EDITORIAL

LANDMINES: IS THE END IN SIGHT?

Uncleared anti-personal mines do not respect a of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, peace agreement or ceasefire. They continue to Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, kill, months or years after a truce had been Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, called between the warring parties. In 1997 Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia there was an estimated 50 million landmines (including Somaliland), Sudan, Swaziland, scattered throughout Africa, twenty million in Syria, Tunisia, Uganda, Western Sahara, Zambia Southern Africa alone. Estimates suggest that and Zimbabwe and that landmine casualties 250,000 people have died or been injured continue to be reported in most of them. because of landmines in Africa in the past 35 Although progress is being made, it does years. not seem to be moving fast enough. The ques- Recently the Second Continental Confe- tion is: what catalyst is needed to fast track the rence of African Experts on Landmines, held clearing of the mines? Financial assistance and on 15-17 September 2004 in Addis Ababa, took dedicated management of the mine clearance stock of how much has been achieved and, how process could be the answer, as most affected much needs to be accomplished in the future. countries have weak economies and high In this edition of the African Security Review poverty levels, and therefore cannot afford the Noel Stott “reflects on the importance of cost of mine clearing. Financial assistance engaging with armed non-state actors (ANSAs) should not only end with the clearing of in order to truly universalise the Anti- mines but should also assist victims that are Personnel Mine Ban Convention and to estab- maimed by landmines. lish the non-use of anti-personnel landmines as A substantial amount of land is rendered the international standard. It outlines one of unusable and unsafe for occupation by com- the most innovative civil society mechanisms munities due to the prevalence of APM’s, and created to do this and argues that it is the similarly land contaminated by APM’s cannot responsibility of both civil society and govern- be used for agricultural purposes. ments to engage with ANSAs, with the aim of Small arms and light weapons (SALW) – facilitating global co-operation to stop all use which includes APM – have been, and contin- of anti-personnel mines.” ue to be, easily accessible and available Based on the on the results of the Second throughout Africa. This has assisted in fuelling Conference, there seems to be progress being the continued conflicts and wars that rage made in dealing with APM challenge. A con- across the continent, within and between cern expressed, though, was that landmines states, increasing the number of displaced peo- and unexploded ordnance (UXO) affected ple, as well as resulting in gross human rights many countries in Africa and include: Algeria, abuses. Alhaji MS Bah’s article on “Micro- Angola, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic disarmament in West Africa”, explores this 2 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 issue. Of the approximately 500 million illicit feat is due to a remarkable process of consulta- weapons in circulation worldwide, it is estimat- tion among key stakeholders in government, ed that 100 million of those are in sub-Saharan industry, academia and civil society, beginning Africa, with eight to ten million concentrated in the early 1990s, that redefined the role of the in the West African sub-region alone. The arti- South Africa arms industry. cle looks into the proliferation of illicit small The article calls attention to the emerging arms and light weapons in the West African partnership that now assures indigenous indus- sub-region and efforts by the regional tries will maintain ‘strategically essential tech- Economic Community of West African States nologies’ over the long term and provide (ECOWAS) to deal with the problem through considerable economic benefit to South Africa. the ECOWAS Declaration of a Moratorium on This reflects a process of change in which the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture members of a society overcame significant his- of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West torical and ideological obstacles to attain agree- Africa. The degree of compliance with the ment about key issues relating to their security, Moratorium by four ECOWAS member states, as well as overcoming the resentments of the namely, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and past in a deliberate series of collective choices Mali, is also explored. to shape a desirable future. Almost equally Closer to home, a positive side to the land- important is the fact that the South Africans mines discussion is that South Africa no longer rehabilitated an institution originally created to produces landmines. This country used to protect sectarian interests to serve the needs of export anti-personnel mines, but it is now the larger society. emerging as a leader in the field of mine clear- South Africa retains a number of anti-per- ance equipment and believes that it possesses sonnel mines for the training of its military per- leading de-mining technology and expertise as sonnel to deal with anti-personnel mine threats well as medical capability and experience to during peacekeeping operations, as well as for assist mine victims. Destruction of its stockpile the development of effective de-mining equip- of mines was completed by October 1998. ment, as provided for under Article 3 of the South Africa’s positive action ties in well Mine Ban Treaty. with the contribution by Dan Henk, Associate The challenge of landmines goes beyond Professor at the US Air War College, also in only being a threat to communities living in this edition, where he describes how the South areas affected. It is a developmental and socio- African defence industry has transformed since economic issue as it places limitations on the the apartheid era, and also survived the political much needed and contested resource in trauma of the 1990s. According to Henk, that Africa: land.

Mpume Nyandu FEATURE

ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS IN AFRICA AND THE BAN ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES1

NOEL STOTT

A truly universal ban on anti-personnel mines cannot be realized without engagement of armed non-state actors and armed groups operating outside state control, including rebels and nation- al liberation movements. Events after 9/11 have complicated engagement with organizations that can be classified as ‘terrorists’. Yet, the use of anti-personnel landmines itself can be viewed as an act of terrorism and African leaders have, on various occasions, classified the use of land- mines and the presence of unexploded ordnance as engendering insecurity and a serious imped- iment to development. The success of a total ban ultimately depends upon ensuring that armed non-state actors act in accordance with international humanitarian law. The Geneva Call Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action (DoC) might be described as an alternative instrument to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and can serve an important and impartial channel of communication with non-state actors. Already 18 armed groups in Africa have signed the Geneva Call DoC.

Introduction This article briefly reflects on the impor- tance of engaging with ANSAs in order to truly The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, universalise the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- Convention and to establish the non-use of Personnel Mines and on their Destruction anti-personnel landmines as the international (Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention) is an standard. It outlines one of the most innova- international agreement by states that have rat- tive civil society mechanisms created to do this ified or acceded to it. While states are not the and argues that it is the responsibility of both only entities that have made use of, or which civil society and governments to engage with continue to use, anti-personnel landmines, the ANSAs, with the aim of facilitating global co- Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention has no operation to stop all use of anti-personnel mechanism to allow for armed non-state actors mines. The article further contends that the (ANSAs) to adhere to its provisions. Common African Defence and Security Policy The aim of achieving a truly universal ban (CADSP) and the Protocol Relating to the on anti-personnel mines cannot, however, be Establishment of the Peace and Security realised without controlling the activities of Council of the African Union (AU) provide non-state actors and similar armed groups oper- useful contexts for such engagement with ating outside state control. The necessity to African ANSAs. engage ANSAs with the aim of securing their commitment to respect the highest standards of international humanitarian norms, such as Defining armed non-state actors that established by the convention, needs to be For the purposes of this article the neutral term recognised and encouraged. ‘armed non-state actors’ (ANSAs) is used to

NOEL STOTT is a senior researcher in the Arms Management Programme at the ISS 6 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 cover ‘rebels’, ‘guerrillas’, ‘separatists’, ‘national national law and the provisions of the Charters liberation movements’ and de facto governing of the AU, the United Nations (UN) as well as authorities. In other words, the term encom- the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ passes an enormous array of groups—groups Rights. This is in line with international with varying goals and objectives but who have jurisprudence, which affirms that the struggle some form of articulated political-economic for national liberation does not in itself consti- and social programmes and which operate pri- tute a terrorist act. marily within state borders. It is, however, While this convention does not define ‘ter- important to bear in mind that many ANSAs rorism’, it does spell out what a ‘terrorist act’ regularly move across state borders or operate is, namely: from other national territories, and often a. any act which is a violation of the criminal receive backing from powerful external spon- laws of a State Party and which may endan- sors, with broader regional or international ger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, agendas. or cause serious injury or death to, any per- Since February 2001, the war on terrorism son, any number or group of persons or instigated by the United States has resulted in causes or may cause damage to public or some of these groups being classified as ‘terror- private property, natural resources, environ- ists’, and any discussion of the presence of mental or cultural heritage and is calculated ANSAs in a country or the need to engage or intended to: them constructively is regarded as a hypersen- i. intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or sitive ‘national security’ issue; however, engag- induce any government, body, institution, ing ANSAs on the use of anti-personnel the general public or any segment thereof, landmines does not mean sympathy with the to do or abstain from doing any act, or to aims of armed opposition groups. On the con- adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, trary, the global campaign against anti-person- or to act according to certain principles; or nel landmines is a single-issue humanitarian ii. disrupt any public service, the delivery of campaign, albeit located in the context of any essential service to the public or to peace building and sustainable development. It create a public emergency; or is located within an open, transparent and iii.create general insurrection in a State. humanitarian agenda. The truth is that some who have in the past Terrorist acts are thus characterised by indis- been members of such ANSAs are now criminate violence against civilians and the dis- involved in ‘legitimate’ political parties, either regard for humanitarian values. in government or as opposition in multiparty democracies. While many people have been Anti-personnel landmines and victims of ANSAs’ tactics and strategies, such terrorism groups have also liberated others from eco- nomic oppression and political tyranny. The use of anti-personnel landmines has been widespread in the colonial, inter-state and intra-state wars that have plagued much of ANSAs and terrorism in Africa Africa for the past three decades. During this period, many thousands of landmines were The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)/AU imported into the region, while a smaller num- Convention on the Prevention and Combating ber were locally manufactured. Today, it is of Terrorism is clear that while member states often civilians, international and African peace- are deeply concerned about the scope and seri- keepers and outside observers who bear the ousness of the phenomenon of terrorism and brunt of these weapons in such countries as the the dangers it poses to the stability and securi- Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), ty of states, it also reaffirms the legitimate right Burundi, Sudan, Mozambique and Angola, as of peoples for self-determination and inde- well as along the border between Ethiopia and pendence, pursuant to the principles of inter- Feature 7

Eritrea. tance for all states to accede to, or ratify, the Given the above, the use of anti-personnel Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and to landmines can be viewed as an example of an pass national legislation that prohibits pri- act of terrorism. In fact, annexed to the AU’s vate citizens from producing, storing or Convention on the Prevention and Combating using anti-personnel landmines. However, of Terrorism is a list of international instru- they also believe that truly universalising the ments that, as a matter of priority, should be convention—to establish the non-use of anti- signed and ratified or acceded to in order to personnel landmines as the international combat terrorism in all its forms and manifes- norm—depends not only on governments: tations: the list includes the Anti-Personnel ANSAs must also feel obliged to adhere to Mine Ban Convention. the terms of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. The success of a total ban on Anti-personnel landmines and anti-personnel landmines and their eradica- tion from African soil is thus dependent on Africa’s security policy all actors—both state and non-state. It is thus The Common African Defence and Security crucial that the education of ANSAs is pri- Policy (CADSP) that was adopted by African oritised in the Geneva Conventions (interna- Heads of State in Libya during 2004, lists tional humanitarian law) and in the landmines as one of the factors that engen- principles of the International Committee of der insecurity in Africa. The adoption of the the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Anti- CADSP is premised on a common percep- Personnel Mine Ban Convention. tion of what is required to be done collec- tively by African states to ensure that Education of ANSAs Africa’s common defence and security inter- ests and goals are safeguarded in the face of States sign and adopt UN conventions and common threats to the continent as a whole. protocols, which legally bind them to the The use of landmines and the presence of standards of international humanitarian law. unexploded ordnance are in this context Non-state forces, however, may declare their viewed as ‘common security/internal threats’ agreement and desire to comply with them, which pose a danger to the common defence totally or partially, by agreement with a state or and security interests of the continent, and unilaterally. In fact, international law foresees cause grave humanitarian situations. the possibility of ‘special agreements’ between The Protocol Relating to the governments and armed opposition groups on Establishment of the Peace and Security particular aspects and rules of the law; for Council of the AU clearly states that the example, regarding prisoners of war and child problems caused by landmines constitute a soldiers. There is no reason why such agree- serious impediment to Africa’s social and ments cannot include the non-use of particu- economic development, and that they can lar weapons. only be resolved within the framework of There are a number of important reasons increased and well-co-ordinated continental why it is imperative that a concerted and co- co-operation.2 ordinated effort be made to educate ANSAs The CADSP and the Peace and Security about the indiscriminate effects of anti-person- Council thus both offer a useful context and nel landmines and why it is desirable to devel- means to engage ANSAs in Africa. op a strategy to ensure that ANSAs act in accordance with international humanitarian Engaging with ANSAs on a landmine law, of which the ban on the use of anti-per- sonnel landmines is now a crucial component. ban These reasons include the following: Many activists in the global campaign to • Experience has shown that ANSAs have rela- eradicate landmines recognise the impor- tively easy access and have made extensive 8 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

use of anti-personnel landmines as weapons Peace processes and mine action of conflict, gravely affecting civilians. The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention is •The campaign against landmines is also a not only about prohibitions; it is also about campaign against their effects. It is a cam- mine action. The AU’s Peace and Security paign for the co-ordinated and systematic Council aims to promote conflict prevention clearance of mines, for the provision of med- and confidence-building measures and the pur- ical care, and for the social and economic suit of negotiated solutions to disputes and reintegration of landmine survivors. As such, conflicts as important strategies for ending the ANSAs—which in some cases control geo- demand for anti-personnel landmines, as well graphical sections of particular countries— as to facilitate the repatriation of refugees and need to give access to these areas. the return of internally displaced persons. •ANSAs are themselves victimised by land- Mine action, in and of itself, is therefore an mines and many among those killed or important vehicle to promote confidence- maimed by landmines are members of non- building measures. Peace processes in Angola, state actors. the DRC and Burundi have in recent times •Various studies have shown that landmines allowed for the initiation of new mine action have a low-level of military utility: this is true programmes or have enhanced existing ones. for both conventional armies and guerrilla Interestingly, some peace agreements have forces. explicitly referred to joint mine action pro- •Non-state actors should be co-responsible for grammes as necessary steps in peace-building de-mining after a war. processes. Mine action therefore has a poten- • Landmines affect the very people that non- tially significant impact on conflict resolution, state actors claim to represent, and claim to peace building (including confidence building) be fighting on behalf of. and reconciliation in mine-affected states. In this respect the use of anti-personnel landmines by non-state actors does NOT justi- The use of anti-personnel mines by fy the use of anti-personnel landmines by gov- ANSAs in Africa ernments. In other words, governments cannot Examples of ANSAs using mines have includ- justify their use of anti-personnel landmines by ed groups in Burundi, Sudan, the DRC and saying that they will continue using them until Somalia. There have also been reports of use of non-state actors give them up. After all, the use of anti-personnel landmines affects the most mines, improvised explosive devices or victim- fundamental rights of everyone: the right to activated booby-traps by ANSAs in Algeria. life, food, access to land, and the right to live in The International Campaign to Ban a peaceful and secure environment. Whoever Landmines’ (ICBL’s) Landmine Monitor has uses anti-personnel landmines denies people over the years identified a number of ANSAs these fundamental rights. The same is true for in Africa that have used mines in the past or ANSAs—they can no longer justify the use of who are alleged to be using anti-personnel anti-personnel landmines by arguing that states landmines currently. These include: use them. • National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola and Namibia, and possibly also in Zambia; The ICBL’s working group on non- • various groups in the DRC; state actors • the Movement of Democratic Forces of In mid-1999, a Working Group on Non-State Casamance (MFDC) in Senegal; Actors was established within the ICBL frame- • various factions in Somalia; work, and in March 2000 a number of ICBL • the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army national country campaigns hosted a pioneer- (SPLA) in Sudan; and ing conference in Geneva entitled ‘Engaging • the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. non-state actors in a landmine ban’. Together Feature 9 with mine ban activists, mine-clearance special- humanitarian law and human rights apply to, ists and experts on international humanitarian and oblige, all parties to armed conflict. law, a range of non-state actors from all over The operative part of the DoC comprises the world met for an exchange of views and to 10 clauses relating to a total ban, mine action, draw up ethical guidelines for engaging non- accountability, implementation, humanitari- state actors.3 an norms, legal status, publicity, attraction, The declaration adopted at the end of the repealing and effectivity clauses.4 meeting indicated encouraging signs that some The DoC is a four-fold mechanism for: armed groups would be willing to enter into •adherence—to humanitarian norms; either unilateral declarations or bilateral agree- • assistance—for compliance; ments with respective governments on the • accountability—for non-compliance; and non-use of anti-personnel landmines. Some • participation—in norm-building. non-state actors appeared open to supporting The DoC as an accountability mechanism is mine-clearance and victim assistance pro- perhaps its most important feature and pro- grammes in territories under their control. vides for three accountability mechanisms, Some even issued public statements to this namely: effect. • compliance reports; It was recognised that these specific under- • independent monitoring; and takings, and indeed non-state actors generally, • field verification. would have to be monitored. In this regard, the The first mechanism (compliance reports) Geneva Call Deed of Commitment for involves the signatory armed group itself sub- Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel mitting a reporting format designed by Geneva Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action Call, similar to the transparency measure under (DoC) was established. The Geneva Call is an Article 7 of the Anti-Personnel Mine independent, international, humanitarian non- Convention. The second mechanism (inde- governmental organisation (NGO) for non- pendent monitoring) involves “independent state actors who wish to commit themselves to international and national organisations” in a total ban on anti-personnel mines and to existing networks already monitoring interna- other humanitarian norms, and serves as a basis tional humanitarian law or human rights on a for their accountability. To this end, the long-term basis, or those monitoring peace Geneva Call can serve as an impartial channel processes and ceasefires for a particular peri- of communication with non-state actors. od, as well as networks created specifically for landmine monitoring. The third mechanism The Geneva Call Deed of (field verification) involves field missions by Commitment Geneva Call visiting and inspecting actual sites to verify reported or alleged serious vio- The DoC might be described as an alternative lations of the total-ban commitment on the instrument to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban part of a concerned armed group, as well as to Convention. It comprises three parts: a preface, evaluate more effectively the progress of an operative section; and a signatory section. implementation.5 The preface begins with a recognition of the global landmine problem and its victims, African signatories to Geneva Call underscoring a humanitarian perspective. Deed of Commitment Several clauses reflect the key principles of international humanitarian law, particularly An increasing number of ANSAs have the principles of distinction, humanity, pro- acknowledged the need to reconsider their use portionality and limitation, and the basic con- of landmines. Unilateral statements and bilat- tent or purpose of international humanitarian eral agreements with clear references to mines law, which is the protection of civilians. have been made by non-state armed groups in Additionally, it points out that international Sudan, the Philippines, Somalia, Colombia, 10 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

Western Sahara, Kosovo/Yugoslavia and Assembly of the Organisation for Security Afghanistan, among others. Some of these and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in July groups have already publicly committed 2004 noted that many ANSAs are using themselves to a ban on landmine use. Others mines and that it is necessary to engage appear willing to support mine clearance and them in order to obtain true universalisa- victim assistance programmes in areas under tion of the convention. They further called their control. on OSCE participating states to “give closer Between March 2000 and 17 September attention to the problem of anti-personnel 2004, 26 armed groups—18 in Africa, six in mines in relation to non-state actors and to Asia and two in the Middle East—have signed support all efforts to commit non-state the Geneva Call DoC. The Sudan People’s actors to the mine ban process”. Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the This work is thus internationally accepted as an National Council for the Defense of important component in achieving the human- Democracy – Defense Forces of Democracy itarian objectives of the ban on anti-personnel (CNDD-FDD) of Burundi, as well as about landmines. 16 factions in Somalia have signed up to the DoC. Conclusion Civil society in general, and the Geneva Call in Recognition from the international particular, is committed to engaging non-state community actors through a persuasive and inclusive The international community in various process of dialogue and education as well as forums has recognised the value of ANSA appealing to appropriate legal and moral refer- engagement work to the universalisation of the ence points. This is in order that the ban on ban on landmines and other humanitarian anti-personnel landmines does indeed contin- norms: ue to be the norm, and that landmines (who- • States parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine ever uses them) no longer serve as weapon Ban Convention first acknowledged the against the poor and no longer exacerbates importance of engagement with ANSAs in poverty and under-development—as they now 2001 and again in 2002. do. •The Human Security Network in 2002 By engaging both governments and ANSAs, recognised the importance of ANSAs in the non-use of anti-personnel landmines as the building human security. international norm can be established. African •The Italian Senate in 2002 and the governments should also play a role by calling European Parliament in both 2002 and on all ANSAs to show their respect for the 2004 passed resolutions supporting Geneva humanitarian norm established by the Anti- Call’s engagement with ANSAs. Personnel Mine Ban Convention by: •The Bangkok Declaration issued at the end • stopping the use, production and trade in of the Fifth Meeting of States Parties to the anti-personnel landmines; Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in • by providing access to mined areas under 2003 affirmed that “progress to free the their control for de-mining purposes; world of anti-personnel mines will be • facilitating mine risk education and victim enhanced if non-state actors embrace the assistance; and international norm established by the • becoming signatories to the Geneva Call Convention and welcome efforts by NGOs DoC. in engaging non-state actors to this end”. Given the international support for such work— The declaration expressed states parties’ and given the CADSP and the Protocol desire for individual countries in a position Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and to do so, to facilitate this work. Security Council of the AU, both of which pro- •The 55-member states of the Parliamentary vide useful contexts for engagement with Feature 11

African ANSAs—the AU and its member states Notes need to: 1This is an edited version of a presentation made • continue to support, as appropriate, mine to the Second Continental Conference of action to assist affected populations in areas African Experts on Landmines, Addis Ababa, under the control of ANSAs, particularly in Ethiopia, 15–17 September 2004. areas under the control of actors who have 2Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, agreed to abide by the norm of non-use of adopted by the 1st Ordinary Session of the anti-personnel landmines; Assembly of the African Union, Durban, 9 July • continue promoting universal observance of 2002. this norm by condemning and taking 3Engaging non-state actors in a landmine ban: A appropriate steps to discourage the use, pro- pioneering conference, Geneva, 24—25 March 2000. duction and trade of anti-personnel mines 4S M Santos, A critical reflection on the Geneva by ANSAs; Call instrument and approach in engaging • underscore the fact that in order to achieve armed groups on humanitarian norms: A south- the core humanitarian objectives of the con- ern perspective, 31 October 2003. 5S M Santos, Jr, Tools or instruments for non- vention, we need to control the activities of state armed groups to adhere to a landmines non-state actors operating outside state con- ban, included in the participant’s kit for, trol, by facilitating engagement with them ‘Looking back, looking forward’, workshop on through appropriate structures with a view engaging non-state actors in a landmine ban, to securing their commitment to respect Bangkok, Thailand, 13 September 2003. international humanitarian laws in general and the norm on non-use of anti-personnel landmines in particular; • support the work of Geneva Call, and in particular its activities of getting as many ANSAs as possible to sign and remain accountable to its DoC. FEATURE

GUNS AND BUTTER Reframing South Africa’s arms industry

DAN HENK

Having developed an arms industry of extraordinary depth and breath of capacity, the advent of the De Klerk presidency in 1989 dramatically affected the South African military establish- ment and its defence industry as budgets were slashed, procurement came to a standstill and the industry was reorganized. Subsequent majority rule did not auger well for the defence industry, yet, a decade later, by 2004, the armaments industry was not only thriving, but had managed to embed itself in the long-term security vision of the state. Key moments in this process was the inclusive and consultative development of the South African White Paper on Defence in 1996, the Defence Review in 1998, and a White Paper on South African Defence Related Industries the following year. Today the relationship between the industry and the government is again close and South Africa’s arms producers constitute an interesting combination of intertwined public and private sector entities, ranging from Armscor, Denel and Defencetek in the public sector to private arms producers embedded in large industrial groupings and a heterogeneous host of smaller autonomous enterprises.

Introduction quest for security made South Africa one of the handful of states in the developing world South Africa’s history in the latter half of the willing to bear the economic burden of devel- th 20 century is complex and fraught with cir- oping not only a massive conventional arms cumstances of wrenching social change. For industry but also nuclear weapons and a space the four decades prior to 1990, the country’s programme (the latter two being dismantled in decisions about ‘security’ were the prerogative the early 1990s). Still, South Africa’s recent of a small group of relatively unaccountable history bequeathed it an armaments industry senior officials. Until 1989, this meant exclu- like no other in Africa.1 sion of the majority of the population from With the advent of majority rule in 1994, opportunity and access, a struggle against lib- South Africa overcame some of the most eration movements in the region, and partici- unfortunate baggage of its past, but it also pation in the front lines of the Cold War faced many difficult choices. One was the dis- against the Soviet Union and its proxies. The position of a highly sophisticated arms indus-

DAN HENK is Associate Professor, Department of Leadership and Ethics at the US Air War College. 14 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 try—an important pillar of the thoroughly dis- arms industry had developed into a complex credited former government. Given the diver- and intertwined system of public and private sity of political voices and agendas in South sector producers. The public part was the Africa at the time, little could be taken for Armaments Corporation of South Africa granted. Yet after a decade of majority rule, (Armscor); an umbrella managerial entity with the industry not only had survived the politi- more than a dozen subordinate production cal transition, it had established a respected and testing enterprises (all wholly government position as a key government partner. South owned) and the Council for Scientific and Africa had become a global actor in the inter- Industrial Research (CSIR).4 Armscor itself was national arms market, having carved out sig- a component of the Department of Defence, nificant high-technology niches where its and in addition to managing the production of products compete effectively. its daughter companies, supervised all of the This article describes how the industry country’s military materiel acquisition— adapted to survive the political trauma of the whether from abroad or from private sector 1990s. It ascribes that feat to a remarkable producers.5 By the end of the era, 3,000 private process of consultation among key stakehold- sector enterprises serviced some aspect of the ers in government, industry, academia and industry as contractors, subcontractors or sup- civil society, beginning in the early 1990s, that pliers.6 The economic importance of the indus- redefined the role of the South Africa arms try had become as significant as the weaponry. industry. The paper calls attention to the Arms producers accounted for fully 9% of the emerging partnership that now assures indige- country’s employment in manufacturing. nous industries will maintain ‘strategically Armscor alone was the 15th largest employer in essential technologies’ over the long term and the country.7 Arms comprised 6.6% of all provide considerable economic benefit to the South African manufacturing output and 1.5% nation as a whole. This reflects a process of of the country’s gross domestic product.8 change in which members of a society over- The advent of the De Klerk presidency in came significant historical and ideological 1989 dramatically affected the South African obstacles to attain noteworthy agreement military establishment and its defence industry. about key issues relating to their security, as The state’s defence budget was reduced by over well as overcoming the resentments of the 40% between 1989 and 1993,9 and defence past in a deliberate series of collective choices procurement by 60%.10 Arms production as a to shape a desirable future. Almost equally percentage of South Africa’s manufacturing important is the fact that the South Africans output shrunk from a high of 6.6% in 1989 to rehabilitated an institution originally created 4.5% by 1994.11 According to Cawthra, to protect sectarian interests to serve the needs “[defence industry] employment fell from of the larger society. 150,000 in 1989 to just over 70,000 in 1993, while the share of defence R&D [research and A time for change development] as a proportion of the country’s total R&D fell from 48% to 18%”.12 South At the end of the apartheid era, the South Africa also discontinued its nuclear, biological African military had an extraordinary amount warfare and strategic missile programmes.13 of state-of-the-art materiel developed exclusive- One of the more interesting changes during ly for its unique requirements and produced by this period was the devolution of the public its own arms enterprises. United Nations (UN) sector arms industry, specifically Armscor.14 embargos had resulted in an industry, possess- While it remained the acquisition arm of the ing in Heitman’s words, “extraordinary depth Department of Defence, Armscor gave up its and breadth of capability”2 and South Africa’s production role.15 A new, state-owned enter- home-made arms clearly brought the county “a prise, Denel, was incorporated in 1992 to man- useful measure of strategic independence”.3 age the various production parastatals along During the apartheid years, South Africa’s with some of the test facilities, and though still Feature 15 government owned, Denel transferred to the dicted that the South African arms industry Department of Public Enterprises.16 The would survive over the long term. decline in the defence budget between 1989 Yet, a decade later, by 2004, the armaments and 1994 also had a significant impact on pri- industry was not only thriving, but had man- vate sector arms producers.17 After a traumatic aged to embed itself in the long-term security series of rationalisations, downsizing and fail- vision of the state. South Africans, with a few ures, the industry by 1994 was significantly prominent exceptions, no longer seemed to smaller and less capable than it had been in question the industry’s relevance to the future 1989.18 of their country. Not only had the industry Despite the trauma, not all the news for the assumed a critical and growing role in the arms industry in the early 1990s was nation’s exports, but was playing an increasing- unfavourable. To the surprise of many in South ly important role in other aspects of national Africa and elsewhere, newly elected South industrial development as well. The armaments African President Nelson Mandela publicly industry had entered the international arms defended the country’s arms industry and pro- market in significant partnerships with foreign moted its products on his overseas trips.19 The arms industries, and had become more depend- new civilian leadership of the Department of ent on exports than upon domestic sales. The Defence echoed his enthusiasm.20 Then in May external partnerships had developed to the 1994, the UN lifted the apartheid era embar- point that armaments offered by major goes on supplying arms to South Africa and Western firms increasingly featured state-of-the- buying arms from it.21 The radical decline of art technology developed and built in South the domestic market motivated the industry to Africa. How could all this possibly have seek export opportunities. Batchelor and occurred in one decade? The answer lies in the Willett note that the value of arms exports grew contributions of a number of key individuals by an impressive 160% (in real terms) between that played critical roles in a process of trans- 1989 and 1993, rising in that period from a formation. That transformation itself was mere 0.3% of total exports to 1.1%.22 mediated by a remarkable series of consulta- Still a sober assessment in 1994 probably tions—perhaps the most profoundly democrat- would have concluded that the advent of ic process of defence decision-making in majority rule did not bode well for the defence modern history. industry. European and North American arms producers dominated the large overseas mar- Defining an arms industry for the new kets for military goods, and were determined to South Africa maintain their advantages. Prospective cus- tomers did not have confidence that South For some years prior to the advent of majority Africans could provide the large-scale or long- rule in 1994, African National Congress (ANC) term service of the large, established defence intellectuals had been debating the nature of industries. Some of South Africa’s new leaders the security establishment appropriate to a new had ideological or moral qualms about an South Africa.26 They now endeavoured to international arms trade in any event.23 apply insights from academia to South Africa’s Diversification into civilian products also unique situation and circumstances.27 Despite proved much more difficult than anticipated.24 a diversity of views, an influential group of The future of the country’s arms industry ANC political ‘insiders’ arrived at essential was plunged in further doubt by scandal in agreement about the kind of military needed September 1994. The new government was after 1994.28 Their model assumed a place for rocked by an international uproar when the the structures and equipment already in place, world press revealed covert arms deliveries to and emphasised a ‘primary function’ for the Yemen, a country with a deplorable human defence forces—preservation of national sover- rights record in the throes of a civil war.25 At eignty and territorial integrity—requiring the that point, no one could confidently have pre- maintenance of a conventional military estab- 16 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 lishment much like the one already in exis- • South African Defence Review (1998); and tence, but under firm civilian control and suit- •White Paper on South African Defence ed to a broadened variety of missions.29 This Related Industries (1999). emphasis subsequently was embedded in the A brief discussion of each of these key docu- interim constitution of 1993, the ANC mani- ments should serve to highlight their signifi- festo of 1994, the permanent constitution of cance, starting with the White Paper on 1996 and follow-on official documents.30 Defence. Several different groups played key roles. The One of the early challenges faced by the new ANC intellectuals provided a general vision for government was a plea from the military for the new security institutions, but two key polit- substantial recapitalisation. Soon after the ical actors guided the vision through a difficult advent of the new government, leaders of the and complex political transition: Minister of military establishment, both civilian and mili- Defence Joe Modise and his deputy, Ronnie tary, began lobbying for extensive re-equipping Kasrils. With his background as former com- of the armed forces.33 Parliament responded by mander of the ANC’s military arm, Modise had demanding that the Defence Force first define impeccable ‘liberation war’ credentials, position itself and its role, demonstrating how it would and influence within the ANC, along with the embody the priorities of the new South personality and vigour to pursue an aggressive Africa.34 The Department of Defence in turn agenda. Kasrils, former chief of intelligence for launched an extraordinary, wide-ranging series the ANC, was uniquely sensitive to many of the of consultations with scholars, practitioners, concerns of political actors and groups, partic- civil servants and members of the attentive ularly those in Parliament, and was able to con- public. During these discussions, several differ- vey the impression of departmental sympathy ent agencies offered competing drafts of a to their agendas and equities.31 The transition white paper, but it was the vision of the ANC of both defence and the defence industry prob- intellectuals that prevailed.35 The result was the ably would not have worked without the active White Paper on Defence published in 1996.36 co-operation of two other key groups: South The White Paper was a clear articulation of a Africa’s senior military leaders and the top new philosophy of national defence. Its managers of industry. Neither group was com- authors tried hard to capture the essence of pletely unanimous. There were individuals in fundamental transformation they believed was each that worked against the changes, but both required in South Africa. They started by groups as a whole sought to reassure the emerg- redefining national security, characterising it in ing new ANC political leadership of a genuine the broadest possible terms.37 The White Paper willingness to be effective contributors to a new went on to specify that the new South African South Africa.32 National Defence Force (SANDF) would be a “ The transformation itself was mediated balanced, modern, affordable and technologi- though genuine, wide-ranging consultation cally advanced military force” and that its “pri- within the country. The new South African mary role [would] be to defend South Africa government that came to power in 1994 was against external military aggression”.38 It went committed to stakeholder buy-in, and spon- far in addressing core interests and concerns of sored a series of conferences that defined both the new ANC-dominated government, and the military establishment and the associations provided a philosophical framework for the between the government and the defence-relat- nature of the new South African military. ed industries. National consultations between However, it left open a number of questions 1996 and 1999 developed a consensus that ulti- about the size, structure and equipping of the mately led to three policy documents that spec- force. ified and documented the new connections. With the initial White Paper in hand, by The documents are the: 1996 the Department of Defence could turn to • South African White Paper on Defence the details of the new military establishment. (1996); Again, it initiated an extraordinary process of Feature 17 consultation resulting in the publication of a partnerships that would permit foreign access Defence Review approved by Parliament in late to South Africa’s defence technology. 1998. The Minister of Defence at the time The third document in the series was a study claimed these consultations to be the “most of the defence industry itself published in late inclusive and transparent” process of its kind 1999: a White Paper on the South African ever undertaken; a boast difficult to contest Defence Related Industries. An important despite its somewhat self-serving tone.39 The objective of this paper was to define how the Defence Review built upon the foundational country would maintain essential strategic White Paper, specifying in some detail the capabilities. The new White Paper was not the nature and role of the new SANDF, addressing result of the same kind of widely publicised, force design, doctrine, deployment and issues multi-sector consultative process of its prede- of resources and accountability. However, for cessors, but the document was compiled by a the purposes of this paper, the most interesting working group of representatives from govern- part of the Defence Review dealt with acquisi- ment, industry, academia and non-governmen- tion management. It defined the South African tal organisations.44 It publicly analysed the defence industry and specified how it would South African arms industry, offering a com- work in tandem with the government to main- prehensive overview of the history and status of tain technological capability.40 Equally impor- the South African defence industry; a sector tant, it noted conditions under which foreign itself never previously exposed to such public industries could market military materiel in the scrutiny. It also provided a very detailed policy country.41 framework defining the interests and involve- The Review stated that the country “should ments of the South African government in the not strive for self-sufficiency in arms develop- industry. The White Paper unambiguously ment, but only limited self-sufficiency in key declared that the government “has a duty to areas”.42 However, the Review clearly implied exercise control over any product or technolo- that the country would maintain an indigenous gy which can be termed an armament”.45 It capacity to meet its strategic requirements.43 recognised defence-related industries as an The acquisition policy specified in the “integral part of South Africa’s defence capa- Defence Review bore a resemblance to the bility”46 and expressed a willingness to support close ties that existed between government and them with government resources, though with industry in the era before majority rule. There the caveat that the South African government were, however, some key differences: much “will be very selective of which technologies are more of the defence industry would consist of to be retained”.47 But perhaps more important private sector enterprises than was the case in than any other feature was the fact that this the past, when parastatals produced much of document gave the armaments industry the South Africa’s military materiel exclusively for opportunity to collaborate with government in South African use. The country now would defining its role in the new South Africa, and even more aggressively market its defence tech- tied the industry into a comprehensive nation- nology abroad, and foreign defence industries al security vision. would play a key role in South Africa’s arms The White Paper looked internally at South purchases. The Defence Review offered a clear Africa’s security needs and externally at its recognition that South Africa required rela- export opportunities. It devoted considerable tionships with external defence industries. The attention to the future roles and materiel needs country no longer would seek self-sufficiency of the SANDF, and considered defence indus- in armaments: its military materiel would be try restructuring, including a treatment of pri- supplied from foreign sources as a matter of vatisation of Denel and various issues of labour routine. The document also articulated the relations and affirmative action. It also dis- value of partnerships for technology transfer cussed the marketing and export of South and access for South African industries to the African arms, addressing issues of non-prolifer- world market, including substantive two-way ation and specifying the need for a government 18 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 partnership with public and private sector pro- primarily for conventional, high-intensity con- ducers. The paper prescribed “strategies” for flict along the country’s borders would provide South Africa to safeguard its “essential defence the wherewithal most appropriate to the articu- technologies”, including government invest- lated range of future roles, particularly against ment in private sector research, special projects threats at the low end of the technological spec- and “advanced technology demonstrators”.48 It trum, including the challenges of various peace included the designation of preferred suppliers operations.52 (Although Heitman argues that and centres of excellence within South Africa.49 recent history provided an ample rationale for For all of its significance, the new White Paper retaining a substantial conventional force. In was much less prescriptive and more descrip- his view, the South African decisions were sig- tive than the earlier documents, offering few nificantly influenced by memories of the rapid- recommendations at the end. Cawthra attrib- ity with which the East Bloc was able to deploy utes this to the differing perspectives and agen- large numbers of conventional forces to das of the groups represented on the steering African contingencies in the 1970s.)53 committee, which made agreement on specific Whether or not the South Africans actually recommendations problematic.50 will require substantial conventional capabili- Taken together, the two white papers and ties to deal with future threats, they have iden- the Defence Review illustrate comprehensive tified essential strategic capabilities and state and careful efforts on the part of the South clearly in their official documents that they Africans between 1994 and 1999 to define their would seek to maintain them by direct govern- military establishment and provide for its mate- ment subsidy if necessary. But it is as yet rial needs. While the South African govern- unclear if they possess the resources and requi- ment now would serve as a fully engaged site political will over the long term to follow partner in promoting arms exports, the docu- through on their published intention. At pres- ments assume the existence of continuing close ent, the indications are ambiguous for, in fact, ties between the arms producers and the South the issue of resources continued to be a trou- African security establishment. They unam- bling one as the 1990s progressed.54 A key fea- biguously announced South Africa’s intention ture of the South African arms industry in the to maintain certain key security-related techno- apartheid era was generous government fund- logical capacities within its industries, even if ing of R&D. By the 1990s, the government no these required government subsidy, and gave longer provided much in the way of R&D every indication of a government intention to funding, and the industry itself has not been play a major role in all the activities of the able to divert sufficient resources to guarantee country’s defence-related industries, whether in its own ability to maintain state-of-the-art maintenance of certain key technologies, pur- expertise across a range of capabilities. Industry chase of its products, oversight of its R&D, or insiders view this as a serious potential prob- overseas marketing and sales of its products. lem.55 One significant implication of these docu- Still, the three documents represented col- ments, taken together, is the degree to which lective South African thinking about the pres- South Africa justified the maintenance of an ent and future strategic needs of the nation. arms industry by citing its own defence needs. Much of that thinking had to do with the kind This was captured in a locally popular phrase of armed forces they would retain, the roles early in the debate: “No defence industry and missions of those forces, and the materiel means no defence force.”51 needed for those roles. As a key part of this Each of the three documents captured effort, however, they also were obliged to evolving South African thinking on security address the role of the indigenous arms indus- issues in the late 1990s, and each left a number tries, and the result was a public acknowledge- of unanswered questions. None of the afore- ment of the importance of those industries to mentioned documents, for instance, explain the security and economy of the nation. They how a high-technology defence force organised were, in fact, provided a public context in the Feature 19 new South Africa. So it is appropriate now to market or in the intensity of its drive to achieve look briefly at the industry, note its ties to gov- government–industry co-operation in this ernment and summarise its capabilities. effort. South Africa’s defence-related industries The industry–government partnership form a community that is much smaller and far more externally oriented than it was at the The defence industry is connected to the gov- end of the apartheid era. This community also ernment at various levels, though the most is more sophisticated, competitive and secure, important aspect of the relationship is the having largely defined its role in the new close partnership between the two. This rela- South Africa. As has always been the case, tionship bears some similarity to the much of it is concentrated in Gauteng, in the apartheid years, but there are significant dif- region around the two major population cen- ferences in the new affiliation. Both parties tres of Johannesburg and Pretoria. However, a now openly acknowledge the relationship. surprising amount now is distributed else- And more importantly, the industry now con- where, including particularly the Western tributes to the mutual agenda as a full part- Cape region. Employment and other eco- ner. The close relationship between nomic benefits derived from the industry government and the arms industry is epito- extend to a considerable proportion of the mised in two different (but related) organisa- country. Many of the old structures and tions: the South African Aerospace, Maritime organisational cultures still are evident, but and Defence Industries Association (AMD) both have evolved in significant new ways. and the South African Defence Export The government still co-ordinates the indus- Support Organisation (SADESO). While try’s efforts to serve national priorities—a lega- AMD is a private sector entity with close link- cy of the years before majority rule. However, ages to the public sector, SADESO is a pub- the motivation of the current ANC govern- lic sector entity with close connections to the ment is quite different. It admits to facing no private sector. AMD is an industry advocacy group, creat- immediate external military threat, yet seeks ed by the defence industry leadership in the to safeguard defence industries both to pre- waning years of the apartheid era. Virtually all serve strategic capabilities and at the same of South Africa’s significant defence-related time provide jobs for citizens and economic corporate actors (in both the public and private benefit to the state through arms sales and sectors) now are affiliated with AMD. It exists trade agreements. to provide its members with research, market- South Africa’s arms producers themselves ing information, access, venues for industry co- still are an interesting combination of inter- ordination and resolution of disputes.56 twined public and private sector entities. Those AMD’s most important role probably is that of in the public sector now consist of three major connecting, facilitating and conserving the net- actors: Armscor (a component of the works of industry insiders and civil servants Department of Defence); Denel (subordinate that traditionally have supervised the country’s to the Department of Public Enterprises); and arms industries.57 Defencetek, a quasi-public sector subsidiary of AMD’s role is complemented by SADESO, the CSIR. The private sector industries are an official instrument of the state chartered in quite diverse with some of the arms producers 2004 to develop and facilitate a South African imbedded in larger industrial groupings while arms export strategy.58 In the words of one cor- others comprise a heterogeneous host of small- porate insider, SADESO is “really a representa- er autonomous enterprises. To understand tive body for the South African South Africa’s current arms production capa- Military-Industrial Complex”.59 There is little bility, it is useful to have a grasp of the diversi- subtlety in South Africa’s published intention ty of the country’s defence industry, starting to be a serious player in the international arms with the public sector entities. 20 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

Defence-related industries in the pub- defence-related industries,67 producing a large lic sector spectrum of air, ground and naval combat equipment, ranging from weapons systems, to The presence of Armscor and Defencetek in avionics, to high technology command-and- South Africa’s contemporary public sector is a control, to electro-optical and laser applica- continuation of policies established early in the tions.68 It still is a state-owned company, but apartheid years. However, the devolution of seems likely to undergo some degree of privati- Armscor in 1992 resulted in a new entity— sation in the future.69 The organisation has Denel—that assumed most of the arms produc- undergone considerable restructuring and tion role formerly played by Armscor. changes in the decade since its establishment, shedding a number of former Armscor enter- Armscor prises, closing down others altogether and con- Armscor remains both an industry actor and a solidating still others.70 It has been subjected to component of the South African Department a continual and disruptive process of rationali- of Defence. As has been the case since its sation and personnel reduction and is engaged founding in the 1960s, it still is a corporation in a variety of affirmative action programmes.71 wholly owned by the government of South For some years after the transition to majority Africa.60 It has retained strong, continuing link- rule in 1994, Denel struggled to achieve prof- ages to other defence industry actors in a vari- itability, vigorously pursuing export opportuni- ety of roles. Armscor’s core function remains ties,72 and its efforts have seen growing success. defence acquisition; a role it plays for the In its 2003 annual report, it claimed an increase South African military establishment and other in export sales of almost 20% over the previous public sector security agencies.61 Its mandated year, noting that export sales had risen to 56% responsibilities include management and exe- of total sales, a 4% increase in one year.73 Denel cution of Department of Defence R&D, con- has sought out relationships with various exter- trol of the tender process for defence nal defence firms.74 acquisition, execution of acquisition pro- grammes, disposition of defence materiel, man- Defencetek agement of strategic facilities, co-supervision of A third public sector entity amongst the the South African defence industry as a whole defence-related industries is Defencetek; a sub- (with the Department of Trade and Industry), sidiary of the CSIR, an organisation with a marketing for the defence industry and man- long relationship to South Africa’s military.75 agement of the defence ‘industrial participa- According to its director, Defencetek has a vari- tion’ programmes (see below).62 Armscor no ety of security-related research interests, though longer has a significant production role (hav- it currently views itself primarily as a consulta- ing given that up to Denel).63 It is now main- tive body on issues of sophisticated technology. ly concerned with research, development, In that role, it uses its expertise and facilities to testing, evaluation and technical consulting. It provide ‘smart buyer’ and ‘smart seller’ advice maintains world-class facilities and technical to clients, particularly (as this is written) within staff for these roles.64 Armscor continues to the South African public sector—and including play a role in marketing South African the military and police. It also offers advice on defence technology.65 counter-trade issues, both to the South African government and to foreign and domestic Denel clients in the private sector.76 A second major public sector entity in South Africa’s defence industry is Denel, founded in Major defence-related industries in the 1992 by separating Armscor’s production sub- private sector sidiaries from its other activities.66 With some The public sector defence industry entities— 20 subordinate enterprises, it is by far the Armscor, Denel and Defencetek—are a complex largest corporate actor within South Africa’s reality, but they are simple compared to the pri- Feature 21 vate sector. Here, the industry is a diverse and Other defence-related industry actors constantly shifting kaleidoscope of corporate In addition to the larger arms producers noted consolidation, divestment, renaming and above, many small South African firms offer restructuring. Today’s private sector defence goods or services with military applications.86 industry includes corporate groups of defence- Botha characterises these as “skills-based, 77 related companies, and a variety of small, entrepreneurial companies that live off con- independent enterprises. Larger private sector tracts from the majors”, since many of the defence actors include: smaller defence-related enterprises function as • African Defence Systems (ADS)—specialising sub-subcontractors for larger enterprises like in electronic, simulator and weapons com- Denel. Botha calls attention to a substantial mand-and-control equipment.78 This firm is decline since 1993 in their overall number, but foreign owned, a member of the Thales the quantity of enterprises engaged in some Group International (a French-based multi- form of security research and production still national); is little short of incredible for a developing •Advanced Technologies and Engineering nation. His study indicates that the successful (ATE)—a world leader in systems integration firms tend to be highly export oriented.87 One of advanced components and weapons for evident aspect of the South African defence- aircraft (including remotely piloted vehicles) related industry, including particularly the and ground combat vehicles;79 smaller enterprises, is the heavy representation • Alvis OMC—South Africa’s major corporate of cyber, simulator and high-end communica- actor in the production and refurbishment of tions-electronics applications.88 Other produc- wheeled and tracked ground force vehicles, ers span a considerable range of different and an acknowledged world leader in mine- applications. Some offer high-quality avionics protected applications that has pioneered the equipment, components and aircraft upgrad- study of mine effects on vehicles.80 Much of ing options.89 South Africa’s defence-related Alvis OMC is foreign owned;81 production includes exotic materials like • Grintek Limited—an electro-technology con- advanced polyurethane wheel technology for glomerate with deep roots in defence pro- combat vehicles, specialised lubricants and duction in South Africa.82 Grintek’s special-purpose boats. Small companies also contemporary interests range across a spec- offer a rich inventory of conventional prod- trum of private sector telecommunications ucts ranging from military clothing to weapons and electrical power applications. Several of systems of various kinds.90 its subordinate enterprises are heavily engaged in building state-of-the-art signals South African military technology intelligence, electronic warfare, communica- tions and other electro-optical equipment. A key question still remains: just how effective Grintek is an acknowledged world leader in is the security-related technology and materiel the miniaturisation of aircraft communica- available from South African sources? This tions. Its high-technology equipment is sold question is easier to pose than to answer. The around the world in European-produced mil- South African advantages are more in capabili- itary aircraft and ships;83 and ty and potential than fielded materiel and more •Reunert Ltd—a South African conglomerate in adaptation and partnership than truly cut- with a long history of military materiel pro- ting edge technology, though they have pro- duction in a variety of fields.84 It remains a duced some of the latter. South Africa large-scale producer of sophisticated fuses for probably will not achieve a dominating role in artillery, rockets and guided missiles. Reunert any domain of armaments production in the also builds search and tracking radars and foreseeable future—nor has it expressed any offers logistics support for artillery and fire intention to do so. However, it is poised to play control systems. Most of its armament pro- effective niche roles. The South Africans duction is exported.85 themselves have identified ‘core products’ 22 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 they consider competitive on the world mar- be an industry leader in this niche. ket,91 and others they deem economically While communications/electronics/elec- viable and worth a continuing investment.92 tronic warfare/instrumentation equipment, But their listing alone does not do justice to mine-resistant combat vehicles, and tactical their capabilities. crew-served weapons are areas of particular There are a few limited areas of fielded mili- expertise, the South Africans can service a vari- tary technology in which South African ety of niche markets. Several South African materiel is cutting edge and many in which it is firms are conducting research on non-lethal state-of-the-art. One area for the former is that weapons and it seems likely that South Africa of tactical communications/electronics, elec- could compete in that market. tronic warfare and electro-optical applications. A significant characteristic of South African European partnerships now assure that South industries is a willingness to tailor products to Africans can keep up with latest advances in the needs of specific consumers, even for limit- communications/electronics and electro-opti- ed product runs. Defence industry spokesmen cal applications, and can compete effectively in still express an eagerness to tailor products,95 an niche applications such as miniaturisation. ability that cuts across industries (and across Another South African niche advantage is in sectors).96 The South Africans place consider- the design and production of special-applica- able emphasis on modularisation of military tion wheeled combat and special purpose vehi- systems. This emphasis is backed by an arms cles.93 South African industries also are widely industry very comfortable with extensive sub- recognised as world leaders in the production contracting, which on relatively short notice of mine-resistant and environmentally protect- can produce tailored packages of components ed technologies—a key feature of their latest such as gun systems or communications and ground combat vehicles. The country also is electronic warfare systems for installation in increasingly visible for its de-mining expertise consumers’ major end items, displaying broad and has fielded some effective equipment now expertise in systems design, engineering, inte- used around the world. gration and equipment upgrading.97 The South Another area in which the South Africans Africans are very good at taking state-of-the-art themselves recognise a special capability is in components from a variety of industries and the production of tactical weapons systems, to integrating them into tailored packages in order include missiles, artillery, projectiles and explo- to enhance the performance of Cold War era sive ordnance. Their tactical missile systems weapons systems. are, in general, state-of-the-art and their grow- Excellent test facilities and human resources ing partnerships with American and European enhance South Africa’s capabilities. The coun- armaments industries probably will assure that try maintains world-class ranges and test facili- they maintain interest and expertise. South ties on a scale astonishing for the developing African R&D has pushed into some novel world. Their quantity, breadth and depth con- areas: for instance, in the development of ultra- tribute to a continuing South African capacity violet guidance for air-to-air missiles to attenu- for rapid development and testing of proto- ate the effect of background noise. types. In addition to the excellent R&D facili- Artillery has been something of the poster ties, South Africa has a surprisingly large child for South African arms exports since the number of organisations (and individuals) that 1980s, when the country began selling its G-5 might be described as ‘technology enablers’. 155 mm extended range gun. The G-5 repre- These include sophisticated consultants on sented a quantum leap in ground-based indi- security issues and enterprises seeking to serve rect fire capabilities for South Africa, and it also as interfaces between military consumers and reflected state-of-the-art technology.94 The developers or producers. Enablers particularly South Africans seem determined to remain include experts in cyber applications. competitive in field artillery—their innovative The complexities of the current relationship new G7 light 105 mm gun/howitzer is likely to between the South African government and the Feature 23 country’s arms industry are illustrated by two African defence packages (first announced in interrelated programmes that together offer as a 1998) offer a graphic illustration of the impact useful case study of the developing partnership: of the country’s offset policies. the counter-trade ‘offsets’ and the South African As early as 1994, the South African military ‘defence packages’ first announced in late 1998— had developed and publicised listings of its crit- purchases that touch most of the issues and ical needs, and several foreign countries began actors of particular interest in this paper. lobbying the South African government for the right to provide new military materiel, interest- Offsets and packages ed particularly in establishing sole-source strategic alliances.106 The government finally South Africa is one of a number of countries reacted in September 1997 by issuing requests that require counter-trade offsets in trading to 11 countries for technical information on 107 relationships with external sellers.98 The basic military equipment. It had made its final idea is that the seller ‘sweetens the deal’ for the selections by the time of a November 1998 buyer by agreeing to mechanisms in which the Defence Exhibition in South Africa, when it buyer can attenuate the costs of outright pur- published its intention to acquire five (later chase. Such arrangements are common even reduced to four) distinct packages of military 108 among developed nations such as the United materiel. The contracts for the packages were States (US) and its North Atlantic Treaty signed a year later, in December 1999, and with Organisation (NATO) partners.99 The actual a price of just over $4 billion, comprised the advantages from such arrangements are a topic largest ever arms purchase by South Africa.109 of continuing debate among economists.100 The new equipment included Swedish multi- However, South Africa ultimately implement- role fighter aircraft,110 British jet trainers,111 ed its own offset requirements—its industrial Italian light utility helicopters,112 German participation programmes—and the country has corvettes113 and German patrol submarines.114 been astute in their use. There are actually two The arms purchases were controversial at the of them: the National Industrial Participation time of their announcement in late 1998, and Programme (NIPP) managed by the became even more so over the following Department of Trade and Industry; and the years.115 Continuing allegations of financial Defence Industrial Participation Programme impropriety and graft swirled around key (DIPP) managed by Armscor on behalf of the defence and party officials involved in the deci- Department of Defence.101 The South African sions, and such suspicions probably were Cabinet implemented the first of these pro- inevitable given the large sums of money grammes in late 1996.102 involved and the intensity of foreign and The NIPP requires a foreign supplier in any domestic competition for defence contracts.116 single South African government contract Yet despite the controversy, the weapons pur- exceeding $10 million to invest at least 30% of chases were not the arbitrary choice of a cor- the contract value in South Africa’s economy. rupt autocrat, nor were they indicative of an (This obligation rises to 50% in the case of out-of-control military establishment. Rather, defence contracts.) The NIPP investment gen- they were one step in a remarkable process of erally must be placed in enterprises other than democratic decision-making following a ration- the defence-related industries.103 South Africa al assessment of long-term defence needs, applies a second offset protocol, the DIPP reflecting deliberate strategic choices and pri- (over and above the NIPP), to foreign suppliers oritisation of national interests. They also illus- of defence-related materiel in any single con- trated one country’s struggle both to define its tract exceeding $2 million. Unlike the NIPP, security ends and its choice of the ways and this programme requires investment in the means to achieve them. defence industry.104 The importance of the One feature of the arms packages that ini- counter-trade offsets to South African industry tially tended to be lost in the controversies was cannot be overemphasised.105 The South the extensive offset benefits South Africa 24 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 reaped from its purchases, with benefits both to markets that otherwise would not have been the defence industry and to a wide range of possible. The defence packages highlight, as other economic enterprises. Many of these perhaps nothing else does, the current status of came directly from related offset agreements. the South African armaments industries. These The competition for South Africa’s business industries, typically in partnership with was so fierce that South Africa used the offset European producers, have surged onto the offers to discriminate among the bidders. The international scene with products marketed DIPP offsets alone ultimately amounted to both to high-end and low-end consumers about 60% of contract value of the foreign around the world. arms, and the NIPP offsets an astonishing The DIPP agreements also illustrate another 350%. The total value of the offsets was some important point: South Africa’s arms industry $16.4 billion, vastly exceeding what South could not rise to its full potential until it had rel- Africa had committed to pay for the weapons atively unrestricted access to the technology and themselves.117 markets of the wider world through associations The growing impact of the defence packages with European and North American arms pro- on the South African economy was clearly evi- ducers. This it gained through vigorous pursuit dent by mid 2003, when some 45 NIPP proj- of foreign partnerships since the mid 1990s. For ects already had gained South African any country seeking to maintain state-of-the-art government approval, carrying a prospective armament production capabilities, there really is value of $6 billion.118 The offsets were paying no substitute for access to the broader currents substantial dividends to the South African of global technology. And even with the foreign economy in general, and investments by the partnerships, South Africa’s success in marketing foreign industries may have been approaching its arms has depended on an ability to discern the point where the economy’s most lucrative and exploit niche roles in co-operation with for- near-term investment possibilities were saturat- eign partners. ed.119 But it is the South African defence indus- Whether or not investment in defence try that is deriving the greatest long-term industries is the best use of national resources, benefit from the policy. The benefits can be the South African use of offsets in arms acqui- categorised in a variety of different ways. sitions has proven a clever way of forcing for- Clearly, the extensive use of South African eign investment in South African industry, and subcontractors by the successful defence pack- an ingenious way of mandating technology age bidders provides an immediate, tangible transfer. Offset agreements may not be a solu- investment in the South African defence sector. tion to every country’s arms acquisition dilem- The subcontracts span a broad spectrum.120 ma, but the South Africans have proven that But the direct infusion of funding for the they can be significant benefactors to an econ- defence package weapons is overshadowed by a omy as a whole and to defence industries in host of additional indirect benefits. These particular. range from a substantial DIPP investment by the foreign arms producers in South African Some concerns defence industries, to the purchase of shares in other South African defence companies, to the The developing partnership between the South outright acquisition of some South African African government and the country’s arms companies by European-based defence con- industry is a remarkable achievement, holding glomerates. The benefits extend to the transfer a promise of significant future benefits for the of personnel and expertise between South whole national economy; but it is not free of African and European firms, significantly facil- current problems and future dilemmas. These itating two-way movements of defence tech- include the ongoing turbulence in the state- nology. They include access to otherwise owned enterprise, Denel, associated with a inaccessible markets for South African arma- seemingly endless process of rationalisation ments, and a visibility in international arms and reorganisation. As the country’s major Feature 25 arms producer, Denel is a prime source of con- remains to be seen if the organisational values tracts for much of the rest of the arms industry. of today’s industry will survive the present The apparent volatility of this key organisation cohort and if today’s advantages will charac- casts a pall of uncertainty over many other terise tomorrow’s industry. decisions about arms production in South 121 Africa. Another current problem is the state A key lesson from the South African infrastructure, set up after the scandals of the experience mid 1990s, to vet and approve arms exports.122 According to industry insiders, this has devel- South Africa’s current leaders apparently see in oped into a sclerotic bureaucracy whose slow- a sophisticated arms industry the opportunity ness in providing export approval has cost the to pursue two objectives: limited strategic 123 country significant opportunities. Still autonomy; and national economic develop- another concern with longer-range implica- ment. However, these two goals may be at least tions (discussed earlier) is the government’s somewhat mutually exclusive. South Africa’s inability or unwillingness to fund significant defence-related enterprises increasingly are con- defence-related R&D. nected to multinational defence industries; a An important advantage that South Africa trend likely to increase rather than decrease. enjoyed over its Cold War opponents from the The greater the degree of South African part- 1960s to the late 1980s was the sophistication nership with foreign arms producers, the better of its human resources. Well-trained young sci- access it has both to state-of-the-art technology entists and engineers, many with military expe- and to the international arms market; circum- rience, populated the arms industries. They stances that are economically desirable, yet were given considerable creative latitude.124 these same connections also bring a degree of The country’s engineers and technicians were foreign influence—even control—over South (and are) world class. For the past 30 years, as a Africa’s industries that limits the country’s group they may have been more capable than options. Perhaps a gradual loss of strategic any analogous community of quickly designing autonomy is the price of the increasing integra- materiel specifically suited to local military tion into the global economy. requirements. It is useful to ask whether or not Still, on security issues, South Africa since this will be a continuing phenomenon. In 1994 can take credit for broader consultation, other words, is the current nature of the South greater accountability and more substantial African arms industry a transitory historical transparency in its security-related decisions anomaly or does it reflect an enduring organi- than most countries. Very much in contrast to sational culture? Posed another way, will the the example of the apartheid years, South industry’s institutional norms survive its cur- Africa’s post-1994 national consultations about rent members? South Africa now celebrates its security issues sets a high standard for the rest multicultural heritage and is making strenuous of the world and could profitably be emulated efforts to empower formerly disadvantaged elsewhere. South Africa’s attentive public and communities. Much of this effort consists of policymakers seem to have mutually examined affirmative action programmes. These pro- the defence industry and, after prolonged grammes have been controversial; many quali- debate, elected to wager on its future benefits fied young white scientists and engineers are rather than sustain the resentments of the past. seeking opportunity outside South Africa. At The results of this consensus so far have been the same time, many non-white South Africans the preservation of a capable industry and the still view the pace of change as far too slow.125 promise of substantial future economic bene- How the South African government handles fits. This example suggests that substantial cul- affirmative action will have a very tangible tural and ideological differences need not long-term impact on South Africa’s defence- preclude agreement on basic themes of nation- related industries. While the increasing diversi- al security if the consultation is sufficiently ty doubtless will bring benefits of its own, it broad. 26 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

Notes College, 2001; for the nuclear programme, see F W de Villiers, R Jardine & M Reiss, Why South 1This paper will continue to refer to a South Africa Africa gave up the bomb, Foreign Affairs 72, Nov- arms industry, but the South African government Dec 1993, pp 98-109; J Shearer, Denuclearisation does not view the country’s arms producers as a of Africa: The South African dimension, distinct industrial sector, arguing with justification Disarmament 16(2), 1993, pp 171-185; D Howlett & J Simpson, Nuclearisation and denuclearisation that these are imbedded components of a larger in South Africa, Survival 35(3), 1993, pp 154-173; economy and that the same industries sell prod- F W de Klerk, The last trek—A new beginning, St. ucts to non-military consumers. In describing that Martin’s Press, New York, pp 273-274; and portion of the economy that produces armaments, Batchelor & Willett, op cit, pp 71-72. the South African government prefers the phrase 14 For a detailed description of this process, see ‘defence-related industries’. White Paper on the Batchelor & Willett, op cit, pp 85-101. South African Defence-Related Industries, 15 Botha notes that part of the pressure to divest December 1999, p 2, . that it was expressly forbidden by law to produce 2H Heitman, unpublished draft describing the non-military goods for the civilian market. South South African defence and defence production Africa’s defence industry, op cit, p 2. The 1992 establishment, 2003, p 65. divestment was accomplished by executive fiat 3 Ibid. and did not change Armscor’s legislative mandate 4The CSIR was created by Parliament in 1945 to established in 1968 (Armaments Development advance South African science in general, mainly and Production Act, Act No. 57 of 1968). This through pure science and research. Since at least would cause a variety of problems until a new act the early 1950s some of its research effort has been of Parliament redefined Armscor’s role in 2003 directed to military applications. Information (Armaments Corporation of South Africa, based on author’s interviews with Andre Nepgen, Limited Act, 2003). director, Defencetek (CSIR), 20 June 2003 and 16 White Paper on South African Defence Related Alan Holloway, vice chairman of AMD and man- Industries, op cit, Chapter 2, paras 25-27. aging director of ANSYS, 7 June 2004. See also D 17 According to Botha, the government had no G Kingwill, The CSIR—The first 40 years, CSIR, industrial transition programme and the industry Scientia Printers, Pretoria, 1990; and found itself “restructured in an ad hoc, market . driven and largely chaotic way.” South Africa’s 5For details, see inter alia, P Batchelor & S Willett, defence industry, op cit, p 2. Disarmament and defence industrial adjustment in 18 Ibid. However, Botha argues that it had become South Africa, Oxford University Press, London, much tougher and more competitive on the 1998; G Cawthra, South Africa, in R P Singh (ed), world market Arms procurement decision making: Volume II: Chile, 19 Batchelor & Willett, op cit, p 146. Greece, Malaysia, Poland, South Africa and Taiwan, 20 R Kasrils, The future of South Africa’s defence SIPRI Publication, Oxford University Press, industry: The government’s perspective, in W London, 2000; S Landgren, Embargo disimplement- Gutteridge, South Africa’s defence and security in the ed: South Africa’s military industry, Oxford 21st century, Dartmouth Publishing Company, University Press, London, 1989; J P McWilliams, Brookfield, VT, 1996, pp 117-126. Armscor: South Africa’s arms merchant, Brasseys, 21 These were UN Security Council resolutions 418 London, 1989. and 558 respectively. 6White Paper on South African Defence Related 22 Batchelor & Willett, op cit, p 80. Industries, op cit, Chapter 2, para 15. 23 Ibid, pp 113-120. 7 Ibid, p 17. 24 Author’s interview with Arthur J R Oates, direc- 8 Batchelor & Willett, op cit, p 81. tor of Business Development, Denel, 24 June 9 Ibid, p 67. 2003. See also D Abrahams, Defence conversion 10 D Botha, South Africa’s defence industry: Charting a in South Africa: A faded ideal?, ISS Occasional new course?, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Paper, 51, July 2001, pp 2-3, Occasional Paper, 78, September 2003, p 1. . 11 Batchelor & Willett, op cit, p 81. Botha notes that the only significant conversion 12 Cawthra, op cit, p 147. See also Batchelor & of defense technology to civilian usage was in air- Willett, op cit, pp 70-71. craft components and mine-protected vehicles. 13 South Africa has continued to develop and pro- He also provides a useful overview of the reasons duce a range of state-of-the-art tactical missiles. for widespread failure to diversify. South Africa’s For an analysis of the discontinuance of the bio- defence industry, op cit, p 9. See also White Paper logical warfare programme, see S Burgess & H on South African Defence Related Industries, op Purkitt, The rollback of South Africa’s chemical and cit, Chapter 2, paras 53-56. biological warfare program, Maxwell AFB, AL: 25 In the resulting scandal, Mandela felt constrained USAF Counterproliferation Center, Air War to appoint an investigating commission headed Feature 27

by an eminent South African jurist, Edwin 30 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Cameron. The Cameron Commission’s first 1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996). See particularly report in June 1995 excoriated Armscor, suggest- Chapter 11, para 200: “The primary object of the ing a number of measures to improve the over- defence force is to defend and protect the sight of arms exports. A second report in March Republic, its territorial integrity and its people … ” 1996 went much further. It recommended parlia- 31 Author’s interview with defense analyst Len le mentary review (and veto authority) over arms Roux of ISS (a retired South African Air Force sales and questioned the propriety of South Major General) who served at senior level in the African involvement in international arms trade Defence Force headquarters during this period of altogether. The South African Cabinet reacted in transition and had regular contact with the actors March 1995 by appointing a ministerial commis- he described), 11 March 2004. sion headed by Minister of Defence Joe Modise 32 A number of individuals are remembered as par- to examine the issue of arms exports with a man- ticularly influential in mediating the transition, date to recommend ethical guidelines and general although particular credit probably goes to retired policy. Batchelor & Willett, op cit, pp 146-150. Air Force Major General Julius Kriel, who rose in 26 These included scholars like Nathan Laurie, this period to the leadership of the key arms Jakkie Cilliers, Greg Mills, Gavin Cawthra and industry advocacy group. Interviews with Rocky Williams. See, inter alia, Ready to govern: Reginald Ngwenya, director of AMD, 21 June ANC policy guideline for a democratic South 2004, Alan Holloway, vice chairman of AMD Africa, adopted at the National Conference, May and managing director of ANSYS, 21 June 2004, 1992, ; L Nathan, Beyond arms and armed Coordination and Counter-trade, Grintek Group forces: A new approach to security, South African Limited, 21 June 2004. Defence Review, 4, 1992, pp 12-21; and B Fanaroff, 33 By 1994, the military establishment was still A trade unionist perspective on the future of the there, but all of the services were facing severe armaments industry in South Africa, South problems of obsolescent materiel and declining African Defence Review, 7, 1992, pp 10-14. capital investment. L le Roux, The South African 27 The South African professional literature at the National Defence Force and its involvement in time reflected a rich ferment in thinking about the Defence Review process, in Williams et al, op new definitions of ‘security’. See, inter alia, M van cit, pp 155-156. Aardt, Doing battle with security: A Southern 34 South Africans had widely differing expectations African approach, South African Journal of on almost any issue—including security—and to International Affairs 3(2), Summer 1996, pp 13-28; make matters worse, a relatively large number of and H Solomon, From marginalised to dominant government officials at all levels had little prepa- discourse: Reflections on the evolution of new ration for their new roles and responsibilities. security thinking, in H Solomon & M van Aardt Cawthra, op cit, pp 142-143. (eds), Caring security in Africa, ISS Monograph, 35 The new official white paper was remarkably sim- 20, February 1998. ilar to ideas published earlier by University of 28 Much of their effort was focused in the Military Cape Town scholar Laurie Nathan. See L Nathan, Research Group, a rather loose collaboration of The changing of the guard: Armed forces and defence academics and intellectuals that coalesced in the policy in a democratic South Africa, HSRC early 1990s and became essentially the ANC Publishers, Cape Town, 1994. think tank on security. The Military Research 36 . Group was co-ordinated by South African scholar 37 Security was now an “… an all-encompassing Gavin Cawthra and included other academics condition in which individual citizens live in free- like Laurie Nathan, Jackie Cock and Rocky dom, peace and safety; participate fully in the Williams. It disbanded by about mid 1995. process of governance; enjoy the protection of Interview with Gavin Cawthra, 22 June 2004. See fundamental rights; have access to resources and also M Shaw, Biting the bullet: Negotiating the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an envi- democracy’s defence, in S Friedman & D ronment which is not detrimental to their well- Atkinson (eds), South African Review 7: The small being.” (emphasis added), White Paper on miracle. South Africa’s negotiated settlement, Ravan Defence, op cit, p 3. The White Paper explicitly Press, Johannesburg, 1994, pp 228-256. stated that the armed forces comprise “… an 29 Cawthra observes that maintenance of the large, important security instrument of last resort … conventional military was partly motivated by a [but not] the dominant security institution.” Ibid, desire to placate the existing military establish- pp 3,4. ment. Gavin Cawthra, interview, 22 June 2004. 38 At the same time, the White Paper was very care- See also R Williams, Defence in a democracy: ful to emphasise that the new military establish- The South African Defence Review and the redef- ment would have a “primarily defensive inition of the parameters of the national defence orientation and posture”, and that South Africa’s debate, in R Williams, G Cawthra & D Abrahams foreign policy would emphasise “regional securi- (eds), Ourselves to know, ISS, Pretoria, 2003, p 212. ty” and “military co-operation with Southern 28 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

African states in particular”. Ibid, p 4. assemble and test the sub-systems, their interfaces 39 Key figures in drafting this paper were Air Force and the resultant major system”); command, con- Major General Len le Roux and Army Colonel trol and communications systems; sensors, signal (Dr) Rocky Williams, both at the time active processing and data processing; combat systems members of the SANDF. Thandi Modise and software and support (emphasising cyber applica- Zou Kota, both members of the Joint Standing tions); and simulation systems and war gaming. Committee on Defence, significantly assisted White Paper, op cit, Chapter 4, paras 32-52. their efforts. Interviews with Major General Len 48 Ibid, paras 53-61. le Roux (South African Air Force, retired) 11 49 Ibid, para 62. March 2004 and Helmoed Heitman, 23 June 50 Author’s interview with Gavin Cawthra, 22 June 2004. The consultation itself “… featured three 2004. National Consultative Conferences, a host of 51 L Englebrecht, Developments in the South Regional Workshops in all provinces, Public African Defence Industry: Interational alliances, Hearings in Parliament … It drew together a wide summary of NIC/IISS Conference, range of interest groups, including: academics, Transformation in global defence markets and clergy, industrialists, media, pacifists, industries, 4-5 November 2000, . Review, op cit, p vi. 52 South African scholars like Rocky Williams and 40 Ibid, p 121. Peter Batchelor have called attention to this 41 Ibid, p 129. apparent contradiction. It also was publicly recog- 42 In the Defence Review, domestic industries were nised in 2003 by the commanding officer of the distinguished by category as “strategically essen- South African Army who implicitly criticised the tial”, “cost-effective local sourcing and export” or limitations of the White Paper on Defence. See “non-strategic”. Ibid, p 127. Batchelor & Willett, op cit, pp 135-137; R 43 Ibid, p 133. Williams, Defence in a democracy: The South 44 White Paper on South African Defence Related African Defence Review and the redefinition of Industries, op cit, Introduction, para 11. The the parameters of the national defence debate, in Steering Committee was chaired by the Chief of Williams et al, op cit, pp 205-223; and S Nyanda, Defence Acquisition (Shamin ‘Chippy’ Shaikh) The South African National Defence Force and and in addition to the government and industry peace missions in Africa, paper presented at the representation, included academics Laurie African Dialogue Series, University of Pretoria, 27 Nathan (University of Cape Town) and Gavin February 2003. Cawthra (University of Witwatersrand), scholars 53 Heitman, personal communication, 12 June 2004. prominent in earlier consultations on defence 54 The armed forces themselves were in increasing restructuring. Another academic, Peter Batchelor, difficulty, facing serious shortfalls in funds for did much of the actual drafting of the paper. training, maintenance and equipment replace- Interviews with Gavin Cawthra, 22 June 2004 and ment. According to Cilliers, the Air Force in late Helmoed Heitman, 23 June 2004. 1997 had been obliged to halt flight activity 45 White Paper on South African Defence Related except in cases of emergency and the Army Industries, op cit, Introduction, para 10. lacked sufficient resources to continue normal 46 Ibid, para 9. training. As part of the political settlement that 47 After recounting the history and surveying the produced majority rule in 1994, the South status of South African defence-related industries, Africans were obliged to integrate the old South the White Paper identified the special capabilities African Defence Force with personnel from two of these industries in the mid 1990s. It specified liberation armies and the military establishments areas in which South Africa’s industries exhibit a of the semi-autonomous black ‘homelands’ in the “core competency”, or put another way, areas in former apartheid state. This was an enormously which the South Africans saw themselves as hav- difficult and traumatic process of change, costly ing a special advantage. Ibid, para 66. The areas and politically fraught. J Cilliers, Defence acquisi- are: electronics; weapons systems; and communi- tions—Unpacking the package deals, ISS Occasional cations. It identified six “strategically essential Paper, 29, March 1998, p 3, defence technologies and capabilities” that South Africa would seek to establish or maintain for its 55 Interviews with Reginald Ngwenya, 21 June 2004; own security needs, whether or not they had fur- Alan Holloway, 21 June 2004; and Paul J Gerber, ther commercial viability. These technologies 21 June 2004; interview with Helmoed Heitman, would maintain “… independence in key strate- 25 June 2004. gic areas or certain niche areas [and reduce] sup- 56 ply vulnerabilities”. The essential technologies 57 This argument is based on the comments of are: logistic support, repair and maintenance of numerous mid-level South African arms industry equipment and systems; systems integration insiders in conversations with the author in 2003 (defined as “the ability to design, specify, procure, and 2004. Feature 29

58 This new organisation essentially performs the to oversee day-to-day operations. The chairman function attributed to a proposed Marketing of the board was an investment banker. Support Board in Chapter 5 of the White Paper Denel Annual Report, 2003, op cit, pp 14-17, 38-39. on South African Defence-Related Industries. For 70 For details, see Botha, South Africa’s defence indus- additional information, see Botha, South Africa’s try, op cit, pp 9-10. defence industry, op cit, p 4, and the Armscor pro- 71 Ibid. motional literature, 72 P Batchelor & P Dunne, Industrial participation, . Africa’s defence related industry, paper prepared 59 It is a formal partnership between the for the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Department of Defence, Armscor and AMD, Town and Middlesex University Business School, with representation from various other govern- UK, February 2000, p 4. ment departments. The Secretary for Defence 73 Denel Annual Report, 2003, op cit, p 24. In con- chairs it. Information provided by Paul J Gerber, ferences with US officials, Denel’s representatives 22 April 2004. have indicated that in the past decade, their pro- 60 By law, the Minister of Defence “exercises owner- duction emphasis has shifted from 90% domestic ship … on behalf of the state”. Armaments sales and 10% exports to the exact reverse, an Corporation of South Africa, Limited Act, 2003, amazing transformation. Interview with Duncan Section 2. In 2003, a 12-person board of directors Lang, contractor to the US Department of chaired by an investment banker oversaw Defense, 11 March 2004. Armscor. Armscor Annual Report, 2002-2003, pp 74 In 2002 Denel claimed strategic partnerships with 8-9, . 13 foreign arms enterprises. Denel Annual 61 These include the South African Police Service Report, 2002, op cit, pp 15, 36-68. By 2003 and Department of Correctional Services. Denel was less specific in its claims and its annual Armscor Annual Report, op cit, pp 18-19. report did not offer a specific number of foreign 62 Armaments Corporation of South Africa, Limited associations. Act, 2003, Section 4. See also White Paper on 75 Most of the CSIR’s focus is on non-military Defence Related Industries, op cit, Chapter 3, issues, with current interests ranging from the paras 35, 36. environment to mining to building technology to 63 See Batchelor & Willett, op cit, pp 84-101 for a advanced cyber applications. For organisational description of this separation. The new 2003 leg- details, see . islation now has specifically empowered Armscor 76 Author’s interview with Andre Nepgen, director, to seek additional commercial opportunities so it Defencetek, 20 June 2003. could conceivably engage in future production 77 Batchelor & Willett, op cit, p 38. and more aggressively market its research and 78 Among its products are a state-of-the-art artillery testing resources to private sector actors. See fire control system and training simulators for Armaments Corporation of South Africa, Limited weapons, aircraft and vehicles. For additional Act, 2003, Section 4. details see . 64 For additional data, see 79 ListCompanies.asp>. 81 75% ownership is held by the UK-based multina- 65 This includes facilitation of arms exhibitions such tional Alvis plc, the remaining 25% by a South as the biennial African Aerospace and Defence African BEE investment firm. show. The next, in September 2004, will be 82 staged at Waterkloof Air Base just outside of 83 Author’s interviews with Paul J Gerber, June 2003 Pretoria. See and Armscor and June 2004. Annual Report, op cit, p 5, 84 . 85 One of its defence-related subsidiaries is partially 66 For detail, see Denel Annual Report, 2002, owned by the European aerospace multinational . See also Batchelor & Willett, EADS. op cit, pp. 84-101. 86 See and 67 Denel Annual Report, 2003, for a more comprehensive list- . ing and description. 68 Although Denel’s subsidiaries retain sophisticated 87 Botha, South Africa’s defence industry, op cit, p 12. production facilities, they also depend heavily on 88 See, inter alia, ; subcontracting from private sector producers. ; ; ; . contract for other defence industry consumers, 89 See, inter alia, ; continuing the private–public sector linkages that ; . evolved in the apartheid years. Ibid. 90 For additional detail, see . in 2003, with an 11-member executive committee 91 According to Botha, South African defence industry, 30 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

op cit, p 7, these are: the G-5 and G-6 artillery rect impact through investment by the seller in systems (to include ammunition and propulsion); the economy of the purchasing country. turrets and gun systems for ground combat vehi- 100 Batchelor & Dunne, op cit, pp 4-6. cles (including ammunition and propulsion); air- 101 Details for the NIP and DIP programmes are craft observation and sighting systems; air-ground drawn from D Botha, Offsetting the costs of SA’s tactical missile systems; laser range finders and strategic defence package, ISS Occasional Paper, 75, periscopes; mine-protected vehicles; missile July 2003, p 5, launch warning systems and low-cost radar warn- , ing receivers; health and utilisation monitoring and Heitman, unpublished draft, op cit, pp 80-83. systems for avionics; and electronic fuses for 102 This was the National Industrial Participation artillery and aerial bombs. Programme (NIPP). Botha, Offsetting the costs, op 92 These include manufacture of airframe sections cit, p 1. Botha notes that Armscor actually had and aircraft gearboxes, aircraft engine mainte- required counter-trade offsets since 1989, though nance, aircraft upgrading and weapons integration presumably as a more informal industry-to-indus- (to include the systems engineering and project try arrangement. management) and general systems engineering, 103 Ibid. project management, upgrading and recondition- 104 It is designed to promote defence industry jobs, ing of military equipment. Ibid, pp 7-8. capabilities and marketing opportunities. 93 Alvis OMC, for instance, has sold multi-role Management of the DIPP is a joint responsibility environmentally protected vehicles to several of the Department of Trade and Industry and the police departments in the US. Author’s interview Department of Defence. Ibid, pp 3-5. with Brigadier Tony Savides (South African 105 R A Bitzinger, Towards a brave new arms industry?, Army, retired), director of International IISS Adelphi Paper, 356, Oxford University Press, Marketing, Alvis OMC, 18 June 2003. New York, 2003, p 46. 94 Its advantages were not so much the brilliant 106 Botha, Offsetting the costs, op cit, p 9. technological advances of the individual compo- 107 These were Brazil, Canada, the Czech Republic, nents—gun tube and chassis, fire control, base- Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, bleed extended range ammunition or warhead Sweden and the UK. Conspicuous by its absence lethality—but the synergy of having the best of in the list was the US. Relations on issues of arms each in one highly compatible system. The entire trade between the US and South Africa were poi- package was so good that 20 years after first field- soned in the mid 1990s. This stemmed from the ing, with product improvement, it still is as US indictment in 1991 of Armscor (later includ- advanced in its intended role as any equivalent ing Denel) and Fuchs for conspiring to evade US system on the market. export control laws in the apartheid era. The 95 Based on the author’s interviews with mid-level criminal and civil cases were settled in 1997, but officials in Denel, Grintek and Alvis OMC in full relationships and privileges were not restored mid 2003. As an example, while the author was until 2004. Details provided by Johan van touring the Alvis OMC plant near Johannesburg Rensburg, commercial specialist with the US in June 2003, he was shown a prototype com- Commercial Service, Johannesburg, 4 June 2004. mand vehicle being built for US special opera- 108 Heitman, unpublished draft, op cit, p 93. tions forces in Iraq. 109 Botha, Offsetting the costs, op cit; Cabinet Decision 96 This is illustrated in the G-6 self-propelled gun. on Strategic Defence Procurement, 15 September Here, by way of example, the South Africans 2000, . (Denel), ammunition by Naschem (Denel), a 110 These will be the JAS –39 Gripen manufactured chassis and propulsion system by Alvis OMC, a by a BAe/Saab Consortium in Sweden. The origi- fire control system by ADS and (conceivably) a nal package included 48 of these aircraft, but the remotely piloted vehicle for targeting furnished number subsequently was scaled back to 28. by Denel or ATE, all in one seamless package. Delivery of these aircraft was scheduled for 2007- 97 Botha, South African defence industry, op cit, p 7. 2011. Flight trials for the first South African 98 For the rich and growing literature on this topic, Gripen in Sweden are scheduled for 2005, with see, inter alia, Offsets information website, subsequent South African flight tests and equip- (maintained by ment certification in 2006. Ibid, p 5; see also the University of Plymouth, UK); S Martin (ed), . The economics of offsets, Amsterdam, 1996; and G 111 This is the BAe Hawk. A total of 24 was ordered T Hammond, Countertrade, offsets and barter: An with delivery scheduled for 2005-2009. Botha, international political economy, Pinter Publishers, Offsetting the costs, op cit, p 5. London, 1990. 112 These are the Agusta-Bell A-109. A total of 30 99 Offset agreements have appeared in an array of would be acquired. The first several were to be different forms including joint production by assembled in Italy, the rest in South Africa by seller and purchaser, licensed production in the Denel. Ibid, personal communication with purchaser’s country, or even seeking a more indi- Helmoed Heitman, 12 June 2004. Feature 31

113 Ibid. These are Meko A200 ships manufactured 118 Ibid. Botha points out that this represents fully by the German Frigate Consortium. See also 40% of the $14 billion NIPP commitments, a remarkable accomplishment after only three years and (10 November since the contracts were signed. 2003). Four were ordered. The first (SAS 119 Ibid, pp 5-6. Amatola) was delivered in November 2003 120 Ibid, pp 6-7. These subcontracts alone are worth although none of the corvettes will be fully oper- more than $200 million for South African pro- ational until 2007. ducers. 114 Three were ordered. These are Type 209 1400 121 Interviews with Reginald Ngwenya, 21 June 2004; manufactured by Ferrostaal in Germany. Botha, Alan Holloway, 21 June 2004; and Paul J Gerber, Offsetting the costs, op cit, p 5. 21 June 2004. 115 For a useful overview, see D Botha, The arms 122 See Batchelor & Willett, op cit, pp 146-150 for deal controversy, African Security Review 12(3), details. The export approvals are vetted in a tiered 2003, pp 99-103. structure headed by the National Conventional 116 Including, among others, Minister of Defence Joe Arms Control Committee (NCACC). Modise, deputy ministers Ronnie Kasrils and 123 Interviews with Reginald Ngwenya, 21 June 2004; Max Sisulu, Department of Defence Arms Alan Holloway, 21 June 2004; and Paul J Gerber, Procurement Chief Shamin (Chippy) Shaik 21 June 2004; interview with Gavin Cawthra, (whose brother directed one of the beneficiary 23 June 2004; interview with Helmoed Heitman, companies in South Africa) and even the govern- 25 June 2004. ing ANC parliamentary party whip Tony Yengeni, 124 Author’s interview with Johan van Rensburg, resulting in his arrest in 2001. By 2003, charges 23 June 2004. were swirling around South African Deputy 125 This is not only true of the non-white communi- President Jacob Zuma, resulting in the arrest of ty. A prominent (white) South African business- his financial advisor. SADC report Modiso’s man recently argued in a prominent media forum dynamic drawn into SA arms scandal, Financial that “the children of today’s captains of com- Times (Cape Town), 6 April 2001; SA politics: merce and industry have no future in South Ambassadors quizzed over arms procurement Africa unless in our second decade of democracy, kick-back claims, Financial Times, Information white sharing is at least equal to black forgiveness Southscan Global News Wire, 15 November in the first.” M Lambert (CEO, Massmart), 1999. See also Botha, The arms deal controversy, Whites must offer fair share, Sunday Times op cit, pp 102-103. Business Times, 7 March 2004, p 3. 117 The Saab/BAe contracts alone were characterised as providing “proportionately … the largest offset clause in defence industry history”. Botha puts these sums in perspective by noting that 1999 South African spending on defence capital was a mere $225 million. Botha, Offsetting the costs, op cit, p 5. FEATURE

MICRO-DISARMAMENT IN WEST AFRICA The ECOWAS Moratorium on small arms and light weapons

ALHAJI MS BAH

This article explores the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons1 in the West African sub-region and efforts by the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to deal with the problem through the ECOWAS Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa. The paper analy- ses the degree of compliance with the Moratorium by four ECOWAS member states, namely, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Mali.

Introduction The outbreak of violent civil conflict in Liberia in December 1989 and in Sierra Leone Of the approximately 500 million illicit in March 1991 marked the beginning of a weapons in circulation worldwide, it is estimat- change to the political and security configura- ed that 100 million of those are in sub-Saharan tion of the sub-region. In addition, these con- Africa, with eight to ten million concentrated flicts have had the combined effect of sucking 2 in the West African sub-region alone. in millions of illicit small arms, making the According to the United Nations (UN): Mano River Basin (comprising Guinea, Sierra Small arms and light weapons destabilise Leone, Liberia and, by extension, Côte regions; spark, fuel and prolong con- d’Ivoire) an attractive and profitable theatre flicts; obstruct relief programmes; under- for illicit arms merchants, mercenaries and mine peace initiatives; exacerbate other non-state actors. The small arms scourge human rights abuses; hamper develop- in West Africa—especially in the Mano River ment; and foster a culture of violence. conflict triangle—is compounded by the easy However, unlike nuclear, chemical and accessibility of natural resources such as rub- biological weapons, there are no interna- ber, timber and, most importantly, diamonds. tional treaties or other legal instruments This has effectively meant that weapons can for dealing with these weapons, which be bartered for these resources, thereby sus- States and also individual legal owners taining the decade-long wars in Liberia and rely on for their defence needs.3 Sierra Leone.

ALHAJI MS BAH is a senior researcher in the Peace Missions Programme at the ISS 34 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

Furthermore, the conflicts have led to the proliferation of illicit small arms pose to massive flow of refugees and internally dis- human security, ECOWAS under the steward- placed persons, both within and outside of ship of Mali—which had undertaken success- the respective borders. The need to combat ful peace negotiations with Touareg security threats posed by the large movement rebels—adopted a Moratorium on the of refugees across the region’s porous borders Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of was one of the reasons advanced by the Small Arms and Light Weapons in West ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group Africa. Adopted by the 21st Session of the (ECOMOG) troop-contributing states for Authority of Heads of State and Government their intervention in Liberia in August 1990. of ECOWAS on 30 October 1998, the In addition to the potential security risk that Moratorium was for a three year period, it creates, large-scale movement of refugees renewable at the end of that period.5 The has placed tremendous stress on the often Moratorium is an unprecedented move by a weak infrastructure in recipient states. For sub-regional organisation such as ECOWAS, instance, the fragile infrastructure in Guinea— and has since its adoption received interna- which had the unenviable challenge of host- tional approval both by governments and ing refugees from Sierra Leone and international organisations. Inspired by the Liberia—has been stretched to breaking point. ECOWAS initiative, the continental The large presence of refugees has also seen a Organisation of African Unity (re-christened soaring rise in violent cross-border criminal the African Union in July 2002) adopted a activity, followed by a proportionate increase common African position on the proliferation in xenophobic sentiments towards foreigners— of small arms and light weapons, commonly mostly refugees fleeing conflicts in their home referred to as the Bamako Declaration.6 countries. Due to weak border controls in the The adoption of the ECOWAS sub-region, it is now commonly accepted that Moratorium is a significant step in addressing some refugees (often former combatants) have the problem of illicit small arms proliferation smuggled weapons into refugee camps. This and general disarmament in the sub-region. It development has led to an alarming increase lays the foundation for the development of a in gun-related criminal activities in the region-wide strategy on arms proliferation in refugee-recipient states. For instance, Ghana, a particular, and disarmament in general. The traditionally peaceful country, experienced an preamble to the Moratorium captured the upsurge in gun-related crimes, believed to be destabilising effect of small arms, stating that perpetrated by refugees from the Mano River “… the proliferation of light weapons consti- conflict triangle, with some level of domestic tutes a destabilising factor for ECOWAS collaboration.4 Member States and a threat to the peace and From the above it could therefore be seen security of our people.” 7 Consequently, the that the unchecked proliferation of illicit broad aim of the Moratorium is to create an weapons constitutes a serious challenge to environment conducive to socio-economic human security in West Africa. Since civilians development in the sub-region. However, its are the primary victims of small arms–related most immediate task is to curb the influx of violence both during and after conflict, curb- weapons through various channels into West ing illicit weapons proliferation would con- Africa. tribute to the protection of civilians. A weapons-free society is therefore an important step towards ensuring the protection of civil- Review of compliance with the ians during conflict, and long after the con- Moratorium flict is over. The analysis focuses on articles 4, 9, 13 and 7 of the Moratorium, which deal with the cre- Background to the Moratorium ation of national commissions, exemptions, In recognition of the serious danger that the collection and destruction programmes, and Feature 35 the harmonisation of legislation respectively. • sensitisation of the public on the need to The essay focuses on specific national initia- hand in to the police illegally held tives by Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and weapons; Mali, in line with the provisions of the • update of arms registers and transmission ECOWAS Moratorium. The choice of the to the ECOWAS Secretariat; four countries is informed by the following: • provision of appropriate recommendations first, Ghana, though a traditionally peaceful to the ECOWAS Secretariat on exemp- country, faces a serious problem with illicit tions to be granted to the Moratorium for small arms. Second, despite the fact that weapons covered by the agreement; Nigeria is not embroiled in a civil war, the • resource mobilisation for programme country—perhaps due to its large population expenditures; and protracted military rule—plays host to a • liaison on a permanent basis with ECOW- disproportionate number of illicit weapons AS and the Programme for Co-ordination circulating in the sub-region. Third, Sierra for Assistance on Security and Leone, which has recently emerged from a Development (PCASED)9 secretariats on ten-year civil war, is littered with tens of thou- issues relevant to the Moratorium, as well sands of illicit weapons—posing a serious chal- as issues regarding the proliferation of lenge to sustainable peace and security in that small arms in general; and country. And fourth, Mali played, and contin- • initiation and development of mechanisms ues to play, a central role in the development for exchange of information and experi- of a regional strategy that culminated in the ence with the other Natcoms.10 Moratorium agreement. The analysis will, how- Although the guidelines leave the decision of ever, also draw attention to some national ini- the composition of the respective Natcoms to tiatives by other ECOWAS member states. member states, it was resolved that they We turn now to analysing specific provi- should at the very least include strategic min- sions of the Moratorium with a view to high- istries such as foreign affairs, internal/interior lighting the level of compliance or affairs and security, defence and justice, as non-compliance by the select member states. well as representatives of civil society organi- sations (CSOs) (see Figure 1, page 36).11 Article 4: National commissions At national level, the establishment of Natcoms is perhaps the single most important Article 4 of the Code of Conduct states that: institutional requirement for the effective In order to promote and ensure co-ordi- implementation of the Moratorium. By nation of concrete measures for effective August 2003, Natcoms or their equivalents implementation of the Moratorium at had been established in 14 of the 15 ECOW- the national level, Member States shall AS member states.12 The Mali Natcom was establish National Commissions, made established in 1996 before the adoption of the up of representatives of the relevant Moratorium and served as the model for authorities and civil society. The Natcoms in other ECOWAS member states. ECOWAS Executive Secretariat shall Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone established prepare guidelines to assist the Member national focal points in 2000, 2001 and 2002 States in the establishment of their respectively. The establishment of Natcoms in National Commissions.8 Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone all required National commissions (Natcoms) are meant special legal procedures and the approval of to serve as the hub around which national and their national assemblies. This is in contrast regional initiatives will revolve. Their main with the francophone member states where functions are: Natcoms can be established by a presidential • formulation of strategies, policies and pro- decree. However, the excessive power of heads grammes against the proliferation of small of state or government in the francophone arms; countries poses serious questions regarding 36 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

Figure 1: Full-time and part-time membership of national commissions

Source: PCASED/ECOWAS Guidelines on NatComs, Bamako, March 2001 the political neutrality and effectiveness of and confiscated 5,100 Red Star double barrel such bodies. gun cartridges.15 As stipulated in the ECOWAS guidelines, Natcoms and their equivalents meet on an all Natcoms or their equivalent should consist annual basis to review their activities and of representatives not only from government exchange ideas on successes and challenges in but also from CSOs. The inclusion of civil their countries. This annual meeting is impor- society in Natcoms is a significant develop- tant because it serves as a stocktaking exercise ment since it marks a radical departure from that will ensure the continued engagement of the hitherto exclusive state-centric approach national governments with the implementa- to dealing with issues of integration in West tion of the Moratorium. Natcoms serve as Africa. Since the illicit proliferation of small important linkages in the implementation of arms is a serious cross-border issue, it is impor- the Moratorium. Furthermore, Natcoms are tant to involve local organisations in the fight seen as critical support mechanisms to the against weapons proliferation. The long and ECOWAS Early Warning Observation porous borders of countries in the region bureaus located in Monrovia, Cotonou, allow for the easy movement of illicit Banjul and Ouagadougou. They are expected weapons through illegal border crossing to provide their views on requests by member points. For instance, it is estimated that there states for exemptions from the Moratorium to are well over 200 illegal border crossing points import arms for legitimate national security or between Nigeria and its western neighbour for international commitments such as peace- Benin.13 Between November 1995 and keeping.16 January 1999, police and customs officials in One of the major challenges to the estab- Nigeria and Benin seized at least 3,500 assault lishment of functional Natcoms is the rivalry rifles, 80,000 rounds of ammunition and 200 between key government departments for revolvers from smuggling syndicates operating their control such as foreign affairs, defence across that country’s land border.14 In a sepa- and interior. Such rivalries have often delayed rate incident in August 2002, a joint the establishment of Natcoms. In addition to Nigeria–Benin border patrol arrested a man competition for control by government Feature 37 departments, tension exists between govern- coincide with the UN Small Arms Destruction ments and CSOs. Since small arms are a secu- Day—thus their activities revolve around cere- rity issue, government officials—especially monial dates. One can thus make the argument security forces such as the police and mili- that the problem of small arms is yet to be fully tary—are hesitant to have civilians in a domain internalised by some ECOWAS member states. that was hitherto under their exclusive con- Some of the states see the small arms issue as trol. an opportunity to dance on the international Security in nearly all countries in the sub- diplomatic stage by carrying out ceremonial region is still viewed from the traditional state- arms-burning exercises. centric approach. A clear manifestation of this trend is the fact that Natcoms in nearly all the Article 9: Exemptions French-speaking states, as well as in Nigeria and Sierra Leone, are headed by military or In order to allow member states to import police officers or located within the ministry weapons to meet legitimate national security of defence. This development is perhaps needs and international commitments such as explained by the significant presence of mili- peacekeeping, article 9 of the Code of tary-turned-civilian heads of state in many of Conduct spells out the procedure for member the countries in the sub-region.17 states wishing to import weapons that are cov- In addition to rivalry between government ered by the Moratorium. It states that mem- departments, there is a perceived lack of polit- bers may seek an exemption from the ical will by some ECOWAS member states in Moratorium for these purposes. All requests the implementation of the Moratorium. for exemptions should be forwarded to the Despite the fact that Natcoms have been Executive Secretariat, which would assess established in nearly all the countries, most of them against criteria developed with the tech- these committees are not functional. For nical assistance of PCASED. Upon receipt of instance, Natcoms or their equivalents exist in the application for exemption: Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Cape Verde, Sierra The Executive Secretariat should circu- Leone, Benin, Burkina Faso, The Gambia and late the request to all Member States. Niger; however, they lack the human and Provided there are no objections, the financial resources to be fully functional and Secretariat will issue a certificate con- operationally effective. The creation of non- firming Member States’ assent. The cer- statutory bodies such as the National tificate should accompany the export Committee on Small Arms in Nigeria, instead license application, together with other of Natcoms (as prescribed by the Code of documentation on end-use as required Conduct) deprives it of an operational budg- by arms-exporting states. Should a mem- et, thereby reducing its efficacy. In addition, ber state object, the request for exemp- most staff of Natcoms across the sub-region are tion will be referred to the ECOWAS also full-time employees in other government Mediation and Security Council.19 departments; as a result, they see their role in Furthermore, the article addresses the issue the Natcoms as secondary. Their part-time sta- of permits for single-weapon ownership either tus, coupled with their lack of technical under- for hunting or sporting purposes. It states that standing of issues relating to arms proliferation all applications for such exemptions should be and disarmament, weakens the operations of processed by Natcoms and recommended to Natcoms. In Ghana, which is the current chair the ECOWAS Secretariat for approval.20 of ECOWAS, there is in principle a Natcom, Guidelines for the issuance of such permits but it is not functional. As of June 2003 the are to be developed by the Executive Ghana Natcom had no designated office space Secretariat, with technical support from and no operational budget.18 It is important to PCASED. point out that most of the activities of Nine of the 15 ECOWAS member states Natcoms across the sub-region are timed to applied for exemptions in 2001–2002, and the 38 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

ECOWAS Secretariat issued 30 such exemp- … the end-user certificates that were tions (see Table 1). used to divert weapons to Liberia in vio- lation of the arms embargo were all from Table 1: Exemptions granted since the ECOWAS member states … some adoption of the Moratorium in member states also seem to violate the October 1998 Moratorium by importing arms without requesting waivers … .21 Country 2001 2002 Total In a separate report the Panel pointed out Benin - 5 1 that: Côte d’Ivoire - 9 9 … there are a number of accounts of The Gambia - 1 1 trucks carrying weapons from Côte Ghana 1 3 4 d’Ivoire into Liberia in 2001 and 2001. Mali 1 - 1 These trucks either brought weapons from Niger - - San Pedro or Abidjan or originated from Burkina Faso, according to eyewitness Nigeria 4 3 7 accounts. Refugees from Lofa County Senegal 2 1 3 reported that two Burkinabe trucks loaded Sierra Leone 5 2 7 with weapons had been surprised in 22 Source: Consultant’s report of the evaluation study Vionjama by Liberian dissidents. of the ECOWAS Moratorium, October 2002; Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea-Conakry have also and Focus on small arms in West Africa, 4, May been named for arming the anti-Taylor 2003. group—Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). It was alleged that The application for exemptions by some LURD uses members in both countries as member states indicates a degree of compli- conduits for weapons supplies, and in some ance with an important aspect of the cases receives weapons directly from the Moratorium. This level of compliance, authorities in those countries. For example, in though minimal, reflects the importance one incident mentioned in the report, the UN attached to the process of developing a mech- Panel was shown a batch of arms that were anism to deal with weapons proliferation in captured by the Liberian army from LURD, West Africa. Thus, given the correct political including 81 mm mortar rounds showing a environment, coupled with political will, the marking of the United Arab Emirates (UAE)— Moratorium can be an effective strategy for a country that is known to supply military disarmament in the sub-region. hardware to Guinea-Conakry. Following the In spite of the above-mentioned applica- Panel’s request for an explanation, the gov- tions for exemptions, there have been allega- ernment of the UAE confirmed that the tions of violations of the Moratorium by some weapons were part of a military assistance ECOWAS member states. For instance, the package to Guinea. However, the Ministry of UN Panel of Experts on Liberia highlighted Defence in Guinea denied knowledge of the serious violations of the UN arms embargo on transfer of any weaponry to LURD, arguing Liberia. The Panel noted that between June and that the mortar rounds it had received from September 2002, 210.5 tonnes of weapons were the UAE were destroyed during a fire in one delivered to Liberia in violation of both the of the arms depots of the Guinean armed UN arms embargo and the ECOWAS forces in 2001.23 Moratorium. The Panel noted that the arms However, the Panel noted that: were purchased with end-user certificates issued The LURD rebels do not occupy any by ECOWAS member states. area to which significant deliveries by The report singled out Côte d’Ivoire, The cargo aircraft would be possible, and Gambia, Togo and Burkina Faso as the cul- they do not have access to the sea. A prits. It stated that: presence of LURD has been noted in Feature 39

Conakry, in Macenta (Guinea) and in captured by UN Research Centre for Peace Danane in Western Côte d’Ivoire but and Disarmament in Africa (UNRCPDA) even deliveries by road from those Director Ivor Richard Fung: places would be impossible without If countries in Africa are to have a passing several frontier crossings that are chance of realising sustainable socio-eco- guarded by either Guinean or Ivorian nomic development, they must first col- border guards.24 lect and destroy excess weapons not Thus, political differences between respective wanted at peace time and curb the flow leaders in the sub-region not only complicate and proliferation of small arms. Whilst the plethora of conflicts that have gripped light weapons remain in circulation, the West Africa in the last decade of the 20th cen- potential for conflicts erupting or resum- tury, but further impede the implementation ing will remain very high.27 of regional initiatives such as the Moratorium. If not destroyed, excess weapons in govern- Guinea’s support for LURD rebels is direct- ment armouries are likely to enter the illicit ly linked to that country’s response to weapons market and exacerbate the conflict attempts by Charles Taylor to destabilise it by cycle in the region. Article 13 of the Code of supporting Guinean dissidents operating in Conduct therefore calls for the “collection, Liberia. On the other hand, Burkina Faso and registration and destruction of all weapons, Côte d’Ivoire (until recently)25 were the back- ammunition and components covered by the ers and mentors of Charles Taylor since he Moratorium …”. The collection and destruc- launched his insurgency against Samuel Doe tion programme will focus on: in 1989. Consequently, political rivalries and • surplus to national security requirements— support for dissident groups operating within as with the exemptions, the determination their borders undermine regional efforts at of arms that are ‘surplus to national securi- curbing the illicit proliferation of small arms. ty requirements’ remains essentially the It should be pointed out that most of the prerogative of the member state; weapons imports that have constituted viola- • seizures from illegal possession; and tions of the Moratorium come from countries • weapons and ammunitions collected fol- of the former Soviet Union and Eastern lowing peace accords and upon comple- Europe. The UN Panel named Ukraine, tion of peace operations.28 Slovakia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Bulgaria Since the now-famous ‘Flame of Peace’ in as violators of the UN arms embargo and of the northern Malian city of Timbucktu, mark- the ECOWAS Moratorium by supplying ing the end of hostilities in that country, sev- weapons to Liberia.26 eral countries in the sub-region have carried It is evident from the above analysis that out ceremonial arms destruction programmes. the implementation of the Moratorium is From 1996 to 2002 six member states, four hampered by political differences between of those emerging from conflict (Mali, member states. Liberia, Sierra Leone and Niger) and two sta- ble ones (Ghana and Nigeria), have all destroyed varying quantities of weapons (see Article 13: Arms collection and Table 2) either as an indication of the end of destruction programmes hostilities or in compliance with article 13 of The presence of illicit weapons constitutes a the Code of Conduct. major threat to human security in the sub- Most of the weapons destroyed during region. Consequently, reducing and eventual- these ceremonies were small arms and light ly eliminating illicit weapons from the weapons and corresponding ammunitions. In sub-region is seen as a sine qua non for socio- Niger, Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone, the economic development in West Africa. The weapons destroyed were collected during the link between socio-economic development disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and a stable weapons-free environment was and reintegration (DDRR) programmes fol- 40 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 lowing the end of conflict in these countries. sonal safety. However, when the new firearms In Nigeria and Ghana, the weapons destroyed legislation comes into force all licensed were those confiscated by the security forces weapons that were confiscated during the cor- or weapons surrendered in response to don and search operation will be returned to amnesty programmes. their lawful owners, provided they qualify under the new legislation.29 Table 2: Ceremonial arms destruction Following the conclusion of the CACD programme the government of Sierra Leone, in West Africa, 1996–2002 in collaboration with the United Nations Country 1996–99 2000 2001 2002 Development Programme (UNDP) and Ghana 8,000 CSOs, embarked on a Community Arms Collection for Development programme. In Liberia 19,000 this phase the government of Sierra Leone, Mali 3,000 530 500 the UNDP and other stakeholders used the Niger 1,243 200 100 ‘carrot’ approach to encourage the collection Nigeria 1,581 and destruction of arms left over from the Sierra Leone 2,000 country’s DDRR programme. This pro- gramme focused on four pilot chiefdoms in Source: PCASED annual programme report, the northern, southern and eastern provinces 2001–2002. of Sierra Leone. Each of the identified chief- doms would present a project proposal related As part of its DDRR programme launched to community development. After the chief- in 2000, the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) dom had been declared arms-free following a embarked on a Community Arms Collection voluntary arms collection programme, the and Destruction (CACD) programme to mop sum of $20,000 would be handed over to the up excess weapons. Through this programme chiefdom development council for the imple- the SLP undertook cordon and search opera- mentation of the proposed development proj- tions, which led to the recovery and subse- ect. It is important to note that the quent destruction of large quantities of development project is conceived by the weapons. The SLP worked closely with com- Chiefdom Recovery Committee (CDC), with munity leaders in locating weapons left over the UNDP and other stakeholders only com- from the country’s DDRR programme. The ing in as partners in implementing the project. SLP adopted the carrot-and-stick approach in The ‘arms for development initiative’ was a its attempts to collect arms used in the coun- practical approach to micro-disarmament in try’s violent civil conflict. In carrying out its post-conflict societies. At the end of each pro- cordon and search operations, the SLP gramme a special ceremony was held at which invoked the country’s firearms legislation the paramount chief and his/her CRC were (though outdated), which makes it illegal for awarded with an arms-free certificate along civilians to possess unlicensed weapons (dis- with $20,000, provided by the UNDP. It cussed later). During the operation, the SLP should also be pointed out that unlike the granted eight weeks’ amnesty to all civilians SLP’s CACD programme, this strategy possessing weapons (licensed or not) to hand emphasises the link between security and devel- them over at designated weapons collection opment. For instance, community leaders and sites. At the expiration of the amnesty anyone members are reminded that the presence of found with a weapon (licensed or not) would small arms drives away investment, both local be in violation of the country’s arms regula- and international, the flow of which is crucial tions. As part of the drive to review the out- for the country’s post-conflict reconstruction dated firearms legislation, the government process.30 This programme, initially focused decided to freeze all licences for the posses- on four pilot chiefdoms, will now be replicat- sion of firearms, either for hunting or for per- ed nation-wide. In addition, plans are under Feature 41 way to undertake a sub-regional project exchange views on the state of illicit small arms involving countries in the Mano River in Ghana. Prior to this initiative there was no Basin.31 From 30 November 2001 to 19 March line of communication between traditional 2002, the CACD programme had collected gunsmiths and the police. Instead, the two 9,237 arms (mostly small arms) and a total of sides had a rather unfriendly relationship, with 34,035 ammunitions and explosives of all the police often accusing gunsmiths of aggra- types. vating the problem of gun-related criminal In Ghana, the New Patriotic Party granted activities and other inter-ethnic rivalries. amnesty to all persons in possession of unli- Dialogue between law enforcement agencies censed firearms. The amnesty, which lasted for and gunsmiths is an important strategy in a period of six months in 2001, was targeted at Ghana’s attempt to deal with illicit weapons former government functionaries, among oth- proliferation, in line with the Moratorium.35 ers, who were believed to have large quantities of weapons acquired during the military Article 7: Review and harmonisation regime from 1979 to 1992. The amnesty received a favourable response as former gov- of legislation and administrative ernment officials and cadres of the measures Committees for Defence of the Revolution, One of the enduring consequences of colo- established during the years of military rule, nialism is the emergence of different legal responded to the amnesty and surrendered frameworks reflecting the legal systems of the nearly 2,000 weapons in their possession. former colonial powers—Britain, France and Most of the surrendered weapons were Portugal. The diverse cultural background of destroyed in commemoration of the UN peoples in the sub-region also accounts for Small Arms Day in July 2002.32 differences in customary law, which affects the Having used the ‘carrot’ approach, the nature of firearms legislation across the sub- Ghana police embarked on a weapons region. For instance, since hunting is a major retrieval programme. Using information pro- economic preoccupation of some ethnic vided by the population, the Ghana police groups in West Africa, the development of a should embark on a cordon and search opera- regional framework to deal with the posses- tion; however, the police acknowledge the sion of firearms should start with a review of daunting task of tracking unlicensed arms, domestic laws regulating the possession and especially in the hands of former government use of firearms in all member states. functionaries and cadres.33 It is in recognition of this need that article Local gunsmiths have also established cot- 7 of the Code of Conduct calls on members tage industries across the sub-region producing to “harmonise and adopt the regulatory and large quantities of firearms, sometimes through administrative measures necessary for exercis- the process of ‘reverse engineering’.34 Although ing control of cross-border transaction with the Moratorium does not address locally pro- regard to light weapons, components and duced arms, in 2003 CSOs such as African ammunition relating to them”.36 It calls for Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR) initi- the training of law and order, immigration, ated a programme to organise these artisans licencing, customs, water resources and into an association as a first step towards open- forestry officials in the effective implementa- ing dialogue between the government and local tion of domestic firearms legislation. In this gunsmiths. At present there is an association of respect member states, with assistance from gunsmiths that meets once a month to discuss PCASED and other partners including civil their operations and how they can collaborate society, will: with law enforcement agencies in addressing • review, update and harmonise national leg- the challenge of proliferation. This is a signifi- islation and regulations on light weapons cant initiative because it provides an opportu- bearing on civilian possession, use and nity for the police and gunsmiths to meet and transfer; 42 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

• apply legal instruments, such as export and the effective implementation of the import permits and end-user certificates; Moratorium.40 The review process involved and key government ministries and a strong net- • harmonise different national legislation work of CSOs in both countries. CSOs play a with a view to developing a regional con- crucial role in the implementation of the vention on light weapons that would relate Moratorium.41 Their activities have ranged to control and reduction, as well as to from advocacy, research, documentation and humanitarian law issues.37 capacity building to lobbying national gov- The harmonisation of legislation is aimed at ernments to implement key provisions of the producing a comprehensive regional conven- Moratorium. Although some ECOWAS tion that will reflect the new aspects of collec- member states have started the process of tive security in the sub-region and the reviewing their national firearms legislations, enhancement of security in general. Current the objective of harmonising laws at regional legislation regulating the possession of level still has a long way to go before it is firearms in nearly all member states does not realised. reflect the contemporary security landscape in The training of security forces is an impor- the sub-region. tant step in the process of reviewing and har- For instance, in Sierra Leone there is no monising firearms regulation. The aim of the single firearms law, but rather two ordinances training programme is to strengthen the established by the British colonial powers. capacity of the security forces in the modern The Arms and Ammunitions Ordinance 1955 methods of arms control. In this vein, No. 14 and the Explosive Ordinance 1955 ECOWAS, PCASED and the UN Regional No. 15 were accepted by the post-independ- Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa ent government but were never passed as laws. (UNCPDA) based in Lomé, Togo will develop They were merely added to the laws of Sierra a curriculum that will serve as a training man- Leone and have since served as the framework ual. The training will focus on three objec- through which civilian possession and use of tives: firearms was regulated.38 Ghana’s current arms • Sensitising armed and security forces to the legislation consists of laws from 1962, aspects problem of the proliferation of light of which were revised in 1972 and more weapons in West Africa. recently in 1993. Even with the relatively • Strengthening their capacity in modern recent reviews, compared to Sierra Leone, the techniques of control of arms and ammu- regulations are still considered to be out of nition, as well as better enforcement of the tune with current developments within Ghana laws and regulations in force within the and across West Africa.39 However, in sub-region. response to the Moratorium, both Sierra •Developing modern techniques of mainte- Leone and Ghana have initiated reviews of nance of law and order; methods of col- their domestic firearms legislation to reflect lecting small arms, dealing with drug the current security realities within their bor- trafficking and cross-border crimes, effec- ders and across the sub-region. In addition, tive ways of maintaining national weapons the governments of Mali, Guinea-Bissau, arsenals; and the DDR of combatants into Guinea-Conakry and Cape Verde have civil society.42 requested assistance from PCASED to review Following the adoption of this pedagogic doc- existing laws in their countries. In response to ument, ECOWAS and PCASED have under- the request, PCASED in June and September taken regional training-of-trainers (TOT) 2001 assisted the Malian government and the workshops involving more than 300 senior government of Guinea-Conakry through their national security officers drawn from the Natcoms to review their laws, statutory instru- member states. The first TOT workshop was ments and administrative procedures, taking held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, from 13–18 into consideration peculiarities and need for August 2001, bringing together security offi- Feature 43 cers from the Third Early Warning tional dates such as the UN Small Arms Observation Zone.43 The second zonal TOT Destruction Day, member states are merely held in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire from 15–20 playing to the gallery of international diplo- October 2001, was conducted for officers macy. The problem of small arms is not fully from the Second Observation Group. It was, internalised by all member states—there is however, agreed at the Freetown meeting that more awareness and effort at combating the strict adherence to the zonal observation proliferation of small arms in countries that bureaus was not ideal for the purposes of the are emerging from conflict. This is, however, training workshops. Officers from Benin, not the case in countries such as Nigeria and Togo and Guinea-Conakry therefore also par- Ghana, which, though relatively stable, ticipated in the Abidjan workshop.44 By the nonetheless play host to large stocks of illicit end of October 2002, the final TOTs for coun- small arms. In addition, there are no mecha- tries in Zone 1 and Zone 4 had been held. nisms in place to deal with member states that Training at the zonal bureau level has now violate the Moratorium. been decentralised to the level of individual In spite of the apparent challenges to the member states through their Natcoms. The implementation of the Moratorium, it is per- Natcoms of Senegal, Niger, Nigeria, Mali and haps one of the boldest steps taken by Burkina Faso have embarked on training pro- ECOWAS to deal with the enormous chal- grammes in their countries. The aim of the lenge posed by illicit weapons proliferation. national training programmes is to allow “local security forces to benefit from the most Policy recommendations current knowledge and the procedures for the maintenance of peace and the fight against In order to deal effectively with the prolifera- proliferation”.45 tion of illicit small arms, the following is rec- ommended: •The ECOWAS Moratorium should be Conclusion transformed into a convention, thereby There is recognition that the proliferation of making it legally binding on all member illicit weapons in West Africa constitutes a states. This would not only oblige member major challenge to human security. The fact states to implement the protocol but would that small arms have been the weapons of strengthen ECOWAS in dealing with choice for all sides involved in conflict in the unscrupulous middlemen/women and region has led to the development of a region- other ‘spoilers’. In addition, it would help to al strategy by ECOWAS to deal with the prob- speed up the process of harmonising lem of proliferation—the adoption of the firearms legislation in the sub-region. Moratorium in October 1998 marked the cul- • Since small arms constitute a major threat mination of such efforts. Since its adoption to human security in West Africa, efforts the degree of compliance has varied, as is should be made to build a strong link highlighted through our specific analysis of between the illicit trade in weapons and the articles 4, 9, 13 and 7. legal trade. This would compel the major The analysis indicates a concerted effort at arms producers to comply with the national, bilateral and regional levels to deal Moratorium by controlling the flow of with the small arms menace in the sub-region. weapons from their countries. Thus, build- However, a major pitfall of the Moratorium is ing an effective link between the two would its lack of legal status. Its implementation is lead to a convergence of interest between therefore dependent on the goodwill of mem- arms-producing and recipient countries— ber states—hence the slow progress in setting consequently addressing both the demand up national structures such as Natcoms, as set and supply side of the small arms equation. out in the Code of Conduct. By timing •ECOWAS needs to establish a fully staffed national initiatives to coincide with interna- department on small arms at its Secretariat. 44 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

Given the magnitude of the small arms chal- Document A/52/298, 5 November 1997, pp 11- lenge in West Africa, the current arrange- 12. The UN defines light weapons as heavy machine-guns, hand-held and mounted grenade ment—with a PCASED liaison officer launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable seconded to the Secretariat—is not adequate anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers to deal effectively with the enormous illicit of anti-tank missiles and rocket systems, portable weapons challenge. The establishment of launchers of anti-missile systems and mortars of such a unit would add to the required sense caliber 100 mm. It defines small arms as revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles, and light of urgency and enhance co-ordination machine guns. among member states. 2For details see . Of 49 major conflicts in enforcing the Moratorium there is a com- the 1990s, 47 were waged with small arms as the weapons of choice. Small arms are responsible for pelling need to develop strong links over half-a-million deaths a year, including between the police services in the sub- 300,000 in armed conflict and 200,000 more region. Valuable lessons could be learned from homicides and suicides. Based on these fig- from the South African Regional Police ures, one can argue that in conflict zones across Chiefs’ Organisation, which to date has the developing world and in sub-Saharan Africa in particular, small arms are the real ‘weapons of worked effectively with the Southern mass destruction’ because they pose the greatest African Development Community in its threat to human security. Unfortunately, there is efforts to control illicit weapons prolifera- minimal international action to deal with the tion. danger posed by the illicit proliferation of weapons compared to efforts in dealing with •The ECOWAS early warning mechanism nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. should include a strong peer review mecha- 3Ibid. nism that could serve as a check on politi- 4Personal interview with police superintendent, cians in the sub-region. In the absence of a Accra, Ghana, 12 July 2003. 5 See ECOWAS Declaration of a Moratorium on viable carrot-and-stick approach, the peer the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture review mechanism should adopt a policy of of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa, ‘naming and shaming’, to ensure compli- 31 October 1998. The adoption of the ECOWAS ance by member states. Moratorium, the first of its kind anywhere in the • In addition, ECOWAS should increase the world, is a significant step in attempts by ECOWAS at developing a region-wide strategy number of early warning observation on arms proliferation and disarmament. In addi- bureaus from its current number of four to tion, the Moratorium is viewed as an arm of what at least ten. This would maximise the visi- the author has argued elsewhere as the emerging bility and effectiveness of implementing the security architecture in the sub-region—this is reflected in attempts to link the implementation Moratorium. of the Moratorium with the Protocol on Conflict •ECOWAS should develop and strengthen Prevention, Management, Peacekeeping and its links with civil society across West Africa. Security adopted in 1999 and the supplementary Developing such a link would encourage Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. participation by ordinary citizens in the Note that the Moratorium was renewed on 1 November 2001 for another three-year period. integration process, thereby making region- 6 See Bamako Declaration on an African Common al programmes such as the Moratorium Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation more representative. For their part, CSOs and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light need to acquaint themselves with ECOW- Weapons, Bamako, Mali, 30 November–1 December 2000. AS policies and programmes so that they 7 See ECOWAS Declaration of a Moratorium, op can make a meaningful contribution to the cit, p 1. integration process. 8ECOWAS Code of Conduct, p 3. 9For detailed information on PCASED, see the ECOWAS Plan of Action for the Notes Implementation of the Programme for Co-ordi- nation and Assistance for Security and 1For a definition of small arms and light weapons Development (PCASED), Bamako, Mali, March see, General and complete disarmament: Small 1999. PCASED was established with the support arms, note by the secretary-general, UN of the UNDP. The aim of the programme is to Feature 45

assist the ECOWAS Secretariat and member Eyadema of Togo and Blaise Compaore of states in the implementation of the Moratorium Burkina Faso—are seriously questioned. and to extend it to other regions of Africa. 18 Personal interview with chair, Ghana National Support from PCASED is supposed to strength- Commission on Small Arms, Accra, 23 June en the capacity of member states in the areas of 2003. security and disarmament, which are vital for the 19 Code of Conduct, op cit, pp 4–5. region’s development. However, at the time of 20 Ibid, p 5. writing, plans are under way for the creation of an 21 For details see, Report of the Panel of Experts on ECOWAS Small Arms Programme (ECOSAP) Liberia S/2002/1115, UN headquarters, New that will consist of a Small Arms Unit to be locat- York, 25 October, 2002, pp 25–26, ed at the ECOWAS Secretariat, and an opera- . Note that there is a UN arms tional unit to be located in Bamako. PCASED embargo on Liberia imposed by Security Council will be replaced by the newly created operational Resolution S/Res/788, 1992. The embargo was unit in Bamako. imposed on the National Patriotic Front of 10 See Decision A/DEC13/12/99 Establishing of Liberia for its continued attacks on ECOMOG National Commissions for the Control of the peacekeeping forces and its support to Proliferation and Illicit Circulation of Light Revolutionary United Front rebels in Sierra Weapons, Lomé, Togo, 10 December 1999. Leone. The arms embargo is still in force. 11 See, Guidelines on the Establishment and 22 Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia to the Functioning of National Commissions Against Security Council 1343, S/2002/1015, UN head- the Proliferation of Small Arms, ECOWAS/ quarters, New York, 26 October 2001, p 65. PCASED, Secretariat, Bamako/Abuja, March 23 See Panel Report S/2002/1115, op cit, p 23. 2001. 24 Ibid. 12 Natcoms or their equivalent exist in Benin, 25 The Ivorian supply line to Charles Taylor was cut Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The off following the outbreak of violent civil conflict Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, in Côte d’Ivoire in 2000. Some of the insurgents Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. involved in the conflict, which has effectively Note that war-torn Liberia is the only country divided that country in two, were believed to be that failed to set up a Natcom or its equivalent. It supported by Charles Taylor before his resigna- is hoped, however, that Charles Taylor’s depar- tion as president of Liberia in August 2003—such ture from the Liberian political scene would allegations and suspicions strained the relation- remove obstacles to setting up a Natcom there. ship between the two former allied states. In addi- 13 Personal interview with senior research fellow, tion, Burkina Faso—which has also been accused National War College, Abuja, 8 August 2003. As by the Ivorian authorities of supporting rebel sol- a result of heightened cross-border criminal activ- diers (a good number of whom are descendants ity, the Nigerian government closed its land bor- of Burkinabe migrant laborers) in northern Côte der with Benin for more than three days in the d’Ivoire—has also been preoccupied with issues second week of August 2003. The land border surrounding that conflict, thereby reducing its was only re-opened after a meeting between the support to Charles Taylor. heads of state of the two countries. 26 Panel Report S/2002/1115, op cit, p 24. 14 A-F Musah, The sorrows of war – Small arms, 27 Cited in B Herbert, War-battered Liberia burns conflict and poverty in West Africa, Democracy the bridges to War, African Peace Bulletin 24, and Development 2(3), September–December, October/November/December, 1999, p 9. 1999, p 13. 28 See Code of Conduct, op cit, p 6. 15 For more information see, Police intercept 29 Personal interviews with: police superintendent, ammunition at Seme Border, Focus on small arms police headquarters, Freetown, 10 June 2003; sen- in West Africa 3, November 2002, p 4. ior secretary, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 16 See A Multi-Kamara, PCASED fourth advisory Freetown, 12 June 2003. New firearms legislation group meeting, report of the acting director, has been drafted by the legal department of the Bamako, Mali, 1–3 November, 2001, p 10. SLP with support from the UNDP. However, the 17 Personal interviews with: police superintendent, new legislation is still in its draft stage as the gov- police headquarters, Freetown, 10 June 2003; sen- ernment is stalling on going forward with it. ior lecturer, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, 30 Personal interview with UNDP director of the 12 August 2003; senior programme officer, Community Arms Collection for Development PCASED, Bamako, 16 August 2003; chair, Programme, Freetown, 11 June 2003; Final report, Ghana National Commission on Small Arms, Community Arms Collection and Development Accra, 23 June 2003. Military-turned-civilian Programme, Government of Sierra Leone & heads of state are in power in five ECOWAS UNDP, June 2003. states—namely: Guinea-Conakry, The Gambia, 31 For details on the sub-regional project see, Project Burkina Faso, Niger and Togo—while the demo- document, Mano River Union Arms for cratic credentials of some heads of states—such as Development Programme, Freetown, Govern- presidents Lansana Conte of Guinea, Gnassingbe ment of Sierra Leone & UNDP, 30 May 2003. 46 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

32 Personal interview with police superintendent, 43 As part of its attempt to establish an effective Accra. early warning system, ECOWAS has divided the 33 Ibid. region into four zones, with zonal bureaus head- 34 Through the process of ‘reverse engineering’, quartered in one of the member states in the local gunsmiths have been able to replicate origi- respective zones. Zone 1 consists of Cape Verde, nal automatic weapons such as the AK 47 rifle, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, with adding to the urgency to deal with the small arms headquarters in Banjul, The Gambia; Zone 2 con- menace in the region. sists of Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and 35 Personal interview with researcher, Africa Security Niger, with headquarters in Ouagadougou, Dialogue and Research, Accra, 18 June 2003. Burkina Faso; Zone 3 consists of Ghana, Guinea- 36 Code of Conduct, op cit, p 4. Conakry, Liberia and Sierra Leone, with head- 37 See PCASED Plan of Action, op cit, p 11. quarters in Monrovia, Liberia; and Zone 4 Member states are encouraged to draw parallels consists of Benin, Nigeria and Togo, with head- with similar initiatives such as the Declaration of quarters in Cotonou, Benin. Geographic proxim- Principles in the context of firearms control and ity, ease of communication and language were trans-national organised crime; the European some of the key variables used in the zoning Union Programme on Preventing and process. The four zonal observation bureaus Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional report directly to the Early Warning Unit at the Arms (1997); the Organisation of American ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria. To date States (OAS) Inter-American Convention against three of the zonal observation bureaus— the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Cotonou, Banjul and Ouagadougou—have been Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other established. The establishment of the Monrovia Related Materials (1997); and the 1997 Ottawa bureau was impeded by the ousted Liberian pres- Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, ident, Charles Taylor. However, it is hoped that Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- his departure will pave the way for the establish- Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. ment of the Monrovia bureau. 38 Final report, Community Arms Collection for 44 N Obasi, Small arms proliferation and disarmament Development Programme, op cit, p 2. in West Africa – Progress and prospect of the ECOW- 39 Personal interview with police superintendent, AS Moratorium, Adophyl Productions, Abuja, Accra. 2002, p 158. 40 Multi-Kamara, op cit, p 19. 45 PCASED annual report, op cit, p 11. 41 The West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA) established in May 2002, with head- quarters in Accra, Ghana. The network consists of over 45 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from all 15 ECOWAS member states. WAANSA has since signed a Memorandum of Understanding with PCASED, identifying key areas of co-operation. In addition, national net- works such as the Ghana Action Network on Small Arms (GHANSA) and the Sierra Leone Action Network on Small Arms (SLANSA), con- sisting largely of NGOs, have been formed in most ECOWAS member states. 42 For details see, West Africa – Disarmament on the move, PCASED Annual Report 2001-2002, Bamako, Mali; and Code of Conduct, op cit, p 5. Note that PCASED, in collaboration with other partners, has developed a curriculum—Training- of-trainers for armed and security forces on the control of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in West Africa, PCASED, Bamako, 2000. The adoption of this training programme makes West Africa the first region in the world to adopt such a pedagogic instrument for training- of-trainers in the control of small arms. See also B Herbert, ECOWAS adopts curriculum to con- trol the flow of small arms, The West African Bulleting 8, December 2000, p 39. AFRICA WATCH

PEACE IN SUDAN Who will pay the price of principle?

RICHARD CORNWELL

When, in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004, greatest humanitarian crisis in the world today.” representatives of the Government of Sudan Other terms have also been used to awaken the (GoS) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation interest and anger of a susceptible public, some- Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed the final times in the hope that this might provoke piece of a framework agreement on a settlement intervention from national governments or to a civil conflict that had cost the country international bodies. Such words as “scorched more than 2 million lives since it began in earth”, “genocide” and its modern euphemism 1983, there was a distinct wariness in the public “ethnic cleansing” were commonly invoked, response. To some extent this was because this often to paradoxical effect as the diplomatic outcome had been so long in coming, and so community deflected its energies into debates often delayed, that there were fewer illusions about whether the particular instances of mass about the work still to be done in filling in the murder, rape and arson in Darfur were accu- framework’s details. At best there would be a rately, or even legally, defined by such expres- pre-interim period of six months, to be fol- sions. Not surprisingly, the resulting arguments lowed by an interim period of six years before generated rather more heat than light, and did the essence of the Accord was put to the test, little to succour the victims of the atrocities and southerners allowed to choose between they reflected. continued inclusion in a federal Sudan or seces- The latest, and worst, “Darfurian Troubles” sion as an independent state. began in February 2003, when the Darfur There was another reason, too. It was begin- Liberation Front, which soon renamed itself the ning to dawn on most observers that the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), launched a Naivasha achievement, however hard-won, had series of attacks against government positions, ignored several pertinent issues which remained announcing that it was fighting to end the unresolved and either actually or potentially region’s marginalisation and neglect by the deadly to the Sudanese people. The most authorities in Khartoum. In so doing the SLA prominent reminder of this could be summed claimed to be following the example of other up in the name of a region of the country: regional insurrections, most notably that of the Darfur. SPLN/A, whose efforts over the past twenty Two years ago there were few people not inti- years finally had attracted sufficient interna- mately concerned with Sudanese affairs who tional attention and support to induce the could have pointed out France-sized Darfur on Sudanese government to the negotiating table the map. That is no longer the case, now that in Kenya, where a peace deal was still being media attention has been focussed on events crafted, section by section. The SLA was con- there, encapsulated in the description “the cerned that the international community RICHARD CORNWELL is senior research fellow in the African Security Analysis Programme at the ISS 50 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 would consider an eventual deal between the or arming these militia, but the evidence gave GoS and the SPLA sufficient solution to the the lie to this attempted subterfuge, especially country’s internal conflicts, and determined to as aerial bombardment frequently preceded the remedy any such misperception. devastation of the janjaweed cavalry. Hundreds The SLA was soon joined by another group, of thousands of Darfurians sought refuge from calling itself the Justice and Equality the onslaught, some as internally displaced per- Movement (JEM), some of whose leaders had sons, others as refugees in neighbouring Chad. previously been associated with Hassan el- Internationally there was great reluctance to Turabi, sometime intellectual guide to the add Darfur to the list of issues delaying the Muslim Brotherhood and the National Islamic pending peace agreement between “North” and Front (NIF) regime that had seized power in “South”. This offered relief to the GoS, which 1989. He had fallen from grace with Khartoum faced potential rebellion from other disaffected in 1999, following an unsuccessful power strug- areas of the North. The concessions required to gle with President Omar el-Bashir, but retained conclude an accord with the SPLA were oner- a popular following, especially among the stu- ous enough to have caused severe internal dis- dent body. His influence was much feared by a putes within Khartoum. To have opened the Khartoum political elite whose material inter- door to a debate about the relationship ests were suspected by some to have supersed- between the central authority and the margin- ed their spiritual ones. The emergence of the alised peoples throughout the country would JEM was further cause for concern that a have been tantamount to political suicide for provincial conflict might prove difficult to iso- the narrowly based NIF regime. late from rivalries at the centre. Though the GoS had generally resisted any Khartoum attempted briefly to dismiss the foreign interference in what it insisted were its SLA and JEM as mere bandits — another man- sovereign affairs, it initially welcomed the ifestation of one of Darfur’s perennial prob- efforts of the Chadian government to mediate lems. This interpretation was soon discredited the Darfur crisis. Khartoum had enjoyed good by rebel military victories severely embarrassing relations with Chad’s President Déby since to the military authorities. Uncertain of the 1990, when he had launched his own success- reliability of its Darfur garrisons, Khartoum ful insurrection against Hissene Habre from took recourse to the mobilisation of mounted Darfur in 1990. Déby’s somewhat clumsy militias, drawn principally from the nomadic diplomatic interventions were useful to the peoples of the region. Tensions between GoS not only in providing an ambiguous basis nomads and sedentary farmers and pastoralists for a ceasefire agreement which compromised had been a recurring feature in the modern his- the rebel position and caused a split among its tory of Darfur, but had been kept under con- leadership, but in affording some cover to trol by traditional methods of conflict those international players eager to see a com- resolution until the 1970s. By then administra- pletion of the North-South peace process that tive changes with implications for land and pas- could be passed off as a success. As events turage rights, the encroachment of the desert, developed, of course, Chad’s role in Darfur and a number of years of severe drought had became more compromised, in that forces hos- undermined the fragile ecological and political tile to Déby began to feature among the pro- balance of the region, precipitating outbursts of government militias, raids to occur across the conflict made bloodier by the easy availability countries’ common border, and the Chadian of automatic weapons. military became restive, with some elements The word janjaweed now entered the inter- offering material assistance to the Darfurian national vocabulary, denoting a mounted mili- rebels. There were even rumours of coup plots tiaman who was far more likely to target the among the soldiers in N’Djamena and other families, crops and livestock of sedentary farm- towns. To some extent these problems were all ers than to engage in fighting armed rebels. moderated by the movement of a small but Khartoum denied involvement in mobilising potent French force to the eastern Chadian Africa Watch 51 town of Abeche, which afforded Deby protec- in the UN Security Council could safely be tion against border forays of whatever prove- warded off by the intervention of Sudan’s nance, while simultaneously visibly placing friends there, and whatever the Secretary- Paris’s marker in the region. General and other senior members of his staff To a degree, Chad’s role is now eclipsed by might say about humanitarian catastrophe and the intervention of the African Union, which even genocide, this was unlikely to result in hosted talks between the GoS and the rebels, concerted action that would seriously discom- and placed a small force of military observers fort Khartoum. into the troubled region. For its part, Beyond all this, there was a private realisa- Khartoum probably calculated that the AU tion in many UN circles that the ability of the force was too small and limited in its opera- GoS effectively to disarm their auxiliaries in tional capabilities to constitute a major embar- Darfur was limited. Certainly air and ground rassment, particularly once the most support to the so-called janjaweed might be cur- destructive part of the militias’ operations had tailed, but much of the effective damage had been completed. For domestic reasons as well been done, and the international community as the need to avoid alienating the Arab states, would find it extremely difficult to return to the Chairperson of the AU, Nigeria’s President their devastated lands the hundreds of thou- Obasanjo, was also unlikely to advocate a sands of people displaced by a scorched earth course of action robust enough to suggest policy. In effect, unless the course of events was alignment with the policies of a US govern- changed dramatically by external intervention, ment pilloried locally as anti-Islamic. the chance of which seemed extremely remote, The rubric of “African solutions”, in the any political settlement to the Darfur conflict form of AU intervention, also suited those would occur largely on ground of Khartoum’s international players who saw no point in choosing. The welfare and security of the dis- antagonising Khartoum needlessly. The placed might well end up hostage to a measure Naivasha agreement, with all its flaws, had of political protection for the ruling elite in been long in coming, and might pave the way Khartoum. for lucrative cooperation with a moderately How all this will play out as the Naivasha realigned GoS, from whom more political and peace process with the SPLA moves into its economic concessions could then be sought. next stage, filling out the details and imple- On this view, that AU intervention, diplomat- mentation of the framework agreements, ic or military, was hardly likely to contribute to remains to be seen. Certainly there will be few a radical change of the situation in Darfur was neutral observers who will have many illusions of little consequence, except to the Darfurians. about the essential cynicism of the GoS after its In the meantime, the AU could take satisfac- performance in Darfur. Indeed, there are many tion from being seen to act, and the interna- who maintain that Khartoum’s rulers have yet tional community at large could use this to abide by the terms of any political agree- modest intervention as an alibi for its own will- ment they have made since independence in ing impotence. 1956. Washington waxed eloquent on the horrors It should be borne in mind, however, that of the humanitarian situation in Darfur, but although the Naivasha agreement broadly rep- although the dominance of the moral high resents the domestic and international power ground offered a minor distraction from the balances pertaining at the time of its conclu- US-led coalition’s embarrassments in Iraq and sion, shifts in these balances are to be expected; Afghanistan, Khartoum was aware that both in the natural course of events uncon- Washington had invested too much in the nected with the peace deal, and as the influence Naivasha peace process to jeopardise long-term of that deal are felt. These shifts will not always policy aims in a region to which it was reluctant be anticipated or intended by those parties to commit ground forces even in a peacekeep- most directly affected. ing role. Any significant US-sponsored motion The principals to the framework agreement, 52 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 whatever their public posture, were obviously This, in turn, raises the issue of how the concerned at Naivasha to secure their own priv- principal beneficiaries of the peace agreement ileged position in any future dispensation. The attempt to persuade possible allies of the open framework agreements effectively sealed the nature of their ultimate intentions – whether domination of the current regime in Khartoum towards democratic opening, or the confirma- for the immediate future. After all, a guarantee tion of the Islamic (or Arab) nature of a united of six years in power would allow most regimes state. the opportunity to arrange the domestic politi- How the current GoS and the SPLA move cal and economic environment to their advan- over the next few months will be telling, tage, entrenching patronage and internal though not decisive, in this regard. Whether security networks. This would be particularly either party will be able to retain the initiative true if the end of the fighting opened the way it seeks to assert, singly or jointly, will be inter- for foreign investment and further oil explo- esting to observe. Should they sense that they ration and exploitation. As for the SPLM/A, are failing to do so, will they be able to divert, the agreement implicitly recognised its political delay or abort the process altogether, or will the hegemony in the south and gave it a significant regional and international powers retain claim on influence at the centre, again, without enough interest and influence to dissuade them having to test its support among the popula- from doing so? tion at large. One of the principal problems As the victims of the Darfur conflict could facing its leader, Dr John Garang, over the next attest, the Naivasha peace process is both six years would be to persuade the majority of flawed and incomplete. For better or worse, southerners that their interests could be best however, it appears to be what the world will served in the context of a united “democratic” have to work with for now. Peace accords are Sudan. This would give him an important bar- rarely equitable, often merely delimiting the gaining chip in his future relations with field for the next conflict. But perhaps, in the Khartoum, though his initial difficulties will light of the chilling use of that term in Central centre on the problem of creating a viable state Europe a little over sixty years ago, we are bet- structure in the neglected south. ter advised to steer clear of a “final solution”. There remains the question of the degree to which non-participant parties to Naivasha can now be convinced that the agreement may pave the way to a more open and inclusive dis- pensation. AFRICA WATCH

ESTABLISHING A NEW ARMY FOR THE DRC: UPDATE ON THE FARDC

HENRI BOSHOFF

Despite the signature of comprehensive agree- ident are yet to sign on the proposed bill. ments after rounds of protracted negotiations, Similar to several key unresolved issues per- restoring order in the Democratic Republic of taining to the transition, military integration Congo (DRC) has proven to be a slow and seems to be plagued by competing agendas incomplete process. The eastern provinces of within the transitional government and a crit- North and South Kivu and the Ituri District in ical lack of confidence and trust between for- Province Orientale in the north-east are still sub- mer belligerents. In addition, and of major ject to sporadic outbreaks of fighting. In fact, concern to the transitional government, fund- Ituri remains largely under the control of rival ing for the military reform process (estimated militias, although a strengthened United at approximately $547 million solely for the Nations (UN) peacekeeping force is gradually formation of a new army) has not been forth- restoring security there. coming. Furthermore, the UN Mission in the The government is also struggling to estab- Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC’s) lish proper control of areas previously under impact on the current situation is at best lim- rebel administration, while civilians in many ited: there is no doubt that the large-scale parts of the country still face hardship in the demonstrations against MONUC in major form of chronic shortages of food, water and cities of the DRC in early July—which fol- other basic needs. The International lowed the sharp deterioration of the security Committee to Accompany the Transition situation in the east of the country—have (CIAT) has expressed concern with what it diminished the organisation’s clout. calls “delays in implementation of the transi- The main objective of the draft law referred tion programmes and by the political tensions to above is the establishment of a Congolese and obstacles observed of late”. National Army, the Forces Armées de la Nevertheless, while a number of initial République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). steps towards reconstructing (some would say, According to the proposed law, while the creating) an integrated Congolese National Head of State holds the function of supreme Army were taken, this critical component of commander of the FARDC, he must consult the transition’s agenda is proceeding in a with the Higher Defence Council (HDC), the painfully slow manner. In this sense, while a government, the National Assembly and the draft law on Defence and the Armed Forces Senate before taking key decisions such as was approved by the Council of Ministers in declaring war or a state of emergency. January 2004 and by the National Assembly at Nevertheless, the HDC is yet to meet. the end of June 2004, the Senate and the pres- Outside the HDC framework, and at bilat- HENRI BOSHOFF is a military analyst in the African Security Analysis Programme at the ISS 54 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 eral level, the Belgium government and the mobile orientation centres. At the orientation Congolese Ministry of Defence have devel- centres, these elements will be registered and oped a plan for military reintegration and briefed on demobilisation and the eligibility demobilisation, disarmament and reintegra- criteria for joining the integrated military tion (DDR). A second draft of this national structures. Those who choose to remain in the DDR plan indicates that there are currently military structures will be taken to one of the up to 330,000 combatants and that at least six centres de brassage for further screening, 200,000 need to be demobilised—current force where a decision will be taken as to their level estimates for a future FARDC are future assignments. approximately 130,000 men and women. While the funding associated with demo- The joint Belgian–Congolese planning bilisation and reintegration will be covered by group identified two options for military rein- the Multi-Donor Demobilisation and tegration and DDR. The first, a fast-paced Reintegration Programme of the World Bank, one, foresees the opening of 25 work still remains to finalise the operational quartering/orientation centres throughout the plans necessary to implement several aspects country, which would proceed with the iden- of the process. Operational details such as the tification and registration process of all com- timing and modalities for reintegration batants in approximately three months. The remain outstanding—in this regard, a South second, a longer-term plan, foresees the open- African National Defence Force task team is ing of only seven orientation centres in the currently helping the FARDC to set up the country as a whole, but will require one year IMS and work out the details of outstanding for the identification and registration process. operational plans. Following a South African Both plans followed conventional practice in delegation visit to Kinshasa over the period DDR programmes, including the quartering 5–9 June 2004 and a visit by FARDC officers and/or re-groupment of combatants in orien- to South Africa during the same month, a tation centres, as well as information and sen- bilateral agreement providing for South sitisation activities not only for former African support to the security sector reform combatants but for the civilian population in (SSR) process was signed. general. Nevertheless, as will be discussed The issue of SSR—specifically the DDR of below, the process as a whole is being held the different Congolese armed groups— back because the transitional government has remains one of the biggest threats to a suc- not yet been able to decide on the command cessful transition in the DRC. The urgent of the Integration Military Structure (IMS)— need for the establishment of the FARDC was the structure that will supervise demobilisa- again reinforced by renewed fighting in tion and reinsertion nationally (a commission Bukavu, where different armed groups still has been created for these purposes, the roam around under their own command-and- Commission Nationale de Démobilisation et control structures. The largely ad hoc deploy- Réinsertion, CONADER). ment of 10,000–15,000 FARDC soldiers from The transitional government approved the Kinshasa to fight General Nkunda’s break- National DDR Plan in late July 2004 and is away faction in the east made the situation now busy with the support of MONUC, worse rather than better. drawing up the operational details of the plan. As far as SSR issues are concerned, and tak- It is envisaged that disarmament and demo- ing into account bilateral agreements, bilisation will take place where the Congolese- MONUC has recently set up a Security formed units are already located or at Sector Reform Cell to coordinate all interna- locations close to the 11 static orientation tional efforts to support the integration of for- centres (three sites in Kinshasa, as well as sites mer combatants into the new Congolese in Kimbinga, Basankusu, Kisangani, Armed Forces. Yet, while coordination of Rumangabo, Shabunda, Kananga, Kamina international assistance is critical, the ability and Lubumbashi) or through one of the seven of MONUC to channel assistance to the SSR Africa Watch 55 process in an efficient and timely manner demands the swift approval by the Senate and the president of the draft law on Defence and the Armed Forces. All programmes currently developed for SSR (and within it DDR) may in fact be rendered useless if the government and other institutions of the transition fail to rectify the draft law, leaving a vacuum on crit- ical issues such as force levels and command structures of the new FARDC, the develop- ment of a national defence strategy and what criteria will ultimately be applied for reinte- gration into the new army. AFRICA WATCH

THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BURUNDI (ONUB) Overview

HENRI BOSHOFF

The United Nations Security Council • contributing to the dismantling of militias (UNSC) on 21 May 2004 unanimously adopt- as called for in the ceasefire agreements; ed Resolution 1545, authorising the deploy- • carrying out the disarmament and demobil- ment of a UN Operation in Burundi isation of combatants as part of the nation- (ONUB), acting under Chapter VI, for an ini- al programme of disarmament, demobi- tial period of six months. The mandate given lisation and reintegration (DDR); to ONUB was the result of a series of formal • monitoring the quartering of the Armed requests made by the president of Burundi Forces of Burundi (FAB), as well as the dis- and by the mediation team, led by South armament and demobilisation of elements Africa’s Deputy President Jacob Zuma, for that need to be disarmed and demobilised; transformation of the existing African Union • monitoring, to the extent possible, the ille- Mission in Burundi (AMIB) into a UN peace- gal flow of arms across the national borders, keeping operation. Following a multidiscipli- including Lake Tanganyika, in co-operation nary assessment mission to Burundi from with MONUC and, as appropriate, with the 16–27 February 2004, a favourable recommen- group of experts referred to in paragraph 10 dation was given to the UNSC for the of Resolution 1533; approval of a peacekeeping force for Burundi. • contributing to the creation of the necessary Similar to the approach taken with the UN security conditions for the provision of Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo humanitarian assistance, and facilitating the (MONUC), ONUB has been conceptualised voluntary return of refugees and internally as a fully fledged multifunctional mission and displaced persons; given responsibilities in areas which transcend • contributing to the successful completion of traditional peacekeeping activities. ONUB’s the electoral process stipulated in the mandate includes: Arusha Agreement, by ensuring a secure • ensuring respect of the ceasefire agreements environment for free, transparent and peace- through monitoring implementation and ful elections to take place; investigating violations; • protecting civilians under imminent threat • promoting the re-establishment of confi- of physical violence, without prejudice to dence between Burundian forces by moni- the responsibility of the transitional govern- toring and providing security at their ment of Burundi; pre-disarmament assembly sites, as well as • ensuring the protection, security and free- collecting and securing weapons and mili- dom of movement of UN personnel, facili- tary material as appropriate; ties, installations and equipment; HENRI BOSHOFF is a military analyst in the African Security Analysis Programme at the ISS 58 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

• co-ordinating and conducting, as appropri- ONUB to use all means necessary to carry out ate, mine action activities in support of its its mandate in areas where its armed units are mandate; deployed and in co-ordination with humani- • providing advice and assistance, within its tarian and development agencies present. capacity and subject to carrying out tasks In terms of force levels, ONUB will com- stipulated above, to the transitional govern- prise a military component of 5,650 including ment and authorities to contribute to their five infantry battalions, 200 military efforts; observers, 125 headquarters staff, aviation • monitoring Burundi’s borders, with special transport capability, a transport element, an attention to the flow of refugees, as well as engineering element, a maritime element, a movements of combatants (especially in the special forces component, a level 3 hospital Cibitoké Province); and, finally, a military police unit. It also • carrying out institutional reforms as well as includes an expected 120-strong civilian the constitution of the integrated national police component in addition to a civilian defence and internal security forces and, in component. While force generation for particular, the training and monitoring of ONUB has been delayed as member states the police, while ensuring that they are have been slow to respond, on 1 June 2004 democratic and fully respect human rights AMIB’s 2,612 troops were ‘re-hatted’ as and fundamental freedoms; ONUB troops, giving the mission its core • proceeding with electoral activities; force component. At present, ONUB has a • completing implementation of the reform total troop deployment of 3,312. of the judiciary and correctional system, in Of relevance as regards some of the region- accordance with the Arusha Agreement; al dimensions of the conflict in Burundi, the • ensuring, in close liaison with the Office of mission will exchange liaison officers with its the High Commissioner for Human Rights, sister mission in the DRC (MONUC), and the promotion and protection of human both missions will share information, particu- rights, with particular attention to women, larly relating to cross-border movements of children and vulnerable persons, and inves- armed groups, refugees and arms flows across tigating human rights violations; and national borders. Military observers will be • co-operating with the government and located along the border with Tanzania, espe- authorities of Burundi, as well as their inter- cially in Makamba, Ruyugi and Muyinga, national partners, in the extension of state where most returning refugees are expected to authority and administration throughout cross into Burundi. Depending on the securi- the territory, including civilian police and ty situation, a military observation team could judicial institutions. also be deployed in Cibitoké Province to Headed by a special representative of the UN monitor the cross-border movement of armed Secretary-General (SRSG), the operation groups.1 includes expertise in all areas required to facil- From its inception, ONUB’s most immedi- itate the implementation of the outstanding ate priority was to take over and reinforce the provisions of the Arusha Agreement. In this role performed by AMIB—in fact, after an ini- regard, the SRSG chairs the Implementation tial consolidation period in Bujumbura, Monitoring Committee and the Joint troops were deployed to strengthen former Ceasefire Commission, which report directly AMIB contingents. As the security situation to the force commander. The force headquar- improves, the force is expected to extend its ters of the mission will have a brigade struc- operations into the more sensitive area of ture, with its headquarters in Bujumbura and Cibitoké. As to the planned concept of oper- battalions operating in four areas of opera- ation, ONUB has deployed a battalion to tion—namely, Bubaza, Gitega, Makamba and Gitega and Bubanza; one company remains in Cibitoké—in addition to Bujumbura. Bujumbura and will build up to battalion Furthermore, the UNSC has authorised strength, being responsible for Bujumbura Commentary 59

Rural and Bururi. The mission has already special forces, military police, headquarters’ deployed more than 100 observers, in teams protection and engineering elements) will be of four to six personnel depending on task able to successfully execute the mission’s and location, in a total of 20 to 30 teams. planned concept of operations. Initially, the teams will support the DDR process, including at disarmament centres, Notes and will monitor the confinement to barracks of the FAB. 1 Extract from Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi, United Nations, New York, 16 March With the possibility of an election at the 2004. end of October 2004, it is crucial that ONUB be staffed to the full. Only a fully staffed ONUB (including the expected maritime, AFRICA WATCH

TRENDS AND MARKERS Recent data, statistics and indicators

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Africa

Countries Affected* Angola Chad Côte d’Ivoire Djibouti Ethiopia Eritrea Guinea Kenya Liberia Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Uganda The Great Lakes Region

*There are approximately 260,000 Angolans living as refugees in Congo-Brazzaville, DR Congo, Namibia and Zambia.

The Great Lakes Region

Location December 1996 June 1998 Burundi 296,000 670,000 Rwanda 1,179,000 550,000 Tanzania 759,000 329,000 DR Congo —- 50,000 Total 2,913,500 2,220,000

West Africa Region

Location December 1996 June 1998 Liberia 1,800,000 209,000 Sierra Leone 609,000 300,000 Côte d’Ivoire 305,000 140,000 Guinea 536,000 614,000 Total 3,250,000 1,263,000 62 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

Mines Retained for Training and Research (Article 3)

Of the current 141 States Parties, 64 retain over 289,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. The status of practice among States Parties in this area is depicted in the following chart:

Not retaining mines 39% Position not known 16%

Retaining fewer Retaining more than than 1,000 mines 10,000 mines 14% 4%

Retaining between 5,000 and 10,000 mines Retaining between 4% 1,000 and 5,000 mines 23%

Countries with landmine / UXO survivors Angola* Lesotho Somalia Botswana Liberia* South Africa** Burundi* Malawi* Sudan* Chad* Mauritania* Swaziland Congo-Brazaville Mozambique* Tanzania DR Congo* Namibia* Uganda* Djibouti* Niger Zambia Eritrea* Nigeria** Zimbabwe* Ethiopia* Rwanda* Somaliland* Guinea-Bissau* Senegal* Kenya* Sierra Leone

Bold – States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty Bold / Italics – Signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty Italics – areas not recognised as independent states * Country with new mine / UXO victims in 2000 – 2001 ** Country whose nationals have been injured during military operations, peacekeeping, demining operations, or other activities, while abroad either 2000 - 2001

Source: LANDMINE MONITOR FACT SHEET. Prepared by Human Rights Watch for the Ninth Meeting of the Intersessional Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction of the 1997 Miine Ban Treaty. Africa Watch 63

Stockpile Destruction (Article 4)

Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty obligates all State Parties to destroy their antipesonnel mine stockpiles, and all antipersonnel mines under their jurisdiction or control, no later than four years after entry-into-force of the treaty for each country. The status of destruction for State Parties is depicted below:

Declared not having Stockpiles 35% In the process of destroying Stockpiles 8%

Not officially declared the presence or absence of Stockpiles 11% Completed Stockpile destruction 40% Need to announce their plans 6%

Stockpile destruction deadline

Liberia 1 June 2004 Cote D’Ivoire 1 December 2004 Mauritania 1 January 2005 Sierra Leone 1 October 2005 Tanzania 1 May 2005 Guinea Bissau 1 November 2005 Eritrea 1 February 2006 Nigeria 1 March 2006 Algeria 1 April 2006 DR Congo 1 November 2006 Angola 1 January 2007 Central African Republic 1 May 2007 Burundi 1 April 2008 Sudan 1 April 2008

Source: LANDMINE MONITOR FACT SHEET. Prepared by Human Rights Watch for the Ninth Meeting of the Intersessional Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction of the 1997 Miine Ban Treaty. ESSAY

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

RAMESH THAKUR

Much has changed since the United Nations was established in 1945. New challenges confront the organization including global warming, global diseases and global terrorism. Responding to these challenges requires continual change, adaptation and learning – a hallmark of the stew- ardship of current UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. In 1997 Annan announced major struc- tural changes to streamline the organization, follow up five years later by another initiative to clarify, simplify and rationalize the organization and subsequent efforts to streamline UN peace- keeping. The UN has also forged new partnerships with civil society and the private sector. Important as these changes are, reform of the General Assembly and the Security Council hold the organization hostage to the vested interests of key member states. There are a number of options to make the Council more representative including regionalism, population distribu- tion, economic weight, culture/religion/civilization and democracy. Clearly the largest chal- lenge is the absence of representation for Asia, Africa and Latin America. Currently Germany, Japan, India and Brazil have strong claims - plus at least one candidate from Africa. Should these four countries decide to act in unison, they could force reform of the Security Council

Speaking in the General Assembly in If the organisation is in crisis, it is a crisis of September 2003, UN Secretary-General Kofi expectations. Annan remarked that the United Nations had Its Charter begins with the grand words, ‘We come to a fork in the road, a moment no less the peoples of the world’. The reality is that it decisive than when the organisation was functions as an organisation of, by and for founded in 1945. Yogi Berra’s advised us that member states. The great Soviet-era dissident when we find ourselves at a fork in the road, we Alexander Solzhenitsyn observed that, at the should take it. Given popular perceptions UN, the people of the world are served up to about the UN in parts of the world, the organ- the designs of governments. The United isation might well heed his advice. Nations needs to achieve a better balance And yet … A wag is said to have remarked between that ‘The interesting thing about Richard • the wish of the peoples and the will of gov- Wagner’s music is that it ain’t as bad as it ernments; sounds’. The same might be said of the United • the aspirations for a better world and its per- Nations: it is not quite as bad as often believed. formance in the real world; and

RAMESH THAKUR, Senior Vice-Rector, United Nations University, and Assistant Secretary-General, United Nations. This is a lecture delivered at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 18 November 2004 68 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

• the enduring political reality enveloping and warming, global diseases, and global terror- at times threatening to suffocate it and the ism. vision of an uplifting world that has inspired Reflecting the conviction that the use of generations of dreamers and idealists to work force under international auspices may some- for the betterment of humanity across cul- times be necessary, even in the cause of peace, tural, religious and political borders. chapter 7 of the UN Charter spells out many The United Nations is at once the symbol of provisions in relation to collective enforce- humanity’s collective aspirations to a better life ment. Yet one of the lessons of recent times is in a safer world for all, a forum for negotiating that the UN is not good at waging wars. By the terms of converting these collective aspira- contrast, the organisation has been especially tions into a common programme of action, good at a slow, steady and unremitting effort and the principal international instrument for to find political, economic, legal and institu- the realisation of the aspirations and the imple- tional alternatives to military force as a way of mentation of the plans. The organisation has to tackling problems of security as well as devel- strike a balance between realism and idealism, opment, good governance and environmental between the desirable and the possible. Its deci- protection. In popular parlance, the United sions must reflect current realities of military States may be from Mars but the UN is from and economic power. In a world in which there Venus. is only one universal international organisation The ambitious project of international but also only one superpower, the UN must institution building is far from complete. The tread a fine line so as to become neither irrele- system of collective security proved illusory vant to the security imperatives of the US nor from the start, and the procedures for resolv- a mere rubber stamp for US designs. ing disputes peacefully have also proven to be generally elusive. The major UN contribution The changing world context to peace and security during the Cold War took the form of consensual peacekeeping The world has changed profoundly and fun- operations. After the Cold War, this expanded damentally, in ways both good and bad, since to multidimensional peace operations to the birth of the United Nations after the reflect the more demanding complex human- Second World War. With the new realities and itarian emergencies. challenges have come corresponding new In the meantime, however, the human expectations for action and new standards of rights and human security agenda had greatly conduct in national and international affairs. expanded and in the 1990s were often Alongside a growth in the number of states, expressed in the form of the so-called chal- for example, there has occurred the rise of lenge of humanitarian intervention. civil society actors who have mediated Increasing use was also made of sanctions as state–citizen relations and brought a wide an instrument of international statecraft. range of new voices, perspectives, interests, Often, the developing countries found them- experiences and aspirations. Together, they selves scrambling to resist, typically in UN have added depth and texture to the increas- forums, the fast-changing norms of humani- ingly rich tapestry of international society and tarian action and compulsory disarmament, brought important institutional credibility even pre-emptive disarmament and regime and practical expertise to policy debates. change. At the same time, the rapid pace of Yearly we face the paradox of the major events placed increased demands on the challenges remaining constant, while many of creaking UN system and intensified the the contingencies demanding urgent and urgency of demands for changes in the work- immediate action are inherently unanticipat- ings, structures and policy responses of the ed and unpredictable. But we also face today organisation. some challenges that were not and could not have been foreseen in 1945, including global Essay 69

Internal United Nations reforms units often working together with partners from government, civil society and the pri- Thus the United Nations has to operate today vate sector. This places a premium on co- in a global environment that is vastly more ordination. challenging, complex and demanding than •There has been a serious disconnection the world of 1945 with respect to the norms, between the establishment of programme issues and challenges demanding urgent atten- priorities and the allocation of resources to tion; the actors in world affairs; and the struc- achieve common goals. Decisions on insti- tures in which their patterns of interaction are tutional priorities are being made in isola- embedded. The price of continued relevance tion from decisions on the use of scarce and survival of the UN is continual change, resources. adaptation and learning by the organisation. • Finally, the report looked at how to attract Set up to manage the world in the revolution- and keep the best people as UN staff. The ary conditions prevailing after a major world organisation has to be lean, but cannot be war, the organisation has had simultaneously mean. Cost-cutting should not be driven to reflect, regulate and respond to the chang- by ideological extremism to the point where ing circumstances around it. To be faithful to relentless shedding of ‘excess’ fat turns it the nations and peoples of the world who into ‘UN Lite’. have kept faith in it for six decades, the UN Efforts to emphasise reform as an ongoing must persevere in its efforts to consolidate process are also reflected in a number of exter- strengths, fill in the gaps, and eliminate waste- nal reviews, initiatives and developments. The ful habits and procedures. Brahimi Panel looked back on the half-centu- Under Kofi Annan’s stewardship, the UN ry’s experience of peacekeeping in order to has been receptive rather than resistant to bring it into line with the realities of the new reform. In 1997 Annan announced major century. In an externally commissioned report structural changes alongside budget and staff on the genocide in Rwanda, and through a cuts in order to streamline the unwieldy body. report of the Secretary-General himself on the In 2002 he unveiled the second stage of his fall of Srebrenica, the UN offered unprece- reform programme, calling for a shift away dented, candid and critical accounts of the from endless meetings and reports and a shortcomings in UN peacekeeping for public greater focus on the things that really matter debate and reflection. to the world’s people. The philosophy under- There have also been procedural improve- pinning the 2002 report, in which I had the ments in the workings of the Security privilege to be closely involved, can be Council, the General Assembly and the summed up in a few words: clarify, simplify, Economic, Social and Cultural Council rationalise, streamline and evaluate. There (ECOSOC), with greater transparency, wider were five principal messages in it. consultations, and a more focused and practi- • Staff have to be clear on what to do before cal treatment of strategic agenda items. The they can learn how to do it well. There is a 2002 Arab Human Development Report marked need to shed some accumulated responsi- a milestone in the UN, saying what needed to bilities that are no longer relevant in today’s be said with regard to good governance in a world in order to devote more focused key region. attention to urgent issues of the day. The To achieve its goals, the UN involves all UN has to simplify and rationalise its rules stakeholders and forges new partnerships with of procedure and processes in order to governments, the private sector and NGOs. reduce complexity, cut paperwork and time, The UN works closely with civil society and increase efficiency and cost-effective- organisations to combat disease, poverty and ness. Staff have to guard against becoming humanitarian disasters, and to build, consoli- captive to the tyranny of trivia. date and monitor norms. Another Annan •The UN system is dispersed across the achievement has been to make the UN much world, comprising a number of different 70 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 more welcoming towards the private sector. become battlegrounds for vested groups to The Global Compact provides the UN with a carry on ideological trench warfare by other framework of ten core principles, drawn from means. Of the two major summits held in human rights, labour and environmental stan- South Africa in recent memory, this was not dards, for involving the private sector in its true of the Johannesburg summit on sustain- various development goals. It has the poten- able development; it was true of the Durban tial to be an important instrument for instill- conference against racism. But the burden of ing civic virtue in the global marketplace. changing all this rests with governments, not the organisation. The reform of the United Reform as work in progress Nations is vital, but root-and-branch reform has been held hostage to the vested interests This does not mean that the organisation can of member states. rest on its laurels. It must not change reluc- tantly, adapting only grudgingly to the pres- Security Council reforms sure of circumstances. Rather, it must anticipate change, lead change, embrace There is widespread concern at how unrepre- change. The responses to date to calls for UN sentative the UN Security Council has action have been neither as prompt and effec- become. The UN membership has grown tive nor as uniform as they should be. The gap from 51 in 1945 to 191 today. The newer between the UN’s promise and performance members have typically been developing and remains unacceptably large. Few can be confi- ex-colonial countries who brought to the UN dent that the next group turning to the UN their own set of priorities and concerns and for protection will not be cruelly betrayed thereby altered the balance of the organisa- because the world body lacks the ability to tion’s work agenda. The Security Council has make critical decisions quickly, or the man- grown from 11 members in 1945 to 15 today. date and resources to act. Its permanent membership remains restricted For most people, the mention of UN to five: essentially a self-appointed oligarchy reform conjures up either one of two scenar- who wrote their own exalted status into the ios: reforming the structure, composition and Charter. procedures of the Security Council; or elimi- When challenged to demonstrate its rele- nating waste, inefficiency, bureaucratic rigidi- vance, senior officials point to the UN’s ty, costliness and so on associated with the uniqueness as the locus of legitimate interna- world organisation. tional authority. But its legitimacy is increas- Many are frustrated with the protracted, ingly clouded as it becomes less and less wasteful and counter-productive posturing in representative of the international communi- the General Assembly. The smaller states find ty, stuck in a time warp. And as its legitimacy the present processes too complex, protracted erodes, its capacity to regulate the behaviour and demanding, and altogether too formida- of member states diminishes. This would ble to be genuine participants and not merely become a still more debilitating weakness if ringside spectators. The frequent policy paral- the Security Council were to become more ysis in the two major political organs also active and assertive: those who no longer per- places a premium on the political role of the ceive the UN as an authentic voice of the Secretary-General. It is difficult, perhaps even international community would simply disre- impossible, for any one office to bear such a gard its edicts. heavy burden of global responsibility. Where For example, in Israeli eyes, the UN lacks the Security Council is united, the Secretary- legitimacy because of the history of obsessive General cannot possibly be an alternative and disproportionate focus on alleged Israeli focus of global dissent; where it is divided, he sins, inability to assure Israeli security when- cannot be an alternative rallying point for ever the nation has been under threat, and international action. Summit conferences failure to condemn atrocities by many other Essay 71 far more abusive regimes. And so, even when for example, when elected to the Security the World Court rightly judges the Council, act more as representatives of Asia- wall/fence/barrier being built on occupied Pacific than of ‘Western Europe’, to which Palestinian territory to be illegal, the General they are attached in the UN system of group- Assembly’s call for the court’s verdict to be ings. respected fails to sway Israeli opinion. The Council could be so composed as to The Security Council risks a similar loss of reflect population distributions, in which case legitimacy and a corresponding erosion of India’s claim to permanent membership effectiveness and efficacy if it fails once again would be greater than that of any other, save to implement significant structural and proce- China. Most people seem surprised when dural reforms. International stratification is informed or reminded that India’s population never rigid. States are upwardly and down- is bigger than that of all of Africa. wardly mobile. A static permanent member- A third possible meaning would be in ship of the Security Council undermines the terms of economic weight, the argument on logic of the status and diminishes the author- which Japan is included in most lists. That ity of the organisation. The central case for Japan bears a heavy financial burden in the Security Council reform must therefore rest UN system without permanent Security on making it more efficient and effective by Council membership amounts to taxation realigning its composition with contemporary without representation. realities – not historical nostalgia. Fourth, representation could refer to the The reform agenda is held hostage to a curi- need for the Council to reflect the major cul- ous oddity. While there is consensus on the tures, religions and civilisations of the world. need for reform in theory, the agreement There is, for example, no Islamic permanent breaks down as soon as any one particular for- member. Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria and mula or package is proposed. Once people see Pakistan become the major contenders on this the details of a concrete proposal, losers and criterion. This is an interesting way of looking opponents always seem to outnumber win- at it, for it helps to detach Pakistan from its ners and supporters. The urgency for reform is local rivalry with India and focus attention on now extreme. The work of the high-level Pakistan’s considerable assets and qualifica- panel, plus the dynamics of the international tions from an entirely novel yet, from a repre- political environment, has created a window sentational point of view, entirely appropriate of opportunity that, once closed, may not perspective. open again for some time. Hence the impor- But is there not a contradiction in advocat- tance of seizing the moment and closing a ing improved representation in the member- deal. ship of the Security Council if it leads to If we were to start afresh, what would the membership of countries which are them- Security Council look like? How can we make selves not representative democracies? One of the transition from what we have to what we the major reasons for Western disenchant- should have today? ment with the UN is the nature of the regimes that end up sitting in judgment on the great A representative Security Council issues of war and peace, as well as the human rights records of democratic governments. So One major explanation for the continuing a fifth possible meaning of representation stalemate on a new formula for Security would be to favour membership of represen- Council membership is that ‘representation’ tative democracies at the expense of others. can have many different meanings. The most common meaning given to rep- MPs represent the interests of their con- resentation is in terms of the different regions stituents. From this viewpoint, a country need of the world. Asia, the UN group that not be a member of a group in order to repre- accounts for more than half the world’s peo- sent its interests. Australia and New Zealand, ple in an organisation that supposedly sup- 72 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 ports human security and popular sovereignty European and Australasian countries are as well as national security and state sover- exemplars of good international citizenship. eignty, is vastly under-represented. Similarly, Their contributions make the UN system it is unconscionable that Africa and Latin work. They pay their dues on time and in full, America are not among the permanent mem- contribute diligently to peacekeeping opera- bers of the Security Council. tions, and in a myriad other ways work hard Or should the Council’s permanent mem- to keep the UN system ticking. bership, in terms of its original logic, reflect The world may have to address the ques- the military power of states? The problem tion of the unit of UN membership. If repre- with this is the ‘moral hazard’ of rewarding sentation is interpreted mainly in terms of militarisation. regional identity, it makes more sense to give Alternatively, should permanent member- given permanent membership to regional ship be a reward for or conditional on sizeable organisations like the African Union, the contributions to UN operations and activities: European Union, and the Organisation of representation on the frontline? American States. But what will happen then Against this, one could argue that Africa is to Asia, whose pursuit of regional identity the chief locale for the UN’s two great nor- remains an aspiration more than a reality? mative mandates of peace and security, and Leaked reports suggest that the High-Level development. Africans can contribute the Panel might recommend a re-jigged variation most to an informed debate of these two of such an idea, with longer and renewable issues based on direct experience, not book- veto-less terms for major countries in desig- based knowledge; Africans will have to live – nated regions.1 Sadly, in the real world of bit- and die – with the consequences of decisions ter regional rivalries and enmity, this could made and implemented; and therefore prove a pernicious formula for exacerbating Africans should have equal voice in the struc- existing tensions and conflicts in most tures and processes of decision-making in the regions. Just imagine India, Indonesia, Japan Security Council. and Pakistan – or Egypt, Nigeria and South It is also unfortunate that the permanent Africa – forever fighting it out for one addi- membership coincides with nuclear status. If tional ‘second-class (with non-renewable, two- one or more non-nuclear-weapon states were year terms being the third class) seat on the made permanent members, the status of great Security Council. power would effectively be divorced from the Whatever formula is adopted, the challenge possession of nuclear weapons. will be to combine the efficiency, representa- There is need also to provide a platform for tional and value-order arguments. Membership the views of NGOs and the private sector in of the Council must reflect current global the UN. They make up two important layers power relationships but not be so large as to of international civil society. Yet there is no make it an unwieldy executive body. official formula for their representation on the Security Council. While there has been great The lead contenders for permanent member- effort in recent years to give NGOs a voice in UN debates without giving them a vote in ship UN decisions, multinational corporations A campaign for permanent membership of remain disenfranchised in the UN. the Security Council cannot be based solely The United Nations, if it is to remain true on asserting a claim of entitlement. Instead, it to its soul, must be a place where ideas matter must combine a mix of arguments aimed at as much as realpolitik. On the criteria of per- persuading the UN community of the merits manent or continuing membership, an impor- of the case; a strategy for lobbying jointly with tant attribute ought to be good UN other leading candidates to forge a powerful citizenship. Yet this is a criterion that seems to winning coalition; and a strategy for identify- be totally ignored. Canada, Northern ing and neutralising potential opponents. Essay 73

Countries should be permanent members four leading candidates – yet to prove it can based on their representational credentials take a genuinely independent stance. It is seen and contributions of human, financial, mili- too often as simply echoing the US position tary and other resources to attaining UN on issues of international security, when goals. On these criteria, there is surprisingly Washington is already far too dominant in the broad agreement already on the leading can- UN system. We need to avoid the twin traps didates. of slavish obedience (which would collapse If the Security Council were to have anoth- the P5 or P10 into a P1) and instinctive oppo- er five permanent members, four are clear-cut: sition, which would ensure that it became the Germany, Japan, India and Brazil. The fifth Security Council of the permanently disunit- would likely be Egypt, Nigeria or South ed nations. Africa. (If somehow the Europeans could be Germany is Europe’s biggest and the convinced to accept permanent membership world’s third-largest economy. It has begun to for only two of Britain, France and Germany, play an increasingly active role in world then Africa could also have two.) affairs, is contributing more militarily, and Opposition comes from three groups: demonstrated the capacity to be independent those with a vested interest in the status quo, of Washington on the Iraq war. But Europe especially the permanent five; the regional already has two of the existing permanent rivals of each of the leading candidate coun- slots; does it really deserve three? tries; and a large group who would see their Brazil joins Germany and Japan in pressing status diminished still further with the growth to break the link between permanent mem- of permanent members from five to ten. All bership and nuclear status and carries the three groups have found it expedient to adopt most weight in Latin America. But in a the tactic of divide-and-rule, convincing the Spanish-language continent, Brazil is leading contenders to compete with one Portuguese speaking. another. Only very recently have Brazil, The four countries acting together can con- Germany, India and Japan woken up to the stitute a powerful bloc in world affairs. If they realisation that either they will all become per- form an issue-specific coalition and mobilise manent members in one major round of world opinion behind their joint campaign reforms, or none will. Japan by itself, or for permanent membership, few countries together with Germany, would worsen what is would be able to resist. Would the immovable already a very badly skewed industrial–devel- object of Security Council reform prove oping country imbalance; adding Brazil and stronger than the irresistible force of these India would redress this. four exerting their full clout in the world of Each of the four has strong claims, as well international diplomacy? as at least one major, but far from fatal, weak- The four have also been among the most ness. frequently elected to the Security Council as India, with more than 1 billion people, is presently configured. If they really wanted to the world’s biggest democracy and ranks highlight the illegitimacy of the present sys- among the biggest contributors to UN peace- tem, they could collectively decide against keeping missions. It is also nuclear armed, but seeking elective membership any further. It is its nuclear status is outside the hard to see how the Security Council would Nonproliferation Treaty. have much credibility left if Brazil, Germany, Japan is the world’s second-biggest econo- India and Japan stayed off it for a prolonged my and contributes more to the UN regular period. budget than four permanent members com- While such a boycott would be dramatic, it bined (Britain, China, France, and Russia). carries all the risks of an essentially negative There is growing resentment at being treated tactic. In the meantime, there is the high-level as an ATM at the service of the United panel of eminent and highly experienced per- Nations. But Japan also is the only one of the sons from around the world. Their brief is to 74 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 examine contemporary threats to internation- in constant flux. Charged with the stewardship al peace and security, and recommend how of the world’s collective destiny, it is both the the UN can remain relevant as the core of symbol of a common future for the betterment multilateral efforts to address the threats. of all humanity and the institutional means of From the point of view of the leading con- bringing about such a better future for all of us. tenders, the composition of the panel reflects The debate over Iraq in 2002–2004 demon- what is wrong with the UN, in that the three strated the true test of UN relevance: both as a groups of opposing countries are much better brake on an unjustified and unilateral resort to represented than those with claims to perma- war and as a forum for legitimising the collec- nent membership. And yet, judgments before tive decision to enforce community demands the fact, that in their profiles they represent a on outlaw regimes. cross between nostalgia and déja vu – as an Multilateralism is under unprecedented unnamed senior official was reported to have challenge, from arms control to climate said – may prove premature. This will depend change, international criminal justice, and the on whether the panellists deliberate and use of military force overseas. At such a time, decide in their wisdom as representatives of it becomes especially important to reaffirm the country from which they come and its the role of the United Nations as the principal narrow national interests, or on the basis of embodiment of the principle of multilateral- individual reflections on what is best for the ism, and the main forum for its pursuit. future of the organisation and the world. The causes and consequences of public pol- icy challenges and decisions are international, Conclusion but the authority for addressing them is still vested in states. The UN’s mandates are glob- The UN must continue to change the way al, while its staffing and financial resources are decisions are made. To deliver on the core less than that of major municipal authorities. missions of the organisation, UN capacity has Hence the dilemma confronting the United to be strengthened. Structural reforms in the Nations of doing too little and too late, or Security Council remain stalemated and most being over-committed and over-stretched. countries see it as having been captured by the The UN remains our one and best hope for major powers. It is neither democratic nor rep- unity in diversity in a world in which global resentative. The structural flaws and procedur- problems require multilateral solutions. But if al bottlenecks in the Council reflect power we want multilateralism to be the preferred imbalances and conflicting claims on values route, then strengthening the UN and making and interests along the North–South axis and it more effective and relevant is imperative – also, in very recent times, along an emerging for its performance has been patchy and vari- trans-Atlantic divide. able. It has been neither uniform in its response In 2005 the UN will celebrate its 60th birth- nor consistent in the quality of services provid- day. This has been the age of retirement for UN ed. We must combine our efforts to redesign officials. But it is also the age at which, accord- and rededicate the organisation so that in its ing to Japanese folklore, life begins anew. structure and by its operations, it helps to bring Which will be it for the United Nations – be about a world where fear is changed to hope, put to pasture, or revitalised and renewed? want gives way to dignity, and apprehensions During the UN’s 60-year lifespan, both the are turned into aspirations – above all for the economic, political and military realities in the people of this great continent. world around us and the vision of a good inter- national society – the goals, principles and val- Notes ues to which we subscribe of a world united in action on the road to a common destiny – have 1This lecture was delivered before the release of the Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level changed. The United Nations was established Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. to provide predictability and order in a world ESSAY

NEW TERRORISM Toward an explanation of cases in Kenya

ERIC E OTENYO

New or contemporary international terrorism associated with Islamic fundamentalism and the struggle against Zionism and American interests is a recent phenomenon in Kenya, different to that experienced during the struggle against colonialism. Many explanations have been offered as to why Kenya is being targeted, but have not sufficiently explored its close relationship with the West – especially Britain and the United States, the perceived connection between Israel and the former Presidency of Daniel Arap Moi, domestic forces and government policy. Externally the most important explanations for the increase in regional terrorism are the three waves of glob- al terrorism since 1967, the most recent and significant of which is associated with Osama bin Laden and the Palestinian Intifada. These events reverberated in the region, Sudan and Somalia in particular, but also internally. Both internal and external attribution factors explain the resur- gence of new terrorism in Africa. In the case of Kenya, terrorist attacks are associated with the country’s internal domestic processes and a naïve approach to broader international issues.

Introduction ant uprising (1952–1958). The Mau Mau oper- ated in cells and took secrecy oaths to bind On 12 December 1963 Kenya attained politi- members to their cause. Paradoxically, a revi- cal independence from Great Britain. British sionist historian, Caroline Elkins, referred to authorities used the word ‘terrorism’ to colonial actions against the Mau Mau as ter- describe the activities of Mau Mau land and rorism.4 Still, Mau Mau terror killed more 1 freedom fighters. In December 2003, in Africans than British settlers.5 response to terrorist security threats, the The point is that there is no single satisfac- United States (USA) imposed travel advisory tory definition of terrorism. Jenkin’s summa- 2 restrictions on its citizens travelling to Kenya. tion of Moussaoui’s imagery is perhaps the The two terrorisms are different, however. most appropriate: ‘Terrorism is like beauty, it Terrorism is a concept with a multitude of is in the eye of the beholder.’6 meanings and manifestations and includes Understanding the Mau Mau has some les- state terrorism, a phenomenon widespread in sons for understanding contemporary terror- Africa.3 ism. For example, the Mau Mau were At the time, the colonial administration in organised along cells, forced members to Kenya employed the term terrorism in abide by tribal oaths, and the applied psycho- describing the activities of the Mau Mau peas- logical killings of non-conformists. Modern ERIC E OTENYO is Assistant Professor at Illinois State University 76 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 terrorist groups of the Al Qaeda type employ of the world-famous five-star Norfolk Hotel in similar oath strategies to cement brother- Nairobi. At least 16 lives were lost and hun- hood.7 dred of people were injured. A Jewish family Yet there are glaring differences, too. Most owned the Norfolk Hotel. In August 1998 US Mau Mau combatants were captured in forests Embassy buildings in Kenya and Tanzania around Mt Kenya: there is no conclusive evi- were bombed, resulting in at least 250 dence that the organisation had national deaths.10 The attack was directly linked to appeal. The movement was disassociated from Osama bin Laden.11 In November 2002 sui- all global ideological currents.8 In fact, cide bomber terrorists calling themselves Kenyatta’s government rewarded loyalists and ‘Army of Palestine’ attacked, wounded, and dishonoured Mau Mau heroes. Being a killed patrons at another Israeli-owned hotel localised protest movement, the Mau Mau in Mombasa, Kenya. Almost simultaneously, posed a lesser threat than the contemporary the attackers shot at an Arkia Airline taking off diffused Al-Qaeda phantom cells that recent- from Mombasa International Airport for ly infiltrated Kenya. Israel. None of the 271 passengers in the plane In brief, the paper analyses the casual fac- was injured. Al Qaeda was blamed for the tors in forming new terrorism in Kenya. attacks.

New terrorism Why is Kenya being targeted? Contemporary or new terrorism – especially The central question is why Kenya has wit- when associated with Islamic fundamentalism nessed the full wrath of global terrorism. So and the struggle against Zionism and far, the media have been replete with com- American interests – is a recent phenomenon mentaries linking the elite in Kenya to in Kenya. Consensus is emerging on the main Western interests. While researchers are not characteristics of new terrorism – particularly agreed on a unified theoretical framework for the increase in religious content and motiva- understanding the causes of terrorism, there tion. Increased use of martyrdom, co-ordinat- are some indicators. Jenkins points out that: ed attacks, and escalation of terror networks … even if we agree that the suicide characterise new terrorism.9 Research suggests bombings are terrorism, experts and that, besides having comprehensible inten- journalists take very different approaches tions, new terror is significantly more lethal in to questions like the accusation of the its methods. New terrorism is also more inter- act, or who might be responsible. Some national in scope and takes advantage of avail- experts would emphasize individual or able technological advances, including the social factors, seeing the attacks as the extensive usage of cyberspace and cellphones. product of frustration and anger. In addition, modern terrorism is capable of He adds that others point accusing fingers to using weapons of mass destruction (WMD), brainwashing by religious fanatics.12 including biological, nuclear, and chemical In this article, the popular explanation that agents. The terror attacks in the US in Kenya is closely allied to US and Israeli inter- September 2001 and in Madrid, Spain, in ests is re-examined. Similarly, the proximity of March 2004 demonstrated the increased easy-to-reach targets, especially American and sophistication of the masterminds. Israeli nationals living in Kenya, is a possible Evidently, new terrorist organisations no variable. There are also commentaries that longer explicitly lay credible claim to their suggest that African hospitality and – perhaps criminal actions. more accurately – administrative ineptitude, The first sign that Kenya had entered the statelessness, and porous borders allow terror- terrorist circuit was in December 1980 when ism to flourish in Kenya. terrorists sympathetic to the Palestine Leading theorist Martha Crenshaw offered Liberation Organisation (PLO) bombed part similar frameworks for understanding why ter- Essay 77 rorism occurs in some localities and not in reinforcement of discourses that present ter- others. According to her, a comprehensive rorism as a global challenge. Such models do explanation must account for the environ- two things. First, they emphasise the legitimi- ment in which terrorism occurs and address sation of terrorist acts in messianic or Jihadist the question of whether political social and terms that provide scholars with opportunities economic conditions make terrorism more to examine the flow of cultural battles within likely to occur in some contexts than in oth- a given polity. In addition, there is the thrust ers.13 She contended that there are precondi- of economic determinism, which, although tions for terrorism to take place. anachronistic, retains its explanatory power. Nevertheless, she observed accurately that The connection is apparent: new terrorists there is an absence of significant empirical have seized this opportunity to attack targets studies of relevant transnational factors to that symbolise economic domination. inform policy on terrorism.14 Ellis and Killingray, among others, recog- While these are credible explanations, they nise the importance of external factors in the do not go far enough in accounting for con- broader presentation of the cause of terrorism temporary terrorism in Kenya. Specifically, in Africa.16 they fail to explain why terrorists attacked Kenya twice between 1998 and 2002, and not Islam, foundations, terrorist waves, other African countries. and internal issues Two-fold explanatory causal approaches Several internal conditions and assumptions account for Kenya’s vulnerability to terrorism. The literature provides some answers, even Terrorist activities occurred when the econ- though insufficient studies have been done on omy was at its lowest level, creating the falla- Kenya’s foreign policy – especially its rela- cy that poverty triggers destitution and crime tionship with Israel and the United States. – including terrorism. A group of human Some of the terrorists are non-state actors, rights activists have also supported the theory but they may be clandestinely supported by that poverty creates conditions conducive to state operatives. Given that many of the states terrorism.17 That assertion is not plausible, that supported terrorism were undemocratic however, because most African countries find and lacked legal structures, idiosyncratic vari- themselves in a similar social-economic ables are hard to verify. Stated differently, to predicament. On the other hand, it is cannot understand terrorism scholars need to dig be denied that religious and cultural sensibili- deeper into non-official policy declarations. ties are at the root of how terrorism is framed Research must therefore go beyond the inter- and conducted. pretation of policy statements and docu- In all probability, the increase in regional ments. Complementary ethnographic and terrorism had more to do with the emergence cultural data would enrich subsequent discus- of new terrorist waves globally. At least three sions about terrorism. waves are known to have been associated with From an analytical point of view, at least the growth of terrorism, which is directly two perspectives are essential for unearthing linked to fundamentalism. the independent variables in question. First, •The first modern wave occurred after the there is merit in understanding terrorism as 1967 war between Israel and the Arab world. perceived from the standpoint of the perpe- •The second, in 1979, was epitomised by the trators of violent action. The focus then return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran and would be on internal aspects such as the traits, the fall of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. abilities, and intentions of the perpetrators of Khomeini’s support for hostage-taking ter- terrorism. Second, attribution may seek expla- rorism gave the world a frightening lesson nations in external forces, including incen- in state-supported terrorism. The tives for terrorist actions.15 Hence the Ayatollah’s support is important in the 78 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

sense that it encouraged martyrdom. African countries already members of the •The third is associated with Osama bin Islamic world, the religious battles are shifting Laden and the Palestinian Intifada, mainly south of the Sahara. at the end of the Gulf War of 1991.18 The Islamist radicals found some support For Kenya, the third wave is particularly sig- in stateless Somalia, a country with an uneasy nificant. Multipartism emerged in Kenya after coexistence with the Nairobi power elite. In 1991. Fearing regime and state disintegration, the 1960s Kenya’s foreign policy was partly then President Daniel Arap Moi banned the designed to check Somali irredentism. Then, registration of parties based on ethnic and there had been talk of creating greater religious affinities. One of the parties denied Somalia, which would include parts of Kenya, registration was the Islamic Party of Kenya Ethiopia, and Djibouti.23 Strategically, links (IPK), which received support from neigh- between Somali-based Islamic fundamental- bouring Sudan, then home to Osama bin ists and the docile nationalists would always Laden. Sudan had a strong anti-Christian spell doom for Kenya. Now that Sudanese- establishment, which was engaged in a mili- based fundamentalists were seeking a ‘holy tary war with the Christian and Animist alliance’ with factions in Somalia, the danger South. Moi was sympathetic to the South, in of instability was real. Further concern part because his Kalenjin are ethnically related stemmed from Sudan’s support to drought- to Sudanese Nilotes.19 stricken Somalis rather than to Southern Furthermore, in 1993 Sudan gave explicit Sudanese Christians facing similar conditions. support to the activities of Joseph Kony’s Sudan’s attitude towards terrorism in Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) guerrilla organ- Kenya was complicated by the fact that its isation in the North in order to undermine government provided support to the Islamist Uganda’s support for the Sudan People’s group Al-Ittihad al-Islami (Islamic Union). Al- Liberation Army (SPLA), whose leader, Islami was founded around 1991, at the end Colonel John Garang, was ideologically asso- of Siyyad Barre’s regime, with the objective of ciated with Uganda’s secular leadership. On finding a minimal element of ‘national’ cohe- his part, Garang framed the Sudanese civil war sion premised on Islamist ideology. as ‘Arabism’ versus Christianity.20 Unfortunately, Al-Ittihad became an instru- Sudan’s role in the war against terrorism ment of Sudanese foreign policy, declaring a must not be seen outside the framework of the jihad against ‘infidels’ in the region. The intention to Islamise the Nile and Greater organisation conducted activities in Ethiopia East African region. It is not surprising that through the intermediary of its large resident Osama bin Laden found a home in Sudan Somali population. The Ethiopian govern- before moving to Afghanistan. The Islamist ment reacted angrily to Al-Ittihad’s activities government came to power in Sudan in June and arrested Somalis living in Addis Ababa 1989 and immediately supported the spread and Gedo. The FBI still regards Ittihad al- of fundamentalism.21 Among the ruling Islamiya (AIAI) as a terrorist group with links National Islamic Front (NIF) leadership were to Al Qaeda.24 As for Kenya, police reports extremists Hassan Tourabi, Khalid Osman about the November 2002 bombing of the Moudawi, and Abdel Rahim Hamdi at Feisal Israeli Hotel in the north of Mombasa attrib- Bank. The top hierarchy also included hard- uted the crime to the group’s support. liners – foreign ministers Ali Osman Still, Sudan supported ethnic Somali Mohammed Taha and Ghazi Salahaddin groups, including the Islamic Oromo Attabani. These radicals formulated Organisation and Islamic Front for the Trotskyian revolutionary policies bent on Liberation of Oromiya (IFLO), based in spreading Islam, first to neighbouring coun- Ethiopia. Ethiopia has a standing military tries and to South Africa by the year 2050.22 treaty with Kenya to deter Somali secessionist Africa has quietly become the battleground movements commonly known as the Shifta. for religious fissures. With several West Former president Siyyad Barre’s government Essay 79 had seriously considered the possibility of the eighties and nineties, the spread of Islam unification as a right of the Somali people.25 in Kenya was undeniable. Part of the problem Traditionally, Kenya had reacted viciously was that the leadership was insensitive to to this possibility, suppressing dissidence. In Muslim citizens. In comparative terms, the 1990s, Somalis were ordered to carry spe- Muslims regions were perceived as most cial identity cards. Human Rights Watch underdeveloped. Curiously, at the lower pri- groups reported that Kenyan authorities treat- mary and secondary levels, schools associated ed thousands of Somalis in refugee camps with Christian churches always performed bet- inhumanely.26 A number of Somalis in the ter than most. camps were suspected of being agents of For several years, the government allowed Islamic fundamentalism. Reports suggest that and supported evangelical preaching in stadi- the Dadaab refugee camp with close to 120,000 ums and other open-air venues. Invited evan- Somalis was a haven for terrorists and ban- gelists from the West preached against the dits.27 Kenya government security briefings encroachment of Islam. A Pentecostal Church were concerned that illegal firearms, other frequented by government officials held sem- weapons, and a variety of telecommunication inars and prayer meetings urging salvation equipment were being sold in refugee camps. and halting the spread of Islam.31 Another The situation was exacerbated by the UN’s Pentecostal Church protested government inability to provide sufficient funds for the provision of land for the building of an needs of refugees. In addition, the World Food Islamic mosque in their neighbourhood.32 Programme (WFP) cut supplies to the camp. Quiet religious warfare was also evident in This provided an opportunity for the song and praise. Several Christian churches Saudi-based Islamic aid organisation Al conducted open-air crusades in which the Haramain Islamic Foundation to fill the void. implicit message was that the spread of Islam Although the FBI claimed that Al Haramain was discomforting.33 Importantly, Islam made was a conduit for terror cells, Kenya and the inroads into the interior of Kenya. Radical United Nations High Commissioner for Islamic preacher Sheikh Khalid Balala actively Refugees (UNHCR) disagreed.28 Later, a con- opposed government policies in the country nection was established between the founda- and threatened to unleash a holy war. He was tion and the terrorist embassy bombing in stripped of his citizenship in 1994 and exiled Kenya.29 to Germany. Millions of Al Qaeda dollars were siphoned The growth of Islam in Kenya directly chal- to sympathisers through Al Haramain. While lenged the Christian oligarchy. Most of the a court in Kenya ruled that the organisation’s money for expansion of Islam came from the registration be reconsidered, the UN blacklist- Middle East and the West. As mentioned ed Al Haramain.30 In March 2002 the United above, funds were channelled through a host States blocked funds of the Somalia and of foundations, including the Islamic African Bosnia branches of Al Haramain, claiming Relief Agency of Columbia, Missouri, and the that those offices were diverting charity dona- Horn of Africa Relief Agency (HARA). Others tions to terrorist groups. The idea that the were the Islamic Foundation Kenya, Islamic camp was vulnerable to the possibility of rad- Circle of North America (ICNA), ICNA’s ical ideas and training seeping in was never affiliate, the Relief-Helping Hand, Mercy rejected. Not surprisingly, after the suicide Relief International, the Al-Haramain bombing incident in Mombasa in November Foundation, Help African People, the Islamic 2002, both the FBI and Mossad moved into Relief Organisation, and the Ibrahim Bin the refugee camps hoping to trace leads as to Abdul Aziz Al Ibrahim Foundation. how two-surface-to-air missiles fired at the Israeli passenger jet were acquired. The West and external attribution On the social front, Kenya is characterised as a majority Christian nation (over 65%). In The second explanatory variable is a reflection 80 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 of Kenya’s external relations with regimes and Hope in Somalia. Later, Mombasa became an non-state actors. An examination of Kenya’s important base for marines seeking out Al relationship with the USA and Israel provides Qaeda terrorists in the Horn of Africa region. causal linkages about perceptions of the The increased presence of US marines provid- nature of the discontent. The simple conclu- ed clear targets for anti-American terrorists in sion is that suicide bombers targeted Kenya the region. because the country provoked the wrath of Importantly, Mombasa is the largest major- Islamic fundamentalists. It is assumed, then, ity Islamic city in Kenya. Since the attacks of that the role of powerful individuals in the August 1998 and September 11, high-level US government contributed to creating condi- forces increased their local presence. Central tions for terrorist reprisals by embracing poli- Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents and German cies inimical to the ideological cause of the and British intelligence officials assigned to perpetrators of terrorist acts. the area assisted local authorities in the pur- While several plausible explanations, other suit of terrorists. The allies patrolled the than conspiracy, account for terror, at least Kenyan coast and monitored shipping activi- four situational foreign policy factors require ties into the Gulf area, especially movements further examination: toward Pakistan, Somalia and the Arab • the perceived close association between Peninsular. Besides, while the USA has exclu- Kenya and the West – especially Britain and sive use of Mombasa airport for military oper- the USA; ations in the region, Britain’s Royal Air Force •the perceived connection between Israel (RAF) has a base in Nanyuki. and elements in the former president’s gov- Kenya also found itself on the wrong side of ernment; self-described religious fundamentalists when it • subjective forces associated with the coun- supported US initiatives to eliminate Libya’s try’s self-definition as a bastion for regional Muammar Gaddafi, then a strong opponent of peace and prosperity; Zionism. Kenya hosted some 354 Libyan • the naïve nature of the elite dealings with troops trained by the US and bent on over- various dissident groups across the board. throwing Gaddafi. Ambassador Smith These factors are not mutually exclusive but Hempstone documented this incident in his reinforce one another. The variables are dis- memoirs.35 The so-called ‘Haftar Force’ was a cussed below. covert effort by the Republican administration to use Libyans captured in the wars in central Situational foreign policy factors Africa, including Chad, to overthrow Gaddafi. Other African countries, including the Most accounts assert that Kenya was from the Democratic Republic of Congo, rejected the outset integrated into the Western economic US offer to temporarily host the clandestine structures as member of the bloc’s ideological force. Moi and Gaddafi were never friends. axis.34 At the height of the cold war, the coun- Moi blamed Libya for supporting dissident try allied with the US while, initially, Somalia activities against him. There were also claims affiliated with the Soviet Union. Regionally, that Libyan nationals were active supporters Ethiopia and Somalia switched camps with of radical Islamic foundations with operations the former seeking Soviet patronage, but in Kenya. The USA short-listed Libya as a Kenya never faltered in its embrace of Western country that sponsored terrorism, but began to capitalism. In fact, President James E Carter soften its stand in 2004 after Libya abandoned procured a military agreement with the a clandestine plan to build nuclear bombs. administration in Nairobi for the exclusive The second attribute is an extension of the use of Mombasa in its Indian Ocean–Gulf first. Regionally, Kenya is perceived to be a region strategic endeavours. Mombasa was close ally of Israel. Some powerful members also used for US military operations during of Moi’s administration had business connec- the first Gulf War and in Operation Restore tions with Israeli nationals. A commission of Essay 81 inquiry into the activities of former powerful arid land plant husbandry. This included sup- Attorney General Charles Njonjo revealed his port to horticulture in the semi-arid Kibwezi, close links with the Israelis and apartheid Makueni District area. The Kibwezi irrigation South Africa. Nicholas Biwott, arguably the project is a joint effort between the Israeli most powerful minister in Moi’s government, Center for International Cooperation, was a business associate of several Israeli Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the nationals, including wealthy businessman University of Nairobi. Additionally, Gurion Gad Ze’evi.36 Ze’evi had substantial interests University collaborated with the University of in leading communication and electricity Nairobi in the area of agriculture. companies. Leading government bureaucrats In brief, Kenya–Israel relations under the often considered his numerous well-paying the Kenyatta and Moi administrations were companies as ‘retirement avenues’ after they warm, causing considerable discomfort to left the public service. Furthermore, Israel local Muslim groups. For example, the influ- trained former President Moi’s security detail. ential Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims Security ties with Kenya predate Moi’s admin- (SUPKEM) in September of 2001 issued a istration. In 1964, Israel supported the forma- statement calling for an end to diplomatic tion of the crack paramilitary General Service links between Kenya and Israel, citing Israeli Unit (GSU) in Kenya. This specialised unit abuse of Palestinian rights. Although Kenya not only provided security for Israel’s El Al voted for the admission of the Palestine flights in Nairobi, but was central to Moi’s Liberation Organisation (PLO) as a perma- personal security.37 nent observer to the UN’s General Assembly, President Moi visited Israel on several occa- it gave little support to Palestinian aspirations sions, including on private affairs. Even when to statehood.38 Prominent scholar Ali Mazrui African countries shut the door to Israel over noted that Kenya paid a price for its policy its occupation of Arab lands – the Gaza Strip, towards Zionism. According to Mazrui, the Sinai Peninsula, and West Bank – in the late root problem of terrorism in Kenya is the dis- 1960s and 1970s, Kenya continued to main- content with those associating with Zionism. tain an open door policy to Israel. The He wrote: Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now Yet the problem of Israel and Zionist the African Union (AU)) had placed embar- power against the Palestinians has to be goes and asked its member states not to have solved if we are serious about ending ter- diplomatic ties with Israel. After the 1973 war rorism … Zionism is a political ideolo- twenty-nine African states severed diplomatic gy; Judaism is a religion. Can we have a relations with Israel. Only three states did not, world without terrorism for as long as namely Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland. The Zionists power is protected by the African boycotts were suspended after the United States? The American veto in the signing of the Camp David Peace Accords in Security Council of the United Nations 1978, which improved relations between Israel makes it difficult even to reprimand and Egypt. A number of countries established Israel for wrong-headed policies.39 diplomatic relations with Israel, including Mazrui’s point resonates with Kenyans, espe- Congo (then Zaire) in 1982, Liberia (1983), cially those of Arab descent. It will be noted Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon in 1986, and that the first major modern terrorist attack on Togo in 1987. At that time, Kenya, Gabon, Kenyan soil in 1980 was an Arab response to and Senegal were maintaining strong links the nation’s support for commandos that res- with Israel. During President Moi’s rule, cued hijacked Israeli planes in Uganda, then Kenya established a full-fledged embassy in under Idi Amin, a sworn enemy of Zionism. Tel Aviv. Likewise, Israel has full diplomatic The subjective forces associated with representation in Nairobi. Kenya’s self-definition as a bastion for regional Israel supported Kenya’s agricultural devel- peace and prosperity is a fundamental reason opment initiatives, especially in the field of for the nation’s vulnerability to terrorism. 82 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

Pundits argue that Kenya is a ‘soft target’ ted Abdalla Ocalan – the leader of the because it the third largest economy in the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) – to enter to the impoverished Sub-Saharan Africa. Besides, the country even though he was wanted in Turkey country registered more Western investments for activities described as ‘terrorism’. Ocalan, than its neighbours and is home to the United expelled from Syria, had been a most wanted Nation’s Environment Programme (UNEP). man in Turkey. Turkey accused Ocalan’s PKK Kenya’s elite projected itself as ‘an island’ of the murder of 30,000 people between 1985 in a region characterised by war and chaos. and 1999. Ocalan, who was sympathetic to The need to defend its image as a Western- Islamic factions in the Gulf, was eventually style democracy placed it at odds with several captured in Nairobi in February 1999.41 His Islamic fundamentalist organisations. capture sparked off protests in Europe, includ- Meanwhile, President Moi, a devout Christian ing at the Kenyan Embassy in Vienna. Several and member of the African Inland Church Kenyan embassies closed for a few days in fear (AIC), was not apologetic for his support for of terrorist attacks. However, the Clinton radical protestant evangelical churches administration regarded Ocalan as a terrorist opposed to Islam. He continued to attend and expressed satisfaction with his apprehen- church services and used his vast financial sion in Nairobi.42 resources to construct church buildings across Similarly, Moi’s administration – in undis- the nation.40 Perhaps Moi regarded Kenya’s closed circumstances – provided full protec- relative peace in comparison to Somalia, tion to deposed Somali dictator Siad Barre, Ethiopia, and Sudan as a blessing. Moi reject- amidst protests from some Islamic organisa- ed the registration of the Islamic Party of tions. Barre was hosted in a Kenyan hotel Kenya for security reasons and was criticised before moving to North Africa. He is consid- for his less than enthusiastic support for ered by many to be responsible for the frag- Islamic organisations. mentation of Somalia and the subsequent rise The final variable that should be consid- of terrorist groups in the region. ered is the naïve nature of the elite’s dealings Kenya’s history of supporting high-risk with various dissident groups. Under Moi individuals is not confined to those from Kenya was considered one of the most corrupt Islamic nations. Kenya supported Afonso countries in the world and therefore vulnera- d’Lakama whose Mozambican National ble to terrorist infiltration. It is possible that Resistance (Renamo) was operating against the terrorists find it easy to infiltrate a corrupt ruling Front for the Liberation of bureaucracy through bribery for services such Mozambique (Frelimo) government of as passports and banking. Furthermore, a cor- Marxist Samora Machel. While d’Lakama was rupt bureaucracy is likely to be extremely engaged in a civil war with Frelimo, he inept and incompetent. Both factors have enjoyed Kenyan diplomatic support. some merit. A corrupt bureaucracy will not Members of the Moi administration also sup- generate enough revenue for social security ported factions of the Southern Sudanese needs. Buttressed by an insecure border, a secessionist movements. In 1998 two factions poor economy and a decayed infrastructure, were engaged in a shootout in Nairobi. the country’s vulnerability is obvious. The list of Kenya’s support for groups that Needless to say, underpaid police are unlikely were pursuing violent means for addressing to be thorough in their jobs. Indeed, the their causes included providing refuge to peo- Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) ple involved in the Rwanda genocide in regarded corruption and poverty as the pri- 1993/94. The former US ambassador to mary causes of terrorism in Kenya. Kenya, Johnie Carson, reported that one of It is important to note that individuals the masterminds of the genocide, Felicien associated with ‘terror activities’ gained admis- Kabuga, was protected by members of the sion to the country with connivance of the Moi administration. The US placed a $5 mil- administration. For example, officials permit- lion bounty on his head.43 Previously, a gov- Essay 83 ernment commission of inquiry reported that Terrorism cannot be reduced to a few vari- former Attorney General Charles Njonjo, ables. Further discussion on the penetration assisted by South African mercenaries, plotted of terrorist cells in African countries is an invasion of Seychelles to forestall expan- required. sion of Marxism on the island.44 Besides, Kenya was partisan in regional civil wars in Uganda (1986) and the Democratic Republic Notes of Congo (1998). Still, a former US ambassa- dor acknowledged that he negotiated the 1 R.Conley, Joyful Kenya gets independence from Britain, New York Times, 12 December 1963; see Haftar Force deal because Kenyan leaders also R A Frost, Sir Mitchell, Governor of Kenya, 45 were venal. In short, elements of the ruling African Affairs 78(313),1979, pp 535–553. power elite made Kenya a haven for groups 2 M.Gaitho, US–Kenya ties ‘better than before’, sympathetic to the terrorist cause. Daily Nation, 5 December 2003. 3J Cilliers, Terrorism and Africa, African Security Review, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 12(4) Conclusion 2004, p 2. 4C Elkins, Kenya: white terror, British The preceding discussion has shed some light Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) documentary, on the expansion of terrorist activities in 2002, , accessed 12 January 2003; D Throup, Economic and social origins of discerning the global state of new terrorism, Mau Mau 1945–1953, Ohio University Press, the African situation has not been well Athens, 1988. explored. Still, accounting for the causes of a 5 In fact the connection between the Mau Mau complex issue such as terrorism is a difficult and African freedom is doubted. See J Lonsdale, Mau Maus of the mind: making Mau Mau and endeavour. The fact that Kenya has been a fre- remaking Kenya, Journal of African History 31, quent victim of terrorist attacks and security 1990, pp 393–421, and A Cleary, The myth of alerts is eliciting considerable debate and Mau Mau in its international context, African demands intellectual analysis. From an empir- Affairs, 89 (355), 1990, pp 227-245. ical standpoint, few systematic studies 6P Jenkins, Images of terror: what we can and can’t know about terrorism, Aldine de Gruyter, New account for the specifics of terrorist attacks in York, 2003; see also A Schmid and J de Graaf, Kenya. There are shortcomings in simple Violence as communication: insurgent terrorism and explanations that modern terrorists attack the Western news media, Sage, Beverly Hills, Calif, American and Israeli interests wherever they 1982, p 60. 7P Williams, Al Qaeda: the brotherhood of terror, are situated. Potentially soft targets exist Alpha Pearsons, New York, 2002, pp 9–12. All throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. members of Al Qaeda were asked to sign agree- Both internal and external attribution fac- ments that they would devote their lives to the tors should be relied upon in identifying the submission of all creation to the will of Allah. causes of the resurgence of new terrorism in They took the oath of allegiance, the bayat, to Osama, involving fasting and self-castigation. Africa. Briefly, terrorist attacks in Kenya are 8Cleary, op cit, p 228. associated with the country’s internal domes- 9D Brooks, The culture of martyrdom: how sui- tic processes as well as with a naïve approach cide bombing became not just a means but an to broader international issues. end, in G Hanus, The compendium: a critical analy- sis of the Arab–Israeli conflict July 2000 – July 2002, In a more general sense, Kenya’s entry into Gravitas Media, Chicago, 2002, pp 180-183; B the terrorist circuit can be attributed to the Nacos, The terrorist calculus behind 9–11: a distinctive and conspicuous actions of the model for future terrorism? Studies in Conflict and power elite in Kenya. Seemingly frequent Terrorism 26, 2003, pp 1–16; M Crenshaw, The psychology of political terrorism, in M Hermann attacks by terrorist cells on Americans and (ed), Political psychology: contemporary problems and Israeli citizens in Kenya must be seen in the issues, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1986, pp light of the terrorists’ psychological disposi- 379–413. tion that some countries are better ‘formatted’ 10 This figure varies according to source. The Kenya for attack than others. government did not verify the actual number of deaths. 84 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

11 J Scherer, Terrorism, 1998, XIII(4), October1998. gospel. The clergy conducted prayer meetings, 12 Jenkins, op cit, p 3. conferences, and crusades against the ‘southward’ 13 M Crenshaw, The causes of terrorism past and spread of Islam into Kenya. Similar messages present, in C Kegley Jr (ed), The new global terror- were carried in several evangelical music cassettes. ism: characteristics, causes, controls, Prentice Hall, 32 Deliverance Church, leaders, opposed construc- NJ, 2003, pp 92–106. tion of an Islamic Mosque in Umoja, 14 Ibid, p 93. Nairobi,1996. 15 H Fritz, The psychology of interpersonal relations, 33 For example, one audiocassette contained offen- Wiley, New York,1958; K Harold, The process of sive lyrics that claimed Prophet Muhammad casual attribution, American Psychologist, 28, 1973, would worship Jesus: The Mwaura’s Praise and pp 107–128. Worship Gospel Singers, undated (c 1995/96), 16 S Ellis and D Killingray, Africa after 11 especially the release ‘Jesus a Mighty God’. September 2001, African Affairs 101, 2002, pp 34 S Makinda, From quiet diplomacy to Cold War 5–8. politics: Kenya’s foreign policy, Third World 17 W Mutunga, Development, terrorism and Quarterly 52 (April), 1983, pp 300–319; Philip human rights, Mellemfolkelight Samvirkr, Partner Nyinguro, Phd Dissertation United States policy NEWS 7(1), , accessed 19 June 2004. 1990–1992, University of South Carolina, 18 For more details on Intifada see J Nassar and R Columbia, 1999. Heacock (eds), Intifada: Palestine at the crossroads, 35 S Hempstone, Rogue ambassador: an Africa mem- Praeger, New York, 1990. Arguably, the fourth oir, University of the South Press, Sewanee, Tenn, wave coincides with hostilities in the Gulf area 1997. after the 2003 US occupation of Iraq. 36 Africa intelligence, a bad debtor, The Indian Ocean 19 The Kalenjin ethnic group is classified as Nilotic, Newsletter, 543, 26 September 1992, along with most Southern Sudanese people. Sudan’s regional war, Le Monde Diplomatique, 37 Editorial, Getting ready for terror, Daily Nation, 2 , December 2002. The GSU was hailed for sup- accessed 2 February 1997. pressing an attempted Kenya Air Force coup d’état 21 Ibid. that would have seen Moi out of office in August 22 W Laquer, The new terrorism: fanaticism and the 1982. See J Karimi, Kenya’s day of terror: 20 years arms of mass destruction, Oxford University Press, after, Daily Nation, 29 July 2002. New York, 1999, p 180. 38 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 23 K Adar, Kenyan foreign policy behavior towards 42/229 A: 143-1-0 of 2 March 1988. Somalia, 1963–1983, University Press of America, 39 A Mazrui, Kenya: US should address causes of Lanham, 1994. terrorism, Daily Nation, 7 October 2001, 24 P Watson and S Barua, Somalian link seen to al Qaeda, Los Angeles Times, 25 February 2002, 40 A Morton, The making of an African statesman, 41 Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, The truth About 25 K Adar, Kenya–US relations: a recapitulation of PKK, , the patterns of paradigmatic conceptualization, accessed 17 June 2004. 1960s–1990s, in M Munene, J Olewe-Nyunya 42 White House spokesman J Lockhart, quoted by and K Adar (eds), The United States and Africa: correspondent P Goodenough in the from independence to the end of the Cold War, East Conservative News Service, 16 February 1999, African Educational Publishers, Nairobi, 1995, p 97. 26 A Parker, Kenya: crackdown on Nairobi’s refugees 43 Republic of Kenya, Commission of Inquiry on after Mombasa attacks, Human Rights Watch, Attorney General, Charles Njonjo, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1984. 27 Ibid. 44 E Chisika, Kabuga still holed up in Kenya, says 28 Statements attributed to various UNHCR per- US. East African Standard, 5 February 2003, sons available at , accessed 25 January 2004. 13.htm> 29 US State Department, Patterns of global terror- 45 Hempstone, op cit. ism report, Washington, DC, April 2004. 30 M Rosenberg, Al Haramain Foundation, , accessed 6 June 2004. 31 A Canadian, Dennis White, then pastor of Valley Road Pentecostal Church, and other evangelical pastors and clergy preached a strong salvation ESSAY

COUPS AND COUP ATTEMPTS IN AFRICA Is there a missing link?

NAISON NGOMA

Coups and coup attempts are a phenomenon that has ravaged the African continent from the time of independence to the present. Despite the common belief that increased democratic practices should lead to fewer incidents of coups or coup attempts, this appears not to be the case. Despite the political determination not to reward military governments or those that have arisen from extra-constitutional arrangements, through welcoming them into the community of states, the scourge continues. This article seeks to identify other possible explanations for the prevalence of this phenomenon. The suggested models include greed and a crisis of expecta- tions; naivety, ignorance and gullibility; and foreign intervention. The paper also provides a review of the prevalence of coups on the continent and a brief coverage of conceptual factors, which provides some understanding of civil-military relations as well as an indication of what the future holds.

Defining a coup d’état government policy”,2 a coup becomes defini- tive action that is legal and by its very charac- Nowamagbe Omoigui has said this about the ter designed to achieve some elusive successes. military and its relationship with state power structures: In other words, a coup d’état projects in the The military has an unrivalled capacity most direct manner possible the letter of gov- to project force. This makes it an impor- ernment’s intentions. Gregor Ferguson rein- tant tool for asserting state authority, forces this view with his personal perception enforcing the rule of law, and protecting of a coup as perpetuating reform and creating the nation against external aggression. a “new order” in which the “country was being Unfortunately, such power, if not prop- saved from itself or from the decadence and erly managed, can also pose a serious frivolity of the politicians who may be accused threat against civil authority as has been of weakening or dissipating the national spirit demonstrated numerous times in several or turning the country into what the fighting African countries.1 men perceive to be a laughing-stock”.3 Clearly, Graham Evans has defined the concept of a this is not the coup d’état that political leaders coup d’état in two ways in a manner that is dread and that military men and women can particularly fascinating. Firstly, by defining a hardly bring themselves to utter, even in the coup d’état as “a sudden and decisive stroke of privacy of their rooms. From the perspective

NAISON NGOMA is a senior researcher in in the Defence Sector Programme at the ISS 86 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 of ordinary people a coup d’état is the phe- subordinate to political authority. With be nomenon that brings about uncertain expec- democracy becoming the norm and a condi- are tations - the prelude to hope or disaster. This tion for either bilateral or multilateral donor brings to the fore the second dimension of the assistance - usually from the western hemi- concept as Evans sees it, which defines the sphere, the International Monetary Fund phenomenon as a “sudden and unconstitu- (IMF) and the World Bank - military coups or tional change of government or regime”.4 military coup attempts in Africa have become Other contributors to the subject of coups unacceptable to the point that the African d’état include Edward Luttwak with his suc- Union has a policy position to that effect.8 cinctly titled work “Coup d’état: A practical The states in the region also have legal provi- handbook”, and Samuel P. Huntington. sions making such acts high treason. Arising Edward Luttwak describes a coup as “the infil- from such a firm stand, it would not be tration of a small but critical segment of the expected that a coup would be attempted, let state apparatus, which is then used to displace alone accepted. In spite of the firmness the government from its control of the towards unconstitutional changes of govern- remainder” and in this manner excludes the ments, military regimes have continued to use of the military as the major actor respon- exist, as have attempts to replace civilian-led sible for the illegal action, as alluded to earli- governments by force, although these are not er in Gregor Ferguson’s similarly entitled as frequent as in the past. Extra-judicial activ- book “Coup d’état: A practical manual”. ities have continued to be a worrisome phe- Samuel Huntington has contributed in this nomenon.9 regard by placing coups in three categories: Four models of military coups d’état have “breakthrough”, “guardian”, and “veto”5. been identified.10 One model postulates that As intimated earlier, the mention of the coups are planned and coordinated by the word “coup d’état” tends to be met with stares military at the very top of the hierarchy. The of bewilderment, fear, anger, or even panic. In second model is one in which there is a com- a region in which states have been grudgingly bined civilian-military plot. The participants described as liberal democracies or at best as are generally senior officers and some ele- electoral democracies and with good reason ments of the government or opposition polit- regarded as either pseudo or virtual democra- ical parties. In contrast to these two models, cies6, an in-depth examination of the extra- the third one – regarded by Ferguson as rather legal activities is critical. However, although unusual - is externally mounted and involves the consequences of unconstitutional removal either mercenaries or foreign troops who may of a government are severe, the phenomenon be assisted by some disaffected opposition has not stopped. Perpetrators have often been politicians in the country. Ferguson’s fourth subjected to charges of treason and, if the model is a putsch. This is a clique within the coup is successful, continental and even glob- military whose membership may not neces- al sanctions against military governments are sarily be from the senior officers’ corps. It is applied, as well as isolation designed to per- nevertheless the prevalence of coups in Africa suade them to revert to democratic gover- that is of major concern in this paper, rather nance. than the type of coups they may illustrate. Coups or attempted coups were a common 7 phenomenon during the Cold War era and, A regional survey to a lesser extent, during the later period, and have continued to be a feature of the African The general prevalence of coups d’état, suc- continent. However, in the post-Cold War cessful and not successful, negatively affects the era, the participation by the military in gov- continent as a favoured destination of Foreign ernment is only an acceptable phenomenon if Direct Investment (FDI). These occurrences, it is in support of civil authorities. The together with the ones not even reported demands of democracy are that the military because of the justified fear that the countries Essay 87 concerned would be deemed unstable, have that democratisation brings about a more sta- contributed to the view of the continent as an ble socio-political environment. Indeed, mili- unstable region. With 80 successful coups, 181 tary coups continued to be generally successful failed ones, and an unknown number of coup throughout the period 1956-2001, as the table attempts between 1961 and 2004, 11 the above shows. Among the dimensions that may African region has probably only been out- provide an improved understanding of the done by Latin America.12 Omoigui notes that occurrence of military coups on the continent by 1989 “very few sub-Saharan countries had and possibly the best way the activities can be been spared the trauma of extra-constitutional checked is a conceptual examination of civil- seizure of power.”13 Today it is probably only military relations. Botswana, Namibia and Mauritius that have not been subjected to this scourge against A conceptual viewpoint democracy. These extra-constitutional activities are dis- This paper identifies two theoretical approach- turbing not necessarily because they are fre- es – organisational and praetorian models of quent or represent a setback to democratic and civil-military relations - as those that best elu- socio-economic development but because they cidate the broad issue of the manner in which have continued to occur. This is despite the the military and general society interact with increasing democratisation of the continent. each other. The discussion will first focus on The graph below (an extraction of data from the former model and, later on, on the latter McGowan) shows the rates of success of these one. The decision on which theoretical frame- coups.14 work to begin with is not significant. Although the period 1966 – 1970 had the highest rate of successful coups, what is partic- The organisational model ularly significant is that despite the demise of the Cold War in the late 1980s and the onset of Organisational theory identifies the military sustained liberal democracy, there has not been institution as an entity separate from other 15 the marked reduction in the incidences of non-military ones. Arising from this exclusive coups one would have expected. The increase character of the institution is the perception of in instances of military coups between 1995 a ‘military mystique’ - a development that has and 2001 challenges the general expectation been worsened by society’s own intrigue with it 88 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 to the point that the military embodies the very through a coup d’état. In this respect it may sanctity of the state. The coveted place the mil- be noteworthy to observe that of the 13 cur- itary occupies on national days, as it shows its rently serving heads of state who came to ‘wares’ during military parades and fly-pasts, power as a result of coups, 12 are from signifies society’s notion of the military’s ele- Africa!19 Is it possible that this may, in fact, be vated position. a reflection of society’s acceptance of some Organisation theory postulates the officer aspects of extra-judicial activity? corps as “an exclusive repository of mod- ernising values and devotion to the ideal of the The praetorian model state as opposed to the regime in power”.16 In the event that the officer corps regards the In contrast to the organisational model that regime as moving in a direction that it does not posits two significant actors – the officer corps consider being in the best interests of the coun- and the middle or emerging class - the praeto- try, it does not hesitate in making the govern- rian model acknowledges that the military par- ment irrelevant. This point is restated in ticipates in an environment that has a number Thomas Cox’s view of this self-acclamation of of other actors. However, the military remains the officer corps as a type of notch ahead of the the dominant group and in this sense is government in the art or science of statecraft - assured that most, if not all, of its demands are a phenomenon that explains the motivation met. In this regard, South African civil-mili- for some officers to seek the reins of power in tary relations of the apartheid era - during the belief that the ruling regime is not as effec- which period the military was able to get the tive as a military-led regime would be. resources it wanted - provides a firm example Generally, the military is seen by all and of this model on the continent.20 The military sundry as having the needed abilities to add in conflict zones or conflict-prone areas such value to the management of the affairs of state. as Angola and the Democratic Republic of the It is nevertheless important to note that Congo (DRC) may be seen in this light. It although the military has a certain contribution may even be argued that the relative signifi- to make towards the development of a state, cance of the defence budgets on the continent this contribution has not always been success- continues to be an indication that the military ful. Eric Nordlinger17 makes the point that the remains an important (if not the dominant) military is not the success organisational the- consumer of fiscal resources.21 Quite often the ory makes it out to be. Relatively poor eco- other sectors of society have “completely nomic management and restrained political (been) in the dark about the budgeting process activity have tended to manifest in virtually or the actual amount apportioned to the mil- all the countries that have had military itary”.22 regimes. The praetorian model also posits the exis- Organisational theory further postulates tence of an interaction between the military that close cooperation exists between officers and society at large and in this regard and the new middle class or emerging middle acknowledges the role of other actors, even if sectors of society. During the 1960s the in a diminished role relative to its own. The United States policy makers considered such model emphasises the general expectation by an alliance as the means of resolving the many “all groups” that the military intervenes in the challenges facing the developing world.18 running of the country. It also argues, how- Military coups of the time were therefore con- ever, that there is an absence of any tension sidered as positive! This helps explain the among the actors.23 The model, however, apparent acceptance of military regimes by posits a military that is neither autonomous the big powers during the early years of nor neutral in political issues and consequent- Africa’s political development until recently, ly suggests a society that expects active mili- when the continental body firmly resolved tary participation in the activities of not to recognise any regime brought about governance. The intervention by the military Essay 89 in Chile and the dominance of the military in tion. Foreign intervention as a factor is also a Algeria are a matter of record.24 matter that cannot be ignored. The democra- Another important dimension that the cy-stability link is an appropriate place to praetorian model addresses is the matter of begin the search for the missing link in the intra-military cohesion and in this regard it understanding of the military coups on the acknowledges “correlations between the African continent. absence of cohesion in the organisation and political fragmentation within the larger sys- Democratic governance- stability equation tem”.25 This view entails that the homogeneity characteristic of the military is not a given, Larry Diamond presents a rather robust argu- and tends to point to the existence of rivalry ment about the role of democracy in ensuring within the rank and file of the military. It is a coup-free environment today and in the probably within this general perspective that future.27 He postulates that “where civil socie- counter coups may be understood. ty is weak and the politics are corrupt and It follows from the praetorian model that divided, the military will prevail in that civil-military relations are considered to be moment of opportunity”28 regardless of very close, to the point that society ‘pushes’ whether it is distrusted or despised. The con- the military into taking the reins of power, verse belief is that with good democratic gov- even if it does not consider itself particularly ernance, characterised by an active civil effective in this role.26 It seems, therefore, society and corrupt-free politics, military that the intervention by the military in gov- coups will no longer occur. The assumption in ernment is driven more by the conclusion this case is that there is a firm link between that the country needs it in order to meet the democratic governance and stability. challenges at hand. The extent to which this The belief in a direct relationship between could explain the continued existence of democracy and the likelihood of military some coup leaders in government, a fact stat- coups or coup attempts does not appear to be ed earlier, is a matter for debate. What necessarily true for the African continent. remains, nevertheless, an important aim of When Nigeria recently had to put down a this paper is the search for possible explana- coup attempt, despite the improved demo- tions for the prevalence of military coups cratic practices of the elected regime following despite the firm stand against extra-judicial decades of military rule, it was evident that actions. other factors motivated this coup attempt.29 Indeed, despite the post-Cold War era being characterised by increasingly multi-party sys- Searching for a link tems of governance (generally understood as The search for explanations of illegal removal symptomatic of democratic practice), contin- of governments in Africa, or attempts to ued coups and coup attempts suggest that the remove them, begins with a critique of the tra- democratic-stability link is weak. Evidence ditional democracy-stability link, the notion indicates that the adherence to democratic that states that adherence to a democratic norms alone is no guarantee that states will ethos will generally create and retain a peace- not slide into the undemocratic tendencies ful environment. Another possible explana- characteristic of an earlier era, as is clear in the tion for military coups d’état may simply be table showing the incidence of successful the sheer greed of some actors, who may coups. either be citizens or foreigners, or even repre- The imperfections that characterise democ- sent an alliance of the two. Yet another plau- racy make it rather tenuous to argue that sible explanation may be the mere failure by adherence to democratic governance entails a those involved to perceive correctly that the stable environment. This is particularly the problem may be a combination of naivety, case in countries in which democracy is yet to ignorance or simply gullibility-driven motiva- take root. It is, therefore, necessary not to 90 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 assume a simple linkage between democracy would seem to be economies performing and stability but instead to acknowledge the beyond the demands made by the general complexity of a democratic society and seek society. Since this is hardly likely, given the to interrogate other dimensions that con- general lack of capacity of the states in the tribute to bringing about a stable environ- region, military coups remain a realistic threat. ment, free of coups d’état. The character of A more serious situation seen in some parts expectations and capabilities is one such of the continent is that of low expectations. dimension. This is a particularly dangerous scenario in that the general society might have lost confi- Greed and a crisis of expectations dence in an economy that may either be per- forming poorly or be improving, but only at a Although the African continent has undertak- very slow rate. States in conflict - like the en great strides in peace and development so DRC, Burundi, parts of the Sudan and much that is negative remains that the preva- Somalia - are often states experiencing declin- lence of the sort of instability discussed above ing capacity and expectations.32 Countries should really not come as a total surprise. like Zimbabwe, Zambia and Sierra Leone con- Nowamagbe Omoigui outlines a range of fea- form to the scenario of countries that are tures that have tended to characterise the improving their economic capacity but with African continent, including frequent and bit- high expectations 33. Both these scenarios pro- ter ethnic feuds30 and the lowest growth rate vide for a coup-prone environment. It is such in terms of per capita Gross Domestic Product environments that are particularly fertile for (GDP).31 The region also has the highest per- greed in society and that provide for a centage of very poor people in the world, with coup–prone situation. This greed is made the majority of poor people living below the worse by an insatiable taste for economic and international poverty line and having a gener- political power on the part of some members al low life expectancy. It is needless to men- of the military and civilian sectors. tion that the economies in Africa have tended Further contributing to the struggle for to be the worst performing on the entire scarce resources is what Nowamagbe Omoigui globe. identifies as the “limited opportunities for As a consequence of all these intractable extra-governmental acquisition of sustainable problems, the continent’s leadership and soci- wealth”.34 He makes the point that this is a ety strive to achieve a peaceful and stable common economic characteristic of a conti- region through the revitalisation of the nent on which accumulation of private wealth region’s economies in order to enhance its is generally due to “access to state power”, capacity to deliver on the numerous public often taking on the dimensions of a “race of expectations. However, although working gargantuan proportions for control of govern- towards fulfilling expectations contributes ment power”,35 Such a race, entered into by towards keeping peace in deprived societies, it numbers of political parties participating in does not guarantee that these expectations national elections, tend towards unconstitu- will be sufficiently addressed to make the inci- tional changes of governments due to their dence of coups unlikely. Nigeria is a case in attractive possibilities. Two issues may be point. In fact, the seemingly unremitting rate identified. Firstly, there are the pursuers of pri- of coups, as displayed earlier, shows that vate wealth who will do anything to achieve despite the improvements of sub-Saharan their goal.36 Once having achieved it, they Africa’s economic performance (which is gen- proceed to ensure that they keep it, under any erally considered synonymous with the circumstances - including through unconstitu- democratisation of the states) the danger of tional means. Since it is essentially the mili- coups d’état remains high. Society’s expecta- tary that holds the ultimate ‘weapon of tions have tended to supersede governments’ persuasion’, it is logical to assume that the economic capacity. The solution in this regard seekers of wealth would want to obtain the Essay 91 help of the military to access the state power learned of people, it is nevertheless not unrea- necessary to maintain their wealth. This is in sonable to argue that the poorly educated are line with Thomas Cox’s view of cooperation especially susceptible to being deceived or between some elements of the military and the misled. Therefore, since it is an undeniable middle class in terms of the organisational the- fact that the African continent has relatively ory of civil-military relations. While this higher levels of illiteracy than other conti- approach suggests greed as the major driving nents, it is more likely to experience an ‘unin- force, the middle class and its allies may also be formed’ reaction to what are often complex seeking solutions to the unfavourable socio- governance issues. economic and political situation generally char- The 1990 and 1997 military coup attempts acteristic of a major part of the continent. in Zambia represent inadequate attempts to Therefore, both greed and a positive desire to analyse the socio-political and economic chal- alter things for the better can be and have been lenges that faced the country. The 1990 the motivation for the use of unconstitutional attempt at illegally removing the Zambian means to bring about change. government, undertaken by Lieutenant Unlike some coups d’état that are elite led, Mwamba Luchembe, was preceded by a chaot- others have been ground based. Sometimes, ic environment that included unprecedented after a long period of poor economic condi- food riots in a country that had generally been tions, people abruptly ‘awaken’ and decide regarded as relatively stable.37 The riots were that ‘enough is enough’ and that an immedi- themselves triggered by government’s ate change of regime is required and, in the attempts to adhere to economic reforms process, invite the possibility of a veto mili- demanded by the International Monetary tary coup. Almost typical of such abrupt Fund.38 The economic austerity programmes ‘eruption’ by the ‘masses’ are the two political continued to prevail during 1997, when the movements in Zambia and Zimbabwe that infamous Captain Lungu who identified him- have ‘change’ as the major part of their names. self as Captain ‘Solo’ during the military coup It is in such an environment that the seem- attempt dubbed “Operation Born Again” ingly popular ‘Luchembe’ coup attempt in undertook to replace President Chiluba’s gov- Zambia, following food riots, may be placed. ernment. Although this event has been attrib- However, if inadequate government capac- uted to Captain Lungu’s compatriots’ ity, society’s unmet expectations, and greed excessive intake of alcohol,39 it is nevertheless on the part of some members of society have pertinent to note that the action taken by dis- tended to put in motion some unconstitu- senting soldiers was itself (as was the case in tional changes of government, credulity or, the earlier coup) embedded in a renewed put differently, naivety, ignorance and even multi-party environment characterised by sheer gullibility, have at times brought about continued economic challenges and a failure coups and coup attempts. to absorb the demands of the tenets of democracy. Although the failure may be Naivety, ignorance and gullibility attributed to more than one or two factors, the inability of the military coup perpetrators Yet another explanation for the prevalence of to perceive that the country was in any event military coups in Africa may actually not have undergoing political and economic reforms of anything to do with the high political or eco- intense magnitude may be explained away as nomic ideals one would have associated with indicative of naivety, ignorance or gullibility. those seeking the reins of state power but sim- ply be a result of naivety, ignorance or plain A case of foreign intervention gullibility, principally on the part of the organisers of coups and, to a lesser extent, on The prevalence of military coups in Africa the part of their supporters. While these fac- may also be attributed to exogenous factors. tors can indeed be found amongst the most Foreign intervention as a significant cause of 92 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 coups or coup attempts is a contentious matter been given with the intention of uplifting the that is often hastily dismissed as nothing but officers’ professionalism, may in fact turn out one of those ‘conspiracy’ theorists, ‘bashers’ of to serve their entry into the political field Western states and business who are said to rather than enhance their military knowledge. always see the hand of ‘colonialists’ and the Foreign intervention as a ‘push factor’ for ‘imperialists’ whenever political upheavals due coups d’état is therefore a matter that cannot largely to the poor governance that occurs in be disputed, as mercenary activity is a known their countries. Yet the history of foreign gov- element on the continent, and past events - ernments and foreign businesses in bringing such as those in Angola during the late down governments in Africa has been well doc- Ronald Reagan’s presidency and in South umented.40 Tacit support for unconstitutional Africa during apartheid - testify to govern- changes of governments in the region during mental participation. However, for how long the Cold War era cannot be disputed. Angola, exogenous actors will continue to be signifi- Congo and even Nigeria are some of the clear- cant in this matter in the face of rigorous con- er examples where foreign governments and tinental and international consensus that multinational corporations have played roles in governments – however detestable – are not subverting some of the governments in the to be removed by force but by democratic states. The role of foreign intervention has means is a matter for conjuncture. resurged with that of mercenaries and both these open and subtle involvement of foreign Peering into the future actors. The standard motivation factors include new business openings and geo-political inter- What the future holds for Africa in regard to ests. The Equatorial Guinea saga and the role unconstitutional changes of government is a that mercenaries were going to play in the matter one can afford to be cautiously opti- removal of the government in that country, mistic about, and one that has been well with foreign assistance (most likely only foreign expressed by Larry Diamond in his declara- businesses) in partnership with some power- tion that: hungry local politicians, is a more recent indi- While the circumstances in Africa today cation of the nature of foreign intervention. are dire, they are not hopeless. In fact, It is also a notable factor that foreign inter- they offer more grounds for hope than vention may initially take the form of positive at any time in the past three decades.42 moves to contribute to raising the technical or Diamond provides several justifications for administrative capacity of some military in this optimism by identifying the counter- the region. However the extent to which this trends against the “greed, suspicion, fragmen- remains at the level of altruism is subject to tation, exploitation, violence” that have been debate. With the constant shifts in geo-poli- associated with politics on the continent. He tics and, consequently, in alliances that are also argues that the growing acceptance of designed to meet concerns of national inter- market and democratic principles among est, it would not be unexpected for foreign many African elites, the general weariness of donors to maximise their influence in some violent conflict, the apparent willingness to elements of the military in order to reflect sacrifice for a more peaceful continent, and their shifted concerns. The United States’ the growing intolerance of corruption are all position on coups in the developing world, indicative of a continent that demands a outlined in the conceptual discourse articulat- peaceful and prosperous future. Diamond also ed earlier, is indicative of this point. Therefore refers to a mass media that “seeks better, more “instill[ing] U.S.-style military discipline”41 liberal, responsible, and humane governance designed to mitigate the emergence of mili- for the society rather than immediate, material tary officers who may attempt to pursue an rewards for themselves”.43 active political life, may turn out to be count- With the inauguration of the Peace and er-productive. The training, which will have Security Council (PSC)44 at the continental Essay 93 level, which has further reinforced the African Notes Union’s undertaking not to recognise govern- ments from extra-constitutional action, it may 1N Omoigui, Military Defence Pacts in Africa, be reasonably assumed that the frequency of . 2G Evans and J Newnham (1998). The Penguin dic- such undemocratic practices will reduce con- tionary of international relations, London, Penguin siderably, if not disappear altogether. However, Books, 1998, p 100. the observation that “an army may be ninety 3G Ferguson, Coup d’etat: A practical manual, Arms percent professional but still coup prone”,45 sig- & Armour Press, New York, 1987, pp 17-18. nifies that classic causes of coups as those dis- 4 Ibid. 5 Breakthrough coups are those undertaken by rel- cussed above, require careful study if the atively junior members of the military with the problem of coups d’état is to be successfully intention of creating a new bureaucratic elite resolved. while the guardian coups are those designed to It is therefore in this light that the essay stop chaos and disorder and do not necessarily imply a change in the structural make up of argues that the democratic governance-stability power. Veto coups are those in which the military connection should not be accepted uncritical- violently suppresses a general civilian uprising. ly. The continuation of what Keith Somerville For details see “Dictionary and Encyclopedia”, describes as “Africa’s virulent military virus” in , p 2. 6For a lengthier discussion of the character of the an environment that seeks both political and African state see L Diamond, Developing economic pluralism clearly shows that the democracy in Africa: African and international mere transition to democratic governance is no imperatives, . further point that the paper makes is that sheer 7Ferguson regards the phenomenon as a mere fact of political life much the same way as taxes and greed and the crises of expectations play a sig- the lesser aspects of human beings like hypocrisy nificant role as ‘push factors’ for these activi- and personal greed, See Gregor Ferguson, ibid, p ties. Military coups are prevalent in Africa 7. because of the generally low levels of literacy. 8 African leaders pledge to oppose coups, support democracy, June 4 1997, Such uninformedness leads the majority of the . cal and economic reforms in a manner that is 9The most recent military coup attempt was premised on naivety, ignorance or gullibility. planned for 14 August 2004 in Mauritania. The The role of some foreign governments and for- country also had a failed putsch in June 2003. IRIN, Mauritania: Defence Minister confirms eign business is another issue that has been coup plot, arrests, August 11 2004. articulated in this article. Therefore, in seeking . a sustained solution to this “military virus” the The elaboration of what the concept of a putsch is African Union and its sub-structures ought to in contrast to a military coup below. 10 Ferguson, op cit, p 113-125. supplement the current policy of non-recogni- 11 The latest coup attempt in Nigeria has been mere- tion of governments that come about through ly explained away as “a breach of national securi- military intervention and sub-regional military ty”. See also A Borzello, Nigeria probes military standby arrangements with a vigorous interro- on ‘coup’, BBC News World Edition, 2 April gation of the problem. This essay is an effort to 2004, . 12 Rise of democracy in South America, contribute to the search for the link that is still . missing for a complete understanding of the 13 N Omoigui, op cit. See also Samuels Decalo, causes of military coups and coup attempts in Modalities of civil-military stability in Africa, Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies, 27(4), 1989, p 547-578. See also Africa at a glance: Facts and fig- ures 2001/02, Africa Institute of South Africa, 2002, Figure 36 on unconstitutional changes of government, 1952-1999. 14 P McGowan, African military coups d’etat, 1956- 2001: frequency, trends and distribution, Journal of Modern African Studies, 41(3), 2003, p 351. 94 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

15 T Cox, Civil-military relations in Sierra Leone: A SIDA Nov 2002, and J Ngoma and A Toure, case study of African soldiers in politics, Harvard Zambia: World Bank supports economic expan- University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and sion and diversification in Zambia. ; Zimbabwe: Investments, credibility 16 Ibid, 9. and the dynamics following trade liberalisation. 17 See E Nordlinger, Soldiers in politics military coups and G Gono, Monetary policy statement: N.J., 1977. The second quarterly to 30 June 2004, July 2004, 18 Ibid, p. 8. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. 19 “Dictionary and Encyclopedia”, op cit, pp 3-4. 34 Omoigui, op cit. 20 P Frankel, Pretori’s Praetorians: Civil-military rela- 35 Ibid. tions in South Africa, Cambridge University Press, 36 It needs to be noted that while the general com- Cambridge, London, New York and Melbourne, mercial actors may have no desire to acquire or 1984. indeed control political power, they would never- 21 IDRC, Budgeting for Defence in Africa, theless not be oblivious to the value of state . power and therefore the desire by some of them 22 Ibid, p 1. to facilitate extra-legal activities. 23 Frankel, op cit, p 9. 37 G Machona, A harvest of treason trials, in A 24 See and E. Hermassi, 1972. flict. . Africa, Macmillan Press, London, p. 141. 38 Ibid. See also M Mulenga, A glance at Zambia’s 25 Cox, op cit, p 9. political history. . 27 Diamond, op cit. 39 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 40 Coups arranged or backed by the USA. 29 Nigeria probes ‘security breach’, BBC News, 2 . April 2004, pp 1 - 2. See also A Borzello, op cit. See also P Goodenough, Zimbabwe says US, 30 The recent massacre of refugees in a camp in Others Behind Alleged Mercenary Coup Plot. Burundi is a case in point. For further details see www.cnsnews.com and A Talbot, British C Tomlinson, Massacre of Refugees in Burundi Guardian backs CIA dirty tricks on Zimbabwe, 28 threatens to re-ignite conflict, August 18 2004. August 2002. . aug2002/muga-a28.shtml>. 31 M McPherson and T Rakovski, Trade and growth 41 R Newman and K Whitelaw, The military is the in Sub-Saharan Africa: Further empirical evi- key, U.S.News & World Report, November 1 dence, African Economic Policy Discussion 1999, . Paper Number 6, 4 May 2001, . 43 Ibid. 32 The concept of “failed states” may actually be 44 The Peace and Security Council was officially applied to the majority of these states. For inaugurated on 26 May 2004. See also L Goering, debates on the concept of “failed states” see A Africa nations from council on security, Hamilton, Idea of state fatally flawed, August 22 . 187223_nationalstate22.html> and R Wilde, The 45 Omoigui, op cit. skewed responsibility narrative of the Failed States concept. . 33 There has been a surge of investments in-flow in these countries and improved economic performance. See Sierra Leone country commer- cial guide FY2004. , O Hesselmark, A country ICT survey for Zambia, COMMENTARY

THE AFRICA CLEARING HOUSE

MARTIN PLAUT1

Introduction Aim On May 24 – 25th 2004 senior officers from The aim of the Africa Clearing House (ACH) Europe, the United States and Canada met at was spelled out by Lt Col Phil Rogers, of the Senningen Chateau in Luxembourg for the US Marine Corps at the start of the meeting. first meeting of what was termed the ‘Africa ‘Goal – To provide a multi-lateral forum to Clearing House’. Europe was represented by exchange information on security assistance Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Ireland, and cooperation programs for the African Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, the continent; to establish the ACH as the pre- Netherlands, Luxembourg and Austria (repre- mier mechanism for continued information senting the UN’s Standby High Readiness exchange, cooperation and future collabora- 2 Brigade - Shirbrig). Also in attendance were tion.’ Colonel Rogers then went on to indi- representatives of Nato and the European cate how it was anticipated that the ACH Union. The conference, co-hosted by the U.S. would operate. It would meet quarterly or semi-annually; there would be a rotating host and Luxembourg and took as its focus West nation which would act as chair and it would Africa and Ecowas – the Economic be open to all interested Nato and European Community of West African States. It is also Union member states. worth noting that there was no African pres- A long list of aims were then presented: ence at Senningen, something that is due to be • Prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict on the corrected at the next meeting, scheduled for continent. December 2004. •Prepare African armed forces and regional The meeting was convened without any organisations for contingency operations publicity and was concluded without a brief- • Professionalise African militaries ing to the press. The Africa Clearing House is •Increase African capacity to prevent and the brainchild of the Eucom – the U.S. respond to terrorist activities European Command, which covers all of • Increase democracy, good governance and Africa, except for Sudan and the Horn. It is respect for the rule of law, and help strength- arguably one of the most important interna- en civil society tional security initiatives relating to the • Strengthen private sector economic growth African continent that is presently under way. and increasing productivity through It is certainly the least well known. expanded trade and investment •Counter the spread of Hiv/Aids MARTIN PLAUT is Africa editor with BBC World Service News. 98 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

• Preserve West Africa’s sustainable resource and global trade.5 As the Kansteiner report base, unique eco-systems. argued: “…Africa has assumed a new, strategic Each of the participants then ran through a place in U.S. foreign policy and in the defini- presentation of just what their nation or tion of U.S. national interests.”6 organisation was undertaking in Africa in gen- Of these factors oil is perhaps the most sig- eral, and West Africa in particular. nificant. It is estimated that by 2010 American The Spanish presentation was particularly reliance on Sub-Saharan oil will rise from the graphic.3 It highlights a concern that is present level of 17% to approximately 25%.7 reflected in a number of European presenta- US corporate investment in the Nigerian and tions, namely the perceived threat of migra- Angolan oil industries was worth $1.8 billion tion. It showed the 14 kilometres that in 2003 alone.8 separates the African mainland from Spain This increasing dependency and level of (actually showing how far Africa is from economic involvement has brought with it an Gibraltar, but that is perhaps beside the increased perception of risk. This was point.) It then indicated the populations of admirably laid out in a recent report by the North Africa and Europe, with large red Washington based think-tank, the Centre for arrows pointing northwards. Finally it pre- Strategic and International Studies. 9 sented the rising trend of illegal immigration New threats and vulnerabilities are to Spain, from around 10,000 in 1998 to over emerging in the region: (1) indigenous 120,000 by 2002. Migration is clearly a signif- militant Islamic groups, concentrated in icant concern for all the delegations from Nigeria and neighboring states, that are southern Europe. linked to externally supported local The other major focus was terrorism. madrassas; (2) the migration southwards Colonel Mike Anderson, the head of the US from Algeria and other North African delegation, put it this way: venues of terrorist movements, most “Africa can no longer be regarded as a terti- notably the Algerian Salafist Movement ary effort. It is a focus of US military policy. for Combat and Prayer, which reported- And it’s a focus because we realise that we ly has established training bases in Mali need to be proactive versus reactive, in terms and Niger; (3) Lebanese trading commu- of dealing with some of the issues that we are nities, long-standing support networks dealing with elsewhere in the world - terror- for Hizballah, some of which are report- ism, illegal immigration, arms trafficking - and edly engaged in illicit diamond traffick- the best way to do that is to be proactive in ing, money laundering, and the sowing the seed corn of stability and security movement of lethal materiel; and (4) a in Africa.”4 rising number of conspicuous, minimal- ly protected economic installations, Background especially in the energy sector, that are overtly tied to Western corporate inter- American focus on Africa has grown in recent ests. Early in 2003, Osama bin Laden years. The lack of interest that characterised publicly exhorted his followers to make the period immediately after the end of the Nigeria a global priority: it is a country Cold War is now firmly in the past. The events divided along a Muslim/Christian fault that are generally credited with initiating this line; its wealth and stability are tied inti- trend were the bombing of the U.S. embassies mately to Western capital and technolo- in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, in gy; and it offers multiple entry points which 224 people were killed. Since then five and local partners. The U.S. European factors have been identified as really shaping Command, mandated to reconfigure the policy towards Africa in Washington: the war deployment of U.S. assets to the south on terrorism, the rising importance of African in Africa and eastward in Europe, has oil, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, armed conflicts begun expanding activities in West and Commentary 99

Central Africa. This has taken the form injunction from the High Court blocking of the Pan Sahel initiative, intended to their deportation from the country. Despite build the counterterrorism capacities of this the men – from Somalia, Kenya, Saudi Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania Arabia and Turkey – were taken from Malawi through training and the provision of and held in Zimbabwe where they were inter- equipment. A number of other access rogated for a month before finally being freed. agreements have been concluded The incident outraged the Muslim communi- (Ghana, Senegal, Gabon, Algeria, and ty of Malawi, which rioted, clashing with Morocco) or are under discussion police. Amnesty International issued a state- (Angola, São Tomé and Principe, and ment complaining that: “Once again it seems Nigeria). There is also active considera- that the US may have been involved in a tion of expanding assistance to strength- transfer which circumvents basic human en the coast guards of energy-rich states rights protections and national law”.13 whose maritime security is weak. Since that passage was written only one factor Conclusion has really changed. The commitment to Africa has increased. The Pan Sahel initiative has had The U.S. is clearly determined to pursue the its area of operation expanded and is now war against terrorism wherever it leads. The renamed the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorist question is to what extent it is willing to sub- Initiative. As part of this programme U.S. mit its legitimate security concerns to the kind troops have finished training African special of limitations that are required for satisfactory forces in Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad.10 multilateral action. To what extent are its Nato What is clear from the above is that Africa allies prepared to pool resources and priorities is of increasing strategic importance to the in Africa? How many European priorities in U.S. The Africa Clearing House needs to be Africa is Washington really willing to take on seen against this background: as a U.S. board? And, most importantly of all, to what attempt to co-ordinate the work of Nato and extent are African concerns to be reflected in Europe so as to meet commonly perceived the work of the Africa Clearing House? risks posed in, for and by Africa. These are just questions at this stage, but These developments come at a time when they will have to be tackled as the project Africa itself is taking its security more serious- unfolds. What is clear, even at this initial ly. As Nelson Alusala demonstrated, the stage, is that if the ACH really becomes the African Union’s Peace and Security Council is ‘premier mechanism for continued informa- now functioning and beginning to work on tion exchange, cooperation and future collab- the formation of five regionally based standby oration’ on Africa, then it will be worth much brigades that should be ready for deployment more serious scrutiny than has been possible by 2010.11 This is something that is enthusias- so far. tically endorsed by the U.S. General Charles Wald, second in command of Eucom, and Notes responsible for Africa has given it his whole- hearted support. He went on to indicate that 1 Martin has written extensively on South Africa and the Horn of Africa and is co-editor (with the Ecowas intervention in Liberia was very Dominique Jacquin-Berdal) of ‘Unfinished much the kind of initiative that Washington Business: the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea’ welcomed.12 Red Sea Press, (forthcoming). It is, however, less clear is what will take 2 All the presentations from the meeting are avail- able on the Eucom website. , not coincide. For example, in June 2003 year . local security forces, working with the Central 3 4Telephone interview with the author. 100 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

5 Rising US Stakes in Africa: Seven proposals to 9 Ibid. pp 14 – 5. strengthen US – Africa Policy, A Report of the 10 Reuters 23 September 2004 Africa Policy Advisory Panel, chaired by Walter 11 African Standby Force: East Africa Moves on. Kansteiner, Centre for Strategic and International African Security Review,Vol 13 No 2, Institute for Studies, Washington, May 2004, page 2. Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, 2004. 6 Ibid. pp 2. 12 Author’s interview with General Wald, Camp 7 Bottom of the barrel: Africa’s oil boom and the poor. Patch, Stuttgard, Germany, 22 March 2004. Ian Garry and Terry Karl, Catholic Relief 13 Amnesty International press release, 25 June 2003. Services, pp 14. . David Goldwyn and J. Stephen Morrison (co- chairs), Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, March 2004, pp 8. COMMENTARY

PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS IN AFRICA Rogue or regulated?

ANGELA MCINTYRE

In a 2003 article Peter W. Singer described a Lifeguard provided security for the staff of fictional scenario in which a private military humanitarian agencies in Sierra Leone, the firm (PMF), in response to a genocide unfold- PMFs Pacific Architects and Engineers and ing in the shadow of international inertia, ICI Oregon supported ECOMOG forces in steps forward with an offer to secure safe West Africa and currently both UNMIL havens for refugees. (Liberia) and UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone). More Fiction moved a step closer to reality than a decade ago, the American firm Brown recently when the United States pledged more and Root (now Kellogg, Brown and Root, than US $200 million in the form of private employed in support of American troops in contracts in support of the African Union Iraq) was contracted by the US Department of Mission in Sudan. In August of this year, Defence to support American military peace- Lieutenant Colonel Michael Bittrick, the US keeping interventions (a time when the US State Department’s deputy director of region- still sent troops on African peace missions) in al security affairs for Africa flew to Addis both Somalia and Rwanda. Ababa to work out the details of an agreement There has been great deal of involvement of by which two private firms, Dyncorp the sector in protecting infrastructures and Corporation and Pacific Architects and industries in conflict areas, as well as in sup- Engineers will provide housing, office equip- porting governments in the training, equip- ment, transport and communications equip- ping and restructuring of armed forces, ment in support of African Union troops. intelligence gathering, ad infinitum. Private Although the nature of the support is logisti- military firms are as pervasive in Africa as cal and may therefore seem innocuous, it security problems themselves. According to nonetheless enables scarce military resources the watchdog organization Public Integrity, to be concentrated where they are most need- there are few African states that have not, at ed. True to the new mantra of north-south some time or another, engaged the services of peacekeeping collaboration, it also spares the a private military firm in some capacity, either donor country the risk of putting its soldiers’ in the handling of crises or more often, in the lives at risk in a conflict that is, for the more mundane training, support and equip- moment, of marginal interest to its foreign ping of armed forces. Furthermore, the trans- policy goals. mutations and permutations of companies, This is not the first time that the support of some of which have been remained in place a multi-national peacekeeping force has been before, during and after conflicts, defy static contracted out to PMFs. Firms such as typologies. ANGELA MCINTYRE senior researcher in the Interact Project at the ISS 102 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004

Although the phenomenon of soldiers-for- opinions. There are few, if any, PMFs that hire is as old as history itself, the growth of the have had the combination of corporate struc- corporate private military sector can be linked ture, effectiveness and government-backed to the end of the cold war. An instant, by- mandates of Executive Outcomes and thus default new world order brought about the the more pedestrian players in the sector tend downsizing of the huge militaries of the to be overlooked or concealed by govern- north, and the resulting surplus of military ments, who are either conscious of the public- expertise and equipment meant that practical- image risks or aware of the convenience of ly any activity normally undertaken by a state ‘security considerations’ in obscuring their military can now be outsourced. In Africa, activities. where state security apparatuses have faced an Some will argue that there is no place in the epidemic of internal conflicts once managed civilized world for the private sector in the or suppressed by superpower manipulation, military domain, whether they operate at the the coincidence of supply and demand has ‘sharp end of the spear’ or remain at its rear been a propitious one. Private military firms echelons. Corpwatch, another corporate have sprung up across the globe, including watchdog agency expressed its concerns about several based in South Africa and Zimbabwe, the employment of PMFs in the Sudan, citing addressing all manner of military require- the lack of transparency surrounding contracts ments of African states, and in rare cases, non- justified by ‘business confidentiality’, and cit- state actors. ing that they circumvent US Congressional The lack of state legislation and/or regional oversight. There are further concerns about agreements aimed governing PMFs is there- codes of conduct and the training and profes- fore of concern, but understandable given sionalism of employees. In another case, when that the activities of PMFs, in keeping with the American PMF Military Professional the general opacity of the defence sector Resources Inc. (MPRI) was asked by the worldwide, have come to light only in excep- Government of Equatorial Guinea to evalu- tional cases. ate its armed forces with particular attention Public awareness of this sector has been to the protection of its offshore oil reserves shaped by a few remarkable events, such as and installations, the Clinton administration the involvement of the now-defunct South refused to grant the requisite license from the African PMF Executive Outcomes in support- State Department given the Malabo regime’s ing the Angolan government in training its history of detention and torture of political armed forces and fighting the UNITA insur- opposition members, among other human gents in the early 1990s, and in leading an rights abuses. Although the decision was assault in Sierra Leone that prevented the briefly reversed in 2000, the collaboration rebel Revolutionary United Front from com- subsequently came to very little. But these pletely overrunning the Sierra Leonean events highlight the kind of oversight of the Capital of Freetown in the latter part of the industry that is urgently required. decade. Short of outlawing the industry entirely, a Opinions of Executive Outcomes remain sporadic and reactive approach to the private divided, particularly on the subject of Sierra military sector is not likely to address the Leone where undoubtedly thousands of peo- complexity of issues that surround the use of ple were spared the brutality of an onslaught PMFs. In 1998, the South African of the RUF as a result of the company’s inter- Government passed the Regulation of Foreign vention. Allegations of payment-in-kind in Military Assistance Act (FMAA), largely in the form of diamond mining concessions, and response to the activities of Executive the company’s ties with oil industry interests Outcomes in Sierra Leone, which sought to in Angola have cast serious doubts on its restrict the involvement of South African citi- accountability. But the unusual example of zens in conflicts abroad, as well as controlling Executive Outcomes is bound to polarize the the activities of companies operating on Commentary 103

South African soil. Critics of the FMAA point sible and properly governed) would surely be out that it offers no distinction between legiti- preferable. Although there is little data avail- mate private military activity and mercenarism. able, it is likely that several hundred One result of this may be that potential Mozambican ex-combatants have been suc- recruits to the industry prefer to circumvent cessfully reintegrated into the private sector, the requirement of seeking permission from albeit into domestic security companies. the National Conventional Arms Control Given the growth of the private military Committee rather than running the risk of sector and its current embeddedness in Africa, becoming enmeshed in a process that appears regulating strictly against PMFs could have to lack clarity, and for some, is felt to penalize the adverse results of reducing state trans- a sector of the population, namely former parency regarding the defence sector and driv- South African Defence Force (SADF) soldiers ing private actors underground. The risk of demobilized during the post-Apartheid trans- the emergence of mercenary groups in this formation, whose military backgrounds and scenario would increase. While the skills are in demand elsewhere, if not in their Organization of African Unity produced in home country. At the moment, there are esti- 1977 the Convention for the Elimination of mated to be some 1,500 South Africans work- Mercenarism, which was couched in the lan- ing for PMFs in Iraq, and hundreds more guage of inter-state conflict and independence working throughout the world for companies struggles, little has been done in the way of whose activities range from guarding infra- developing regulatory frameworks for the pri- structure to clearing landmines. vate military industry that could effectively Like many countries that have witnessed prevent PMFs from going rogue. Perhaps large-scale demobilizations following regime most significantly, many PMFs are anxious to changes, South Africa has been a fertile see the development of rational regulatory recruiting ground for the private military sec- frameworks and willing to submit to the mon- tor. Elsewhere, such as in conflict-wracked itoring of their activities. The development of West Africa, large-scale demobilizations and benchmarks for good (and ethical) business inadequate measures for reintegrating soldiers practice opens the doors for the legitimization into civilian life have resulted in a surge in of firms and thus more contract opportuni- mercenarism, mainly among young soldiers ties, but also for the civil oversight of the whose needs are clearly not being met by the industry. plethora of reintegration initiatives in the Regulation of the private military sector has region and choose rather to seek out the next become an issue of governance; wherein the war. The migration of Liberian, Sierra activities of firms can only be legitimatized by Leonean and Guinean fighters between con- both their states of origin and those states, flicts in has been cited by UN Secretary regional bodies, or, in the case of the United General Kofi Annan as one of the key causes Nations, international authorities, that of instability in the region. The absorption of employ their services. ex-soldiers into the private sector (where pos- COMMENTARY

ZIMBABWE The MDC’s electoral boycott

CHRIS MAROLENG

Zimbabwe’s largest opposition party, the the current electoral framework would be tan- Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), tamount to endorsing an illegitimate process, announced on 25 August 2004 that it would open to manipulation and vote rigging by the not contest the parliamentary elections sched- ruling party. It maintains that the ruling uled for March 2005. The MDC said it party’s proposed technical reforms of the elec- believed that the political environment in toral laws only partly address the minimum which elections would be held would be inim- standards required to improve the transparen- ical to a free and fair poll, and added that it cy and fairness of polling. This August, the would reconsider its decision only after a com- government responded to calls for compre- prehensive reform of the political system. hensive changes to the system by proposing a The party cited legislation such as the series of technical reforms to the electoral Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the laws. This may also have been an attempt to Access to Information and Protection of anticipate the adoption of electoral guidelines Privacy Act (AIPPA)—both of which circum- by the 14-member Southern African scribe civil liberties and freedom of expres- Development Community (SADC). sion—as major obstacles to participation. It The reforms proposed by the government claimed that Zimbabwean law enforcement of Zimbabwe included changes that would see agencies, directed by the governing Zimbabwe voting limited to a single day, the tabulation African National Union–Patriotic Front of election results at polling stations rather (ZANU-PF) routinely used these statutes and than at central locations, and the establish- other regulations to silence or exert pressure ment of an independent electoral commis- on the political opposition and pro-democra- sion. Although these reforms go some way cy activists. The MDC alleged that these laws, towards improving conditions on the actual coupled with the rules relating to the conduct day of the poll, they fail to address the broad- of elections, were intended to undermine the er political context in which elections are held opposition and tilt the political playing field in Zimbabwe. In fact, the MDC had set out to the ruling party’s advantage. the minimum standards under which it would The government has responded to the be prepared to participate in elections in a MDC’s decision by claiming that the opposi- party policy document entitled ‘Restore’. tion was afraid to test its popularity at the David Coltart, MDC MP and shadow justice polls, fearing inevitable defeat. Regardless of minister, assesses the shortcomings of the gov- the actions of the MDC, it said, the parlia- ernment’s proposal as follows: “What the rul- mentary contest would proceed on schedule. ing party’s proposal clearly demonstrates is The MDC argues that participation under that they view an election as an event as CHRIS MAROLENG is a researcher in the African Security Analysis Programme at the ISS 106 African Security Review 13(3) • 2004 opposed to a process.” in South Africa’s weekly newspaper, Mail and At this year’s SADC summit in Mauritius, Guardian, Iden Wetherell expressed the opin- the region’s leaders unanimously agreed to a ion that although it was understandable that protocol establishing minimum standards for the MDC should wish to “draw a line in the elections in the member states. The summit sand” the timing of this decision not to par- chairperson, Mauritian Prime Minister Paul ticipate in the election was flawed, and denied Berenger, said that SADC sought to establish the opposition an opportunity to “test the an environment in which all political parties government’s sincerity against the SADC could campaign freely, without fear of the electoral principles step by step”. The point threat of violence or hindrance in their cam- has also been made that other SADC mem- paigning and access to the media. bers could take offence at the MDC’s deci- In every election since independence, sion, which might harm the party’s attempts Zimbabwe’s ruling party has been accused of to garner regional support. various kinds of illicit electoral manipulation. Nevertheless, the MDC remains convinced Following the last general election in 2000, that President Mugabe’s strategy is to stall the the MDC lodged legal objections to the implementation of any comprehensive results in 37 constituencies, claiming serious reforms until the last few weeks before the irregularities in the conduct of the polling. elections, in the hope that enough damage Four years have passed, and the Zimbabwean would have been done to the opposition’s judiciary has yet to pronounce on the opposi- campaign to render it virtually defeated before tion petitions. the polls. In the face of this, the options open The presidential polls of 2002 were also to the MDC are few and far apart. The expec- marred in controversy, as the MDC was sup- tation that SADC will somehow exert pres- ported by elements of the international com- sure on the Zimbabwean government to munity in condemning the conduct of these implement reforms in line with the newly elections. The ruling party summarily dis- adopted protocol on elections may, in view of missed these complaints, though this resulted past practice, be overly optimistic and even in Zimbabwe’s suspension and subsequent unrealistic. Although South Africa’s President withdrawal from the Commonwealth in Thabo Mbeki made it clear that member December 2003. states who fail to comply with the provisions Although the Zimbabwean government of the protocol could face suspension from has shown little interest in implementing the regional body, it remains to be seen reforms in line with the new SADC protocol, whether SADC (or for that matter any of many political observers have questioned the Zimbabwe’s neighbours) will take a firm wisdom of the MDC’s boycott. Commenting stance against the ZANU-PF regime.