Since ment intervention, although it may have each of the four main Beja tribes has its own brought apparent gains to the Rashaida, also land and nazara, inter-Beja tribal conflicts exacerbated the mistrust between them and arise over land borders. As borders between their Hadandawa and Bani Amir hosts. In the four tribes and sub-tribal units within consequence, friction and mistrust have them are vaguely defined and not clearly replaced the peaceful coexistence based on demarcated, the point where land owned by respect for tradition that had regulated har- one tribe ends and that of another begins is a monious relations between both tribes for so matter for dispute and occasional conflict. long. Government concessions to the Such disputes among tribes frequently occur Rashaida’s demands for the creation of the between two neighbouring sub-tribal divisions independent tribal political office of nazir belonging to two different tribes. Often, this is (nazir is the one who occupies the office, what also the cause of conflict within one tribe, the Rashaida demanded is the affirmation of between its own smaller sub-divisions. Thus, the office for the tribe. Who occupies the the issue of land borders between Beja tribes office from amongst them may well be an and within these tribes is the most prevalent 22 issue over which competition and conflict cause for conflict. might arise amongst the Rashaida themselves.) Such border disputes could easily escalate and the grant of certain tribal land ownership into major inter-tribal conflict and therefore rights without consulting the other concerned constitute a potential threat to peace. In 1999 Beja tribes have led to a situation of potential violent conflict nearly resulted between two discord which could erupt into violence at sub-tribes belonging to two different tribes. any time. The Hannar, a sub-tribe of the Basharin, and The top-down approach adopted by vari- the Keilab, a sub-tribe of the Amara’ar, each ous Sudanese governments in the case of the claimed a piece of land situated in the Halaib Rashaida, bypassed local tradition and cus- area of north-eastern Sudan. The sheikhs were tom. Consultation, consent and even inform- unable to solve the problem of conflicting ing concerned tribes of government moves claims and both sides stuck to their positions. and intentions were neglected. This situation The normal preventive procedure was fol- created suspicion on the part of the lowed after the intervention of omdas and Hadandawa and other Beja tribes and vio- mashaykhs to avoid violent conflict. The pro- lence could be the result in the future if the cedure included giving gullad not to use force situation is not handled carefully and the con- or resort to violence and wagab (truce) to flict resolved through the engagement, partic- freeze the problem until a peaceful solution ipation and the consent of all the parties could be reached at some future date. Taiweg concerned. (commitment) has to be respected according to salif tradition, and in the event of it being violated, this is seen as the responsibility of the sheikh. Wagab, which is the deferment of the problem, helps to calm feelings and give time to create the appropriate conditions for the mediators to negotiate a settlement • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 15
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acceptable to both parties. vidual and itself take revenge. Until revenge is For the majlis held on the wagab (the fixed taken, tradition dictates that women refrain postponed date) a religious leader called sharif from mourning the dead. These concepts of in the area west of Port Sudan was called in to honour and revenge are common to all Beja help with mediation effort. Because of his reli- tribes. gious position, he was held in great respect by It is important for the collective security of both sub-tribes. After listening to the respec- the tribe’s members that those intending to tive arguments he took action and demarcated commit such a crime, or any lesser one that borders. Both sub-tribes accepted his judge- might lead to it, realise the grave conse- ment and the problem was peacefully quences of their actions. Preventing an indi- resolved. vidual act from developing into an inter-tribal In the resolution of this conflict the respect conflict is one important mechanism among of the sub-tribes for both the tribal tradition the Beja for containing violence. of salif and religious beliefs played a signifi- What helps in making this mechanism suc- cant role. The gullad, wagab and taiweg values cessful is the grassroots’ attendance of the of salif and respect for tribal leaders helped majlis normally formed to resolve the dispute. manage conflict between the two tribes and Although parties to the dispute do not parti- prevented violence. The intervention of an cipate in the discussion themselves — the pre- influential religious figure contributed, with sentation of arguments and positions, the weight of the traditional tribal leaders, to suggestions and consideration of solutions — the resolution of a potentially dangerous bor- those concerned with the matter of the dis- der dispute. pute are informed and indirectly involved at all stages of the resolution process. When a Murder and tribal security resolution is reached it is through agreement Another major cause of inter-tribal conflict is by the parties, represented indirectly to the the case of a member of the tribe being mur- majlis through negotiations with their sheikh. dered by somebody from a different tribe. This form of participation of the grassroots This sometimes results from disputes about facilitates understanding and respect for the camels, personal honour or land borders. decision being reached. Regardless of the conditions underlying a Other ordinary members of the tribe are murder, if the consequences are not contained informed of circulating news and information in time this act may lead to a pattern of through traditional mechanisms called revenge and counter-revenge and descend sakanab, which conveys news of the solution into a tribal affair involving more general con- reached to other concerned tribesmen. As part flict. This makes the act of murder and the of a long greeting ritual when two or more effort to settle it a tribal responsibility, individuals meet, news of issues of impor- because the tribe functions to protect the indi- tance is communicated. This may include vidual member. When harm is done to the news about rain, animal diseases, grain prices, individual it is the tribe whose support is major problems of inter-tribal disputes, dis- sought and the tribe that comes to the aid of putes or conflicts that have been resolved and the individual. According to tradition if an the details of the agreement.23 A tradition of individual member of the tribe is killed, his honesty in reciting and retelling news ensures close kin and fellow tribesmen have to take the credibility of the information communi- revenge. Revenge is also a tribal matter and cated. any member of murderer’s tribe, particularly his close kin, may be killed. Once the cycle of Beja inter-tribal conflict prevention, management mutual revenge has begun, it is difficult to and resolution mechanisms: halt the process, for the conception of indi- Traditional leaders’ majlis mediation vidual honour is extended to the tribe and In the event of a member of one tribe mur- dictates that the latter has to stand by the indi- dering a member of another, the tribe to • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 16
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which the killer belongs immediately acts to into the case. The majlis is composed of omda, calm the situation and prevent further escala- mashaykh and a wise elder from each tribe or tion. It intervenes through sheikhs and omdas sub-tribe called sorknab, together with the par- to apologise and the omdas, sheikhs and pro- ties to the dispute and other interested me- bably the nazir or nazirs mediate to first get mbers of the tribe. The sorknab is normally gullad (word of honour) from the tribe of the experienced in dispute and conflict resolution deceased that it will not take revenge and will and has the ability to cite wise sayings and abide by a truce (wagab). Until such under- verses to remind the conflicting parties of the takings are received, the omdas and sheikhs virtues of reconciliation, tolerance and for- would insist that the burial of the murdered giveness. He is also well-versed in precedents, tribesman would not take place. According to salif and the details of tradition and custom. custom it is considered inappropriate and In addition, notables, neutral parties and socially unacceptable to refuse the solutions men known for their wisdom who enjoy the put forward by tribal leaders mediating the respect of all parties, attend the majlis. The conflict. presence of a nazir, sheikh or omda from ano- The mediation of sheikhs, omdas and nazirs ther tribe is especially valued and helps parties of other tribes conducted immediately after to the dispute come to a solution and adhere the case, is tantamount to the recognition of to it. The first issue the majlis considers is the right of the injured tribe to an apology whether gullad has been respected. Although and a demonstration of respect, to which the all parties concerned attend the majlis, their injured tribe normally responds positively. omda or sheikh presents their case and argu- The injured tribe usually gives gullad and ments. The process of reconciliation starts and accepts the truce, thus averting the danger of dialogue between the two disputant parties is further violence. The issue of murder is con- conducted indirectly through their omdas and tained and kept as between individuals.24 sheikhs. Parallel talks outside the majlis cha- Subsequently the crime may be either sub- mber are normally conducted between the mitted to court or be resolved through tradi- parties to the dispute and their tribal leaders tional tribal mechanisms of dispute on the one hand and the mediators on the resolution. The resolution of the dispute may other. Then each party’s arguments are pre- end by the relatives and close kin of the mur- sented indirectly to the majlis through their dered person accepting compensation (dyya) tribal leaders who act as representatives, and and in many cases the traditional mechanisms modify the positions originally held, in accor- of tribal leaders’ mediation results in forgive- dance with the broader interests of the tribe ness being granted by the relatives of the vic- and sub-tribe relative to other groups. The tim. This is considered salif for the forgiving process continues until compromise and a res- tribe, which in return receives forgiveness in olution acceptable to all parties is reached. the event of one of its tribesmen committing Cases usually end with reconciliation and for- murder against the same tribe or sub-tribe in giveness, which is the aim of the tribal leaders. the future. Such a successful outcome demonstrates In most cases, even if the case is submitted the tribal leader’s influence among his com- to court, time is accorded to traditional tribal munity and also enhances his position among leaders to resolve the conflict. Even in cases other tribal leaders. It also enhances his repu- when the court has passed a death sentence, tation and ability to mediate successfully in traditional mechanisms can still attempt to future, at all levels of Beja society. The gra- resolve the case according to custom, and if nting of forgiveness in one instance would forgiveness is granted by the victim’s tribe the also involve reciprocal obligations in future court normally endorses the settlement and cases (the tradition of salif).25 cancels the formal case. Thus, there are factors related to objective In the traditional settlement of such a dis- conditions, traditions, identity and culture pute, a majlis (conference) is convened to look that may lead on the one hand to the escala- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 17
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tion of conflict and on the other hand provide Beja intra-tribal conflicts: Causes for conflict prevention and resolution outside the jurisdiction of a modern state. In a mo- The violation of rules governing communal land dern state system, the act of murder is consi- use dered an individual act punishable by law, and only the individual who commits the The violation of salif rules governing the use crime is held responsible. However, under of communal land owned by the tribe may conditions in which tribal loyalty and identity also be a cause for conflict within the tribe or take precedence, such a crime is considered an sub-tribe. Among the Beja, customary rules act committed against the tribe and revenge ensure equal right of use of communally may be exacted accordingly. Thus, while the owned land among members of the tribes as act of murder is considered a tribal responsi- well as outsiders. Households’ or individuals’ bility, the punishment for which may be attempts to erect permanent installations or extended to all other tribal members, the set- construct wells on tribal or sub-tribal commu- tlement of the conflict arising from it is also a nal land without seeking permission and con- tribal responsibility which has to be shoul- sent of the group claiming ownership are dered and resolved by the tribe whose mem- resisted even by close kin. The construction of ber has committed the crime. fixed installations such as water wells is under- Actions and responses by the tribe to which stood to establish exclusive land ownership the murdered individual belongs are shaped, and use rights. If those intending to construct oriented and conditioned by intense feelings fixed installations are not from the same line- and perceptions of identity and honour, age or sub-tribal group, permission and the which, if not swiftly contained, may lead to commitment to pay gudab have to be agreed major inter-tribal conflict. Thus tribal identity upon between the two groups. The violation and feelings, perceptions and the actions that of such rules often gives rise to disputes that follow from them are rooted in objective con- could develop into violent conflict. ditions that give the tribe and loyalty to it pri- The violation of land use customary rules: macy over individual considerations. In the The Guraieb-Henseilab conflict absence of effective modern state bodies, for reasons of geography, ecology or socio-eco- One such dispute caused by the violation of nomic factors, the tribe is the most viable rules governing land use, was that which entity providing security to its members. The developed between the Guraieb and individual act of murder is thus considered a Henseilab sub-tribes. During the 1980s when violation of one tribe’s security and through the Khartoum-Port Sudan road was construct- the anticipated act of revenge the security of ed, some Guraieb tribesmen started to erect the tribe to which the murderer belongs is also huts near the road at a rocky place called threatened. Because of this mutual threat, Agaba, to rent as guesthouses to travellers and actions of murder and revenge involving two truck drivers. But the Heinseilab claimed own- different tribes or sub-tribes become subjects ership of the land on which the huts were to of intense inter-tribal diplomacy to prevent be constructed and strongly objected to this escalation and achieve a settlement that serves move. According to custom salif, the Guraieb the interest of the two contending tribes in violated tradition by not obtaining the restoring peace. Henseilab’s permission prior to the construc- Tribal mechanisms designed to maintain tion of the huts. According to custom this peace and security and handle inter-tribal amounted to the denial of land ownership cases of murder and revenge, thus extend even rights claimed by the Henseilab. Violent con- further than modern state law to achieve for- flict seemed a possible result. giveness and reconciliation. The indigenous mechanism of conflict pre- vention started to function to contain the situation at an early stage, before matters could get out of hand. Nazirs, omdas and • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 18
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sheikhs intervened and involved tradition to a situation, conflict over the tribal political prevent, manage and resolve the conflict. office of omdyya or mashaykha, arises between Gullad and taiweg (word of honour and com- the two close relatives, each claiming the mitment) were secured from the Guraeib not office for himself, and the group (the sub-trib- to proceed with the construction of the huts. al unit) divides its support between the two A wagab not take any action was also obtained contenders. from both sub-tribes until a majlis could be One such conflict began in Tokar in the convened (freezing and postponing the prob- 1990s after the omda of the Shaayab sub-tribe lem to a fixed future date) to discuss the prob- of the Hadandawa died. During his life as the lem and reach a peaceful solution. The majlis omda, he had appointed his cousin as his was held and both parties presented their wakil. Upon his death his cousin claimed him- arguments. At the conclusion of its delibera- self to be the omda unless the sub-tribe dis- tions the majlis, composed of tribal leaders puted this. The late omda’s son, who also and wise men, passed a verdict that the land claimed to be the omda, challenged him. This was the Henseilab’s and that the Guraieb could have led to a dangerous confrontation tribesmen had no right to erect the huts. Both between the two factions of the divided sub- parties accepted this verdict and the dispute tribe giving support to each of the two con- was peacefully settled. tenders- making more clearer the likely intra In all the steps taken, respect for salif tradi- sub-tribal confrontation. tion by the two parties to the dispute was deci- According to tradition a meeting for the sive. This is part of the culture, values and sub-tribe was held to settle the dispute. The traditions that are inseparable from the rest of nazir of the Hadandawa attended the meeting Beja social, economic and political life as it in addition to omdas, sheikhs and wise men has evolved to deal with an inhospitable and and other members of the sub-tribe, which difficult environment. had divided their support equally behind the two contenders. According to salif tradition, Beja intra-tribal conflict over power and as the office is hereditary, the issue could have easily been settled with a judgement in Competition for tribal political office favour of the omda’s son. The wakil, however, Conflicts also arise from within the tribe or confident in the support he had built up over the sub-tribe as a result of competition for var- the years, insisted on putting the matter to the ious tribal political offices. The most frequent sub- tribe. The meeting ended without reach- is that for tribal political office of a lesser rank, ing a final resolution. such as omodyya and mashaykha. According to As the divided sub-tribe was gathering in custom, succession to all tribal political the Mahalyya headquarters, in Aroma, and offices (nazara, omodyya and mashaykha) is was unable to reach an agreement on who was hereditary. On the death of a father who holds to be their omda, the Tokar Administrative office, the eldest son succeeds to the position. Officer issued a decree appointing the wakil as There are cases, however, in which the omda or the omda. Conflict erupted and the two the sheikh appoints a cousin or nephew as his groups of supporters clashed inside the deputy (wakil) even if he has eligible sons. The Mahalyya using traditional weapons. The wakil exercises such powers as political office police were called in and, although they man- has bestowed on him, while the sheikh or the aged to contain the situation, tension between omda is still alive, in cases in which the latter the two groups remained high and conflict are absent, sick or aged. could have resumed at any time had it not When the tribal leader dies there are cases been for the intervention of other tribes to in which the son traditionally entitled to the settle the dispute according to salif. office, claims it and the wakil who has experi- Other tribes including the Amar’ar, Bani enced the power of office also extends his Amir,and Urtega joined the Hadandawa to claim to continue occupying the post. In such intervene through their nazirs, omdas and • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 19
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mashaykh to contain the situation. They first negotiations and is an example of a top-down got gullad and wagab from both sides pending approach. The support the Omda’s cousin the convening of a majlis. The majlis issued a commanded would have made it possible to ruling according to custom (urf and salif) for accept the break with tradition and get the the omda’s son. This was approved by other cousin appointed as Omda had tradition been tribal leaders attending the majlis, for they somewhat observed. were also as keen to maintain the tradition The second form of intervention is that of that keeps office for their sons in turn. the traditional tribal leadership. The underly- Although the violent conflict has been ing principle of conformity to tradition and avoided, the issue is not completely resolved, respect is on the side of the traditional tribal for the wakil still enjoys considerable popular leadership, however, their interest in this case support. There are attempts to appoint the lat- is to get the son appointed, which has impli- ter as wakil for Port Sudan as a compromise, cations for the succession process of their in an attempt at a final resolution of the prob- sons. Subsequently the weight of the other lem. half of the tribe and the judgement of the for- Despite the fact that the traditional mecha- mer Omda were neglected and so the tradi- nisms of resolving disputes have not been tional tribal leadership also failed. wholly successful in putting an end to this Government intervention failed to put an end conflict as in all similar intra-tribal disputes, to the conflict, as had the traditional mecha- they have been effective in containing the nisms of conflict prevention, management conflict. It has not erupted into large-scale and resolution. It is a rare case of stalemate or violence and despite the potential for vio- deadlock, where tradition which is widely lence, the competition between the two con- respected has not been adjusted to take tenders remained peaceful. The conflict account of changing conditions. However, involves tradition and adherence to it. But large-scale violence was prevented using both when tradition, generally strictly adhered to, is modern (the use of the police) and traditional violated and supported by almost half of the mechanisms (Gullad, Wagab and Salif). sub-tribe’s members, as is the case of the sup- Despite the limited success of traditional port for the Omda’s cousin, there must be mechanisms in resolving this issue, they have good reasons for this. The questions of why been effective in containing the conflict. the Omda did not appoint his son as his There must be underlying reasons why the deputy and why there has been much support traditional succession is contested, and why for the Omda’s cousin, meaning less support the late omda appoint his cousin rather than for the Omda’s son despite his hereditary his eldest son as wakil. This would suggest that though the son enjoys the hereditary claim, right are questions not in favour of the the cousin has leadership qualities that are val- Omda’s son. All these questions indicate that ued by some of the tribe. the Omda’s son has only his hereditary right Central government intervention will not of succession to qualify him for the office. be effective in such a case, because it fails to The Omda’s cousin seem to possess the lead- involve the consultation and negotiation ership qualities that gained him the support of inherent in traditional attempts at resolution. his uncle (the late Omda) and half of his This is a rare case of stalemate or deadlock, tribesmen. where tradition that is widely respected has There are two forms of intervention to not been adjusted to take account of changing resolve this conflict. One form is government conditions. intervention represented by the administra- tor’s decision to condone the Omda’s cousin as Omda. Although it looks appropriate despite its break with tradition, this form of government intervention did not work because it was not based on consultation and • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 20
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Conclusions and recommendations ularly those responsible for keeping the peace, is very weak. Consequently, sheikhs and omdas Inter-tribal conflicts among the Beja rarely still play a very important role in tackling escalate into violence, unlike the situation in petty crime, solving community problems Darfur. There are various reasons for this. and representing community interests to high- Although the Beja have potent forms of er state bodies. Moreover tribal leaders are conflict management and resolution, tradition more accessible to the Beja at grassroots levels, assigns greater importance and emphasis to making it easier to handle problems in time. conflict prevention mechanisms. The point is The low population density of the Red Sea not that preventive mechanisms exist, but that Hills means that competition over resources they are effective because popular culture, (land and water) is less fierce here than in norms and values support them. The cultural other parts of the Sudan where the population conceptions of gullad (word of honour), wagab density is higher as in the case of Darfur in (truce and waiting until the situation calms western Sudan. down and sufficient consultations and negoti- Almost all Beja tribes are pastoralists and ations are conducted) and taiweg (commit- there are very few settled peasant-farming ment) all help to keep conflict at manageable communities. The presence of large settled proportions and prevent escalation. Respect for and adherence to these values facilitate the farming communities would have presented role of wise men and tribal leaders to prevent, an acute problem of conflict of interests manage and resolve conflicts and reinforce the between pastoralists and peasant farmers effective functioning of conflict prevention, which is a major source of violent conflicts in management and resolution mechanisms. Darfur region. Ample time is given for consultation, dialogue Despite the heterogeneity of the Beja and mediation to reach consensus. tribes, the similarity of their language, culture Forgiveness, which is often the outcome of and values, resulting from similarity of origin conflict resolution, is superior to the results of and strict adherence to both Islamic principles modern law not only because the latter and indigenous cultural values (salif) all serve emphasises punishment but also because as elements of unity in diversity rather than through forgiveness the seed of resolving pos- friction sible future conflict according to the salif tra- dition is sown. Recommendations Despite the reduction of the powers of tra- ditional tribal leaders, who were once the The traditional mechanisms of conflict pre- state’s only symbols in Sudan’s countryside, vention have been very effective and success- since the 1960s, in the Red Sea Hills area their ful in eastern Sudan and in Darfur in the past, position at all levels among the Beja has though not in Darfur at present. To preserve remained generally strong. Certainly there the functioning of these preventive mecha- have been some socio-economic and political nisms in eastern Sudan and avoid future intra changes, including the emergence of a new and inter-tribal violence, a number of general Beja educated elite, but traditional tribal lead- measures need to considered ership has retained great power and influence • Support for tribal traditional leadership at in the daily lives of the Beja; this is particular- all levels, even if this leadership is not offi- ly true of tribal leaders at the lower levels cially retained within formal state adminis- (omdas and sheikhs). The main reasons for this trative structures. Financial and material strong traditional leaders’ influence is the support would enhance its ability to handle geography and the natural environment of the conflicts in accordance with tradition Beja. Living in a very inhospitable environ- (truce-wagab, word of honour-gullad) and ment and thinly spread, Beja pastoralists are in close collaboration, consultation and scattered over a wide geographic area and the negotiation with the grassroots presence of state bodies and personnel, partic- •The state should continue allowing tribes • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 21
Amin 21
in the eastern region to resolve their dis- bilise food prices during droughts. putes by themselves according to tradition Conflict management mechanisms among the and employ state bodies only as observers Beja tribes are interrelated to actions and pro- and guarantors. With the exception of a cedures intended to prevent and resolve con- few conflicts, this is what the state has so flict. In all cases it must be emphasised that a far done and also this has contributed to bottom-up approach is likely to be more effi- the effectiveness of traditional conflict pre- cacious than measures imposed from above or vention, management and resolution outside. mechanisms. • If the state has to intervene, intervention Notes needs to be bottom-up to be effective in restoring peace rather disrupting it. 1. Nazara is a tribal political office originally insti- Consultation and negotiations with the tuted by the British administration. It is the high- est tribal political office, heading a tribal hierarchy grassroots and their leaders at all levels of junior political offices. Nazara is also a symbol must be conducted and consensus reached of the recognition of the tribe as political entity before decisions are taken. and in most cases nazara corresponds to a real but Specific measures have to be taken to pre- vague territorial entity for the tribe. 2. S Pantuliano, Changing livelihoods: Urban adap- vent the Hadandawa-Rashaida conflict from tation of the Beja pastoralists of Halaib Province erupting into violence in the future. These (NE Sudan)and NGO planning approaches, measures have to include: Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Leeds, • Encouraging the Hadandawa and Rashaida 2000, pp. 33-35. to engage in a dialogue to negotiate, devel- 3. Ibid, p. 90-91. 4. Ibid. p. 91 op mutual understanding and reach an 5. M Suliman Sudan: Wars Over Resources and agreement on the Rashaida’s independent Identity, (in Arabic), Cambridge Academic press, administrative body, according to tradition Cambridge, 2000, p. 279. but taking into account changing circum- 6. Notice the similarity to the position of Arab tribes among the Masaliet, Fur and other indigenous stances. African tribes. • Securing the agreement of all tribes affect- 7. The Rashaida have three sub-tribes; Zneimat, ed by the creation of West Kassala Rural Bra’asa and Brateikh, with one omda heading each Council, including the Hadandawa, to sub-tribe). See Abdel Rahman Badawi Abu Al Bashar, The Tribal Conflict in Kassala between El agree to resolve the issue of land for the Beja and El Rashaida; 1985-1995, (in Arabic), Council according to tradition. Unpublished M.Sc. Thesis, The Institute of • Both the above issues could be handled Disaster Management, 1998, p. 40-43 and also see according to tradition through consulta- A Suliman. op cit, p. 280. tion and negotiation. The Rashaida could 8. Although there are cases of friction between the Rashaida and Hadandawa over murder cases and pay gudab in recognition of the Hadandawa the theft of camels, these are minor and are nor- and other Beja tribes’ ownership of the mally handled and contained according to urf and land and retain the land for Kassala Rural traditional conflict prevention mechanisms so as Council. Given the disparity in access to not to escalate into major inter-tribal conflict. 9. Abdel Rahman Badawi Abu Al Bashar, op cit, p. 68. financial resources between the two parties 10. Some issues included in the agreement have been this, which is also a measure of resource contended since the 1970s by the Rashaida and reallocation, could reduce tension and cre- have thus become a source for the current covert ate mutual interests. The resources from unsettled conflict between the Rashaida and Hadandawa. gudab could be used to improve social serv- 11. Abdel Rahman Badawi Abu Al Bashar op cit.p. 68. ices in the drought and poverty-ridden Beja 12. The Rashaida have adapted themselves to the area. Alternatively these resources could be restrictions on access to land and water imposed used to improve food security for the Beja, on them by the 1933 Agreement. Some of these by using it to purchase food reserves from adaptations include entry into Eritrea to have access to more pastureland. Water is bought from the neighbouring food surplus Gadaref the Hadandawa when the wells they have been area to guarantee food availability and sta- allowed access to are insufficient to water their • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 22
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animals. The Rashaida also purchased dura from 22. Information on cases of conflict among the Beja the market to supplement the grain shortage tribes and sub-tribes and on procedures to pre- resulting from the restrictions placed on cultiva- vent, manage and resolve them are lacking. The tion. main source for the following sections is personal 13. Quoted Abdel Rahman Badawi Abu Al Bashar, communication with resource persons. Unless op cit, p. 70. otherwise cited all the information on cases of 14. Ibid.p. 72. conflict and procedures pursued to deal with them 15. Ibid.p. 75. following traditional conflict prevention, manage- 16. Ibid.p. 75 ment and resolution mechanisms, is extracted 17. In their appearance the Rashaida are not very dif- from information provided in a lengthy discus- ferent from Saudis and they receive special treat- sion with a group made up of officials most of ment by the Saudi authorities when they enter whom are from amongst the Beja tribe. This group Saudi Arabia. This has facilitated Rashaida access of Beja officials who also worked for a long time to jobs in Arabia and accordingly they have been in different parts of the Beja area as local govern- able to build up wealth and camel herds, buying ment or development officers and they are well- Beja camels. informed resource persons. The group includes, 18. It is important to notice here that the British Mohamed Ahmed Osman, Local Government allowed the traditional conflict prevention and Officer, Halaib; Abdella Littab Local Government resolution mechanisms to function and settle dis- Officer; Hasseina Hag Ali, Development Officer, putes, including the Hadandawa-Rashaida con- Kassala; Alawia El Hadi Ahmed, Adil Mahagar, flict, with minimal or no government Local Government officer, Port Sudan; Omyma intervention. This resulted in the 1933 Agreement, Ahmed, Local Government Officer, Port Sudan; which has provided peace between the two tribes Amal Suliman Development Officer, Port Sudan. to the present day. But instability started after 23. Group discussion and also S Pantuliano, op cit. independence in the late 1950s. Although the p. 61. 1933 Agreement has not been abolished, both the 24. Actually this may not be exactly the case. Being an Rashaida and the government have violated it. individual matter, in cases of murder, as a result of 19. The Governor of Kassala issued a Decree in April maglis mediation, is actually relevant only in as far 1989 appointing a nazir for El Rashaida. See as containing the case from escalating into further Abdel Rahman Badawi Abu Al Bashar, op cit, inter-tribal violence. The tribe is still involved in p.84. the proceeding resolution stages, which it can end 20. Notice that this was taking place during the same it by forgiveness or by supporting its member period the Fur-Arab conflict in Darfur was being through the judicial process. dealt with. While preparation were going ahead 25. Getting forgiveness form his tribesmen the tribal for convening a tribal conference to resolve Fur- leader gets salif obligation from the tribe granted Arab conflict was scheduled for 30 June 1989, the forgiveness. This, in turn, enables him to settle Hadandawa demonstration was planned for the future murder disputes with other tribes; particu- same day objecting to the creation of nazara for larly the one granted forgiveness, by reciprocating the Rashaida. by giving forgiveness. This tradition is one major 21. See Abdel Rahman Badawi Abu Al Bashar, op cit, factor halting murder cases from developing into pp. 92-95. Informal Personal Interview with Idris inter-tribal conflict through revenge and counter Ibrahim, Local Leader, The Legislative Council, revenge. June 2001. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 23
FEATURE
SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND: Envisioning a dialogue on the question of Somali unity
MATT BRYDEN
Introduction tion, sharing and distribution of revenues will be fiercely contested; and preparations for a Not for the first time since the collapse of the new constitution and national elections will Somali government in 1991, international be complex, painstaking and easily derailed. mediators are struggling to assist Somalis to Arguably the thorniest problem facing a rebuild their failed state. If the current round new transitional government will be the unity of peace talks in Nairobi, Kenya, is successful, of the Somali Republic. The Republic of then a comprehensive peace agreement should Somaliland (northwest Somalia) declared its be signed by mid-2004. If not, and the talks independence from the rest of the country in succumb to the regional rivalries, parochial 1991. Although it has yet to earn recognition disputes, and mediocre leadership that have as a single member state in the United Nations hamstrung their progress since October 2002, (UN), Somaliland, through its relative peace then Somalis must resign themselves to sever- and stability, has earned the support and sym- al more years of political disorder and occa- pathy of a number of governments inside and sional violence. outside Africa. A constitutional referendum in The conclusion of a peace agreement, how- 2002 found that a significant majority of ever, will mean that the real work is just Somaliland’s inhabitants approved of the beginning. Somalia’s faction leaders have independence platform—an observation con- signed innumerable settlements in the past, firmed by numerous independent reports and only to resume their skirmishing to even more media accounts. deadly effect. Many observers doubt not only But Somaliland’s aspirations to independ- the faction leaders’ collective commitment to ent statehood are anathema to a significant peace, but also their capacity to fulfil the fun- minority of Somalilanders, and to the vast damental obligations of a transitional govern- majority of southern Somalis as well. It may ment. Such concerns notwithstanding, the be no exaggeration to state that the question implementation of a Somali peace agreement of Somali unity is the most divisive and emo- will face formidable challenges. Negotiating tive dimension of the crisis. A transitional the structure and systems of a federal state will Somali government will undoubtedly claim be delicate and potentially divisive. sovereignty over the entire territory of the for- Demobilisation and disarmament, as well as mer Somali Republic, including Somaliland, the creation of new security forces, will be which might bring matters to a head. Ideally, fraught with mistrust and anxiety. The collec- some solution of the dispute will be found
MATT BRYDEN serves as a Senior Analyst with the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Senior Adviser with the WSP- International (formerly War torn Societies Project) Somali Programme. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 24
24 African Security Review 13(2) • 2004
through dialogue. Unresolved, it could lead to the SNM had agreed to attend a conference in violent conflict between Somali unitarians Cairo with southern political movements—a and the proponents of an independent decision that was deeply unpopular among Somaliland. their supporters. However, the decision of the SNM’s wartime allies from the south unilater- ally to declare a new national government was Background probably an equally important factor. Mass Somaliland’s declaration of independence on demonstrations erupted through the Isaaq- 18 May 1991 was an impromptu event. The inhabited regions of northwest Somalia, and political and traditional leaders gathered at on 16 May angry crowds converged at the the dusty northern Somali town of Bur’o had Bur’o meeting hall, where the SNM central come to discuss peace, not secession. Since committee was in session. After a one-day 1982, the Somali National Movement (SNM), pause, the SNM leadership bowed to public a guerrilla movement drawn chiefly from the pressure and declared Somaliland’s independ- northern Isaaq clan, had struggled to unseat ence. the military government of General Given the spontaneity of the event, there Mohamed Siyaad Barre. The conflict had was no way of accurately assessing, at the escalated dramatically in 1988, when the time, the scope, depth and durability of sepa- SNM seized control of the major northern ratist sentiment. Genuine support for inde- towns and the government responded with a pendence was located almost exclusively scorched earth campaign that left tens of within the Isaaq clan, which represents the thousands of civilians dead and forced nearly majority of Somaliland’s population. For half a million into neighbouring Ethiopia as them, rule by Mogadishu had become identi- refugees. During the course of 19989 the fied with discrimination, oppression and SNM was joined in its efforts by two southern quasi-genocidal violence. Although represen- clan-based factions,1 and in January 1991 rebel tatives of other clans formally endorsed the forces seized control of the Somali capital, declaration,4 some claim to have done so only Mogadishu. as a tactical concession, in the interests of The leadership of the three fighting fronts peace. The apparent fragility of the separatist had previously agreed that the Somali platform was underscored three years later. In Democratic Republic should remain unified, 1994, Somaliland’s first president, but under a federal rather than a unitary sys- Abdirahman Ahmed Ali “Tuur”,5 having been tem. But many ordinary Isaaq had long ousted from office by a rival faction within believed that the true aim of the struggle was the SNM, declared himself in favour of feder- independence from southern Somalia,2 and in ation with Somalia and joined the self-pro- the months following the collapse of the Barre claimed Somali government of General regime the separatist lobby had begun to gath- Mohamed Farah Aydiid in Mogadishu. Civil er momentum. In April 1991, SNM leaders war erupted in Somaliland, with opposition and northern Somali traditional elders gath- leaders claiming (inaccurately, as it turned ered in Bur’o intending to conclude a lasting out) that their supporters favoured federation ceasefire and establish a transitional adminis- over independence. tration for Somalia’s north-western regions. Somaliland survived the federalist chal- But on 18 May they reached an entirely unex- lenge intact, and with its commitment to sep- pected decision: the dissolution of arate statehood apparently undiminished. In Somaliland’s 1960 union with Somalia, and the 13 years since the declaration of inde- the restoration of its sovereignty as an inde- pendence, Somaliland separatism has evolved pendent state.3 from a relatively superficial platform to The immediate trigger for the decision express clan grievances into a more nuanced appears to have been an announcement over and complex political reality. Although the Mogadishu radio, three days previously, that dissolution of Somalia’s 1960 union is still • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 25
Bryden 25
vigorously opposed by some within and superficially plausible method of address- Somaliland and by most southerners, for a ing the issue of Somali unity. In practice, it is majority of Somalilanders the prospect of likely to prove a complex proposition, and independent statehood continues to be more one that could easily exacerbate tensions attractive than unity with the south. rather than mitigate them. Nevertheless, Somaliland remains unrecognised, and its aspirations to independ- Getting to the table ence are vigorously opposed by sections of the Any Somaliland government that moves international community, especially the towards dialogue with the south must be pre- African Union (AU) and the League of Arab pared to confront vigorous internal opposi- States. Successive resolutions issuing from tion, including allegations of a “sell-out”. these organizations and the European Union Before committing themselves to such a (EU) and UN have reaffirmed their recogni- potent political risk, Somaliland’s leaders are tion of the unity and territorial integrity of likely to first evaluate the credibility of their Somalia. More than a dozen peace initiatives southern negotiating partners. The stability of between 1991–2003 have aimed at the restora- an interim Somali government, the quality of tion of a Somali government based in its leadership, and the degree to which its Mogadishu that would also exercise jurisdic- commitments would be respected by its suc- tion over Somaliland – despite the consistent cessors would all come under scrutiny. A frag- lack of participation of credible representa- ile, provisional government of national unity tives from Somaliland. Likewise, the most might be poorly placed to offer unpopular recent effort, an ongoing peace conference in concessions. Thus it might prefer to retreat Nairobi, Kenya, under the auspices of the into populist, unionist rhetoric in order to Inter-Governmental Authority on Develop- shore up its support base in the south. From ment (IGAD),6 aims to establish transitional Somaliland’s perspective, there would be little federal institutions with authority throughout point in discussing its sovereignty with such a the territory of the former Somali Republic.7 feeble and inflexible partner, except possibly The political and legal arguments in favour to demonstrate the futility of dialogue. of Somaliland’s case for independence have External parties may harbour similar reserva- been extensively covered elsewhere, and they tions: international observers of the will not be recapitulated in this paper.8 Intergovernmental Authority on Nevertheless, Somaliland’s political leaders Development (IGAD) peace process asserted have long argued that their government is pre- in early 2003 that an interim Somali govern- pared to enter into dialogue with a southern ment would lack sufficient legitimacy to alter government when one eventually emerges. the country’s international commitments or Many observers, both Somali and internation- status.9 They may therefore question whether al, have chosen to interpret such statements as an interim authority would be competent to evidence that Somaliland’s commitment to take binding decisions on the issue of Somali independence remains flexible. If so, then it unity. seems reasonable to expect that the formation Likewise, a southern government will have of an interim Somali government could be fol- to contend with domestic opposition to a dia- lowed by dialogue with Somaliland, leading logue with Somaliland. Some southern lead- either to a mutually acceptable form of associ- ers will argue that bilateral dialogue with ation or an amicable divorce. Somaliland is tantamount to recognition of the breakaway state. Others may feel that bilateral negotiations between Mogadishu and Renegotiating the union Hargeysa might upset existing power-sharing The notion of dialogue between a transitional arrangements amongst southern groups, by government in Mogadishu and a Somaliland awarding excessive importance and legitimacy government in Hargeysa offers an attractive to Somaliland and its administration. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 26
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Status of the parties acknowledge Somaliland’s independence. On With sufficient goodwill on both sides, rein- this crucially sensitive issue, leaders on both forced by arm-twisting from international par- sides will be acutely aware that to defy the will ties, the initial reservations felt by Somalia of their respective constituencies would be and Somaliland about a bilateral dialogue tantamount to political suicide. could probably be overcome. The next hurdle These mutually exclusive positions find on the path to negotiations between the two legal expression in the respective charters of governments would probably be the relative the two polities. Somaliland’s leaders are status of the two parties. The Somaliland lead- bound by their 2001 constitution to uphold ers consider that their polity has broken away the sovereignty and independence of their from Somalia, whether or not others choose state. An interim government in Mogadishu to recognize that fact, and will therefore ini- will be similarly charged by the transitional tially insist that a meeting be conducted as national charter to defend the unity and terri- between two sovereign states. A southern torial integrity of Somalia. In order to enter Somali government, on the other hand, will negotiations at all, one of the two govern- approach Somaliland as a secessionist entity ments (possibly both) would have to be pre- acting in defiance of a legitimate national gov- pared to contemplate altering or violating the ernment, and will expect this unequal rela- legal instruments from which it derives its tionship to be manifested at the bargaining authority. table. In Somaliland, the situation is further Such differences over status are not complicated by ancillary legal considerations. uncommon in peace negotiations, and can First, Article 1 of the May 2001 constitution probably be addressed by a formula that pro- stipulates that “sovereignty resides in the peo- vides for talks between sovereign equals, with- ple”, implying that any alteration of Somaliland’s sovereign status would require a out prejudice to the legal status of either party. popular mandate and could not be taken by Agenda the administration alone. Since that same constitution was approved by general referen- With status issues resolved, the two parties dum, it would be difficult for the Somaliland will approach talks with very different aims government to alter Somaliland’s sovereign and expectations. In setting the agenda, both status without submitting the question to a will naturally seek to predetermine, as far pos- second plebiscite. Such considerations may sible, the final outcome of the negotiations. seem arcane to outsiders, but since the On Somaliland’s part, this will probably Somaliland government is democratically entail the demand that dialogue be without elected, it can ill afford to ignore them. preconditions, leaving independence as a pos- One way of splitting the difference sible (if not probable) outcome. This will be between north and south might be to borrow unacceptable to a transitional Somali govern- a chapter from the current Sudanese dialogue ment, which will inevitably seek to preclude and to discuss unity as a “priority”. While the formal break-up of the Somali state as a southern unionists could probably accept product of the talks. such a formula as a basis for talks, The positions of the two parties will reflect Somaliland’s leaders are more likely to insist not only their respective preferences or princi- that the “priority” assigned to unity be purely ples, but also the real political and legal con- procedural rather than political. In other straints they must each contend with. For words, they will insist that the negotiations example, while a clear majority of northerners should first explore the possibility of associa- seek independence for Somaliland, an approx- tion and, if that fails, advance to arrangements imately equal proportion of southerners reject for legal separation. it. A Somaliland government can no more afford to cede sovereignty to Mogadishu than a southern government can afford to • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 27
Bryden 27
The shape of Somali unity: restruc- Somaliland would retain a far greater degree turing the state of autonomy and sovereignty within a federa- tion than it did following the 1960 union. But In negotiating a hypothetical association, one the political and legal subtleties of a federal of the first orders of business would be the formula will be unfamiliar to most ordinary structure of a united Somali state. The open- Somalis and public discourse on the topic will ing positions for this aspect of the negotia- tend to reduce any settlement to a simplistic tions are far apart. “cake-cutting” exercise. The more complex the From Somaliland’s perspective, anything formula, the harder it will be for leaders on less than outright independence would repre- either side to sell it to their respective con- sent an extraordinary sacrifice, and would stituents. require dramatic concessions from the south An asymmetrical federation or confedera- to make it worthwhile. The next best arrange- tion could conceivably bridge the gap ment would be a bilateral confederation between the kind of confederal arrangement between sovereign equals. Somaliland’s nego- that might mollify northern separatists and tiators would probably argue that anything the federal structure proposed by some south- less would fail to win public support, and erners. Asymmetry might entail a “confedera- would strengthen the hand of hard-line sepa- tion” between a unitary Somaliland and a ratists. In the unlikely event that they could federal Somalia. Under this arrangement, be persuaded to consider an even more cen- tralized form of unity, they would take as their Somaliland would receive a greater degree of point of reference the number of parliamen- autonomy than other member states of the tary seats and cabinet posts allocated to the union, a larger share of national representa- State of Somaliland (roughly one-third of the tion and possibly the option of a referendum total) upon unification with the south in on independence at some specified point in 1960. But this would place the talks on shaky the future (à la Sudan). This would allow ground. Somalilanders often blame the failure Somaliland to subscribe to elements of the of the initial union on the inadequacy of the interim charter or constitution already in 1960 arrangement, and are convinced that force in the south, while imposing certain only a more equitable merger could succeed. conditions. These would probably take the For their part, southern leaders will be con- form of restrictions on the deployment of cerned that significant concessions to southern military forces or police in its terri- Somaliland—say, of the kind required by a tory, decentralized control over revenues or bilateral confederation—could upset the deli- foreign assistance, and/or limitations on the cate transitional power-sharing arrangements political rights of non-Somalilanders (such as in the south. Consensus in the south has been their eligibility to run for electoral office in shifting, although with great difficulty, Somaliland). It might also eventually open the towards some kind of federalism, probably door for certain regions of Somaliland to opt involving four or five relatively autonomous for closer ties to the (southern) federation states—one of which would be Somaliland.10 while permitting others to retain their confed- Since this would ostensibly award Somaliland eral status. only one-quarter or one-fifth of the “national There are two reasons why an asymmetri- cake” (less than the one-third share implied by cal federation might prove problematic. First, the 1960 union, and far less than a bilateral many southern Somalis will vehemently resist confederation would offer), it would almost the notion that any region or clan should be certainly prove unacceptable to the sepa- given preferential treatment.11 The greater the ratists. concessions to Somaliland’s special status, the Of course it would be both inaccurate and more opposition they will face from south- deceptive to equate the power-sharing erners who perceive these to be unjust and a arrangements of a unitary state with those threat to the long-term stability of the new proposed under a new federal structure. union. Second, the separatist leaders in • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 28
28 African Security Review 13(2) • 2004
Somaliland will have little confidence in the for human rights. legal and institutional intricacies of such a Though southern Somali political leaders mechanism, and may have difficulty in per- routinely express their determination to move suading their constituents of the merits of in the same direction, they are many years asymmetrical union an alternative to outright behind Somaliland in terms of political devel- independence. Despite its hypothetical merits opment. An interim Somali government, as a possible compromise, in practice a pro- when one is formed, is likely to be dominated posal for asymmetrical federalism is likely to by faction leaders whose democratic creden- meet with condemnation from both sides. tials are doubtful. Genuine democratisation will be postponed until the expiry of the inter- im government’s mandate and the transition Beyond unity: prospects for integra- to a democratically elected civil administra- tion tion. Although the interim period envisaged A negotiated settlement between the govern- in the current peace process has been set at ments of Somalia and Somaliland would not five years, it is quite possible that the transi- of itself result in a stable and durable union. tion will actually take much longer.12 The Its implementation will require great care and Somali Transitional National Government sensitivity, if the deal is not to collapse. The (TNG) declared in August 2000 following a hasty and haphazard process of integration peace conference in neighbouring Djibouti following the 1960 union was one of the root utterly failed to undertake its transitional causes of the alienation between north and duties within its three-year mandate. The first south, and the subsequent war in the north president of Puntland, an autonomous region- between the SNM and the Somali govern- al administration in north-eastern Somalia,13 ment. Successful integration of the two terri- circumvented the prescribed transitional tories will be critical to sustaining support for arrangements, plunging his region into con- the union, preventing a return to both seces- flict and postponing indefinitely the political sionism and violent conflict. transition to an elected administration. To be successful, integration ideally Somaliland’s transition has so far required requires the merger of two democratic polities more than a decade, and is still incomplete.14 at similar levels of political and economic There is no reason to believe that an unwieldy development. The greater the differences interim government of national unity will be between the partners in a merger, the greater any more successful in meeting its initial tran- the political and economic capital that must sitional targets and deadlines. It must also be be expended to make the union viable. taken into consideration that the interim Somaliland and Somalia have evolved along arrangements could break down at any point, very different trajectories for more than a causing the peace process to collapse. The decade, making their proposed amalgamation integration of two largely incompatible sys- a formidable challenge. tems—Somaliland’s embryonic democracy on Somaliland’s political system has pro- the one hand, and Somalia’s fragile transition- gressed some way in the direction of a consti- al national structure on the other—would run tutional democracy. In May 2001, a the risk of destabilizing both. constitution was approved by referendum. The duties of a interim Somali govern- Local elections took place in December 2002; ment will be laid out in a transitional charter presidential elections followed in April 2003; of some kind. This is likely to take the form of and legislative elections are expected to com- an agreement that represents a complex com- plete the transition to a multiparty system by promise between diverse southern Somali mid-2005, if not sooner. Though weak, interests, but without significant input from Somaliland’s democratic experiment is charac- Somaliland. Since Somaliland is unlikely to terized by vigorous political pluralism, excep- simply accept a southern peace agreement, tional press freedom and reasonable respect provisions dealing with everything from rev- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 29
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enue sharing and currency to security forces An “ Eritrean–Ethiopian” solution? and electoral systems will have to be either Foreign diplomats have sometimes suggested amended or added. an “Eritrean–Ethiopian” solution to the The chances of successful integration Somali problem. In other words, Somaliland would be greatly improved by robust interna- would have to obtain the recognition from tional diplomatic engagement, external eco- Mogadishu before other foreign governments nomic support and, most important, the would follow suit. This precedent is especially existence of mature, capable and committed attractive to African governments, since it per- political leadership on both sides. At the mits them to exercise a degree of control over moment, few Somalilanders are enthusiastic secessionist dynamics elsewhere on the conti- about the prospects for integration, and few nent. In the Somali context, this would be southerners seem prepared to make the kind equivalent to awarding a southern govern- of concessions that might make unity more ment a right of veto over Somaliland’s asser- attractive to the north. Leaders on both sides tion of the right to self-determination. This is are inclined to be inflexible and populist a scenario that is reminiscent of the 1961 ref- rather than visionary and statesmanlike in erendum, when the rejection by the north of their approach to the unity issues. And foreign a new unitary constitution was swept away by governments remain committed to the princi- a tide of “yes” votes from the numerically ple of Somali unity, while lacking sufficient dominant south.15 Somalilanders are probably interest or engagement to invest substantively correct in their assumption that, given the in its success. chance, southerners would once again vote overwhelmingly in favour of continuing Negotiating separation unity. Since Mogadishu’s veto of Somaliland’s independence is virtually assured, committed Many Somalilanders consider their independ- separatists will feel compelled to reject the ence to be non-negotiable and irreversible. Eritrean–Ethiopian formula outright. This They oppose any discussion on the topic of time, Somaliland’s leaders will almost certain- association and view the prospect of dialogue ly argue, the decision should belong to with the south solely as an international Somalilanders alone. requirement for obtaining international recog- nition as an independent state. The domi- A “Sudanese” solution? nance of the separatist platform in Somaliland As in the Sudanese peace process, politics, enshrined in constitution and rein- Somaliland’s leaders might be prevailed upon forced through the electoral process, means to accept a trial period of co-existence with that no Somaliland government will be able Somalia under transitional legal arrange- to hazard dialogue with the south unless inde- ments, before Somaliland’s final status is pendence remains an option. In order to jus- determined via referendum. tify such a risk, Somaliland’s leaders would Despite vast differences between the also probably seek reasonable assurances of Sudanese and Somali cases, this option has a international recognition if unity proves number of intriguing features. A trial period unworkable. of “cohabitation” might serve to develop However, negotiating a mutually accept- communication between the two sides and able formula for separation is likely to prove encourage open debate on the question of no less difficult than a workable formula for unity. Both sides would be under pressure to unity, partly because of reluctance in the uphold justice, democracy and effective south to accept the break-up of the Somali administration, since public opinion is likely Republic. Another reason is Somaliland’s to be swayed by the quality of governance assertion that its exercise of self-determination rather than by rhetoric alone. Perhaps most should be independent of southern influence significantly, the international legal principles or control. of self-determination and territorial integrity • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 30
30 African Security Review 13(2) • 2004
would be given equal weight in the determi- Somaliland will thus insist that any referen- nation of Somaliland’s future status. dum be settled by a simple majority vote by But several key ingredients required for the its own citizens. Sudanese peace process are lacking in Somalia. Unlike those of the Sudanese A matter for Somalis to decide? People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the leaders of Somaliland would find it difficult to In diplomatic circles, the question of Somalia agree to join a government of national unity unity is routinely described a matter best left during the interim period, since this would for Somalis to decide. This is a disingenuous technically oblige them to abandon their and deceptive argument to the extent that it claim to independent statehood. Nor is refers only to the recognition of Somaliland; Somali unity likely to bring the kinds of most foreign governments stand ready to “rewards” that are on offer in Sudan, where recognise a new Somali government when one the inducements of increased oil revenues, finally emerges, implicitly accepting its claims foreign investment and large-scale donor com- to sovereignty over Somaliland as well. In the mitments will help to make a peace agreement context of the mutually exclusive claims of desirable. On the contrary, the very limited the authorities in Mogadishu and Hargeysa, nature of the Somali “peace dividend” is like- international recognition of one or the other ly to leave most Somalis dissatisfied, sharpen- would be deeply prejudicial to the resolution ing perceptions of inequity, breeding of the unity question and might endanger the resentment and – in Somaliland - fuelling sep- prospects of a genuine Somali dialogue on the aratist sentiments. Somalilanders would also issue. In effect, the issue of unity would have oppose the Sudanese option if the “peace div- been decided even before dialogue could be idend”—foreign aid—were to be channelled opened. through Mogadishu during the interim peri- If a transitional Somali government even- od, favouring a southern government and tually emerges from the current round of providing it with an opportunity to under- peace talks in Kenya (or from any subsequent mine the political arrangements of the north. process), its leaders and their sponsors in the If, as in Sudan, a referendum were the region will immediately seek international agreed instrument for determining recognition and support. Recognition in any Somaliland’s final status, some southern lead- degree would tacitly acknowledge the new ers would undoubtedly argue that all Somalis government’s claims to jurisdiction over should vote on the issue. The Somaliland Somaliland and discourage further negotia- leadership, remembering what happened in tion on the question of unity. Having been the 1961 referendum, will insist that only the awarded international recognition and legit- people of Somaliland have the right to cast imisation, southern Somali leaders might then ballots. Even so, a Somaliland-only ballot will be tempted to treat the Somaliland govern- not entirely resolve the problem: southerners ment as a rebel faction rather than as an equal will demand that the results be tallied on a partner in the pursuit of a comprehensive and region-by-region basis. This would permit the enduring peace. eastern Sanaag and Sool regions to opt out of Under such circumstances, it is question- the secession if a majority of the Dhulbahante able whether a meaningful dialogue between and Warsengeli populations so cast their bal- Hargeysa and Mogadishu could be engaged at lots.16 However, since the loss of Sool and all. Neither party is likely to recognise the eastern Sanaag would mean forfeiting the legitimacy of other. Having earned interna- boundaries received by Somaliland at the tional recognition as the custodians of Somali moment of independence, it would almost sovereignty during the interim period, certainly disqualify it for admission into the Somalia’s new leaders would be duty-bound AU, which would jeopardise the likelihood of to preserve their country’s unity and territori- its being granted international recognition. al integrity. Somaliland’s leaders, on the other • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 31
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hand, would be confronted by a dilemma: a significant proportion of its scarce financial whether to pursue their demands for inde- resources. pendence in an increasingly unfavourable In sum, the future of the Somali republic international environment, or renegotiate the is unlikely to be decided by Somalis alone. union from a clearly disadvantaged position. International recognition of a new interim An interim Somali government will enjoy government will tip the scales in favour of a critical advantage over Somaliland: juridical Somali unity, making the prospects for a recognition, which implies privileged access to peaceful, negotiated settlement with external resources, and a monopoly on the Somaliland more difficult. Also, by presenting legitimate use of force throughout Somali ter- Somalis with such a fait accompli, such recog- ritory. The leadership of the interim govern- nition might inadvertently polarise the situa- ment may of course choose how best to tion further, and raise fears that a new chapter deploy this leverage; there will inevitably be in the Somali war will open.19 some temptation to exploit the ascendancy of office for political consolidation rather than The way forward: preventive diplo- for reconciliation and reconstruction. The prospect of a military confrontation between macy an interim Somali government and Were the current round of Somali peace talks Somaliland is implausible, because a provi- to collapse, it is not inconceivable that sional Somali government will — at least for Somaliland will receive the international several years — lack the forces and resources to recognition it seeks. This would present a project military power in such a way. A more whole new range of scenarios for managing likely deployment of its powers would be the the relationship between the two sovereign distribution of resources, contracts and politi- states so as to defuse the natural tensions cal appointments in a way calculated to attract between them, and to maintain peace and sta- the loyalty of individuals and groups from bility in the Horn of Africa. within Somaliland. The example of the TNG If an interim government does emerge established in August 2000 is instructive in from the talks, however, the challenge for the this regard: rather than engaging its chal- international community will be to encourage lengers in dialogue, it deployed financial and its success while mitigating the likelihood of military means throughout Somalia, notably tension and conflict arising over the the areas controlled by the Rahanweyne Somaliland question. Striking the right bal- Resistance Army (RRA),17 Puntland and ance, however, requires that the prevailing Somaliland, in order to co-opt and desta- “wait-and-see” attitude should be discarded in bilise.18 favour of active preventive diplomacy. While intervention of this kind could A first step might be for the AU Peace and potentially unsettle Somaliland, it might only Security Council to take the issue of damage, not eliminate, separatist sentiment. It Somaliland under formal consideration prior might even reinforce demands for independ- to the formation of an interim Somali gov- ence by compounding Somaliland’s sense of ernment.20 This would open a diplomatic historical humiliation and grievance. forum for deliberation of the unity issue, and Imposing unity in this way would thus justify the opening of diplomatic channels of achieve little more than displacing the Somali communication with both the interim Somali conflict from south to north. This might serve government and the Somaliland administra- the short-term objectives of an interim gov- tion before and during the transitional period. ernment by undermining Somaliland’s credi- Establishing the mechanism will not be bility as a stable and sovereign entity. enough, however: foreign governments and However, over the long term it would also international organisations, especially the illustrate the government’s inability to pacify IGAD, the AU, the League of Arab States and large stretches of its territory, while absorbing the UN, should actively engage with both par- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 32
32 African Security Review 13(2) • 2004
ties in order to reinforce their commitment to 3The term “Somaliland” is used in this paper to a negotiated outcome. denote the territory of the former British Protectorate and the independent “State of Negotiations will hold little attraction for Somaliland”, to which the British government Somaliland if the outcome appears to have ceded sovereignty on 26 June 1960. been predetermined by international recogni- 4The ‘Iise, Gadabursi, Dhulbahante and Warsengeli tion of an interim Somali government. Some are the four largest clans in Somaliland after the Isaaq. form of qualified recognition, such as award- 5 Tuur is a Somali nickname meaning “Stooped” or ing both parties observer status in various Hunchbacked”. international organisations (such as the UN, 6A regional intergovernmental organisation that AU and IGAD), would help to level the play- comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. ing field and provide an incentive for both 7The Somali National Reconciliation Conference sides to come to the table. (SNRC) was inaugurated at Eldoret, Kenya, in Lastly, the AU Peace and Security Council October 2002 and relocated to Mbagathi, a sub- and the United Nations could together could urb of the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, in January establish procedures for accompanying and 2003. The conference was still in progress at the time of writing. monitoring progress during the transitional 8 See for example, Touval, Somali nationalism, period that would include the resolution of Cambridge, 1963; Drysdale, Whatever happened to the unity question. An international presence Somalia? London, 1994; The case for Somaliland’s of this nature could help to build the confi- international recognition as an independent state, a Briefing Paper prepared by the Somaliland dence of both parties in the viability of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hargeysa, August negotiated settlement, while ensuring that 2002; and Somaliland: democratization and its dis- talks are conducted in good faith. At the same contents, International Crisis Group (ICG) Africa time, it would prevent an Somali government Report No. 66, Nairobi/ Brussels, 28 July 2003. 9For example, international observers at the from losing focus on critical transitional tasks Mbagathi talks argued that an interim government such as a new constitution, national elections should be given no power to alter the status of and demobilisation. Arabic as an official language, since this would Such measures will involve political com- jeopardize the country’s membership in the Arab League. mitments and financial costs above and 10 These would probably be Somaliland, Puntland, beyond those currently available for the Central Somalia, and Southwest Somalia. Somali peace process. Organising a dialogue Whether or not the inter-riverine areas (Bay and on the issue of Somali unity will be challeng- Bakool) would become a separate province or be absorbed by Southwest Somalia remains unclear. ing, taxing and — from some political perspec- Mogadishu would probably have special status as tives — risky, but it is a far better option than the capital city. the most probable alternative: another 11 Opposition to an asymmetrical federation will be intractable conflict in the Horn. This would especially strong in Puntland, which has consis- tently sought to portray itself as a non-secessionist prove far costlier than peace talks, not least in state, but in every other respect on a par with humanitarian terms. There exists, at least for Somaliland. the time being, a window of opportunity for 12 Among the tasks facing a provisional government international mediators to prevent conflict will be: drafting of a permanent constitutional document; demarcation of new regions and dis- rather than to pick up the pieces after the fact. tricts; passage of electoral legislation; and comple- That alone should be grounds for early and tion of census and/or voter registration. All of decisive intervention. these issues are likely to prove highly contentious, which will delay their completion. 13 Formed in 1998, the Puntland administration Notes opposes Somaliland’s independence and advo- cates instead a federal system for Somalia. 1The United Somali Congress (USC) led by Puntland and Somaliland exercise mutually exclu- General Mohamed Farah Aydiid and the Somali sive claims to certain areas that fall within Patriotic Movement (SPM) headed by Colonel Somaliland’s colonial boundaries but are inhabit- Ahmed Omar Jess. ed by members of clans linked more closely by 2 See M Bryden,, “Fiercely Independent” in Africa kinship to Puntland than to Somaliland. Report, African-American Institute: November- 14 The first parliamentary elections are due in March December, 1994, p35. 2005. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 33
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15 The rural southern district of Wanle Weyne alone 18 The strategy was partially successful with respect reportedly (and implausibly) cast more ballots to the RRA and Puntland, both of which became than the entire population of Somaliland. divided between factions aligned with the TNG 16 Ancillary disputes are likely to emerge over such and others opposed to it. Only in Somaliland did issues as whether or not non-resident the TNG manifestly fail to achieve its objectives. Somalilanders (that is members of Somaliland 19 For additional arguments, see Negotiating a blue- clans resident in southern Somalia or members of print for peace in Somalia, ICG Africa Report N°59, the diaspora) are eligible to vote. 6 March 2003, p 14. 17 A faction drawn from the Digil-Mirifle clans, who 20 This is recommended in Biting the Somali bullet, inhabit mainly the regions of Bay and Bakool in ICG Africa Report No. 79, 4 May 2004, p ii. south-western Somalia. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 35
FEATURE
DEBATING SECESSION AND THE RECOGNITION OF NEW STATES IN AFRICA
IAN S SPEARS
It has become obvious that many African to commit sufficient resources and troops to states remain unable to meet the most basic bring security to the continent’s people. development needs of their respective citizen- Indeed, it might be said that Africa’s problem ries after more than 40 years of political inde- is perhaps less one of exploitation by external pendence. In fact, many of these states were powers, as commentators have long argued, viable during the Cold War only with the than one arising from their profound neglect assistance of their patron superpowers. Few and indifference. appear viable now. Despite the promises of It is also not clear how to solve the chal- peace and prosperity that came with the Cold lenges Africa faces. Africans and non-Africans War’s end, a number of states have since dis- alike have been puzzled by the continent’s solved into civil war. From Angola in the apparent resistance to standard models of south to Liberia and Sierra Leone in West development and conflict resolution. The pos- Africa, and Somalia in the Horn, regimes have sibility that reforming the African state system struggled with opposition movements which might improve Africa’s prospects for develop- sometimes have a better grip on territory than ment and peace is perhaps only the latest the governments themselves. In some cases, hypothesis to be debated among scholars. To the inability of governments to extend control date there has been little in the way of a con- over their territory has led political analysts to sensus on how state reconstitution might worry that terrorist cells are now able to oper- work, or even whether it would work. Some ate with impunity in such countries. scholars, such as William Zartman,3 have Mobilizing the resources necessary to argued that a more cautious approach which address Africa’s problems has become particu- seeks to “reaffirm the validity of the existing larly difficult at a time when the continent’s unit and make it work” is more likely to yield share of global trade has shrunk to less than positive results over the long term. Others two per cent.1 As a diplomat once observed, have argued that conditions in Africa have “Economically speaking, if the entire black deteriorated to such an extent that more cre- Africa, with the exception of South Africa, ative solutions that go beyond the “steel grid” were to disappear in a flood, the global cata- of the current state system need to be consid- clysm will be approximately nonexistent”.2 ered if progress is to be made.4 A few, such as African conflicts have also frequently been Jeffrey Herbst,5 have argued that the interna- allowed to run their violent course because the tional community’s “dogmatic devotion to international community has been unwilling the current boundaries” should be discarded
IAN SPEARS is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Guelph in Guelph Ontario, Canada. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 36
36 African Security Review 13(2) • 2004
in favour of new forms of sovereignty. For around a decentralized kingdom, political Herbst, “[t]he inevitable disruption caused by boundaries, no matter how they were drawn, state creation will ... have to be balanced were bound to be arbitrary. “To draw any line against the profound harm that existing states to pull 200,000 or 300,000 square miles into a ... do to their populations everyday”. single territory,” observes Donald Horowitz Decisions about domestic considerations— (1985: 76), “was necessarily to throw together what kind of government, what kind of state a great many stranger-groups and to divide and so on—can and should be decided exclu- other groups”.8 What the colonial powers did sively by Africans. But the issue of recognition then was to change the scale of the polity. The is ultimately an external matter which colonies were artificial not merely because involves a number of complex questions and they failed to respect the diversity of people dilemmas. Does the collapse or near-collapse within, but because the territories that result- of countries such as the Democratic Republic ed were often many times larger than the of Congo (DRC), Somalia or Sierra Leone political entities which had previously existed. reveal the dysfunctional nature of the African Even if we consider the territories that state? Does it provide a relatively low-risk eventually formed independent states in the opportunity for reform, since weak or non- 1960s (rather than the sometimes much larger existent governments have little or no capaci- colonial territories), the geographic extent of ty to object? Or has state collapse in a sense these entities is impressive. Consider that the liberated Africa’s people from the tyranny of size of the average African state is more than their previous rulers? This would obviate the twice that of the average European state.9 need for boundary reform, since most govern- Another point worth raising is that the six ments can no longer enforce their authority, countries of Eastern Europe (East Germany, and local government structures and adminis- Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania tration would emerge on their own. Does and Bulgaria) whose political and economic recognition of new states imply the abandon- transformations signalled the end of the Cold ment of all existing states and borders, or can War, occupied an area of 990,329 sq km, it take place alongside the strengthening of which would easily fit inside one medium- existing governments, however weak? sized African state like Angola (1,246,700 sq km). Their combined extent would take up less than half the size of the Sudan (2,505,813 The rise and fall of the African State sq km). In fact, all of the countries of Western The debate over reform of existing states and Europe would fit into the DRC. The point is the recognition of new ones emerges from a not that large states do not work (there are fundamental weakness in Africa’s current state many large states that do), or that the devel- system: the arbitrary nature of its colonial bor- opmental challenges faced by African states ders. A typical explanation for the continent’s are attributable solely to their size. Rather it is “legacy of tribal conflict”, for example, is that that Africa’s governments—some of which it was “European colonizers [not Africans] remain among the weakest and most incapac- who divided the region into administrative itated in the world—are expected to manage units little connected with ethnic identities”.6 some of the world’s largest, most diverse, and While some scholars have debated the extent least developed countries. to which borders were drawn in accordance Prior to 1945, the borders of most with existing political structures or identities,7 European states were relatively fluid. Also, few deny that the political entities that were owing to both centripetal and centrifugal created at the end of the nineteenth century forces, their governments tended to look for a marked a sudden and rapid change from what size that was optimal for efficiency .10 Newly had existed before. Given the manner in independent African governments, by con- which most African groups at the time tended trast, ruled in territories, large or small, which to centre around the village or, in a few cases, have not changed appreciably since independ- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 37
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ence. Their borders have generally not been or collapsed, because this has happened in allowed to expand or contract to reflect the similar states in Europe. The former capacity of the incumbent regimes; nor have Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet African governments achieved a strength con- Union, for example, lumped disparate politi- gruent with the vastness of their territories. cal entities together and kept them so by coer- While alternative forms of political organ- cive means for much of their existence. The ization or even a reorganization of Africa’s achievement of more viable states in Africa borders could have been considered at the since the early 1990s, then, should have been time of decolonization, the opportunity was a matter of identifying pre-colonial entities not taken. ‘Decolonization’ refers to the (where they existed), and rebuilding states on granting of political independence to former top of them.16 Again, however, African leaders colonies rather than assuring sovereignty to resisted serious consideration of more decen- the diverse peoples within each state.11 With a tralized models of state formation which few exceptions, African states did not get might have undermined their rule. Few of smaller to accommodate the aspirations to them were willing to experiment with new independence of each and every ethnic or reli- conceptions of political organization, even if gious grouping in a given former colony. In they did reflect previous forms of gover- some cases, post-colonial states actually nance.17 For the leaders of Africa’s independ- became larger, as different colonial territories ence movement, development was contingent were merged to form one independent state.12 on throwing off the bonds of colonialism. This was probably not the intended outcome. General Principle XIV of the 1964 United Even the parties to the 1885 Berlin confer- Nations (UN) Conference on Trade and ence, at which the colonial boundaries were Development, for example, stated that “com- first drawn, considered the possibility that plete decolonization...is a necessary condition “revisions” might be needed, “because possi- for economic development and the exercise of bilities and new requirements will probably sovereign rights over natural resources”.18 reveal themselves”.13 Since decolonization, Indeed, while African borders may have been however, respect for Africa’s existing borders arbitrary, most leaders believed that having has been entrenched in the charters of the their borders effectively guaranteed would Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the facilitate development, not obstruct it. This subsequent, and recently created, African was because secure borders would free gov- Union (AU).14 The reason is that, because ernments from having to defend their territo- most of Africa comprises multi-ethnic states, ries from external threats, and instead allow African leaders recognize that any effort to them to focus attention on political and eco- create another basis for statehood would jeop- nomic development. Moreover, it was ardize their own hold on power. assumed that within these states ethnic divi- Some scholars contend that the viability of sions would fall away as these countries mod- states is related to the existence of pre-colonial ernized. To them it did not matter that newly communities and identities onto which con- independent countries had ethnic cleavages. temporary state structures, including demo- As the Guinean president, Sékou Touré, once cratic institutions, can be bolted.15 From this argued, “In three or four years, no one will perspective, the continuities and political tra- remember the tribal, ethnic or religious rival- ditions which evolved over the centuries in ries which, in the recent past, caused so much Africa remain significant today (as they do in damage to our country and its population”.19 Europe), and could continue to provide a The post-colonial years, however, did not foundation for political development in con- lead to the bridging of ethnic divisions, as temporary times. In contrast, discontinuities Africa’s independence leaders had hoped. Nor and the lack of a common political identity did a political system which effectively guar- are sources of weakness. It is no surprise that anteed the security of African borders facili- large multi-ethnic states in Africa have failed tate development in the post-independence • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 38
38 African Security Review 13(2) • 2004
era. On the contrary, there was little impera- constitutions left by departing colonial pow- tive to develop, since regimes were not ers in favour of “popular dictatorships”, in the required to defend their citizenry from exter- case of Guinea for example.24 As their rule nal threats. In this sense, the weakness of became increasingly precarious, some of them African states and the manner in which they sought to develop strategic relationships with achieved political independence were inti- superpower patrons, who in return provided mately connected. Many early European military aid to keep these struggling client states were not so different from African ones regimes afloat. In a further effort to sustain in terms of ethnic and linguistic diversity. As themselves in power, these “toxic states” in Africa, the challenge for Europe’s leaders sought to compensate for their weakness by was to develop a common national con- bombing into submission those who chal- sciousness throughout a territory. Italy, lenged them.25 This may have sustained them observed the Austrian statesman, Clemons in the short term, but it also led to the demo- von Metternich, was also merely “a geograph- ralization of the government’s own troops ic expression”.20 Similarly, as E H Carr and to the creation of other sub-state entities. observed, “one of the chief obstacles to the Some of the latter, being born out of war, growth of a common German national con- became more coherent and capable than the sciousness was the difficulty in persuading regimes they were fighting. Prussians, Saxons, and Bavarians to treat the Patronage by America or Russia, then, good of Germany as more important than the served only to conceal (and, in the end, exac- good of Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria”.21 The erbate) the dysfunctional nature of many difference for African states was that they did African states. Without superpower assistance, not have to fight for their independence in countries such as Somalia had insufficient the way that some European states had to bat- means to sustain a durable state structure. tle for their survival. Instead such states learned to adapt them- War was of central importance to the polit- selves parasitically to whatever resources were ical development of European states insofar as available. Not surprisingly, client states such it compelled them to develop a strong and as Ethiopia, Somalia and Zaire collapsed after efficient state infrastructure. According to the Cold War (and their patronage by the Jeffrey Herbst22 and others,23 for all its superpowers) ended. In some cases the politi- destructive tendencies, war also helped in the cal movements which delivered the final coup consolidation of a national identity forged out de grâce to these regimes either took up resi- of a common fear of an external “other”. dence in the capital or carved out their own While African states frequently did have areas of control within the broader failed state. inspired anti-colonial movements, the threat Africans now live in an era that follows the posed by the colonial powers themselves was collapse of the state. The question now is: never sufficient to overcome the deepest What should be done? Should Africa’s states internal cleavages. In some cases, such as be changed to reflect the realities within, and Angola, the DRC and Rwanda, the intense in a way which might make development pos- competition for political office which sible? Or is African state-building only in the emerged prior to independence merely exac- early stages of a centuries-long project which erbated these differences. requires patience and support, but not neces- In the absence of a common national con- sarily a restructuring of the state system sciousness or durable political institutions itself?26 The next section of this paper consid- which could manage or direct political ener- ers more specifically the arguments that can gies to constructive ends, African leaders be made in favour of reforming the state sys- looked to a number of means to keep their tem and recognizing new states. states together. Fearful of divisions which could undermine their rule and fragment their countries, regimes abandoned the democratic • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 39
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The case for reforming Africa’s state and most significant of these political entities, system has since gone on to develop a number of fea- tures normally associated with formal state- The legacy of civil conflict and state break- hood, including a “national” government, a down has meant that in many places in Africa, currency, vehicular licence plates, and a well- the international community has little choice established sense of self.33 but to work with local and substate political A number of reports demonstrate how entities rather than national ones. In Somalia, these substate administrations can result in for example, neither the local parties them- regional variations in development. Even selves nor the international community have prior to the collapse of the Mengistu govern- been able to re-establish a government in the ment in Addis Ababa, Eritrea’s per capita capital whose authority extends beyond the income was twice that of the rest of city limits.27 As Hussein Adam and Richard Ethiopia.34 The 2001 UN Human Ford wrote in 1998, “What is clear is that any Development Report indicates that in form of national institution will have only Somalia, levels of human development are limited power and authority. The wounds and differentiated. They are generally higher in the scars of the past ten years are too great at this self-declared Republic of Somaliland, where a point to think of a unified and centralized government has been established, than in entity”.28 Similarly, and more recently, Matt southern and central Somalia, where food Bryden29 has written that the “abusive prac- tices...of the military regime—state sponsored insecurity, armed conflict and low household violence, institutionalized repression, authori- incomes have remained persistent problems. tarian and corrupt leadership—comprehensive- Moreover, investment in road and port reha- ly and enduringly damaged the Somali bilitation has also been possible in northern confidence in the institutions of the state”. Somalia, allowing for increased volumes of Predictably, following the collapse of the gov- trade, while similar infrastructure in the south ernment in Mogadishu in January 1991, many has experienced rapid deterioration owing to Somalis rejected national solutions and opted ongoing conflict and an absence of effective 35 instead for smaller and more localized peace governance. Clearly, the north’s ability to processes which have sometimes demonstrat- manage its internal conflicts has produced ed greater accountability. Despite the expen- benefits in terms of development and rehabil- sive and very public efforts at national itation. peace-building in Somalia during the early These experiences in Somalia suggest that 1990s, only local reconciliation efforts bore substate entities may be the way of the future. fruit.30 As Ken Menkhaus observed, The decision of the Special Representative of Somalis have well-established social the UN Secretary General, Ambassador mechanisms for managing interclan con- Mohamed Sahnoun, to work with four major flict at the local and regional level, tradi- ports of delivery during the Somali crisis in tional practices that were resilient mid-1992 recognized both the variations in enough to step into the vacuum created developmental needs and the existence of by the collapsed Somali state. When four main power blocs in the region.36 In those grassroots institutions were recog- other regions of Africa, de facto control of ter- nized and assisted rather than marginal- ritory by rebel movements has meant that the ized, they were at least sometimes able UN and its agencies have had to deal with to overcome deep-seated clan hostilities these entities if they wanted to provide devel- and forge durable local reconciliation. 31 opment resources to those on the ground. In Between 1996–2000, these locally-based the days prior to the fall of the government of approaches produced “relative security, stabil- Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, for example, the ity, and functional (or at least incipient) United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) administration” in more than half of was required to maintain operations in what Somalia’s territory.32 Somaliland, the largest were essentially two separate states. One was • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 40
40 African Security Review 13(2) • 2004
controlled by an increasingly weak de jure gov- engage in the actual extermination of their ernment in Kinshasa, and the other was a de adversaries. Moreover, they claim that advo- facto state under the Alliance des Forces cates of partition have yet to produce “proof” Démocratics pour la Libération du Congo in the that partition is still the only viable and cred- eastern regions of the country.37 In this sense, ible solution in the aftermath of these ethni- the issue of supporting or recognizing substate cally-motivated civil wars.39 entities in an era of collapsed states is as much Of course, there are a number of institu- one of operational necessity as it is a political tional solutions to ethnic conflict that stop choice for the international community. short of secession, including consociational A second and related justification for the power-sharing schemes or federalism. But recognition of new states is that reform is the those who take what is in effect a primordial only means to eliminate or even manage vio- view of identity formation see little hope of lent conflict between groups. Where neces- forging a common sense of nationhood in fac- sary, Africa’s borders should be redrawn so tions brutalized by war.40 Minority groups that states do not encapsulate so many differ- might prefer democratic rule in theory, but ent and incompatible groups, and so that bit- resist it in practice (for example Tutsis in ter adversaries can be separated. Many Burundi and Rwanda, or Sunnis in Iraq) by Africans point to a double standard when it spoiling peace processes if effective guarantees comes to the international recognition of new cannot be put in place. Power-sharing agree- states. Why is it acceptable to redraw political ments between former disputants have also boundaries to separate disputants or peoples proved an unstable form of post-conflict gov- in the former Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and ernance, and rarely stand the test of time. And Soviet Union, when the differences between while federal arrangements can be an effective African groups are equally profound? Western means of balancing the need for autonomy scholars and statesmen preach the merits of while maintaining state integrity, rebel move- coexistence and ethnic pluralism, but they do ments are often wary of them. In a continent so from countries which have already been where states are so poorly institutionalized through a process where local identities have and where even the most extreme violence been sacrificed for a common national one, or does not elicit international intervention, it is where peoples have effectively sorted them- simply not enough to rely on federalist provi- selves out ethnically. It is not that multi-eth- sions. The implementation of these is ulti- nic states are inherently conflictual. On the mately dependent on mercurial leaders in the contrary, most states are multi-ethnic and capital, who can retract them at will.41 have developed mechanisms which manage Consequently, groups opt for formal inde- these differences effectively. As a number of pendence because statehood promises to scholars have pointed out, multi-ethnic states lessen their vulnerability. While recognition is have also been among the most stable politi- itself a legal procedure, it is the entitlements cal entities.38 The problem is, however, that if that it allows which are most attractive from conflicts are not effectively contained and vio- the disputants’ point of view. Formal inde- lence does break out, these experiences pendence is the only reliable means of become woven into the identities of the com- defence because it provides groups with the munities themselves. It becomes extremely right to take up arms to defend themselves. If difficult to put war-torn communities back the international community is not willing to together except in the presence of some new intervene when political movements are authority which can assure the security of each threatened with violence, then it should come party. as no surprise that some groups should Critics of secession and partition argue demand political independence. that the fears of disputants are usually In many cases, there is justification for the unfounded; that the oppressors usually want fears of former rebel movements. Consider only to protect their interests rather than to Rwanda, for example, where the rhetoric of • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 41
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Hutu extremists following the breakdown of tition, rather than the making of a positive the 1993 Arusha Accords was matched only case in favour of the status quo. To be sure, by the intensity with which they sought to many observers of Africa recognize the chal- eliminate the entire Tutsi population.42 Or lenges to development and conflict resolution recall the experiences of both Eritrea and that exist in large, arbitrarily assembled and northern Somalia (Somaliland), where govern- poorly institutionalized African states. ment aircraft repeatedly bombed civilian tar- Although 40-odd years is perhaps too short a gets and engaged in acts of brutality.43 Indeed, time to make a definitive judgment on the as Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis have argued, continent’s record of governance, Africa’s in the midst of weakening or collapsed states, experience of the type of state structure that disputants may take the view “that the other is has existed since independence does not give such a menace that they can be secure only if one much hope for the future. But how can it is crippled, if not destroyed”.44 From this one be sure that Africa’s troubles are solely perspective, it is not a question of providing the result of supposedly arbitrary colonial “proof” that partition is the only viable and boundaries? Or that changing these bound- credible solution to ethnic conflict; rather it is aries and recognizing new states will reduce a question of ensuring perceived security gains complications in the long run? for the disputants. While many may lament Beyond these general concerns, two broad the fragmentation and demise of Yugoslavia, sets of arguments can be advanced for main- few have regrets about the security it has taining the status quo. The first of these argu- brought them. Similarly, in Africa, few ments questions the motivations for, and the Eritreans say that they would have been better actual benefits of, reform and the recognition off staying within Ethiopia, after years of vio- of new African states. While their argument lent civil war during which they were left to was not necessarily one in favour of the status fend for themselves.45 Consequently, one can quo (in fact quite the opposite), Robert accept that partition does not “help prevent Jackson and Carl Rosberg47 claim that the recurrence of ethnic war”, as Nicholas recognition of African states in the 1960s did Sambanis argues,46 and still recognize that for little to promote their development. Once some groups partition—escape—will be regard- recognition is granted, they argue, “there are ed as the only acceptable option. few if any compelling international pressures Interestingly, most scholars who contextu- on governments to engage in state building.... alize partition in terms of conflict and conflict On the contrary, in so far as it will not cost resolution recognize that partition can be them their sovereignty and the significant avoided if anarchy is controlled. African lead- privileges and perquisites which go with it, ers, however, have now become accustomed they are at liberty to neglect development”. In to a timid international community which is short, instead of focusing on development, more interested in rescuing its own expatriates African leaders were relieved by recognition of than in restoring order. At some point, then, the burden of state-making, and many saw it the international community must accept that as an opportunity to enrich themselves if it is not able or willing to step in and man- instead. age political transitions or defend groups The trend in Africa toward seeing state- being assaulted by their adversaries, then local hood in terms of self-interest rather than as disputants will see few alternatives to the cre- allowing national problems to be addressed ation of new states. has continued to the present. Ken Crossley48 even questions the degree to which those who aspire to statehood have an interest in devel- The case in favour of the status quo opment. He argues that while there may be The arguments of those who reject partition legitimate grievances among ordinary people, often comprise merely an inventory of all the there is little genuine interest in the actual res- things that can go wrong in the event of par- olution of these issues on the part of what is • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 42
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frequently a self-appointed local leadership. civil society, and claim that naive assumptions He argues that the leaders of the various fac- about wise community elders who are beyond tions would rather engage in the process of reproach are seductive but ill-founded. conflict resolution (which affords them the Clearly, however, there are important comparative luxury of endless meetings in exceptions to these tendencies. Somaliland, fancy hotels in European and African capitals) for example, has persisted in its independence than undertake the more challenging task of agenda despite its lack of major foreign government. The case of the Sudan Peoples donors. Similarly, while Eritrea has shown Liberation Army in the Sudan is given as an greater willingness to accept outside assistance example, Similarly, Ken Menkhaus has in recent years, the country demonstrated observed that in southern Somalia critical rec- marked discipline and an impressive desire for onciliation issues, such as property return and self-reliance both before independence and compensation, or political issues such as during the early years of statehood. Moreover, decentralization, representation, taxation and while patron states were willing to lavish budgetary sustainability, are never considered. funds and other perquisites on their clients in Instead, he argues, the context of the Cold War, these same ben- all energies are devoted to protracted efits are now unlikely to be forthcoming wrangling over ‘seat banking’ by clan, except where African countries can demon- followed by internal squabbles within strate progress in democratic and economic each clan over which political figures reforms. Any discussion of recognition then may claim its allotted seats. This must, as always, involve an important element inevitably causes rapid inflation in the of due diligence. number of seats in parliament and pro- The second set of arguments against parti- posed ministries—designed solely to buy tion begins with the view that political inde- off and satisfy as many clans as possi- pendence for one group will create a ble—leading to bloated and utterly precedent or demonstration effect leading all unsustainable administration. 49 other similarly oppressed groups to consider It is not that the southern Sudan is not enti- secession as well. Moreover, given that no tled to become an independent state or that state can be ethnically pure, attempts to the incipient government in Mogadishu redraw borders will inevitably create new nerv- should not be recognized. Rather the point is ous minorities. It is simply impractical to that care has to be taken not to support any think that a state can or should be created for movements with a dubious interest in the wel- every group that has at one time aspired to fare of ordinary citizens. Despite protestations self-determination. While it may be true that and efforts to demonstrate the contrary, the colonial map-makers did not always take the attributes, infrastructure and credibility that ethnic composition of their proposed local elites require to make their states politi- colonies into account, such a project was cally and economically viable are often never feasible. For example, if language were absent. to be used as the basis of state formation, All of this raises questions about the pos- Nigeria’s 248 distinct linguistic groups would sibility that identities are being fabricated by provide grounds for skepticism.51 In Ethiopia, self-appointed local leaders or a political dias- the government’s efforts to create more or less pora, both of which which seek to benefit ethnically homogeneous states during the from the acquisition of statehood. Another 1990s ran into difficulty because its southern concern is that in pursuing a decentralizing region is divided among more than 40 nation- approach to state-building, the international alities. From this perspective, the states of community risks being unduly charmed by contemporary Africa should not be regarded the appeal of charismatic grass-roots leaders. as having failed. On the contrary, given that Indeed, some critics50 have questioned the Europe’s nationality problem was solved only nature of the links between local leaders and through wars and population transfers which • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 43
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took place over centuries, interstate conflict accepting of secession if it leaves an ethnical- among African states has been relatively min- ly homogeneous rump state rather than a imal. In these terms Africa’s states should be multi-ethnic state that could continue to regarded as having achieved a comparative splinter. The government of Czechoslovakia success. was more amenable to the secession of the So many African states have ethnic cleav- Slovak Republic in the early 1990s than were ages that they might all be subject to fracture the leaders of a larger multi-ethnic state, such if divided according to ethnic or religious as the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the early groupings. Not only would the resulting frag- twentieth century. Secession set a less risky mentation create an unmanageable and per- precedent in the former than in the latter haps undesirable proliferation of fragile and case.56 52 dependent states, but the mere prospect of Proponents of partition claim that fears of such an occurrence and the message of weak- a chain reaction of secessions are unfounded. ness it sends would lead existing central gov- Michael Lind, for example, argues that world- ernments to strenuously resist such changes. wide the likely number of new states “is in the 53 As Barbara Walter has observed, govern- dozens, not in the hundreds or thousands”. ments rarely allow sections of their territory to According to him, be severed because “their reputation for While there are thousands of ethnic resolve is intricately tied to their ability to nations in the world, there are at most defend and maintain their territory. Once it only dozens of national groups numer- becomes clear that governments can no ous, unified and compact enough con- longer defend their own sovereign territory, ceivably to serve as the nuclei of they become attractive targets for any domes- sovereign nation states. The impossibili- tic or international foe”. Indeed, even in ty of basing nation states on tiny minori- Europe, political borders have been changed ties like Sorbs or Wends in Germany or only in the aftermath of great wars—and only the Amish in the United States in no for the defeated powers. From this perspec- way discredits the potential for state- tive, then, reforming Africa’s current borders hood of the Kurds or the Ibo or the could never be executed peacefully except in Tibetans...If the world survived the rapid cases of total state collapse. Indeed, African specialists have declared that this is a particu- expansion of the number of UN mem- lar problem for African states because territo- ber states from 52 in 1946 to 183 today, ry and territorial integrity remain of critical surely it can survive a more incremental 57 importance, particularly in peasant-based soci- expansion by a dozen or two more. eties. The prospect of a rebel movement But Africa, with its hundreds if not thousands undermining even Africa’s large and multi- of ethnic groups, would appear to be the ethnic states can elicit strong nationalist exception. Even here, however, it is not clear responses.54 that one incident of secession leads to similar On the other hand, existing governments aspirations among other ethnic groups within may be more willing to accommodate seces- the same state. In Ethiopia, for example, the sionist movements if they believe it might secession of Eritrea in 1993 has not led to the relieve them of the burden of fighting them in fragmentation of its other regions, even the future. For example it was clear that new though the country’s administrative units are Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic based to some extent on ethnic identity Front (EPRDF) government in Addis Ababa (which, at least in theory, entitles them to self- recognized that the secessionist war in the determination).58 Similarly, in neighbouring north could not be won. It was therefore will- Somalia, aspirations to political independence ing to respect the democratic wishes of are associated only with Somaliland, although Eritreans as expressed in the 1993 referen- other regions have established rudimentary dum.55 Some governments may be more administrative structures.59 • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 44
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Shortcomings in the existing debate new states. Gidon Gottlieb63 writes, for exam- and an exploration of alternatives ple, that “there should be some intermediate status between politically subordinate autono- The response to the issue of boundary reform my and territorial sovereignty that can ease and recognition of new states depends on the relationship of nations without a state of one’s level of analysis. The international com- their own to the remainder of the world com- munity’s preference for stability and order munity”. He calls for “a deconstruction and among states will lead it to emphasize the sta- rearrangement of [the] rigid concepts of terri- tus quo and minimal or no alteration. The torial borders, sovereignty and independence” process of border reform involves too many in favour of “soft” solutions which do not uncertainties and risks, as even its proponents alter political borders or make new states. This admit. The arguments for change, however, might make such a solution more acceptable become more compelling as one moves from to existing governments. Instead of mutually the global to the local level. Recent trends in exclusive jurisdictions, these “functional developmental thinking have emphasized the spaces and zones” and “historic homelands” benefits of decentralization.60 With respect to would involve multiple and overlapping juris- group security, disputants in civil wars may 64 also feel secure only if they are able to enjoy dictions and authority. Such an arrangement the entitlements of statehood, specifically the would allow for recognition to be granted to right to arm themselves. In any event, the nationalities so that they have international chronic weakness of many existing states and standing, even if their territorial claims do the emergence in some locations of what are not. sometimes more effective states-within-states Ironically, perhaps, the experience of will make it difficult for the central govern- Somalia may provide some of the best ment to regain its authority. insights into how to deal with state collapse The task then is to find alternatives which and issues of conflict resolution, development both meet the development and security and recognition. Beginning in 1998, the UN needs of local citizens and do not unsettle the began to distinguish between regions of international community. The problem is that Somalia in terms of recovery, transition and currently this balance does not exist. Since crisis zones. In so doing, the UN and its agen- World War II, the globe has been levelled into cies attempted to tailor their humanitarian a single format or category: the sovereign ter- and rehabilitation strategies and types of ritorial state.61 While there are, indeed, signif- external assistance to meet the most pressing icant differences in terms of development, needs of each environment. The international population and (perhaps most important) community has also experimented with newer state capacity, the formal or legal international methods of state rebuilding. In Somalia since hierarchy has been eliminated. State recogni- 1998, the UN has adopted the so-called tion has become an all-or-nothing affair. This “building block” approach, which is meant to has consequences for development. reflect this bottom-up vision of state recon- Somaliland, for example, has been unable to struction. As some observers have recognized, persuade international financial institutions the idea of building-blocks is less an approach such as the World Bank to provide funding than a reflection of the current situation in because of its lack of formal status. As one failed or weak states, in an acknowledgment Somaliland politician observed, “After a cer- that the many previous efforts to rebuild a tain point, you can’t go any further. You need central government have been fruitless. The recognition”.62 proponents of “building blocks” seek to base Not surprisingly, then, there have been their efforts on existing though smaller-scale calls for alternatives to the existing state sys- and more localized successes, and to take tem which address the needs of local popula- advantage of the regional administrations that tions but do not necessarily involve the have already established themselves in various redrawing of state borders or the creation of regions.65 • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 45
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Clearly, there is a need for flexibility on here is to provide space and incentives for the part of the international community and an agreement rather than a permanent two- for a variety of responses to Africa’s problems state solution. of underdevelopment and conflict. The point • Finally, in the few cases where a virtual is not for the international community to state-within-a-state already exists and has endorse anything and everything. Rather it is an apparently irreconcilable rift with a dys- to identify and work with effective structures functional or collapsed ‘parent’ state, the which promise to bring about genuine devel- international community may have no opment; and to strengthen those that need choice but to consider some sort of recog- support, so that they can become effective, nition for the former. democratic and benevolent. Beyond this To sum up, it would be simplistic to argue that approach, four tasks can be proposed. either the status quo or the redrawing of bor- • First, the international community must ders is the correct solution in all cases in distinguish predatory movements which which the territorial integrity of African states are incorrigible and need to be sidelined is threatened. The challenges facing Africa and from those which can be engaged and much of the developing world are profoundly encouraged to practice good governance. complex. Addressing them requires patient Examples of the former are those led by and careful attention to local circumstances. Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh (both of The international community should be whom controlled relatively large, some- aware that whatever options are chosen, they times state-like territories in Liberia and will need to be accompanied by trade-offs. Sierra Leone respectively),66 while instances While the scholars are remarkably divided on of the latter are the Somaliland govern- the issue of secession, the tendency to date in ment in northern Somalia and the Eritrean policy circles has been to leave things as they People’s Liberation Front in Eritrea. While are. There is value in remaining conservative the latter movements have not been flaw- on issues of secession. The criterion for the less, they have demonstrated a greater creation of new states needs to be an exacting capacity for responsible government than one in order to prevent a proliferation of weak the former. Indeed, enhancing their credi- states. On the other hand, maintaining the bility may be an effective means of social- status quo may not advance development and ization and go a long way toward making conflict resolution either. Therefore it may be them constructive partners in the larger advantageous to consider appropriate and project of rebuilding the state. carefully calibrated alternative solutions. • Second, in situations of humanitarian dis- aster which have been precipitated by predatory groups or individuals, the inter- Notes national community should acknowledge publicly the sovereignty of the existing 1. Africa’s share of world trade fell from more than state and do more to help the recognized three percent in the 1950s to less than two percent in the mid-1990s. If South Africa is excluded, this government to neutralize the coercive figure falls to only 1.2 %. See World Bank, Can capacity of the threatening group. Africa claim the 21st Century? World Bank, •Third, in cases of humanitarian disaster Washington, 2000, p 20. precipitated by the existing state, it may be 2. M Chege, Remembering Africa, Foreign Affairs, 71(1), 1992, p 148. necessary for the international community 3. I W Zartman, Collapsed states: the disintegration and to intervene and to provide protection to restoration of legitimate authority, Lynne Rienner, the people most at risk. This can be done Boulder, 1995, p 268. by creating a temporary state-within-a-state 4. C Young, Self-determination, territorial integrity, or trusteeship, or by allowing the local and the African state system, in I W Zartman & F Deng (eds) Conflict resolution in Africa, Brookings group that has been targeted to maintain Institution, Washington DC, 1991, pp 320-346. the means to defend itself. The objective 5. J Herbst, States and power in Africa: comparative les- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 46
46 African Security Review 13(2) • 2004
sons in authority and control, Princeton University 19. S Touré, Toward full reafricanisation, Presence Press, Princeton, 2000, p 267. Africaine, Paris, 1959, p 28. 6. H Handelman, The challenge of Third World develop- 20. Putnam, op cit, p 121. ment, 3rd ed, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, 21. E H Carr, The twenty years’ crisis, 1919–1939, 2003, p 82. Macmillan, London, 1956, p 166. 7. S Touval, The boundary politics of independent Africa, 22. J Herbst, War and the state in Africa, International Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1972. Security, 14(4), 1990, pp 117-139. 8. D L Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: 23. C Tilly, Reflections on the history of European University of California Press, 1985), p. 76. state-making in C Tilly (ed) The formation of nation- 9. If there are 53 African countries spread over a con- al states in Western Europe, Princeton University tinent of 30,293,000 sq km, the size of the average Press, Princeton, 1975; and S P Huntington, African state is approximately 571,566 sq km. Political order in changing societies, Yale University Compare this figure with Europe, where there are Press, New Haven, 1968, p 123. 35 countries spread across a territory of only 24. S Touré, The role of the party, in R Emerson & M 10,245,000 sq km. In Europe’s case, the average Kilson (eds) The political awakening of Africa, size is 219,714 sq km, less than half the size of the Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1965, pp 129- average African state. 134. 10. R Bean, War and the birth of the nation state, 25. M Bryden, Reviving the Somali peace process: perspec- Journal of Modern Economic History, XXXIII (1), tives and prospects in the Post-Arta period. Paper pre- 1973, p 204. sented to the 8th Congress of the Somali Studies 11. R Jackson, Quasi-states: sovereignty, international International Association, Hargeisa, 2001, p 2. relations, and the Third World, Cambridge 26. Samuel Makinda writes, for example, that “it is University Press, Cambridge, 1990. tempting to assume that in places like Liberia and 12. The two colonies of Italian Somalia and British Somalia—where anarchy has emerged—a viable Somaliland were united to form the Republic of state might have existed and it disintegrated when Somalia soon after both achieved independence the Cold War ended. Yet the truth is that, in much in 1960. The British Southern Cameroons and the of Africa, the state has not fully emerged. The process of state-making is still in its early stages”. S former French Cameroons were also united in M Makinda, Book Review of Africa in the new inter- 1961 (although this marked the reunification of national order: rethinking state sovereignty and region- German Cameroon, which had been between al security, E J Keller & D Rothchild (eds) in Britain and France in 1916 following the defeat of Survival 39(4), 1997. Germany in World War I). 27. Anonymous, Government recognition in Somalia 13. Cited in Herbst, op cit, pp 258-59. and regional political stability in the Horn of 14. Article III of the OAU Charter called for “respect Africa, Journal of Modern African Studies, 40(2), for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each 2002, pp 247-272. State and for its inalienable right to independent 28. H Adam R Ford, Removing the barricades in existence”. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the Somalia: options for peace and rehabilitation, United African Union, which has now superseded the States Institute of Peace, Washington, 1998. OAU, calls for “respect of borders existing on 29. M Bryden, Undiscovered options: a way forward for achievement of independence”. Somalia?’ Unpublished paper, 2002, p. 2. 15. C Clapham, War and state formation in Ethiopia and 30. According to K Menkhaus, International peace- Eritrea. Paper presented to the colloquium, La building and the dynamics of local and national guerre entre le local et le global. Centre d’Etudes reconciliation in Somalia in W Clarke & J Herbst et de Recherches Internationales, 2000, p 15; R (eds) Learning from Somalia: the lessons of armed Putnam, Making democracy work: civic traditions in humanitarian intervention, Westview 43, Boulder, modern Italy, Princeton University Press, 1997, p 60, “of the seventeen national level and Princeton, 1993; and Herbst, 2002, op cit, pp 29- twenty subnational Somali peace conferences 30. from 1991 to 1995, the only examples of success- 16. Others have argued, however, that the political ful reconciliation occurred at the local and region- foundations which would have served as the basis al level”. for contemporary states were effectively erased by 31. Ibid, p 60. colonialism, or were denied by an elite group of 32. Bryden, 2002, op cit, p 2. Africans determined to embrace the modern state. 33. I S Spears, Reflections on Somaliland and Africa’s See B Davidson, Black man’s burden: Africa and the territorial order, Review of African Political Economy, curse of the nation-state, Times Books, New York, 95, 2003, pp 89-98; and S Touré, The role of the 1992. party in R Emerson & M Kilson (eds) The political 17. Herbst, op cit, p 100. awakening of Africa, Prentice Hall, Englewood 18. R Jackson and C G Rosberg, Sovereignty and Cliffs, 1965, pp 129-134. underdevelopment: juridical statehood in the 34. Noted by P Collier, Economic causes of civil con- African crisis, Journal of Modern African Studies, flict and their implications for policy in C A 24(1), 1986, p 20. Crocker, F O Hampson & P Aall (eds) Turbulent • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 47
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peace: the challenges of managing international conflict, dilemma in B F Walter & J Snyder (eds) Civil wars, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, insecurity, and intervention, Columbia University 2001, p 52. For a journalistic account of the Press, New York, 1999. impressive infrastructure in Eritrea created during 45. In the case of Eritrea, support for independence the war with the central government, see R was extremely high. The results of the referendum, Kaplan, Fate and war in Eritrea, New York Times, announced on 27 April 1993, showed that 99.805 23 May 2000, p. A25; and A Buckoke, Rebels’ % of those participating had voted in favour, and cocktail of socialist theory, The Times (London), 29 only 0.17 % had voted against. See United November1988, p 10. Nations, The United Nations and the Independence of 35. M Bradbury and K Menkhaus, Human development Eritrea, Blue Book Series, Volume XII, United in Somalia, 2001: an overview. Paper presented to Nations Department of Public Information, New the Eighth Congress of the Somali Studies York, 1996, p 29. International Association, Hargeisa, 2001; and 46. Op cit. United Nations Development Programme, 47.K Menkhaus, Somalia: in the crosshairs of the war Human Development Report, 2001: Somalia. on terrorism, Current History, May 2002, p 212. Nairobi, 2001. 48. K Crossley, Why not to state-build new Sudan in 36. M Bryden, New hope for Somalia? The building P Kingston & I S Spears (eds) States within states: block approach, Review of African Political Economy, incipient political entities in the post-Cold War era, 26(79), 1999, p 134. Palgrave, p 263. Forthcoming. 37.L T Munro, Providing humanitarian assistance 49. Menkhaus, 2002, op cit, p 212. behind rebel lines: UNICEF’s eastern Zaire oper- 50. W Finnegan, A world of dust, The New Yorker, 20 ation, 1996–1998 in P Kingston & I S Spears (eds) March 1995, 70, p 70. States within states: incipient political entities in the post 51. This figure for Nigeria’s linguistic diversity comes Cold War era, Palgrave, 2004. from L Diamond, Nigeria: pluralism, statism, and 38. P Collier, Doing well out of war: an economic per- the struggle for democracy in L Diamond, J J Linz spective in M Berdal & D M Malone (eds) Greed & S M Lipset (eds) Democracy in developing coun- and grievance: economic agendas in civil wars, Lynne tries: Africa, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1988, p 33. Rienner, Boulder, 2000, pp 91-111; and N 52. On this issue, see A M Rosenthal, The driver’s Sambanis, Partition as a solution to ethnic war: an license, New York Times, 23 February 1993, 23: empirical critique of the theoretical literature, A21. Others have argued that the drive for seces- World Politics, 54(4), 2004, pp 37-483. sion is motivated by a desire in leaders to rid 39. Sambanis, op cit, p 439. themselves of having to support the poorer 40. C Kaufmann, Possible and impossible solutions to regions of their respective countries. The problem ethnic civil wars, International Security, 20(4), 1996, then is not simply state break-up but the large pp 136-175; and C Kaufmann, When all else fails: number of impoverished communities that would separation as a remedy for ethnic conflicts, ethnic be left behind. See also Collier, 2001, op cit, p partitions and population transfers in the twenti- 152. On the other hand, countries that were once eth century, International Security, 23(2), 1998, pp believed to have limited potential for growth have 120156. on occasion proved to be more viable than expect- 41. Eritreans argue that their special status was dis- ed in the years after partition. See, for example, D missed by Haile Selassie in 1962 when he dis- Milbank, How the Slovaks have taken flight, Globe solved the 1952 federation between Eritrea and and Mail (Toronto), 5 December 1994, A10. Ethiopia. Similarly, the 1972 Addis Ababa peace 53. B Walter, The critical barrier to civil war settle- agreement between Khartoum and the Sudanese ment, International Organization, 51(3), 1997, p Peoples Liberation Army was annulled by 355. President Nimeiri in 1983. See T M Ali, R O 54. Clapham (op cit p14) notes, on the recent conflict Matthews & I S Spears, Failures in peacebuilding: between Ethiopia and Eritrea, that “The ‘invasion’ Sudan (1972–1983) and Angola (1991–1998) in R by Eritrea of what was perceived by Ethiopians as O Matthews & T M Ali (eds) Durable peace: chal- ‘their’ territory...prompted a far wider and more lenges for peacebuilding in Africa, University of nationalist Ethiopian response than could other- Toronto Press, Forthcoming. Inhabitants of British wise have been expected from a small local con- Somaliland also maintain that northern represen- flict over land that most Ethiopians had never tation was effectively ended in the years following heard of”. Indeed, when they have occurred, exter- independence in 1960. nal threats have had an important psychological 42. M Mutua, The Tutsi and Hutu need a partition, impact on the developing world’s existing state sys- New York Times, 30 August 2000, p. A23. tem. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, arbitrary as 43. Africa Watch, Somalia: a government at war with its many of these states are, even the largest and most own people, Africa Watch Committee, New York, capricious of them can elicit some kind of com- 1990; and Africa Watch, Evil days: thirty years of mon effort from their citizens when faced with an war and famine in Ethiopia, Human Rights Watch, external threat. For instance, observers have New York, 1991. remarked how Congolese from various parts of 44. J Snyder and R Jervis, Civil war and the security the country have shown varying degrees of com- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 48
48 African Security Review 13(2) • 2004
mon affinity for the Congolese state when threat- administration, but does not seek formal political ened by the country’s neighbours, Uganda and independence. Rwanda. See I Fisher and N Onishi, Congo’s 60. R C Crook and J Manor, Democracy and decentral- struggle may unleash broad strife to redraw Africa, ization in South Asia and West Africa: participation, New York Times, 12 January 1999, p. A1. accountability and performance, Cambridge 55. The willingness of the EPRDF to tolerate the University Press, Cambridge, 1998. secession of Eritrea was also attributable to the 61. Jackson, 1990, op cit, p 17; and K J Holsti, The fact that the core group within the EPRDF, the state, war and the state of war, Cambridge University Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front, had itself been a Press, Cambridge, 1996, p 79. regionally-based movement that had seriously 62. Cited in Integrated Regional Information considered a future independent Ethiopia. See J Network (IRIN), A Question of Recognition—Part Young, Peasants and revolution in Ethiopia: the Tigray 2, 10 July 2001. Peoples Liberation Front, 1975–1997, Cambridge 63. G Gottlieb, Nations without states, Foreign Affairs, University Press, Cambridge, 1997. 73(3), 1994, pp 101-2. 56. S Van Evera, Hypothesis on nationalism and war, 64. According to Gottlieb, such a system is not as for- International Security, 18(4), 1994, p 17. eign as it sounds: “The deconstruction of rigid 57.M Lind, In defense of liberal nationalism, Foreign boundaries is a feature of current state relations. Affairs, 73(3), 1994, pp 90-91. Soft jurisdictional lines for authority of all sorts 58. The Ethiopian Constitution pledges that “[e]very have long been a characteristic of national life: nation, nationality, and people in Ethiopia has an agencies like the New York Port Authority exercise unconditional right to self-determination, includ- their powers astride the limits of the states of New ing secession”. With the exception of Eritrea, the York and New Jersey”. provision remains untested. See Federal 65. Bryden, 1999, op cit; and Integrated Regional Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, The Constitution Information Network (IRIN), Somalia: are “build- of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 8 ing blocks” the solution? 17 July 1999. December 1994. 66. W Reno, Reinvention of an African patrimonial 59. Bryden, 2002, op cit, p 7. The region known as state: Charles Taylor’s Liberia, Third World Puntland has also established a self-governing Quarterly, 16(1), 1995, pp 112-117. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 51
AFRICA WATCH
WAR, PEACE AND DIAMONDS IN ANGOLA: Popular perceptions of the diamond industry in the Lundas1
JUSTIN PEARCE
Introduction death in battle on 22 February 2002, and the capitulation of UNITA’s remaining leadership. Ten years ago, the diamond fields of north- One aphoristic assessment of the war in eastern Angola were synonymous with civil Angola during the 1990s was that “the gov- war, and more specifically with Jonas ernment had the oil, but UNITA had the dia- Savimbi’s União para a Independência Total monds”. Such an assessment was simplistic de Angola (UNITA). UNITA’s return to war since, while the government never lost control after the Angolan elections of 1992 alienated of Angola’s oil wells, the diamond fields its former Western patrons from the Cold War remained a site of conflict between the two era; without access to the diamond trade, the rebel movement would never have continued sides, a conflict stoked as much by the desire to engage the Forças Armadas Angolanas for personal gain as by the political motives of (FAA / Angolan Armed Forces) and to control the warring parties. substantial tracts of Angolan territory during Following the signing of the the decade that followed. Memorandum of Understanding by UNITA It was this war, together with the insurrec- and the FAA on 4 April 2002, UNITA ceased tion by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to exist as a military force, and Angola – with 2 in Sierra Leone, that drew international atten- the exception of the Cabinda enclave – was tion to the potential of the gem trade to per- definitively at peace. The arguments around petuate conflict, frequently with catastrophic “conflict diamonds” were no longer applicable consequences for civilians living in conflict to Angola now that the country’s diamond zones. Media exposure of the events in Angola fields were, at least nominally, under state and in Sierra Leone popularised the notion of control. “blood diamonds” or “conflict diamonds”, This paper was researched during a ten-day and prompted the United Nations and other trip to various locations in the provinces of sections of the international community to Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul in November seek mechanisms to exclude from internation- 2003. The purpose of this visit was, above all, al commerce any diamonds whose sale might to examine local popular perceptions of the be traced back to armed rebel movements. diamond industry and of its impact on the Sanctions against UNITA were among the fac- region and on its people, and to examine to tors that contributed to the gradual weakening what extent the modalities of diamond pro- of the movement, culminating in Savimbi’s duction established in a time of war continue
JUSTIN PEARCE is a South African freelance journalist and researcher. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 52
52 African Security Review 13(2) • 2004
to influence the conduct of the industry granted diamond prospecting rights through- today. out Angola, Diamang was later restricted to a 50,000 square kilometre area in the Lundas.4 This was and is, however, the part of Angola A brief history of diamond explo- where alluvial diamonds are most abundant, ration in the Lunda region and with its headquarters in Dundo, Diamang’s operations were concentrated in Introduction the north-east of what is now Lunda Norte Early foreign travellers to the Lunda region of province. Angola spoke of mud huts decorated with The company was owned jointly by the shining stones: uncut diamonds, pressed into Portuguese state, and by British, Belgian and the red clay as it dried in the sun. The builders American interests. As a partly state-owned of these houses would have found these enterprise, Diamang reported not to the colo- stones among the gravel of the many rivers nial governor in Luanda, but directly to that flow through the region, rising in Lisbon; its autonomy from the colonial gov- Angola’s central plateau, and making their ernment, and the fact that its principal opera- way north to join the Congo River. tions were in one of the colony’s remotest As late as the end of the nineteenth centu- corners, left Diamang to take on many of the ry, a diamond found in one of those rivers was functions of government in the region now unlikely to be traded outside the region. known as Lunda Norte.5 It was Diamang that Portuguese traders had been in Angola since built the towns of Lucapa, Dundo, and the late fifteenth century, but centuries passed Andrada (now Nzaji); the streets of American- before their presence began to extend into the style detached houses owe nothing to the interior. Even then, the Lunda region, far Portuguese colonial architecture seen else- from the coast and less attractive to where in Angola. A training college for mine Portuguese farmers than the central plateau, technicians was established at Lucapa, as well was among the last areas of Angola to be set- as schools and hospitals in all the main min- tled by Europeans. Colonial hegemony was ing towns. Secondary industry was estab- not fully established in the east until well into lished, most notably a machine plant at Nzaji, the twentieth century;3 the people of the which was among the largest of its kind in region have played a marginal role in the con- Africa. Electricity for the towns and industries solidation of Angolan nationhood, and they came from a hydroelectric station on the retain a strong sense of ethnic and regional Luachimo River at Dundo, and the company identity. ran farms to supply food to its employees. Diamang’s function as provider of The Companhia de Diamantes de Angola employment, social services and infrastructure (Diamang) is of significance because, as we shall see, it is According to one account, the start of dia- still remembered in the region, and has mond extraction for commercial gain in coloured people’s perceptions and expecta- Angola dates to the discovery of seven dia- tions of its successor company, Endiama, and monds in a river in 1912; this led to the estab- of the present-day Angolan state. Historical lishment five years later of Companhia de accounts indicate, however, that Diamang was Diamantes de Angola (Diamang). The compa- far from being a benevolent employer, taking ny extracted alluvial diamonds from riverbeds advantage of the repressive practices of the and hillsides; as its operations developed, it colonial administration in securing cheap started diverting rivers in order to facilitate the labour. For example, in 1947, 5,500 of retrieval of diamonds from the beds. Diamang’s 17,500 African staff were provided Diamonds became Angola’s most valuable by the intervention of the authorities’ (i.e. export, until overtaken by coffee exports fol- through forced labour), and in 1954 the gov- lowing the Second World War. Originally ernment, fearing unrest, ordered Diamang to • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 53
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double the wages of its black employees. The mond industry began to recover again after company was reluctant to do this, even 1985. though the sum of money involved ($410 This recovery was linked to the govern- 000) was only one tenth of the profits paid to ment’s steps towards commercialising the dia- shareholders in the same year.6 mond industry, allowing foreign firms to form It was only in the 1960s, towards the end partnerships with Endiama.8 The Roan of the colonial period, that commercial dia- Selection Trust established operations in the mond exploration began in the Cuango val- Cuango Valley in 1986, and the Sociedade ley, in the west of present-day Lunda Norte. Portugesa de Emprendimentos began explor- As a result, this area never benefited from ing in the Lucapa area the following year. The infrastructure development on the scale that mines at Nzaji and Dundo continued to be was seen in the east of the province. The operated solely by Endiama. But UNITA con- Cuango valley is now known to be potential- tinued to hold territory outside of the main ly the most lucrative source of alluvial dia- urban centres, and the late 1980s also saw the monds in Angola, and indeed among the rebel movement beginning to profit from dia- richest in the world. By 1974, the year before monds minded in areas under its control: independence, Angola was producing 2.4 mil- both from mines abandoned by earlier com- lion carats a year, placing it among the world’s mercial operators, and through taxes imposed major diamond producers.7 on garimpeiros.9 Prospects of peace as the decade drew to a Endiama close, followed by the signing of the Bicesse Following independence in 1975, the MPLA Accord between the government and UNITA government assumed a controlling interest in in 1991, boosted the confidence of investors. Diamang, and eventually, in 1986, replaced it Brazil’s Odebrecht was contracted by with a wholly state-owned company, Endiama to mine in the Cuango, while De Endiama. Production fell as mining opera- Beers invested $50 million in infrastructure, tions were compromised first by the departure also in the Cuango, and pledged a further $50 from Angola of many of the skilled expatriate million over five years for the exploration of personnel, and thereafter by civil war. After kimberlite pipes. Endiama – possibly using UNITA’s South African backers withdrew the money supplied by De Beers – began at from Angola early in 1976, UNITA entered a this point to construct basic social infrastruc- phase of retraining and re-arming, and by the ture, including a clinic and communal water early 1980s once again posed a threat to the points, in Cafunfo, an important mining cen- Angolan state. In the Lundas, two incidents in tre which had been little developed before particular have been noted for the damage independence. they did to the diamond industry: in 1984, At the same time, informal diamond min- UNITA soldiers attacked diamond operations ing (garimpo) expanded rapidly, encouraged in the Cuango area, with expatriate workers both by the improved security situation fol- among those seized as hostages; the following lowing the 1991 cease-fire, and by new laws year, UNITA attacked a diamond sorting cen- that legalised the possession and sale of rough tre in Nzaji. diamonds. Foreigners both from the then The decline of the mining operations in Zaire and from further afield, and former sol- the years following independence was accom- diers of the UNITA and government armies, panied by a gradual collapse of the secondary were among those who tried their luck at find- industry and social infrastructure established ing diamonds in and around the rivers.10 under Diamang. The mining college in Lucapa closed its doors in the 1980s. The The resumption of war in 1992 increasing isolation of the area also made the This period of confidence ended abruptly fol- vehicle plant at Njazi no longer viable. These lowing the September 1992 elections as facilities were not rehabilitated when the dia- UNITA rejected the election results and remo- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 54
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bilised its armed forces. The government had kill the baby when they gave her 25 lashes. largely complied with the disarmament Anyone who wept when they saw this got the requirements of the Bicesse Accord, and was same punishment.”14 caught unprepared for the resumption of con- The signing of the Lusaka peace accord by flict. By the end of 1992, the government held the government and UNITA in 1994 only the mining towns of Saurimo (Lunda increased foreign investor confidence in the Sul), Dundo, Lucapa and Nzaji (eastern Lundas as in the whole of Angola. In the same Lunda Norte), while UNITA took control of year, new legislation in some way reversed the the surrounding countryside and villages, liberalisation measures of 1991, strengthening including many important diamond-bearing the position of Endiama at the expense of areas. Most significantly, UNITA seized the small-time diggers and dealers. Cuango valley.11 The essence of the Lusaka agreement was Outnumbered and outgunned by UNITA, the granting of a limited number of govern- the government enlisted the services of the ment posts to UNITA, in return for the rebels South African mercenary firm, Executive returning the territory under their control to Outcomes, in its attempt to win back territory state administration. With hindsight, it is clear from UNITA. It was with the assistance of that Lusaka failed to take into account the fact Executive Outcomes that the government that the civil war in Angola had by then recovered control of Cafunfo in 1993, passed from being primarily a political con- although the remainder of the Cuango region flict, to being a battle over resources, and in stayed under UNITA control until 1997. particular, diamonds. UNITA lagged behind During this period, the then Zaire assumed a schedule in returning territory to civil admin- particular importance as a conduit for dia- istration; this reluctance has been attributed monds leaving Angola.12 to a desire by influential figures within Accounts by people who were in the UNITA – including generals – to secure a Cuango during this period suggest that the stake for themselves in the mining industry as line between government and UNITA influ- an adjunct to the signed peace deal.15 ence was not always as clear as one might Under military pressure from the FAA, expect. One industry source13 speaks of a UNITA eventually relinquished its last territo- “symbiotic relationship” that existed between ry in the Lunda diamond fields in 1997.16 government and UNITA generals who con- trolled different parts of the Lunda provinces: The diamond industry today a relationship that was determined by com- mercial concerns more than by the supposed Today, the diamond industry in the Lundas political affiliations of the generals from the may be divided into three broad categories: two sides. •Garimpo: digging and sifting gravel by According to one former garimpeiro who hand; worked in the twilight zone between UNITA • Dredging: using light machinery to dig and and government control, foreign dealers paid sort gravel from river beds; and, finally, $250 to UNITA for prospecting rights. He • The formal sector: large-scale, mechanised added that “lots of Senegalese, Malians, Cape open cast mining. Verdeans, Nigerians, Lebanese – they don’t speak Portuguese, they don’t have the papers, Garimpo but they were there in the Lundas.” For most local people, participation in the The same informant described UNITA’s diamond industry takes place at the very low- behaviour in the diamond fields as “disci- est level: garimpo, the Angolan term for arti- plined”. sanal diamond digging. This is sometimes “When they beat a pregnant woman they supported by a patron (patrocinador) who pro- made a hole in the ground – she lay down vides some basic capital investment (tools, or with her belly in the hole so they would not food for when garimpeiros have to travel for • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 55
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days in the bush to diamond sites) in detained Angolans were given a chance to exchange for a percentage of takings. Patrons prove their citizenship by calling on Angolan may be Angolans or foreigners.17 relatives to vouch for them. One source said The digging site is co-ordinated by a site the FAA soldiers were also relying on accent master (dono da terra) who receives a percent- and dialect as way of identifying Angolans: age of diamond earnings. Garimpeiros usually clearly not a reliable indicator when some work in teams of three or four, and the team Angolans may have grown up as refugees in will share the income from a find after the the Congo.21 patron and site master have taken their cut. Garimpeiros speak of being threatened, Dredging beaten or forcibly removed by members of This process (draga in Portuguese) involves the FAA or by private security companies; this specialised machinery to extract and sort grav- happens when the garimpeiros try to dig for el from riverbeds, and therefore a considerable diamonds in areas where the larger commer- investment. In the Cuango area, the machines cial concerns have staked out their claims. are believed to be operated by citizens of the When this happens, garimpeiros will travel, on DRC and other foreigners, in partnership foot, further and further from the urban cen- with generals of the FAA, who provide pro- tres in order to seek out new areas where they tection and ensure that a designated area might be able to dig unhindered by the secu- remains the preserve of one particular opera- rity forces. Some garimpeiros believe that the tor.22 security forces follow them and report back to In the light of the recent expulsion of for- the companies, because the presence of eigners, it is not known to what extent the garimpeiros in an area usually means that the FAA generals were able to prevent the expul- place is a potential source of diamonds. sion of men working under their protection. “When doing garimpo you have to stay Industry sources have suggested that the influ- very alert,” said one garimpeiro in Nzaji, in the ence of the FAA in the Lunda diamond indus- east of the province. “If someone says the try may be in decline since the end of the security is coming, you have to run. If you are armed conflict, with the intelligence services – caught they put you in jail, and to get out you directly answerable to the presidency – have to pay $50.”18 becomingly increasingly influential.23 Subsequent to the field research on which Local sources in Cafunfo have claimed this paper is based, there have been several that those foreigners who were working for reports in the Angolan and international the FAA officers on the dredging operations media about the expulsion of foreign diggers, were exempt from the large-scale expulsion of especially citizens of the DRC, involved in foreigners in early 2004, referred to above.24 At the diamond mining industry.19 Medical per- the same time, however, industry sources have sonnel working for Médecins sans Frontières suggested that the influence of the FAA in the on the Congolese side of the border reported Lunda diamond industry may be in decline that many of the Congolese had suffered bru- since the end of the armed conflict, with the tal treatment, including beatings, rape and intelligence services - directly answerable to body cavity searches, after being rounded up the presidency - becomingly increasingly by the FAA in areas around Cafunfo and Xa- influential. Muteba and before being forced across the border.20 Given the porous nature of the bor- The formal sector der, and the fact that the process of civil regis- Large-scale commercial diamond mining in tration was interrupted during the war years, it the Lunda region has undergone rapid expan- is likely that some Angolans, or people with a sion in the past ten years, as the security situ- claim to Angolan citizenship but lacking the ation stabilised. The largest and requisite documents, could have been longest-established project in this sector is the expelled too, although local sources say that Catoca mine, close to Saurimo, the capital of • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 56
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Lunda Sul province. Catoca is operated by Diamond marketing Sociedade Mineira de Catoca (SMC): a part- In terms of Angolan law, diamonds have to be nership between Endiama, Odebrecht (Brazil), sold to a dealer licensed by Ascorp, the Al Mazi Rossi Sakha (Russia) and Daumonty Angola Selling Corporation. The most promi- Financing (Israel). The mine employs 3,000 nent Ascorp licensees in the Lundas are from Angolans, but it is not known how many of outside of Angola, including citizens of the these are from the Lunda region. Reports indi- DRC, Mali, Senegal, and at least one Israeli: a cate that local people are employed only to man trading by the name of Big Ben in perform basic manual labour. In the words of Dundo. one expatriate humanitarian worker with In Cafunfo, one of the prominent many years’ experience in the Lundas, “the Congolese is a man named Tchatchumbala, locals are not trusted – it is assumed they will who was the buyer for UNITA in the days steal.”25 when UNITA occupied substantial parts of North of Saurimo lies the area – the east- the Lunda region and used diamonds from ernmost part of Lunda Norte – which saw the the area to fund its war effort. Tchatchumbala birth of large-scale diamond mining in left Angola after government forced recap- Angola, and where the formal sector of the tured the diamond fields, but returned follow- industry has again expanded rapidly since the ing the peace accord that the government and end of the armed conflict. The companies UNITA signed in 2002. He is believed still to operating in the area and their parent compa- be doing business with some current UNITA nies are as follows: leaders. • Sociedade Mineira do Lucapa (SML): There are also substantial communities of Endiama and SPE (Portugal); Congolese, as well as Senegalese and Malians, • Projecto Luo: Endiama, Angodiam, working as informal diamond buyers. These Hipergesta (Angola), Almazi Rossissaka people may trade on the street or in private (Russia), Escom (Portugal); homes, and are connected to networks cross- • Projecto Chitotolo: Endiama, Lumanhe ing into the DRC and beyond. There are also (Angola), ITM (UK / Bermuda); some Angolans involved in the informal • Projecto Luarica: Endiama and Trans Hex trade, including at least one official of the (South Africa). Partido de Renovação Social (PRS). The dom- Here as elsewhere, mining companies have inance of the market by foreigners neverthe- been criticised for providing few jobs for local less provokes considerable resentment among people, choosing instead to employ Angolans those people whose origins are in the region. from elsewhere in the country. “They bring Local people in the Lundas are fond of stating the people they know from Luanda to work emphatically that locally-born Angolans are here,” one local man claimed.26 excluded from participation in the industry, In the Cuango area (the western part of even although this is not entirely accurate. Lunda Norte), the commercial exploitation of One theory current in the region is that diamonds is a more recent phenomenon, hav- the foreigners are easy to control; they have ing been started by Endiama only in the no long-term commitment to the region, and 1960s. The return of the area to government if they misbehave, they can be thrown out as control opened the way to large-scale mining, the authorities choose. This was borne out by but this appears still to be at the exploratory the large-scale expulsion of foreign garimpeiros stage. The principal operator in this area is early in 2004, although, as far as can be estab- Sociedade de Desenvolvimento Mineiro de lished, the well-established foreign dealers Angola (SDM), which is owned by the were allowed to remain. By contrast, the Angolan state diamond company Endiama, Lunda-Chokwe have a strong regional identi- and the Brazilian Odebrecht. Large conces- ty, here in one of Angola’s remotest corners. sion areas have been granted to SDM between Were they to become a force within the dia- Cafunfo and Calongo. mond industry, they might start insisting on • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 57
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the state diamond revenues being invested in to the Lundas - this road was once notorious the area. for UNITA ambushes. The road journey time Anger is directed not only towards the for- from Luanda to the Lundas has also been sub- eign traders themselves, but also towards the stantially reduced by the construction of a Angolan government. Ascorp, a state enter- new route between Luanda and Malange. The prise, is believed to have a deliberate policy of resultant increase in trade is most noticeable discrimination against local people when it in Saurimo where the number of shops and comes to issuing diamond-buying licences. It market stalls has increased since the end of the is true that the larger, licensed dealerships war. throughout the Lundas bear the names of In Lunda Norte the picture is different, non-Angolans. Local people believe that a due in part to the frequency of roadblocks substantial part of the region’s diamond pro- where police demand bribes of traders, and in duction leaves through illegal channels, and part to the extremely poor condition of the ask why the government does not exercise road between Lucapa and Dundo. stricter control over the border with DRC. In Saurimo, the provincial government has plans for new infrastructure projects, including the rehabilitation of a hydroelectric The social and economic situation scheme. The governor has expressed the opin- today ion, however, that local people are “difficult” The livelihood of people in the Lundas is and that there is a need to bring labour and overwhelmingly dependent on subsistence management staff from outside. Friction agriculture, and their participation in the dia- between the governor (from UNITA) and the mond industry is seen by most as the best MPLA-dominated bureaucracy is believed to chance of a cash income. However, as already be an obstacle to progress. A beer factory is discussed, opportunities as workers in the for- under construction outside the city, with mal sector and as traders are limited, and South African and Chinese backing. Local garimpeiros are under increasing pressure from people are hopeful that this will bring further the security forces. job opportunities, though it has yet to be seen Garimpeiros say that lack of formal employ- whether the business will show a commitment ment leaves them no alternative but to dig to local labour. diamonds. Also in Saurimo, internationally-funded According to a man in Nzaji: “There’s no NGOs, working principally in the area of pub- work, so I’ve been doing garimpo since I came lic health, provide a limited number of out of the army six years ago. If you find employment opportunities – such openings something, you might get $100 or $200 - it are decreasing in number as donor funding to depends on the diamond. If not, you starve. I Angola declines following the end of the know some garimpeiros who have gone five armed conflict. years without finding anything.” The towns of Lunda Norte are notable for Typically, the wives and female relatives of a sharp contrast between the colonial-era garimpeiros will cultivate crops (usually cassa- neighbourhoods built by Diamang, and the va) for subsistence or to sell, or gather wood slums which have developed subsequently. and burn and sell it as charcoal, to keep their The old Diamang neighbourhoods have been families alive when no diamonds are forth- well maintained, and in the case of Dundo coming.27 and Nzaji, are supplied with electricity from Other income opportunities are limited; the hydroelectric scheme on the Luachimo though, particularly in Lunda Sul, opportuni- River outside Dundo. Outside of these privi- ties to make a living in trade have increased leged quarters, shelter consists of the self-built since the end of the Angolan conflict. Peace cement-block houses typical of the poor bair- has allowed traffic to return to the main road ros (townships) that are attached to most that runs from Luanda to Malange and hence Angolan towns. Here, the streets have never • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 58
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been tarred, and electricity, running water and man in Nzaji. Another participant in the same sewerage are absent. Particularly in Cafunfo, conversation elaborated by saying that “the soil erosion has caused serious damage to the influence of the government in development streets, cutting off some important access policies in this area is the same as that of the routes. companies. They are benefiting from each Social services are all but absent, with the other. The government has built nothing here facilities built by diamond companies since [independence in] 1975.”28 (Diamang and later by Endiama) having dete- While many of the foreign corporations riorated or been put to other purposes. The that work in partnership with Endiama profess hospital in Nzaji, dating from the Diamang to have social responsibility programmes, era and once well-equipped, has deteriorated there is little evidence of any recent social to the point where the wards are dirty with investment in the areas where these corpora- broken windows, and no medical equipment tions are most active. still functions. In Cafunfo, where Endiama began to provide some basic services shortly The military and business before the 1992 elections, a clinic has been The fact that Lunda Norte spent many years commandeered for use as a police station, and under military control, with the battle lines the communal water taps installed in the bair- shifting frequently, has led to a situation ros have long since run dry. where army officers operate unaccountably, Education, too, has been neglected. There using the human and material resources of the are only four schools in the whole of the military to further their own business inter- Cuango municipality, none of them provid- ests. ing classes beyond the fourth year of primary Generals in charge of mining operations schooling. have used FAA soldiers to defend their work- ings; this state of affairs began during the peri- od when FAA troops were deployed to defend The role of the state and its agents territory against UNITA, but has continued The Lunda provinces, particularly Lunda after the end of the armed conflict. This de Norte, provide an extreme illustration of a facto privatisation of the armed forces has in phenomenon widespread in post-war Angola: some cases been given legitimacy by the estab- the near total collapse of the institutions of lishment of private security firms owned by the state, at the same time as individuals the generals, with (former) soldiers providing endowed with the authority of the state manpower. (notably the police and army) use this author- Likewise, after the Angolan government ity to their own private ends. engaged the services of Executive Outcomes to supply mercenaries to lead the post-1992 Social welfare offensive against UNITA’s forces, many of The lack of strong state institutions dates back these mercenaries eventually found them- to the days of Diamang, when the colonial selves staying in the Lundas to defend the administration played only a secondary role diamond workings. Executive Outcomes in the development and provision of services spawned a security firm known as Alfa 5, con- in the area. Even today, there is a perception tracted both by SDM and by the Luarica proj- that the mining companies, rather than the ect, with the South African former state, are responsible for the welfare of the mercenaries playing a senior role. population. This perception was reinforced Local people seldom distinguish between a during the brief period of peace before the FAA soldier and a private security guard. 1992 elections, when Endiama resumed its Sousa Kandonda Kononoko, a traditional role as provider. leader in the Cuango valley, says the notional “The mining companies ought to build transition from war to peace meant little to schools, medical posts, and houses,” said a the people in his area: • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 59
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When UNITA left we thought there extra-judicial detention by the police. There would be peace. After two weeks under are frequent reports of PRS flags being torn the control of the government we heard down – sometimes by officials of the local that SDM had arrived. Not much later, administration – in villages where party Alfa 5 shot someone dead, near the river. activists have been flying them.33 We don’t know why - probably because In Dundo, a senior official of Angola he was on the road by himself and sus- Telecom was demoted in May 2003, apparent- pected of stealing diamonds. People ly because of being a prominent PRS activist. can’t even go to the river any more.29 As is the case elsewhere in Angola, it is According to traditional leaders in Lucapa, taken for granted that government agencies mining companies have evicted people from and resources may be used in MPLA cam- their fields in the nearby villages of Calonda, paigning. Foreign aid workers in Saurimo told Camufue and Samboaje. “Citizens are not how they decided to withdraw from an Aids free to travel on the roads,” a traditional awareness rally in late 2003: the rally, suppos- leader claimed. “The roads are controlled by edly a joint venture between the health the security firms Alfa 5, Teleservice and department and non-governmental organisa- Mambonje.”30 tions, took on a political character when Lolina Mwassanza, a peasant farmer in the MPLA activists arrived with party banners, t- Cuango valley, told how the fields that she shirts and hats.34 used to cultivate were destroyed by security guards working for SDM, which is expanding Extortion into the area where she farmed: In other cases, agents of the state seem to be We asked for compensation but they motivated by personal financial gain, or the gave us nothing. The least we are asking desire to settle personal scores. for is for our husbands and sons to be In one village in the south-western part of given jobs. Now our only means of sur- Lunda Norte province, a church representa- vival is burning charcoal.31 tive told how he had been trying to set up a According to local people near Nzaji, land health post, but the local administrator had was seized without compensation for the demanded payment of $800 in return for per- Chitotolo project.32 mission for the facility to operate. As a result Even in those cases where the police of this, the health post has not opened. and/or FAA were not involved directly in The constant traffic of foreign nationals these evictions, the absence of any function- between Lunda Norte and neighbouring areas ing system of policing and prosecution means of the DRC – notwithstanding Angola’s strict the victims of eviction have no recourse to the passport and visa requirements – gives credi- law in challenging these illegal actions carried bility to reports that Angolan immigration out by the security companies. officials are allowing people to cross the bor- der on payment of a bribe. Politics in the Lundas Police continue to maintain roadblocks, There is also strong evidence to suggest that which are used to extract bribes from traders the police and civil administration are on main routes in and out of Lunda Norte, involved in measures to interfere with the despite promises by the Luanda government activities of the government’s opponents, par- of “the free circulation of people and goods” ticularly the PRS, the most important opposi- as a consequence of peace. tion movement in the Lundas. In the words of one local resident: “one The PRS has documented the murder of cannot talk of democracy in this area. With three of its activists in Lunda Norte within the the controls on the roads, how can you talk of space of six months in late 2002 / early 2003, the free circulation of people and goods? We allegedly by police agents. PRS officials also are outside Angola here. Luanda is another speak of activists experiencing harassment and country. The words and the ways of the one- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 60
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party system still remain here.”35 and legitimise this sector during its rapid In Nzaji, one man spoke of the abduction expansion in the late 1990s. But industry of his 12-year-old niece by a policeman, sources speak of holes in the accounting sys- apparently because the girl had been squab- tem for Ascorp’s revenues; its agents buy dia- bling with the policeman’s young daughter.36 monds with cash dollars.39 Just under half of Ascorp is shared between Israeli magnate Lev Security forces and the diamond industry Leviev, and Omega of Belgium; 51% of the The state security forces have also been corporation is officially state owned, but involved in evicting garimpeiros from the areas according to one industry expert, “that could where they work, despite the lack of a clear mean government, or people in government – legal framework on garimpo, and sometimes the shareholding is not clear”. using excessive force. At the same time, the frequent reports During 2002 garimpeiros at Cacumbi, in from local residents of diamonds leaving the municipal district of Cacolo, were Lunda Norte illegally for the DRC are testi- removed by armed men, allegedly under the mony to Ascorp’s failure to fulfil its statutory supervision of FAA and former UNITA gener- mandate as buyer of diamonds on behalf of als, who threatened to shoot if the diggers did the Angolan state. One industry observer not leave. At Sasuaha in the Saurimo munici- attributed this to the fact that the prices paid pal district, members of the Civil Defence for diamonds by Ascorp are less than what chased away garimpeiros and took their dia- diggers can obtain by crossing into DRC.40 monds. Endiama’s role in relation to the diamond The large-scale repatriation of foreigners industry parallels that of the state oil compa- working as garimpeiros early in 2004 attracted ny, Sonangol, in the Angolan petroleum condemnation from the authorities in DRC, industry: a state agency which participates in who accused the Angolan security forces of mineral extraction in partnership on a project- using excessive force and ignoring legal proce- by-project with foreign concerns, which sup- dures.37 These charges were broadly denied by ply much of the capital and technical needs. the Angolan government. The Angolan As with Sonangol, Endiama’s internal deal- ambassador to the DRC, Mawete João ings and its business with its partners are con- Baptista, did not deny that excessive force had ducted in an atmosphere of secrecy; there is been used, blaming such instances on “people no clear data available to facilitate comparison out of control that were acting on their own”. between Endiama’s revenues and its contribu- He also said that the government “has called tions to the treasury. on foreign nationals in general, and DRC cit- izens in particular who wish to be involved in Popular perceptions and political diamond mining operations in Angola to response enter into partnerships with legally set up Angolan companies” – in other words, not The experience of the people of the Lunda ruling out the continuing involvement of the provinces in relation to the Luanda govern- Congolese and other foreigners in Ascorp.38 ment and to the diamond industry has nur- tured a widespread sentiment that the region State corporations is distinct from the rest of Angola, and that its The Angolan state asserts itself in the Lunda people are the victims of a process of exploita- provinces – and particularly in the remoter tion of which the beneficiaries are the other regions of Lunda Norte – principally through regions of the country, but particularly the the state-controlled corporations Ascorp and ruling elite in Luanda: Endiama. We are the slaves of the MPLA. People Ascorp, which has the exclusive legal right cannot move freely, dress well, buy meat to buy diamonds from the informal sector of or a bicycle. We are beaten because of the trade, was set up supposedly to regulate the diamonds. The diamonds are the • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 61
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property of the people of Lunda Norte. far the most successful of the new parties that All we of the east are ex-combatants, yet emerged in the multi-party era, lacking the we don’t have the right to mine. Those hegemonic force which the MPLA and of us who fought in the south never UNITA in the areas which had been under brought back a head of cattle or a bag of their military control up to the signing of the maize from the south. 41 Bicesse accords. And, The relative success of the PRS is due The political parties we know in Angola entirely to its ethnic and regional support base are stealing Angola’s wealth and causing in the Lundas, which in turn is attributable to suffering, especially here in the Lundas. the sense of political and economic exclusion We lack necessities like hospitals, roads felt by people in that region. Angola’s three and schools, and work opportunities. largest ethnic groups – the Ovimbundu, the What business can come here, when we Mbundu and the Bakongo – were historically are the lords of the land? Our wealth is associated, respectively, with UNITA, the diamonds – Alfa 5 is armed against us.42 MPLA and the FNLA; while PRS officials And from King Muatchissengue wa Tembo: boast of having support among all of Angola’s We are being colonised by black provinces and ethnic groups, the PRS’s sup- Angolans. We were already colonised by port is essentially among the Lunda-Chokwe, the Portuguese. Now it is worse.43 the country’s fourth largest ethnic group who Factors which have fuelled such perceptions historically were marginalised from politics. of separateness and exploitation include: The PRS has to an extent been able to • The geographical isolation of the Lundas, invoke its rights as a political party with rep- leading to its late experience of colonial resentation in parliament, and negotiate some rule; of the obstacles put in its way by the local • The fact that, for decades, Diamang played authorities. In contrast to the presence of PRS a more significant role than the colonial structures throughout the region, civil society government; organisation remains extremely weak, with no • The ethno-linguistic coherence of the area significant local NGOs in the region. This can as distinct from the rest of Angola – and, be attributed to the region’s isolation from the particularly, as distinguished from the cre- rest of Angola as well as the difficulties in olised culture of the Angolan coastal elite. communication among the widely dispersed Activists defending the interests of the region diamond producing centres of the Lundas – and its people frequently draw comparisons particularly given the heavy police presence between the Lunda provinces and Cabinda, on the roads, and the furtherance of MPLA which famously supplies the greater share of party political interests by the administration. Angola’s oil revenue, while seeing little invest- The foreign NGO presence in the Lundas ment in return. But in contrast to Cabinda, is concentrated in and around Saurimo, and is where a separatist rebellion pre-dates Angola’s concerned principally with public health independence from Portugual, separatist senti- rather than wider-reaching political and social ments are not normally heard in the Lundas. issues. Nor has the church in the Lundas been Dissent has found expression chiefly a focus for political mobilisation as has been through the emergence of the PRS. Founded the case particularly in Cabinda, but in other in 1990 under a new political dispensation parts of Angola too.44 People in the region are that did away with the one-party system that divided among a number of religious denomi- had prevailed in Angola since independence, nations (Catholic, Evangelical, Seventh Day the PRS took some 2.7% of the vote in Adventist), in contrast to many other areas of Angola’s first, and only, multi-party parlia- Angola where the Catholic Church has a clear mentary elections in 1992. While this was a majority. Thus there is no one church that long way behind the results achieved by the might act as a unifying social force and an MPLA and UNITA, the PRS proved to be by advocate for justice, as the Catholic Church • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 62
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has done elsewhere in Angola. In fact, far from occasioning a fundamen- In this absence of civic organisation to tal change in the pattern of exploitation in the provide a voice for the region, the situation in diamond fields of the Lundas, the end of the the Lunda provinces remains largely unknown war has served to legitimise the status quo in in the rest of Angola and the world at large. the eyes of international observers and partic- ipants in the industry. It was the experience of wartime Angola which – along with the com- Conclusion: Beyond ‘blood dia- parable and contemporaneous experience of monds’ Sierra Leone – drew the attention of rich dia- The end of the armed conflict between the mond buying countries to the consequences Angolan government and UNITA has provid- of buying diamonds from armed rebel move- ed the first opportunity since independence ments: during the 1990s, Sierra Leone’s for the creation of a stable and regulated envi- Revolutionary United Front as well as UNITA ronment, in which Angola in general, and the bought arms and maintained armies on the Lunda provinces in particular, might be able profits from the diamonds which ended up on to benefit from the diamond wealth of the the international market. This led to pressure region. Attaining this objective would involve for internationally binding mechanisms to the initiation of a transparent process for the keep such “conflict diamonds” out of the allocation of diamond concessions, with global trade. The culmination of these efforts room both for commercial exploitation and was the Kimberley Process, a voluntary agree- garimpo; a transparent system of revenue man- ment between states and companies involved agement; legally enforced fair labour practices both in the production and in the marketing for employees of the large commercial com- of diamonds; the Kimberley Process has been panies; and a level of social investment befit- recognised as the most effective means yet ting the region’s needs. Social investment devised to ensure that diamonds sold by ille- ought to take into account the training needs gal armed movements do not end up on the of the diamond industry, so as to improve world market. local people’s employment prospects in the The effectiveness of the process depends, industry. among other things, on the fact that it is In reality, none of this has happened. endorsed by governments. But linked to this Despite the notional return of peace to the endorsement is the fact that the Kimberley Lundas, the management of the diamond Process defers to national sovereignty; it has industry retains many of the characteristics no mechanism to keep a check on abuses that that it acquired during the period when the are carried out by, or with the complicity of, diamond fields were both a prize and a the state and its agents. The concept of “blood weapon in the civil war: the control of the dia- diamonds” is one which has hitherto been mond fields and their populations by force of associated with armed conflict. The lesson of arms; the absence of any kind of functioning the Lundas today is that a notional peace is no legal framework to protect the rights of dia- guarantee that the exploitation of diamond mond workers and the population at large; resources will be done in a way that respects the lack of any functioning civil administra- basic human rights, and which contributes to tion (beyond the level of mere bureaucracy) in the development and well-being of the dia- most parts of the Lunda provinces; and the mond-producing region, and the country as a domination of the Angolan diamond trade by whole. Perhaps it is time to re-think the idea secretive networks operating on the margins of what constitutes a “blood diamond”. of the law, but ultimately to the benefit of the members of political elites. At the same time, Angola itself continues to be defrauded as Notes inadequate controls allow unknown but sub- 1. A previous electronic version of this article was stantial quantities of diamonds to leave the released by the African Security Analysis country illegally. Programme at the Institute for Security Studies as • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 63
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a situation report on 6 May 2004. For the purpos- ations carried out in these two provinces, another es of this publication, and as a result of a subse- 344 foreigners were also detained, of whom 139 quent visit to the country, the author has kindly were from Guinea, 121 from Gambia, 34 from updated a number of sections in the article. Mali, 15 from Sierra Leone, 13 from Senegal, and 2. The Cabinda conflict, between the FAA and fac- 10 from Cote d’Ivoire. The rest came from the tions of the Frente para a Libertação do Enclave Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, de Cabinda (FLEC), has always been geographi- Rwanda, Nigeria, Sudan and Guinea-Bissau. […] cally and politically separate from the FAA - The disclosure of these figures emerges soon after UNITA conflict and has no bearing on the situa- the Angolan government made a report at the end tion in the Lunda provinces. of last week, guaranteeing that it will not allow the 3. As Davidson points out ‘when, in the mid- illegal entry of foreigners into the country. “The dle1960s, the people of the east began responding government is going to continue to welcome all to the national movement, their experience of the foreign citizens who wish to settle and carry out colonial system was often less than forty years useful activities in Angola, but it will not allow old’. See B Davidson, In the eye of the storm: Angola’s those who cross the border illegally to carry out people, Longman Group Limited, London, 1972, p activities that are liable to destabilize the country 109. from an economic and social point of view,” said 4. A Hodges, Angola from Afro-stalinism to petro-dia- the document. To put an end to this “intolerable mond capitalism. African Issues, The Fridtjof situation,” the government recalled that the armed Nansen Institute & The International African forces and the police launched a “widespread Institute, James Currey, Oxford, 2001, p 148. operation” at the end of last year, which started in 5. The division of the Lunda region into Lunda the provinces of Bié and Huambo but that has Norte and Lunda Sul came only after Angolan also already been extended to the provinces of independence, in 1978. Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malange, and Cuanza 6. B Davidson, op cit, p 139. Sul. 7. A Hodges, op cit, p 148. 20. Médecins sans Frontières, MSF Statement, April 8. C Dietrich, Inventory of formal diamond mining 2004. in Angola, in J Cilliers & C Dietrich (eds), Angola’s 21. Interviews, April 2004. war economy. The role of oil and diamonds, Institute 22. Interviews in Cafunfo, November 2003. for Security Studies, South Africa, 2000, p 144. 23. Interview in Johannesburg, January 2004. 9. A Hodges, op cit, p 152. 24. Interviews, April 2004. 10. C Dietrich, op cit, p 146. 25. Interview in Saurimo, November 2003. 11. A Hodges, op cit, p 154. 26. Interview in Lucapa, November 2003. 12. Ibid, p 152. 27. Interviews in Nzaji, November 2003. 13. Interview in Johannesburg, January 2004. 28. Interview, Nzaji, November 2003. 14. Interview in Benguela, December 2002. 29. Interview, Cuango town, November 2003. 15. C Dietrich, op cit, p 149. 30. Interview, Lucapa, November 2003. 16. Ibid. 31. Interview, Cuango town, November 2003. 17. Interviews in Cafunfo, Dundo and Nzaji, 32. Interview, Nzaji, November 2003. November 2003. 33. Interviews, Cafunfo, November 2003. 18. Interview in Nzaji, November 2003. 34. Interview, Saurimo, November 2003. 19. Lusa news agency, Luanda, 12 April 2004. “Since 35. Interview, Dundo, November 2003. the end of 2003, in the context of Operation 36. Interview, Nzaji, November 2003. Brilliant, which aims to put an end to illegal dia- 37.According to Digital Congo website, Antoine mond prospecting, and as of early April 2004, the Ghonda, the minister of foreign affairs and inter- Angolan authorities have repatriated about 60,000 national cooperation, has said that he has written foreign citizens who have come from 14 African to the Angolan authorities informing them of the countries. Most of the detentions were in the dia- concerns of the Congolese government concern- mond-rich provinces of Lunda Norte and Lunda ing the expulsion of some 10,000 citizens of the Sul, where the Angolan military and police forces DRC. The DRC foreign minister stated that there detained 49,656 foreign citizens, of whom only is a method for repatriating people in irregular sit- 600 have not yet been repatriated. The figures, uations in a foreign country and that sending which refer to the situation on 9 April, were them to borders must not be done in inhuman revealed by a source from the Angolan Armed conditions. The minister made it known that Forces’ chief of general staff, quoted by Jornal de Kinshasa is waiting for reactions from Luanda Angola. The great majority of illegal foreigners after sending the letter to his Angolan counter- detained in the provinces of Lunda Norte and part. It is worth noting that the Voice of the Lunda Sul came from neighbouring Democratic Voiceless for the defence of human rights spoke Republic of Congo (DRC), to which 48,712 peo- out to denounce the atrocities perpetrated against ple were repatriated in the last few months. Of the Congolese by Angolans and castigated the role these repatriated people 36,129 were men, 6,870 of the Angolan authorities. Dolly Ibefo, the were women and 5,713 were children. In the oper- deputy chairman of this nongovernmental organ- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 64
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ization for the defence of human rights, even said zen who is legally established and abides by the on Radio Okapi that he learned about the death laws in force in Angola can be affected by this of Congolese citizens or the imprisonment of oth- operation, which must in no way be seen as a ers. According to him, the Angolan army carried show of xenophobia.” Ambassador Mawete João out several operations in villages hosting Baptista then advised that his government has Congolese nationals, surrounding houses and dis- called on foreign nationals in general, and DRC lodging the inhabitants under military escort. The citizens in particular who wish to be involved in expelled Congolese did not have the right to carry diamond mining operations in Angola to enter leave with their belongings. According to some into partnerships with legally set up Angolan com- sources, those who wanted to resist were tortured panies. He also refuted allegations that expelled and made to suffer degrading treatment. Digital DRC citizens were the target of human rights vio- Congo website, 30 January 2004. lations and loss of property, saying that any cases 38. According to the Jornal de Angola, about 350,000 of indiscipline or excessive use of power had to be DRC nationals living illegally in diamond rich blamed on people out of control that were acting areas are about to be repatriated. This has been on their own. During the news conference, the announced at a news conference by Mawete João Angolan diplomat took the opportunity to recall Baptista, Angolan ambassador to the DRC. the ties linking the two countries which, he Ambassador Mawete Joao Baptista further noted emphasized, go back several centuries. He that “this is a decision by the Angolan govern- explained that more than 15,000 DRC citizens ment that already has been relayed to the DRC already have been repatriated and the operation is government.” This senior government official said carrying on. He also disclosed that in addition to that three months prior to the implementation of the DRC citizens, there are 90,000 other foreign this decision, the Angolan government called on nationals in a similar situation. Most of them hail all interested persons, both Angolans and foreign from countries in West Africa, and Mawete João nationals, to legalize their gainful activities or to Baptista made it clear they too would be sent set them up in less sensitive areas where they home directly. Jornal de Angola, 6 February 2002 could earn their living more peacefully and with 39 Interviews in Johannesburg, January 2004. greater dignity. He stressed that the government 40 Interviews in Johannesburg, January 2004. took this measure as part of its plan to restore 41 Interview in Cuango, November 2003. authority to all parts of Angolan territory now that 42 Interview with Soba Domingos António, Cuango, the conflict is over, with a view to advancing eco- November 2003. nomic and financial recovery, and using the coun- 43 Interview in Itengo, November 2003. try’s resources for the benefit of the population. 44 For example, the Catholic Church played a lead- The ambassador to the DRC also pointed out that ing role during 2001 and 2002 in uniting opinion only duly authorized individuals and companies against the conflict between the Angolan govern- carrying the appropriate diamond mining licenses ment and UNITA, and advocating for the resump- are allowed to set up their operation in the above tion of peace talks. mentioned areas. He added that “no foreign citi- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 65
AFRICA WATCH
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO Update on Ituri
HENRI BOSHOFF AND THIERRY VIRCOULON
Introduction targeting of MONUC, which has been sub- jected to 20 separate attacks, the last of which Since November 2003, the Ituri Brigade1 of was launched by militiamen of the Front for the United Nations (UN) Mission in the National Integration (FNI) on 7 May 2004. Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) This article focuses on the process of has consolidated its position in Bunia and restoring government in Ituri, the current sta- started preparing to deploy to the rest of the tus of Ituri’s armed groups and MONUC’s Ituri district. The overall political and military role in this district. situation has not, however, improved signifi- cantly. Since January 2004, two high-level del- egations, one of which was headed by Restoring government in Ituri Vice-President Ruberwa, have been sent to Ituri by the Transitional Government of the Since January 2004 there has been some Democratic Republic of Congo (TGoDRC) to progress, albeit limited, in stabilising the polit- assert its administrative control over the ical situation in Ituri. On 17 December 2003, region. On 26 May 2004, President Kabila the CCGA in Bunia agreed in principle to appointed Governors and Deputy Governors launch a pilot disarmament project. Since for the Democratic Republic of Congo then MONUC, the Pacification and (DRC), including Ituri. Verification Commission of the Ituri Interim It seems that the armed groups generally Administration (IIA) and members of CCGA accept the transitional process in the DRC, have designated assembly areas for the Ituri although clashes between them continue in armed groups as a precursor to their handing various parts of the district, notwithstanding in their arms. An operational plan for disar- the deployment of the Ituri Brigade. At a meet- mament and community reintegration was ing of the Committee for the Co-ordination of adopted on 20 January this year. However, the the Armed Groups in Ituri (CCGA) that took IIA has not yet succeeded in extending its place in Kinshasa during the week of 10 May reach much beyond Bunia, and even within 2004, 20 leaders of the militia groups signed an Bunia the armed groups are still competing for agreement with the TGoDRC to disarm and political power.2 There are several reasons for participate in the county’s transitional process. this, including lack of trust on the part of the However, a new trend has become apparent community, the unwillingness of most of the among militia hardliners. This is the deliberate armed groups controlling Ituri to accept the
HENRI BOSHOFF is a military analyst at the ISS. THIERRY VIRCOULIN is a technical assistant with the European Delegation to the DRK. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 66
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IIA, the absence of a police force or army, and Current status of armed groups in limited logistical and technical capacity in the Ituri (May 2004) IIA. Also, the role to be played by the IIA is Ituri is home to 18 distinct ethnic groups, as yet undefined with the Hema/Gegere and Lendu/Ngiti com- On 24 February 2004, the Special munities together representing about 40% of Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the inhabitants. The other major groups are the DRC, Ambassador Swing, requested the Bira, the Alur, the Lugbra, the Nyali, the President Kabila to extend the reach of the Ndo-Okebo and the Lese. Although the state’s authority by appointing a governor for importance of ethnic identity is growing, a Province Orientale and a district commissioner new group has emerged, the non-originaires— for Ituri. During a visit to Ituri early in 3 “outsiders” who were not born in Ituri. The March 2004, an inter-ministerial delegation Hema, Lendu and Nande groupings largely from Kinshasa expressed strong support for seek to set agendas that serve their own ends. the inclusion of the district in the broader They are playing off the various outside transitional process. It announced that Ituri’s groups against one another, and change sides administration would be transferred from the as their interests dictate.5 Table 1 below sets IIA to the central government through the out details of the different armed political appointment of a provincial governor and a groups: their leaders, ethnic connections, district commissioner. During the visit, the areas of operation and estimated strength. delegation also extended an invitation to all Although the Ituri armed groups are super- armed groups to visit Kinshasa to resume dia- ficially alike (all having young commanders, logue with the TGoDRC. On 14 May 2004 child soldiers and light equipment), this is not President Kabila announced the names of the actually the case. An important difference is governors of the provinces, which included that while some groups are ethnically–based, that of Baruti Amisi of the Rally for Congolese others have no specific ethnic connection. Democracy–Goma (RCD–G) for Province The summary opposite provides further dis- Orientale,3 on the same day that representatives tinctions between the groups. of seven armed groups, responding to the del- egation’s invitation, had signed an agreement UPC to disarm and participate in the transitional The northern Hemas, who control the Djugu process (referred to in the Introduction). territory, split into two groups To end the culture of impunity and restore (UPC–Thomas Lubanga and UPC–Floribert justice in Ituri, nine magistrates were sworn in Kisembo) in December 2003. The head of on 30 January 2004 in Bunia. MONUC and the UPC forces, Floribert Kisembo, had per- its partners have refurbished the Bunia prison, sonal grievances against the leader of the the courthouse, the police headquarters and UPC, Thomas Lubanga. He tried to bring off the judges’ accommodation. The TGoDRC a coup within the party, but failed, as most of has not released the funds to pay the salaries the militia remained loyal to Thomas of judicial staff in Bunia, however, although Lubanga, even though he is based in the European Union has paid the first instal- Kinshasa for several months of each year. ment. MONUC will continue to hold UPC–Kisembo is a minor armed group that detainees in Bunia on behalf of local authori- is not very effective. ties until the latter are able to take over this responsibility. In addition, MONUC has PUSIC trained 81 police officers in Bunia, and is pro- Kisembo officially runs the southern Hemas viding advisers to support local police. militia, but Chief Kahwa, the former presi- However, the impact of this assistance has dent, is still very much in command. There been limited because the local police lack were some dissident elements within PUSIC, essential equipment (and are very inadequate- but they have recently been neutralised. ly paid).4 PUSIC controls a part of the Irumu and • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 67
Boshoff & Vircoulon 67
ARMED POLITICAL ETHNIC CON- LEADERAREA OF OPERA- ESTIMATED GROUP NECTION TION STRENGTH UPC: Union of Hema/Gegere UPC–Lubanga Djugu Territory, Iga 3,000 Congolese Patriots UPC–Kisembo Barriere and Fataki PUSIC: Party for Hema Chief Kahwa Irumu, Djugu and 2,000 Unity and Mandro Chomia Safeguarding of the Kisembo in the Integrity of Congo South FPDC: Popular Alur and Lugbara Thomas Unen Aru and Mahangi north 300 Force for Chen of Ituri Democracy in Congo FNI: Front for Lendu Floribent Njabu Reti and Kwandroma 27,000 National Integration Ngabu FRPI: Patriotic Ngiti Dr Adirodo Beni 9,000 Forces of Resistance in Ituri FAPC: People’s Mixed Commander Aru 6,000 Armed Forces of Jerome Congo Bakonde APC: Congolese Non Iturian Irumu and Mambasa 300 Peoples Army
Djugu territories and the main harbour on the APC Congolese shore of Lake Albert. Now called the FARDC, the APC militia con- trols the southern part of the district (the FNI Irumu territory and part of the Mambasa ter- These are northern and southern Lendu mili- ritory), and is composed of non-Iturians from tias who joined together in 2003 but divided Kivu. They are expected to be integrated into up again at the beginning of this year. They the Congolese army at some point in the disagreed on strategy, and their commanders future. therefore decided to return to their independ- ent status. Nevertheless, they are still allied on ethnic grounds. Ituri: a “no peace, no war” situation The present situation in Ituri is one of “no FPDC peace, no war”. Violence continues outside This is an Alur militia, allegedly run by Bunia, and during January 2004 MONUC Thomas Unen Chen. Although this group was attacked several times by the UPC in Nizi, purported to protect the Alur people when Drodo and Iga Barriere. The combatants the FNI started attacking them, the FPDC has claimed they had been ordered to do so by never been able to mobilise a significant force. Commandant Ngatanga, who had replaced It is regarded as a “fake” force created by Floribert Kisembo. The FNI combatants have Kampala. been keeping a low profile, and do not seem particularly keen on increasing their political FAPC visibility in Bunia, although their militias The FAPC is a militia controlling the Aru ter- have continued to intimidate the population ritory and part of the Mahagi territory, which in Kpandroma, Reti and surrounding areas. is on the DRC border with Uganda. It is led However, when they attacked MONUC on 8 by Jerôme Kakwavu with the support of the May 2004 near Kobokabo, MONUC retaliat- UPDF. ed, killing ten FNI combatants.6 • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 68
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On the inter-militia side, there has been a es and instruments of war have not been degree of stabilisation. Clashes between mili- removed. In Bunia, while some areas are still tias are rare, as harassing civilians for money, under the control of the UPC, providing food and women has become the main activ- some sort of stability, the local population ity instead. Two massacres whose main motive continues to be harassed by this militia group. was robbery took place in October 2003 and It is hoped that the IIA will take advantage of January 2004. All the militia leaders claim to the deployment of MONUC troops to want to be integrated into the new dispensa- assume authority over all the territories. This tion, as part of either the army or the govern- would enable the new District Administration ment. However, while the majority of troops to provide some basic public services to the hope to become soldiers in the new unified local population. Congolese Armed Forces, this is unlikely to Recent events, such as the appointment of happen. [As a result] Realising this, the mili- a governor for Province Orientale and the new tias have adopted a survival strategy, keeping agreement signed between the TGoDRC and particularly tight control over the large and the Armed Political Groups are positive steps. rich areas in the district. Nevertheless, the local dynamics remain for On the international front, while a funda- war rather than against it. The foreign powers mental pillar of the transition in the DRC is that have been fuelling and manipulating the that Kampala (Uganda) and Kigali (Rwanda) conflict have not really changed their behav- should no longer interfere in Ituri, they con- iour, despite their official pledge to withdraw tinue to do so in important ways. Kampala is from the DRC. still the place where militia leaders gather There are currently four major concerns when they must take important decisions, and that need to be addressed: foreign influence Rwandan troops have recently been spotted in and meddling; the militias; ethnic rivalry Kivus. between the Lendus and Hemas; and, finally, commercial interests. Foreign influences need MONUC’s response to be diluted by exerting diplomatic pressure Since November 2003, MONUC’s Ituri on neighbouring countries and stopping the Brigade has consolidated its position in Bunia flow of weapons into Ituri. The militia leaders and deployed to seven locations (Iga Barriere, who are responsible for continued killings Bogoro, Fataki, Kpandoroma, Mahagi must be arrested and sentenced, and their Marabo, Tchomai Aru and Mongbwalu) in the troops disarmed. The ethnic rivalry between interior, as part of Step 4 of the Concept of the Lendus and Hemas could be greatly Operations. The security environment in reduced by sorting out the land issue and Bunia has improved tremendously since the sidelining the most radical of their leaders. Ituri Brigade started round-the-clock foot Finally, satisfying the commercial interests patrols across the town. It is very important would mean brokering a fair deal among the that the Brigade, which has a strength of 4,800 economic players, and putting businesses on soldiers (four battalions), attack helicopters formal footing. and a Chapter 7 mandate, should continue to ensure stability in the Ituri district. Notes 1. The Ituri Brigade consists of 4,500 soldiers from Conclusion MONUC. 2. Fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on the Although the international community has UN Mission in the DRC, 25 March 2004. injected enough peacekeepers into Ituri to 3. Reliefweb, 19 May 2004. defuse conflict and stop massacres on the 4. Fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on the scale witnessed during 2003, much remains to UN Mission in the DRC, op cit. 5. Ituri covered in blood, Human Rights Watch, July be done to achieve a sustainable local peace 2003. process in Ituri. Many of the underlying caus- 6. Reliefweb, 10 May 2004. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 69
AFRICA WATCH
BURUNDI BEYOND THE TRANSITION? The challenges of a return to peace JENNY CLOVER
Introduction tion came to an end on 31 October 2004. However, this has not happened. An all- inclu- Current discussions on Burundi have been sive cease-fire has still to be achieved, while a centred on whether the democratic elections large number of the practical steps needed to scheduled for 1 November 2004 will and build general confidence in the peace process should go ahead. These elections will fulfil the have not been completed. Among these are provisions of the Arusha Peace Accords and disarmament and demobilisation; the return signal the end of the current transitional of refugees and internally displaced persons; process. In the debate, the transitional govern- the drawing up of a new post-transitional con- ment of Burundi (TgoB), the political parties, stitution and its approval by a referendum; the media, civil society organisations and sea- soned observers have pointed to some of the and voter registration. relative advantages as well as the dangers of However, over and above these immediate sticking to the time frame set by Arusha. and technical concerns are the imperatives of Arguments for and against abound, for exam- planning, in a wide-ranging and detailed way, ple in the negotiations held recently in for the country’s medium and long-term Pretoria, South Africa, and in the subsequent development. A well-designed strategy is need- Heads of State meeting in Dar-es-Salaam, ed to address such problems as unequal access Tanzania. However, while the debate is to political, social and economic opportuni- focused entirely on the issue of elections, very ties. Paradoxically, for a country that is rush- little thought has been expended on what lies ing to hold elections in the coming months, a ahead for Burundi in the post-transition number of critical issues have not been phase. addressed. These include plans for the physi- To be sure, the technical arguments pre- cal reconstruction of the country’s infrastruc- sented in the debate as to the feasibility or ture, and the establishment of a desirability of sticking to the 1 November reconstruction and development unit to 2004 deadline identify several critical issues implement these projects. Overall it seems related to the sustainability of the peace that transitional and political issues on the process. When the length of the transitional one hand, and the personal interests of power- period was laid down in the Arusha Accords, seeking elites on the other, predominate at the it was assumed that all the necessary condi- expense of the needs of Burundians. tions that would make free and fair elections Yet the development of plans to recon- possible would be met by the time the transi- struct and develop is essential for the long-
IAN SPEARS is a researcher in the African Security Analysis Programme at the ISS. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 70
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term sustainability of the peace process, par- of impunity continues, as rebels and the mili- ticularly in the post-transition phase. tary increasingly make armed attacks on civil- Currently the government does not appear to ians, including women, children and the have any clear strategy for the future, and has elderly. One of the most under-reported of little by way of funds to tackle Burundi’s these war crimes (which is also a human rights many needs (including the immediate require- violation) is rape, which is on the increase in ments for the 1 November 2004 elections). Burundi. This can be directly attributed to the The design and implementation of wide-rang- civil war and to a widespread and growing ing programmes to assist the repatriation and belief that having sexual intercourse with very resettlement of refugees, for example, and the young girls is a cure for HIV/Aids. Most of necessary rehabilitation of transport, health the cases of rape involve girls under the age of and education services and infrastructure 18. Bringing the perpetrators to justice is also should be urgent priorities. problematic, as many of the judges support This article focuses on the repatriation and the widely-held view that rape is not a serious resettlement of refugees as a critical compo- crime. nent of a sustainable peace process in There are, however, a few positive indica- Burundi, both in the short as well as the long tions. Some measures have been, or are being, term. taken. Among them are the establishment of a reception facility for refugees and sinistrés The return and resettlement of IDPs (those affected by war); the creation of a National Commission for the Rehabilitation and refugees: A major humanitarian of Sinistrés; and the appointment of a sub- challenge commission (as part of the latter) to act on In November 2003, Burundi’s President land issues and provide special assistance to Ndayizeye and Pierre Nkurunziza, the leader vulnerable groups. of the National Council for the Defence of Democracy–Forces for the Defence of Internally displaced persons (IDPs) Democracy (CNDD–FDD), signed a cease- Coinciding with the difficult political envi- fire agreement. This led to a reduction in the ronment in Burundi is the pressing need to intensity of the long-running civil war, and arrange for the return and resettlement of awakened tentative hopes for peace. But internally displaced persons (IDPs) and although this agreement has led to improved refugees. This will constitute the major security in parts of the country, the situation humanitarian challenge for the country in communities living outside Bujumbura throughout 2004. continues to cause serious concern. One In recent months, large groups of IDPs insurgent group, the Party for the Liberation have begun returning to their original homes. of the Hutu–National Liberation Front The number of people in Burundi’s camps for (Palipehutu–FNL) of Agathon Rwasa, remains the displaced dropped by half between outside the peace process, so despite the rela- 2002–2004, from 281,000 to 140,000 in May tive calm in most provinces, fighting between 2004. However, these findings are the result of the army and the FNL continues in the a UN Organisation for the Coordination of province of Bujumbura Rural. This has result- Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) survey that ed in the displacement of some 50,000 peo- covered only IDPs who were in the camps ple. An average of 20,000 people leave their during March and April 2004, and omitted homes each week, sometimes for just a day, those temporarily displaced because of fight- sometimes for longer, to flee the fighting. ing, especially in Bujumbura rural province. Trapped in an apparently endless cycle of In addition, IDPs living with host families violence, human rights abuses, poverty and were also excluded from the survey. humiliation, Burundians have lost much of Of those persons living in the IDP camps, their capacity to care for themselves. A culture 44% come from the provinces of Gitega, • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 71
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Kayanza, Kirondo, Muyinga, Muramvya, January this year the Tripartite Commission Ngozi and Karuzi. Almost 60% expressed (consisting of representatives from the gov- their willingness to return home in the near ernments of Burundi and Tanzania and the future. Most of those wanting to return had UNHCR) signed an agreement paving the homes in the southern and eastern provinces way for the large-scale return of refugees. This rather than in the central and northern required the opening up of both old and new provinces. The reasons these IDPs gave for entry points. The main entry point at Gisuru wanting to return were the poor living condi- (Ruyigi) was reopened on 28 January 2004, tions in the camps, their desire to reclaim and has since been used by a large number of their properties before the arrival of refugees returning residents. So far more than 40,700 from Tanzania, and the improved security sit- Burundian refugees have returned home from uation. However, close to 40% of IDPs, espe- camps in Tanzania this year, leaving just over cially those from the central provinces, said 290,000 remaining. (This is the first time since they wanted to remain in the IDP camp sites. 1998 that the population in the camps has Moreover, it should be noted that the gen- been below 300,000.) eral population of IDPs does not appear to be More than half of those who have experiencing a humanitarian emergency situa- returned this year have gone back to the bor- tion as such. Most have settled in the camps der provinces of Makamba, Rutana, Ruyigi, and have continued to exploit their fields out- Cankuzo and Muyinga. The vast majority of side these camps. Nevertheless, in contrast returnees have come back on UNHCR-facili- with refugees, who have the support of the tated convoys, mainly through two border UN High Commission for Refugees crossing points—Gisuru in the east and (UNHCR), no single institution exists to meet Kobero in the north. A third entry point for the needs of IDPs, particularly for protection. assisted returns is Gahumo, in Cankuzo Furthermore, because by definition their situ- province, and a fourth is scheduled to open at ation is an internal matter, the government is Mugina in the southern province of likely to view any attempts by organisations Makamba, possibly early in June this year. outside Burundi to create an agency to The opening of the latter has been delayed by address the IDP issue as meddling in its heavy rains, which have slowed down the road domestic affairs. repairs necessary to enable the convoys to use Although the task of reintegrating the roads. refugees and IDPs into society is a massive According to the Tanzanian authorities, one, it is crucial to the success of the peace another 170,000 Burundians, most of whom process. This has been shown by the experi- left in the early 1970s, live in settlements out- ences of Mozambique and Angola (and will side the camps, while another 300,000 have soon be seen, one would hope, in the made independent homes in Tanzanian vil- Democratic Republic of Congo). What the lages. No-one has been able to make an accu- government should bear in mind is that the rate estimate of the numbers of Burundian needs of the returnees and of those who will refugees in Tanzania, especially one that takes be receiving them are equally important, and those who arrived in 1972 into account. The equally extreme. Levels of poverty are only way of ascertaining the actual number extremely high in both groups.1 would be by taking a census of Burundians still living in Tanzania. Refugees During 2004, the UNHCR plans to repa- Although a certain amount of spontaneous triate 150,000 of the 300,000 refugees who repatriation of refugees has taken place since fled to Tanzania during the last decade. Yet 1997, it was only during the course of 2003 Refugees International, an international non- that the numbers picked up. A total of 81,000 governmental organisation (NGO), has people returned during that year, 36,000 of expressed concern that the rapid pace of the them assisted and 45,000 spontaneously. In repatriation process threatens the security of • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 72
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returning refugees. They argue that UNHCR the reinforcement of the Burundian govern- Burundi lacks the capacity to protect them ment’s capacity to meet social infrastructural because of their numbers, and because of the needs related to education, health and agri- political instability that continues in the culture, because many facilities such as country.2 The organisation has recommended schools and health centres have been that the process of repatriation be slowed destroyed or are no longer operational. down until the government of Burundi can Indeed, more than half of those who left have demonstrate that it has made some progress in lost their houses, which were burnt down or addressing key social and economic issues. dismantled after they had fled. Some In sum, pressure on refugees and IDPs to returnees have settled in IDP sites because repatriate seems to be a push–pull matter. The they provide assistance, and it seems a better mixed messages can be partially explained by security option. There is also the strong prob- a change in the political dynamics between ability that many refugees, especially those the Tanzanian government and the TgoB. who fled the country in 1972, have lost their Tanzania’s support of Burundi over the years land in the course of a long history of proper- has been considerable. However, the role of ty appropriation. Much of the land has facilitator in the peace negotiations has been changed hands many times over the interven- shifted from Tanzania to South Africa. It ing years. appears that the Tanzanians now feel side- Competition for rapidly diminishing land lined, and in consequence their attitude resources remains a serious problem in towards the Burundian refugees seems to have Burundi. Some 90% of the population are become less supportive. This has been con- dependent on agriculture, with most families firmed by many returning refugees, who have farming on less than a third of a hectare. The spoken of reduced food rations and restric- arable land has been over-farmed for more tions imposed on their freedom of movement than a century, and topsoil loss is heavy, outside the camps. Within the camps, there resulting in greatly diminished yields. Some are water shortages and problems with the environmentalists have predicted that if cur- provisions for health and safety. Tensions rent trends continue, within 20 years no between Burundi and Tanzania have also been arable farmland will remain. In addition, heightened by the accusations of the former many communities have been dispossessed of that rebel groups have been using the camps their land and their homes, both of which in Tanzania as rear bases. have been despoiled and looted by rebels, armed forces and bandits. Grave concerns Repatriation and reintegration have been expressed that land and property On a recent field trip to Burundi, the writer issues may present serious obstacles to the was told that the government is finalising a successful repatriation and reintegration of repatriation plan to return and reintegrate refugees and IDPs. The government has pro- 500,000 Burundians between now and 2006. duced a report that indicates that there is a Accordingly, the government, in consultation considerable amount of “free” land available, with the UNHCR, is preparing for the volun- but this has been widely disputed. With less tary repatriation of at least 150,000 than 5% of the land registered, there is too Burundians from Tanzania in 2004. UNHCR much uncertainty over ownership to verify Burundi, which is due to phase out its opera- this report. tions by 2007, is assisting the government by Returnees are also anxious to know what developing an operational plan for the repa- sort of compensation they will be offered if triation and reintegration of refugees and they have lost their land. Although a Land IDPs over the next three years. However this Commission was established in April 2003 to has not as yet received the “green light” from address the concerns of returnees (especially this organisation’s head office. the 1972 caseload of refugees), it has not car- The UNHCR’s operational plan includes ried out its mandate. This is largely attributa- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 73
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ble to a shortage of funds and administrative dominate, at the expense of the needs of the weaknesses. No national policy for land own- community. The government seems to have ership, restoration or compensation has yet been distracted from more important issues been drawn up; nor has the government come by the political deadlines it is facing. It has up with a clearly co-ordinated strategy to tack- failed to prioritise strategic thinking on post- le these issues. transition issues and needs, even though the All of these factors point to the likelihood development of such plans is essential for the of property disputes, which, if not carefully long-term sustainability of the peace process, handled, will provide political ammunition to particularly in the post-election period. anyone interested in derailing the peace In addition, significant work needs to be process. Not surprisingly, the UNHCR has done by the international donor community come forward with the idea of mounting an to support good governance at all levels, so all-inclusive operation to strengthen the that equitable social and economic develop- dynamics of reintegration. Some of the mech- ment and political participation may be anisms suggested include a reconciliation ensured. Particular emphasis should be placed process at grassroots level; the use of peaceful on increasing opportunities for the disenfran- conflict resolutionstrategies; an anti-HIV chised in Burundi. it is vital that the donor health policy; and, finally, the provision of community should act in a clear and decisive medical assistance to vulnerable communities. manner. Currently it seems to be trapped in Responsibility for repatriation and reinte- dilemmas concerning whether it should wait gration ultimately lies with the government’s for peace and the outcome of the elections Ministry of Reinsertion and Resettlement of before disbursing funds, and determining who Displaced Persons and Refugees. In addition, will take the lead (government or NGOs) in there is the national commission to assist war projects. Donors see themselves as caught in a victims (the Commission Nationale de double bind. The emphasis on assistance to Réhabilitation des Sinistrés—CNRS) that was set the government is a direct result of their desire up in February 2002. Its work has been ham- to consolidate the peace process. However, pered by a lack of funds and uncertainty over the government is not only plagued by weak its statutory independence from the Ministry. institutional capacity but is opposed to funds The relationship between the CNRS and the being channelled through local NGOs. The Ministry also reflects a political power-sharing latter also lack capacity. This leaves donors compromise, the presidency of the unsure about who will take the lead in proj- Commission having been allocated to the ects. Front pour la démocratie au Burundi The political dynamics of determining (Frodebu) and the Ministry falling under the who will control the aid are creating consider- G10 grouping of parties.3 This creates addi- able anxiety in donor circles. A valid concern tional layers of bureaucracy and does not help is that post-conflict assistance that is oriented the CNRS to function effectively. towards government structures may reinforce the very factors that fuelled the conflict in the first place. This could undermine support for Conclusion peace among groups that are not part of the As the above discussion makes clear, a num- transitional government, who may resent ber of critical areas have not yet been what they perceive as a bias. A core principle addressed in Burundi. These include the of humanitarian assistance—in theory if not preparation and prioritisation of plans for always in practice—is its political neutrality: to physical reconstruction after years of war; and save lives regardless of affiliation. But whatev- the design of a country strategy for medium er its intentions, humanitarian aid has politi- and long-term development. Overall it seems cal effects that inevitably create incentives and that transitional and political issues and the disincentives for peace or for war, whether personal interests of power-seeking elites pre- deliberate, acknowledged or not. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 74
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Humanitarian organisations are becoming tives for peace, but which go beyond the “car- increasingly conscious of the political nature rot and stick” approach: of all aid, and are paying greater attention to Incentives for peace refer to all purpose- the maxim that it is no longer enough to just ful uses of aid that strengthen the abide by the principle of “do no harm”. Peter dynamics that favour peace, by influenc- Uvin sums this up in the following state- ing actors’ behaviours, by strengthening ment:4 pro-peace actors’ capacities, by changing This involves recognising that percep- the relations between conflicting actors tions matter as much as facts in aid (ethnic groups, the state and civil socie- impacts; that who gets which piece of ty), and by influencing the social and the cake is usually as important as the economic environment in which con- total size of the cake; that efficiency may flict and peace dynamics take place.7 sometimes need to be traded for stabili- In practice, “political and socio-economic ty and peace; that the development dis- solutions are so intermeshed that the classic course can be used for many political ‘phased’ approach—peace first, economics sec- purposes; and, broadly, that process is as ond—would at best leave an impossible legacy important as product. for those who inherited the peace”.8 In peace- Humanitarianism is being transformed from a building and conflict resolution, windows of narrow framework designed to mitigate the opportunity rarely present themselves. While impact of war to one which acknowledges that the TgoB and Burundi’s main political parties the nature of conflicts is such that something may be focusing on short-term considerations more has to be done to help conflict resolu- related to the elections, they should not lose tion and peace-building. The UN Security sight of the urgency, for the very sustainabili- Council has taken up the position that the ty of the peace process, of some of the issues way to assist African countries in the area of discussed above. As regards the donor com- peace-building is “to combine measures taken munity, it should realise that Burundi’s in support of peace-building, emergency assis- prospects for peace can be secured by placing tance and longer-term development in a com- emphasis (and funds) on creating the condi- prehensive and coherent response”.5 Many tions necessary for rapid and sustained socio- humanitarian aid organisations are following economic development, from the very start of this lead, and beginning to explore their role the reintegration process. in peace-building. In other words, the critical nexus between peace and development Notes requires a comprehensive and integrated approach to conflict prevention, poverty erad- 1. Burundi’s indicators of social wellbeing are among the worst in the world, and are generally well ication and development. below the average for sub-Saharan Africa. An esti- By way of contrast, donors have long mated two-thirds of the population live in assumed that, in post-conflict environments, absolute poverty, and one out of eight adults is peace-building must precede development. HIV-positive. Life expectancy has plummeted to 6 40 years from 54 in 1992. Some 70% of the This has surely been the case in Burundi. Burundian population are under-nourished, and Clearly aid alone is limited in its influence close on 60% live below the poverty line. over the dynamics of political conflict. The Malnutrition levels are increasing, especially issue for the international agencies is how to among children under the age of six years. 2. Refugees International, Burundi country report, manage aid in a way that goes well beyond
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flict, Organisation for Economic Co-operation integration, length of commitment and policy. It and Development (OECD), 1999, p 4. is a matter of acknowledging that development is 5. United Nations Secretary-General, Implemen- complementary to the political and security ele- tation of the recommendation contained in the ments of peace-building, and as such should begin report of the Secretary-General on the causes of as soon as there is even a prospect of peace. conflict and the promotion of durable peace and Furthermore, it means ensuring that measures sustainable development in Africa, Progress should be adopted to manage risks. Report, Fifty-sixth session, Item 59, United 7. Uvin, op cit, p 3. Nations General Assembly, 18 September 2001. 8. Katherine Marshall, quoted in J Haughton, The 6. Whether humanitarian organisations can effec- reconstruction of war-torn economies, CAER II tively serve these multiple purposes is a matter for Discussion Paper No. 23, Harvard Institute for debate. What is required goes beyond managing International Development, USA, March 1998. determinants such as timing, co-ordination and • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 77
AFRICA WATCH
MALAWI GENERAL ELECTION 2004: Democracy in the firing line
CHRIS MAROLENG
Introduction monarch with no heirs”.2 The start of the 1990s was accompanied by On 20 May 2004, Malawi held its third multi- a feeling of growing discontentment among party elections, marking a decade of democra- the general population at the economic cy in this impoverished southern African inequalities and political repression they were country. However, rather than being an exam- ple of a free and fair electoral process, these subjected to under the Banda regime. In 1992 elections were, at the very least, considered Malawi was rocked by an unprecedented erup- “controversial” by the majority of observers tion of strikes, student demonstrations and present in the country. Even though the oppo- riots. Donors suspended non-humanitarian sition claimed that the vote had been rigged, aid in May of that year—a measure which citing “massive irregularities”, Bingu wa effectively supported the pro-democracy Mutharika,1 the hand-picked successor of the movement because of Malawi’s dependence outgoing president, Bakili Muluzi, was on overseas development assistance. Banda declared winner of the presidential elections. responded to these disturbances by cracking 3 The main opposition parties have challenged down on opposition elements, but his grip the outcome of the poll in the High Court—so on power gradually started to slacken, and he far to no avail. The announcement of the eventually agreed to a referendum on a single results was followed by violent protest and versus a multiparty political system. rioting, in which at least four people died, in The referendum that was eventually held the cities of Blantyre and Mzuzu. on 14 June 1993 saw 63% of the voting popu- lation opting for a multiparty democracy. Two weeks later, opposition parties were legalised Background and an amnesty was extended to all political When Malawi gained its independence from exiles and prisoners. The new political dispen- Britain on 6 July 1964, Dr Hastings Kamuzu sation led to the formation of an all-party Banda of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) interim administration. Representatives from became the country’s first president. His all the parties were charged with steering the regime became progressively more dictatorial, transition to political pluralism. This process and in 1970 Banda declared himself President culminated in the drafting of a new interim for Life. As Phiri observes, from that point on, constitution, which was rushed through par- politics in Malawi under Banda’s reign were liament on 16 March 1994, mere weeks before “similar to those in the court of an absolute the presidential and parliamentary elections
CHRIS MAROLENG is a researcher in the African Security Analysis Programme at the ISS. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 78
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were held.4 These elections saw Bakili Muluzi However, the controversy surrounding the of the United Democratic Front (UDF) oust elections and Muluzi’s succession plan was Dr Banda, thereby ending 33 years of auto- not limited to the few weeks before the elec- cratic rule in Malawi.5 tion. Malawi’s constitution allows for only Since the transition to democracy in 1994, two consecutive presidential terms, an political opposition in Malawi has been cen- arrangement that precluded President Muluzi tred around the Malawi Congress Party from standing for a third term in 2004. (MCP) and the Alliance for Democracy However, reports in 2003 indicated the begin- (Aford). The MCP and Aford formed an ning of an active campaign, emanating from alliance prior to the June 1999 elections, but influential quarters within the UDF, to seek did not succeed in gaining a parliamentary approval from parliament to amend Section majority. These elections were once again won 83 (3) of Malawi’s constitution to allow an by President Muluzi’s UDF. open-term presidency.8 This campaign was The National Democratic Alliance (NDA), preceded by the ruling party’s efforts to which officially began as a pressure group reduce the majority required to amend the consisting mainly of disaffected members of constitution from two-thirds to a simple the UDF, was launched as a political party majority, so as to ensure that the UDF would early in 2003 by the former UDF Minister of have sufficient representation in parliament to Transport, Brown Mpinganjira. The new party approve constitutional changes. This was was expected to make some inroads in the done in anticipation of the all-important 2004 elections.6 debate in parliament concerning a third presi- dential term. The alteration in voting require- ments that would permit this constitutional The May 2004 elections amendment was approved in November The elections which were eventually held on 2001.9 20 May 2004, were plagued by irregularities The UDF’s attempts to manipulate the and controversy even before the voting start- constitution did not go unchallenged, and ed. Prior to their commencement, the church groups and civil society organisations Mgwirizano (Unity) grouping, a coalition of openly declared their opposition to a third seven opposition parties led by the veteran term for President Muluzi. Parliament eventu- politician Gwanda Chakuamba, took the ally met on 4 July 2002 to debate the pro- Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) to posed amendment to the constitution. While court, demanding a postponement of the orig- 128 votes were needed for the constitutional inal (18 May) election date, to allow for prop- amendment (and paradoxically 29 opposition er scrutiny of the voters’ roll. In support of his MPs and one independent voted for the case, Mgwirizano contrasted the number of amendment), the 59 opposition votes cast registered voters (agreed by all parties to be 5.7 against it were enough to block the move. The million) with the number of ballot papers defeat of the amendment was a positive sign printed by the MEC (over 7 million). of a strengthening of democracy in Malawi. Justifiably, the opposition parties saw this dis- Muluzi commented, somewhat disingenuous- crepancy as providing an ideal opportunity ly, that democracy called for “tolerance of dif- for electoral fraud,7 expressing a concern that ferent views”.10 was positively viewed by the High Court. An It is widely believed that after failing to extension of two extra days was granted, and secure a third term for himself, Muluzi chose the new election date set for 20 May 2004. the 70-year-old wa Mutharika as his successor, The High Court later granted custody of the reasoning that, as a relatively unknown politi- more than one million excess papers to the cal lightweight, wa Mutharika would be vul- courts rather than the MEC. The Supreme nerable to the influence of a more powerful Court of Appeal subsequently overturned this political force. This would enable Muluzi to decision, leading to even more confusion. continue to run the country from behind the • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 79
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scenes. This analysis is supported by the fact didates managed to secure a further 38. A that Muluzi retained his position as national number of smaller parties accounted for the chairperson of the UDF, effectively ensuring remaining seats (see Table 2 below). that he would be the “power behind the throne”.11 This would also allow him to pro- Table 2: Malawi parliamentary election 2004: official results tect himself against any charges of corruption in the future. An unintended consequence of POLITICAL PARTY NUMBER OF SEATS this power play was the partial fragmentation MCP 59 UDF 49 of the UDF, with several defections and resig- Mgwirizano 27 nations from the party. Independents 38 Others 14
The election results International responses to the poll Unmoved by the storm surrounding his elec- toral victory, wa Mutharika was sworn in as At an international level, strong criticism of Malawi’s president on 24 May. The official the outcome of both the presidential and par- results for the presidential race gave wa liamentary elections was voiced. Yet, the dis- Mutharika 1.1 million votes; 846,457 to John putes described above notwithstanding, the Tembo of the MCP and 802,386 to Gwanda majority of observer missions endorsed the Chakuamba of the Mgwirizano coalition (see election as generally peaceful and fair, while at Table 1 below).12 the same time recording reservations with 13 Reacting to the official announcement of regard to the conduct of the MEC. Observer these results, the seven-member Mgwirizano missions from the African Union (AU), the coalition protested, maintaining that its leader Commonwealth and the European Union was the rightful winner of the election, and (EU), together with the Electoral Institute of vowed to use all available means to contest Southern Africa (EISA), have all expressed the result. concern over the election. Their reasons Parliamentary voting was postponed in include poor preparation by election officials, six districts because of errors on the ballot a heavy state media bias in favour of the rul- papers. However, in the parliamentary voting ing UDF and, in particular, the ruling party’s that did take place, the turnout was merely abuse of state resources to support its cam- 52%. The distribution of parliamentary seats paign.14 The Chief Electoral Officer, has in the past followed clear-cut regional Roosevelt Gondwe, has denied any wrongdo- voting patterns. Traditionally, the UDF has ing, saying that the MEC had taken sufficient been considered the party of the populous care to verify the counting of the ballot southern region, while the MCP has been papers. regarded the party of the central region. However, contrary to all expectations, the UDF lost its parliamentary majority, winning just 49 of the National Assembly’s 193 seats. The MCP won 59 seats, Chakuamba’s coali- tion gained 27 and several independent can-
Table 1: Malawi presidential election 2004: official results
POLITICAL PARTY CANDIDATES TOTAL NUMBER PERCENTAGE OF VOTES OF VOTES
UDF Bingu Wa Mutharika 1 119 738 35% MCP John Tembo 846 457 27% Mgwirizano Gwanda Chakuamba 802 386 26% • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 80
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The politics of personality and con- tion and political tension. Neither he nor the venience governing party can escape Malawi’s mount- ing economic, social and political challenges. Politics in Malawi are disproportionately In all these spheres, reforms must be under- based on the personality of leaders, focusing taken as a matter of urgency if Malawi is to on these rather than on policy or ideology. It avoid social upheaval, political unrest and fur- is for this reason that each of the main parties ther economic decline in the future. However, has experienced leadership challenges and if the president’s speech at his inauguration is severe internal divisions in recent years. This anything to go by, there may yet be a glimmer characteristic of politics in Malawi was evident of hope that serious measures will be taken to both before and after the elections, raising confront the country’s acute economic and serious questions about the actual commit- political malaise.16 ment of political leaders to their professed val- It is hoped that wa Mutharika’s technical ues and principles. expertise in economics and policymaking will The MCP has suffered from internal divi- eventually translate into the kind of leader- sions caused by infighting between the party’s ship that will transform Malawi’s currently vice-president, John Tembo (a former “strong- un-transparent and disorganised economic man” of Banda), who came second in this and political system. The government’s focus year’s presidential poll, and its former presi- in recent years has been almost entirely on dent, Gwanda Chakuamba, who came third. getting the UDF re-elected, to the detriment Chakuamba emerged as the president of the of matters of serious importance to the major- MCP in a surprise victory over Tembo in 1997. ity of Malawians. This myopic approach has In 2000 the Chakuambo and Tembo factions brought Malawi’s economy to the brink of held parallel leadership elections, which were collapse. Recognising the risk, the followed by a lengthy High Court battle over International Monetary Fund (IMF) has who should lead the party. This split in the resumed lending to Malawi, even though the MCP subsequently resulted in Chakuamba’s performance targets it set previously (particu- leaving the party altogether to form another, larly with regard to fiscal management) are not the Republican Party (RP). being met.17 Chakuamba later revived his political In the economic sphere, excessive govern- career by emerging as the leader of the seven- ment spending together with a lack of donor party coalition, Mgwirizano, which aimed to support has caused an explosion of domestic act as a counter-balance to the growing ten- debt, the servicing of which has become a dency to autocracy in the ruling party. severe burden.18 The resumption of donor However, in an unexpected volte-face after the support should allow some of the debt to be election, Chakuamba’s RP broke faith with its retired. If this does not happen, given the fellow coalition partners by signing a memo- adverse reports by the electoral observer mis- randum of understanding with the newly- sions and a continued lack of control over elected president. This deal paves the way for government expenditure, there is a real risk of the president to gain a majority in parliament, a debt default. This would cause a crisis in the effectively consigning the coalition (although banking sector, with serious knock-on effects not Chakuamba) to the trash heap of for the rest of the economy.19 Malawi’s already bankrupt multi-party democ- Officially, economic policy is being driven racy.15 by the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) published in April 2002. Its primary Perils and prospects: yet another trip objective is to empower the poor and diversi- back to the future? fy the economy away from agriculture, while acknowledging that during the next few years Even though wa Mutharika has been elected, the agricultural sector will be the focus of its he has assumed office under a cloud of litiga- efforts. However, Malawi’s new government • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 81
Maroleng 81
inherits a legacy marked by poor performance ernance, a country sacrificed on the altar of and lack of commitment to the strategy out- political expediency. lined in the PRSP. In order to face the challenges described above, the new president will have to step out Notes of Muluzi’s long, dark shadow. The structural 1. Bingu wa Mutharika is a former World Bank econ- weaknesses inherent in the institutions and omist and former Secretary-General of the political parties entrusted with safeguarding Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). the effective functioning of a multi-party 2. A T Phiri, The authoritarian state in Malawi: The democratic system have unquestionably crisis in the path to democratization. helped to create an environment in which Contemporary African Affairs 86(63) March, rampant corruption and the cult of personali- 1999, pp 2-3. ties have flourished largely unchallenged. It 3. C Maroleng, Malawi: The slippery slide towards autocracy. Situation Report, Institute for Security would be in the interest of Malawians to Studies, 2003. address these underlying structural problems. 4. Ibid. This would ensure that future elections repre- 5. Muluzi had, in the early 1980s, been a cabinet sent the will of the majority of the voters member, but had fallen out of favour with Banda rather than the result of manoeuvring by and been sacked. 6. C Maroleng, op cit. political elites. 7. IRIN, Malawi: Special report on general elections, Public condemnation of the recently con- 19 May 2004,
AFRICA WATCH
TRENDS AND MARKERS Recent data, stastics and indicators
Gross National Income Per Capita (US dollars, Atlas method)
476 Sub-Saharan Africa 549
310 Sudan 340
350 Kenya 330
100 Ethiopia 110
150 Eritrea 140
Djibouti 880
100200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
2000 1992
Gross National Income Per Capita Based on PPP
Sudan 1,878
Kenya 1,032
Ethiopia 717
Eritrea 803
Djibouti 2,077
500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 84
84 African Security Review 13(2) • 2004
Gross Domestic Product (real, in millions of US dollars, constant 1995 prices)
9,739 Sudan 6,426
9,884 Kenya 8,413
7,364 Ethiopia 4,642
558 Eritrea 369
495 Djibouti 546
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
2000 1992
Life Expectancy at Birth (in years)
47 Sub-Saharan Africa 49
56 Sudan 50
48 Somalia 44
47 Kenya 57
42 Ethiopia 44
52 Eritrea 46
46 Djibouti 46
10 20 30 40 50 60
2000 1985 • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 85
Trends and Markers 85
Infant Mortality (per thousand)
91 Sub-Saharan Africa 107
81 Sudan 107
117 Somalia 136
78 Kenya 64
98 Ethiopia 143
60 Eritrea 94
115 Djibouti 126
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
2000 1985
Estimated Percentage of Adults Living with HIV/AIDS, end of 2001
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.4
Sudan 2.6
Somalia 1
Kenya 15
Ethiopia 6.4
Eritrea 2.8
2610481214 16 • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 89
ESSAY
SOUTH AFRICA’S NATIONAL INTEREST1
ANTHONI VAN NIEUWKERK
… adeptness at identifying the national interest and pursuing it in a creative way is part of the chal- lenge of governance and state leadership in the current global arena. Te n Year Review.2
Over the past ten years, our involvement in world affairs has been premised on the view that the strength of our nation depends on the strength of the entire continent.
Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, June 20043
Introduction shared understanding of the nation’s broad and long-term interests. However, the concept In response to the unfolding humanitarian cri- is often questioned by those who suspect elite sis in Sudan’s Darfur region, the South collusion in matters of national importance African government recently agreed to and want to know who determines the content despatch a small number of military officials of the national interest, and how it is done. to the area as part of a group of African Union (AU) peace monitors.4 Although the urge to respond to other people’s suffering is a strong The concept of national interest justification for intervention, it is important to understand how this and similar decisions that By unpacking the question of the national promote or protect South Africa’s interests are interest, many questions arise, not least the determined. If one believes that the govern- accusation that it is an old-fashioned concept ment of this country should assist with peace- used obsessively during the Cold War era to making or peacekeeping, or render assistance promote questionable ideologies, conceal to the victims of aggression in Darfur, then poor policies or justify unethical behaviour. should it do the same in Chechnya? What So, the death of 58,000 United States (US) sol- about Iraq? One way to respond is to invoke diers in Vietnam (not to mention the death of the concept of the national interest. two million Southeast Asians) was in the inter- Supporters of this concept suggest that foreign ests of fighting Communism; the Soviets and security policy ought to flow from a invaded Afghanistan in the interest of extend-
ANTHONI VAN NIEUWKERK is a senior lecturer at the Centre for Defence and Security Management at Wits University. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 90
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ing the ‘Socialist camp’ (with similar untold Botswana where, according to the ruling human suffering). Even landing on the moon party: was in the US national interest (today the Central in the country’s foreign policy challenge is Mars). The erstwhile South … are the interests of Botswana which African government in turn abused the con- embrace the preservation of the demo- cept in its defence of apartheid policies and cratic form of government, its institu- practices, including the destabilisation of the tions and values, its sovereignty and Southern African region. Currently, in the territorial integrity, brooking no inter- post 9/11 period of global insecurities caused ference in its internal affairs, its respect by terrorism and counter-terrorism, the con- for self-determination and independ- cept is back in vogue, and again used obses- ence of peoples, its non-racialism, its sively by the neo-conservatives in Washington non-alignment, the non-use of its terri- and liberals elsewhere. The dominant dis- tory as a launching pad for attacks course today is the ‘war on terror’, with the against neighbouring states, the non- assumption—nay, demand—that joining the use of force in the settlement of dis- US on this issue would be in all countries’ putes and the development and national interest. It appears Libya’s Ghaddafi security of its foreign markets.7 buckled under the pressure, and most proba- As appealing as this line of thinking is, bly Spain’s then-president Aznar argued that many have argued for an inverse relationship, membership of the anti-Iraq coalition was in that is: global dynamics often determine local his country’s national interest.5 That (mis-) responses. Structures (such as the rules of the calculation cost his party the general election international system) determine, allow or con- of March 2004. Prisoner abuse in Iraq is being strain what agents (such as national govern- argued away as an unintended consequence of ments) can and cannot do.8 However, a more bringing freedom to the oppressed masses. nuanced approach might suggest that the So, what then is the national interest? world is not simply given and/or natural but Stephen Krasner, in his 1978 classic Defending one of artifice—it is constructed through the the national interest used the term to refer to the actions of the actors themselves.9 Applied to preferences of a nation’s leaders, or put differ- our situation, the ‘fact’ of South Africa’s dom- ently, the goals that are sought by the state.6 ination of the Southern African Development He further specified that such preferences, or Community (SADC) is viewed by some as set of objectives, must be related to general good and necessary, while others bitterly societal goals, persist over time, and have a resent its hegemony in the region. Thus, the consistent ranking of importance in order to beliefs, interests and actions of the many justify using the term. If objectives changed actors in the region constitute a web of inter- daily or even annually, it would be misleading active politics that co-determines processes to use the term ‘national interest’. As Krasner and outcomes. That is to say, South Africa noted, in such cases one would better look to might be regarded as a powerful regional actor bureaucratic preferences or societal pressures but it does not follow that its views always to understand the actions taken by central dominate. Its interaction with other regional decision makers. actors impacts on the region as well as its own perceptions and self-image. In this sense then National interest, national security South Africa changes and is changed by the region. and foreign policy Lastly, the way in which South African Many analysts assume that foreign policy is elites define their (and their country’s) role based on national interest. Thus, if one can towards the region, or Africa, becomes impor- identify a nation’s enduring strategic interests, tant in trying to understand South Africa’s its foreign (and security) policies would fol- national (and security) interests. The key low. This line of thinking is evident in insight from the constructivist paradigm con- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 91
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cerns the role of identity. This approach focus- that could lead to costly policy and strategy es attention on the relationship between the failures.15 concepts ‘identity’, ‘interest’ and ‘threat’. As Keeping in mind that there exists no gen- Weldes recently argued, identity is construct- erally accepted definition of national security, ed and reconstructed in relation to others. the term is employed here to mean the Threats are the insecurities faced by particular processes by which the state deals with threat identities. Some threat perceptions are a direct perceptions.16 Put differently, security is about function of identity—that is, they follow the pursuit of freedom from threat. When it is almost logically from the nature of a particu- discussed in the context of the international lar identity. Other threat perceptions are a system, security is about the ability of states function of interpretation of actions or events and societies to maintain their independent made possible through the symbolic technol- identity and their functional integrity. ogy that is the security imaginary. Interests— Whether local or global, the security of people those ‘national interests’ or ‘preferences’ is affected by factors in five major sectors: mil- articulated by decision makers—are also two- itary, political, economic, societal and envi- fold: they can be a logical function of the ronmental.17 Protecting people and identity itself, or a function of specific threats institutions from a variety of threats is there- constructed in relation to the identity. The fore in a country’s national interest. In this three concepts are thus mutually constituted: sense then, foreign policy is one of the key it is in relation to identities, or identities and instruments used to promote a nation’s inter- threat perceptions, that interests are identi- ests, including security. fied.10 Nevertheless, returning to the theme South Africa’s interests under discussion, it appears that states tend to pursue two kinds of policy preferences to In a recent study on state–civil society rela- operationalise their perceived/constructed tions, the point was made that in South ‘national interest’: material (that is, economic Africa, “[f]oreign policy and national interests well-being) or ideological. For Australia and should be debated much more vigorously. other members of the Organisation for The sad fact is that in practice there is no Economic Cooperation and Development debate on these issues”.18 This statement still (OECD), trade and investment is the key.11 rings true today and calls for a debate to be On the other hand, until recently Sudan opened. Questions for such a debate include under General al-Bashir was aligned both with the following: What is South Africa’s national Lybia and with Islamic fundamentalists from interest/s? Who determines it? Can South Iran and elsewhere; even Osama bin Laden Africa afford competing interpretations of the was allowed to reside in the Sudan.12 Powerful national interest? Or is contestation states pursue both kinds simultaneously. inevitable; in fact a normal feature of demo- America’s interest in the Persian Gulf (and cratic intellectual dialogue? Most of all, can more precisely, its role in Iraq) would be an the concept realistically guide South Africa’s example of such a double set of preferences. foreign policy? As Joseph Nye wrote (back in 1991, and true Given the country’s economic profile, pub- today) oil is the quick answer.13 The other half lic policies focusing on the human security of the answer lies in Bush’s declaration, in the agenda (e.g. poverty eradication, job creation, introduction to the post-9/11 US National economic growth, personal security) should Security Strategy document, that the US constitute the core of South Africa’s national wants to make the world safer and better.14 As interest. After winning the national elections the demise of apartheid demonstrated, and for the third time with an increased majority of perhaps the ‘war on terror’ will too, an ideo- close to 70%, President Mbeki announced that logical foreign policy manifests in mispercep- government’s policies and programmes were tion, or an absence of means-end calculations, “… informed by the struggle against poverty • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 92
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and underdevelopment” and that it will determination? After all, citizens vote a party respond by addressing the ‘First’ and ‘Second’ into power in order for it to make precisely economies.19 Does it mean that its foreign pol- those choices on the basis of its policy plat- icy should therefore mostly be about trade and form. investment? What about the pursuit of other In a less than ideal world, different actors values, and how to choose? To illustrate, pub- maintain unique definitions of the national lic debates on foreign policy in South Africa interest. For the ANC and government, the focus, among others, on how the following state’s strategic policy priorities, as determined issues/positions promote the country’s long- annually by the Cabinet lekgotla (and term interests: announced during the president’s annual state 1. The country’s overwhelming and growing of the nation address in parliament), equals regional (and increasingly, continental) the national interest.23 In the longer term, economic and trade dominance.20 some level of predictability is provided in the 2. The arms industry, including arms sales, election manifesto with which a party cam- and the purchase of Gripens, corvettes and paigns the elections, and in the case of the submarines.21 ANC the 1956 Freedom Charter provides the 3. Government’s approach to the Zimbabwe guiding light. In the view of the opposition, crisis (‘quiet diplomacy’).22 government often blurs the lines between 4. President Mbeki’s recent visit to party and national interests. Critics are fond Haiti/accommodating deposed President of quoting the foreign minister as having said Aristide in South Africa. that her government will never condemn 5. Hosting of the Pan African Parliament and Zimbabwe as long as it is in power.24 Other the 2010 Soccer World Cup. players also have sectional interests at heart The concept national interest—as well as that when seeking to influence the policy process. of national security—is frequently used by the For example, mining executive Clem Sunter South African government and its critics. believes the nation’s greatest challenge in the However, they often differ dramatically on coming decade “… is the construction of an how to promote the country’s national inter- entrepreneurial economy with no racial or est. These debates have often assumed the class divisions, thus enabling ‘Team SA’ a character of a zero-sum game: whatever policy thrilling economic ride (on the globalisation or action the African National Congress wave) provided social harmony is pursued”.25 (ANC) defends as being executed to advance How does this vision resonate with other sec- the national interest is branded by the oppo- tors of society? Is it inclusive? Adding toge- sition or critics as achieving the opposite. ther disparate visions in the hope of getting to Hence the question of whether the nation can a synergetic sum of all the parts might be an agree on a definition. interesting exercise but ultimately not helpful. Undoubtedly, high-level debates about government’s policy intentions, and practices, South Africa’s foreign and national are signs of healthy democratic discourse and security policy therefore desirable. However, disagreement on key issues also complicates government’s abil- South Africa’s foreign policy is premised upon its ity to manage effectively the country’s domes- national interests … tic and international affairs. It would seem to Deputy Minister of Foreign be better, wouldn’t it, to be able to speak with Affairs, Aziz Pahad, 2003.26 a united voice on critical local and global mat- ters—from poverty eradication programmes to Considering the difficulties of formulating an the condemnation of mercenary practices, or inclusive common national interest in a a firm position on the restructuring of the democracy, a review of South Africa’s foreign World Bank. But is it achievable? Isn’t it good policy and affairs might shed some light on enough for the ruling party to make that the government’s efforts to define the nation- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 93
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al interest and execute policies to promote it. approach that is devoid of moral value (“talk In March this year, South Africa’s 10 years left, walk right”, the title of Bond’s latest cri- of democracy was celebrated at an interna- tique of Mbeki’s foreign policy29)? tional conference organised by the Africa The mindset and approach of some South Institute of South Africa. As could be expect- Africans towards the African continent—either ed, many aspects of the country’s transition as individuals or collectively—continue to be a received critical scrutiny. On the theme of its source of unease for many. Racism, now recast foreign relations, there was generally all-round as xenophobia, still motivates the behaviour recognition of progress and achievement. of many a South African. The level of dis- Indeed, the country’s foreign minister, Dr comfort is not lowered by an apparent inabil- Dlamini-Zuma earlier offered a plausible ity of government to put an end to one of the explanation for this state of affairs: country’s nasty export products, namely mer- … our collective experiences as South cenaries. Many add the perceived aggressive Africans have placed us in a unique behaviour of South African–based companies position to understand the challenges to the list of unwanted export products. The facing humanity … firstly, ours is a sometimes naïve enthusiasm with which gov- reality of two nations, one developed ernment tended to market South Africa’s set- and wealthy, the other marginalised tlement—the Government of National and poor … Hence we have committed Unity—to countries in conflict could be a fur- our foreign policy to the eradication of ther candidate for the list. These difficulties poverty and underdevelopment and raise questions about the country’s identity for the transformation of the continent (the belief that South Africans are exception- and the global environment.27 al) and the nature of its relations with its This is not to say that South Africa’s for- counterparts on the continent and elsewhere eign policy behaviour is free of criticism. (the belief that South Africa is powerful and Overtly pursuing a human rights–based for- the expectation to be seen as a natural leader). eign policy is a delicate balancing act at the With regard to the structural constraints best of times. The challenge is maintaining a upon policy choices, as discussed earlier, what balance between human rights commitments is not stated upfront is the need for the coun- and the pursuit of commercial interests— try’s leadership to harmonise their policy something the US, in its relations with the objectives with the demands of globalisation. People’s Republic of China, found difficult to In a sense then, and unsurprisingly, our achieve. Losing the balance often attracts national interest is increasingly being shaped accusations of betrayal, as South Africa’s ear- and determined by the demands and expecta- lier approach to Nigeria’s Abacha and tions of the world’s powerful, here identified Indonesia’s Suharto, and Zimbabwe’s Mugabe as the group of 31 high-income or industri- currently illustrates. The latest controversy is alised member states of the OECD,30 the the apparent choice to discount the human international financial institutions, the rights record of Equatorial Guinea’s president, nuclear club, multinational corporations, and Brig.-Gen. Nguema Mbasogo in favour of the US-driven war on terror. However, to fully cementing strong commercial and trade rela- appreciate the international state of play one tions.28 Why the government has chosen to should include global processes and institu- mask its commitment to human rights pro- tions to which South Africa is party: the motion is a tough question to answer. Could United Nations (UN), Non-Aligned it be that it has good strategies in place but Movement, Commonwealth, African Union, needs to communicate them better (“put a and strategic partnerships with countries such better spin on it”, as journalist Max du Preez as Brazil, Nigeria, India and China. once said)? Or could it be that it has made Considering the apparent anomalies and fundamental policy shifts by embracing the considerable structural constraints upon for- North’s neoliberal paradigm—a policy eign policy options, any attempt to assess the • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 94
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government’s choices ought to refer to the Foreign Affairs and the Justice, Crime ‘seven principles’ that were elaborated in 1996 Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster objec- to inform the government’s foreign policy ori- tives”.35 Recall our earlier definition of securi- entation as the benchmark.31 In my view it ty as the pursuit of freedom from threat. still serves as a broad orienting guide to the Generally speaking South Africa’s security country’s foreign policy choices and actions. interests have been broadly conceptualised.36 The broad public should not hesitate to make The 1996 White Paper on Defence states: the government aware of it where its represen- In the new South Africa national secu- tatives—or policies—deviate from the guide. rity is no longer viewed as a predomi- The government’s foreign policy approach has nantly military and police problem. It over time been refined by the Department of has broadened to incorporate political, Foreign Affairs to refer to ‘wealth creation’ economic, social and environmental and security, a commitment to the African matters. At the heart of this new Renaissance and the creation of a better world approach is the paramount concern for all. By the latter is meant “strengthening with the security of the people. solidarity among developing countries of the Security is an encompassing condition South” and “building partnerships with devel- in which individual citizens live in free- oped countries of the North”.32 A subsequent dom, peace and safety.37 further reformulation of the Department of As the government’s Ten Year Review Foreign Affairs’ mission has replaced “wealth notes, this approach is important for integrat- creation and security” with “South Africa’s ed policy making: particularly in an era of national interests and values”. Studying the mutual vulnerabilities and a plethora of ‘new’ department’s Strategic Plan for 2003–5, it security threats including terrorism, flows of appears the government’s top five foreign pol- illegal migrants and refugees, international icy priorities are the promotion of the African crime syndicates, illicit small and light arms Renaissance, peace and security, sustainable trade, money laundering schemes, narcotics development, strategic bilateral relations and trafficking, environmental degradation, the international conferences.33 spread of communicable diseases and trans- Particular strategic foreign policy priorities border crime.38 for the current year were distilled by the 2004 The conceptualisation of strategy and pol- Cabinet lekgotla (meeting) and include: icy based on the identification and manage- 1. global governance—issues relating to the ment of threats in an integrated fashion, given UN, trade, Millennium Development resource constraints, is indeed a daunting Goals, security, the Middle East, transbor- task.39 There is a clear need for the harmoni- der crime; sation of the country’s foreign policy and 2. consolidation of the African agenda—issues defence objectives. In terms of foreign policy, relating to democracy and stability, conflict President Mbeki is driven by a quest for con- resolution, socio-economic development, tinental stability via peace making, -building, and integration into the global economy; -keeping and -enforcement. This vision of 3. South–South cooperation; and Africa at peace with itself and the world also 4. the strengthening of strategic bilateral rela- finds expression in the policy documents of tions.34 the AU and the New Partnership for Africa’s As far as national security is concerned, South Development (NEPAD) of which Mbeki was a Africa has no open official document that chief architect. Indeed, the four foreign policy contains a clear definition and policy com- priorities identified by the 2004 Cabinet lek- mitments. The South Africa Yearbook of 2003/4 gotla, quoted above, can be seen to serve as contains an indication of the process from the context for constructing South Africa’s which the country’s strategy is deduced: national security interests. Concerning South “National Security Strategy is derived from Africa’s pursuit of these objectives, the presi- implied national interests, the Department of dent expects the security sector to play a criti- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 95
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cal supportive and implementing role. ensure the sovereignty and independence of Although members of the defence or intelli- the home territory and to perpetuate a partic- gence agencies will vigorously defend their ular political, social and economic system role in this quest, academics point to a gap based on that territory.41 between expectations and the potential to Holsti then identifies three kinds of mid- deliver. Shelton argues that the South African dle-range objectives: the promotion of private National Defence Force (SANDF) must re- business interests abroad, whether or not define its role and missions, and suggests four these relate to broad societal needs; attempts areas where it can contribute to Africa’s secu- to increase a state’s prestige in the system (not rity, namely to: expand warning intelligence only military capability but increasingly levels capacity; advance the regional and continen- of development and scientific and technologi- tal security regime; operationalise the SADC cal skills); and, thirdly the many different forms defence pact; and advance the AU’s security of self-extension or imperialism. Many states framework.40 seek advantages in neighbouring territories, By utilising Holsti’s schematic conceptual- including access to raw materials, markets and isation of foreign policy objectives, we can trade routes that they cannot achieve through offer a construction of South Africa’s (official) ordinary trade or diplomacy. This was (is?) done foreign policy. Holsti’s hierarchy of foreign via colonies, protectorates, ‘satellites’ or ‘spheres policy objectives looks as follows: All states of influence’. Ideological self-extension is also pursue core interests and values; they are most prevalent in many forms, where agents of a state frequently related to the self-preservation of a undertake to promote its own socio-economic political unit; these are short-range objectives, and political values abroad or to ‘convert’ other because other goals obviously cannot be peoples to a particular religious, cultural or achieved unless the political units pursuing political faith. Beyond these, there are a myri- them maintain their own existence; the most ad of objectives that governments espouse: essential objective of any foreign policy is to supporting friends and allies, promoting human
Figure 1: South Africa’s foreign and national security policy objectives
LONG RANGE GOALS * Democratic global governance * Reform of the UN, World Trade Organisation, international financial institutions * African Renaissance
MIDDLE-RANGE GOALS * Support regional & continental * AU structures and processes, NEPAD, organisations SADC operational plans * Pursue trade opportunities * SADC trade protocol, regional trade agreements with EU, US, China * Host international events * Global conferences, sport events * Promote human rights, democracy * Conflict resolution in Angola, DRC, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Sudan, Swaziland * Support allies * Relations with ‘strategic countries’ TIME / PRIORITY including India, Brazil, China
CORE OBJECTIVES * Economic welfare * Domestic policies * Territorial integrity * Border protection * National security * Identify and manage threats * Protect & enhance ‘own way of life’ * Constitutional democracy, rainbow nation IMMEDIATE/HIGH DISTANT/LOWIMMEDIATE/HIGH DISTANT/LOW VALUES ABSTRACT CONCRETE • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 96
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rights, environmental regulation, the develop- Conclusion ment of international institutions, values and In a democracy, the national interest is what a regulations, schemes for regional integration or majority, after discussion and debate and security collaboration. through a representative parliament, decides Long-range goals are those plans, dreams are its legitimate long-term shared interests. and visions concerning the ultimate political The basis for such a decision should not be or ideological organisation of the internation- limited to immediate interests (survival, secu- al system. rity) but should include economic well-being Regarding South Africa’s approach to Africa, as well as other preferences relating to identi- the mid- to long-range priorities are elaborat- ty, self-image and moral values. Although ed in Figure 2 most South Africans would probably agree
Figure 2: South African foreign policy priorities relating to Africa, 2003–542
Objective Activities PRIORITY ONE: AFRICAN RENAISSANCE Execute AU responsibilities Establish organs of the AU (Commission, Pan African Parliament, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, the Peace and Security Council, specialised technical committees (STCs), financial institu- tions (FIs), the African Court of Justice) Finalise the Common African Defence and Security Policy Promote NEPAD Finalise modalities for the African Peer Review Mechanism Align programmes of the STCs, FIs and regional economic com- munities to NEPAD Coordinate partnership projects. Finalise SADC restructuring and Finalise and implement the Regional Indicative Strategic harmonise its policies with Development Plan AU/NEPAD Finalise the SADC Mutual Defence Pact
PRIORITY TWO: PEACE AND SECURITY Promote peaceful conflict resolution Work towards consolidation of peace processes in Burundi, DRC and encourage peace building and Ivory Coast Continue ongoing efforts to achieve peace and stability and to deepen democracy in Angola, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Comoros, Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia Combat all forms of terrorism Implementation of UN Security Council resolutions through the UN Security Council Maintain a role in arms control, non- Continued engagement; utilise AU/SADC mechanisms to sensitise proliferation and disarmament issues African governments Combat transnational crime Encourage action plans regarding transnational organised crime, money laundering, extradition, mutual legal assistance, etc.
PRIORITY THREE: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Promote the Agenda of the South Develop feedback on NEPAD, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) and the World Conference against Racism (WCAR) Work towards reform of Bretton Coordinate South Africa’s position, participate in relevant events Woods Institutions, the UN Economic and enhance the interests of Africa and the South and Social Council and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 97
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that there is a national consensus on the need est by linking the country’s fundamental to further the human security agenda, there interests with that of Africa.44 The department will always be dissenting voices. And many told parliament that “…the future of our would continue to question whether particu- country is inextricably linked to the future of lar policy options such as the multi-billion the African continent and that of our neigh- arms deal or hosting the Pan African bours in Southern Africa. Africa therefore Parliament are in South Africa’s long-term remains the central area of focus in the con- interest. duct of our foreign policy”. It then links the The contours of the debate on South domestic with the foreign: “The national Africa’s national interest have begun to vision of building a united, non-racial, non- emerge. Here are five examples. An early sexist and prosperous society is also relevant description of South Africa’s national interest to our vision for Africa. Coupled with this is was provided by the authors of the White the understanding that socio-economic devel- Paper on South African Participation in opment cannot take place without political International Peace Missions, approved by peace and stability.” All of this means that Cabinet in October 1998: “South Africa’s efforts are therefore directed South Africa’s emerging national inter- at creating an environment in which all states ests are underpinned by the values on the continent will achieve their full poten- enshrined in the Constitution, which tial”. As Figure 2 demonstrates, these efforts encompass the security of the state and entail support for the AU, SADC and its citizens, the promotion of the social NEPAD, as well as peace-making and peace- and economic well-being of its citizenry, keeping on the continent. the encouragement of global peace and According to the influential Ten Year stability and participating in the process Review report of the South African govern- of ensuring regional peace, stability and ment commissioned by The Presidency in development. These national interests 2003, the closest the country ever got to a are concretely reflected in key national broad vision (that is, ‘an agreed understanding policy documents—examples of which of the national interest’) was the RDP.45 The include the Constitution, a range of challenge for the country, according to the White Papers on the Reconstruction and Te n Year Review, is constructing its replace- Development Programme (RDP), ment. It offers some ideas. The first is that the Growth, Employment and RDP objectives need to be integrated with the Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), the UN Millennium Declaration.46 The second is Transformation of the Public Service, that: Intelligence and Defence. South Africa’s … serious consideration should be given foreign policy … is an important com- to the nature of a social compact that ponent of this definition of national can provide an encompassing framework interest. In short, it is in the South for further development. It may also be African national interest to assist peoples necessary that beyond the need to who suffer from famine, political repres- improve the formal institutions of the sion, natural disasters and the scourge of state, much greater attention should be violent conflict. South Africa may thus given to mending and reinforcing the provide civilian assistance and armed social fabric. The first ‘Big Idea’ for the forces in common international efforts next century therefore is to articulate an when properly authorised by interna- encompassing framework which not tional authorities to help in such only helps better integrate the activities efforts.43 of government, but also harnesses the The Department of Foreign Affairs recently efforts of civil society to realise the offered an interesting, if not unsurprising, national development objectives.47 construction of South Africa’s national inter- What if our list of priorities, our own ‘big • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 98
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idea’, looked different from those being pre- ble alternative to globally hegemonic styles of scribed by the world’s powerful? Consider this power. In their view, these include: idea from the Institute for Food and (A) remarkable national consensus on Development Policy, sounded over 20 years liberal democratic constitutionalism, the ago, but relevant today given the overwhelm- idea of a society committed to processes ing belief, as George Bush puts it, in only ‘one of reconciliation across racial divides, model for success’— freedom, democracy and the notion of transitional justice as the free enterprise: basis of national reconciliation and as an … the possibility that emerging nations alternative to the politics of vengeance may demonstrate that the US may not and retribution, South Africa’s re-inser- be the last word in democracy, freedom tion into the politics, economics and and opportunity … might sound far- cultures of the African continent, and fetched. But think of the implications. the possibilities of the country’s experi- What if a third-world society demon- ence of negotiated liberation in inspiring strated that the choice is not just global efforts to re-invigorate cosmopol- between US-style capitalism and Soviet- itan ideals.49 style statism? What if an emerging third- At the same time Mbembe and Posel warn world order were to offer greater that alongside these “markers of hope” are a opportunities for citizens to be involved number of challenges, if not crises: in shaping economic policy than either HIV/Aids and gender violence, deepen- superpower model …? Or expanded ing orders of poverty and inequality, the human rights protection to include the persistence of social violence, and the right of every rural person to farmland tensions inherent in the notion of dem- sufficient to live in dignity? Or began ocratic citizenship (where refugees and building a political system in which migrants are considered ‘outsiders’, not wealth is strictly precluded as a factor in worthy of entitlements).50 gaining office? To US policymakers, The people of a country have a responsibility only the market and private control over to assist and guide the state in determining the productive property are consistent with country’s national interest. This requires con- freedom and democracy. To do things tinuous vigorous debate and broad participa- differently is to undermine both. What tion through membership of political parties if an emerging society were to question and participation in organised civil society. such a dogmatic approach, putting peo- This is necessary to ensure that the country’s ple’s need for land, jobs, and food first? policymakers manage the affairs of state effec- And what if such policies were pursued tively and in the interest of the broad popula- with broad popular support, not repres- tion rather than for the sake of political sive measures, so that people felt their expediency. When left unchecked, power-hun- freedom expanded? Such a development gry politicians and centralised decision-mak- almost certainly would give hope to ing structures open the door to excessive oppressed peoples throughout the control over and manipulation of the nation- world. Moreover, US citizens might be al agenda. Nor should society meekly accept encouraged to challenge the control of the preferences of the world’s powerful, often concentrated wealth here at home and unilaterally imposed on the global South. the assumption that those monolithic Despite left-leaning academics’ tendency to corporations … are best left beyond ridicule President Mbeki’s approach to inter- democratic control. 48 national relations, attempts at transforming Two decades later, reflecting on South Africa’s the institutions of global governance (democ- experiences of freedom, academics Achille ratising the UN, WTO and so on) seem worth Mbembe and Deborah Posel suggest ways in pursuing and ought to form part of a progres- which its democratic project presents a possi- sive country’s national interest. As the Ten • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 99
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Year Review notes: 7. Botswana Democratic Party election manifesto, South Africa seeks to transform a deeply 1984. 8. The ‘agent-structure debate’ in IR was made divided society in a situation in which the famous by Alexander Wendt. See his 1987 article, nation-state is subjected to varying forms of The agent-structure debate in international rela- global licence—economic, cultural, political tions theory, International Organisation 41(3), pp and otherwise—which may not be fully appre- 335-70. ciative and supportive of the nation-state’s 9. According to the constructivist paradigm agents and structures can be viewed as mutually consti- agenda. Thus adeptness at identifying the tutive entities. Social interaction via self- and col- national interest and pursuing it in a creative lective identity becomes key. For a review of the way is part of the challenge of governance and debates on constructivism, visit the book series, state leadership in the current global arena.51 International Relations in a constructed world, Kubalkova, Onuf and Pettman (eds), ME Sharpe, The call is not for society to support slav- London, 1998. ishly government’s initiatives—or its identifi- 10. See J Weldes, Constructing national interests, cation of national interests—nor Western-style University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, party political opposition, but rather strategic 1999. engagement with sectors of the state, based on 11. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, In the National Interest White Paper, undated. the careful consideration of the merits of each 12. M Dent, Identity politics: Filling the gap between fed- case. The experience of 10 years of democracy eralism and independence, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004, has given South Africans sufficient experience p163. to pursue an ongoing and informed dialogue 13. J Nye, Why the Gulf War served the national interest, The Atlantic Online, 1991,
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to play a meaningful regional (and continental) It also aims to contribute to the expansion of peacekeeping role, the effectiveness, affordability world trade on a multilateral basis. B Turner (ed), and appropriate force structure of the South The Statesman’s Yearbook 2002, Palgrave, New York, African National Defence Force need serious 2001, p 49. review. See G Shelton, The South African 31. The promotion of democracy and human rights; National Defence Force and President Mbeki’s accepting the supremacy of peace, justice and peace and security agenda: New roles and mission, international law in guiding relations between IGD Occasional Paper No 42, Institute for Global nations; a commitment to the development of the Dialogue, Braamfontein, 2004. African continent and the Southern African 22. For a thoughtful examination of South Africa’s region in particular; a belief that South Africa’s approach towards Zimbabwe, see M Schoeman growing economic development depends on and C Alden, The hegemon that wasn’t: South regional and international cooperation in an inter- Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe, dependent world; a belief that our international Strategic Review for Southern Africa 25(1), 2003, pp relations must mirror our deep commitment to 1-28. the consolidation of a democratic South Africa. 23. For example, the current director-general of the South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document, Department of Foreign Affairs, Dr Ayanda Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 1996. Ntsaluba, recently noted that the four foreign pol- 32. 2002 Annual Report, Department of Foreign icy priorities identified by the 2004 Cabinet lek- Affairs. gotla (meeting) included global governance (issues 33.
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44. ANC Today 4(24), 18-24 June 2004, p 5. 47. Policy Coordination and Advisory Services, p 106. 45. Policy Coordination and Advisory Services, p 103. 48. F Lappe, R Shuman and K Danaher, Betraying the 46. The Millennium Development Goals focus on national interest, Institute for Food and reducing poverty and hunger and child death Development Policy, Oakland, California, 1982. rates, promoting primary education, sexual equal- 49. A Mbembe and D Posel, Concept paper: The ity, and health of mothers, combating HIV/Aids, promise of freedom and its practice. Global per- malaria and other diseases, protecting the envi- spectives on South Africa’s decade of democracy, ronment, and developing a global partnership for Wits Institute of Social and Economic Research, development. For a critical analysis, see Clemens University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. and Moss, Setting up Africa for failure, Mail & 50. Ibid. Guardian, 28 May–3 June 2004. 51. Policy Coordination and Advisory Services, p 9. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 103
ESSAY
CHILDREN UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
MAX DU PLESSIS
Introduction world, photographs of children toting AK-47s becoming the stuff of NGO fundraising.2 I begin this paper by drawing on two realities, What I wish to traverse here is not how this horrifying in their detail, and breathtaking in reality has come about. My aim is to focus on that they are sprung from true facts, not twist- the means by which the law—more specifically ed fiction. The first is illustrated by the events international criminal law—might be called that took place on a day in March 1999. On into service in the struggle against these atroc- that day members of a Serbian paramilitary ities. An international framework of laws exists unit known as ‘The Scorpions’, rounded up to provide norms for the protection of chil- inhabitants of the village of Podujevo, dren as victims from war, some of which are Kosovo. The villagers, mostly women and also aimed at protecting children from being children, were taken to the courtyard of a local recruited into armies as soldiers of war. police station where they were shot. This was one of many massacres committed during the Kosovo conflict. Nineteen people were mur- International framework for the pro- dered, the youngest just two years old. Despite tection of children severe injuries, five children managed to sur- vive, even if their parents did not. The sur- The rights of children have not always fea- vival, one appreciates, might itself have been a tured very prominently in international law. horror—the scars of such a day live on perma- Early international law declarations and nently in the mind and body of the orphaned treaties of the 18th century omitted children child.1 from their purview, not least because children The second reality is one that leaps into were regarded as the property of their parents, our mind’s eye from the pages and pages doc- and states had very little desire to impinge umenting Africa’s wars: the boy soldier in upon this relationship, let alone set standards Sierra Leone or Rwanda, barely larger than his of treatment. weapon, dulled by the opiate of war. Holden The last century saw the signs of change. Roberto was the first to recognise how much it At least one motivation for that change has demoralises an enemy village to have its chief been the dramatic rise in child victims of war; executed by a child. It is a despairing fact that a reality which has increasingly come to there are currently around 300,000 such ‘sol- demand the world’s attention. The League of diers’ serving in armed conflicts around the Nations, already in 1924, moved by the num-
MAX DU PLESSIS is a senior lecturer at the Howard College School of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal. He is also an advocate of the High Court and an associate member of the Natal Bar, as well as a research associate for Matrix Chambers in London. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 104
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bers orphaned in the Great War, adopted the • Second, states must respect and ensure Declaration of the Rights of the Child—the respect for the rules of international first sustained international effort focused on humanitarian law that are relevant to chil- the rights of children, calling upon govern- dren. In this respect, states must “take all ments to provide food, shelter and medical feasible measures to ensure protection and attention to poor children. The declaration care of children who are affected by an was nothing but inspirational, being very armed conflict”.4 vague in its standards and containing no •Third, and harking back to the aspirations mechanisms for its enforcement. It was only of the League of Nations Declaration of with the rise of the international human rights 1924, states are obliged to take all appro- movement, more especially under the aegis of priate measures to promote the physical the United Nations (UN) post-1945, that and psychological recovery and social rein- there has come a sustained effort to provide tegration of children following an armed legal protection to children in armed con- conflict—this recovery and reintegration flicts. must take place in an environment that fosters the health, self-respect and dignity Protection for children as civilian victims of war of the child.5 This effort took some time to crystallise, and These protections under the Convention on culminated eventually in the Convention on the Rights of the Child—human rights protec- the Rights of the Child in 1989. This conven- tions—exist alongside various norms that pro- tion sets out various general protections for tect children and that have arisen in the children, which are directly enforceable parallel field of humanitarian law. against states parties. It is the first binding Humanitarian law is a body of rules that have universal treaty dedicated solely to the protec- come to govern armed conflicts, and symbol- tion and promotion of children’s rights. The ic of this body of law are the famous Geneva treaty provides a detailed framework of princi- Conventions. The 1949 Geneva Conventions, ples and standards for treatment of the world’s more especially the Fourth Convention, sets children. Unusually for a human rights instru- out various standards which go to the protec- ment, it combines economic, social and cul- tion of children, even if only by implication. tural rights with civil and political rights, and These protections include general prohibi- consequently offers the fullest legal statement tions on murder, torture and inhumane treat- of children’s rights to be found anywhere. It ment during times of international armed focuses both on the protection of individual conflict. Common Article 3 to the Geneva children and on the creation of general condi- Conventions ensures that these general pro- tions in which children’s full potential can be tections inure to children in an internal armed recognised. conflict. In cases of an international armed Particularly relevant protections in our conflict, the Fourth Convention specifically context—which apply both in times of war and details the following protections: peace—include the right to essential care and Article 14: In time of peace, the High assistance, the right of access to health, food Contracting Parties and, after the out- and education, the prohibition of torture, break of hostilities, the parties thereto, abuse and neglect, the prohibition of the may establish in their own territory and, death penalty, and the need for the protection if the need arises, in occupied territories, of children in situations of deprivation of lib- hospital and safety zones and localities erty. Of especial importance are the addition- so organised as to protect from the al protections that pertain specifically to the effects of war, wounded, sick and aged treatment of children during armed conflict: persons, children under fifteen, expec- • First, states undertake to ensure access to tant mothers and mothers of children and the provision of humanitarian assis- under seven. tance to children during armed conflict.3 Article 24: The Parties to the conflict • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 105
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shall take the necessary measures to Protocols of 1977. Additional Protocol I appli- ensure that children under fifteen, who cable to international armed conflicts pro- are orphaned or are separated from their vides as follows in Article 77: families as a result of war, are not left to Protection of children their own resources, and that their main- The Parties to the conflict shall take tenance, the exercise of their religion all feasible measures in order that chil- and their education are facilitated in all dren who have not attained the age of circumstances. Their education shall, as fifteen years do not take a direct part in far as possible, be entrusted to persons hostilities and, in particular, they shall of a similar cultural tradition. refrain from recruiting them into their In 1977 the Geneva Conventions were updat- armed forces. ed by two Additional Protocols. Protocol I, If, in exceptional cases, despite the which regulates international armed conflicts, provisions of paragraph 2, children who stipulates, for example, that “children shall be have not attained the age of fifteen years the object of special respect and shall be pro- take a direct part in hostilities and fall tected against any form of indecent assault”.6 into the hands of an adverse Party, they Parties to the conflict are moreover obliged to shall continue to benefit from the spe- provide children with “the care and aid they cial protection accorded by this Article, require, whether because of their age or for whether or not they are prisoners of war. any other reason”.7 Protocol II guarantees pro- If arrested, detained or interned for tections during times of internal, or non- reasons related to the armed conflict, international, armed conflict. In respect of children shall be held in quarters sepa- children, it provides in express terms that chil- rate from the quarters of adults, except dren must be provided with the care and aid where families are accommodated as they require, including education and family family units … . reunion.8 Additional Protocol II sets out the follow standards in respect of non-international Protection against recruitment or participation of armed conflicts in Article 4: children as child soldiers Fundamental guarantees So much for children as victims of war. A 3. Children shall be provided with recent development, and one which is an the care and aid they require, and in par- unwelcome scourge, is the involvement of ticular: children as combatants during times of armed (c) Children who have not attained conflict. While such children are also ‘victims’ the age of fifteen years shall neither be of war, they might be usefully classified sepa- recruited in the armed forces or groups rately as combatant victims as opposed to the nor allowed to take part in hostilities. civilian category of child victims discussed I mentioned earlier the Convention on the above. Rights of the Child. That convention reiter- While the scale of the child soldier prob- ates and furthers the humanitarian laws lem has reached crisis proportions in recent regarding child recruitment. Aside from, as times, international humanitarian law has pointed out, obliging states parties to “respect attempted to provide protection for such chil- and to ensure respect for rules of internation- dren for well over 50 years. The Fourth al humanitarian law applicable to them in Geneva Convention, for instance, in Article armed conflicts which are relevant to the 51 provides that the occupying power may child,”9 the following specific demands are not compel protected persons to serve in its made of states that are party to the conven- armed or auxiliary forces—children being tion by Article 38 of the convention: included in the category of protected persons States Parties shall take all feasible under that convention. Standards specific to measures to ensure that persons who children came later with the Additional have not attained the age of fifteen years • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 106
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do not take a direct part in hostilities. our conscience is not revolted nor our States Parties shall refrain from sense of dignity challenged. This repre- recruiting any person who has not sents a fundamental crisis of our civilisa- attained the age of fifteen years into tion.11 their armed forces. Machel accordingly called on governments, In response to problem of child soldiers, the international organisations and every element UN General Assembly took steps at the end of civil society to take seriously the impact of of the last century to strengthen this conven- armed conflict on children.12 The UN tion so as ensure deeper protection for chil- response was to appoint a Special dren who participate in armed hostilities. It Representative for Children and Armed did so by adopting the Optional Protocol to Conflict, Olara Otunuu, whose job was and the Convention on the Rights of the Child on remains to act as a public advocate on behalf the Involvement of Children in Armed of children whose right and welfare have been Conflict. It entered into force on 12 February and continue to be violated in armed con- 2002 and has 115 signatories, and has been flict.13 Otunuu has warned that while the last ratified by 70 states. The Optional Protocol 50 years have seen the nations of the world lays down two important principles which develop and ratify an impressive array of inter- serve to protect children. The first is to raise national human rights and humanitarian the age limit for compulsory recruitment and instruments, “the value of these provisions is direct participation in armed hostilities to 18, limited to the extent to which they are and requires states parties to lift the minimum applied”. The world’s children know only too age for voluntary enlistment to 16. The sec- well that Otunuu is correct when he states: ond and more strident protection is to pro- “Words on paper cannot save children in hibit insurgent armed groups “under any peril.” circumstances” from recruiting persons under One means by which the international 18 years or using them in hostilities. community can be seen to take these warnings seriously is by the development of a body of Enforcement through international rules known as international criminal law, and by the creation of an international criminal criminal law court to enforce that law. This then serves as a background to what I The Statute of the International Criminal would like to focus on in some detail, name- Court was adopted on 17 July 1998 by an ly, the role of international criminal law, and overwhelming majority of the states attending more particularly the International Criminal the Rome Conference; a conference specifi- Court (ICC), regarding the enforcement of cally organised to secure agreement on a children’s rights. The protections described treaty for the establishment of a permanent above have unfortunately been observed by international criminal tribunal. states more in their breach than in their obser- After five weeks of intense negotiations, vance. One consequence of this failure is the 120 countries voted to adopt the treaty. Only appointment by the UN in 1993 of Graça seven countries voted against it (including the Machel to study the adverse effects of armed rather strange bedfellows of China, Israel, conflict on children. Three years later Machel Iraq, and the United States) and 21 abstained. presented her report to the General The treaty would come into force upon 60 rat- Assembly.10 In that report, she noted with ifications. The magic number was reached by despair that the international community has April of 2002. consistently watched while children’s rights To date, the Rome Statute has been signed are flagrantly attacked and has done little to by 139 states and 94 states have ratified it. It is defend them. In her words: notable that within just four years the treaty It is unforgivable that children are has achieved the 60 required ratifications, far assaulted, violated, murdered and yet sooner than was generally expected. The • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 107
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statute entered into force on 1 July 2002, at ment in international armed conflict17 and which time the court’s jurisdiction over geno- internal armed conflict.18 cide, war crimes and crimes against humanity Article 8 took effect. The judges for the court were cho- War crimes sen last year in February, and were sworn in The Court shall have jurisdiction in on 11 March 2003 at the inaugural session of respect of war crimes in particular when the court in The Hague. The prosecutor has committed as part of a plan or policy or been chosen—the highly respected Argentine as part of a large-scale commission of lawyer Luis Moreno-Ocampo—and the court such crimes. is expected to hear its first case soon. For the purpose of this Statute, “war The importance of the court for the pur- crimes” means: pose of our discussion should be clear. Through the ICC individual accountability is Conscripting or enlisting children under set in place for those who violate the norms the age of fifteen years into the national protecting children during times of hostilities. armed forces or using them to partici- That is done through criminalising various pate actively in hostilities. forms of behaviour detrimental to children. In This provision is based on the provisions in respect of crimes aimed against children as favour of children contained in Additional civilian victims of war, the court will have Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, in par- jurisdiction over a range of offences. In the ticular, Article 77(2), which requires states to first place, children obviously stand to gain “refrain from recruiting them into their armed alongside other civilians from the statute’s forces” and requires parties to ensure “that prohibition of crimes against humanity, war children who have not attained the age of 15 crimes and genocide. A number of such pro- years do not take part in hostilities”. The hibitions, although not specifically directed at Rome Statute thus sets out two offences relat- children, may be of particular relevance. ing to child soldiers. Aside from prohibiting These include the crimes of sexual violence the “conscription” or “enlistment” of chil- (rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, dren, the statute also outlaws “using children forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation or to participate” in hostilities. other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity),14 whether committed as a crime Accountability in action—internation- against humanity or as a war crime, the use of starvation as a method of warfare, the genoci- al criminal courts dal act of preventing births,15 and the war The Rome Statute is the most recent and most crime of intentionally directing attacks against optimistic feature of an infant system of inter- schools and other educational facilities.16 national criminal accountability. As yet there Aside from these general prohibitions, the has not been a prosecution before the ICC. Rome Statute also targets the ‘child-specific’ At this stage in the court’s history it has been crime which we have come to associate with up to speculators and prophets to predict how ethnic cleansing. Article 6 of the statute pro- the court will function generally, let alone to vides in this respect that the forcible transfer predict how it will fare regarding the prosecu- of children belonging to a national, ethnic, tion of crimes relating to children. racial or religious group A, to another group That said, however, there are encouraging B, with the intention of destroying, in whole developments of late in the field of interna- or in part, group A, is an act which amounts tional criminal law, which hint at a healthy to genocide. future. One such development is in respect of Turning to the problem of child soldiers, child soldiers. In the realm of child-law until the Rome Statute sets out specific prohibi- very recently there had not been a prosecution tions in this regard. Article 8 (regarding war of an individual for recruitment of child-sol- crimes) includes the crime of child recruit- diers, either before an international court, or • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 108
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in a domestic legal system. Indeed, we are on Aside from confirming more generally the the cusp of history. On 31 May 2004, the international community’s concern for the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Prosecutor v crime of recruiting children into the heart of Sam Hinga Norman19 handed down the first darkness, the court’s judgement indicates that ever judgement regarding recruitment of child the crime of recruiting child soldiers is now soldiers. The wheels of international criminal part of customary international law. justice have been set in motion regarding Article 4 of the Statute for the Special child-specific crimes, and we now have a good Court provides that the court has the power example of what such a prosecution might to prosecute persons who committed serious entail before the ICC. violations of international humanitarian law, That the Sierra Leone Tribunal was seized including “[c]onscripting or enlisting children with this type of case will come as no surprise. under the age of 15 years into armed forces or The conflict in Sierra Leone has been marked groups using them to participate actively in by the use of children as soldiers. It is estimat- hostilities”. In other words, for crimes com- ed that around 10,000 children under the age mitted after 30 November 1996, the date on of 15 have served in the armies of the main which the court’s jurisdiction bites, Article 4 warring factions.20 Many were killed or provides the court with jurisdiction over the wounded and others have been forced or crime of ‘child-recruitment’. Norman was induced to kill and maim; their victims includ- charged with child-recruitment alleged to have ed members of their own community and been committed after 30 November 1996, but even their own families. The effect of this hor- his lawyers raised an important argument of ror is understandably traumatic. Children con- principle. That argument was that the crime of tinue to suffer reprisals from communities ‘child-enlistment’ only became a crime in cus- they were ordered to attack, and they exhibit, tomary international law with the passing of not surprisingly, behavioural problems and the Rome Statute of the ICC and the psychological difficulties related to the crimes Optional Protocol to the Convention on the they have been involved in under the direction Rights of the Child. The defence argument of adults in positions of command responsi- was that there was not enough state practice bility.21 Sam Hinga Norman was such an prior to these two treaties to confirm a rule of adult. He was eventually arrested and charged international law obliging the punishment of under the statute of the Special Court for child-recruitment. In a nutshell, said the Sierra Leone. This tribunal is the result of an defence, the act of child-recruitment, even if agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone morally abhorrent to reasonable people the to try “those who bear the greatest responsibil- world over now and before 30 November ity” for crimes against humanity and disrupt- 1996, was not a war crime at the time that ing the peace process.22 A special court that Samuel Norman was alleged to have commit- has been established pursuant to Security ted it. That is because his crime was commit- Council Resolution 1315, bears many similari- ted in the period after 30 November 1996 but ties with the ad hoc tribunals created by the before the existence of the Rome Statute and Security Council to deal with the atrocities the Optional Protocol to the Convention on committed in the former Yugoslavia and the Rights of the Child. One does not need to Rwanda.23 The court is a hybrid, staffed by be an expert lawyer to appreciate the line of local and international personnel, and has an attack taken by Norman’s defence team. Their international prosecutor.24 It was brought into argument was simple: the UN when it created existence in 2000 and its temporal jurisdiction the Sierra Leone Tribunal in 2000 and gave it to prosecute international crimes under its jurisdiction by way of Article 4 over the crime statute stretches back to crimes committed of child recruitment, had in fact got ahead of from 30 November 1996.25 itself. That is because, so the argument went, The significance of the case against Sam the crime detailed in Article 4 only became a Hinga Norman cannot be underestimated. crime much later, and the UN ought not to • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 109
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have criminalised it in the Statute of the Sierra Statute of ICC. Of course the Rome Statute is Leone Tribunal, but ought instead to have not retrospective. Its jurisdiction extends only limited the court’s jurisdiction to crimes like to those crimes that were committed after 1 murder, rape and so on which were clearly July 2002 when its statute became operative. crimes against humanity in international law. What the Hinga judgement confirms is that So, said the defence, because international certainly by that date the world had accepted criminal law contains a basic principle that that, aside from the terms of the Rome Statute punishment must not be inflicted for conduct itself, recruitment of child soldiers was crimi- that was not clearly criminal at the time it was nalised as a war crime under customary inter- committed—expressed in the quaint Latin national law. The Hinga judgement of the adage of nullem crimen sine lege—Chief Hinga Sierra Leone Court symbolises the beginning Norman cannot properly be prosecuted for of a trend. That trend is to take seriously the the crime of child recruitment when it was not issue of crimes concerning children, and to clear to the chief that such activity was crimi- prosecute those responsible for such viola- nalised at the time he was embattled in Sierra tions, both to exact retribution from the Leone. offender, as well as to send a message of deter- What did the court find? The court rence to others. In January this year the ICC trawled through all the conventions that were announced that it was ready to investigate its discussed earlier in this paper—such as the first case. The details have not been disclosed Geneva Conventions and the Convention on in any great measure, but the Prosecutor’s the Rights of the Child—concentrating on Office has confirmed that it will involve the those provisions that set out the norms prosecution of Ugandan rebel leaders of the regarding child recruitment. It found, con- Lords’ Resistance Army who have kidnapped trary to the assertions by Sam Norman’s thousands of children as soldiers or sex lawyers, that already prior to 1996, the act of slaves.27 The ICC’s first case is thus as good an recruiting child soldiers was a war crime out- indication as any that the trend begun by the lawed under international humanitarian law. Hinga judgement is one that is likely to con- Accordingly, to the court, the Rome Statute tinue. and the Optional Protocol of the Convention That brings me now to a related topic; one on the Rights of the Child were doing little which will surely exercise the minds of all the more than codifying and effectively imple- psychologists, criminologists and sociologists menting the existing customary norm which in years to come. The problem is this: how criminalised child-recruitment. The court’s does the law deal with the crimes committed conclusion was expressed thus: by children participants in times of armed … the Government of Sierra Leone conflict? was well aware already in 1996 that chil- In many national jurisdictions, children dren below the age of 15 should not be are exempt from criminal liability for their recruited. Citizens of Sierra Leone, and acts because they are regarded as doli incapax— even less, persons in leadership roles, incapable of forming a criminal intent. The cannot possibly argue that they did not age limit for criminal responsibility varies know that recruiting children was a crim- widely between domestic states. inal act in violation of international International criminal law has not over- humanitarian law.26 come this problem. The drafters of the Statute The case is therefore a public, and interna- for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, for tional, demonstration of disgust at the recruit- example, faced perhaps their most difficult ment of child soldiers through the means of ethical question in deciding on how to deal international criminal law. It also prefigures with the atrocities committed by child sol- the work of the ICC, and the prosecution of diers. Many of the worst mutilations were those who recruit child-soldiers and use them committed by aggressive and violent 16- and to participate in hostilities under the Rome 17-year olds, and the populace demanded that • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 110
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they be punished. It is reported that Kofi combatants, in armed conflict. These norms, Annan took the forgiving line of most NGOs, it is correct to say, are worthless if they remain namely, that these youths were in fact victims simply written on paper. Action must translate of war themselves, and that they should not norms into meaningful protections for chil- be made accountable for their criminal acts.28 dren. One manner in which this might be The treaty between the UN and Sierra Leone done is through international criminal prose- which establishes the tribunal reaches some- cution. We can now look towards the ICC for thing of a compromise, albeit an uneasy one: such action. The ICC is part of a continuum; soldiers under the age of 15 at the time of a process that was catalysed in Nuremburg their crime will not be prosecuted, while those and one which does justice to the world pub- who are between 15 and 18 will be prosecuted lic’s demand that there be no impunity for but not go to jail if convicted.29 international crimes that tear at the very fab- The Rome Statute of the ICC, however, ric of our humanity. Crimes against children sets a different standard. After a great deal of tear perhaps more than any others. We can debate and lobbying by child rights advocates, but hope that international criminal law, prac- the drafters of the ICC Statute decided that ticed by international tribunals such as the the court should not have jurisdiction over ICC, is one of many meaningful measures by persons under the age of 18 years at the time which it can be shown that children’s rights of the alleged commission of the offence.30 are worth more than just the paper they are Perhaps the exclusion of child perpetrators written on. from the jurisdiction of the ICC is an impor- tant victory for those who believe that inter- Notes national judicial mechanisms are not best 1 Recounted in Stuart Beresford, Children’s issues: Protecting the most vulnerable child witnesses and suited for prosecuting young persons. the International Criminal Court, 14, in Irina Certainly the exclusion lends credence to the Kebreau, Eyes on the ICC, published by the idea that such children are essentially victims Independent Student Coalition for the and, therefore, should be treated as such by International Criminal Court, 2004. 2. See G Robertson, Crimes against humanity: The the international criminal justice system. struggle for global justice, 2002, p 217. However, the Sierra Leone experience 3. Article 27(3). points in the other direction. Some appalling 4. Article 38(4). atrocities have been committed by these 5. Article 39. 6. Article 77. young soldiers, and the problem may well be— 7. Article 77(1). as Geoffrey Robertson has suggested31—less 8. Article 4(3). the challenge of taking the boy out of the war 9. Article 38(1). than the war out of the boy. Perhaps their age 10. G Machel, Impact of armed conflict on children: Report of the Expert of the Secretary-General, should mitigate penalty rather than excuse submitted pursuant to General Assembly their crime. It may be regrettable, on this view, Resolution 48/157, UN Doc A/51/306, 26 August that 16- or 17-year-olds, who may well be law- 1996 (hereinafter the “Machel Report”). fully recruited into armies without conse- 11. Ibid, para. 317. quence under the Rome Statute (remember, it 12. Ibid, 316 and 317. 13. See J Vachachira, Report 2002: Implementation of is only a crime to enlist persons under 15 for the Optional Protocol to the Rights of the Child an active part in hostilities), should be on the Involvement of Children in Armed immune from prosecution. Conflict, 18, NYL School Journal of Human Rights, p 543. 14. Rome Statute, Articles 7(1)(g) and 8(2)(b)(xxii) and Conclusion (e)(vi). 15. Rome Statute, Article 6(d). In this paper I have attempted to outline the 16. Rome Statute, Article 8(b)(ix). norms that exist, both under human rights law 17. Rome Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi). 18. Rome Statute, Article 8(2)(e)(vii). and humanitarian law, in respect of children 19. Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of who are caught up, whether as civilians or Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 31 May 2004, • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 111
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Case No, SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E). curred in by Justice King (Justice Robertson dis- 20. See the judgement (dissenting) of Judge Robertson senting). in Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, para. 7. 27 See UN Wire, First International Criminal Court 21. Ibid, para. 7. case targets Uganda’s rebels, 30 January 2004. 22. See Robertson, op cit, pp 468-469. 28 Robertson, op cit, p 469. 23 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 30 Rome Statute, Article 26. 25 Ibid. 31 Robertson, op cit, p 217. 26 Para. 52, per the judgement of Justice Ayoola, con- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 113
ESSAY
AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE East Africa moves on
NELSON ALUSALA
Introduction social, health and other related problems are all vital for the creation of conditions of sta- This paper traces briefly the efforts undertaken bility and well being, which are necessary for by African states through the African Union peaceful and friendly relations among nations. (AU) to find a common African security poli- Conflicts in Africa bear certain unique cy that envisages the establishment of an characteristics predominantly embedded in African Standby Force (ASF). The paper then their root causes, intensity, duration (often too goes on to discuss East African countries’ long), escalation and their propensity to spill efforts to establish an Eastern Africa standby over to neighbouring states. Although the brigade, in line with the requirements of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC).1 recent creation of the AU PSC led to concert- The need for a common African defence ed efforts by African states to search for peace and security policy was stressed during the on the continent, the commitment of African Inaugural Summit of the AU held in Durban, people to mitigate their own conflicts is not a South Africa, in July 2002, when the Assembly recent thing. The continent has been grap- of Heads of State and Government deliberated pling with the issue since the beginning of the the proposal of Libyan leader that Africa post-colonial period—with renewed vigour and establishes a single continental army. The determination every time—yet the fruits have African leaders were also motivated to persistently remained elusive. respond to the multifaceted challenges to sta- The predecessor of the AU, the bility, security and cooperation on the conti- Organisation of African Unity (OAU), under- nent. It is in this context that the Constitutive took numerous efforts to address the problems Act of the AU in Article 4(d) calls for the of intra- and inter-state conflicts. Central to establishment of a common defence policy for this was the Cairo Declaration of June 1993, the African continent. which saw the establishment of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Tracing the urge Pursuant to the Cairo Declaration were the The United Nations (UN) Charter provides 1994 Declaration on the Code of Conduct for the foundation for a broad and long-term Inter-African Relations, the Declaration on approach to conflict prevention based on the Unconstitutional Changes of Government of wide concept of peace and security. Article 55 July 2000, as well as the Solemn Declaration of the UN Charter unequivocally underscores of the Conference on Security, Stability, that solutions to international economic, Development and Cooperation in Africa
NELSON ALUSALA is a senior researcher in the Arms Management Programme at the ISS. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 114
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(CSSDCA), also of July 2000. Through its Marshal Plan, for Africa’s reconstruction in four calabashes,2 the CSSDCA commits cooperation with industrialised countries. member states to the process of developing a NEPAD’s Programme of Action focuses on common position on the basis that the securi- capacity building, peace and security, eco- ty, stability and development of each African nomic and corporate governance, banking country is inseparably linked to that of other and financial sectors, regional infrastructure African countries. The four principles were projects and agricultural development and first articulated in the Kampala Leadership market access for Africa’s member states’ Forum Document of 1991, in recognition of products. NEPAD also establishes, through the fact that the problems of security and sta- peer review, a club of African states commit- bility in many African countries had impaired ted to good governance and to ending con- their capacity to achieve the necessary level of flict. intra- and inter-African cooperation that is Africa therefore continues to demonstrate required to attain socio-economic develop- eagerness in taking responsibility for its des- ment and transformation. tiny, based on initiatives aimed at enabling its The CSSDCA Declaration therefore pro- people to tackle their own problems following vides a framework for collective action and an African agenda, managed by Africans and cooperation at regional, continental and inter- designed to promote and foster the conti- national levels. It is upon this foundation that nent’s interest, with the active involvement of early prevention of conflicts and maintenance the international community. of durable peace in Africa must be established if the region is to tackle effectively such issues AU Peace and Security Council as poverty (socio-economic iniquities and inequalities), ethnic violence, human rights The AU PSC was set up in July 2002 when the violations, disputes over political participa- First Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, tion, land (re)distribution, illicit proliferation which is also the plenary organ of the organi- of small arms and light weapons, the plight of sation, resolved to replace the OAU Central refugees and internally displaced persons and Organ with the Council. The PSC is therefore illegal exploitation of mineral resources. the standing decision-making organ for the According to Mills and Oppenheimer,3 prevention, management and resolution of the African challenge is a complex one, root- conflicts. The protocol establishing the PSC ed in history and defined by ill-formed (some- entered into force in December 2003. The times dysfunctional) geographic and state PSC is composed of: units, with domestic, regional and interna- •a Panel of the Wise, which is a body that tional dimensions relating both to its colonial advises the council on issues relating to the history and to the nature of the continent’s maintenance and promotion of peace; transition to independence, marked by the •a continental Early Warning System, to growth of corruption, nepotism, populist facilitate anticipation and prevention of redistribution and patronage politics. This is conflicts; reflected in the continent’s economic decline • an African Standby Force (ASF)—a body of as well as its political and institutional failures. multidisciplinary military and civilian con- Underlying the fact that violence is tingents for rapid deployment; and endemic and persistent in Africa is the reality •a Special Fund to provide the financial that the continent is constantly exhibiting resources for its activities. changing and challenging dynamics charac- The multiplicity of the PSC components proj- terised by shifting patterns of international ects its structure as being functionally decen- and regional engagements, in its quest for tralised; an aspect that has attracted some solutions. Notable in this dimension is the criticism, mainly on how these structures New Partnership for Africa’s Development should relate with mechanisms of other (NEPAD), modelled on the United States regional security organisations such as the • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 115
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Economic Community of West African States immediately followed by the First Meeting of (ECOWAS). (That topic, however, falls out of African Ministers of Defence and Security. the scope of this paper.) The ACDS meeting focused on issues relating to the establishment of the ASF, the MSC and the CADSP, furthering the aims already pro- The establishment of regional stand- posed by, among others, the Second and by brigades Third meetings of the ACDS of 1997 and The rationale, based on past experience May 2003 respectively, which recommended (notably in 1994 in Rwanda), is that in con- that the AU Commission and the five regions flict, time is of the essence if one is to prevent pursue efforts to establish a standby brigade in an emerging crisis from degenerating into a each of the regions. catastrophe. Under the UN peacekeeping structure, it takes on average three to six Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EAS- months from the time the UN Security BRIG) Council decides to establish a peacekeeping mission until it is able to deploy such a mis- In implementing the AU Commission’s sion.4 During this time period lives may be requirements, the Intergovernmental lost while the conflict escalates, spilling over Authority on Development (IGAD) convened to neighbouring regions. the Jinja meeting of Experts in February 2004 The AU decision taken at its 2002 Durban on the establishment of the Eastern Africa summit to establish a PSC and an African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). This was fol- Standby Force (ASF) for conducting peace lowed by a meeting of Eastern African Chiefs support operations in the continent was there- of Defence Staff (EACDS) from the Comoros fore forward looking. In its recommendations, (which sent a representative), Djibouti, Kenya, the AU envisaged the development of an Madagascar, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and African common security policy by 2010 with Uganda, the defence attaché of Tanzania, who the establishment of an ASF capable of rapid attended as an observer, and a representative deployment. The ASF would comprise stand- from the Common Market for Eastern and by brigades in each of the five regions (south, Southern Africa (COMESA). There were also east, north, west and central Africa). observers from the Multinational Stand-by The powers of the PSC are outlined in High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Article VII of the Protocol for the establishment operations (SHIRBRIG) and Reinforcement of the PSC, and primary among them is the of African Peacekeeping Capacity power to implement the common defence pol- (RECAMP). It was noted that, once estab- icy for the AU within the context of the UN. lished, EASBRIG would encompass 13 east Pursuant to the AU 2002 Inaugural African countries. Hence, in addition to those Summit at which African Heads of State and mentioned above would be included Eritrea, Government signed the Protocol for the estab- Ethiopia, Mauritius and the Seychelles. lishment of the PSC, under which the ASF and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) were Mission scenarios established, the AU prepared the Common African Defence and Security Policy In order to assess fully and objectively the Framework (CADSP) as well as the policy requirements for the establishment of EAS- framework for the establishment of the ASF BRIG, it is important to recall that the struc- and the MSC. These were then considered by tures of the ASF are informed by missions and government experts, African Chiefs of scenarios defined within the Third ACDS Defence Staff (ACDS) and ministers of for- Policy Framework for the establishment of the eign affairs, defence and security. ASF. In January 2004, the 4th Meeting of ACDS A Scenario 1 approach would entail provi- and experts was held in Addis Ababa and was sion of military advice to a political mission, • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 116
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as was the case in Côte d’Ivoire. Under • light multi-role logistical unit of up to 190 Scenario 2, the AU or a regional observer mis- personnel and 40 vehicles; sion is supposed to co-deploy with a UN mis- • level two medical unit of up to 35 person- sion, as was the case with the OAU/AU nel and 10 vehicles; Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE) • military observer group of up to 120 offi- or the Verification Monitoring Team (VMT) cers; and in the Sudan. A Scenario 3 mission is a stand- • civilian support group consisting of logisti- alone AU or regional observer mission, such cal, administration and budget compo- as the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) or the nents. AU Mission in the Comoros (AMIC). In order to assist troop-contributing countries Scenario 4 entails an AU or regional peace- (TCCs) to determine the details of contribu- keeping force for Chapter VI and preventive tions and commitments, the EACDS noted deployment missions (and peace building), that the AU was in the process of developing such as the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), and gaining approval for TOEs that should while Scenario 5 means an AU peacekeeping serve as a useful guide and base document force for complex multidimensional peace- against which EASBRIG contributions and keeping missions, including those involving commitments could be assessed. The EACDS low-level spoilers. A Scenario 6 mission would decided that when the planning element include intervention, for example, in genocide (PLANELM) finalises the TOEs of EASBRIG, situations where the international community it should also include sealift capabilities, given does not act promptly. the extended coastline of the East African region, as well as additional fire-support capa- bilities in the case of Scenarios 5 and 6. Operationalisation of EASBRIG During the meeting various countries pro- Based on the view that the AU emphasises posed their contributions to EASBRIG, while standardised regional standby brigades for others asked for time to consult and report Scenario 4 as opposed to specific structures by back later. Rwanda offered two light infantry each of the regions, the EACDS concurred battalions with organic transport, one mecha- with the basic force requirements as set out by nised battalion (with 10 armoured personnel the AU. The EACDS recognised that the carriers and four ICVs), one signal platoon, quantities they relied on were derivatives of one provost company, one engineer the UN specifications that entail the follow- squadron/company, one medical company, ing tables of organisation and equipment one special forces company and public rela- (TOEs): tions and legal officers. Sudan offered one •brigade (mission level); light infantry battalion, including organic • headquarters support unit of up to 65 per- transport to EASBRIG. sonnel and 16 vehicles; Kenya, while offering its Peace Support • headquarters company and support unit of Training Centre (PSTC) to serve as a regional up to 120 personnel; centre of excellence at all levels, from tactical •4 x light infantry battalions, each com- through to strategic, also offered to provide posed of up to 750 personnel and 70 vehi- one light infantry battalion including organic cles;5 transport, one medical company and one • engineer unit of up to 505 personnel; squadron of engineers. • light signals unit of up to 135 personnel; Djibouti offered one light infantry battal- • reconnaissance company (wheeled) of up ion (consisting of three sub-units) with organ- to 150 personnel; ic transport composed of 330–350 persons in • helicopter unit of up to 80 personnel, 10 the order of a support command company, vehicles and 4 helicopters; two infantry companies and one de-mining • military police unit of up to 48 personnel team. Djibouti also offered one high-ranking and 17 vehicles; officer as part of PLANELM and proposed to • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 117
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host a regional logistics centre, while Uganda Committee of EACDS (‘the Committee’). offered one light infantry battalion, including The Committee will be responsible to an organic support. Somalia offered one infantry Eastern African Council of Ministers of company with 10 technicians. Defence and Security (‘the Council’) which will in turn report to the Assembly of the Heads of State of Eastern Africa for EAS- EASBRIG membership and the role BRIG. The Committee will be responsible for of IGAD the management of all aspects of EASBRIG During the meeting it was observed that the force preparation and will regularly report to 13 EASBRIG member states are also members the Council in this respect. The EACDS of several regional economic blocs, namely, agreed that force deployment of EASBRIG COMESA, the East African Community would require authorisation by Eastern (EAC), IGAD and the Southern Africa African Heads of State and Government. Development Community (SADC). This cre- On the chairing of the EASBRIG Heads of ates interfaces since no single regional eco- State meetings, the Council and Committee, nomic community (REC) accommodates all the EACDS decided that a system of rotation, 13 member states; the difficulty, however, is in based on voluntary country offers (that is designating one single REC to manage the open to and applies to all EASBRIG member EASBRIG.6 states) be followed. None of the existing RECs could therefore The EACDS agreed on the requirement claim to represent completely EASBRIG on for the existence of a permanent PLANELM behalf of the AU, while recognising the desig- for EASBRIG, consisting of a nucleus of one nated interim role allocated to IGAD in this military officer from each member state, work- respect. The EACDS therefore decided that ing on a regional rotational basis and with limited terms of service within the Element. the appropriate role of IGAD would be that of The EASBRIG PLANELM, which will be sep- interim coordination, including coordination of all activities of the EASBRIG, calling meet- Proposed command and control structure ings of the Council of Ministers of Defence for EASBRIG and Security for EASBRIG and the East African Ministers of Defence and Security, Assembly of HOS of East Africa undertaking fundraising in conjunction with other RECs, the AU and the UN to support the work of EASBRIG, providing and sharing Council of Ministers of African Union Defence and Security information to facilitate planning for the EASBRIG and establishing an EASBRIG Committee of Chiefs fund to coordinate donor funding and of Defence Staff resources offered by the international com- munity. After analysing various case studies of command and control structures, the EACDS IGAD Secretariat PLANELM EASBRIG agreed to conform to the following structure for EASBRIG: arate from the brigade headquarters, will be required to interact with the continental The EACDS decided to appoint a sub-com- PLANELM within the Commission of the mittee to work out the budget implications of AU. The brigade headquarters itself is a sepa- the PLANELM and the proposed rules for rate arrangement. The regional PLANELM country assessments/contributions. therefore constituted a permanent and sepa- Given the requirement to establish a rate structure, responsible for force prepara- Mechanism in East Africa to manage EAS- tion of EASBRIG. The staff of the PLANELM BRIG, the EACDS decided to establish a may deploy in-theatre and/or at the rear head- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 118
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quarters, or be divided between the two loca- and participating in fact-finding missions tions as determined by the chief of staff of towards the deployment of missions in the PLANELM. East African area or involving the deploy- The Eastern Africa PLANELM will be ment of EASBRIG. responsible to the Committee, also working •Collecting, evaluating and determining directly towards the PLANELM at the level of best practices (lessons learned) from previ- the AU. Within this staffing structure, it is ous and ongoing missions and, where nec- proposed that the terms of reference for the essary, collaborating with research PLANELM responsibilities include the fol- institutions for this purpose. lowing: • Evaluating and submitting an annual •Monitoring the implementation of the rec- report to the Committee of EACDS and ommendations relating to the establish- the Commission of the AU on the status ment of the EASBRIG by contributing of the EASBRIG, making recommenda- member states. tions to address relevant problems and •Developing and updating standard operat- challenges, and projections for the future ing procedures (SOPs) within the frame- maintenance and employment of the work of the generic AU SOPs for peace Brigade. support operations (PSO), which are con- • Submitting an annual audited report to the sistent with the UN doctrine. Committee of EACDS on the financial •Coordinating and harmonising resource and budgetary state of the PLANELM contributions and commitments for the and/or EASBRIG. Standby Brigade, submitting data to the During meetings in Addis Ababa in January Committee of EACDS and sharing infor- 2004, African Chiefs of Defence Staff and mation and planning data with the AU Ministers of Defence and Security reaffirmed Commission (Peace and Security Division) their earlier decision to establish the ASF in and the UN Standby Arrangements System two phases. Phase one is to end on 30 June (UNSAS). 2005. During this phase, the key AU objec- •Developing databases, options and contin- tive would be to establish a strategic level gency plans for the strategic movement of management capacity for Scenarios 1 to 2, regional standby troops and equipment, in while RECs would complement the AU by order to ensure rapid deployment of EAS- establishing regional forces up to a brigade. BRIG or its components by reducing pre- In Phase one priority will be on the military deployment planning and deployment and police aspects of EASBRIG since UN time. humanitarian, development and human • Evolving a concept of combined (i.e. from rights elements, which do not require UN different countries) force preparation Security Council mandate, could deploy in (ongoing operational training) for the EAS- tandem with EASBRIG and other ASF mis- BRIG, including the planning and conduct sions. of regional combined training exercises Phase two envisages that by 30 June 2010 (CTX). the AU will have developed a capacity to • Establishing a concept of mobilisation and manage complex peacekeeping operations, pre-deployment training to ensure mission while the RECs continue to develop the readiness. capacity to deploy a mission headquarter for •Additionally, coordinating efforts towards Scenario 4, involving AU/regional peacekeep- the establishment of regional centres of ing forces. excellence for PSO training, as well as Scenarios 1 to 3 entail less complex struc- monitoring training at these centres. tures, minimal management effort and fewer • Being prepared to support the AU resources for deployment and sustainment. In Commission with operational planning at contrast, Scenarios 5 to 6 entail enormous all levels, including contingency planning management effort, as well as considerable • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 119
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resources for deployment and sustainment of ed a three-tier system for the development of missions, that may only be attained during regional centres of excellence, namely: tactical Phase 2 of the establishment of the ASF. (Mali); operational (Kofi Annan International Between these two extremes, Scenario 4 Peacekeeping Training Centre) Ghana; and appears to be the type of mission and struc- strategic (Nigerian War College). Elsewhere ture for which all regional brigades, including peacekeeping training is presented as an add- the EASBRIG, are likely to be involved in on by existing institutions. The EACDS normally and in the foreseeable future. In line decided that the region should develop a clear with the guidelines received from the various and suitable policy in this regard. AU meetings, the efforts of the East African The EACDS agreed that: region should therefore aim at establishing an • EASBRIG member states should propose EASBRIG for Chapter VI peacekeeping oper- regional centres of excellence to the IGAD ations and preventive deployment, as well as Secretariat before the end of March 2004; peace-building missions along the lines of and AMIB. • offers should be made for the establish- While the EACDS took note of these ment of the PLANELM, and that external guidelines and recommendations, regional assistance towards improving on and main- realities appear to call for an earlier develop- taining the effectiveness of such institu- ment of a more robust capacity, closer to that tions should be channelled through the reflected in Scenario 5 above. RECs. During discussions, the representative from RECAMP (France) invited EASBRIG to make Standardisation of doctrine and training use of the services of the Peacekeeping School In conformity with guidelines from the AU, in Koulikouro (Mali) for training of staff offi- EASBRIG will adopt the relevant UN doc- cers at brigade or battalion level. The repre- trine for PSO. However, the EACDS recalled sentative from SHIRBRIG offered access to that the development of AU SOPs was rec- its training and possible participation in train- ommended by the 3rd Meeting of the ACDS ing activities. as a joint effort between the AU Commission and RECs. In this respect, the Eastern African Mission sustainment and logistical PLANELM should not only start the develop- bases ment of appropriate SOPs for EASBRIG, given requisite resources and expertise, it Member states agreed that EASBRIG, upon should in addition start the development of establishment, should be supported by a cen- an appropriate doctrine for the operational tralised regional logistical infrastructure that and tactical deployment of the brigade. The would also harness available external initia- development of such a document would tives and assistance. EACDS recognised, how- enable the region to tap regional expertise and ever, that this was an issue that required resources that contribute towards the work of further investigation. A point of consideration the joint work group to be established by the was that the regional logistical base must be AU and RECs. It is not necessary for the located in a country and at a place where the PLANELM to aim at the development of a greatest benefit could be derived from the document covering the whole spectrum of infrastructure and investment made towards operational and tactical deployment of the its establishment. EASBRIG; it could develop appropriate sec- The instructive experiences of the AU in tions of the document for submission to the respect of the African Mission in Burundi AU Commission to facilitate harmonisation (AMIB) underscore the reality of the need for with the ASF doctrine. member states to contribute resources to On training, the EACDS noted that other deployed missions within the framework of regions, West Africa in particular, have adopt- the ASF. Drawing on the coordination func- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 120
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tion of IGAD, the EACDS requested IGAD transparency in national defence and security to commission an independent study involv- policies. Third, a common policy will provide ing the UN to determine the logistical support best practices to strengthen the defence and framework for EASBRIG. This is to be con- security sectors as well as to safeguard individ- cluded before the end of August 2004. ual national, sub-regional and continental val- ues. A Common Defence and Security Policy will be cost effective to member states, as it External initiatives will eliminate unnecessary national expendi- The EACDS reiterated the recommendation ture on defence and security and will allow for from the Fourth Meeting of the ACDS and the reallocation of resources to address more the First Meeting of African Ministers of threatening challenges such as poverty and Defence and Security that regions should, as globalisation. much as possible, undertake the establishment As the AU embarks on creating a of the Regional Brigades with their own Common Defence Policy, certain issues are resources. The EACDS further called upon likely to continue posing a threat. First is the the AU to coordinate all external initiatives to question of sustainability in terms of financ- build African peacekeeping capacity and that ing the ASF during intervention times. More the Eastern Africa Region should devise a often than not, conflicts in Africa are lethal, common approach to external initiatives. and in several cases unpredictable. A recent example was the reoccurrence of conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Legal framework Congo (DRC) in May 2004, when dissident The EACDS agreed that EASBRIG would troops captured the town of Bukavu despite operate on the basis of a memorandum of the presence of UN peacekeepers in the coun- understanding (MoU), which could eventual- try. An ASF will have to be well equipped ly be transformed into a higher legal frame- (which calls for proper and sustained financ- work such as a protocol, treaty or defence ing) in order to mitigate conflicts of this pact. They decided to forward a separate Draft nature. Finance, however, remains a thorny Protocol for the Establishment of EASBRIG issue for many African countries still grap- to legal experts as input for such an MoU. pling with food insecurity, disease, low levels of literacy, among other gloomy issues. Other challenges to be tackled will entail Conclusion the issue of language. Africa is divided into The move by Eastern African countries to various linguistic groupings – English, French, establish a standby brigade underscores their Portuguese and Arabic. Which language, commitment towards the management of therefore, will be the language of command conflicts in the region. It is a positive step in for the standby force? Of equal importance is complementing UN and AU efforts in peace the command structure for the force. Each support operations. The realisation of mem- country/region has its own command struc- ber states’ commitments is commendable and ture that is familiar and it may not be easy to should attract support from all corners. adopt a new one. Why should African countries pool their In the face of these challenges, it is impor- resources together for the common defence tant that flexibility of African countries sur- and security of the region? First, such a policy passes their rigidity if they are to see success in is likely to reduce suspicion and rivalry among creating a unified ASF. This will require all the states—a factor that has engendered conflicts five regions moving at the same pace in creat- in the continent and has traditionally hin- ing their regional brigades in response to the dered interstate cooperation and integration AU’s call. The task is not massive—it simply in Africa. Second, cooperation will increase requires commitment. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 121
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Notes African recovery and the New Africa Initiative, South African Institute of International Affairs, 1. The discussion on the establishment of the Johannesburg, 2002, pp 90-105:92. Eastern Africa Standby Brigade is based on the 4. See Project on Peacekeeping and the United proceedings of the February 2004 Jinja Meeting by Nations, Developing a rapid deployment capabil- the Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defence Staff. A full ity: An old idea for troubled times, version of the Brigade’s framework is available at
COMMENTARY
DEVELOPMENTAL PEACEKEEPING What are the advantages for Africa?
NOZIZWE MADLALA-ROUTLEDGE & SYBERT LIEBENBERG
“Peace is not the absence of conflict but industrial and social growth. the presence of creative alternatives for In response to these challenges this paper responding to conflict.” proposes the creation of an African Action Dorothy Thompson Plan for Developmental Peacekeeping and Reconstruction, which is rooted in the con- Introduction cepts of developmental peacekeeping and human security. This paper will illustrate how This paper seeks to address and explain the developmental peacekeeping, as a post-con- failures of current peacekeeping interventions flict reconstruction mechanism, can serve as a to resolve resource-based conflicts on the catalyst for achieving the African Union and African Continent. It will argue that the main the New Partnership for Africa’s drivers for conflict in Africa are resource- Development’s (NEPAD) primary objectives based. Whether it is a struggle to control, to of: access or directly exploit scarce resources, •Poverty eradication; Africa’s conflicts are inherently economic by • Placing African countries, both individual- nature. If this holds true then current military ly and collectively, on a path of sustainable focused approaches ignore the developmental growth and development; and economic nature of not only the source of •Halting the marginalisation of Africa in the conflict, but also its resolution. globalisation process and enhancing its full This failure is clearly illustrated by the long and beneficial integration into the global time delays between peacekeeping and post- conflict reconstruction interventions. These economy; and delays are characteristic of all missions cur- •Accelerating the empowerment of women rently being conducted on the African Continent. This is in part due to the sympto- The challenge of ensuring sustainable matic short-term “military” solutions, which human security forms the core of current peace-missions as opposed to a developmental economic To understand the challenges facing current approach. As a result, current peacekeeping peace-missions and the rationale for adopting interventions lack focus and capacity to accel- a developmental peacekeeping approach, it is erate sustainable peace, through economic, necessary to unpack the nature and causes of
NOZIZWE MADLALA-ROUTLEDGE is ex Deputy Minister of Defence, now Deputy Minister of Health & SYBERT LIEBENBERG (Associate, CSIR Boutek), presented this paper at the African Defence Summit 2004, 13 July, Gallagher Estate, Midrand, South Africa. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 126
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conflict in Africa and to see how current Economic wars are a predominant instiga- peacekeeping approaches are geared to meet tor and sustainers of conflict in Africa. The these challenges. failure of African states to provide human security through formal mechanisms of eco- nomic exchange has given rise to the increased The causes of conflict in Africa informalisation of economies and the devel- General Amadou Toumani Toure remarked opment of parallel extra-legal activities that that: “Conflicts arise from human relations in try to obtain control of resources within a two principal ways: first, individuals or groups fragmented environment. of individuals have different values, needs and Amid shrinking resources and a collapsing interests; and, second, most resources are not formal economy, ethnicity networks provide available in unlimited quantities and so access limited access to resources (through excluding to them must be controlled and fought for. other members of the society), thereby creat- These two factors intrinsically cause con- ing polarisation. In turn, these informal net- flicts.1” works undermine the ability of the state to Through the years a wide range of causes protect the interest of all its citizens. As a of conflict in Africa has been identified, these result, an alternative set of economic and include: social relations develop which make use of • Unequal access to and control of resources; violence and perdition as a means of survival • State collapse or failure due to poor gover- and legitimacy. This alternative economy is nance and a lack of the rule of law; defined as a war economy. • Social and regional inequalities; At the heart of a war economy is the prac- • Ethnicity; tice of asset transfer based on the expulsion of •Food insecurity; populations, killing and large-scale human • Economic decline and shock which leads rights violations as means of accumulating to unfulfilled expectations; resources. In addition, prolonged conflicts in • Absence of an independent, well-informed Africa destroy the productive human capacity civil society sector; and and infrastructure necessary for development. •Misplaced humanitarian assistance. In turn, this disrupts production that weakens When one analyses these causes of conflict on social, economic and administrative struc- the African Continent, it becomes apparent tures. Ultimately, this results in the collapse of that they all relate in some way either direct- the state and the economy. ly or indirectly to the ability to attract, absorb This economic and political collapse and utilise resources equitably and transpar- results in African societies emerging from con- ently. The ability to attract, absorb and utilise flicts that are characterised by: resources is fundamentally an economic as •Polarised economic and social relations; well as a political imperative. This position is •Decimated social cohesion; supported by Dzelilovic when he states that • Lack of human security; the failure to understand how economic and • Isolation from the outside world and mar- political factors are linked have important kets; implications for policies aimed at resolving • Lack of basic functioning institutions; conflict and assisting post-war rehabiliation.2 •Poverty; • Social decay; •Political instability; and The nature of conflict in Africa •Destroyed infrastructure (transport, com- For decades the African continent has been munication and basic social services) ravaged by wars characterised by the prolifer- These characteristics reduce the ability of ation of small arms, forcible recruitment of post-conflict societies to enhance their capac- children, sexual violence, killing and maim- ity to normalise economic relations and struc- ing of civilians, ethnic cleansing and geno- tures as reflected in the primary objectives of cide. NEPAD. These normalised economic rela- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 127
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tions and structures constitute the basis for absorb combatants into the formal economy dismantling war economies and predatory and to dismantle the war economy. practices. In spite of their importance in nor- The time delay exponentially increases the malising post-conflict economies these impor- risk of unmet expectations, as post-conflict tant factors have been functionally ignored by economies are unable to address and remedy current peacekeeping practices as will be illus- the fundamental developmental causes of trated in the next section. resource-based conflicts. Ultimately, this results in an inability to break down conflict systems. Overview of peacekeeping approaches The inability to breakdown conflict sys- The United Nations (UN) currently consti- tems results in increased instability in other tutes the dominant hegemony with regard to areas or regions. Moreover, the mechanisms of peacekeeping operations. In spite of its domi- the war economy become reactivated. nance, the UN has come under both internal and external criticism for its apparent failures Problem Statement in the area of peacekeeping. The Brahimi Report is a review of the UN peacekeeping Based on the above-mentioned analysis, the performance. In this report, failed peacekeep- following problem statement has been formu- ing efforts of the UN are ascribed to a lack of lated: a “sound peace building” or “post-conflict Current peacekeeping interventions are reconstruction” strategy. unable to resolve resource-based con- An analysis of the Department of flicts or conflicts that are being sustained Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) documen- by war economies. tation found that the primary focus of tradi- The main causes of conflict in Africa are tional peacekeeping methods remains within resource-based. Whether it is a struggle the traditional understanding of security, to control, access or to exploit scarce which gives preference to the security of the resources, it is inherently economic and state. This approach illustrates a failure to political in nature. Therefore, a purely understand the full extent of human security, military approach ignores the develop- resource-based conflicts and war economies. It mental and economic nature of peace appears that the UN approach, in essence, building and the contemporary defini- ignores the need for a speedy economic tion of human security. recovery, which is crucial for removing the Current peacekeeping approaches are threat of renewed conflict or the escalation of characterised by long time lapses before an existing one. developmental and peace-building inter- The current UN approach entails merely ventions can be implemented in war disarming combatants and does not address torn zones. This leads to inadequate the dismantling of war economies and effec- capacity to dismantle war economies, tively re-integrating ex-combatants into socie- the inability to both absorb ex-combat- ty, which is at the root of the problem. The ants and to destroy conflict systems. approach pays lip service to gender equality Lacking focus to accelerate economic, by not taking cognisance of the specific needs industrial and social growth through of women ex-combatants or the violation of post-conflict reconstruction inhibits a the rights of women by peacekeepers. In fact, post-conflict society from being despite the fact that the UN passed a resolu- absorbed into the global economy. In tion calling for greater participation of women turn, the inability to be integrated into in all aspects of the peace processes, this is the global economy sets the war econo- often ignored.3 The delay between the start of my into motion resulting in the reacti- peacekeeping operations and the start of vation of the conflict system. peace-building and socio-economic develop- In response to the above-mentioned problem ment interventions reduces the ability to statement, developmental peacekeeping has • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 128
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been formulated as an African alternative to agreements between two, or more, war- current peacekeeping interventions. ring political entities. The presence of UN forces has to be consented to; UN forces are to be strictly impartial; and Defining Developmental they may not use force except in self- Peacekeeping defence and as a last resort. Developmental peacekeeping is fundamental- The definition of peace enforcement (under ly rooted in the holistic understanding of Chapter VII of the UN Charter) is essentially human security in all its dimensions. These the same as that of peacekeeping with the dimensions include the establishment of con- exception that the principles of consent, neu- ditions that enable people and communities trality and the non-use of force are suspended. to live free and secure lives, through the pro- Clearly the definitions are not in keeping tection of fundamental human rights and with the concept of human security outlined meeting of basic needs-–health, education and in the UN Commission Report on Human a clean and healthy environment free from Security, published in 2003. These concepts poverty and exploitation need to be reformulated and doctrines for In keeping with this holistic understanding peacekeeping and peace enforcement changed of human security, developmental peacekeep- in line with the broader concept of human ing is defined as a post-conflict reconstruction security which recognises the security of peo- intervention which aims to achieve sustain- ple as well as that of states.4 able levels of human security through a com- The second distinguishing feature of devel- bination of interventions aimed at opmental peacekeeping is that it does not dis- accelerating capacity building and socio-eco- tinguish between peacekeeping and peace nomic development which will result in the building on a process level. Peacekeeping, dismantling of war economies and conflict peace-enforcement and peace building are col- systems and replacing them with globally lapsed into one process. On an operational competitive peace economies. level this is its greatest distinguishing charac- Developmental Peacekeeping has two fea- teristic. In essence this means that post-con- tures, which distinguish it from current flict reconstruction interventions operate in approaches to peacekeeping. The first is the synergy with peacekeeping and peace-enforce- focus on human security. Traditional defini- ment. On a practical level this would mean tions focus on the application of security and that post-conflict reconstruction practitioners military apparatus in ensuring the security of and resources are deployed alongside peace- the state, as apposed to the security of indi- keepers irrespective of the existence of cease- viduals and communities. In essence this sys- fire agreements. tem is applies to interstate conflicts as opposed to intrastate conflicts. The Developmental Peacekeeping This is illustrated by current United Process Nations (UN) definitions, which tend to reflect the traditional understanding of securi- Developmental Peacekeeping does not distin- ty. The preoccupation with the security of the guish between peacekeeping, peace-enforce- state is clearly illustrated by the UN defini- ment and peace building as separate phases or tions of both peacekeeping and peace enforc- elements in a linear process. Developmental ing as defined by the United Nations Peacekeeping actually rolls all of these into Department for Peacekeeping Operations one process. Peace building, peacekeeping and (DPKO). peace-enforcement, unlike current approach- In this regard peacekeeping (under es, start simultaneously at the onset of a peace Chapter VI of the UN Charter) is defined by mission. the Department of Peacekeeping Operations This would require that peacekeepers enter (DPKO) as: the operational area (irrespective of the exis- The use of military forces to monitor tence of a ceasefire) with the mission objective • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 129
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of creating an enabling environment for post- bilised combatants are restricted to demobili- conflict reconstruction teams which are sation centers without any effort being made deployed simultaneously with them. In other to equip them or the communities to which words, African Peacekeeper contingencies of they are returning with functional economic the future should no longer solely consist of skills. Some of these ex-combatants have been military personnel but should include multi- restricted to demobilisation centres for up to disciplinary teams of development econo- eight months. This situation greatly enhances mists, civil engineers, public and development the potential for conflict as pressure on limit- managers and policy developers which are ed resources will be increased and as ex-com- deployed at the onset of an operation. batants and internally displaced people place These post-conflict reconstruction teams more demands on the system. should conduct detailed socio-economic By starting “peace-building” only after a assessments of the target country. The aim of cease-fire agreement has been signed, more these assessments would be to develop an pressure is placed on the economy and this integrated post-conflict reconstruction action exponentially increases the potential for con- plan for the beneficiary country. The integrat- flict. By rolling the “peace building” and ed development plan will focus on identifying “peacekeeping” components into one, as pro- opportunities and resource requirements for posed in terms of developmental peacekeep- economic development. Critical to the suc- ing, mechanisms are created to reduce the cess of this plan is the identification of mech- volatility, which characterises the early stages anisms to dismantle war economies and the of a peace-mission whilst speeding up the creation of mechanisms to ensure the optimal post-conflict reconstruction process and utilisation of economic resources for the ben- capacity. efit of all. Central to this process is the identi- fication of mega infrastructure projects that would enhance the economic development The Advantages of Developmental process. Peacekeeping Mechanisms for the These mega infrastructure projects should African Union and NEPAD form the core of an extended public works The advantages of Developmental programme, which in turn would lay the Peacekeeping primarily focus on the realisa- foundation for sustained service delivery. tion of the African Union and NEPAD’s pri- Sustained service delivery is a critical mecha- orities. Firstly, it creates a platform from nism in dismantling war economies and which to establish the conditions for sustain- ensuring human security. These extended able development by ensuring the creation of public works programmes in turn should peace and security. Because of its focus on the place a heavy emphasis on labour-based causes of conflict as opposed to the symp- methodologies and technologies. The use of toms, it provides a sustainable solution to labour-based technologies would enhance the peace and security on the continent. The util- absorption of ex-combatants and affected isation of post-conflict reconstruction communities. resources towards achieving sustainable politi- The implementation of such an integrated cal and economic development will advance extended public works programme would cre- democracy and the regional integration and ate a massive impetus for the skilling and rein- cooperation, through the dismantling of tegration of ex-combatants into society. exploitative war economies. Through the accelerated training of ex-com- The primary focus on accelerated capacity batants and affected communities the power building and training, as part of macro infra- relationships between these parties would be structure development will create the required altered and the need for violence as a survival capacity to ensure sustainable socio-economic mechanism negated. and political development. Secondly, devel- The logic of this approach is underlined by opmental peacekeeping creates a platform for the current situation in Burundi where demo- policy reforms and increased investment • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 130
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through the dismantling of war economies. and its institutions such as the African Union This is primarily achieved through the devel- and NEPAD, with a mechanism to address the opment of an integrated development plan or fundamental causes of conflict, through the framework for post-conflict reconstruction dismantling of war economies and the cre- and development. Not only does it drive the ation of sustainable equitable economic dismantling of war economies, it also facili- growth and accelerated skills development. It tates the optimal use of resources by focusing provides a mechanism that mitigates the fail- reconstruction efforts on optimal internal ures of current peacekeeping interventions to value addition as apposed to value extraction resolve resource-based conflicts, by focusing by external role players. In essence it facilitates on the developmental and economic nature the development of strong local economies of not only the source of conflict, but also its on the African continent. The focus on creat- resolution. ing an enabling environment through the cre- It provides a mechanism to reduce the ation of labour-based infrastructure delays between the start of peacekeeping mis- development will enable African economies sions and the implementation of post-conflict to cluster their activities, thus ensuring the reconstruction or peace-building activities, by retention of and addition of value to their rolling these processes into one. Through the products. effective integration of these processes it cre- The clustering of post-conflict economies ates the capacity to accelerate the creation of will also allow for the diversification of pro- sustainable peace, through economic, indus- duction with the intention to export, which in trial and social growth. turn will ensure sustainable socio-economic What developmental peacekeeping development. The creation of such clustered requires is the collective wisdom of all the markets will accelerate intra-African trade, members of the African Union to expand and thus mitigating the exploitative nature of the develop the concept to a level where it can be war economy. The focus on the equitable institutionalised within the African Union. redistribution of resources in post-conflict This would require the formulation of a devel- societies will ensure stability and confidence, opmental peacekeeping doctrine, which which is fundamental for achieving sustain- would guide the retraining of our armies able economic growth both locally and with- towards contributing to the reconstruction of in the global economy. the African continent. It will also require a The strong focus on service delivery issues redirection of our research and development and socio-economic imperatives such as skills resources towards enhancing our capacity to development, job creation and food security deliver developmental peacekeeping technolo- at the early stages of a developmental peace- gies to meet the service delivery and post-con- keeping intervention serves as a strong driver flict reconstruction needs of war-ravaged for effective and efficient utilisation of human communities. resources and capacity building. As Africans we need to create political, Accelerated capacity building for gover- socio-economic and military mechanisms that nance and service delivery in turn is a critical would accelerate the dismantling of war mechanism in establishing and securing economies. This needs to be done in a uni- peaceful political transitions. By linking form manner under the leadership of the capacity building to service delivery and the African Union in conjunction with civil soci- infrastructure needs of a clustered economy, ety. This is the only effective way to break the the acceleration of functional skills develop- cycle of violence on our continent. Anything ment is achieved. else is a compromise. Finally, we need to institutionalise and resource developmental peacekeeping as a Conclusion guiding principle within a broad African Developmental peacekeeping although still in Action Plan for Developmental Peacekeeping its infancy, provides the African continent and Reconstruction that can be implemented • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 131
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by the African Union. Then we, as Africans, Notes will truly be able to achieve our shared goal to 1. A Adedeji (ed), 1999: Comprehending and mastering end wars on our Continent and to ensure the African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and positive and equitable application of our Good Governance, Zed Books. indigenous resources, towards ensuring sus- 2. United Nations, 2000: Mainstreaming a Gender tainable human security on the African Perspective in Multi-dimensional Peace Operations. Lessons Learned Unit, Department of Continent. Peacekeeping Operations, New York. 3. UN Resolution 1325, 2000. 4. UN Commission on Human Security, 2003: Human Security Now. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 133
COMMENTARY
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN US PEACEKEEPING POLICY AND ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA
ERIC G BERMAN
Africa has not ranked particularly high on the than 2,000 at one point in 1999. During this agenda of the United States (US) in the past, time operations headed by Africans were but that is changing. A transformation in deployed in no fewer than eight conflict zones America’s strategic concerns is the principal throughout the continent. reason for this development. A desire to wean Before 1996, US assistance to African-led itself from relying too heavily on Middle peace operations had been largely ad hoc and Eastern oil suppliers and to exploit Africa’s short-lived. Washington provided financial growing petroleum reserves is a major factor. and material support to Zairian troops partici- So is the growing recognition that failed and pating in the OAU Neutral Force in Chad for failing states provide safe havens and possible six months in 1981–82. Similarly, it assisted recruiting grounds for international terrorists. Senegalese troops in the Economic Community US policy toward Africa had begun to shift of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-fire before the November 2000 US presidential Monitoring Group in Liberia in 1991–92, and elections, but the terrorist attacks of 11 later aided Tanzanian and Ugandan contin- September 2001 quickened the pace and deep- gents in the same mission during 1993–94. ened the commitment. As a result, the US has Despite Washington’s professed “partner- supported United Nations (UN) peacekeeping ship” with Africa, the initial US capacity- operations in Africa with renewed vigour, and building programme to develop African has expanded its assistance to augment the peacekeeping capabilities was essentially a ability of African militaries to undertake peace product of its policy of disengagement, and operations. fairly limited. The African Crisis Response After an unprecedented growth in the Initiative (ACRI) began as the African Crisis number of UN peacekeeping operations in the Response Force (ACRF), and was rolled out wake of the Cold War, the US commitment to rather clumsily during a dramatic rise in inter- UN missions waned. It increasingly supported ethnic tensions in Burundi in 1996. The then those interventions undertaken by regional US president, Bill Clinton, wanted an option organizations and coalitions of the willing. that did not include the deployment of US This had a profound effect in Africa. Whereas troops should the escalating political conflict there were more than 30,000 UN Blue in Burundi result in a bloodbath. The coup Helmets serving in Africa for much of 1993 d’état in Bujumbura brought the crisis to an and 1994, the numbers had dwindled to fewer end, and ACRF transformed into ACRI. The
ERIC G BERMAN is a visiting fellow at the Thomas J Watson Jr Institute for International Studies, Brown University, United States. He will join the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey as its Managing Director in the summer of 2004. • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 134
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programme, which cost an average of about ing-the-trainer initiatives have not material- $15 million a year, provided training and ized, at least in the short term, some just-in- equipment designed for classical peacekeeping time training for countries contributing environments to eight sub-Saharan African troops to peace operations has been well countries at the battalion and brigade levels.1 received. The programme has now hit its Although welcomed by its recipients, stride, having overcome numerous bureau- ACRI had more to do with what the US felt it cratic and administrative hurdles that signifi- could provide than what the African countries cantly hampered it in the early stages. Several necessarily needed. Moreover, there was con- ACRI “alumni” have received ACOTA train- siderable dissatisfaction felt by the Pentagon ing, as has Ethiopia. Botswana has signed up over the State Department’s criteria for select- for the programme and additional countries ing countries that were to receive training. The may soon conclude agreements to receive it. link between a country’s participation in However, with funding at similar levels to ACRI and the recipient’s decision to con- ACRI’s—which is rather meagre—there is a tribute troops to a peace operation was often limit to what the US can achieve through tenuous. Similarly, it is difficult to establish a ACOTA. definite correlation between the training Running concurrent with ACOTA is the offered and a recipient’s improved perform- Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), which (although ance. designed to counter terrorist threats in West A subsequent US capacity-building initia- Africa) has much in common with peacekeep- tive known as Operation Focus Relief (OFR) ing training programmes. Its objective is to represented a shift in the direction of US assis- improve the recipients’ ability to exercise tance. Unlike ACRI, OFR provided lethal effective control over their territories. Mali training and equipment. It was undertaken in and Mauritania received field training in their response to the May 2000 hostage crisis countries in early 2004; Chad was undergoing involving peacekeepers in the UN Mission in training in June; and it is expected that Niger Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). From the outset will be the next recipient later this year. All there was a shared understanding between four countries, however, have already been Washington and the recipient countries provided with PSI-issued vehicles and com- (Ghana, Senegal and Nigeria) that their troops munications gear. These were shipped to would be deployed to that operation with Sierra Leone, where a US company3 taught OFR-provided materiel. Six of the seven the recipients how to use and maintain it. The OFR-trained battalions served with distinc- first units were trained in August 2003 and the tion in UNAMSIL, with the seventh failing to last in February 2004. The cost for this initia- deploy for reasons outside that country’s con- tive is around $8 million. The rationale for the trol.2 OFR differed from ACRI in two other programme was underscored earlier this year ways: follow-on training was not part of the when an Algerian terrorist group travelled to package; and the programme—costing roughly Mali to purchase weapons. With US assis- $90 million over 15 months—was relatively tance, the Algerian armed forces engaged the expensive. Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. The African Contingency Operations The latter retreated to Chad via Mali and Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme Niger, with the militaries of each of those that succeeded ACRI sought to rectify many countries engaged in hot pursuit.4 of ACRI’s perceived shortcomings. It is more A much larger and more costly US under- flexible and responsive to Africa’s peacekeep- taking to counter terrorism involves the Horn ing needs. Training for peace-enforcement of Africa, where a Combined Joint Task Force environments is offered, and the provision of of some 1,400 US troops has been based in lethal equipment is not ruled out (although Djibouti since the last quarter of 2002. Unlike none has yet been dispensed other than the aim of PSI, the primary purpose of this ammunition for target practice, as was done in initiative is to develop US capabilities. While ACRI). While the hoped-for benefits of train- the focus is on operational activities, the Task • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 135
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Force could also help to develop regional its growing recognition of the limitations of capacities to undertake civil-military opera- African regional organizations, the US as a tions by providing skills that would be appli- member of the UN Security Council has cable to peacekeeping. A programme to authorized a spate of new UN missions on the develop a small number of African air bases continent, to which it has contributed money for the possible use of US forces in military or and logistical support, but not its own contin- humanitarian operations on the continent is gents. In the past year alone, the UN has also being developed. established missions in Burundi, Côte There are a number of other initiatives d’Ivoire, and Liberia, which when fully undertaken by Washington in the last five deployed will comprise more than 25,000 years that warrant mention. The African Blue Helmets. Today, there are more than Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), created 50,000 UN peacekeepers serving throughout in 1999, has engaged senior-level civilian and Africa. The number of troops serving in military African leaders in myriad issues of African-led missions has plummeted from direct relevance to the successful undertaking more than 30,000 in 1999 to just a few hun- of peace operations. The US has also provid- dred today. ed funds and expertise to African countries to It is in this context that the administration combat the growing incidence of the of George W Bush is reportedly making ready Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome to launch a new programme that has been ten- (AIDS) in the ranks of their armed forces. It tatively called the “Global Peace Operations trained a battalion of Guinean soldiers to Initiative” (GPOI). Details are sketchy, and defend their country from Revolutionary there is a chance that Congress will not sup- United Front (RUF) incursions, with notable port it or that the administration will ulti- success. Washington also has provided mately choose not to promote it. Initial ECOWAS headquarters and member states information suggests that GPOI would pro- with computers and communication equip- vide training, equipment, and logistical sup- ment, and installed a retired US military offi- port to assist foreign forces to participate in cer in Abuja to facilitate command and peace operations. African countries would control, as well as planning, for peace opera- receive a significant proportion of this aid. tions. Funding for the programme is reportedly set Given these initiatives, some US policy- at about $130 million a year for five years.5 makers were troubled last summer by the Thus, African countries would receive signifi- inability of ECOWAS to deploy a peacekeep- cantly more training and equipment than is ing force to Liberia in a manner Washington presently possible under ACOTA, and at lev- considered meaningful and timely. This els approaching what was offered under OFR. should have come as no surprise, given the Such a programme would be a welcome peacekeeping commitments ECOWAS states development, as resources allocated to sup- already had in Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic port African peacekeeping are far below what Republic of Congo and elsewhere. It also is needed. However, these resources should be showed the limited progress that the regional distributed differently to be made more effec- organization and its members had made, tive. The idea of training trainers is sensible, despite years of assistance from various west- but the recipients must first prove they have ern capacity-building programmes. Financial sufficient capacity and structures in place to constraints and very limited force projection maintain and build upon what is provided. capabilities also played a role. Regional training centres should be given pri- These policymakers viewed this situation ority over national programmes, so that they as particularly distressing given that ECOWAS can assist African countries and regional countries, both collectively and individually, organizations to develop their logistical, com- were seen as significantly more advanced in mand and control as well as force projection peacekeeping terms than other African capabilities. Also, a way needs to be found to regions and organizations. As a reflection of ensure that Nigeria benefits from the pro- • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 136
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gramme. The UN Security Council’s support complete the programme, for various reasons. for UN operations in Africa may peak after 2. Senegal ultimately did not send its battalion to UNAMSIL because the UN declined its assis- the expected mission in Sudan. After that it is tance, as the mission’s troop ceiling had already probable that African-headed peace opera- been met. tions will again be called upon to take a lead- 3. The company in question is Pacific Architects and ing role in the promotion of peace and Engineers (PAE), which maintains an automotive security on the continent. It is not too late for and engineering depot in Freetown and has been providing much-needed logistical support to Washington to create the partnership with ECOWAS and UN peace operations in West Africa to which it aspires. Africa. In a period when many legitimate and troubling questions have been raised about the wisdom of relying on private businesses to provide Notes some military-related services, PAE’s activities in Africa exemplify the very positive role companies 1. Nine countries concluded agreements to receive can play. ACRI, but the US suspended Ethiopia from the 4. Craig S Smith, US training African forces to programme before training had commenced uproot terrorists, The New York Times, 11 May because of that country’s war with Eritrea. Benin, 2004, p A1. Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, 5. B Graham, Bush plans aid to build foreign peace Senegal and Uganda comprised the eight recipi- forces, The Washington Post, 19 April 2004, p A01. ents. Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Uganda did not • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 137
COMMENTARY
THE ARMING OF RWANDA, AND THE GENOCIDE
NELSON ALUSALA
In the book Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, the take to prevent and punish. This includes con- authors, Barabara Harff and Ted Gurr state spiracy to commit genocide, attempts to com- that the World War II holocaust should have mit genocide, and direct public incitement to enlightened the world as to what ethnic and commit genocide. Rwanda acceded to the religious hatred can do when used by Convention in 1975.2 unscrupulous leaders armed with exclusionary It has been said many times that the mur- ideologies. They point out that many people der of close to one million people in Rwanda hoped that with the end of colonialism, Africa was preventable.3 Certainly the onslaught could look forward to a better world in which that began in Rwanda in 1994 could have nation-states would guarantee and protect the been abated if serious measures had been put basic freedoms of their peoples. Harff and in place early enough. Much of the blame for Gurr pose a question: the genocide that followed has been ascribed when the United Nations came into exis- to the international community’s failure to tence, were we wrong to believe that a intervene. However, many of the contribut- new world order would emerge, one in ing factors have yet to be explored. For which minimum standards of global jus- example, the question of how weapons tice would be observed and violators reached the hands of the perpetrators punished? Is it still possible that a civil remains unanswered. Who provided the mis- society will emerge in which citizens siles that shot down the plane carrying the eschew narrow ethnic interests in favour then presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, of global issues?1 Juvenal Habyarimana and Cyprien While the authors’ concerns are legitimate, it Ntaryamira, on 6 April 1994? As Rwanda is true, as they later acknowledge, that some commemorates the ten-year anniversary of progress has been made to check ethnic wars the 100 days of atrocities that followed, mys- since the mid-1990s. However, the world tery still surrounds the identity and motiva- badly needs more innovative ideas about how tions of the instigators of that human to fight these scourges, which continue to catastrophe. plague mankind. The Arusha Peace Accords, which were Article I of the Convention on the signed on 4 August 1993, raised hopes that an Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of end to the three-year war between the govern- Genocide of 1948 requires that state parties ment and the then rebel forces of the consider genocide a crime, which they under- Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) was in sight.
NELSON ALUSALA is a senior researcher in the Arms Management Programme at the ISS • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 138
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The Accords included a power-sharing According to the UN High Commission on arrangement that would lead to multi-party Human Rights (UNCHR), while people were rule in Rwanda, which would pave the way for frequently hacked to death by machetes or a transition to democracy. A United Nations other non-ballistic weapons, the victims were (UN) peacekeeping force was included in the often rounded up by being threatened with provisions of the Accords, with the aim of firearms.8 stabilizing the situation in Rwanda during While commenting on the proliferation the transition to peace. The Accords also of weapons in Rwanda prior to the genocide, bound the parties to the upholding of the Jacques Castonguay records that “…assault Ceasefire Agreement of 16 September 1991. rifles, guns and grenades were distributed The terms of the Agreement included sus- throughout 1993. Some militia leaders were pension of supplies of ammunition and issued with AK 47s, for which they had to fill weaponry to the field, and bans on both the in requisition forms; the distribution of infiltration of troops and the conveyance of grenades required no such paperwork. By the troops and war materiel to the area occupied time genocide began, some 85 tons of muni- by each party. tions are thought to have been distributed However, despite the Agreement, in throughout the country.”9 In the same vein, January 1994 a Human Rights Watch report Linda Melvern, in her comment “A rming on Rwanda observed that the country was Rwanda,”10 writes that during 1993, the year being flooded with weapons. These were so that the Arusha Accords were negotiated, a readily available that anyone could exchange project began to import into Rwanda a huge two beers for a grenade.4 According to the number of matchetes and other agricultural report, France, Egypt and South Africa were tools. Melvern notes that the purchase of the principal sources of arms shipments to the these tools took place in eighteen separate Rwandan army during this period. Prunier, in deals, and by companies not usually associ- his book The Rwanda crisis: history of a genocide, ated with agriculture. As well as matchetes states that “a few weeks [prior] to the outbreak they imported razor blades, nails, hoes, ham- of genocide, arms had become plentiful in mers and shears; and that these tools entered Rwanda, grenades were sold alongside man- Rwanda under government import licenses goes and avocadoes on fruit stands at markets headed “eligible imports”. Melvern con- around Kigali.”5 He adds that UN Mission in cludes that in the three years from October Rwanda (UNMIR) officials were aware of, but 1990, Rwanda, one of the poorest countries could not cope with or monitor, the scale of in the world, became the third largest illicit arms trading. importer of weapons in Africa, spending an Prior to the start of the genocide, the gov- estimated $US 112 million.11 ernment is said to have played an active role According to the report published by the in arming certain of the (already polarized) Human Rights Watch Arms Project, “Arming citizens, purportedly against the threat of Rwanda”, France was a principal source of invasion from outside forces. The real aim, arms for the Rwanda government. The report according to a secret government document, discloses that in June 1993, the Rwandan was to distribute close to 2,000 assault rifles to Minister of Defence confirmed that a French civilians loyal to the president’s political party bank, Crédit Lyonnais, had guaranteed a $6 (Movement Révolutionaire National pour le million arms deal between the Rwandan gov- Développement—MRPD), under the guise of ernment and the government of Egypt that “self-defence.”6 High-ranking officials also involved the transfer of heavy artillery, mor- armed citizens and members of the militia, tars and Kalashnikov automatic rifles (AK-47). and traded weapons for tea.7 Although during Four years later, in 1998, a French newspaper, the orgy of killing that followed machetes Le Figaro, carried an article declaring that the were the most commonly used weapons, serial numbers of the two surface-to-air mis- large-scale massacres were carried out with siles that had struck the aeroplane carrying the automatic rifles and hand grenades. two presidents matched those of missiles • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 139
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seized from Iraq by French troops during the Conclusion Gulf War of 1989–1991.12 The reporter, Patrick de Saint-Exupery, also disclosed that The ten-year commemoration ceremony of his sources were some French soldiers, who the genocide in Rwanda hit the world’s media had claimed that after the missiles had been headlines, with TV channels showing the confiscated from the Iraqi stockpiles, they had massed skulls of the victims. However, little been sold to Rwandan government forces. was said about the need to know how the This had occurred between 1993–1994 as part weapons used in the genocide got into of a covert French policy (le secret de défense).13 Rwanda. A truth and reconciliation process The government of France denied the story has been recommended as a possible first step published in Le Figaro, and accused the towards healing for the Rwandan people. But American State Department of having sup- will truth and reconciliation prove a therapy, plied the missiles, arguing that American, not or will it be a mockery of justice and a warrant French, forces in the Gulf had seized the two for vengeance? How will healing take place in missiles and sold them to Uganda. The US an atmosphere enshrouded in secrecy, fear rebutted this charge.14 and assumptions? One of the relatives of the Although the origin of the arms supplied victims remarked, after the confessions of a to that country has not yet been traced, former genocidaire, Rwanda is just one of several states in Africa in …he didn’t kill only two. He killed at which the number of small arms and light least six in my family and others too. He weapons sold to a country plagued by ethnic, killed my brothers, the wives of my nationalist or religious strife has had disas- brothers and my nieces. I did not forgive trous effects. Stephen Goose and Frank Smyth him because I think he is insincere, I for- 16 postulate that the post-Cold War era has seen gave him because the church told me. profit motives replace East–West rivalry as the For many of the survivors, the genocide lives main stimulus behind weapons sales. on. Countries that were members of the Warsaw The availability and misuse of small arms Pact and North Atlantic Trade Organization present a serious challenges to the interna- (NATO) have been selling off their arsenals on tional community. During the UN open markets, with the result that the prices of Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and some weapons, such as AK-47s, have fallen Light Weapons In All Its Aspects, held in New below cost.15 The two authors also claim that York in 2001, the participating states recog- many developing countries have joined in the nized that trade in light weapons and small arms. The the excessive accumulation and uncon- difficulty in tracing such arms dealings is that trolled spread of small arms in many governments rarely disclose the details of their regions of the world…pose a serious transfers of small arms and light weapons. threat to …safety, security, stability and The overall result, however, is that sustainable development at the individ- weapons flood strife-torn regions, not only ual, local, national, regional and interna- fanning warfare but also undermining inter- tional levels.17 national efforts to embargo arms and to com- Except in the case of weapons of mass pel the opposing parties to respect human destruction, there are relatively few binding rights. Goose and Smyth conclude that if international restrictions on the right of states more had been known about the flow of to transfer arms. Perhaps the most important arms into Rwanda, and if the international of those that exist at the global level are the community had had the opportunity to stop embargoes imposed by the UN Security the influx of arms, or at least to make sure Council on particular groups or states, which that the arms suppliers made trade with indi- are binding on all member states. However, vidual countries conditional on their human although the UN Programme of Action to rights performance, the outcome might have Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit been different. Trade In Small Arms and Light Weapons In all • ASR V13N2 2004 frans 8/9/04 1:54 PM Page 140
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Its Aspects contains a series of commitments sions, which includes recommendations on at the national, regional and global levels, the measures to end the illegal flow of arms into programme in not legally binding. the Great Lakes region. The 2000 UN Conference proposed sever- al solutions to the problem posed by small arms and light weapons. Among them are: • the need for international assistance (both financial and technical) to the countries Notes most affected; 1. B Harff and T Robert, Ethnic conflict in world poli- • the marking and tracing of weapons; tics, Westview Press, Oxford, 2004, pp 1-19:1. 2. The Convention entered into force on 12 January • effective disarmament, demobilization and 1951. For the text and list of countries that have reintegration (DDR) programmes; ratified it, see UN Treaty Series, vol. 78. • mandatory import and export controls of 3. The majority of the victims were Tutsi. small arms; 4. Arming Rwanda: the arms trade and human rights • the regulation of arms brokering through abuses in the Rwandan war, Human Rights Watch Arms Project 6, January 1994. strict legislation; 5. G Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis: History of a • information exchange as a means of build- Genocide,Columbia University Press, New York, ing confidence among states; 1995, pp 148-9. • export criteria aimed at prohibiting arms 6. See Walter Dorn, Jonathan Matloff and Jennifer Matthews, Preventing the bloodbath: could the transfers to zones of conflict/repressive UN have predicted and prevented the Rwanda regimes; genocide? Journal of Conflict Studies, 2000 • the involvement of civil society (in raising