Ec Budget 2007

House of Lords London

European Union Committee SW1A 0PW www.parliament.uk/hleuc

The primary purpose of the House of Lords European Union Select Committee is to scrutinise EU law in draft before the Government take a position on it in the EU Council of Ministers. This scrutiny is frequently carried out through correspondence with Ministers. Such correspondence, including Ministerial replies and other materials, is published where appropriate.

This edition includes correspondence from 4 June 2014 - 30 March 2015

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

(SUB-COMMITTEE C)

CONTENTS

ACCESSION OF AFGHANISTAN TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (UNNUMBERED) . 7

ACCESSION OF ECUADOR TO THE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND COLOMBIA AND PERU (UNNUMBERED) ...... 7

A EUROPEAN UNION MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY (7537/14) ...... 7

A NEW DEAL FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE: IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP FOR COMMUNICATION COM(2013)542; TOWARDS A MORE COMPETITIVE AND EFFICIENT DEFENCE AND SECURITY SECTOR (11358/14) ...... 8

APPLICATION OF SPECIFIC MEASURES TO COMBAT TERRORISM, AND REPEALING DECISION 2014/72/CFSP (UNNUMBERED) ...... 9

ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY AND THEIR MEMBER STATES, OF THE ONE PART, AND THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA, OF THE OTHER PART (7941/14) ...... 11

ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY AND THEIR MEMBER STATES, OF THE ONE PART, AND THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA, OF THE OTHER PART (7944/14) ...... 13

ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY AND THEIR MEMBER STATES, OF THE ONE PART, AND THE REPUBLIC OF TURKMENISTAN, OF THE OTHER PART (UNNUMBERED) ...... 15

ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY AND THEIR MEMBER STATES, OF THE ONE PART, AND THE REPUBLIC OF UKRAINE, OF THE OTHER PART (13519/14) ...... 16

ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT(S) WITH ANDORRA, MONACO AND SAN MARINO: ADOPTION OF NEGOTIATING MANDATE (UNNUMBERED) ...... 16

A STRONGER ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN ACHIEVING INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (9802/14) ...... 17

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC – STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT (SOMA) (UNNUMBERED) ...... 18

CITATION OF ARTICLE 28 TEU IN COUNCIL DECISIONS RELATING TO EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES (UNNUMBERED) ...... 18

COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP) MISSION IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: EUBAM RAFAH (UNNUMBERED) ...... 19

COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: POLICING IN AFGHANISTAN (UNNUMBERED) ...... 23

CONSEQUENCES OF RUSSIA’S ILLEGAL ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA – EU RESPONSE (UNNUMBERED) ...... 23

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS (UNNUMBERED) ...... 24

COUNCIL DECISION LAUNCHING THE EUROPEAN UNION CSDP MISSION IN MALI (EUCAP SAHEL MALI) AND AMENDING DECISION 2014/219/CFSP (UNNUMBERED) ...... 24

DEVELOPMENT FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, AND GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL: 12-16 DECEMBER (UNNUMBERED) ...... 25

ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT WITH THE WEST AFRICAN REGION (13263/14, 13217/14) ...... 29

ELEMENTS FOR AN EU STRATEGY ON PUBLIC SECURITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (10108/14) ...... 30

ENGAGING WITH THE EU INSTITUTIONS ON UK PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY (UNNUMBERED) ...... 31

ESTABLISHING A MECHANISM TO ADMINISTER THE FINANCING OF THE COMMON COSTS OF EUROPEAN UNION OPERATIONS HAVING MILITARY OR DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS (ATHENA) (18066/11) ...... 31

EU-ALGERIA RELATIONS (11520/14) ...... 32

EU AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: STABILISATION AND ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT (UNNUMBERED) ...... 32

EUCAP NESTOR (UNNUMBERED) ...... 33

EU CSDP MISSION IN NIGER (UNNUMBERED) ...... 34

EU CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY (UNNUMBERED)...... 35

EU CHINA INVESTMENT AGREEMENT (UNNUMBERED) ...... 36

EU CSDP: UPDATE ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE JUNE 2015 EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON DEFENCE (UNNUMBERED) ...... 37

EU - FIJI – ARTICLE 96 OF THE COTONOU AGREEMENT, DISCONTINUANCE OF SPECIAL MEASURES (UNNUMBERED) ...... 39

EU FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL 21 NOVEMBER 2014 - PRE-COUNCIL WRITTEN MINISTERIAL STATEMENT (UNNUMBERED) ...... 39

EU FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL (TRADE) 8 MAY (UNNUMBERED) ...... 40

EU GULF OF GUINEA ACTION PLAN 2015-2020 (5222/15) ...... 40

EU MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY – ACTION PLAN (UNNUMBERED) ...... 41

EU MILITARY ADVISORY MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (UNNUMBERED) ....41

EU MONITORING MISSION IN GEORGIA (UNNUMBERED) ...... 45

EULEX RULE OF LAW MISSION IN KOSOVO (UNNUMBERED) ...... 48

EU POLICING MISSION AFGHANISTAN (EUPOL) (UNNUMBERED) ...... 50

EU PROCESS FOR SANCTIONS LISTINGS AND REVIEWS (UNNUMBERED) ...... 53

EU REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR SYRIA AND IRAQ AS WELL AS THE DA’ESH THREAT (UNNUMBERED) ...... 56

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY: DRAFT BUDGET 2015 (UNNUMBERED) ...... 56

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY STEERING BOARD MEETING, 18 NOVEMBER 2014 (UNNUMBERED) ...... 57

EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (UNNUMBERED) ...... 58

EU - SINGAPORE PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT (UNNUMBERED) ...... 58

EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES FOR AFGHANISTAN MANDATE – BUDGET INFORMATION (UNNUMBERED) ...... 61

EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (UNNUMBERED) ...... 63

EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA (UNNUMBERED)...... 63

EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE SAHEL (UNNUMBERED) ...... 65

EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND THE CRISIS IN GEORGIA (UNNUMBERED) ...... 66

EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN KOSOVO (UNNUMBERED) ...... 68

EU STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN 2014-16 (9467/14) ...... 69

EU-SWISS INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT (UNNUMBERED) ...... 71

EU TRADE DEFENCE INSTRUMENTS - TDI MODERNISATION’ (8493/13, 8495/13) ...... 71

EU TRAINING MISSION SOMALIA (UNNUMBERD) ...... 72 3

EU-TUNISIA ACTION PLAN (UNNUMBERED) ...... 73

EU-UKRAINE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT, INCLUDING DEEP AND COMPREHENSIVE FREE TRADE AREA (UNNUMBERED) ...... 73

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL: 15 AUGUST 2014 (UNNUMBERED) ...... 78

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL AND GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL: 9-10 FEBRUARY (UNNUMBERED) ...... 79

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL AND GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL: 22-23 JULY (UNNUMBERED) ...... 82

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE LED EU BUSINESS DURING ELECTION PERIOD (UNNUMBERED) ...... 84

GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL: 29 SEPTEMBER (UNNUMBERED) ...... 85

HR/VP PROGRESS REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING DECEMBER 2013 EUROPEAN COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS (UNNUMBERED) ...... 86

HUMANITARIAN AID AND CIVIL PROTECTION POLICIES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION IN 2013 (12770/14) ...... 88

INTRODUCING EXCEPTIONAL TRADE MEASURES FOR COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES PARTICIPATING IN OR LINKED TO THE EUROPEAN UNION'S STABILISATION AND ASSOCIATION PROCESS AND SUSPENDING ITS APPLICATION WITH REGARD TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (11398/14) ...... 89

INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT TRIBUNALS (11868/12) ...... 90

IRAN: SECURING A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT (UNNUMBERED) ...... 90

ITALIAN EU PRESIDENCY 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 2014 (UNNUMBERED) ...... 91

MINERALS ORIGNATING IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS: AN INTEGRATED EU APPROACH (7704/14, 7701/14) ...... 91

PARTICIPATION OF ARMENIA IN UNION PROGRAMMES (14062/12, 14061/12)...... 92

PARTICIPATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON IN UNION PROGRAMMES (9248/14, 9264/14) ...... 94

PARTICIPATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA IN UNION PROGRAMMES (9289/14, 9294/14) ...... 95

POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA AND FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT (UNNUMBERED) ...... 95

REDUCTION OR ELIMINATION OF CUSTOMS DUTIES ON GOODS ORIGINATING IN UKRAINE (13466/14) ...... 98

RESTRICTIONS ON GOODS ORIGINATING IN CRIMEA OR SEVASTOPOL, IN RESPONSE TO THE ILLEGAL ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA AND SEVASTOPOL (UNNUMBERED) ...... 100 4

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST COTE D’IVOIRE (UNNUMBERED) ...... 103

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST IRAN - COUNCIL DECISION 2014/829/CFSP OF 25 NOVEMBER 2014 AMENDING DECISION 2010/413/CFSP (UNNUMBERED)...... 105

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST IRAN - COUNCIL DECISION AMENDING COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP (UNNUMBERED) ...... 105

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH SUDAN (UNNUMBERED) ...... 117

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST SYRIA - COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION 2014/488/CFSP OF 22 JULY 2014 IMPLEMENTING DECISION 2013/255/CFSP & COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) NO.793/2014 OF 22 JULY 2014 IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) NO.36/2012 (UNNUMBERED) ...... 118

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST SYRIA - COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION 2014/678/CFSP OF 26 SEPTEMBER 2014 IMPLEMENTING DECISION 2013/255/CFSP & COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) NO.1013/2014 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 2014 IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) NO.36/2012 (UNNUMBERED) ...... 119

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST SYRIA - COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION IMPLEMENTING DECISION 2013/255/CFSP & COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) NO.36/2012 (UNNUMBERED) ...... 120

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST UKRAINE (UNNUMBERED) ...... 123

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST ZIMBABWE (UNNUMBERED) ...... 125

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES DIRECTED AGAINST CERTAIN PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE - COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2015/143 OF 29 JANUARY 2015 AMENDING DECISION 2014/119/CFSP & COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2015/138 OF 29 JANUARY 2015 AMENDING REGULATION (EU) NO.208/2014 (UNNUMBERED) ...... 126

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN RESPECT OF ACTIONS UNDERMINING OR THREATENING THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE - COUNCIL DECISION 2014/241/CFSP OF 9 FEBRUARY 2015 AMENDING DECISION 2014/145/CFSP & COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) NO.240/2015 OF 9 FEBRUARY 2015 IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) NO.269/2014 (UNNUMBERED)...... 126

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN RESPECT OF ACTION UNDERMINING OR THREATENING THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE -COUNCIL DECISION 2014/265/CFSP OF 12 MAY 2014 AMENDING DECISION 2014/145/CFSP (UNNUMBERED) ...... 127

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN RESPECT OF ACTIONS UNDERMINING OR THREATENING THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE - COUNCIL DECISION 2014/308/CFSP OF 28 MAY 2014 AMENDING DECISION 2014/145/CFSP ...... 128

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN RESPECT OF ACTIONS UNDERMINING OR THREATENING THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE - COUNCIL DECISION 2014/455/CFSP OF 11 JULY 2014 AMENDING DECISION 2014/145/CFSP (UNNUMBERED) ...... 128

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN VIEW OF RUSSIA’S ACTIONS DESTABILISING THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE - COUNCIL DECISION 2014/512/CFSP OF 31 JULY 2014 (UNNUMBERED) ...... 130

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN VIEW OF RUSSIA’S ACTIONS DESTABILISING THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE - COUNCIL DECISION 2014/512/CFSP OF 31 JULY 2014 (UNNUMBERED) ...... 134

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN VIEW OF RUSSIA’S ACTIONS DESTABILISING THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE - COUNCIL DECISION 2014/872/CFSP OF 4 DECEMBER 2014 AMENDING DECISION 2014/512/CFSP CONCERNING & DECISION 2014/659/CFSP AMENDING DECISION 2014/512/CFSP ...... 135

TRADE IN CERTAIN GOODS WHICH COULD BE USED FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, TORTURE OR OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (6083/14) ...... 137

UK JHA OPT-IN TO A COUNCIL DECISION RELATING TO THE ACCESSION OF THE SEYCHELLES TO THE WTO (UNNUMBERED) ...... 137

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL) TRANSPARENCY CONVENTION (UNNUMBERED) ...... 138

UPDATE ON EUBAM LIBYA (UNNUMBERED) ...... 138

UPDATE ON EUFOR CAR AND FCO EU BUSINESS AFTER WINTER RECESS – FROM 5 JANUARY 2015 (UNNUMBERED) ...... 139

UPDATE ON PROPOSALS FOR A CIVILIAN COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY MISSION FOR UKRAINE (UNNUMBERED)...... 141

UPDATE ON THE FUTURE OF CSDP IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) ...... 146

UPDATE ON THE ITALIAN EU PRESIDENCY DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES (UNNUMBERED) ... 147

UPDATE ON THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (UNNUMBERED) ...... 149

ACCESSION OF AFGHANISTAN TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from Lord Livingston of Parkhead, Minister of State for Trade and Investment, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, to the Chairman I wish to inform the House that on 23 June 2014 the Government opted in to the Council Decision relating to the Accession of Afghanistan to the World Trade Organisation. The Government has supported the accession of Afghanistan to the WTO on the right terms. In acceding to the WTO, Afghanistan will embrace a series of rules and commitments which form the foundation of an open, transparent and non-discriminatory global trading system and which will provide important guarantees for them and for other WTO Members. Accession to the WTO will bring Afghanistan more firmly into the global economy and help make Afghanistan a more attractive place to do business. Afghanistan’s accession to the WTO is consistent with the UK’s policy of helping Least Developed Countries to take advantage of the international trading system. It is also in line with the UK’s policy of helping to establish a viable Afghan state, to help Afghanistan develop a more dynamic economy and become more able to meet its economic needs without external support. The Council Decisions has the effect of extending to the Afghanistan the horizontal commitments the UK makes to all WTO members, including in the provision of services by natural persons from third countries, otherwise known as “Mode 4”. It is the presence of these Mode 4 commitments in the relevant instruments which triggers the UK Justice and Home Affairs opt-in. 14 July 2014

ACCESSION OF ECUADOR TO THE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND COLOMBIA AND PERU (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to Lord Livingston of Parkhead, Minister of State for Trade and Investment, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills At its meeting of 19 March, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above proposal. We note that the Government contends that its opt-in rights apply in part to these agreements and that relevant deadlines apply as a consequence. As you know, we do not consider that the opt-in Protocol is triggered when a proposal does not specifically cite a Title V legal base. We therefore wish to make clear that we do not accept that the opt-in Protocol applies in the absence of a Title V legal base. We think the Government’s opt-in policy in these circumstances is misguided, being without legal foundation and liable to lead to legal uncertainty. However, as per our usual policy, we do not intend to retain the document under scrutiny on this basis. With regards to the mixed agreement, we would be grateful if you would keep us updated if the Commission brings forward a proposal that the agreement should be an EU competence only. We would also be grateful if you could provide us with an update in due course on the discussions which take place at the EU-Latin America summit in June. In the meantime, we are content to clear the proposal from scrutiny. 19 March 2015

A EUROPEAN UNION MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY (7537/14)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing to you regarding the Explanatory Memorandum on the Joint Communication, Elements for a European Union Maritime Security Strategy, which was cleared by the Lords Sub Committee C on 13 May and on which the European Scrutiny Committee reported on 30th April and 11th June (European

Scrutiny Committee Report 35857). I now wish to provide the Committees with my final assessment of the EU Maritime Security Strategy. As you will recall, the Joint Communication was intended to form the basis of the EU Maritime Security Strategy. This has now been developed and is due to be adopted at the General Affairs Council on 24th June through Council Conclusions, before being noted at the European Council on 26th June. A copy of the final draft is attached [not printed]. Although none are expected, I shall update you if any substantial changes occur before adoption. The attached [not printed] Strategy is being provided to the Committee under the Government's authority and arrangements agreed between the Government and the Committee for the sharing of EU documents carrying limite marking. It cannot be published, nor can it be reported on substantively in any way which would bring detail contained in the document into the public domain. Following the release of the Joint Communication, UK officials have been fully engaged with the drafting of the EU Maritime Security Strategy. The Strategy is consistent with the UK’s wider maritime security objectives of promoting a secure international maritime domain, upholding international maritime norms and assuring the security of vital maritime trade and energy routes. The commitment to improve coordination within the EU and between Member States is very welcome. In my previous letter, I set out a number of particular areas of concern, including the suggestion of new legislation and the need for stronger references to NATO. We have pressed hard on these and other points and across all areas of concern, the UK’s red lines have been protected. The UK secured language guarding against new legislation in paragraph (b) on page 4 of the EU MSS, and multiple references to NATO, such as paragraph (d) on page 5 “cooperation with all relevant international partners and organisations, in particular the UN and NATO...are essential”. The next stage will be the development of an Action Plan under the Italian Presidency and UK officials will continue to be engaged as this develops. 20 June 2014

A NEW DEAL FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE: IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP FOR COMMUNICATION COM(2013)542; TOWARDS A MORE COMPETITIVE AND EFFICIENT DEFENCE AND SECURITY SECTOR (11358/14)

Letter from the Chairman to Dr Andrew Murrison MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence The House of Lords European Union Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered this document at its meeting on 9 September. We note that the proposal is still at a relatively early stage and ask that we continue to be kept apprised of any substantive developments. In particular, we note the proposed Green Paper on the control of industrial and technological assets in defence and security. We are not clear as yet what the Commission’s “European Approach” would look like and the concomitant national ramifications. We look forward to further details on this in due course. Furthermore, have the recent events in east Ukraine and NATO discussions to bolster its defences affected the substance of the negotiations on this Communication? As the Government and the Communication emphasise that the EU should complement the work of NATO it must surely be an important part of the discussions. Finally, we recall that previous attempts by the Commission to create an integrated defence internal market have stumbled on national sensitivities and the lacklustre implementation of Directives by some Member States, some of which are referred to in the Roadmap. Will this Communication have a graduated approach setting out short-term and then perhaps more ambitious long-term proposals? Are there other ways of proceeding that might guard against the danger of Member States’ slippage? On the first question we look forward to your response in due course. We would be grateful for a response to the other questions in the usual ten working days. In the meantime, we are content to clear this proposal from scrutiny. 9 September 2014

Letter from Dr Andrew Murrison MP to the Chairman Thank you for your 9 September letter to Dr Murrison, clearing the above document from House of Lords Scrutiny. You asked for our comment on some aspects of the Commission’s Communication as well as on the impact of some of the recent developments in the Euro-Atlantic security arena. I am responding to you as EU matters are now under my remit following the Summer 14 ministerial changes in the MOD. As we set out in the Explanatory Memorandum, the UK worked hard to seek to influence the preparation of the roadmap before its publication and as a result, the Commission took a more cautious approach than might have been the case (with many of the proposals at a high level). The key going forwards will be for us to remain proactively engaged in discussions to develop the detail of the proposals, including bilaterally with the Commission as well as with other Member States (including through the Letter of Intent1 group) and the European Defence Agency. We will seek to influence the debate in line with our priorities to deliver benefit for the UK. And we will continue to resist the areas we consider to be greatest risks, including any actions that could potentially cross UK red lines such as no EU ownership of capabilities, actions that may limit our ability to procure the best capability for our armed forces and Commission action in third markets (where we are clear that export policy is a matter of national sovereignty). In addition, we will continue to work to ensure that there is no extension of competence on the part of the Commission. In your letter, you draw attention to the link between recent events in east Ukraine, NATO discussions to bolster its defences and the European defence industry. As you will be aware, at the 4/5 September NATO Summit, Heads of State reaffirmed the strength of the Alliance and committed to providing the resources, capabilities and political will required to ensure the Alliance remains ready to meet any challenge. And it was recognised that a strong defence industry across the Alliance remains essential for delivering these capabilities. As such, we believe it is more critical than ever to focus on creating a more innovative, sustainable and competitive defence industry in Europe. Whilst we are clear, of course, that the main drive and responsibility for this lies with Member States and of course the defence industry themselves, we welcome support, where appropriate, from the European Commission and the European Defence Agency in areas where they can truly add value. This is not only important to deliver the capabilities needed by our Armed Forces, but also for our long term economic growth. You also highlight the difficulties faced in creating a more open internal European defence market. Supporting the implementation of the internal market and ensuring that companies from across the EU can compete on a level playing field is one of the top priorities for the UK. But we believe that it is important the Commission takes a pragmatic, rather than overzealous approach here, which would most likely be counterproductive and reduce transparency. And, recognising that the Defence Procurement Directive has only recently been transposed into law in all Member States, it needs to be given time to bed down. We therefore feel that the Commission should focus in the short term on supporting Member States to ensure consistent implementation of the Directive across the EU as well as encouraging transparency over Article 346 and supporting SMEs and R&D. Longer term, we believe it could be beneficial to make a further assessment of the impact of measures aimed at supporting the internal market, including the Directive, on the defence market and cooperation in Europe, but only at the appropriate juncture. We will, of course, keep you informed of substantive developments including on the Commission’s proposals related to the control of defence industrial and technological assets, as you have requested. 8 October 2014

APPLICATION OF SPECIFIC MEASURES TO COMBAT TERRORISM, AND REPEALING DECISION 2014/72/CFSP (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting on 17 July, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above documents which had already been cleared from scrutiny.

1 France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, UK

We appreciate that the details of the individual in question must remain confidential until the delisting has been formally approved by the Foreign Affairs Council. However, once the Decision and Regulation have been agreed, we would be grateful if you could write to us with the details of the individual concerned and the reasons for delisting them. We look forward to your response within the usual 10 working days. 17 July 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing in response to your letter dated 21 July 2014 in which you request more information regarding the recent Explanatory Memorandum concerning Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism. On 22 July, the Foreign Affairs Council agreed the delisting of Mr Sofiane Fahas from the list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts to be carried out pursuant to Article 1(6) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and Article 2(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001. The CP931 listing was based on a domestic Italian decision to commence legal proceedings against Mr Fahas (the “competent authority decision”). During the most recent six month review of CP931 listings, it was proposed that Mr Fahas be removed from the CP931 list of designated persons. When the Council no longer wishes to retain a listing on the basis of the original competent authority decision, it is normal practice to carry out checks to ensure we do not have additional information that supports continued listing and an interest in maintaining the listing notwithstanding the proposal to delist. These checks were carried out in the present case and no relevant information was found. The UK therefore agreed the delisting. As set out in the Explanatory Memorandum, listings under this sanctions regime operate in a way which means it is difficult to maintain listings when it is not possible, or not desirable , to rely on the original competent authority decision. The exception is found in cases where either we, or another Member State, have sufficient information to put in place a new competent authority decision (in the UK, this would be either proscription or terrorist asset freezing) as the basis for continued listing in the EU. The availability of sufficient information and a strong UK interest are therefore prerequisites to working to maintain a listing where delisting is proposed on this basis. 4 August 2014

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 19 March, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above documents. There are two matters which we would like further information about. You inform us that in response to the growing body of court rulings, the Council has used the most recent six month review of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (CP931) measures to “substantially revise” the way in which it provides information to listed persons and entities. Would it be possible to share with us the review, or a summary of the findings of the review, and in particular, what might be these substantial revisions? Second, we understand that the Council is appealing the General Court annulments of the LTTE and Hamas listings. We would be grateful to know on what basis the Council is seeking to appeal the General Court ruling. We would be grateful if you could provide a response in due course. In the meantime, we clear this proposal from scrutiny. 19 March 2015

ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY AND THEIR MEMBER STATES, OF THE ONE PART, AND THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA, OF THE OTHER PART (7941/14)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing to update the Committee on the Government’s approach to the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) opt-in aspects of the signature, provisional application and conclusion of the Association Agreements (AA) with Georgia and Moldova. The 8-week enhanced scrutiny period ended on 29 May. I thank the Committee for its consideration of these dossiers. The Government has taken the Committee’s view into account when making its decision. I can now confirm that the UK will opt into the provisions of the AA which relate to re-admission and Mode 4 (trade in services) obligations. When making this decision, the Government took into consideration that the UK already participates in the existing re-admission agreements between the EU and Georgia/Moldova and as such it is appropriate that we now opt-into the new provisions which require the EU on one part, and Georgia/Moldova on the other part, to ensure the full implementation of those agreements. As regards the Mode 4 provisions, the Government’s position remains that these provisions fall within the scope of the UK’s JHA opt-in. Those provisions are in line with the EU’s Doha round offer to the World Trade Organisation and are subject to rigorous safeguards, including minimum skills levels. We are therefore content to opt-into these provisions. As mentioned in my letter of 2 May, the Government is content for the provisional application of provisions relating to re-admission in both Agreements. These are Article 15 with respect to Moldova and Article 16 with respect to Georgia. With respect to these articles, my officials have continuously pushed for the citation of relevant Title V legal bases and the splitting of the Council Decisions into JHA and non-JHA decisions during negotiations in Brussels. I regret to inform the Committee that we did not secure these aims. However, in the absence of the citation of the relevant Title V legal bases, we will register our dissatisfaction through a minute statement. It will make clear that the UK has opted-into the relevant JHA provisions and that we consider the relevant Title V legal bases should have been cited in respect of the provisions related to re-admission. 4 June 2014

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 5 June, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above documents and decided to clear them from scrutiny. I am grateful to the FCO officials who attended the meeting to discuss the documents and I know that Members of the Sub-Committee found the briefing useful. Although we decided to clear the documents from scrutiny, we remain concerned about the Association Agreements and would like to receive updates on the monitoring and assessment structures which will be put in place to ensure that Moldova and Georgia are able to deliver the necessary reforms. In the light of the political reaction which was triggered as a result of the Association Agreement with Ukraine, and the upcoming NATO summit where Georgia may be offered the Membership Action Plan (MAP), we are particularly conscious of the need to be aware of Russia’s possible reaction and to take into account all eventualities. We would therefore be interested to know what steps are being taken to support Moldova and Georgia after the signature of the Agreements. With regard to Georgia seeking the MAP, we would also like to know what stance the Government plans to take at the NATO summit in September. We also remain doubtful about how the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements and the Association Agreements will be applied to Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and would welcome regular updates on how the EU’s relationship with those regions develops under the Association Agreements. You note from your letter of 4 June that the Government has not been able to secure the citation of relevant Title V legal bases for some of the articles and that the Government will make it clear that 11

the UK has opted-into the relevant JHA provisions. As you know, we do not consider that the opt-in Protocol is triggered when a proposal does not specifically cite a Title V legal base, even if the Government thinks it contains justice and home affairs (JHA) matters. However, this is a long- standing disagreement and in this instance we think little purpose would be served in holding up the clearance of these agreements on this basis. We note also that your most recent letter on this matter (of 29 May), regarding the JHA opt-in Protocol in relation to Kosovo agreements, is due to be considered by the Sub-Committee on Home Affairs, Health and Education at its meeting on 18 June. It is likely that the Government’s opt-in policy on these similar agreements will form part of that Sub- Committee’s consideration. We look forward to receiving the updates requested above in due course. 12 June 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 12 June concerning Georgia and Moldova. I am very grateful for your Committee’s continued engagement in this issue, both in terms of the two Association Agreements and the wider geopolitical situation. I was very pleased to secure your Committee’s support for signature of these two Association Agreements. The Council Decisions on signature and provisional application were adopted at the AgriFish Council on 16 June, and signature of both Agreements should go ahead at the European Council on 27 June. In your letter, you said your Committee would like to receive updates on the monitoring and assessment structures. This monitoring process will be founded on Association Agendas concerning each country, replacing (and being analogous to) the respective ENP Action Plans. The two Association Agenda for the next three years have now been agreed and were adopted at the 23 June Foreign Affairs Council. Although these documents are not subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, I attach [not printed] them to this letter for your Committee’s information. Please note these documents have not yet been made available to the general public. The EEAS will produce annual monitoring reports for each country, including regarding the protracted conflicts. The Government will continue to share these documents with your Committee. I am of course at your service if and when you require additional ad hoc updates from the Government. The EU is taking a number of steps to support Georgia and Moldova following signature of the Agreements. The most obvious is through the European Neighbourhood Instrument, which is the EU’s financing instrument for the neighbourhood. On current Commission planning, the indicative allocation foreseen for Moldova and Georgia for 2014 to 2020 is between €610m to €746m each. This is a significant increase on the previous period. On 6 May 2014, the European Commission announced an additional support package for both Georgia and Moldova, worth €30 million each. This immediate support will help each country to seize the benefits and opportunities of the Association Agreements. Allied with the existing package of technical assistance, I am confident that the EU is doing as much as feasible to support these two important partners. I understand your concerns about South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria and the application of the Association Agreements. Both Association Agreements apply to the entire territories of both Georgia and Moldova. However, application in relation to Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia will only commence once the Georgian and Moldovan governments ensure the full implementation and enforcement of the Agreements in their entire territory. As I outlined above, the annual reporting by the EEAS will cover this issue, and the Government stands ready to provide its own analysis as required. The agenda for the NATO Summit in Wales, including enlargement issues, was most recently discussed at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting on 24 June. As the NATO Secretary General said after that meeting, the Alliance will develop a substantial package for Georgia that will help it come closer to NATO, recognising Georgia’s progress and their valued contribution in Afghanistan. We will base decisions about membership on the ability of candidate countries to advance NATO’s core values of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. I would also like to take this opportunity to draw to your attention to a change on the EU’s restrictive measures concerning Transnistria. In the past, Parliamentary scrutiny of the annual

review of these sanctions has been difficult because of the imperative to agree a Decision in advance of expiry of the sanctions (30 September), while Working Group discussions only started in early September due to the summer break in Brussels. At the most-recent informal review, the UK pressed the institutions and other Member States to extend the expiry date of the sanctions, from 30 September, to 31 October. This has now been agreed and formally adopted at the Foreign Affairs Council on 23 June. I was very grateful that you agreed to waive scrutiny for this small technical change. We hope this change will mean your Committee will have the proper time to perform scrutiny of the EU’s restrictive measures concerning Transnistria in future. 26 June 2014

ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY AND THEIR MEMBER STATES, OF THE ONE PART, AND THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA, OF THE OTHER PART (7944/14)

Association Agreement with Ukraine, and the upcoming NATO summit where Georgia may be offered the Membership Action Plan (MAP), we are particularly conscious of the need to be aware of Russia’s possible reaction and to take into account all eventualities. We would therefore be interested to know what steps are being taken to support Moldova and Georgia after the signature of the Agreements. With regard to Georgia seeking the MAP, we would also like to know what stance the Government plans to take at the NATO summit in September. We also remain doubtful about how the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements and the Association Agreements will be applied to Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and would welcome regular updates on how the EU’s relationship with those regions develops under the Association Agreements. You note from your letter of 4 June that the Government has not been able to secure the citation of relevant Title V legal bases for some of the articles and that the Government will make it clear that the UK has opted-into the relevant JHA provisions. As you know, we do not consider that the opt-in Protocol is triggered when a proposal does not specifically cite a Title V legal base, even if the Government thinks it contains justice and home affairs (JHA) matters. However, this is a long- standing disagreement and in this instance we think little purpose would be served in holding up the clearance of these agreements on this basis. We note also that your most recent letter on this matter (of 29 May), regarding the JHA opt-in Protocol in relation to Kosovo agreements, is due to be considered by the Sub-Committee on Home Affairs, Health and Education at its meeting on 18 June. It is likely that the Government’s opt-in policy on these similar agreements will form part of that Sub- Committee’s consideration. We look forward to receiving the updates requested above in due course. 12 June 2014

will only commence once the Georgian and Moldovan governments ensure the full implementation and enforcement of the Agreements in their entire territory. As I outlined above, the annual reporting by the EEAS will cover this issue, and the Government stands ready to provide its own analysis as required. The agenda for the NATO Summit in Wales, including enlargement issues, was most recently discussed at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting on 24 June. As the NATO Secretary General said after that meeting, the Alliance will develop a substantial package for Georgia that will help it come closer to NATO, recognising Georgia’s progress and their valued contribution in Afghanistan. We will base decisions about membership on the ability of candidate countries to advance NATO’s core values of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. I would also like to take this opportunity to draw to your attention to a change on the EU’s restrictive measures concerning Transnistria. In the past, Parliamentary scrutiny of the annual review of these sanctions has been difficult because of the imperative to agree a Decision in advance of expiry of the sanctions (30 September), while Working Group discussions only started in early September due to the summer break in Brussels. At the most-recent informal review, the UK pressed the institutions and other Member States to extend the expiry date of the sanctions, from 30 September, to 31 October. This has now been agreed and formally adopted at the Foreign Affairs Council on 23 June. I was very grateful that you agreed to waive scrutiny for this small technical change. We hope this change will mean your Committee will have the proper time to perform scrutiny of the EU’s restrictive measures concerning Transnistria in future. 26 June 2014

ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY AND THEIR MEMBER STATES, OF THE ONE PART, AND THE REPUBLIC OF TURKMENISTAN, OF THE OTHER PART (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing to inform the Committee of an unfortunate administrative error which led to the Council and Commission Decision on conclusion of the Turkmenistan PCA not being deposited for scrutiny at the appropriate point, and the Government’s opt-in deadline being missed. I apologise sincerely for this oversight, and would like to reassure the Committee that steps have already been taken to prevent reoccurrence. When this Decision was first published in 2011, officials regrettably failed to identify that this was a depositable document, and so it was not deposited for scrutiny at the appropriate point. This Decision has now been submitted for scrutiny along with an Explanatory Memorandum and, as the Government’s scrutiny reserve remains in place, the Committee still has an opportunity to scrutinise this document prior to its adoption. At the same time, officials also did not identify that the UK’s opt-in had been triggered and, as a result, the Government regrettably missed the opportunity to opt in to certain Mode IV provisions of the Agreement relating to intra-company transfers. Further detail on this issue is set out in the Explanatory Memorandum. After these oversights were first identified and brought to my attention in September 2013, I instructed my officials to take the necessary steps to ensure I could provide the Committees a comprehensive account of Government’s position on these documents. However, my writing to you on this was unfortunately delayed for a number of reasons, including the need to ascertain that, by the time the PCA came to be ratified, the UK would be in a position to meet its obligation to use our best endeavours to ensure legislative compliance with its provisions, and the subsequent changes to the cited legal bases, on which the Explanatory Memorandum elaborates. These oversights naturally do not meet the high standards that I and the Committees expect. I have personally met relevant officials to discuss the steps needed in order to prevent re-occurrence. The FCO has since implemented internal procedures designed to minimise the risk of the same mistakes 15

reoccurring, including reworking the guidance given to desk officers and raising awareness amongst staff of policy relating to third country agreements. 5 December 2014

ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY AND THEIR MEMBER STATES, OF THE ONE PART, AND THE REPUBLIC OF UKRAINE, OF THE OTHER PART (13519/14)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 16 October, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document and the reasons given in your letter for the override of the scrutiny reserve. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that it was reasonable for the Government to proceed without following the usual parliamentary scrutiny procedures, and we are grateful to you for explaining your reasons. 16 October 2014

ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT(S) WITH ANDORRA, MONACO AND SAN MARINO: ADOPTION OF NEGOTIATING MANDATE (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing to update the EU Scrutiny Select Committee on the matter of proposed EU Association Agreements with Andorra, Monaco and San Marino. At the General Affairs Council of 16 December 2014, the Council adopted a mandate authorising the Commission to negotiate, on behalf of the Union and its member states, one or several Association Agreement(s) with these states. EU relations with Andorra, Monaco and San Marino are currently governed by a number of agreements, covering selective areas of the EU acquis and policies. In December 2010, the Council concluded that EU relations with these three states were “extensive but fragmented”, and there were still obstacles to an unimpeded movement of persons, goods and services. Following an EEAS exploration, in early 2014 the Commission produced a draft Council Decision and negotiating Mandate for one or several Association Agreements. The UK is supportive of the principle of improving the framework for relations between the EU and these three states, including integrating them more closely into the internal market. This would represent a small but positive widening of the single market. On my instruction, officials in Brussels ensured that the UK’s policy positions on legal base, mixity, and Justice and Home Affairs were reflected in the negotiating mandate. This means that the mandate contains recitals confirming: — That the legal nature of the Agreement(s) shall be decided at the end of negotiations; — That the agreement does not confer on the Commission any additional powers over matters falling within Member State competence; — That the United Kingdom’s established Justice and Home Affairs provisions are to be reflected in the final association agreement(s). 31 December 2014

A STRONGER ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN ACHIEVING INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (9802/14)

Letter from the Chairman to Lynne Featherstone MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for International Development At its meeting on 19 June the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document and decided to clear it from scrutiny. As you know, last year the Committee conducted enhanced scrutiny of the EU's WASH programme and many aspects of the Communication are pertinent to the evidence we heard. In particular, we concluded that there was an opportunity for private sector external finance to reinforce financial sustainability and efficiency and to build economic resilience of the WASH programme. However, sub-Saharan Africa is not always an easy context within which to operate and both the private and the voluntary sector need specialised support in order to enable their potential to be unlocked. Though we were content to clear the Communication from scrutiny, the real proof of the success of the framework will lie in its application to specific projects. We would therefore be interested to hear your assessment of how the principles outlined in the Commission's Communication could be utilised in the WASH programme, and which aspects the UK Government will be taking forward in order to improve the financial sustainability of that programme. In particular, how can the framework be adapted to ensure that the private and voluntary/NGO sectors work effectively and sustainably with local interests? We hope that the new principles outlined in the Communication will enable the EU to harness the power of the private and voluntary sector to ensure the long-term success of the WASH programme and look forward to your response in due course. 26 June 2014

Letter from Lynne Featherstone MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 26 June 2014 regarding the application of the principles set out in the Communication above to the European Commission’s Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WaSH) programme. As previously stated, we welcome the Commission producing a Communication on the role of the private sector in development programmes: it is the private sector that creates wealth in society, taking risks, innovating, and transforming economies. The Department for International Development has made economic development a priority for our programming.

APPLICATION OF THE COMMUNICATION’S PRINCIPLES TO THE EU’S WASH PROGRAMME EU discussions on operationalising the Communication have only just begun so we do not expect to see an immediate impact on the WaSH programmes. However, private sector development is a priority for the Italian EU Presidency which began this month, so we anticipate seeing some progress on this agenda over the next six months. That said, and as noted in my previous correspondence to you (28 April 2014), EU country programmes have prioritised a maximum three sectors for the new seven year programming cycle and we expect a decrease in EU engagement in this sector. As within all WaSH programmes, there is more scope for the EU to work with domestic private sector in the delivery and maintenance of services. Key to the success of these models is a clearly defined role for the private sector and a regulatory framework which ensures profitable but non- exploitative tariffs with effective performance monitoring. Working with the private sector in areas where the financial resources of beneficiaries are limited, or in politically fragile contexts is much more difficult. In addition, many small private sector enterprises do not currently have the skills to develop clear business plans, nor properly account for results and expenditure. Having said this, Commissioner Piebalgs stated that the Commission has a desire to “develop new ways of engaging with the private sector … for delivering public goods and infrastructure” in his October 2013 response to your letter on the European Court of Auditors Special Report No 13/2012: European Union Development Assistance for Drinking-Water Support and Basic Sanitation in Sub-Saharan Countries report.

Since our earlier correspondence on WaSH, the Commission has been working to enhance EU Delegations’ knowledge of the importance of WaSH project sustainability and the participation of the private sector to the operation and maintenance of water supply and sanitation systems. A workshop has already been conducted by EuropeAid in the Pacific and in October 2014 a second one will be organised for Central Asian countries. EuropeAid has also initiated contacts with the European Water Stewardship Programme in order to identify opportunities for cooperation. A session at the last Coordination Group of the EU Water Initiative (EUWI) was dedicated to this issue, and joint meetings took place during the African Water Week in Dakar, May 2014. In order to try and address the problem of domestic private sector being unable to develop and implement business plans of sufficient quality, Unilever has established a Toilet Board (TB), that brings together international private sector companies, for-profit and not-for-profit sanitation providers, academics and donors to identify innovative market-based solutions to sanitation and bring them to scale. DFID officials have been involved in the establishment of the TB and have shared the documents with counterparts working on WaSH at the European Commission. DFID officials continue to engage with their counterparts in the Commission and other Member States through the EU Water Experts’ Group and the EUWI. Thank you for taking the time to write on this important issue. 30 July 2014

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC – STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT (SOMA) (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing in reply to your letter of 26 February in which you requested further information on final staffing numbers for the Mission and adaption in light of the reduced numbers. As noted in your letter, the Force Generation Conferences of 3 and 10 February did not yield the required number of personnel to launch EUMAM CAR. However, following the Force Generation Conferences on 23 February and 5 March, there have been additional commitments. Forty three of the sixty posts are now filled. Contributions have been committed by France (21), Austria (4), Sweden (2), Romania (2), NL (2), Poland (2), Moldova (1), Serbia (4) and Georgia (5). On 9 March the Mission Commander wrote to the Chair of the PSC to say the additional contributions from Georgia and Serbia made at the 5 March conference meant he had sufficient personnel to launch the mission on 15 March, and he recommended that the PSC agree to this. The Commander advised that Serbia and Georgia would not be able to deploy their troops by 15 March and that France will cover the shortfall until these forces deploy. The Commander envisages declaring “initial operating capacity” three to four weeks after the Georgians and Serbians deploy. I agree that any impediment to EUMAM CAR delivering its mandate due to capacity restraints would be disappointing. I understand others are considering contributing. The Commander has said he can prioritise and start to deliver his mandate with the troops he has. My view is that we should support that commitment and give him the opportunity to deliver. 11 March 2015

CITATION OF ARTICLE 28 TEU IN COUNCIL DECISIONS RELATING TO EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing to clarify the UK Government’s position on the citation of Article 28 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in Council Decisions relating to EU Special Representatives (EUSR). This letter follows my Explanatory Memorandum (EM) of 2 June 2014, on the renewal of the budget of the EUSR 18

in Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH), where I highlighted that the draft Council Decision did not cite Article 28 TEU. Article 28 TEU provides for the Council to adopt CFSP decisions where the international situation requires operational action by the Union. A Council Decision under Article 28 TEU lays down, inter alia, the objectives and scope of that action. Previous Council Decisions on this topic have cited Article 28. The UK Representation to the EU raised the fact that Article 28 TEU had not been cited during discussions on the draft Council Decision pertaining to EUSR BiH. The EEAS position is that it is not necessary to cite Article 28 TEU in documents relating to EUSRs which do not contain any new operational activity. They stated that the Lisbon Treaty indicates that Article 33 TEU is the legal basis for the High Representative to propose an EUSR. This is also covered by Article 31(2) TEU. UK officials carefully considered the proposal to make sure it did not expose the UK to any risk on competence creep. Given that, following completion of discussion in the working group on the draft, this only makes amendments to the EUSR budget and not to the EU’s operational activity, I am satisfied that the UK position is not compromised. We can therefore accept Article 33 and Article 31(2) TEU as the appropriate substantive and procedural legal bases for an EUSR appointment with a Mandate that does not provide for new operational action by the EU or establish any new Union positions within the CFSP. We would however continue to expect any new EU operational action or new Union positions within the CFSP to be dealt with in a separate Council Decision with a legal base of Article 26 or 28 TEU as appropriate, alongside Article 31(1) TEU. Given that this specific Decision simply sets the budget for an existing EUSR within an existing mandate, we do not consider that there is any need to cite Article 28 TEU. Therefore, we will not be seeking to insert Article 28 TEU into the final Council Decision. 26 June 2014

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP Thank you for your letter of 26 June on the above matter, which the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered at its meeting of 10 July. We welcome the Government’s concern that the correct legal bases are cited for CFSP proposals, and agree that on this occasion the citation of Article 28 TEU is not necessary. There is no need to reply to this letter unless, of course, you wish to do so. 10 July 2014

COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP) MISSION IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: EUBAM RAFAH (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing to the Committee further to my Explanatory Memorandums of 9 June 2014 and 23 June 2014 on the Council Decisions to extend the mandates of the European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) and the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) for one year until 30 June 2015. The Committee has cleared the mandate extensions to both EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah. At the time of submitting the Explanatory Memorandum on EUBAM Rafah on 9 June, the EUBAM Rafah interim Strategic Review, which was due to be published in May 2014, had been delayed. It had still not been published at the time of submitting the EUPOL COPPS Explanatory Memorandum on 23 June. I promised to write to the Committee again with my views on the interim Strategic Review and on the implications for the Mission’s future once it had been published. The Committee requested that at the same time I also provide information about the EU’s comprehensive approach to Gaza, including whether it was in the form of a depositable document. I am pleased to inform the Committee that, after continued lobbying by UK officials, the EUBAM Rafah interim Strategic Review has now been published. The interim Strategic Review assesses that developments on the ground, namely the uncertainty over a resumption in the peace talks, the impact of Egypt’s sustained pressure on the situation of Hamas in Gaza, and the potential impact of intra- 19

Palestinian reconciliation on the future of EUBAM Rafah mean that the situation continues to be too fluid and transitory to warrant a major review of the mission or a change of direction at this stage. Furthermore, the Review identifies other issues having a direct impact on the future of EUBAM Rafah that remain uncertain and would need to be carefully assessed. These are the future of the Rafah crossing, whether agreement can be reached for Palestinian Authority (PA) officials to resume a presence there, and the position of all parties including Egypt. The Review recommends that these issues are evaluated fully in the full Strategic Review, due in February 2015. The document then proceeds to review EUBAM Rafah’s performance against its mandate. It states that “the main operational responsibility for EUBAM Rafah is to preserve its capacity for rapid redeployment to the Rafah Crossing. As agreed by EU Member States, the focus of the mission’s preparedness-related activities will be to further work with PA counterparts on developing their capacity to deploy and function at the border should they return to the Rafah crossing – the “PA preparedness project” – which has been recognised as a fundamental aspect of the overall capacity for speedily reactivating the crossing point.” The “PA preparedness project” is expected to run its course in the next mandate period. The review then goes on to state “The successful completion of the “PA preparedness project” should mark a significant moment with regard to the availability of further operational space for EUBAM Rafah if not deployed at the border crossing point. If political developments do not unlock any operational likelihood of redeployment then closure must be considered likely.” The interim Strategic Review then looks at ways ahead. It highlights several potential options for the future of EUBAM Rafah. It says that the full Strategic Review in February 2015 should consider all of them, with a focus in particular on modalities for closure in summer 2015. The potential options are as follows: — Reactivate the mission — Close the mission — Maintain the status quo — Merge the mission with EUPOL COPPS — Reduce the mission to a symbolic presence. I welcome the interim Strategic Review. I agree with the assessment that options for the mission’s future should be considered and note the uncertainties with next steps in the Middle East Peace Process, the terms of the implementation of the Palestinian reconciliation deal and the impact of these on the mission’s future. That is why I was content to agree to a one-year mandate extension until 30 June 2015. The recent escalation in violence between Gaza and Israel since the publication of the Interim Strategic Review only serves to increase the uncertainty about the political situation and the impact on EUBAM Rafah’s role. However, I remain concerned about the value of an inactive mission and I know that these concerns are shared by the Committee. Therefore, I am pleased to see that the interim Strategic Review includes clear options for detailed consideration in the February 2015 full Strategic Review, including closure if conditions do not allow for the reactivation of the mission by the end of June 2015. I will instruct officials to ensure that the EEAS keeps its commitment to look at all options in the full Strategic Review so that we are able to make a fully informed decision about the mission’s future beyond 30 June 2015. With regards to the EU’s approach to Gaza, this is not in the form of a depositable document. The EU’s approach consists of a number of different strands, including short term (measures to alleviate the humanitarian situation of the Gazan population), medium term (actions to promote economic development) and long term (working to ensure a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is ultimately what is needed to address Gaza’s economic and humanitarian situation as well as Israel’s legitimate security concerns). This reflects the EU’s view that the crisis in Gaza is first and foremost of a political nature. The EU believes that Gaza is an integral part of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and an essential part of the future state of Palestine. The EU has consistently underlined the unsustainability of the situation in the Gaza Strip and called for the immediate, sustained and unconditional opening of all crossings for the flow of humanitarian aid, commercial goods and persons to and from the Gaza Strip. The EU has also consistently condemned rockets attacks, called for the issue of illegal weapons transfer into Gaza to be addressed and for all parts of the November 2012 ceasefire agreement to be implemented. 20

In terms of the humanitarian situation (short-term), the EU believes that efforts are needed by Israel as the occupying power, by Hamas as the former de-facto authorities of Gaza, and by Egypt to address it. The international community also has an important role. In this regard the EU provides a range of humanitarian assistance. The EU’s annual contribution to the general budget of UNRWA ensures the delivery of essential education, health and social relief services to Palestinian refugees. EU humanitarian assistance is also provided by the European Union Humanitarian and Civil Protection Office (ECHO) and channelled through UN specialised Agencies, the ICRC and international NGOs. The EU also provides substantial assistance in the area of water and sanitation. On economic development (medium-term), EU assistance is focussed on development of the private sector in Gaza, on technical and vocational training and development of the agricultural sector. The EU is supporting a job creation programme through UNRWA and the expansion of the Kerem Shalom Crossing Point. The EU also supports the activities of a range of civil society organisations in Gaza. On working to ensure a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (long-term), the EU supports US- led peace efforts and encourages both parties to take steps towards peace. The EU has offered an unprecedented package of security, political and economic support to both parties in the event of a final status agreement, in order to demonstrate that a resolution to the conflict will bring benefits to Israel and the future state of Palestine The Committee will be aware of the recent cycle of violence between Gaza and Israel. Following weeks of rising tensions, including the kidnapping of 3 Israeli teenagers in the West Bank on 12 June, Israel’s search for the teenagers and accompanying security operation in the West Bank, the murder of a Palestinian teenager in occupied East Jerusalem on 2 July and a barrage of rocket fire from Gaza into Israel, Israel launched Operation Protective Edge on 7 July. On 17 July, Israeli forces began a ground invasion in order to destroy tunnels and Hamas’s ability to launch rockets. The UK Government and the EU are deeply concerned at the high numbers of civilian casualties and the humanitarian impact of the conflict. Our shared urgent priority is bringing the violence to an end, to ease the suffering of ordinary people inside Gaza and to make Israelis secure. The EU Foreign Affairs Council issued Conclusions on 16 July which: condemned the firing of rockets from Gaza into Israel and the indiscriminate targeting of civilians; reiterated Israel’s right to protect its population from these kind of attacks; said that in doing so, Israel must act proportionately and ensure the protection of civilians at all times; deplored the loss of innocent lives and the high number of wounded civilians in the Gaza Strip as a result of Israeli military operations; expressed deep concern about the rapid and dramatic deterioration of the humanitarian situation; welcomed ongoing efforts by regional partners , in particular the ceasefire initiative launched by Egypt and stated that the EU stood ready to provide support to this end. We need a durable end to the current cycle of violence and a long term strategy to address the underlying causes of the conflict and transform the situation in Gaza. There is no alternative that can deliver peace and security for both Israelis and Palestinians. This will need to include: a strong role for the Palestinian Authority and the restoration of Palestinian Authority control in Gaza; the opening up of legitimate movement and access into and out of Gaza (which EUBAM Rafah could potentially play a valuable role in); a long term strategy for economic growth; and a permanent end to the unacceptable threat of rocket attacks and other forms of violence from Gaza against Israel. The EU could play an important role in all of these areas. The UK will work closely with the EU over the coming weeks to support a sustainable ceasefire that addresses the underlying causes of the conflict. 4 August 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing to the Committee to provide an update on the CSDP missions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (the European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) and the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS).

SITUATION ON THE GROUND Our priority remains the achievement of a two-state solution. We continue to believe that the best way to achieve this in reality and on the ground is through negotiations. We hope that it will be

possible to resume direct talks after the Israeli elections in March. At the current time we are urging the parties to avoid taking any steps which will make the resumption of meaningful talks more difficult. There is an urgent need to address the terrible situation in Gaza. At the Gaza reconstruction conference in Cairo on 12 October the UK pledged £20m to help kick start the recovery and help get the Gazan people back on their feet. We need a durable end to the cycle of violence and an agreement to address the underlying causes of the conflict and transform the situation in Gaza. There is no alternative that can deliver peace and security for both Israelis and Palestinians. An agreement should ensure that: Hamas and other militant groups permanently end rocket fire and other attacks against Israel and stop rebuilding the tunnel network; the Palestinian Authority (PA) resumes control of Gaza and restores effective and accountable governance; and that Israel lifts its restrictions in order to ease the suffering of ordinary Palestinians, and allow the Gazan economy to grow. The UK is continuing to urge the parties to prioritise progress towards reaching a durable solution for Gaza, and to take the necessary practical steps to ensure Gaza’s reconstruction and economic recovery.

THE STRATEGIC REVIEW OF EUBAM RAFAH & EUPOL COPPS In my letter to the Committee of 4 August I gave my views on the interim Strategic Review and on the implications for EUBAM Rafah’s future. I said that a full Strategic Review would be due for publication in February 2015, within which several potential options for the future of EUBAM Rafah would be considered, including closure. The Strategic Review, which will now cover both missions, has yet to be published. However, it is scheduled for discussion in Brussels later this month, so we should receive a draft within the next few weeks.

EUBAM RAFAH As the Committee is aware, EUBAM Rafah has not been in operation since 2007 when Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip. However, the mission has been taking steps to ensure that redeployment is swift and effective, should the right conditions be in place. We believe the Strategic Review is likely to recommend that the mandate should be extended. The UK’s view is that should the necessary political and security conditions arise to enable reactivation to take place (agreement from Israel, the PA and Egypt, an enduring ceasefire and effective PA control of Gaza), EUBAM Rafah could make a significant contribution to improving the situation in Gaza and reducing the likelihood of a return to conflict. It was for that reason that on 20 October 2014, the Foreign Secretary wrote to Baroness Ashton, along with the French and German Foreign Ministers, to emphasise the important role of EUBAM Rafah. Regrettably, the necessary conditions for reactivation are not yet in place, although the UK, along with EU partners, continues to urge the parties to make process. In light of the potential usefulness of EUBAM Rafah and the very negative message about the EU’s commitment to the reconstruction of Gaza and its reintegration with the West Bank as part of a future Palestinian state that closure would bring, the UK’s view is that we should support an extension in the mission’s mandate.

EUPOL COPPS Following a shift to a more strategic role in 2013-2015, the mission has three core objectives: support reform of the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP); strengthen and support the criminal justice system; and improve prosecution-police interaction. We believe that the Strategic Review is likely to assess that this work needs to continue and that the mandate should be extended. The UK supports EUPOL COPPS, as it is a key component of EU support to Palestinian state-building efforts. We want to see a sustainable and well managed policing operation, which is transparent and accountable and operating within a sound legal framework in accordance with international standards; an effective community policing operation; and a sustainable criminal justice sector, in full compliance with human rights. We believe the mandate should be extended to enable the mission to eventually drawdown and transition activities to other stakeholders.

NEXT STEPS We await formal circulation of the draft Strategic Review. Once published, my officials will look to support the continuation of both missions. Negotiations on the mandate renewals and budgets will take place during dissolution. However, we will continue to press for value for money, and will monitor mission performance carefully to ensure that the CSDP operation in the Palestinian 22

Territories remains on track to achieve its objectives. We will lobby Member States to achieve UK objectives. Should EUBAM Rafah reactivation look unlikely in the longer term, I will reconsider whether closure should be considered a serious option. I will update the Committee on the outcome of the Strategic Review in due course. 12 March 2015

COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: POLICING IN AFGHANISTAN (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 15 December the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document. In the light of the factors you outlined in your Explanatory Memorandum, and the continuing situation in Afghanistan, the Committee agreed to clear the document from scrutiny. We do, however, have questions regarding the involvement of women in the Afghanistan national police force. In your letter of 6 June 2013, you noted that the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) had set an ambitious goal of employing 5,000 female police officers by the end of 2014, but that it was unlikely to meet this target. The MoI had therefore set up a working group to develop a comprehensive approach to the role of women in the police. EUPOL was also planning to monitor progress in reducing sexual harassment within the police force. We would be interested to know what progress has been made in recruiting more women into the police force, and to improve the working conditions for female police officers, and would therefore be grateful for your assessment on this in due course. 16 December 2014

CONSEQUENCES OF RUSSIA’S ILLEGAL ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA – EU RESPONSE (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing to update the Committee on the EU’s response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. Crimea was illegally annexed by the Russian Federation following an illegal referendum on 16 March and a subsequent decree by the Russian President. The UK has repeatedly condemned this illegal annexation, a position reasserted by the European Council Heads of State on 27 May, who said: ‘We stand firm in upholding Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and we strongly condemn the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation and will not recognise it.’ In response, the March European Council asked the Commission to evaluate the legal consequences of the annexation of Crimea and to propose economic, trade and financial restrictions regarding Crimea for rapid implementation. Led by the Cabinet Office, the UK Government has been closely engaged in this process and the 12 May Foreign Affairs Council agreed the Commission’s initial proposals, calling for swift implementation. Proposals that are currently being taken forward include: a ban on the import of products of clear Crimean origin; suspension of assistance programmes in Crimea (except those in support of civil society and people to people contacts); an omnibus bilateral declaration stating that consultations will be undertaken with Ukraine to clarify the effects of recent events on the practical application of relevant agreements; a reminder to the Russian Federation that the territorial scope of all agreements signed by the EU remains the internationally recognised territory of the Russian Federation (which does not include Crimea and Sevastopol); and guidance on contacts with Crimea’s formal institutions and de facto authorities.

The proposals are being handled in different ways and on individual timelines. In some cases, the decision-making process involves consultations with Member States. However, where proposals are subject to scrutiny, such as the Council Decision concerning the import ban for goods of Crimean origin, I, and other Ministers, will ensure the relevant documents are deposited in the normal manner. A strong EU response to Russia’s illegal annexation will not only send a strong signal to Russia and the region, it will also provide a basis on which the UK and EU can engage more widely. The 12 May FAC called on ‘UN member states to consider similar measures in line with UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262’. Resolution 68/262, adopted on March 27 2014, recognised the territorial integrity of Ukraine. 13 June 2014

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman At the 16 March Foreign Affairs Council, Member States agreed a negotiating mandate to enable the High Representative’s staff in New York to begin discussions on an agreement for future co-operation between the European Union and the United Nations in the framework of their respective crisis management operations. The EU’s civilian and military CSDP operations and the UN’s peacekeeping operations are frequently deployed in the same theatres of conflict outside of the European Union. Following the latest CSDP deployment of EUFOR CAR as a bridging mission for the UN Mission to the Central African Republic (MINUSCA); discussions about how to make this sort of collaboration as efficient and effective as possible have come to the fore. Effective co-operation between EU and UN missions is crucial; not only to ensure the smooth running of these operations, but also to ensure that there’s no duplication of effort. This co-operation is important from the perspective of increasing the UK’s collective impact in addressing conflict and in making the best use of our funding. The UK currently funds 6.68% of the UN peacekeeping budget and a 15.66% share of EU CSDP mission common costs. Under the current system; Field Specific Agreements (FSAs) are drawn up by EU and UN missions to enable co-operation and handover between the two organisations. These FSAs can take a long time to conclude and the content varies significantly from mission to mission. I attach a copy of the negotiating mandate, which will enable discussions to begin between the EU and the UN for a legally binding framework agreement. Such an agreement would enable personnel working in future missions to conclude FSAs more swiftly and with a sound legal basis. The mandate text puts a special emphasis on the need for Member States, through the expert level groups, to be properly consulted throughout the negotiations progress. I expect this to lead to a final framework agreement that the UK can support. The negotiations are likely to take several months. At the point where there is a draft framework agreement available, I will submit it to the committee for scrutiny in the normal way. 25 March 2015

COUNCIL DECISION LAUNCHING THE EUROPEAN UNION CSDP MISSION IN MALI (EUCAP SAHEL MALI) AND AMENDING DECISION 2014/219/CFSP (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 15 January the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document. In the light of the factors you outlined in your Explanatory Memorandum, the Committee agreed to clear the document from scrutiny. 24

There is no need to reply to this letter unless, of course, you wish to do so. 15 January 2015

DEVELOPMENT FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, AND GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL: 12-16 DECEMBER (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing to inform you about the Development Foreign Affairs Council on 12 December, the Foreign Affairs Council on 15 December and the General Affairs Council on 16 December. My Right Honourable Friend the Secretary of State for International Development, My Right Honourable Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and I attended the respective Councils above. The Development Foreign Affairs Council and the Foreign Affairs Council were chaired by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, and the General Affairs Council was chaired by the Italian Presidency. The meetings were held in Brussels. Neven Mimica, Commissioner for International Cooperation & Development, Karmenu Vella, Commissioner for Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, and Christos Stylianides, Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid & Crisis Management were in attendance for some of the discussions at the Development Foreign Affairs Council. Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations was in attendance for some of the discussions at the Foreign Affairs and General Affairs Councils.

DEVELOPMENT FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL A provisional report of the meeting and Conclusions adopted can be found at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/146213.pdf

POST-2015 AGENDA The Post-2015 development agenda was the main discussion item. The UK remains at the forefront of the post-2015 discussions, building on the Prime Minister’s co-chairing of the UN high-level panel. Ministers discussed the EU’s approach to intergovernmental negotiations on post-2015. High-level Council Conclusions have since been agreed and are in line with UK objectives, reflecting on the UN Secretary-General’s synthesis report and the EU’s collective commitment to spend 0.7% GNI on official development assistance. The Secretary of State made the case for a more simple, inspiring and relevant set of goals and targets, and called for a renewed EU commitment to 0.7% as soon as possible.

GENDER In response to the UK’s call for the EU to show greater ambition on women and girls, the Commission updated Ministers on progress on the current EU Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment. The UK strongly supported the Commission to take greater political leadership and deliver an ambitious Gender Action Plan 2016-20. High Representative and Vice- President Mogherini said that women and girls would be a personal priority and Development Commissioner Mimica committed to championing gender.

EBOLA FROM THE DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE The Commission updated Ministers on the latest developments. Ministers discussed the practical issues around combating Ebola, agreeing on the importance of working with communities, and praising UK leadership. The Secretary of State reiterated the urgent need to maintain momentum in tackling the immediate crisis. It was also important to focus on the social and economic impacts of Ebola and on regional preparedness to prevent spread. The Secretary of State said Member States should work in partnership with lead nations and made the case for more healthcare workers and lab technicians for Sierra Leone.

MIGRATION, REFUGEES AND DEVELOPMENT Ministers discussed the inter-linkages between migration and development, and the need for consistency between the Union’s internal and external migration policies.

ADOPTION OF COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS The Council adopted conclusions on: the 2014 Annual Report on the EU's development and external assistance policies; the action plan on nutrition; and on the role of the private sector in development.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL A provisional report of the meeting and Conclusions adopted can be found at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/146293.pdf

SYRIA/IRAQ High Representative Mogherini presented a draft EU strategy against ISIL, to be finalised in early 2015. The Foreign Secretary called for the strategy to be finalised and implemented rapidly. Immediate priorities were unblocking the EU Passenger Name Records (PNR) Directive; increasing support to the Syrian moderate opposition; and strategic communications to counter ISIL’s ideology. The Foreign Secretary said that Assad could not be a partner in the fight against ISIL. Several Member States agreed, including on the need for increased strategic communications to challenge ISIL’s ideology and tackle foreign fighters. Ministers agreed conclusions which expressed support to Staffan de Mistura, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Syria, enhanced support for the moderate opposition and underlined the culpability of the Assad regime as well as that of ISIL / Da'esh, Jabhat al-Nusra and other terrorist groups for atrocities and human rights violations, including the Assad regime’s use of chlorine as a chemical weapon: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/146257.pdf

There was broad support for the EU to do more to promote an inclusive political process in Iraq, including support for incorporating Sunni tribes into security structures, decentralisation and training the security forces. Some Member States called for a CSDP police training mission to Iraq. The Commission underlined the need to increase current funding to the crisis ahead of a UN appeal for over €7 billion in 2015. Member States agreed that Iran and Russia would be instrumental to progress, especially towards a broader political transition in Syria. A number of Member States called for greater influence over Gulf States and Turkey.

UKRAINE Ministers also discussed Ukraine. Ministers reaffirmed their desire to impose further restrictive measures in response to the ongoing illegal annexation of Crimea including a ban on EU investment in, and some exports to, Crimea. These measures have now been agreed.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA The High Representative debriefed Ministers on her recent trip to Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Commissioner Hahn and agreed to engage with the Bosnia leaders on drafting a written commitment on reform. Commissioner Hahn reiterated his intention to coordinate International Financial Institutions and other donors on reform. The Foreign Secretary welcomed the visit by the High Representative and Commissioner Hahn, as well as the Conclusions endorsing a new EU approach on Bosnia, and stressed the importance of bringing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement into force upon agreement of the written commitment. Other Member States called for improved EU communications and highlighted that this initiative should not set a precedent for the region.

EBOLA The High Representative noted that EU Ebola Coordinator and Humanitarian Commissioner Christos Stylianides would be reporting to the December European Council on progress. Ministers agreed to continue to focus on the Ebola crisis in 2015.

LIBYA UN Special Envoy Bernardino Leon updated Ministers on the UN-led dialogue process, and gave his assessment that the political space for launching a negotiated solution was shrinking considerably. Leon called for more direct and compelling messages from the EU on the threat of an oil embargo; the need for aerial surveillance of military activity; and the need for "robust" monitoring when an agreement is reached. The High Representative concluded the discussion, reiterating that Libya and developments in the country had to remain in focus on the EU side. Political Directors were tasked to draft an EU 28 Statement giving a unified declaration of support to the UN-led process, which was subsequently issued. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/146327.pdf

OTHER BUSINESS — The High Representative announced her intention to restart the Belgrade- Pristina Dialogue on normalisation in January. — Two Member States called for EU action in response to the UAE designating several European moderate Muslim organisations as terrorist groups. — The Presidency debriefed the Council on the outcome of their informal meeting on Migration held on 27 November in Rome. — Council Conclusions on South Sudan were approved. — Council Conclusions on Central African Republic were approved. — Council Conclusions on Small Arms and Light Weapons were approved. — Council Conclusions on “AMICI” were approved. — The Council extended the implementation period for EU support to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the UN Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). The EU funds were initially granted in December 2013 and will be prolonged until 30 September 2015. — The Council allocated €3.5 million to support states in the Sahel region in conducting physical security and stockpile management activities to reduce the risk of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. — The Council allocated € 990.000 for activities in support of the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation. The funds will be used for information and communication, action to strengthen ballistic missile non- proliferation and outreach activities for the ‘universalisation’ of The Hague Code of Conduct — The Council endorsed the EU position on the rules of procedure of the Association Council with Ukraine and those of the Association Committee and of Sub-Committees, the establishment of two Sub-Committees, and the delegation of certain powers by the Association Council to the Association Committee in Trade configuration. — The Council adopted the EU position for the Stabilisation and Association Council with Serbia, to take place in Brussels on 17 December. — The Council adopted the EU position for the twelfth meeting of the EU- Morocco Association Council, to be held in Brussels on 16 December. — The Council approved the Operational Plan for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Mission EUCAP SAHEL Mali. EUCAP SAHEL Mali has been established as a civilian mission to deliver strategic advice and training

for the Malian internal security forces, in coordination with international partners.

GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL A provisional report of the meeting and Conclusions adopted can be found at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/145844.pdf

ENLARGEMENT AND STABILISATION AND ASSOCIATION PROCESS The UK continues to be a strong supporter of EU enlargement, which has helped bring peace, prosperity and stability across the continent of Europe. We continue to support the future EU membership of all of the Western Balkans and Turkey, provided EU aspirant countries meet all the requirements of membership before accession. It is important to recognise that we cannot handle future enlargements as we have in the past, however. For this reason, I was pleased that the Conclusions agreed by the GAC acknowledged the importance of maintaining the credibility of and public support for the enlargement process. The Conclusions also noted how economic development in accession countries could help mitigate migratory pressures. These are issues that the Council will need to return to before further countries join the EU. Enlargement is one of the strongest drivers for reform in EU aspirant countries and, for that reason, I highlighted the need to strike the right balance between ensuring that conditionality is sufficiently rigorous whilst also ensuring there is visible progress to encourage those driving reforms in these countries. I highlighted Bosnia and Herzegovina as an important UK priority, where I wanted to see a new EU approach, building on the recent UK-Germany initiative, to inject momentum into Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU stalled accession process. On Turkey, I noted that our inability to agree steps towards opening negotiations on Chapters 23 and 24 (on rule of law issues) and on Chapter 17 (on economic and monetary policy) will be disheartening to those Turkish people who want to see the country move towards EU standards. On Macedonia, I would have liked to have seen a more forward looking approach. It is clear that the Macedonian government needs to do more to address slippages in Macedonia’s reform process. However these slippages are in part due to the absence of prospects for opening EU accession negotiations.

RULE OF LAW The GAC adopted Council Conclusions on the rule of law, establishing a political dialogue among Member States to promote respect for the rule of law within the EU. The regular dialogue complements existing procedures to safeguard EU values set out in Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty. It is a sensible and pragmatic outcome that Member States will be responsible for leading the discussions on the rule of law. The discussions will be held once per year with the first in 2015. The process of formal Member State dialogues on the rule of law will be reviewed in 2016 and the UK will make its views known on the relative merits of the discussion at that time.

EUROPEAN SEMESTER AND EUROPE 2020 MID-TERM REVIEW The GAC took note of the Commission’s Annual Growth Survey which outlines in broad terms the EU’s jobs and economic growth objectives for the year ahead, and the European Semester roadmap which sets out actions during the Latvian Presidency in the first half of 2015. The GAC also received details of progress on the mid-term review of the Europe 2020 Strategy, the EU’s ten-year plan for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.

PREPARATION OF THE DECEMBER EUROPEAN COUNCIL The GAC prepared the 18 and 19 December European Council, which the Prime Minister attended. The December European Council agenda is expected to cover: economic policy, including further

efforts to foster growth, jobs and competiveness; and external relations issues, such as Ukraine and Ebola. On economic policy, I noted the announcement of the Commission’s EU investment package and looked forward to examining further details including the draft legislation. I emphasised the importance of a rigorous and objective assessment of potential recipient projects and the critical role of the single market, trade and structural reform in generating the right environment for growth.

FOLLOW-UP TO THE JUNE EUROPEAN COUNCIL The GAC held its fourth discussion of the implementation of the ‘Strategic Agenda for the Union in times of change’ as agreed by Leaders at the June European Council this year, focussing on the subject: “The EU as a strong global actor”. Ministers reiterated support for the priorities outlined in June and the key role of Member States in setting the EU’s foreign policy.

FRIENDS OF THE PRESIDENCY ON IMPROVING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EU The Italian Presidency presented their report summarising the four Friends of the Presidency Group on improving the functioning of the EU meetings held during its Presidency.

STRENGTHENING INTER-INSTITUTIONAL ANNUAL AND MULTI-ANNUAL PROGRAMMING Following the discussion at the November GAC of the broad priorities for the Commission’s 2015 Work Programme (CWP), Commissioner Hahn presented further detail on the Commission’s programme next year. I welcomed the information received so far but pressed for more time for consultation with the Council in future years. GAC Ministers also considered the Presidency’s proposals for a high level Joint Declaration with the Commission and European Parliament on legislative programming in future years.

COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The GAC considered a Commission proposal to amend the composition of the Committee of the Regions, which would reduce the number of members from 353 to 350 as stipulated in the Treaties. The Council agreed a revised procedure to appoint 350 members when the current Committee’s term of office expires in January 2015. I am writing in similar terms to Mr William Cash MP, Chairman of the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee and Richard Ottaway MP, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, copying to the Clerks of the respective Committees, Les Saunders at the Cabinet Office, Sophie Warner-Fog, Pavan Chima and Faisal Moosa, Departmental Scrutiny Co-ordinators, and Una Ryan, FCO Select Committee Liaison Officer. I am placing a copy of this letter in the library of the House. I will continue to update Parliament on Foreign and General Affairs Councils as and when future meetings are held. 2 January 2015

ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT WITH THE WEST AFRICAN REGION (13263/14, 13217/14)

Letter from the Chairman to Lynne Featherstone MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for International Development At its meeting of 23 October, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above documents which had already been cleared from scrutiny. We welcome the prospect of the EPA and would be grateful if you could provide us with an update on the outcome of the negotiations on the provisional application of the agreement in due course. 23 October 2014

ELEMENTS FOR AN EU STRATEGY ON PUBLIC SECURITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (10108/14)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting on 10 July, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document and decided to clear it from scrutiny. It appears as though the strategy is a step in the right direction towards assisting development in Central America and the Caribbean, but as its main purpose is to coordinate and support the work being done by different EU Member States, its success will depend upon it being able to deliver results over and above the work already being undertaken independently by different actors. We therefore have some questions about the resourcing and implementation of the strategy. Given that your Explanatory Memorandum noted that the strategy would be delivered via existing programmes and resources, we would be interested to know which programmes will be used to fund this and to hear your assessment of whether you believe there will be sufficient resources for the strategy to be implemented effectively. Furthermore, your Explanatory Memorandum notes that Member States have been invited to share information on their bilateral engagement with countries in the region, so as to identify possible synergies and areas for further engagement. We would be interested to hear to what extent such information is already shared and what difference the strategy will make. Under the new strategy, through what means will this information sharing be conducted in the future? Who will be responsible for identifying the synergies and ensuring that work is coordinated effectively? We would be grateful to hear your views on the above and to receive any further updates in due course. 10 July 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 10 July, confirming that the EU-Sub Committee on External Affairs considered the above document and decided to clear it from scrutiny. You also raised some questions, however, about the resourcing and implementation of the strategy. As stated in the Explanatory Memorandum, the strategy will be delivered via existing programmes and resources. The major resources at the EU level remain the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) for Latin America and the European Development Fund (EDF) for the Caribbean. Although the strategy itself brings no new funding and focuses on enhancing political dialogue with regional authorities at the bilateral, sub -regional and regional levels, it will contribute to the identification of actions under the security priorities of regional and sub-regional cooperation, and to security-related bilateral cooperation in selected countries of the region (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica) in the period 2014–2020. In terms of the invitation to Member States to share information on their bilateral engagement in the region, so as to identify possible synergies and areas for future engagement, this information is already occasionally shared on an informal basis between EU Member State Embassies. The new strategy will, in the first instance, focus on arranging for a mapping exercise of donors to be carried out. The mapping will initially be based on secondary sources, including the IDB's Online Mapping Platform on Citizen Security in Central America, the Caribbean Donor Activities Matrix done by Canada, and other work done by UNDP and EU Delegations. Next steps beyond this are still under internal discussion. My officials will stay in close touch with the EEAS and I would be happy to keep the Committee informed of progress. 25 July 2014

ENGAGING WITH THE EU INSTITUTIONS ON UK PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman As I set out in my letter to you on 15 December 2014, I wrote to High Representative Federica Mogherini concerning scrutiny on 9 December 2014. I am writing to update you on the High Representative’s reply and our latest engagement with the EU institutions. In my letter to HRVP Mogherini, I emphasised the importance of providing documents well in advance to ensure sufficient time for UK parliamentary scrutiny. On documents where timetables are known, such as mission renewals, I set out the dates by which we would need to receive documents from the EU in order to allow for scrutiny. I also offered for my officials to brief EEAS officials on the UK parliamentary scrutiny process. I am encouraged by her reply, in which she has made clear that her services will work to provide legal acts at an earlier stage and, for annual renewal of sanctions measures, she will instruct her services to begin the review and renewal process at an earlier stage to allow parliamentary scrutiny to take place. There are of course challenges that she has highlighted, such as unpredictable developments in CFSP and CSDP, and in the case of sanctions, the time it takes to secure consensus amongst Member States before legal acts can be produced. However, I think this gives us a strong basis for working together and I am reassured that the EEAS will work harder to ensure that documents are produced early where possible. Since writing to HRVP Mogherini, my officials visited Brussels and, with the UK Representation, held a productive meeting with senior EEAS officials – as well as others in the Council Secretariat, Latvian Presidency Team and Luxembourg Presidency Team – to ensure the UK parliamentary scrutiny process is better understood and to strengthen our engagement. My officials have agreed to return to brief EEAS Working Group Chairs to ensure that all those involved with the process of document production have a good understanding of UK parliamentary scrutiny. We will continue to engage with the EEAS and other EU institutions to provide workshops on UK parliamentary scrutiny and meet with key EU officials on a regular basis to ensure that scrutiny timetables are taken into account wherever possible. 4 March 2015

ESTABLISHING A MECHANISM TO ADMINISTER THE FINANCING OF THE COMMON COSTS OF EUROPEAN UNION OPERATIONS HAVING MILITARY OR DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS (ATHENA) (18066/11)

Letter from the Chairman to Julian Brazier MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and Minister for Reserves, Ministry of Defence The House of Lords European Union Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered this document at its meeting of 10 November and decided to retain it under scrutiny. As the Government is not yet in a position to be able to deposit the final Council Decision, we would normally require a comprehensive Explanatory Memorandum (EM) to effectively scrutinise the Government’s position. However, the EM provided to us contained very little detail. For example, we do not consider it sufficient to state that “all proposed amendments to the Council Decision have been predominantly technical in nature and have not crossed UK red lines” without offering us more details of the amendments in question. Moreover, the EM offers little explanation of where other Member States may have wished to extend common funding arrangements and we therefore cannot make any informed decision of the Government’s veto. On the basis of this EM, we therefore feel that we cannot undertake proper parliamentary scrutiny, especially in the short timeframe requested. On substance, we would be interested to know what steps the Government took to engage with the review. Did the UK engage constructively and proactively in order to influence the functioning of the Common Security and Defence Policy?

When the negotiations are concluded, we would be grateful if you would deposit the Council Decision along with a more detailed EM explaining the amendments which have been made. In the meantime, we have decided to retain this proposal under scrutiny. 10 November 2014

Letter from the Chairman to Julian Brazier MP I am writing regarding the document listed above, which the House of Lords European Union Sub- Committee on External Affairs considered at their meeting of 25 March. Thank you for your comprehensive Explanatory Memorandum. We are now content to clear the proposal from scrutiny. 25 March 2015

EU-ALGERIA RELATIONS (11520/14)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman As set out in my Explanatory Memorandum of 21 July, the deadline for the 8 week enhanced Parliamentary Scrutiny of these agreements ended on 27 August. You cleared these documents from scrutiny on 29 July at the Chairman’s sift, for which I am grateful. The Government considers that the opt-in is triggered by the above mentioned Framework Agreements because they include access to Fiscalis 2020 and Customs 2020. Both Fiscalis 2020 and Customs 2020 contain JHA obligations related to fighting fraud and as such we consider that the JHA opt-in is engaged. The Government has decided to opt in to the decisions on signature and conclusion because the UK already participates in these underlying programmes. As you are aware the Code of Practice on enhanced scrutiny of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) asks that the Written Ministerial Statement (WMS) is laid within 2 weeks of the opt-in letter issuing to the EU. As Parliament is in recess, I plan to write to the Home Affairs Committee, Foreign Affairs Committee, and Commons Liaison Committee, informing them of our opt-in decision. 8 October 2014

EU AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: STABILISATION AND ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 12 March, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document. We welcome the constructive role that the UK has been playing in encouraging reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). However, we would highlight the importance of clear and unambiguous messaging from the EU and Member States towards BiH, which clearly states the political conditions required from BiH, sets realistic goals of what can be achieved and the timeframe required to do so. We hope that you agree with the need for such messaging and further hope that the UK Government will guard against raising the hopes of the people of BiH of what can be achieved through the EU path. We also have a further concern regarding the role of regional players interfering in BiH. In particular, we note that Serbia and Russia have significant political ties with the leadership of the Republika Srpska. We would be grateful for your assessment of the degree of influence that Serbia and Russia have in BiH, and the role they play. Also, what is your assessment of the commitment of the leadership of the Republika Srpska to the EU project? While we welcome the commitment of the leadership of the Republika Srpska to the Written Commitment, are there any steps that the EU and Member States can take to uphold the political agreement? We would be grateful if you could respond to this letter in due course. In the meantime, we are content to clear this proposal from scrutiny. 12 March 2015 32

EUCAP NESTOR (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing to update the Committee about the mandate renewal of EUCAP Nestor, and to deposit a Council Decision extending the mission’s budget until October 2015 and a related Explanatory Memorandum. Firstly, I regret that I have to inform you of an error in the FCO’s handling of the previous Council Decision to extend the mission’s mandate and budget. As you will recall, my officials wrote to the clerks on the 27 June to request a waiver of scrutiny for a proposal to extend the budget for three months. The reasons for this request were that negotiations on the renewal of the mandate had turned out to be more protracted than expected and there was significant under spend in the budget to allow for a three months extension without additional cost. The Committee agreed to the request. When they wrote to the clerks, my officials believed that the Decision referred only to the three month, no cost extension. Only very recently did anyone in UKREP or the FCO notice that at the very end of the text was a sentence extending the mandate (though not the budget) until December 2016. The Decision was adopted by the FAC on 22 July. It is true that the RELEX Secretariat, in a covering email sent to UKREP on 26 July, describe the draft Council Decision as “concerning the no-cost extension of EUCAP Nestor. It is also the case that whenever we have negotiated short term extensions previously, we have had a special Decision adopting just the negotiated changes and not an additional long term mandate extension. We shall be taking up with the EEAS their handling of this case. However, the fact remains that this extension ought to have been spotted. The FCO should have been more vigilant, especially since we were asking the Committee to grant a waiver. I feel deeply embarrassed and offer you, the Committee and your clerks an unreserved apology. From a policy perspective, I do support the two year extension to the mission’s mandate. In addition, the attached [not printed] Council Decision extending the mission’s budget is still to be adopted by unanimity at Council and therefore the UK retains the ability to influence the mission in light of the Committee’s considerations. Officials will be scrutinising the budget very closely and working hard to reduce costs. The European Scrutiny Committee has highlighted concerns with EUCAP Nestor and questioned whether continuing the mission is of value to the UK. I am convinced that it is. Although no Somali pirate attack has been successful since May 2012, pirates retain an ability to operate from the shore as they did at the height of the problem in 2011. International naval forces remain key to mitigating this risk in the immediate term but the EU and NATO mandates beyond the end of 2016 are unknown. Capacity building efforts, including EUCAP Nestor, will therefore remain important to address the root causes of piracy on land. I supported the continuation of the mission on this basis but wanted to see a greater focus on UK priorities and measures to improve the mission’s performance. I believe this has been achieved, so I continue to give my support to the mission going forward. However, I would like to address your concerns in turn and set out further the progress that has been achieved in recent months. Through discussions on the Strategic Review and Operational Plan (OPLAN), the FCO has worked hard to improve the performance of the mission and ensure it delivers UK objectives. The mission is now more tightly focussed on delivering in Somalia through a three phased approach. As described in my letter of 22 May, in the first phase this involves developing further security and risk mitigation options to allow deployment throughout key areas in Somalia; developing jointly with Somali authorities conceptual plans on law enforcement in coastal areas, including possible future police structures at federal level and developing options on how to reduce the operation of piracy networks in conjunction with other missions. The second phase involves support to entities in charge of law enforcement in coastal areas such as police services stationed along the coast, maritime or coastal police forces, coast guards or port police. Concrete activities could comprise advice, mentoring and limited equipment, in close cooperation with other regional implementing partners, such as UN agencies and training of specialized capacities to police coastal areas. The third phase involves evaluating, mentoring and monitoring the people who have been trained. Following the European Scrutiny Committee’s report, ESC 35429 of 9 April 2014, officials have ensured that adequate security measures for deployment inside Somalia are reflected in the

Operational Plan. Furthermore, there will be a drive for continued progress and accountability. Any decision to move from phase one to phase two in Somalia will be made on the basis of a comprehensive assessment of the mission’s progress against five criteria, including the completion of phase one activities; mechanisms for oversight; the implementation of proper security and medical arrangements; and commitment from the Somali authorities. The assessment of the conditions to be fulfilled before the mission can move forward to phase two in the different regions in Somalia will be submitted to the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom) through regular reporting (Mission Monthly and Six-Monthly reports) and/or ad hoc reports. The UK will have the opportunity to challenge the assessment at CivCom. If these are not achieved in the short term (6 months) then we will review our bilateral support of the mission, comprising a number of UK secondments. The European Scrutiny Committee asked how the local state authorities will be able to provide EUCAP Nestor with the necessary buy-in that has been lacking thus far. The OPLAN provides further details on this point. Key Leadership Engagements (KLE), building on a recent successful KLE with the Puntland authorities from an EUNAVFOR ATALANTA ship, will aim to cement buy-in within Somalia. Following successful UK interventions, the OPLAN also states how the mission will work more closely with UN agencies who have been operating inside Somalia for many years, such as the UN Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). This will further improve the mission’s access, security and standing within Somalia. Moreover the mission is increasingly engaged with broader international efforts in Somalia, which improves the mission’s visibility and reputation with local authorities. For example, through its involvement with the UK-led Working Group on Capacity Building of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the mission will be held to account for any failure to focus its efforts on key priorities or any lack of coordination with other regional implementers. I apologise again for the omission within the exemption request, which does not meet the high standards that I expect. I have followed up in detail with officials and, as specified above, have ensured steps have been taken to prevent reoccurrence. 3 October 2014

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 23 October, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above Council Decision which set the budget for the EUCAP NESTOR mission, and which had already been cleared from scrutiny at the Chairman’s sift. We welcome the prospect of a mandate extension of the EUCAP NESTOR Mission. However, with regard to Council Decision 2014/485/CFSP of 22 July 2014, we are concerned that this could have been agreed without the FCO being aware of its contents and without the proposal having undergone proper parliamentary scrutiny. We are grateful to you for your honest explanation and the reasons provided in your letter, and hope that the actions you have taken will prevent this from happening again. However, as the exemption from deposit was granted under false pretences, we would be grateful if you could now deposit the original document on the extension of the mandate (agreed on 22 July), along with an accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, so that the Committee is also able to consider that document as well. We look forward to receiving the document and accompanying Explanatory Memorandum as soon as possible. 23 October 2014

EU CSDP MISSION IN NIGER (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 17 July the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document, which had already been cleared from scrutiny.

We were pleased to hear of the progress that the EUCAP Sahel Niger mission has made recently, but continue to take a close interest in the work of the mission and the security of the region. Your letter of 28 March noted that Nigerien elections were due in 2015-2016 and that a visible EU presence would increase the chances of a smooth poll. We would be interested to receive updates on the work of EUCAP Sahel Niger and, in particular, to receive an assessment of the mission’s work following the outcome of those elections. We look forward to your response in due course. 17 July 2014

EU CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 12 March, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document. We are following the revision of the EU’s Strategy for Central Asia with some interest. However, we have serious concerns about the EU’s capacity to deliver substantive and long term reform in Central Asia, and whether the EU’s efforts there constitute good value for money. In particular, we highlight that the lack of political will amongst partner countries is a serious impediment to reform and that the Commission has not been able to leverage its trade and economic influence sufficiently to combat corruption. We note that the approach is to “revisit and refine” the priorities adopted in 2007, but there may perhaps be a good argument for a more comprehensive reconsideration of how the EU can use its influence and the considerable resources it invests in the region to greater effect. We would value your frank assessment of what the EU can realistically achieve in Central Asia and what its priorities should be. We would be grateful if you could respond to this letter in due course. In the meantime, we are content to clear this document from scrutiny. 12 March 2015

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 12 March, confirming that the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document and cleared it from scrutiny. You raised concerns however about EU activity and capacity to deliver substantive long term reform in the region, and sought an assessment of what the EU can realistically achieve and what its priorities should be. As the Commission/EEAS report itself outlined, and as summarised in the original Explanatory Memorandum of 9 February, implementing EU strategy in the region faces a number of significant long-standing underlying challenges. But this does not invalidate the strategy, which provides a useful overall framework for EU engagement in the region, designed to address a series of key shared security, economic and governance challenges, covering key areas including security, rule of law, economic development, energy and education. We have yet to receive draft proposals for the strategy review scheduled for the coming months: we will share these with the Committee(s) as the review process moves forward. And with specific discussions in Brussels yet to take place in working groups, we do not yet have a clear picture of the views of other Member States at this stage. But nothing we have heard thus far would lead us to conclude that states are on course to question the core of the strategy itself. Based on our experience to date, more than 7 years after the creation of the original strategy, we remain of the view that the existing strategy is still largely valid, needing to be refreshed rather than overhauled. And that it is better to focus on implementing strategy which is essentially sound, rather than spend further time on comprehensive strategy review for its own sake. Overall, we believe the EU’s main focus in near to medium term needs to remain on supporting sustainable economic development, addressing threats to regional stability and promoting rule of law and respect for human rights. In implementing this existing strategy, it makes sense to differentiate between the five Central Asian states, recalibrating resources where necessary given differing levels of engagement and appetite for key EU policy and reform messages. Throughout it is important to focus 35

on delivering results and on getting proper visibility for EU activity across the Central Asian states. We will be examining too overall prioritisation and the breadth of scope of EU activity, particularly in a climate of necessary resource constraint. Overall, I think it is worth highlighting that the EU Central Asia strategy should be grounded on a long-term perspective, given the wide-ranging deep-rooted challenges faced in the region, and the limits on resources available. The challenges faced in securing changes in governance practice and implementation of internationally-recognised rule of law standards necessarily mean that tangible sustainable results may take many years to achieve. In general, we are necessarily looking at consistent, focussed, bottom-up work on the ground, the results of which may not always be immediately visible. Such activity does not by its nature lend itself to a series of short-term top-level strategy reviews, but regular evaluation of specific areas of project work and any necessary resulting adjustments. You will have seen my separate letter of 11 March to the Commons European Scrutiny Committee which covers their related queries on evaluation of EU development aid in general, including in Central Asia and the Committee’s response. In relation to processes to identify a new EU Special Representative for Central Asia, the Committee may already have seen that HR Federica Mogherini has proposed the appointment of Peter Burian, currently State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Early stage preparatory work in Brussels working groups is now underway on a draft mandate and budget, and we will shortly be sending the Committees relevant drafts for scrutiny in line with usual procedures. 27 March 2015

EU CHINA INVESTMENT AGREEMENT (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from Lord Livingston of Parkhead, Minister of State for Trade and Investment, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, to the Chairman I am writing to provide you with an update on developments in investment protection negotiations between the European Commission and China. Lord Green wrote to inform you of the Council agreement of the mandate for these negotiations on the 12th November 2013. The Commission’s negotiations have commenced with three initial rounds in 2014. These were followed by the 4th round on the 20th-23rd January 2015 in Brussels at which the Commission presented an offer to the Chinese which is ambitious, both in terms of investment protection and market access. The investment agreement would give UK investors a higher standard of protection than is offered by the current UK-China Bilateral Investment Treaty. It could also provide significant benefits to British businesses by increasing their access to Chinese markets, especially in services. It is for these reasons the Government fully supports the Commission’s negotiation and the work programme to date has allowed a period of extensive consultation by the Commission with member states. The next negotiating round will be during the week commencing 16th March 2015. I will continue to support this initiative which is an important step towards a full Free Trade Agreement, and I will continue to update you on developments. The growing importance of trade with China only reaffirms my view that a strengthened trade and investment relationship will be of great benefit to the British economy. There is significant interest in this agreement from UK business and we will continue to use our influence in Brussels to secure an agreement which promotes growth and a good deal for UK taxpayers. 26 February 2015

EU CSDP: UPDATE ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE JUNE 2015 EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON DEFENCE (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from Julian Brazier MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and Minister for Reserves, Ministry of Defence, to the Chairman When we last wrote to you in December we promised a further update on our objectives for the June European Council on defence following the Defence Ministers’ informal on the 18-19 February. We would also like to take the opportunity to respond to requests for additional information contained in your reports of 15 January 2015 and 10 December 2014.

DEFENCE INFORMAL – 18-19 FEBRUARY 2015 EU Defence Ministers met in Riga on the 18th and 19th of February for an informal discussion on Defence, Minister for Reserves Mr Brazier represented the UK. The meeting began with a discussion on the June 2015 European Council on Defence. High Representative Mogherini said that she would report in April against the taskings from the December 2013 European Council and saw five further potential areas of focus, higher levels of defence spending, improved co-operation in capability development, exploitation of “dual use” research, development of the “train and equip” concept, and improved EU-NATO co-operation. The Minister welcomed the intention to take stock of progress on the decisions made at the December 2013 European Council and, along with others, stressed the need for closer EU-NATO co-operation. He also emphasised the importance of respecting divisions of competence between Commission and Member States in security and defence matters. A discussion on Hybrid Warfare was opened by the NATO Secretary General, whose presence was welcomed by several Member States including the Minister, who said that the EU had a constructive role to play, using its political, diplomatic and economic instruments to complement the military response that could be offered by NATO. On CSDP Operations, the Minister emphasised UK support for EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina and for EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, the counter-piracy mission off Somalia. The next meeting of Defence Ministers will be alongside their Foreign Minister counterparts in the Foreign Affairs Council on 18 May."

JUNE 2015 EUROPEAN COUNCIL Our overall objective for the June European Council is to continue to ensure that the EU’s plays a useful role in defence and security that is complementary to NATO. The June Council is also an opportunity to boost delivery of the areas where the EU can make a difference within the parameters agreed by the Prime Minister at the December 2013 European Council. Specifically, we want to use the June Council to: — Improve EU/CSDP’s contribution to ‘full spectrum’ response to crisis and conflict management: the EU should focus on implementing the Comprehensive Approach to ensure better coordination between its unique range of civilian, military, economic, diplomatic and developmental tools. The economic lever in particular is likely to remain one of our most powerful responses, as exemplified by the current Russia/Ukraine situation. This would improve the EU’s contribution to addressing security challenges that matter to the UK. We also want more progress on civilian CSDP delivery and smarter missions, including establishing the Shared Service Centre to deliver more value for money and operational impact. — Support implementation of NATO Summit commitments: As host of the Wales’ NATO Summit, we have a strong locus to encourage use of the June Council to support Summit legacy follow up. We want the European Council to again acknowledge the importance of European burden sharing on defence as it did at the last defence discussion in December 2013. We also want the Council to reflect NATO Summit commitments where relevant to all EU partners; and investigate opportunities for addressing defined EU capability targets which complement NATO shortfalls. — The Council should also encourage Member States to open up their defence markets further, pool procurement to build economies of scale and support market-driven consolidation & specialisation. It should progress 37

complementary Commission and EDA actions endorsed in December 2013, which promote a level playing field in the internal market, support SMEs, and support the private sector development of dual use technologies with market potential. — Improve NATO-EU cooperation and coordination to strengthen Europe’s full spectrum response and cost-effectiveness: The EU has a useful role to play in complementing the military response capacity offered by NATO and we should strengthen co-operation between the two in response to the hybrid warfare threat. As we saw at the Euro-Atlantic security event at the Wales Summit, Ukraine has increased the collective NATO and EU appetite for better coordination. We want to capitalise on this momentum and will advocate more regular informal strategic dialogue on a wider set of issues, including strategic communications. As ever, we will not agree any expansionist measures such as: increasing common funding for EU military missions; a network of EU Defence Attachés; a permanent operational headquarters; EU ownership of military assets or any measures that undermine an open, competitive defence industry. So far, we believe there is some degree of support from Member States on the need to focus efforts on delivering December 2013 agreements, but preparations are still at an early stage and others may suggest new initiatives over the coming months. We have already begun to make clear to partners that the timing of our General Election will make agreement to any new initiatives difficult in any case. Whilst detailed agendas have not yet been set, there are already a number of emerging themes: — Tasking the High Representative with a refresh of the European Security Strategy: Mogherini is developing a document designed to form the basis of a discussion in June. It will be composed of three elements: (1) global trends; (2) the foreign policy implications of internal EU trends; (3) an evaluation of the EU’s major foreign policy instruments. We agree that the strategic environment has changed sufficiently to warrant an update, particularly given events in Ukraine. The ESS has not been refreshed since it was written in 2003 (although it was reviewed in 2008). However, we are concerned that any refresh could quickly become bogged down in detail and expose Member States’ divisions, leading to protracted negotiations which distract from frontline delivery. We will push for any review to be strategic, high level, and developed by the High Representative. We expect any EU foreign policy strategy to remain non-binding upon Member States and we would block any moves to change that position. — ‘Train and Equip’: As outlined in previous updates, most recently 10th December, we support the overall concept behind the train and equip initiative. The EEAS and Commission are working on a Joint Communication designed to set out details on its implementation. We expect to see this before June. Details on the content are limited at this stage including on financial implications and methodology. Pilot studies have just been conducted in Mali and Somalia designed to explore the opportunities and challenges for implementation. The results of these pilots are yet to be shared with Member States. We will provide the Committee with a copy of the final Joint Communication with accompanying Explanatory Memorandum when it is published. — Defence Industry: We do not expect any major new initiatives on the defence industry in June. We expect it to be largely a stock take of agreements from the December Council in 2013. We will continue to be supportive of a more competitive defence industry, whilst resisting any language or measures that could be seen as protectionist, lead to Commission ownership of military capabilities, or distort the market.

ESC REPORTS On a separate note, we are also grateful for your reports entitled “European security and defence: following up the December 2013 European Defence Council” of 15 January 2015 (35696) and “European Defence Agency” of 10 December 2014 (36526, 36527). The reports make a number of

points and contain a number of requests for further information, which we have sought to provide in the attached annex [not printed]. You are already aware of the difficulties that we face when negotiating EU policy. Issues such as document classification, the last minute release of EEAS documentation and, on some occasions, the speed of negotiations, can all make it difficult to submit documents in good time or before the documents are agreed. However, please be reassured that, wherever possible, we will continue to be proactive in sharing information with the Committees and we hope the overview contained in the annex [not printed] will be helpful in this respect. 4 March 2015

EU - FIJI – ARTICLE 96 OF THE COTONOU AGREEMENT, DISCONTINUANCE OF SPECIAL MEASURES (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing to update you on progress in relation to Article 96 special measures that were imposed on Fiji, as advised in my Explanatory Memorandum of August 2013. The Explanatory Memorandum related to a Council Decision amending and extending the period for which Decision 2007/641/EC applied, concluding consultations with the Republic of Fiji Islands, under Article 96 of the African, Caribbean and Pacific-EU Partnership Agreement and Article 37 of the Development Cooperation Instrument. As stated in the Explanatory Memorandum, the restrictions on Fiji were extended to the end of March 2015. Since the extension was put in place, Fiji has successfully held a general election, resulting in a return to a parliamentary democracy. The election was observed by a Multinational Observation Group, co-led by Australia, India and Indonesia. UK and EU observers participated in the mission. Since the election, the Commonwealth has lifted Fiji’s partial suspension allowing it to return as full members. An EU Verification Mission subsequently visited Fiji following the election. On 29 October 2014, the EU published its Verification Mission report on the fulfilment of the commitments agreed with the Republic of the Fiji islands in 2007. This report strongly recommended “that in light of the recent developments and the overall atmosphere in the country, the appropriate measures suspending development cooperation with the government should be discontinued and… political engagement should be reinforced”. It also recommended that the necessary steps to finalise round 11 of the European Development Fund (Pacific) with Fiji were carried out. At a meeting in Brussels on 20 November, the EU agreed to accept the recommendations in the report and to inform the President of Fiji that the special measures under Article 96 would be discontinued. A draft of the letter is attached [not printed]. 4 December 2014

EU FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL 21 NOVEMBER 2014 - PRE-COUNCIL WRITTEN MINISTERIAL STATEMENT (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from Baroness Neville-Rolfe, Minister for Intellectual Property, Parliamentary Under-Secretary-of-State, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, to the Chairman The EU Foreign Affairs Council (Trade) will take place in Brussels on 21 November. I will represent the UK for all issues on the agenda. Please see attached [not printed] a Pre-Council Written Ministerial Statement which is being laid in Parliament. 16 November 2014

EU FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL (TRADE) 8 MAY (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to Lord Livingston of Parkhead, Minister of State for Trade and Investment, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Thank you for your letter of 16 May 2014, regarding the Foreign Affairs Council (Trade) on 8 May. The EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the letter at its meeting on 5 June and found the update helpful. However, the Committee noted the disappointing progress on the post-Bali Doha Development Agenda and wondered if you would be willing to share the Commissioner’s analysis on the matter. Your letter stated that the Commissioner’s analysis recognised a need for a “lowering of ambition” and we would also be interested in receiving further information on where the ambition will be lowered. We look forward to your response in due course. 5 June 2014

EU GULF OF GUINEA ACTION PLAN 2015-2020 (5222/15)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing in response to your committee’s report 36652, issued 4 March 2015, which discussed the Joint Staff Working Document Draft EU Gulf of Guinea Action Plan 2015 – 2020. Negotiations in Brussels have continued since my Explanatory Memorandum of 26 February 2015 and I hope to address the concerns your committee raised. Revision two of the action plan is not due to issue until later today, so I have attached revision one and the draft Council Conclusions for your information [not printed]. It contains some significant revisions over the first draft and has addressed the concerns I have previously outlined to you. I previously mentioned my desire for greater clarity on the EEAS’ intentions for CSDP’s role in this action plan. My officials have raised this issue in the Politico- Military Group and the Council Working Group on Africa (COAFR) to ensure that the UK’s view is known. This is a difficult topic to negotiate on, but paragraph nineteen (concerning possible CSDP) is now far more balanced around both military and civilian CSDP considerations, with a focus on learning lessons from existing CSDP activity, rather than new action. . The draft action plan further notes that planning is underway for funding instruments for 2015 – 2020, which reduces the prospect of any CSDP mission. There is little Member State appetite for a CSDP mission and such a future mission would be subject to full parliamentary scrutiny. The subject of ‘regional buy-in’ was raised at the COAFR Working Group and it appears that the EEAS had previously missed opportunities to communicate the work they had undertaken. While it would be impossible to develop the action plan jointly with the twenty two nations which it is intended to help, the EEAS have embarked on high level discussions. In the last year they have briefed a number of African Ambassadors in Brussels and the HRVP hosted a maritime security meeting in the margins of the EU-Africa summit in April 2014. The draft action plan is now much clearer on the importance of ensuring regular dialogue at various multilateral and bilateral levels. This will help achieve a shared understanding of the threats and opportunities and enhance collective efforts towards implementation of the Action Plan. This, coupled with the strength of paragraph two of the draft Council Conclusions, shows that serious effort will be put into understanding the assistance that is required, rather than just offering what is convenient. I hope the Committee agree that the revised draft adequately addresses my concerns and is now a far better document and would consider reviewing this on 11 March. 6 March 2015

EU MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY – ACTION PLAN (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter to Sir William Cash MP, of 24 November, on the EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan. The Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered your letter and the draft Action Plan at its meeting on 15 December and was interested to hear about the progress made in developing the Action Plan. You mention in your letter that there will be a brief review of progress on the Action Plan under each Presidency. We would be grateful if you could keep us informed of updates regarding the Action Plan and these brief reviews. The Committee is interested in maritime security and, in particular, is keen to know more about how the EU Maritime Security Strategy fits together with the work of Operation Atalanta. We were therefore wondering whether officials from the FCO may be able to come and brief us on the work of Operation Atalanta and the development of the EU Maritime Security Strategy? We would be happy for this briefing to be either on or off the record, and ideally would like to arrange this for the new year, after we have finished our current inquiry. If this would be possible then the Clerk of the Committee would be happy to discuss possible dates with your officials. We look forward to your response in due course. 16 December 2014

EU MILITARY ADVISORY MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing to provide you with a further update on the Central African Republic (CAR). In addition, I submit an Explanatory Memorandum on the draft Council Decision for extending the mandate for the EU Operation in CAR (EUFOR CAR) for three months. I previously wrote to you on 24 April 2014.

SITUATION ON THE GROUND The security environment remains fragile. CAR is facing a situation where its state, justice and economic structures will need to be built from scratch. Levels of inter-religious violence and tensions remain high. Whilst there have been some improvements in Bangui, the situation is getting worse outside the capital. The humanitarian crisis in CAR has been aggravated by continuing sporadic violence. The UN estimates that over 2.5 million people (more than half of the population) are in dire need of humanitarian assistance, including protection, food, water, shelter, health and sanitation.

UN The UN Peacekeeping Operation (MINUSCA) deployed on 15 September. We judge the handover from the AU (MISCA) to UN authority in Bangui to have been a success. The AU’s 5,200 MISCA troops were re-hatted and augmented by approximately 1,800 additional UN uniformed personnel. 65% of uniformed staff are now deployed and the UN is on track to reach full operating capability by April 2015.

EU EUFOR CAR launched to Bangui on 1 April 2014 with the aim of providing a secure environment, protecting the populations most at risk and creating the conditions for the provision of humanitarian aid. EUFOR CAR reached full operational capacity (FOC) on 15 June, signalling the start of its six- month mandate. EUFOR CAR has succeeded in establishing security at the international airport and in the 3rd and 5th districts of Bangui.

The operation’s budget was agreed in May at €31 million (the Reference Amount in the original Council Decision was €26 million). An additional €3.7 million was exceptionally agreed to pay for accommodation for troops, and €1.4 million was added to cover the cost of contracting for logistics and medical capabilities. The budget was reviewed in July and no extra funds were requested. The Government believes that EUFOR CAR has had a positive effect on security within its area of operations. Although force generation has proved difficult, the ability to provide a visible presence through regular patrols has helped deter violence, with anecdotal evidence suggesting some that had fled have started to return to the capital. The flexible capabilities offered by the gendarmerie unit and the special operations cell have also proven useful responsive tools when needed, and the operation has engaged effectively with community leaders building trust. However, these successes and their sustainability will depend on MINUSCA’s ability to take over EUFOR CAR’s work.

EUFOR NEXT STEPS – REQUEST FOR EXTENSION CAR’s interim President Catherine Samba-Panza has requested that EUFOR’s mandate be extended by 3 months, until MINUSCA is fully deployed. The UN DPKO have stated that they would very much welcome EUFOR CAR’s extension. EUFOR has played a vital role, securing the airport (which was the only effective logistical and economic bridge into CAR), and creating a stable and secure environment in the third and fifth districts of Bangui (the only remaining areas of the capital where there was still a significant Muslim community). Whilst MINUSCA has already started to deploy, it will not reach full strength until after the end of the current EUFOR mandate. Maintaining EUFOR’s presence for a further three months would allow a better handover with MINUSCA including conducting joint patrols and providing backup rapid reaction forces whilst MINUSCA beds in. Due to the fragile nature of the security situation in Bangui, not extending EUFOR for a short period risks harming security gains. We understand from the EEAS that current troop providers have indicated their willingness to extend. Having considered carefully, HMG believes it right to agree a one off extension to ensure a smooth transition to MINUSCA. The UK and EU Member States agreed in principle to an extension at the Political and Security Committee on 30 September subject to scrutiny reserves. You will also find an accompanying Explanatory Memorandum along with draft Council Decision authorising the extension of EUFOR CAR’s mandate. For operational planning reasons, I would very much appreciate the Committee’s support in clearing this EM in a timely manner.

FUTURE EU ENGAGEMENT IN CAR EU Member States are also considering options for future EU engagement in CAR, what role they want to have post-EUFOR and how to support international efforts, specifically the UN and MINUSCA. Member States have tasked the EEAS to assess potential options (in a Political Framework for Crisis Approach, PFCA) to allow Member States to take an informed decision at a later date. We will press the EU to consider future options as part of a wider Comprehensive Approach to conflict prevention, including areas such as humanitarian, development, economic and possible CSDP actions. I will keep you informed as thinking develops on next steps.

PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY In my letter of 24 April to the Committee, I submitted what was the final version of the Transfer Agreement (TA). However, following the adoption of the Council Decision on 14 April, the CAR authorities asked to renegotiate the text of the TA. The EEAS negotiated on behalf of the EU. The agreed changes were minor, with language helpfully tightened and references added to EUFOR detentions being in pursuance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2134 (2014). An updated Council Decision on the conclusion of the negotiations was subsequently agreed and the TA signed on 18 July 2014 by the Head of the EU Delegation in Bangui and CAR’s Prime Minister. Operation Commander Pontiès stressed: “It [TA] is an important mechanism in the common efforts of EUFOR CAR and local authorities to create a safe and secure environment and to end the impunity of serious crimes in CAR.” These limité documents are attached [not printed], and are being shared with the Committee under the Government’s authority and the arrangements agreed between the Government and Committee for sharing such documents. It cannot be published, nor can it be reported on in any way which would bring detail contained in the document into the public domain. 42

TRANSIT AGREEMENT WITH CAMEROON I also mentioned in my previous letter the further Council Decision on EUFOR CAR, which would authorise the closing of negotiations with the Republic of Cameroon, to conclude an Agreement on the status of the EU Forces in transit within Cameroonian territory (something that was already happening on a case by case basis until an agreement was in place). Negotiations with Cameroon were authorised by EU Member States. This agreement and Council Decision were issued on 15 September and your staff kindly agreed to exempt this being submitted for Parliamentary Scrutiny due to its technical and non-political nature. My officials will be happy to coordinate with the Committee clerks to answer any questions you may have in advance of your Committee meeting, in particular on the request for approval of the extension to EUFOR’s mandate. 9 October 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing to provide an update on EUFOR CAR and to make the Committee aware of FCO- related EU business that is subject to scrutiny after the Winter Recess. I would like to apologise for not sending the Committee the usual pre-Recess letter, this was missed in the exceptionally busy period before Christmas. This does not meet the high standards we set for ourselves but please be reassured that processes have been put in place to avoid this happening again.

A. ITEMS WHICH I HOPE CAN BE CLEARED SHORTLY AFTER RECESS DUE TO THEIR URGENCY AND IMPORTANCE: EUCAP Sahel Mali: The mission’s current mandate expires on 15 January. The relevant Council Decision was deposited for scrutiny on 8 December and the EM was sent to your Committee on 18 December. This is scheduled for adoption at the 19 January Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) to avoid any gap in the mission’s mandate. EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The appointment begins at the start of March 2015 and is scheduled for adoption at the 19 January FAC to ensure a smooth transition. The relevant documents were deposited for scrutiny on 15 December and the EM was sent to your Committee on 18 December.

B. AN UPDATE ON EUFOR CAR: In October the Committee cleared documents extending the mandate for the EU Operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR CAR) for three months [October 2014 to January 2014]. At that point I also updated the Committee on the progress of the mission and next steps, including that Member States were considering options for future EU engagement in CAR and that potential options were being considered in a Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA). I would like to provide the Committee with another update at this point for information and to ensure that we can allow adequate time for parliamentary scrutiny.

CURRENT POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CAR EUFOR CAR has secured the airport and the 3rd and 5th districts within the capital, Bangui. EUFOR’s mandate will expire on 15 March 2015. We judge the handover between the African Union troops (MISCA) to the UN Peacekeeping force (MINUSCA) on 15 September as a successful transfer of authority. However, several months of relative calm in Bangui was shattered in October with an increase in violence including an attack on a MINUSCA convoy. The situation has calmed since then but still remains fragile. Banditry, in particular against the humanitarian community, is now the main problem in Bangui. Elections are scheduled for July 2015. There is a requirement for building state institutions in CAR but this can only be considered when there is sufficient and effective political dialogue, leadership and security.

FACA there is a real risk they will turn against the population of CAR and further destabilise the country. The UN are currently going through and cleansing the database of FACA personnel – removing people that have been involved in threatening the peace and stability of the country. The CAR interim President has requested that priority be given to reforming and training the FACA. The UN (which has the lead on security sector reform in CAR) has requested that the EU starts the process of security sector reform of the FACA in CAR. The UN would then look at putting together a wider plan on security sector reform following elections ensuring it has the buy-in of the newly elected CAR government. In November, the EU started to consider the possibility of developing an advisory mission to the FACA, which might also provide non-operational training if conditions allow.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT Political endorsement was given for a new EU Military Advisory Mission to CAR (EUMAM CAR) and a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) was approved at the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on 15 December. A CMC is the first stage of the planning process of a possible mission. The UK supported the development of a CMC and will work with partners to ensure that the mission will: have a clear mandate, be co-ordinated with the UN, have a realistic scale, be underpinned by proper planning, represent good value for money, and have a clear exit strategy and budget. The severity and scale of the violence and subsequent humanitarian crisis, as well as the potential for the situation to destabilise the region, has justified a UK response. A follow-on mission meets our objective of working with and through international organisations to ensure peace and security is delivered to CAR. The CMC incorporates a ‘phased approach’ for EUMAM CAR – starting off as an advisory mission, which, subject to agreed conditions and further political consent, could transition to conduct targeted non-operational training, in co-ordination with the UN. Non-operational training will involve improving the capabilities of existing units chain of command, increasing military leadership skills and competences, courses on basic citizenship and military knowledge modules (Human Rights, Gender Equality, international humanitarian law etc). The mission would consist of 50 – 60 military advisors. The further Security Sector Reform process depends on the elections in CAR as a prerequisite to set up a democratically elected and recognised government. Since elections are scheduled for July 2015, the mission will have a duration of 12 months from the time of reaching full operational capacity.

TIMETABLE AND PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY The timetable for EUMAM CAR is tight, with the aim to have the mission on the ground before EUFOR CAR ends to enable continuity and a good handover of contacts and expertise. We will work to ensure we get the necessary documents to the Committees as early as possible to ensure adequate time for clearance. We have very much appreciated the speed at which previous EUFOR CAR documents have been cleared by the Committees and hope the same will be possible for this mission. With the CMC approved at the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on 15 December, we anticipate that a draft Council Decision to ‘establish a mission’ will be issued at the beginning of January which we will aim to submit to scrutiny Committees by 8 January with a view to the Council Decision being approved at the FAC on 19 January. A draft Council Decision to ‘launch the mission’ will then be issued late January / early February which we will submit to scrutiny Committees with a view to the Council Decision being approved at the FAC on 9 February. The EU Military Advisory Mission to CAR (EUMAM CAR) is envisaged to deploy on 1 March and reach full operational capacity on 15 March, the same date that the mandate for EUFOR expires. I hope the Committee finds this letter useful, and my officials would welcome any suggestions for improving or streamlining pre-recess updates. 2 January 2015

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 26 February, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document, which had already been cleared from scrutiny at the Chairman’s sift. We support the launching of an EU Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA). However, we note that two Force Generation Conferences have not yielded the required number of 44

personnel. Can you inform us of the final staffing numbers that will be deployed and, in light of the reduced numbers, indicate where the Mission might wish to prioritise or how it will adapt? Furthermore, what further steps might be taken to ensure that EUMAM RCA is adequately resourced in due course? It would be disappointing if EUMAM RCA were only able to lay the groundwork to undertake security sector reform and then be hampered in its capacity to proceed any further. We look forward to your reply within the usual ten working days. 26 February 2015

EU MONITORING MISSION IN GEORGIA (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 3 July 2014, clearing our submission on the new appointment of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia (EUSR). You enquired about what temporary measures, if any, were in place to fund the gap in the mandate. The budget for the EUSR for the period January 2014 to June 2014 had an under spend due to the EUSR position being vacant for several months after Ambassador Lefort’s resignation at the end of January and the appointment of Ambassador Salber. Part of this underspend was used to cover the period between the start of the new mandate and the Council adopting the appointment of the new EUSR and the new budget mandate. The EUSR budget mandate also had a small built in contingency fund for unforeseen or exceptional circumstances. You also asked about coordination of the work of the EUSR, the EU and NATO. Georgia has the closest relationship with NATO in the South Caucasus region. Georgia’s Euro Atlantic Integration Ministry is the primary mechanism for ensuring all assistance received by Georgia from NATO and the EU is coordinated to meet Georgia’s needs and that both EU and NATO assistance is complimentary. The EU and NATO representatives locally also each have mechanisms in place to encourage coordination. The NATO Annual National Plan with Georgia is the main tool for NATO’s engagement and lists all the areas of interest to NATO and Georgia as the country moves closer to the Alliance. This document draws together all the strands of work which are ongoing with bilateral partners and international organisations which fall into the areas of interest. The plan lists other partners already contributing to progress in a particular area, thus allowing an annual consolidation of work. The EU records thematic projects being carried out in Georgia and invites other EU Member States, other active countries or international organisations to record their projects on the database before meeting with interested parties to further coordinate activity. The UN also brings the wider donor community together for regular coordination meetings in three areas; conflict prevention and resolution; human rights; and, finally an ‘Ambassadors’ working group’ to discuss issues of the day. NATO’s cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan is less than Georgia’s given Armenia’s membership of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation and Azerbaijan’s policy of not joining military alliances. Unlike the conflicts affecting Georgia, the role of the EUSR, while still significant, is less prominent given the OSCE’s primary position and in particular the three Co-Chair countries’ (France, US and Russia) lead role in negotiating a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, there remain several NATO and EU shared objectives in their relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan. These objectives include encouraging both sides to make the necessary steps towards finding a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; promoting democratic reforms (in the case of NATO in the defence sector); and working towards shared EU and NATO security goals, including more secure international borders. NATO also has Individual Partnership Action Plans with both Armenia and Azerbaijan and both countries contribute to NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan. 17 July 2014

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 15 December, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document. It is regrettable that, two hours before the Committee was due to meet to consider this document, we received your letter to say that we had already been overridden. Following the sifting of this document to the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs, it was placed on the Committee’s next agenda so that it could be considered at the earliest opportunity. The date of yesterday’s meeting had been set a couple of months ago, so that the Committee could hear evidence from you regarding the EU and Russia inquiry, and we had therefore never planned to meet on Thursday 11 December. Even if we had met a few days earlier, this would not have helped to facilitate parliamentary scrutiny. The whole point of the scrutiny process is that the Committee is given the opportunity to ask questions about the documents presented to it and to challenge the Government on the positions being taken. If, as is the case in this instance, we have questions on a particular document, then time is therefore required in order to allow for a proper exchange of correspondence before the document is cleared. I am grateful to you for your letter which sets out some of the timing problems caused by protracted negotiations. However, the end date of the mission has been known for months and so it really is unacceptable that the decision should have been bounced through at the last minute. I am glad to hear from your letter that you have written to the High Representative to reiterate the importance of allowing enough time for parliamentary scrutiny, particularly on documents where the timetables are known, such as mission renewals. I would be grateful if you could keep us updated on this issue when you receive a response from the High Representative. Turning to the document itself, we find the EU’s action in and over Abkhazia and South Ossetia very disappointing. The EUMM is unable to implement its original mandate fully and there is no evidence of a long-term comprehensive EU strategy towards a settlement of the status of these two breakaway regions. Instead the EU has continued with existing efforts which have failed to make progress over the last six years and Member States have not demonstrated the political will or unity to lead a settlement process. It is not evident that the EU has a comprehensive and coordinated strategy to resolve conflicts. This is an issue likely to become of pressing importance in Ukraine. Do you share our disappointment with EU efforts in Georgia and its tools and approach towards conflict-resolution in its neighbourhood? As part of our inquiry, we have heard that Russia would be satisfied with creating the conditions for another frozen conflict in eastern Ukraine. In this case, what lessons should the EU learn from Georgia and how would you advise the EU to revise its conflict-resolution and management tools? Pending an answer to our questions, we have decided to retain the document under scrutiny and look forward to your reply in the usual ten working days. 16 December 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 16 December regarding my decision to override scrutiny on the EUMM Georgia mandate renewal. I would like to apologise again that it was not possible to allow adequate time in this instance for full parliamentary scrutiny due to the lateness of EU negotiations. I would be happy to update you as soon as I receive a response to my letter to High Representative Mogherini requesting that renewals of this type be considered earlier to allow sufficient time for our scrutiny process. I regret that there was some confusion about the date of the relevant meeting of sub-Committee C. I have asked my officials to work closely with your Committee clerks to put together a forward look for meetings to underpin continued close joint working. Regarding your specific points on EU action in and over Abkhazia and South Ossertia, I believe that the EU has made a significant contribution to ensuring that there is no return to conflict in Georgia: both through the EUMM and as a co-chair of the Geneva International Discussions – the only forum that brings together all parties to the conflict - where the EU Special Representative, Herbert Salber, who took up the role in July 2014, has contributed to a more constructive atmosphere at recent Geneva discussions. The EU has consistently reiterated its firm support for Georgia’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. At the recent Association Council meeting between the EU and Georgia, both sides agreed to send strong signals of engagement towards

Abkhazia and South Ossetia as the best way to move towards peace, stability and conflict resolution in Georgia. At the same time the EU continues to raise issues of concern, including the recently signed “treaty” between Abkhazia and Russia in bilateral contacts, as does the UK. The EU began assisting Georgia in the early 1990’s to overcome the consequences of the conflicts in the breakaway regions. It maintained this support after the 2008 war, in particular to support efforts to improve the quality of life of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) of which there were approximately 275,000 as a result of both conflicts. The EU is one of the largest donors providing support to conflict affected people from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2008, it pledged up to €500 million including assistance for the resettlement of internally displaced persons; economic rehabilitation and recovery projects; macro-financial stabilisation and support to Georgia’s infrastructure. The EU remains a large donor to Abkhazia with a focus on confidence-building, education, health and livelihoods. Its access to South Ossetia is now very limited due to restrictions brought in by the de-facto government after the 2008 war. In 2008 the EU made a political commitment to provide a credible, visible and effective monitoring presence along the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs). The EUMM has had some success in doing this, despite the ongoing refusal of the breakaway territories to grant the mission access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EUMM has helped prevent a return to armed conflict. It is able to act as a mediator between the parties, including through an incident prevention and response mechanism hotline, which prevents misunderstandings and diffuses tensions along the ABL. The EUMM reports provide information for the EU and international community about activities along the ABL and within the breakaway regions. These reports are a valuable resource for policy makers in the EU and its Member States. In addition, the EUMM has also helped the local population with initiatives around health, education and trade and works closely with the Georgian army and police. Recent examples of the Mission’s activities include: — Provision of advice to the Georgian Government and international organisations on strategy regarding the breakaway regions, — Monitoring of the EUMM’s Memorandum of Understandings with the Georgian Ministry of Affairs, which provides transparency and imposes restrictions on equipment used and activities of the Georgian police in the boundary areas, and with the Ministry of Defence which limits the positioning of troops and heavy equipment in these areas, — Monitoring of the number of detentions made within the breakaway regions and raising these at the regular Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meetings (South Ossetia) between the parties, — From January – November 2014, facilitation of 36 medical cases across the ABL into Georgia (up from six in 2013), — Monitoring of access to local schoolchildren across the ABL’s to help ensure their access to education, — In co-ordination with the UN’s 16 Days of Activism, helping to address the serious problem of gender based violence in Georgia through outreach and awareness raising of the issue with communities along the ABL, — Facilitating a project to bring together ten young journalists from Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia for training in conflict-sensitive reporting, — Monitoring and advice to the Georgian Government and local communities on “winterisation”, the term used to describe preparations for winter to help poor local communities. The new EUMM mandate will reduce the size of the mission but allows for increased flexibility, within its mandate to take on more confidence building work, including improving ongoing coordination between parties to the conflict in between Geneva discussions. It is significantly more cost effective achieving savings of approximately €3.5 million compared to the previous year. The new mandate also encourages the EUMM to strengthen coordination with the EU Special Representative and EU Delegation to ensure a comprehensive EU approach to the conflict in Georgia and to strengthen its media and information operations to increase understanding of the EUMM’s work in the conflict zones. Therefore, while the size of EUMM will be reduced, although still within the parameters of its 47

original mandate, the intended impact and reach will remain and will continue to support the EU’s strategic aim of preventing a return to conflict and making the areas adjacent to the ABLs safe and secure for the local population. Most importantly, the Georgian government values the work of the EUMM and believes it acts as a deterrent to Russian aggression. Georgia feels under increasing pressure from Russia following the Ukraine crisis. Russia’s decision in November 2014 to sign a “treaty of alliance and strategic partnership” with Abkhazia and current plan to sign a similar document with South Ossetia in February 2015 has only increased Georgia’s sense of vulnerability. The renewal of the EUMM’s mandate sends a strong signal to both the Georgian and Russian governments of Europe’s commitment to Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Georgian government would see withdrawal of the mission as a severe blow. You also asked about the EU’s conflict resolution and management tools. Learning from experience in recent years, including EUMM Georgia and other CSDP missions, the EU is developing a better coordinated strategy to resolve conflicts through the “Comprehensive Approach” agreed at the December 2013 European Council. The Comprehensive Approach sets out to improve how the EU collectively develops, embeds and delivers more coherent and effective policies, including on conflict resolution and management. The EU now uses a Political Framework for Crisis Approach: a means of analysis aimed at articulating clearly the problem to be addressed; explaining why the EU should act and identifying what instruments might be available. This approach was used for the first time when establishing the EU Mission in Ukraine. With respect to the Ukraine crisis, I was pleased to be able to discuss this with the Committee at my recent appearance at the inquiry into the EU and Russia. The EU has adopted a multifaceted approach; making clear our respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, encouraging constructive dialogue between all parties, providing support for Ukraine and maintaining pressure on Russia, including through restrictive measures. The EU has set up a civilian CSDP mission (EUAM Ukraine) to support civilian security sector reform, planning for which was structured and comprehensive. This will help ensure that EUAM is able to deliver its mandate effectively, in support of the Government of Ukraine’s implementation of a comprehensive over-haul of the civilian security sector and rule of law institutions. The EU has been clear that Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea should continue to have consequences, and further restrictive measures were agreed following the 15 December Foreign Affairs Council. 2 January 2015

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 15 January, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered your letter and the reasons given for the override. Thank you for your comprehensive reply. Despite the override, we have now agreed to formally clear the proposal from scrutiny. 15 January 2015

EULEX RULE OF LAW MISSION IN KOSOVO (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 9 September, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document. We note that as part of the smaller, more focussed mission, EULEX KOSOVO will start to phase out its executive functions in the justice sector as part of a phased handover to Kosovo. Given the important work currently being carried out by the mission to investigate serious cases, we wondered what work has been undertaken to ensure that the authorities in Kosovo are capable of taking on this role. What assessment has there been of Kosovo’s ability and willingness to take on this role? How will EULEX KOSOVO assist Kosovo with the creation of a special court to hear trials arising from SITF investigations and ensure that ongoing work on serious cases are completed in a timely and thorough manner?

We would also be interested to know how the success of the mission will be assessed. What criteria regarding the success of the mission will the UK Government apply when considering the budget again this time next year? We would be grateful to receive your response within the usual 10 working days. In the meantime, we are content to clear the document from scrutiny. 9 September 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 9 September on EULEX Kosovo. You asked a number of questions about the transition envisaged in the Strategic Review.

WHAT ASSESSMENT HAS THERE BEEN OF KOSOVO’S WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO TAKE ON SERIOUS CASES CURRENTLY HANDLED BY EULEX, AND ENSURE THAT THESE CASES ARE COMPLETED IN A TIMELY MANNER? The transition to Kosovo responsibility will inevitably be a challenging one, but I am confident that the mission’s approach offers a good chance of success. We were among the Member States who insisted during the Strategic Review that the mission must prepare a ‘transition roadmap’ no later than the end of this year, assessing exactly the question you pose and considering how best to manage the risks of this process. We will need to await the development of this roadmap, but we expect the transition from EULEX will be accompanied by an increase in EU assistance through other tools, such as European Commission projects, so that the Kosovo authorities will not be left completely unsupported. In the meantime, the mission will also begin to step up joint working with the Kosovo authorities on serious cases, to ensure there is a steady increase in local capability and to minimise the risk of gaps and delays when the mission eventually hands over cases.

HOW WILL EULEX ASSIST WITH THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL COURT TO HEAR TRIALS ARISING FROM THE SITF INVESTIGATIONS? This is an ongoing area of planning for the mission, led by the EEAS. It has been agreed that EULEX will provide the funding and staffing for an out of country special court, including the appointment of judges, and the mission and EUSR will also assist the Kosovo authorities as necessary with the legal and practical elements of their agreement and co-operation with the authorities of a potential host state. Kosovo has agreed in an exchange of letters between the High Representative and the President that they will accept this assistance and ensure the establishment of the court. Further details will take shape once a new government is formed in Kosovo and more detailed laws to facilitate the creation of the court are passed. Discussions are also ongoing in Brussels about the practical arrangements, such as funding, and there is EEAS-led work with the potential host state.

WHAT CRITERIA WILL THE UK APPLY TO CONSIDER THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION? The UK was successful in inserting much more robust benchmarks and indicators into the mission’s revised Operations Plan, for the first time explicitly requiring the mission to establish quantitative baselines for numbers of cases, mentoring activity and so on. The O Plan requires progress against these indicators to be reported in the mission’s regular reports to Member States, allowing robust scrutiny of its performance. At the general level, we would want to see evidence of successfully completing serious cases, clear signs of increasing capability among the Kosovo authorities, and an improved security environment in the north of Kosovo through the process of Dialogue implementation. As the mission approaches the end of its mandate, it will also be required to prepare a thorough report on its performance and the progress achieved by the Kosovo authorities. We will use all these materials as part of our assessment of the mission when the budget is next considered. I hope these responses answer your questions satisfactorily. 22 September 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman You may recall that we exchanged letters a few months ago about extending the mandate of the EULEX rule of law mission in Kosovo, based on a smaller budget and a more focused approach. I

would like to update you on a recent serious development in relation to EULEX and explain the UK’s position on it. On 27 October, allegations of corruption within EULEX’s ranks were aired in the Kosovo media, and have been subsequently repeated in media reports across Europe. The allegations were made by a UK national seconded to EULEX as a prosecutor by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The central allegation is that a EULEX judge (seconded by Italy) took bribes from contacts of the defendant in a criminal case – a charge that is denied. Secondary allegations relate to EULEX’s handling of this issue and of the UK staff member concerned. This is a serious matter. The UK, along with other Member States, quickly made it clear to the EEAS that a thorough response was needed, which not only investigated the allegations but also ensured that public confidence was maintained in EULEX’s handling of such cases. High Representative Mogherini has announced that an external investigation will take place into the matter. We welcome the transparency and much-needed external scrutiny that these actions will bring. The issue was discussed by the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee on Monday 3 November. While this is an internal matter that is primarily for EULEX to address, the UK Government has a clear interest both as a supporter of the EULEX mission and because the prosecutor making the allegations and some of the individuals named in secondary allegations are UK nationals seconded to EULEX by the FCO. My officials are therefore engaged with EULEX and the EEAS. We are also in touch with affected staff members through Human Resources channels, although it would not be appropriate to comment on individual cases. The Government’s priority is to ensure the allegations are thoroughly investigated by the EEAS, help restore public confidence in EULEX, and ensure the mission is as effective as possible for the remainder of its mandate in Kosovo. I will update the Committee in due course as the situation develops. 6 November 2014

EU POLICING MISSION AFGHANISTAN (EUPOL) (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman The European Scrutiny Committee requested further information on the Strategic Review (SR) into the EU Policing Mission Afghanistan (EUPOL) in its latest report of 5 November 2014. I hope this information will also of use to the EU Select Committee, ahead of the Council Decision extending EUPOL Afghanistan’s mandate and budget being shortly deposited for scrutiny. The European Scrutiny Committee requested clarity on the outcome of the SR into EUPOL Afghanistan. The SR assessed that progress had been made in all areas of EUPOL Afghanistan’s mandate, but recognised that the Mission's six strategic objectives would not be fully achieved by the end of 2014. In addition, it was acknowledged that Afghan capacity would not be sufficient to continue self-sustaining progress towards a capable and functioning police service by December 2014 and assessed non-EU actors, such as NATO and the UN, would not take on EUPOL Afghanistan activity. Member States agreed that EUPOL Afghanistan should therefore extend its mandate to support Afghan authorities in the further development of an effective civilian police force. We assess that EUPOL provides an effective means of delivering engagement on policing post-2014, augmenting our own efforts to build sustainable rule of law institutions that the Afghans can lead in the long term. Member States agreed that a two year mandate extension was a sufficient period to support Afghan authorities in areas where progress was lacking, allowing the mission to transition activity to the Afghans in a timely and practicable manner. Based on the evidence presented in the SR, Member States agreed that the mandate extension should continue EUPOL Afghanistan’s current structure of three broad lines of activity (advancing institutional reform in the Ministry of Interior, professionalisation of Afghan National Police (ANP) and connecting the police to the justice sector), within which support could be prioritised as necessary. Member States agreed on the continuation of all three strands of activity for the first year, with the third pillar (connecting the police to the justice sector) discontinued at the end of 2015. In its final year the mission will continue to support Ministry of Interior (MOI) reform and police

professionalisation, with all activity transitioned to the Afghans or other multilateral actors by the mission end date of 31 December 2016. The focus of the new mandate will be narrowed in terms of size and scope. Mentoring will take place only at the highest strategic level, activity will be prioritised, and the geographical layout of the mission reduced, resulting in reductions in staffing and a reduced mission budget. The SR identified a number of sustainable outcomes in most areas of mission activity. Under the first operational pillar, advancing institutional reform in the Ministry of Interior, the SR highlights the improved institutional capacity of the MoI, largely due to the delivery of substantial leadership and management training, including in the Police Staff College. Specific reference is made to progress in professionalism, leadership and management skills, as well as embedding of command and control mechanisms. Improvements in the Ministries’ capacity to draft operational policies and strategies are acknowledged, as evidenced by the development of a number of Afghan operational policies, such as the ANP Code of Conduct and the 10 Year Vision for the ANP. Under the second operational pillar, professionalisation of ANP, sustainable outcomes focus on the construction and development of ANP training infrastructure and the Afghans increased capacity to deliver training. The Police Staff College (PSC) and the Crime Management College (CMC) were established by EUPOL Afghanistan, with Afghan officers trained to take over the running of both training facilities. The Colleges were successfully transferred to Afghan ownership in February and March 2014. In addition, the SR references the establishment of a number of EUPOL Afghanistan trained and mentored Community Policing Units in Kabul and seven provinces, demonstrating progress in the MOI’s commitment to community policing. Under the third operational pillar, connecting the police to the justice sector, the SR outlines the increased capacity of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Attorney General’s Office (AGO). MoJ and AGO are increasingly able to draft policies and strategies, as demonstrated by the drafting of the five year strategies for the MoJ and the AGO. The budget for the period 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2016 is still being negotiated in Brussels. Proposed expenditure is €58,000,000. This would represent a reduction of approximately 39% on the current budget covering the period 1 June 2013 to 31 December 2014. I will include a detailed analysis of the budget in my forthcoming explanatory memorandum on the mandate renewal, which I hope to issue within the next two weeks. EUPOL Afghanistan will apply a structured process to report and inform on the mission’s performance and progress in implementing the mandate. The next mandate will be benchmarked against the objectives, timeframes and measurable indicators identified within the OPLAN. This contains a clear outline of the phases and timescales for activities in the run-up to the end of 2016, assessing progress of the three lines of operation and the transition of the mission’s activity. Benchmarking will help measure progress and outcomes by comparing the situation (an initial baseline) for a range of activities, against their evolution at given points using pre-defined indicators and means of verification. Information on progress will then be used to facilitate tactical, operational and strategic policy adjustments, as required. The UK will continue to have the opportunity to evaluate the impact of EUPOL through the six- monthly reports issued by the Head of Mission which evaluate the mission against its specific objectives. These six month reports are discussed in Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management Committee and the Political & Security Committee and provide all Member States with the opportunity to critique the mission at regular intervals and inform budget and mandate discussions, ensuring that the mission is delivering value for money. The European Scrutiny Committee also requested clarity on how EUPOL’s work in the areas of “good governance” and human rights will relate to the overall EU strategy on Afghanistan 2014-2016. The EU is pursuing a comprehensive approach in its support to Afghanistan, with the respective mandates of the EU instruments aligned to achieve this overarching EU Strategy. The extended mandate will deliver human rights and anti-corruption activity through a combination of both mainstreaming and specific measures. A dedicated human rights and gender advisory capacity at the level of the Head of Mission will provide strategic advice on mainstreaming gender throughout the mission's activities. In addition, the mission will address anti-corruption, gender and human rights in each of its three lines of operations, with work at the operational and tactical level. It is intended that EUPOL Afghanistan’s niche activity in this area will be aligned and will reinforce the overall EU approach as outlined in the EU Strategy on Afghanistan 2014-2016; advancement of human rights,

linking the components of the justice sector, tackling human rights abuses and strengthening freedom of expression. I will shortly deposit the Council Decision extending EUPOL Afghanistan’s mandate and budget, and provide further detail in the related Explanatory Memorandum. I will also write in due course to update the Committee following the London Conference and the National Security Council’s consideration of the UK’s specific post-2014 military commitment. 21 November 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing with regard to the EU Council Decision concerning Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia. My Explanatory Memorandum of 25 November confirmed the draft Council Decision, proposing the mandate renewal of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to Georgia, for two years, from 16 December 2014 to 15 December 2016. The EM was cleared by the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee on 3 December. The House of Lords EU Select Committee sifted the EM to Sub Committee C on 3 December. The Sub Committee was due to meet on Thursday 11 December. However, I understand this meeting will now take place on Monday 15 December and the EM will be considered then. Apart from the practical issues, there are wider risks in leaving the Mission without a mandate. As I set out in the EM, it has been agreed that the mission will reduce in size significantly, that it will take on more confidence building work and conduct its monitoring more flexibly. These are sensible changes and I retain full confidence in the efficacy of the mission. However, they have provided an opportunity for Russia to suggest the EU’s commitment to the Mission is declining. I am convinced that, given this situation and the pressure that Georgia feels from Russia more widely, including the signing on 24 November of a “treaty” between Russia and Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia, now is not the time to leave the Mission without a mandate. This would only give Russia an opportunity to use it as further evidence of a declining EU commitment, whatever the real reasons for a delay are. Georgia would also be deeply concerned if there were a gap in the Mission’s mandate. If the Georgian government believed that the UK has prevented the effective functioning of the Mission this would have a significant and harmful impact on our bilateral relations. Unfortunately, these documents were not agreed more swiftly due to protracted negotiations. Given the political importance I attach to the continuing effective functioning of the EUMM, I regret that I find myself in the position of having to agree to the adoption of this Council Decision before your sub-committee has had an opportunity to scrutinise the document. I hope the Committee appreciates the reasoning behind my decision. This is an unfortunate scenario that is not primarily of our making. And I fully recognise the need to avoid similar incidences in the future. Your Committee has previously expressed concern that renewals of this type are not considered earlier in the EU, reducing the possibility of the documents being scrutinised. This is something I am very aware of and I have instructed my officials to continue to raise these concerns with colleagues in the EU. I wrote to High Representative Mogherini yesterday (12 December 2014) to address these issues. 16 December 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing in response to your letter of 16 December 2014 concerning the Common Security and Defence Policy European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan). You requested further information regarding the involvement of women in the Afghanistan National Police (ANP), in particular a report on the progress made in recruiting more women into the police force and improvements to the working conditions of female police officers. The increased participation of women in the ANP is a complex and long-term project but slow progress is being made. The international community has, over the years, given substantial strategic and operational support to improve working conditions and retention of female police officers. Despite this support and ambitious commitments from the Afghan Government, the recruitment, training, integration and retention of women in the ANP continues to be a challenge, with limited progress in meeting targets to date.

As referenced in your letter, in 2010 former President Karzai set a goal of employing 5,000 female police officers by the end of the 2014. Subsequently, former Minister of Interior Daudzai announced that in addition to this target, the number of female police officers serving in the ANP would reach 10,000 in the next five years, and ten percent of the police force in the long term. Despite these ambitious targets, in October 2014 just over 2,100 women were serving in the ANP, far below the established goal. Though this figure represents an increase on previous years (180 in 2005, to 1,489 in 2013), the gap remains significant. In addition, less than two percent of these female police officers hold senior positions within the ANP, with many based in the Ministry of Interior (MoI) rather than in operational posts within the ANP. Obstacles to improvement include the lack of senior political will to implement approved policies, skills training of a standard equal to that given to male police officers, facilities to support female police officers and education to address negative attitudes towards women within the police. Though societal acceptance of women in the police may be increasing, cultural resistance to female authority continues to be prevalent in some parts of the country. Progress on increasing numbers of female police officers in 2014 was also limited by the Afghan Government’s focus on delivering security for the two rounds of elections, the subsequent discussions regarding the formation of the National Unity Government and the delay in confirming ministerial appointments. Despite these challenges, during 2014 the Afghan senior leadership introduced a number of initiatives, policies and guidelines to aid the recruitment and improved working conditions of female police officers. Under the leadership of former Minister of Interior Daudzai, the Afghan MoI has shown significant support for women in the ANP and taken steps to protect and empower female police and female MoI staff. In January 2014, the Minister of Interior signed the ‘Strategy for the Management of the Affairs of ANP Female Personnel’, which is supported by an implementation plan developed in cooperation with donors such as EUPOL and the UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). This strategy is seen as a significant step in improving the working conditions and retention of female ANP officers. In addition, the National Police Plan (May 2014) explicitly identifies female integration into the ANP as one of its goals. Comprehensive Afghan-drafted policy and planning documents are now in place, with the need to now shift the focus towards their implementation, which has been slow. Through EUPOL, we work with the MoI to support the full implementation of the Gender Strategy and the National Police Plan. To assist in this implementation, EUPOL provides specialists to the MOI working group tasked to address the practical delivery of the implementation plan and provides advice and support to the Deputy Minister Administration, who holds responsibility for delivery of the plan. We will continue to support the further recruitment and integration of women within the ANP, working with the Afghan Government to increase the numbers of female police officers. In addition to the above activity, EUPOL continue to provide mentoring support to the Head of the Gender Human Rights & Children’s Rights Department (GHRCR) and Family Response Units (FRUs), which run a helpline for female police officers. Recent statements of support from the new Afghan National Unity Government regarding the role of women in the Afghan National Security Forces represent continued movement in the right direction. 11 February 2015

EU PROCESS FOR SANCTIONS LISTINGS AND REVIEWS (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing following the informal briefing my officials attended on 15 January 2015 to address the question the Committee raised regarding due process for EU sanctions listings. I am aware of the Committee’s concerns about aspects of this process and have asked my officials to ensure those are brought to the attention of EU partners.

EU PROCESS FOR SANCTIONS LISTINGS & REVIEWS Sanctions listings may be proposed by a Member State(s) or the European External Action Service (EEAS). Once proposed there will be a discussion in the appropriate EU Council working group of the evidence and proposed “Statement of Reasons.” This will include an assessment of the legal basis for the listing i.e. whether there is sufficient evidence to show that the individual or entity meets the 53

listing criteria in the relevant sanctions regime. The Council Legal Service (CLS) will normally give its opinion on this and its views carry significant weight. Listing decisions require unanimity. If a listing is agreed, the EU Council maintains a file on the person or entity, including any evidence provided by the Member State(s) / EEAS in support of the listing. Once the listing is adopted, the individual or entity is notified of the listing and may request sight of the information on their file and make representations to the Council in respect of it. Once this request has been received, the Council will discuss with Member States/EEAS and agree what can be disclosed to the individual/entity in question. It is usual practice for open source information held on the file to be disclosed. In accordance with the Council’s Rules of Procedure, the identity of the listing proposer(s) is not shared with the listed individual or entity. If a listed individual or entity makes representations to the Council, they may challenge the decision in the EU Courts for annulment of the listing. When an individual or entity is the subject of a new listing proposal or relisting proposal within the EU, there exists a well-established mechanism for review and consultation of the decision between the EU and the individual or entity concerned. It is applied consistently across the Member States through the Council. It would be inconsistent with EU law for the UK to apply a different standard to that which is applied across the EU to its own citizens. In any event, neither NITC nor Golparvar are UK citizens. Where a listing decision is annulled by the General Court and the Council seeks to relist an individual or entity, this will normally take place during the period for appealing the decision, namely two months and ten days between the Court’s judgment and the annulment taking place; although, this may not always be the case. In these circumstances, the individual or entity is pre-notified of the proposed re-listing. The Council will usually provide the individual or entity with any open source evidence it seeks to rely on in order to support the Statement of Reasons. The individual or entity concerned may make representations to the Council at the point of pre-notification. It is also worth noting that most EU sanctions regimes provide for an annual review. The Council then takes a decision as to whether the listing remains lawful or whether the Council should consider delisting (it should be recognised that achieving de-listing is not within the UK’s gift as it requires a unanimous decision of the Council).

OUR SMARTER SANCTIONS POLICY The FCO takes sanctions extremely seriously and follows a rigorous process for ensuring that targeted sanctions are both as effective as they can be, and legally robust. Before the UK proposes a listing in the EU it carries out an impact assessment, one aspect of which is a requirement that listings are based on sufficient open source information to provide reasonable grounds to suspect that the person meets the listing criteria. In making this assessment, desk officers take into account the jurisprudence of the EU Courts and seek legal advice. In cases where the listing is controversial, the decision will be taken by FCO Ministers. When we propose a listing, we also submit to the Council a summary of the open source material, including links to web-sites, where relevant. This is then placed on the Council file and becomes a Council document. If a listed individual or entity writes to the UK seeking a review of their listing, we refer them to the Council as the decision-making body. Any representations made to the Council will come to the appropriate working group. If it was a UK proposal, we will assess any information provided and decide whether or not we still have reasonable grounds to suspect that the individual or entity meets the listing criteria. If that test is not satisfied, the UK may propose de-listing the individual or entity. As de-listing requires agreement of all 28 Member States and the UK may face difficult negotiations, the FCO exercises discretion as to the timing of making that proposal to maximise the changes of agreement. Substantive communications with the listed individual or entity are done via the EU Council as the decision-making body. This reflects the obligation of professional secrecy in the Council Rules of Procedure which prohibit Member States disclosing deliberations of the Council. As set out above, the UK plays its part in ensuring that listings are legally robust and proposing de-listing where it is appropriate to do so. It is worth bearing in mind that the annulment of a listing by the Court does not preclude the Council from re-listing the individual or entity concerned. Indeed, the Court ruled in the NITC case that in “the course of a further review, the Council has the possibility of again listing the applicant on the basis of reasons which are supported to the requisite legal standard” (NITC T-565/12) The NITC and Govarpar listings 54

As you are aware, following EU General Court’s decisions to annul these listings the Council has pre- notified the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) and an individual, Gholam Golparvar (Golparvar) of its proposal to relist them. I wanted to provide you with some additional background information as to why the EU Council is considering relisting of both NITC and Golparvar, despite the General Court’s decision to annul the decisions. NITC has been proposed for relisting with a revised “Statement of Reasons” and additional evidence. Golparvar has been proposed for relisting under the same grounds as he was previously listed. The rationale behind each proposal is outlined below.

NITC NITC’s listing was annulled by General Court judgment T-565/12 on 03 July 2014. NITC was listed in 2012 on the following grounds: “effectively controlled by the Iranian Government. Provides financial support to the Government of Iran through its shareholders which maintain ties with the Government”. In its judgment the Court held that the Council had committed a “manifest error” in its assessment that NITC should be listed, because the Council had no evidence to support those allegations. During 2014, new evidence was submitted to the Council by the proposing Member State(s)/EEAS. This evidence was assessed by the Council and provided to Member States/EEAS to consider. The new evidence supports a revised and more detailed statement of reasons: “The National Iranian Tanker Company provides financial support to the Government of Iran through being owned by the Iranian State Retirement Fund, the Iranian Social Security Organization, and the Oil Industry Employees Retirement and Savings Fund. These entities are controlled by the Government of Iran. Moreover, the NITC is one of the largest operators of very large crude carriers in the world and one of the main transporters of Iranian crude oil. Accordingly, it provides logistical support to the Government of Iran through the transport of Iranian oil products.” In light of the new evidence, and taking on board the detail of the General Court judgment, the Council is considering relisting NITC. As outlined in the Explanatory Memorandum sent previously to the Committees on 15 December 2014, the combination of the EU summer break and the necessary focus on events in Ukraine meant that the relisting proposal was not considered until the end of 2014, several months after NITC’s listing lapsed.

GOLPARVAR Golparvar’s listing was annulled by General Court judgment T-58/12 on 12 December 2013. The case covered 11 individuals, all of whom had been listed on the grounds of their links to IRISL (Islamic Republic of Iranian Shipping Lines), which is regarded as being directly involved in nuclear proliferation activities. The IRISL listing was not upheld by the Court. It followed therefore that any individual or entity whose listing was linked directly to the IRISL listing, had to be annulled as well. While the General Court annulled the listings of the 11 individuals, in the case of Golparvar, the Court indicated that had the listing of IRISL been lawful, Golparvar’s listing would also have been upheld (as the link between Golparvar and IRISL was established). IRISL has now been re-listed under new specific criteria in the legislation, which is why the Council has proposed to relist Golparvarand that this proposal is lawful. Following the revision of the IRISL listing criteria, the Council is considering relisting Golparvar on the same grounds as he had previously been listed. As outlined in the Explanatory Memorandum sent previously to the Committees on 15 December 2014, the combination of the EU summer break and the necessary focus on events in Ukraine meant that relisting was not considered for some time after Golparvar’s listing had lapsed.

SHARING UNDERLYING EVIDENCE As mentioned at the informal briefing session, it is not possible to share with the Committee the underlying evidence which the Council holds in support of both these listings. Whilst the evidence is not high classification material, it is essential that the Council and Member States/EEAS are able to protect the research methods and sources of information that are used to evidence cases in support of new listings and relistings. The Council is concerned about the future availability of research material. By way of example, in the past 18 months, websites that have been valuable sources of information have disappeared from the Internet after they were accessed by users with a UK

Government footprint. As a result, the UK has adopted secure searching techniques to protect the identity of those individuals researching online. Given this known risk to valuable sources of information needed to develop sanctions listings, the Council must adopt a ‘need to know’ principle when handling this information. Sharing this evidence with the Parliamentary Scrutiny Committees would risk the information, and thus its sources, being made public. 19 January 2015

EU REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR SYRIA AND IRAQ AS WELL AS THE DA’ESH THREAT (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 12 March the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above Joint Communication. We have decided to now formally clear the document from scrutiny. There is no need to reply to this letter unless, of course, you wish to do so. 12 March 2015

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY: DRAFT BUDGET 2015 (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to Julian Brazier MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and Minister for Reserves, Ministry of Defence At its meeting of 15 December the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above documents and decided to clear them from scrutiny. We are grateful to you for your letter of 26 November, which included the limité draft budget, which we shall of course keep confidential until it has been agreed by the Council. On reading your Explanatory Memoranda on the EDA’s report and draft budget for next year, it appears as though the UK is taking an increasingly isolated stance in its approach towards the work of the EDA and its funding. While we recognise the importance of maintaining national sovereignty over defence issues, given that other Member States appear to be more willing for the EDA to take forward some of the collaborative work, it would seem to be increasingly important for the UK to decide whether it wishes to be a full member of the EDA, and accept the collaboration and funding requirements that go with this, or to decide whether to withdraw from the EDA. You mention in your letter that the UK Government has committed to a comprehensive review of the benefits and risks associated with the UK’s continued involvement. However, this review was mentioned in the government’s explanatory memorandum submitted on this subject last year, and we are not aware of any obvious progress having been made. We would therefore be grateful if you could provide us with an update on the likely timescales for conducting this review, and the progress made so far. We look forward to your response within the usual 10 working days. 16 December 2014

Letter from Julian Brazier MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 16 December 2014 in which you requested an update on the likely timescales for conducting the review of the UK’s continued involvement in the European Defence Agency (EDA) and progress so far. The MOD has committed to producing a comprehensive review of the risks and benefits associated with the UK’s membership of the EDA. The 2014/2015 UK Membership review is underway, which will inform SDSR 15, will provide a thorough assessment of the value to the UK of membership of the Agency and the potential impact of UK withdrawal.

I will inform the Committee of any decision, informed by the review, to change the UK membership of the EDA. 13 January 2015

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY STEERING BOARD MEETING, 18 NOVEMBER 2014 (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from Julian Brazier MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and Minister for Reserves, Ministry of Defence, to the Chairman You will have seen a copy of my predecessor’s letter of 26 February 2014 to the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee which confirmed that we would endeavour to provide the draft Policy Framework on Systematic and Long Term Co-operation before the Foreign Affairs Council (Defence) met on the 18 November 2014. However, due to their late finalisation and their security classification while in draft form, we were unable to submit them to Parliament prior to their adoption. Equally the confirmed agenda was released to Member States just a few days before the meeting and so there was insufficient time to provide the Committees with our policy position on the agenda prior to the Steering Board. I am now writing to inform you of the positions I took on each of these documents, and to share the Policy Framework with the Committee. The Head of Agency report and the accompanying Explanatory Memorandum have been deposited for scrutiny.

EDA 2015 BUDGET The proposed 2015 Budget called for zero ‘real’ growth which corresponds to a total increase of €0.6M, and a total budget of €31.1M. However, the UK has been successful in securing a freeze in the budget for the sixth consecutive year which has led the EDA to produce a revised ‘flat cash’ 2015 Budget totalling €30.5M. This reduction reflects our position that the EDA should be realistic about its budget, given the financial climate, and prioritise more effectively within existing resources. The draft budget is still classified as limité so I have submitted an Explanatory Memorandum on the matter with the ‘Official Text Not Yet Received’ caveat. I attach [not printed] a copy of this draft 2015 budget for scrutiny on the understanding that it will not be released to the public until such time as I receive the consent of the Council. I would be grateful for your consideration and agreement.

EDA 2014 BUDGET You may recall that the European Scrutiny Committee requested further information on any differences between the draft EDA 2014 budget and the finalised version adopted by the Council when they considered the Government’s EM last year. You will note the adopted EDA budget for 2014 clearly reflects the department’s stated objective to freeze the 2014 budget at 2013 levels (€30.5 million). The adopted EDA budget 2014 contains no significant differences to the draft budget that was provided to you, other than the reduction to the EDA’s Operational budget, which purely focuses on funding research projects and study work. This reduction does not impact any of the EDA programmes that the UK participates in.

POLICY FRAMEWORK The 2013 December European Council (DEC) Conclusions called for Member States (MS) to increase transparency and share their defence plans with the aim of fostering more systematic and long-term cooperation. We have worked closely with the EDA to develop a Policy Framework that clearly notes that Member States’ National decision making processes retain primacy over the recommendations set out in the Policy Framework. This should act as a guide to inform Member States interested in conducting potential European Collaborative Defence programmes. We have also ensured that it is a requirement that any European Collaborative Defence programme should be conducted in full coherence with the existing NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). In addition, the Framework includes a commitment to use the EU’s Capability Development Plan, produced by the EDA, to establish the Capability priorities for collaboration and guide the efforts of the EDA. The UK has long argued that a key starting point for cooperation is the development of agreed list of priorities for EU Member States which should be based on mature risk based assessment of our collective shortfalls and which incorporates the outputs of the NDPP. 57

EDA HEAD OF AGENCY REPORT The European External Action Service (EEAS) Report by the Head of the EDA was presented to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on the 12 November 2014. As we did not have sight of the report until the 12 November 2014 we were unable to deposit it for scrutiny before its consideration at the Foreign Affairs Council (Defence) on the 18 November 2014. Overall we are content that the report accurately captures the key EDA activates although I raised concerns over the European Parliament’s new CSDP Pilot Project and in particular the EU Parliament, on its own initiative, wishing to directly fund and instruct the EDA to undertake defence activities which, since defence is a Member State competence, creates a worrying precedent for the role of the Parliament in defence.

UK REVIEW OF ITS MEMBERSHIP OF THE EDA

The Government has committed to conduct a comprehensive review of the benefits and risks associated with the UK’s continued involvement in the EDA will inform Parliament prior to any decision relating to either staying in or leave the EDA. You may recall that the European Scrutiny Committee raised a question about the format of future EDA Steering Board documents. In 2013 the European Council guidelines to the EDA which would normally accompany the draft budget and report from the head of the EDA were replaced by the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) Conclusions. This arrangement has continued in 2014 as the EDA Steering Board and FAC(D) were held consecutively. However, I fully expect the normal European Council guidelines to be submitted to the EDA Steering Board in the foreseeable future. 26 November 2014

EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 9 September the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document and decided to clear it from scrutiny. The Committee continues to take a close interest in the European External Action Service (EEAS) and was interested to see that many of the recommendations made by the European Court of Auditors matched the conclusions of the Committee’s report on the EEAS published in March 2013 (European Union Committee, 11th Report of Session 2012-13, HL Paper 147). It will be interesting to hear how other Member States, the new Commission and the European Parliament react to this report and I would be grateful if you could keep us informed of any further developments regarding the future of the EEAS in due course. 9 September 2014

EU - SINGAPORE PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman The PCA between the EU and its Member States and Singapore and the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which is being negotiated in parallel, provide a legal framework for EU-Singapore relations. They are key to strengthening the EU’s and Member States’ relationship with Singapore. This is strongly in the UK’s interests. The EU is Singapore’s second largest trading partner after Malaysia. Around three-quarters of Singapore’s inward investment into Europe goes to the UK, worth £22 billion in 2012. Over 1000 UK companies have offices in Singapore and in 2012 the UK was the third largest foreign direct investor. We are also cooperating more closely with Singapore on security issues, in particular cyber security, counter-proliferation and maritime security. 58

The original Commission proposal of 18 February 2014 for a Council Decision on signature of the Singapore PCA was contained in one Decision - 2014/0036. A revised proposal was issued on 24 February 2014 to split this proposal into two Decisions which supersede the previous document: one Decision (“the Main Decision”) concerning signature of the entire agreement with the exception of matters related to readmission (a JHA matter) and a second (“the Readmission Decision”) concerning signature of the PCA with regard to matters related to readmission, citing a Title V legal base (Art 79(3) TFEU). In Article 19(6) of the Agreement, covered in the Main Decision, the Union assumes an obligation, upon request, to negotiate a readmission agreement with Singapore. This would require the EU to seek to negotiate in an area covered by Title V of the TFEU. The Government therefore considers that the JHA opt-in applies to this provision, even though the Main Decision does not cite a Title V legal base. The draft Readmission Decision, which covers Article 19(5) of the Agreement, does have a Title V legal base. However, the obligations in Article 19(5) are clearly directed at the Member States themselves and we do not think it appropriate for the EU to exercise competence in this area. The Government has therefore decided not to opt in to the draft Readmission Decision, and instead to assume the obligations in Article 19(5) in its own right, rather than as a Member of the EU. I am writing to inform you of this fact. The UK intends to put down a minute statement stating that pursuant to Article 2 of Protocol No. 21 we do not regard ourselves bound by Article 19(6) of PCA and that we do not consider Article 19(5) an exercise of EU competence and the separate Decision was therefore not necessary. We have decided not to opt in because Singapore is not a priority country for removals from the UK, and we are not currently persuaded that participating in a future EU readmission agreement with it would improve the already effective bilateral arrangements we have for the returns. We note that if negotiations for a readmission agreement take place as envisaged by Article 19(6), those negotiations would require a separate negotiating mandate to which a separate opt-in decision would apply. If our assessment of the utility of an EU readmission agreement with Singapore changed, we would still be able to opt in to that negotiating mandate and indeed to the signature and conclusion of any such agreement. In making this decision the Government took into consideration that the Government’s general position on mixed (EU and Member State) agreements is that Member States should assume the obligations in their own right other than in areas of exclusive EU competence. This is consistent with the approach that was taken with regard to the EU-Indonesia PCA and the EU-Korea FTA. 19 August 2014

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP Thank you for your letter of 19 August, on the above Agreement, which the EU External Affairs Sub- Committee considered at its meeting on 9 September. We note that your letter neither mentions, nor respects, the recent decision of the Court of Justice on 11 June on the PCA with the Philippines (C-377/12), with which you are no doubt familiar. That PCA contains a similar Article on migration to Article 19 of the PCA with Singapore. In relation to the readmission provisions of the migration Article in the Philippines PCA, the Court held that they “do not contain obligations so extensive that they may be considered to constitute objectives distinct from those of development cooperation” (paragraph 59). The Court held that the Council was wrong therefore to add a legal base in Title V for the readmission provisions and annulled the contested Decision. Yet your letter is written as if the Court had come to the opposite conclusion: In Article 19(6) of the Agreement, covered in the Main Decision, the Union assumes an obligation, upon request, to negotiate a readmission agreement with Singapore. This would require the EU to seek to negotiate in an area covered by Title V of the TFEU. The Government therefore considers that the JHA opt-in applies to this provision, even though the Main Decision does not cite a Title V legal base. You then tell us that the Government will put down a minute statement in the Council to this effect. In order to scrutinise national policy on the EU effectively, we rely on the Government’s transparency in disclosing all relevant factors, including those, such as in this case, which constrain government

policy. We would therefore be grateful to hear why your letter did not mention the consequences of the Court’s decision in C-377/12 on the PCA with Singapore. Further, we ask you to explain the basis on which you contend that Article 19(6) of the PCA with Singapore derives from Title V TFEU, in direct contravention of the Court’s decision. We look forward to your response within the usual 10 working days. 9 September 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing in response to your letter of 9 September 2014 on the above Agreement. I would like to take this opportunity to apologise for the delay in replying to your Committee. This was due to the time it took for the Government to conclude its consideration of the impact of the CJEU judgment in case C-377/12 (the Philippines case). The Home Secretary and Justice Secretary wrote to Baroness Quin on 21 January, following on from their evidence session on 14 January, setting out the view of the Government on the impact of that judgment. Case C-377/12 was brought by the Commission, asking for the annulment of the Council Decision authorising signature of the EU-Philippines agreement. The Decision on signature cited a number of legal bases including Article 207 TFEU (common commercial policy) and Article 209 TFEU (development cooperation) in conjunction with Article 218(5) TFEU. The Council subsequently added a number of further legal bases relating to the readmission of third country nationals (Article 79(3) TFEU, transport (Articles 91 and 100 TFEU) and the environment (Article 191(4) TFEU. The Court concluded that the Council was wrong in adding the legal bases relating to readmission, transport and the environment and that a development co-operation legal base sufficed. This was because the relevant provisions contributed to the pursuit of the objectives of development cooperation. The Court concluded that the provisions of the agreement relating to readmission, transport and the environment did not contain obligations so extensive that they could constitute objectives distinct from those of development cooperation. In order to amount to such “distinct objectives”, and thus merit the citation of separate legal bases, the Court held that the provisions in question would need to be neither secondary to the objective of development cooperation nor indirect in relation to it. The Court did not indicate precisely which provisions it considered to be “secondary” to the development cooperation objective and which were “indirect”. The Court also noted that a JHA legal base may be appropriate for more extensive JHA provisions, distinct from development co-operation, and we consider that the conclusion in Paragraph 59 of the judgement on readmission must be read in the light of the analysis in Paragraph 58. The Court appears to have undertaken an ‘aim and content’ consideration of the agreement, in line with its usual process for defining legal base. However, the Court did not give judgement on the UK’s arguments that the existence of Protocol 21 means that exercises of JHA competence need to be considered differently to the Court’s usual process for deciding the correct legal base. The Court did not consider the implications of its findings for the application of Protocol 21, nor whether and how the UK’s opt-in is triggered. Following the judgement, the Government accepts that for Agreements in respect of which the predominant purpose is development cooperation, additional legal bases in the accompanying Council Decisions will not be required unless: — The JHA content is capable of falling outside the development cooperation legal base; or — The JHA provisions are more extensive than those in the Philippines agreement so that they constitute objectives distinct from those of development cooperation. However, whilst the reasoning of the judgement is not clear, the fact that the agreement in question was a development cooperation agreement and that development cooperation itself is a distinct area of competence, which pursues broad objectives which touch on a variety of specific matters, was clearly relevant to the CJEU’s conclusions. As the Court specifically considered whether the relevant provisions constituted an exercise of development co-operation competence, we take the view that the judgement cannot be applied to other types of agreements with third countries, including Association Agreements under Article 217 TFEU, Economic, Financial and Technical Co-operation 60

Agreements under Article 212 TFEU, and agreements relating to Common Commercial Policy under Article 207 TFEU. For third country agreements without an Article 209 TFEU development co-operation legal base, the Government will continue to seek citation of a JHA legal base where there is JHA content being entered into by the EU, and will continue to assert the JHA opt-in to those obligations. Therefore, in relation to this Council Decision on signature of the Singapore PCA, which cites an Article 212 TFEU legal base, the Government considers that a JHA legal base should be cited for the readmission provisions, and that whether or not a JHA legal base is cited, the UK’s JHA opt-in will be triggered by those provisions. The Government has not opted in to these provisions so the UK will not be bound by them as part of the EU. In my last letter to you on this subject, I said that the Government would put down a minute statement in the Council. In 2014, the Council Decision on signature was split into JHA and non-JHA Decisions. We are awaiting clarification from the Commission on whether they intend to propose a revised single Council Decision. We will consider the content of a minute statement once the form and content of the Council Decision on Signature is issued. I hope that the above clarifies my position. 13 March 2015

EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES FOR AFGHANISTAN MANDATE – BUDGET INFORMATION (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 12 February, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above documents and the corresponding Explanatory Memorandums. They had already been cleared at the Chairman’s sift on 3 February. We look forward to receiving details of the final budgets and mandates once they have been agreed. We also have a question regarding the future of the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs). We understand that there had been an assumption last year that the new High Representative would review the role of the EUSRs, but these latest extensions appear to simply be renewals without such a review. We were therefore wondering whether the new High Representative intended to review or reconsider the function of the EU Special Representatives at some point in the future? 12 February 2015

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman You have received the draft Council Decisions renewing the mandates of the EU Special Representatives for the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Kosovo, Afghanistan, the South Caucasus and Human Rights and the EEAS has started to issue the corresponding draft budgets. Thank you for your initial reports on the mandates. I believe that Federica Mogherini’s decision to extend the mandates is a positive step, and one which the UK has welcomed. As you have noted in your reports, Ms Mogherini has proposed extending all but the EUSR for Human Rights for an initial period of eight months. She has proposed renewing the mandate of the EUSR for Human Rights for two years in order to align it with the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy. Ms Mogherini wrote to Member States on 27 January 2015 outlining the reasons for the eight month extension for those EUSRs with a geographical remit, stating it was to allow her to “further acquaint herself with their work and interaction with the EEAS before making substantial proposals on the way ahead in autumn 2015”. As you know, following the departure of Peter Sorensen, Lars-Gunner Wigemark has been appointed EUSR for Bosnia and Herzegovina and will take up his duties on 1 March 2015. His initial mandate is until June, but we expect this to be extended. Ms Mogherini has proposed the reestablishment of the EUSRs for Central Asia and the Middle East Peace Process. She has invited Member States to propose candidates for the two positions and hopes to make appointments in March. She told Member States that “a new EUSR for Central Asia would 61

take up stewardship at political level of vital regional issues at stake. It would assure Central Asian partners that the region remains important to the EU and provide us with a privileged channel of communication at the highest level with the countries of the region. This would be essential for pursuing our objectives there given the specificities of Central Asia. It will also build on the ongoing exercise to review our Strategy for Central Asia”. She said that the proposed EUSR for MEPP “would focus on enhancing the EU’s engagement on the peace process. This would include the development of close contacts with all major players, including the parties to the conflict themselves, members of the Quartet, Arab states and relevant regional bodies. This engagement would also be underpinned by the EU’s clear position on the MEPP, including the parameters set out in the July 2014 Conclusions”. Ms Mogherini has also announced that she intends to conduct a wider evaluation on EUSRs, looking at the “political objectives, visibility of the EU, interaction with the EEAS, the resource implications and the ability of the EEAS to take on some of the tasks”. I support the initiative to hold such a horizontal discussion. As you know, prior to Ms Mogherini’s appointment, Member States once again fought off proposals by the EEAS for a transfer of the EUSR budget from the Common Foreign and Security Budget (CFSP) to the EEAS budget. We will continue to emphasise the importance of Member State oversight of this important tool of the CFSP. As the Committee will recall, I wrote to Ms Mogherini in December 2014 highlighting the importance of timely circulation of draft mandates. What is more, during a negotiation last year on revised EU Guidelines on the Appointment, Mandates and Financing of EUSRs, the UK successfully argued for the inclusion of a reference to the need for early circulation of documents to allow for the completion of national procedures. I will continue to urge the EEAS to respect the terms of the Guidelines. 13 February 2015

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for confirming that the EU-Sub Committee on External Affairs considered the above document provided on the 29th January and decided to clear it from scrutiny. This letter provides an update following receipt of budgetary information. As stated in the Explanatory Memorandum, the proposed EUSR Mandate does not make substantial changes and focuses on the EU’s visibility and role in Afghanistan over the next eight months. However, it does propose an expansion of the EUSR responsibilities to include EU strategic support to rule of law reform, activity which is currently undertaken by the EU Policing Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL). EUPOL rule of law activity will be discontinued at the end of 2015. This additional support includes an uplift of two senior international advisors and two local staff to the EUSR’s office. The advisors will enable the EU to continue its strategic level dialogue with the Afghan Government on advancing rule of law reform, delivering on the objectives identified in President Ghani’s reform paper and the EU 2014-2017 Strategy for Afghanistan. The continued presence of an EU rule of law expertise will enable the EUSR to advance such priorities, consolidating EUPOL’s rule of law activity, particularly the provision of strategic advice to the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General's Office. The increase of four personnel to the EUSR office will result in an increase to the budget of €215,000. Overall EU spending and personnel numbers in Afghanistan will however reduce substantially due to reductions in EUPOL activity. Staff numbers will reduce by over 100, from 235 international staff in January 2015 to 100-150 international staff in January 2016. EUPOL rule of law support will draw down from 27 international staff in January 2015 to zero by January 2016. This represents a €14m reduction in the annual EUPOL budget on the previous year. We have been vocal in Brussels on the need to keep any additional incurred cost to a minimum. The final cost of this additional activity represents a decrease from the initial proposal. Initial drafts of the mandate proposed the EUSR’s office be augmented by six advisors (three international and three local); four to support rule of law activity and two to support a strategic dialogue with the MoI. Further scrutiny of this proposal by the UK and other Member States has led to a reduction in personnel and associated costs to the proposal. The budget is currently being negotiated in Brussels. Should the final budget differ from the above figures I will update your committee accordingly. 23 February 2015

EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman On 30 January I submitted to the Committees an Explanatory Memorandum (EM) and draft Council Decision extending the mandate of the EU Special Representative for Human Rights (‘the EUSR’), Mr Stavros Lambrinidis. I undertook to update the Committees on the draft budget for the EUSR, which we had not received when I submitted the EM. We have now received the proposed budget for the first 12 months of the extended mandate. I am pleased to inform you that, at €788,000 Euros for 2015/16, it is slightly less than for the last eight-month extension (-4.5% on a pro-rata basis). I am content with the proposed budget, which I believe is commensurate with the EUSR’s role. The budget for the second 12 months of the proposed extended mandate, from 28 February 2016 to 28 February 2017, will be subject to a further Council decision, which I will submit to the Committee in due course. 20 February 2015

EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 10 July, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document and decided to retain it under scrutiny. The Committee remains to be convinced, given the increased violence and continued instability in South Sudan, that the balance of priorities struck is the right one, the capacity available is commensurate to the task and the resources awarded to the double-hatted EUSR for the Horn of Africa are adequate. Since the decision was taken to merge the two mandates of the EUSR, the situation in South Sudan has deteriorated seriously in the last 6-9 months. We would therefore welcome your assessment on whether you feel that the resources available to the double-hatted EUSR will be sufficient to enable the necessary work that is required in South Sudan. Do you agree that the situation in South Sudan would benefit from renewed and sustained political focus from the European Union? Is the EUSR a useful tool to be able to deliver the EU and Member States’ political objectives? Your explanatory memorandum notes that, should the violence in South Sudan escalate further or the famine worsen, then the mandate should be reviewed, but we wonder whether that is soon enough. Is it now timely to reconsider the EU’s engagement in South Sudan and the region and to further reconsider whether that engagement should be upgraded? We look forward to receiving your response within the usual 10 working days. 10 July 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 10 July regarding Council Decision amending Decision 20113/527/CFSP amending and extending the mandate of the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa. I appreciate your concerns about the current situation in South Sudan, which remains deeply disturbing. We keep all of our diplomatic engagement on that country under constant review, including the role of the EUSR. However, I remain satisfied at present that the EUSR is playing a vital role in helping to resolve the conflict, and therefore believe current levels of engagement and resourcing remain appropriate. The EUSR has been actively engaged with the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) chaired talks, on which he has worked closely with our own Special Envoy and the wider Troika (UK / US / Norway) to support IGAD and push for a swift and inclusive process. As part of this, the EUSR has been able to be sufficiently flexible and his team sufficiently well resourced to engage key regional players and to travel to Addis Ababa in order to participate in key meetings in person, often at short notice. 63

Where the EU as a whole can play an important role in South Sudan is through co-ordinated actions that increase pressure on the two sides to abide by their commitments and reach rapid agreement on a transitional government of national unity. A key element of this agenda is sanctions, targeting those identified as breaching the cessation of hostilities agreement or seeking to hamper further political negotiations. The EUSR was heavily involved in developing the first round of EU sanctions announced on 11 July, which we believe have sent a strong political message to both parties that they must remain sincerely engaged in the process. The possibility of further rounds of sanctions, as well as UN measures are very real and the EUSR will again play a crucial role in helping support any such actions. This activity has not prevented the EUSR from also being active in Somalia, where he is also effectively delivering his mandate. There, despite an extremely challenging operating environment real political progress is being made, Al Shabaab are being pushed back militarily and EU engagement in the round is increasing. The EUSR’s excellent personal contacts with Ethiopian and IGAD contacts in Addis Ababa have directly contributed to these successes. We have also recently seconded a British member of staff to the EUSR’s office, which should improve the EUSR’s coordination with the UK. I hope this letter will be sufficient for the committee to reconsider the proposal and agree to extending the EUSR mandate until February 2015. 21 July 2014

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 12 February, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above documents and the corresponding Explanatory Memorandums. They had already been cleared at the Chairman’s sift on 3 February. We look forward to receiving details of the final budgets and mandates once they have been agreed. We also have a question regarding the future of the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs). We understand that there had been an assumption last year that the new High Representative would review the role of the EUSRs, but these latest extensions appear to simply be renewals without such a review. We were therefore wondering whether the new High Representative intended to review or reconsider the function of the EU Special Representatives at some point in the future? 12 February 2015

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for confirmation that the EU Select Committee considered the above document and decided to clear it from scrutiny at the Chairman’s Sift on 3 February 2015. I wanted to provide additional information on the timeframe and the proposed budget for the mandate, which was originally missing from the Explanatory Memorandum. I can now confirm that the mandate will cover an eight month period beginning on 1 March 2015. This is to allow the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy a period for evaluation of all EUSR roles and performances. The UK has scrutinised the budget very closely to ensure that the EUSR continues to represent value for money in light of the impact of increased pressures on the EUSR following the merger of mandates for the Horn of Africa and for Sudan and South Sudan last year. The Office of the EUSR has not requested any budgetary increase which means the total cost for this mandate for eight months is €1,770,000. There are small changes within the budget allocation. For example, the EUSR’s Office now sub-rents from the EAAS in Mogadishu instead of the UN which means a reduction of €1,250 per month in running costs. However, any savings made are offset by the slight increase in the mission costs. This is due to the increase in the frequency and extent of travel proposed by the EUSR within the eight month period. Further budgetary information is set out below. Detail of proposed budget for eight months, (March-October 2015 inclusive): — Personnel expenditure - €1,295,068: The budget covers the salaries and daily allowances of the EUSR and fifteen staff. — Missions - €396,940: This covers travel, accommodation and daily expenses. This takes into account lessons learnt from the previous mandate which saw an overspend due to underestimating the amount of travel staff would need to undertake, as well as underestimating flight and accommodation costs. We judge that this is a realistic forecast for the new mandate. 64

— Running expenditure - €446,804: This covers costs for office support, including equipment and supplies, IT services and office rent for offices in: Brussels, Juba, Khartoum, Nairobi (co-located with the EU Delegation) and Mogadishu (space sub-rented from the EEAS). — Capital expenditure - €14,199: This has been earmarked to pay for eventual replacement of communications and security equipment. — Representation - €9,600: This covers costs related to dinners or functions with or for host governments. — Contingencies - €17,541: A contingency reserve of 1% has been written into the budget. This is in line with other EUSRs where the contingency reserve can only be used with prior written approval by the EU Commission. We do not judge that this contingency will be used, but will ensure that Member States are consulted before the EU Commission provides written approval. My officials will stay in close touch with the EEAS and I would be happy to keep the Committee informed of progress. 20 February 2015

EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE SAHEL (UNNUMBERED)

communication at the highest level with the countries of the region. This would be essential for pursuing our objectives there given the specificities of Central Asia. It will also build on the ongoing exercise to review our Strategy for Central Asia”. She said that the proposed EUSR for MEPP “would focus on enhancing the EU’s engagement on the peace process. This would include the development of close contacts with all major players, including the parties to the conflict themselves, members of the Quartet, Arab states and relevant regional bodies. This engagement would also be underpinned by the EU’s clear position on the MEPP, including the parameters set out in the July 2014 Conclusions”. Ms Mogherini has also announced that she intends to conduct a wider evaluation on EUSRs, looking at the “political objectives, visibility of the EU, interaction with the EEAS, the resource implications and the ability of the EEAS to take on some of the tasks”. I support the initiative to hold such a horizontal discussion. As you know, prior to Ms Mogherini’s appointment, Member States once again fought off proposals by the EEAS for a transfer of the EUSR budget from the Common Foreign and Security Budget (CFSP) to the EEAS budget. We will continue to emphasise the importance of Member State oversight of this important tool of the CFSP. As the Committee will recall, I wrote to Ms Mogherini in December 2014 highlighting the importance of timely circulation of draft mandates. What is more, during a negotiation last year on revised EU Guidelines on the Appointment, Mandates and Financing of EUSRs, the UK successfully argued for the inclusion of a reference to the need for early circulation of documents to allow for the completion of national procedures. I will continue to urge the EEAS to respect the terms of the Guidelines. 13 February 2015

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing to update you on the renewal of the mandate of the EUSR for the Sahel, Michel Reveyrand, which falls on 28 February. The matter was cleared by your Committee at the Chairman’s sift on 10 February; however you may find this additional information useful. On Ms Mogherini’s decision to extend a number of EUSRs’ mandates (including the Sahel) for only eight months as opposed to the normal twelve, I have written to you separately giving the detailed background. Accordingly, M Reveyrand’s new mandate will be for eight months: from 1 March to 31 October 2015. M Reveyrand can expect to have a busy time in this period: the talks in Algiers between the Malian Government and the northern groups have reached a critical stage, and there are signs that, given the right encouragement (including from external players such as the EU), an agreement could be reached in the next few weeks. Should an agreement be found, the EU would have a further important role to play in devising and monitoring an implementation mechanism which would help to ensure that the parties stick to the terms of any deal. On the substance of M Reveyrand’s mandate, this has now been finalised and has not changed substantially from the previous version which I attached to my earlier explanatory memorandum. I am also able to give you definitive information on the budget for Mr Reveyrand’s next mandate. This remains the same, pro-rata, as the budget for 2014-15. During the discussions in Brussels the UK was joined by other Member States in calling for no increase in 2015-16, and this has been agreed. Consequently, the EUSR will operate with EUR 900,000 in 2015-16, in line with the EUR 1,350,000 budget for the full 12 months from March 2014 to February 2015. We are content that this represents good value for money, and the one change in M Reveyrand’s team structure will be achieved within this funding envelope. 20 February 2015

EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND THE CRISIS IN GEORGIA (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 3 July the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document and decided to clear it from scrutiny. 66

However, the Committee noted that the current budget for the EU Special Representative expired on 30 June and that the UK’s scrutiny reserve would remain in place until the committees in both Houses had cleared the document. We would therefore like to know what temporary measures, if any, have been put in place in order to cover the gap in the mandate. In light of recent events, we would also be interested to know what discussions there have been to ensure that the work of the EU Special Representative, and the EU in general, is closely coordinated with the work of NATO in the region. We look forward to your response within the usual 10 working days. 3 July 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing to update the Committee on the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), in light of the completion of its latest Strategic Review. I hope this information will assist the Committee’s preparations for scrutiny of the EUMM’s mandate at the end of 2014. The EUMM was launched in August 2008, following the Georgia/Russian conflict, to monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreements of 12 August and 8 September. The mission’s core tasks are Stabilisation, Confidence Building, Normalisation and Informing EU Policy. The Mission will be six years old when the current mandate expires in December 2014. In view of developments in the region, the latest strategic review of the EUMM recommended that: — The mandate be extended for two years (i.e. up to December 2016); — It continues to focus on the core tasks mentioned above; — It should maintain its current headcount for now (401 in total, 272 international and 129 local) given the wider political context of Russia’s actions in Ukraine/Crimea; — There should be further strengthening of its cooperation and coordination with all EU instruments and Member States as well as other actors engaged in Georgia and conflict resolution; — The structure of the Mission should be kept under review and the Head of Mission should make proposals to update it as appropriate; and — The next Strategic Review should be held mid-mandate (i.e. around the end of 2015). The Government is content with the outcome of discussions on the Strategic Review and is minded to agree to the mandate extension at the end of 2014 on the terms set out above. Renewing the mandate would be an important signal of EU support to Georgia at time when the country is concerned about the potential for punative Russian actions against it. The EUMM continues to play a vital role in stabilising and providing security to the region, for example successfully managing tensions last autumn in the period around the Presidential elections, and earlier this year ahead of and during the Sochi Winter Olympics. It also continues to play a vital role in facilitating activities near the Administrative Boundary Lines by informing all parties in a timely, credible and reliable manner. This allows, for example, works on utilities to go ahead which directly benefits local populations. A new Head (Toivo Klaar, Estonia) and Deputy Head (Ryan Grist, UK) have had a positive impact on the work of the EUMM, although relations with the de facto authorities in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia continue to be difficult. Ongoing lack of access to the breakaway regions continues to be a major constraint towards full implementation of the Mission’s mandate. The EU continues to push for the EUMM to have access to the breakaway regions, although other parties involved have yet to agree. In addition we continue to support and argue for the EUMM Head of Mission and the EEAS to regularly review the structure and staffing numbers of the mission, in order to maximise the impact of existing resources and identify efficiency savings. I will write again ahead of mandate renewal with further information. 7 July 2014 67

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 3 February, confirming that the EU Select Committee had considered the above document and decided to clear it from scrutiny. I promised to update you with the proposed budget information when it was received, and to confirm the length of the mandate. The 8 month budget for June 2014 – February 2015 was €1,380,000. The 8 month budget for March 2015 – October 2015 is €1,350,000 representing an overall decrease of €3,750 a month. Savings identified by us in the last budget, such as the reduction in one-off payments including funds for a ‘team retreat’, have been maintained in this budget. Other significant budget lines, such as staff salaries remain at the same level compared to the previously agreed budget. While overall running costs have increased, due mainly to a provision for new service contracts, we understand that this is to mitigate the risk of insufficient staffing around the time of the Geneva International Discussions. This increase has also been offset by a reduction in capital expenditure, and a more realistic assessment of personnel costs, by only budgeting for 6 months salary for positions yet to be filled, factoring in time for recruitment campaigns. The contingency reserve has also been kept down, with only a 0.03% increase added, as an adjustment for inflation. Given that the new proposed budget represents an overall reduction in costs in comparison to the last mandate’s agreed budget, we are therefore content to accept the proposed budget for the period March – October 2015. The length of this mandate has been confirmed to be 8 months rather than the normal 12 months. We understand that this is due to the High Representative’s desire to have time to acquaint herself with the Special Representatives and to adequately evaluate their work. 20 February 2015

EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN KOSOVO (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 3 February 2015, confirming that the EU-Sub Committee on External Affairs considered the above document and decided to clear it from scrutiny. I agreed to update the Committee once the budget was received. The proposed budget for the next eight months is €1,520,000, which represents an increase of 4.6% (€70,000) in gross terms on last year’s budget of €1,450,000 for the eight month mandate. This increase is due to the progressive transfer, which began three and a half months into the last eight month mandate, of nine legislative experts from EULEX to the EUSR. These experts are embedded in the Ministry of Justice and Internal affairs and deal with legal cooperation and mutual legal assistance. These are critical aspects of the EUSR’s mandate. This year the staff will need to be budgeted for for the full eight month mandate (to end on 31 October 2015) as opposed to only for four and half months, hence the increase. We believe this continues to represent value for money, and despite this small increase in the budget of the EUSR there is a significant net reduction in the joint cost to the UK of the EUSR and EULEX of over £20m. My officials will stay in close touch with the EEAS and I would be happy to keep the Committee informed of progress. 4 March 2015

EU STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN 2014-16 (9467/14)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting on 26 June the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document. As you note in your Explanatory Memorandum, there are a number of uncertainties facing Afghanistan and the strategy will therefore need to be flexible in order to adapt to these. Given these uncertainties, we would be grateful if you could provide us with some further information on how the strategy might be developed in light of forthcoming political and military changes. In particular, we would be interested to receive your assessment on the outcome of the Presidential election in Afghanistan, once it is known, and the impact of that result on the strategy. As the level of military involvement in Afghanistan will have a significant impact on the potential for progress, we would welcome an update on the UK/Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement and NATO’s Status of Forces Agreement with Afghanistan. We also invite you to provide further details on the two key events to which you referred (the NATO Summit and the Development Conference) and how discussions at these events might affect the strategy. Finally, we would be interested to know more about the EU’s plans for Afghanistan after 2016 and invite you to elaborate on how longer-term plans for the country, and the Cooperation Agreement for Partnership and Development, will tie together with this strategy for 2014-16. We have therefore decided to retain the document under scrutiny, pending an update from you on the above, and request a copy of the strategy once it has been agreed. We look forward to your response in due course. 26 June 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman You requested as part of the scrutiny process, additional information on the situation in Afghanistan. I agreed to write to you on these topics once a new President of Afghanistan had been announced. In this letter I will set out details on the Presidential election, provide an update on the security situation, an overview of the NATO Summit and London Conference, the EU’s work in Afghanistan and finally, sanctions.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS The first round of the Presidential elections took place in April 2014. More than 7 million people turned out to vote, a truly historic moment for Afghanistan. This was followed by a second round contest in June between the two leading candidates from the first round, Dr Ashraf Ghani and Dr Abdullah Abdullah. After some initial dispute over the preliminary results, the candidates agreed to support a full audit of the ballots cast, to be overseen by the Afghan Independent Election Commission, with support from the United Nations. After a protracted and challenging process the audit was completed and Dr Ashraf Ghani was declared the winner. Dr Ghani was sworn in as President of Afghanistan on 29 September, the first democratic transfer of power in Afghan history. He immediately appointed his electoral rival Dr Abdullah Abdullah as Chief Executive and partner in what will be a National Unity Government. Together over the coming weeks and months, they will take decisions on key appointments and a programme for Government. The Prime Minister visited Afghanistan on 3 October and was able to meet with President Ghani. It was an opportunity to underline our strong commitment to the new Government; making clear that we see our role in Afghanistan as changing - not ending. President Ghani in his inaugural address set out an ambitious agenda on reform and international partnership. Alongside our own bilateral efforts, we will continue to influence the EU and other Member States to engage constructively with the new Government at all levels, to ensure that we can take the necessary steps to align and deliver on our shared priorities.

SECURITY In his Quarterly Statement to the House of Commons on 9 September, the Foreign Secretary spoke of the security challenges that remain in Afghanistan and the evolution of our support beyond 2014. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are now leading 99% of combat operations across Afghanistan and proving increasingly effective. We know that to maintain this progress and protect the gains made so far, the ANSF will require sustained support. The UK has committed £70 million per annum to 2017 in support of this crucial activity. The focus of our assistance will be the Afghan National Army Officer Academy, which aims to provide the professional and effective leaders the army needs to maintain security The first significant act of the National Unity Government was to sign both the US/Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). This was a decisive and welcome move by the new President. These documents provide the legal framework for the presence of international military support post 2014. Their signature ends a long period of uncertainty.

NATO SUMMIT AND THE LONDON CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN The UK hosted the NATO Summit in Wales on the 4-5 September 2014. The Summit was an important opportunity to mark the achievements and sacrifices of the ISAF mission. A declaration was agreed setting out the long term commitment of NATO partners to Afghanistan, focused on three key strands of activity: a) Resolute Support Mission; b) financial support for the Afghan National Security Forces and c) NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership. The London Conference on Afghanistan will take place on 24-25 November. The United Kingdom will co-chair the Conference alongside the Afghan Government. The Conference will be a further platform for the international community to demonstrate solidarity with Afghanistan and for the new Government to set out its vision for reform and delivery of our shared priorities.

EU STRATEGY 2014-16 & THE EU/AFGHAN COOPERATION AGREEMENT ON PARTNERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT (CAPD) The EU strategy for Afghanistan was endorsed by the Foreign Affairs Council in June 2014. A copy of the agreed strategy and Council Conclusions is attached [not printed]. As set out in my Explanatory Memorandum, the EU strategy is designed principally to ensure that the EU and Member States can adopt a comprehensive and coordinated approach to activities on the ground in support of the Afghan Government. The four key priority areas set out in the strategy will act as an important guide for the EU’s focus and engagement. However, we do recognise that the

EU’s approach will need to be responsive to the outcomes of the London Conference, the vision set by the new Government and the challenges of a post conflict environment. As acknowledged by your Committees, it will be important for the EU and Member States to remain flexible. Over the coming weeks and months, we will encourage partners to work closely with the new Government, adapting our approaches as necessary to ensure that we are working to a strategy that allows us to meet our desired outcomes. This is likely to be an ongoing discussion. As part of the EU’s long term commitment to Afghanistan it continues to seek agreement on the EU/Afghan Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development. If signed, the agreement will provide a legal underpinning for a wide-ranging long-term partnership between the EU and Afghanistan. Now that a new Afghan Government is in place, we will continue to work with the EU and Member States to reach an agreement. Once this work is concluded, as previously agreed with the Committee, I will deposit the relevant documents for your consideration.

SANCTIONS Finally, I wanted to update you on sanctions. On 11 February, 16 May, 30 July and 20 August 2014, the relevant United Nations Security Council Committee updated and amended the Afghanistan sanctions list. Five new individuals were listed and 14 statements of case updated, for example to include further identifying information. These amendments are in the process of being implemented by the EU; a process which should conclude shortly. The Parliamentary Committees have had sight of the relevant documents. 16 October 2014

EU-SWISS INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thank you for your letter of 16 May regarding the negotiating mandate for an EU-Swiss Institutional Framework Agreement. The EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered your letter at its meeting on 5 June. We are grateful to you for undertaking to keep the Committee informed about the negotiations for an EU- Swiss Institutional Framework Agreement. We are also interested in the renegotiation of the EU- Swiss Free Movement of Persons (FMOP) Agreement, and would welcome receiving updates on those negotiations too as they progress. We look forward to receiving your further updates in due course. 5 June 2014

EU TRADE DEFENCE INSTRUMENTS - TDI MODERNISATION’ (8493/13, 8495/13)

Letter from Lord Livingston of Parkhead, Minister of State for Trade and Investment, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, to the Chairman I am writing to bring you up-to-date with the Modernisation of EU Trade Defence Instruments dossier. Since my last update in March 2014, discussions in both the Council and the European Parliament (EP) have continued. The non-regulatory parts of the proposed package continue to progress separately on the Commission’s own responsibility, although the EP still wants to incorporate some into the regulation. The main issues for both institutions remain the Commission proposals to: eliminate the use of the lesser duty rule in anti-subsidy investigations and cases of structural raw material distortions; introduce a so-called two-week shipping clause coupled with pre-disclosure to interested parties at the provisional measures stage; and provide for reimbursement of duties paid when an expiry review does not result in the renewal of measures.

The Italian Presidency pressed hard during the autumn to unblock the Council impasse on this dossier but without success (the opposing blocking minorities I outlined in my previous letter maintained their positions). It concluded in November that this dossier required further work.

EP POSITION The EP adopted a first reading position on 16 April last year. It remains our assessment that their amendments would lead to a more trade restrictive regime than the Commission’s original proposal, and make no pretence at a balanced package between the different interests affected by trade defence measures.

NEXT STEPS At the time of writing the next steps are not entirely clear. However, given the continuing impasse, and the fact that this dossier is not a priority for the Latvian Presidency, we anticipate that there will not be any significant developments in the near future. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, in his letter of 1 November appointing Cecilia Malmström as Trade Commissioner, advised that it is time to take stock of the EU’s use of its Trade Defence Instruments so that the Commission can decide on the best way forward. We await to hear how Commissioner Malmström’s intends to proceed, but the UK supports President Juncker’s proposal and stands ready to work with Commissioner Malmström and other Member States. I will keep you informed of any developments with this dossier. 14 February 2015

EU TRAINING MISSION SOMALIA (UNNUMBERD)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman Following the Committee’s meeting on 24 February which discussed but did not clear the above Council Decision, the Committee asked for an explanation as to why they were not given prior information on this Council Decision. I am replying to the Committee’s question and providing further background; I hope you will find this useful. The UK was proactively involved in the Strategic Review, including bearing down on costs and ensuring a favourable outcome in line with UK objectives. Negotiations and discussions on the review and Mandate renewal took between October and early February. Despite persistent lobbying of the EEAS for an early draft version of the Council Decision, to help inform the Parliamentary Committees, we did not receive a copy until the end of January. At this point we began the process of submitting for Parliamentary scrutiny, which we finalised on 10 February following conclusion of mandate negotiations on 9 February. Providing a detailed update before receipt of the Council Decision would have risked misleading the Committee. We could only be certain about the scope and content of the EEAS proposals once that Decision was available. We are content that the Review and subsequent negotiations resulted in the right outcome: a modest rebalancing of the way the mission carries out its tasks. This aligns with unchanged UK objectives for the EUTM. The Council Decision is designed to enable the Mission to continue its positive progress. As soon as we received the Council Decision we started preparing the Explanatory Memorandum to inform the Parliamentary Scrutiny Committee. I recognise this was not ideal, and had there been more time we would have informed the Committee accordingly. I have reminded officials of the need to ensure the committees are updated as early as possible. Looking forward, I will update the Committee after the April Athena (financial) Committee meeting, and look to provide further summary updates for EUTM Somalia as and when developments dictate. 6 March 2015

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 12 March, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document. We were pleased to hear of the progress being made in the region, and support the continuation of the mission to train Somali security forces. We have therefore decided to clear the document from scrutiny. 12 March 2015

EU-TUNISIA ACTION PLAN (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I attach [not printed] an Explanatory Memorandum on the proposed Council Decision on the implementation of the EU-Tunisia Action Plan. As you will be aware such Action Plans have in the past been agreed either through Council Conclusions (EU-Jordan) or I/A note (EU-Lebanon and EU-Morocco). I want to explain, therefore, why the Government is content to accept the proposal that this particular Action Plan is agreed by way of a Council Decision. As the Committee will recall, the reason the Council agreed previous Action Plans by way of Council Conclusions or I/A note was because the Action Plans concerned made political recommendations only and had no legal effects. As a result, establishing the Union’s position in the relevant Association Council did not require a Council decision pursuant to article 218(9) TFEU, as the Action Plan was not an act “having legal effects”. However, the European Parliament and the Council recently adopted the European Neighbourhood Instrument Regulation (ENIR) (Regulation 232/2014). The ENIR specifically references Action Plans in its article 3(2) as a key element in the application of the Regulation. In application of a recent Court of Justice judgment interpreting “legal effects” for the purposes of article 218(9) TFEU (Case C-399/12 Germany v Council) the Government considers that the Tunisia Action Plan will have legal effects for the purposes of article 218(9) vis-a-vis the ENIR (even though the recommendations within it remain political recommendations) and that as a result a Council Decision under Article 218(9) is the appropriate method for establishing the Union’s position in the EU-Tunisia Association Council which will be called upon to adopt the Action Plan . This Action Plan with Tunisia is the first such Action Plan to be agreed since the ENIR came in to force. Agreeing the Action Plan by Council Decision means, of course, that the Council Decision needs to be deposited with Parliament for scrutiny. I expect that will apply to future Action Plans with European Neighbourhood countries where such Action Plans have legal effects, since I expect them also to be agreed by Council Decision. However, I would reiterate the Government’s position that we cannot make a blanket statement on the scrutiny of other types of Action Plan (for example, with countries not covered by the ENIR) since the term is not defined in the Treaties and can therefore cover a range of documents that may or may not be legally or politically important. Similarly, the mode of adoption may vary depending on the legal implications (or lack thereof) of the document. 23 February 2015

EU-UKRAINE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT, INCLUDING DEEP AND COMPREHENSIVE FREE TRADE AREA (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman The election of President Poroshenko in a decisive first-round victory on 25 May has given Ukraine the chance to move forward from the turmoil of the last few months and address the underlying problems of the country through wide-ranging reforms. But the situation in the east of Ukraine remains of grave concern, and the UK and wider international community are continuing to support Ukraine and make clear to Russia that its actions will have consequences. I wanted to update you on developments, in particular with regard to our action in the European Union. The Foreign Secretary updated Parliament on 13 May following his visit to Ukraine on 6-7 May, and the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 12 May. His statement covered the UK response to the 73

situation in Ukraine, including: a) support to Ukraine and b) pressure on Russia to de-escalate the situation. Under the category of support to Ukraine, the Foreign Secretary noted the Foreign Affairs Council’s firm commitment to sign the remaining provisions of the Association Agreement with Ukraine, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, as soon as possible after the presidential elections. You will recall that in my letter to you of 17 March, I informed you that EU Heads of State and Government had, at the request of the Ukrainian Prime Minister, agreed to bring forward signature of the political chapters of the EU’s Association Agreement with Ukraine. These chapters were signed at an Extraordinary Summit on 21 March. In his inauguration speech on 7 June, President Poroshenko made clear his commitment to a European future for Ukraine and that his pen was in his hand ready to sign rest of the Association Agreement. Some will question whether Ukraine and the EU should sign the Association Agreement when retaliation from Russia remains likely and Ukraine has many internal problems to resolve. Our firm position is that Russia should not be allowed to have a veto over Ukraine’s future. Signing the Association Agreement will not come at the expense of dialogue with Russia, and the UK will continue to urge Russia and Ukraine to engage constructively to de-escalate the tensions in the east of the country. We are encouraging President Poroshenko to continue to engage with the whole country in an inclusive dialogue, and ensure that any security operations remain measured and respect the safety and security of non-combatants. I am also convinced that the Association Agreement provides the best support framework for Ukraine to take forward the reforms that are essential to build a stable, prosperous, democratic country. The Prime Minister met President Putin on 5 June and called on him to recognise the legitimate election of President Poroshenko. He urged Putin to take action to contribute to ending the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, stop arms crossing the border from Russia into Ukraine, and cease Russian support for separatist groups. The Prime Minister made clear that if these things did not happen, stronger sanctions, applied by economic sector, would follow. G7 leaders affirmed last week our non-recognition of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and condemned the unacceptable interference in Ukraine’s sovereign affairs by the Russian Federation. You will be interested in the implications of AA signature for parliamentary scrutiny. As you will recall, we originally submitted draft Council Decisions in June 2013 in expectation of a Ministerial decision on whether to sign the Association Agreement with Ukraine at the Eastern Partnership Summit on 28-29 November 2013. The draft Council Decisions on signature and provisional application of an Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU cleared scrutiny in the Commons via a debate in European Committee B on 11 November 2013 and the resolution of the House agreed the following day. These decisions also cleared scrutiny in the Lords on 15 October at the EU Select Committee Chairperson’s sift. However, President Yanukovych subsequently announced that Ukraine’s preparations for signature of the Association Agreement would be put on hold. In my letter of 17 March, I explained that a Council Decision had been circulated authorising signature and provisional application of the ‘political chapters’ of the Association Agreement. The ‘Final Act’ document signed by all parties in March included a commitment to proceed to signature and conclusion of the whole agreement in due course. Nothing had been added to the text of the Agreement which was cleared from scrutiny in 2013. The March Council Decision authorised signature and provisional application of the following Titles from the AA text previously cleared from scrutiny: — Preamble – Article 1 — Title I – General Principles — Title II – Political Dialogue and reform, Political Association, Cooperation and Convergence in the field of Foreign and Security Policy — Title VII – Institutional, General and Final Provisions On 11 June the College of Commissioners put forward a new Council Decision to agree signature and provisional application of the remaining Titles of the Association Agreement. These are: — Title III – Freedom, Justice and Security — Title IV – Trade and Trade-related Matters — Title V – Economic and Sector Cooperation 74

— Title VI – Financial Cooperation, with Anti-fraud Provisions Again, nothing has been added to the text of the Agreement that cleared scrutiny last year. The new draft Council Decision differed from the Decisions previously considered by the Committees in one respect: — It is a single Decision and not split to give a Title V legal base for the article regarding the provisions relating to the treatment of third-country nationals legally employed as workers in the territory of the other party; The UK has lobbied to ensure that this change is reversed. This will be discussed at COEST on 12 June where, based on informal assurances, we are optimistic that the Title V legal base will be reinstated and the Decision split. Both the Council Decisions and the Association Agreement will therefore be substantively identical to documents previously cleared by the Committees. The aim is to sign the Agreement at the June European Council on 27 June, which means that all processes will need to be completed by 18 June, in advance of the Foreign Affairs Council on 23 June. Pending entry into force of the Agreement, only a limited number of articles within these Titles will be applied provisionally once Ukraine has ratified the Agreement. The UK Government negotiated a limited scope for provisional application to protect Member State competence. The Agreement being presented to the European Council respects the deal reached in September. Under Title III on Justice, Freedom and Security, for example, provisional application will only cover Articles 14 and 19. Article 14 is a general chapeau article on rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; in September the UK secured a Joint Statement that makes clear that cooperation under this article does not constitute an exercise of competence by the European Union pursuant to Title V of Part III of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. This Statement is annexed to the new Council Decision and Final Act. Article 19 only applies to the UK in respect of a pre-existing re-admission agreement and, as I have previously advised the Committee, the UK opted into this provision in September 2013. The only other aspect of the Agreement where the UK declared its opt-in and opted in is Mode 4. My Explanatory Memorandum of 9 October set out the UK’s approach and position. As these documents are in essence the same as those which cleared scrutiny in September 2013, and there is an important political imperative to sign the Association Agreement with Ukraine as soon as possible to enable the EU to strengthen its support for Ukraine, I am formally requesting that your Committee exempt the documents from scrutiny. 12 June 2014

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP Thank you for your letter of 12 June, regarding the situation in Ukraine, which was considered by the Sub-Committee on External Affairs at its meeting on 19 June. The revised Council Decision to sign and provisionally apply the EU-Ukraine Agreement is of considerable political importance. We therefore cannot agree that the Decision should be exempted from scrutiny, and instead we ask that it should be deposited immediately, so that the Committee can examine it in further detail. We note that the previous Decision was cleared from scrutiny in September last year, before the political upheaval in Ukraine had begun. A further reason the draft Decision should be deposited is the Government’s approach to the opt-in, which, though familiar, in the context of the provisional application of an agreement as important as this raises important political and legal questions. The EM which follows the deposit of the draft Decision should explain the UK’s approach in detail, including whether the UK is isolated in its views on the application of the opt-in, what the views of Ukraine are, and how legal certainty will be achieved. That said, the EU has very publicly and consistently signalled its policy to sign the Association Agreements by June 2014 and we understand that to hesitate now and to miss its own internal deadline could be perceived as a sign of division. In light of this political importance, we do not wish our request for the revised Decision to be deposited to frustrate ministerial agreement in the Foreign Affairs Council on 23 June. So, while we cannot formally agree to exempt the document from scrutiny, we have agreed that, if the Decision is deposited in advance of the Council meeting on 23 June, we will waive scrutiny for the purposes of ministerial agreement at that meeting — in other words, in these exceptional circumstances we will grant a waiver of a document in advance of it being deposited. 75

We look forward to hearing the outcome of the Council, and the decisions taken in relation to the Association Agreement, in due course. 19 July 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 19 June agreeing to waive scrutiny of the new Council Decisions relating to the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement for the purposes of agreeing the Decisions at the Foreign Affairs Council on 23 June. This allowed signature to go ahead at the European Council on 27 June. As requested, we deposited the new documents on 20 June and I am submitting an Explanatory Memorandum that covers your questions relating to the UK’s approach to the opt-in. You may be interested to see the texts agreed on 21 March, and all associated statements or declarations, in order to give the complete picture. I am pleased to enclose [not printed] these with this letter. The Council Decision that allowed signature and provisional application of the political chapters on 21 March covered the following elements of the Association Agreement that had cleared scrutiny in November 2013: — Preamble – Article 1 — Title I – General Principles — Title II – Political Dialogue and reform, Political Association, Cooperation and Convergence in the field of Foreign and Security Policy — Title VII – Institutional, General and Final Provisions Pending entry into force of the Agreement, only a limited number of articles within these Titles will be applied provisionally once Ukraine has ratified the Agreement, probably in autumn 2014. The Council Decision allowing signature and provisional application of the political chapters respected the deal reached in September 2013 following intensive UK Government negotiation to limit scope for provisional application to protect Member State competence. Under Title II, provisional application will only cover Articles 4, 5 and 6. Articles 7 and 10 on, for example, Common Security and Defence Policy and Common Foreign and Security Policy will not be provisionally applied. The ‘Final Act’ document signed by all parties included a commitment to proceed to signature and conclusion of the whole agreement in due course. In March, Portugal lodged a minute statement regarding competence of Member States in relation to the Council Decisions to approve signature and provisional application of the political chapters mentioned above. In respect of the signature and provisional application of the remaining parts of the Association Agreement, we secured a joint statement on the part of the Council, the European Commission and the High Representative on competence relating to the provisional application of Article 2 (Title I – General Principles) and Article 14 (Title III – Justice, Freedom and Security). The UK also lodged minute statements relating to exercise of competence on free trade areas and traditional knowledge, and the Justice and Home Affairs opt-in. In addition, Austria, Italy, Romania and the Czech Republic lodged minute statements to register their view that a Title V legal base did not need to be cited to cover the provisions relating to the treatment of third-country nationals legally employed as workers in the territory of the other Party therefore leading to split Decisions. The Foreign Affairs Council on 23 June also approved two Council Decisions relating to conclusion of the Association Agreement, which will be sent to the European Parliament to obtain its consent prior to adoption by the Council. These documents are substantially the same as those I submitted to the Committees under my Explanatory Memorandum of 9 October 2013. They have merely been updated to reflect the fact that certain provisions of the Agreement had already been signed, and to mirror the two split Decisions on signature. A third Decision was adopted approving the conclusion by the Commission, on behalf of the European Atomic Energy Community of the Association Agreement. As you’ll recall, this third Decision was exempted from scrutiny by your Committee in November 2013. The “Final Act” signed by all parties contained language making clear that “the Agreement shall apply to the entire territory of Ukraine as recognised under international law and shall engage in consultations with a view to determine the effects of the Agreement with regard to the illegally annexed territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and of the City of Sevastopol in which the Ukrainian Government currently does not exercise effective control.” 76

2 July 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman My letter to you of 2 July confirmed that, following your Committee’s agreement to waive scrutiny clearance of the new Council Decisions relating to the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, signature of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement went ahead at the 27 June European Council. The situation in Ukraine continues to be of great concern. The Government remains committed to supporting a political settlement to the crisis. Although an agreement, including a ceasefire, was signed in Minsk on 5 September by representatives of Ukraine, Russia and the pro-Russian separatists, the ceasefire remains fragile, with violations reported on a daily basis. We continue to urge Russia to take action to withdraw its troops and equipment from the territory of Ukraine, to engage constructively with the Government of Ukraine, and to use its influence with the separatists to encourage them to do the same. On 12 September at the latest in a series of trilateral (EU-Ukraine-Russia) consultations, a deal was brokered in which the EU proposed to delay the provisional application of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) of the Association Agreement to 31 December 2015. These consultations form part of a wider intense negotiation process aimed at deescalating tensions on the ground in Ukraine. The 12 September proposal offers a pragmatic and flexible solution by delaying its provisional application of the DCFTA, at Ukraine’s request, whilst leaving the text unchanged. The Ukrainian Rada ratified the Association Agreement, including the DCFTA, on 16 September, and the European Parliament gave its assent to the Agreement in parallel. These actions demonstrated the continuing commitment by both parties to the Association Agreement and a closer EU-Ukraine relationship. Five Member States have already ratified the Agreement and we plan to begin the UK ratification process for the EU-Ukraine Association Agreements, alongside those with Georgia and Moldova, in the near future. Russia, which had previously hinted at retaliatory measures, has not responded to the ratification of the Association Agreement by Ukraine. Following the 12 September discussions the Commission has formally proposed the delay in the provisional application of the DCFTA, which forms Title IV of the Association Agreement, to Member States. Delay of the DCFTA until 31 December 2015 requires a new Council Decision and therefore is subject to scrutiny. The timetable for agreement of the new Council Decision is, however, extremely tight. Given that Ukraine has now ratified the Agreement, provisional application would, if notification by the EU had followed based on the original Council Decision, begin on 1 November 2014. The text of Article 486 of the Association Agreement provides that provisional application comes into force on the first day of the second month after Ukrainian ratification and notification by the EU of what it intends to apply. Therefore, if the Council Decision is agreed by the 30 September we would remain on schedule for provisional application of the non DCFTA elements on 1 November as planned, whilst agreement in October means provisional application would slip to 1 December. After much consideration, I regret that I must override scrutiny in this instance in order to allow the Council Decision to be agreed and the non DCFTA elements of the Association Agreement to be implemented in the necessary timeframe. It is my strong view that we cannot delay provisional application of the non DCFTA elements of the Association Agreement. Russia has already sought to misinterpret the agreement and imply that the 12 September deal applies to the Association Agreement in its entirety, not just the DCFTA, it is politically important to remain on schedule. It remains the case that any amendments to the Association Agreement, including DCFTA, can only be at the request of one of the two Parties to the Agreement. Any amendment would require the unanimous agreement of EU member states and Ukraine, and changes to the Agreement itself would require further ratification procedures. The informal trilateral consultations between the EU, Ukraine and Russia on the possible impact of the DCFTA on Russia do not affect the autonomy of the decision of the EU and Ukraine as the two Parties to the Agreement, and does not impact on Ukraine’s right to make its own sovereign decisions and determine its own future. I regret that due to the political imperative I find myself in the position of having to agree to the adoption of this Council Decision before the House returns from recess and your Committee has had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. This has been a particularly difficult decision, as I recognise that this is clearly a politically important decision on which I would have liked to have given you the opportunity to scrutinise. The Decision and a thorough Explanatory Memorandum will still be 77

deposited for scrutiny as soon as possible. As you know, I take the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues of political importance seriously and the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion is regrettably unavoidable. 25 September 2014

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 16 October, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the documents and the reasons given for the override of the scrutiny reserve. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that it was reasonable for the Government to proceed without following the usual parliamentary scrutiny procedures, and we are grateful to you for explaining your reasons. 16 October 2014

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL: 15 AUGUST 2014 (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing to inform you about the Foreign Affairs Council on 15 August which my Right Honourable Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs attended. The Foreign Affairs Council was chaired by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Ashton of Upholland. Commissioner Georgieva (Humanitarian Aid) and Commissioner Barnier (Internal Market) were also in attendance. A provisional report of the meeting and Conclusions adopted can be found at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/144316.pdf

IRAQ Nikolai Mladenov, UN Special Representative to the Secretary General on Iraq, briefed Ministers on the worsening crisis in Iraq. As well as addressing the immediate humanitarian crisis, the international community needed to support the Iraqi political process. Discussion focussed on the humanitarian, political and security situation. There was broad agreement on the need for EU unity and to step up its humanitarian support across the country and political support for Al-Abadi. The Foreign Secretary set out the UK’s deep concern at the humanitarian situation in Iraq and highlighted the security challenges facing Iraq, the region and the EU. The Foreign Secretary also stressed the need to ensure that Al-Abadi formed an inclusive government as quickly as possible. Conclusions were agreed that reiterated the EU’s commitment to Iraq’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, welcomed the commitment of additional European aid, and the decision by individual Member States to respond positively to urgent requests from the Kurdish regional authorities to provide military material.

UKRAINE Baroness Ashton updated Ministers on President Barroso’s discussions with President Putin and President Poroshenko on 11 August. Ministers then discussed the situation in Ukraine and the impact that Russian sanctions were having on Member States. The Foreign Secretary highlighted the need for the EU to stand together and work on the humanitarian situation, reiterating the importance of international humanitarian standards being upheld. Conclusions were agreed that urged the Russian Federation to put an immediate stop to any form of border hostilities, and to withdraw its forces from the border. The need to find a political, sustainable solution to the crisis had become a matter of urgency, and the Council underlined the importance of the implementation of President Poroshenko’s peace plan. The Council agreed that the restrictive measures taken by the EU against the Russian Federation remained valid and the Council was ready to consider further steps, in light of the evolution of the situation on the ground.

GAZA Ministers also discussed the latest situation in Gaza. Conclusions were agreed on the Middle East (Gaza) in which the EU strongly welcomed the ceasefire, and commended the considerable efforts of 78

Egypt to broker this and other deals. The EU also called for increased efforts to facilitate immediate and unimpeded access into the Gaza Strip, and for the mobilisation of humanitarian aid for the population of Gaza. The Conclusions highlight the need for a durable ceasefire to address Israeli security concerns and Palestinian requirements regarding the lifting of restrictions on Gaza. They noted the readiness of the EU to contribute to a sustainable solution, including by supporting a possible international mechanism endorsed by the UN Security Council, and through the reactivation and possible extension in scope and mandate of its EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS missions on the ground.

LIBYA Baroness Ashton briefed Ministers on Bernardino Leon’s appointment as UN Special Representative for the UN Secretary General on Libya and highlighted the strength of EU engagement on Libya and the need for a continued EU role. In Conclusions, the EU condemned the increasing violence in Libya and its devastating effect on the civilian population. The EU was strongly concerned by the threats the violence represented for regional security and for the EU.

EBOLA CRISIS Ministers, at the request of Spain, also briefly discussed the Ebola crisis in West Africa. Spain and the Commission briefed Member States on the severity of the epidemic, and on the potential political and security implications of the Ebola crisis. I am writing in similar terms to Sir William Cash MP, Chairman of the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee and Sir Richard Ottaway MP, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, copying to the Clerks of the respective Committees, Les Saunders at the Cabinet Office, Jonathan Worgan and Magdalena Williams, Departmental Scrutiny Co-ordinators, and Victoria Butt, FCO Select Committee Liaison Officer. I am placing a copy of this letter in the library of the House. I will continue to update Parliament on Foreign Affairs Councils as and when future meetings are held. 22 August 2014

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL AND GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL: 9-10 FEBRUARY (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing to inform you about the Foreign Affairs Council on 9 February and the General Affairs Council on 10 February. The Foreign Secretary attended the Foreign Affairs Council and I attended the General Affairs Council. The Foreign Affairs Council was chaired by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini and the General Affairs Council was chaired by the Latvian Presidency. The meetings were held in Brussels. Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations and Neven Mimica, Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development were in attendance for some of the discussions at the Foreign Affairs Council.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL A provisional report of the meeting and Conclusions adopted can be found at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2015/02/09/

UKRAINE The Council unanimously adopted additional listings concerning separatists in Eastern Ukraine and their supporters in Russia. These consist of an asset freeze and a travel ban on 19 persons and nine entities involved in action against Ukraine's territorial integrity. The Foreign Secretary emphasised the need for united messaging.

LIBYA The Council discussed the situation in Libya and the UN-brokered talks taking place in Geneva. Ministers fully supported the political dialogue and UN Secretary General’s Special Representative Bernardino Leon’s efforts. There was consensus that the EU should be ready to assist in the implementation of confidence building measures as requested by the UN. Ms Mogherini highlighted the need for a flexible approach to EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya.

IRAQ/SYRIA Ministers took note of the Joint Communication by the High Representative and the Commission on an EU Comprehensive Regional Strategy on Iraq/Syria, with a view to formal adoption at the March FAC. Ms. Mogherini said that agreement had been reached by the EU services on funding for the planned activities. The Foreign Secretary emphasised that it was unacceptable that the strategy had taken six months to prepare and EU services needed to be far more responsive to the tasking of Leaders.

COUNTER-TERRORISM Ministers held a general discussion on Counter-Terrorism over lunch, agreeing a step-change in external action. In her introduction Ms. Mogherini supported the need for action on Passenger Name Records. The discussions covered how to increase cooperation with key overseas partners on counter-terrorism. The Foreign Secretary also called for swift implementation of the EU’s Foreign Fighter’s strategy.

YEMEN Ministers discussed the situation in Yemen. The Foreign Secretary expressed deep concern at the Houthis’ recent unilateral declaration and reiterated that the National Dialogue Conference outcomes, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative and the Peace and National Partnership Agreement had to remain the reference points for Yemeni transition. Ms. Mogherini agreed with Ministers’ assessments and the GCC Initiative should remain the political framework. Council Conclusions highlighting the specific role of the Houthis and expressing grave concern were adopted.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS Ms. Mogherini briefed on the Quartet Principals’ Statement issued in Munich on 8 February. She underlined the need to alleviate the fiscal challenges facing the Palestinian Authority so that negotiations could be re-launched following the Israeli elections.

OTHER BUSINESS The Foreign Secretary regretted the postponement of the planned Africa discussion. Ms. Mogherini agreed and said that she planned to return to this strategic discussion at the March FAC. The Foreign Secretary raised EU support to the African Union’s Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was tackling effectively one of the largest terrorist organisations in Africa. The African Union was a valued and trusted partner. It was important that the EU continued to honour its ongoing commitments to support it, on time and in full. Ministers agreed a number of other measures: — The Council amended the EU restrictive measures against Côte d'Ivoire. The changes provide for a derogation to enable the licensing of certain equipment for civilian mining projects. — The Council allocated €1.2 billion for action in support of its proposal for an international code of conduct for outer space activities during the next two years. The funds will be used for awareness raising activities as well as for maintaining a framework for the multilateral process on the code of conduct. — The Council approved the exercise programme of the European Union under the Common Foreign and Security Policy for the years 2015 to 2019.

— The Council approved the conclusion, on behalf of the EU and its member states, of a protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement with Tunisia so as to take account of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU. — The Council took note of a supplement to the Force Catalogue 2014, containing the contribution from Serbia in addition to those of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and of Montenegro. — The Council approved the annual update of the common military list of the European Union, which defines the scope of the EU's common rules on arms exports and of its arms embargos. — The Council took note of the sixteenth annual report on arms exports by EU member states, in accordance with the EU's common rules on arms exports. — The Council appointed on 5 February 2015, by written procedure, members of the Committee of the Regions from Germany and United Kingdom for the period from 26 January 2015 to 25 January 2020. — The Council already appointed on 26 January 2015 the new members of the Committee of the Regions from the other EU countries for the next five years. — The Council adopted Conclusions on Libya; — The Council adopted Conclusions on Counter Terrorism; — The Council adopted Conclusions on Nigeria elections; — The Council adopted Conclusions on Boko Haram; — The Council adopted Conclusions on Central African Republic — The Council adopted Conclusions on Mali; — The Council adopted Conclusions on EU Priorities for UN Human Rights Fora.

GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL A provisional report of the meeting can be found at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/gac/2015/02/10/

LATVIA PRESIDENCY WORK PROGRAMME The Latvian Presidency presented its work programme and priorities for its term of office, January to June 2015. Further details of the Presidency’s priorities can be found at: https://eu2015.lv/images/PRES_prog_2015_EN-final.pdf

EU STRATEGIC AGENDA – UNION OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE The GAC discussed the EU’s response to the horrific attacks in Paris and Belgium last month. I set out the UK’s priorities: the swift adoption of a strong and effective Passenger Name Records Directive covering intra-EU flights; the proactive exchange of criminal conviction data; tackling illegal firearm trafficking; addressing online terrorist and extremist propaganda.

PREPARATION OF THE MARCH EUROPEAN COUNCIL The GAC discussed the agenda for the 19 and 20 March European Council, which will cover Energy Union, the Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga in May, and conclusion of the first phase of the 2015 European Semester. On Energy Union, I restated the UK’s support for the agreement reached in the October 2030 package, which balanced ambition with flexibility and in particular allowing Member States to determine their own energy mix, within the context of overall targets.

EU STRUCTURAL FUNDS Ministers discussed measures to ensure the timely adoption of the 2014-2020 EU Structural Funds operational programmes which are awaiting approval. 20 February 2015

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL AND GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL: 22-23 JULY (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from Lord Livingston of Parkhead, Minister of State for Trade and Investment, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, to the Chairman I am writing to inform you about the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on 22 July, which the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs attended, and the General Affairs Council (GAC) on 23 July, which I attended. The Foreign Affairs Council was chaired by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Ashton of Upholland, and the General Affairs Council was chaired by the Italian Presidency. The meetings were held in Brussels. Commissioner Füle (Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy) was in attendance for some of the discussions at the FAC. Commissioners Šefčovič (Inter-institutional Relations and Administration) and Katainen (Economic and Monetary Affairs) were in attendance for some of the discussions at the GAC.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL A provisional report of the meeting and Conclusions adopted can be found at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/144098.pdf

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS Baroness Ashton briefed Ministers on the outcome of the E3+3 negotiations with Iran. Both sides had worked hard to reach a deal before the deadline of 20 July, but differences remained and more time was needed. Negotiations would continue with a new deadline of 24 November. Ministers agreed to extend limited sanctions relief in return for Iran continuing to dilute/convert its uranium stockpile.

UKRAINE The discussion on Ukraine focused on the appalling tragedy of the crash of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17. Ministers agreed that the immediate priority was the dignified repatriation of the deceased, full and safe access to the site and an independent international investigation. There was agreement that Russia needed to do more to influence the separatists to provide free and unimpeded access to the site, and to prevent the flow of arms and equipment to the separatists. Ministers discussed means of putting pressure on Russia and the FAC agreed to accelerate the preparation of new sanctions, building on those agreed at the European Council of 16 July. Ministers agreed Conclusions which said that the Council would, before the end of July, agree entities and persons to be listed under the enhanced criteria; expand the EU’s restrictive measures with a view to targeting individuals supporting or benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine; and adopt additional measures to restrict trade with, and investment in, Crimea and Sevastapol. The FAC tasked the Commission and the European External Action Service to finalise preparatory work on possible targeted measures and to present proposals for action, including on access to capital markets, defence, dual-use goods and sensitive technologies, including in the energy sector. The FAC also approved a Council Decision to establish a civilian CSDP Mission in Ukraine and to lift the temporary suspension of arms exports to Ukraine for equipment that might be used for internal repression, which had been agreed by the FAC on 20 February. MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS/GAZA

Ministers had a substantial discussion on the situation in Gaza and on the Middle East Peace Process. Discussions focused on the EU’s response to Hamas’s rocket attacks and Israeli action in Gaza. There was agreement on the need for an immediate ceasefire and EU support for the wider peace process. Ministers discussed whether this was the time to change language on the EU’s parameters for a final status deal. The Foreign Secretary argued that the EU’s focus should be on supporting a ceasefire. Council Conclusions were agreed that expressed concern over the crisis in Gaza, condemned Hamas’s rocket attacks, called for a sustainable solution to Gaza, offered EU support for the wider peace process, and urged Israel to halt settlement expansion.

IRAQ Ministers discussed the crisis in Iraq, and agreed to maintain the pressure on Iraqi leaders to form a new government quickly that could unite Iraq in the fight against terrorism.

AOB ITEMS The situation in Libya was raised, highlighting the continuing insecurity there and the impact that this had on the security, including border security, of EU Member States, especially through migration. Ministers also noted the outcome of the 16 July Donors Conference on the flooding in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia, which had raised €1.8bn.

OTHER BUSINESS Ministers agreed without discussion a number of other measures. The Council: — Approved the EU common position for the 11th EU-former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Council on 23 July 2014. — Endorsed the regular review of the EU list of terrorist persons, groups and entities subject to specific measures to combat terrorism. — Adopted technical changes to the legal acts setting out restrictive measures against Iraq, which were originally imposed in implementation of UN sanctions. — Endorsed preparations for the annual review of the EU restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities threatening the peace, security or stability of Guinea-Bissau. — Amended the EU restrictive measures imposed in view of the situation in Libya. — Reinforced EU sanctions against the Syrian regime. — Took note of the sixth implementation report for Pakistan of the plan for strengthening EU action in Afghanistan and Pakistan adopted in October 2009. — Endorsed the six-monthly progress report on the implementation of the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, covering the first semester of 2014. — Extended the EU CSDP mission in Niger, EUCAP Sahel Niger, until 15 July 2016. — Extended the mandate of the EU mission on regional maritime capacity building in the Horn of Africa, EUCAP NESTOR, until 12 December 2016. — Adopted a decision on the aspects of the use of the European Global Navigation Satellite System affecting the security of the European Union. — Allocated a budget of €756,000 to the European Security and Defence College for the period from 1 August 2014 to 31 December 2015. — Took note of the High Representative / Head of the European Defence Agency's progress report on the implementation of the December 2013 European Council Conclusions.

GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL The GAC focused on: the Italian Presidency Work Programme; Implementation of European Council Conclusions; the Europe 2020 Strategy Mid-Term Review; and Lithuania’s accession to the Economic and Monetary Union. A provisional report of the meeting can be found at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/EN/genaff/144128.pdf

ITALIAN PRESIDENCY WORK PROGRAMME The Italian Presidency presented its work programme and priorities for its term of office, July to December 2014. Further details of the Presidency’s priorities can be found at: http://italia2014.eu/en/presidency-and-eu/programme-and-priorities/programme-of-the-italian- presidency-of-the-council-of-the-european-union/ I welcomed Italy’s ambitious programme, and its strong support for measures to produce growth and jobs, particularly around better regulation and the single market. I also welcomed the Italian intention to discuss the EU’s future priorities as part of their Presidency.

IMPLEMENTATION OF EUROPEAN COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS The GAC discussed its role in ensuring that actions mandated in European Council Conclusions are properly implemented, and considered ways to improve the process in the future, such as through regular progress reports.

EUROPE 2020 MID-TERM REVIEW The Presidency presented to the GAC a roadmap for the Mid-Term Review of the Europe 2020 Strategy. Further details are available here: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011645%202014%20INIT The roadmap sets out how work will be taken forward under the Italian presidency and prepares the ground for the 2020 Strategy Review in 2015.

ACCESSION OF LITHUANIA TO THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION The GAC adopted three legal acts to confirm Lithuania’s Accession to the Economic and Monetary Union and allow it to adopt the euro on 1 January 2015. This followed a recommendation of euro area Member States at ECOFIN in June and endorsement of the Commission’s proposal at the June European Council. The Commission’s Convergence Report of 4 June 2014 assessed that Lithuania meets all the convergence criteria for adopting the euro. 30 July 2014

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE LED EU BUSINESS DURING ELECTION PERIOD (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thank you for your letter of 4 March, regarding the items of scrutiny that are likely to arise shortly before, during, or soon after, dissolution. We are very grateful to you for outlining the expected proposals so thoroughly. We do, of course, understand that while Parliament is dissolved, you may need to agree documents without waiting for the Committee to be reappointed in order to clear them from scrutiny, and so we are grateful to have early warning of the issues which are likely to arise. However, when Parliament reconvenes after the general election, we would expect the FCO to deposit EMs for any documents approved during dissolution, so that the Committee can consider them further when it is reappointed. We look forward to receiving these in due course. 19 March 2015

GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL: 29 SEPTEMBER (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing to inform you about the General Affairs Council (GAC) in Brussels on 29 September, which I will attend. The September GAC is due to be chaired by the Italian Presidency of the Council and should focus on: the preparation of the European Council on 23 and 24 October 2014; the follow-up to the European Council on 26 and 27 June 2014; and a Commission Communication on the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian region.

THE PREPARATION OF THE OCTOBER EUROPEAN COUNCIL The GAC will prepare the 23 and 24 October European Council, which the Prime Minister will attend. The October European Council agenda is expected to include: the 2030 Climate and Energy package (including energy security); Economic issues; and external relations issues (likely to include Ukraine).

FOLLOW-UP TO THE JUNE EUROPEAN COUNCIL The GAC will follow up on the June European Council conclusions which outlined a ‘Strategic Agenda for the Union in Times of Change’. The primary focus of this GAC discussion will be on growth and jobs, the first priority outlined in the document. The UK’s priorities in this area are on strengthening and deepening the Single Market, increasing access to finance for SMEs, reducing regulatory burdens and agreeing ambitious trade deals, including TTIP.

THE COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON THE EU STRATEGY FOR THE ADRIATIC AND IONIAN REGION The GAC is due to consider a Commission Communication on the proposed EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian region and agree Council Conclusions. I am writing in similar terms to Sir William Cash MP, Chairman of the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, and the Rt Hon Sir Richard Ottaway MP, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, copying to the Clerks of the respective Committees, Les Saunders at the Cabinet Office, Sophie Warner-Fog and Magdalena Williams, Departmental Scrutiny Co-ordinators, and Jonathan Layfield, FCO Select Committee Liaison Officer. I am placing a copy of this letter in the library of the House. I will provide an update after the GAC has taken place. 26 September 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing to inform you about the EU General Affairs Council (GAC) that took place in Brussels on 29 September, which I attended. The September GAC was chaired by the Italian Presidency of the Council and focused on: the preparation of the European Council due to take place on 23 and 24 October 2014; the follow-up to the European Council on 26 and 27 June 2014; and a Commission Communication on the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian region. Interim Commissioner Nelli Feroci was in attendance for some of the discussions at the GAC. A provisional report of the meeting can be found at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/144962.pdf

THE PREPARATION OF THE OCTOBER EUROPEAN COUNCIL The GAC discussed the annotated draft agenda for the 23 and 24 October European Council, to be attended by the Prime Minister. This European Council is expected to focus on: climate and energy, including the 2030 package and energy security; economic issues; and external relations issues, to be determined nearer the time. 85

I used the meeting to press for an ambitious 2030 climate and energy deal in October which gives Member States flexibility to achieve the necessary reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in the most cost effective way, and includes substantial measures to improve EU energy security as a core element of the package. On economic issues, I reminded the Council of the key role it has in ensuring that Leaders’ strategic priorities for the EU are fully implemented. I agreed with others that investment was needed to support EU growth, but it should be through private rather than new public means and make use of existing instruments.

FOLLOW-UP TO THE JUNE EUROPEAN COUNCIL The GAC held its first discussion of the implementation of the ‘Strategic Agenda for the Union in times of change’ that was agreed by Leaders at the June European Council this year. The focus at this GAC was the chapter on growth, jobs and competitiveness; future GACs will examine the implementation of other Strategic Agenda chapters. I welcomed the Italian initiative to discuss implementation of the Strategic Agenda and said that the Council should continue to monitor implementation. I also suggested that further detailed evaluation of progress across economic sectors was needed, for example on better regulation. The Council should also consider its structure in relation to the new Commission’s work programme to take forward the economic growth agenda in the most effective way.

EU STRATEGY FOR THE ADRIATIC AND IONIAN REGION The GAC adopted conclusions on the Commission communication on the EU strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian region.

OTHER ITEMS The GAC adopted ‘A’-items including an item on the statute and funding of European political parties. In line with the UK’s consistent opposition to these Regulations, I voted against this A-item. Despite improvement, the Regulations are still flawed.

ANY OTHER BUSINESS The Presidency informed the Council about the first meeting of the Friends of the Presidency Group on improving the functioning of the EU which took place on 25 September 2014. 9 October 2014

HR/VP PROGRESS REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING DECEMBER 2013 EUROPEAN COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I wrote to you on 2 June 2014 with an update on the implementation of the December European Council Conclusions on defence and on the Comprehensive Approach. I promised a further update to accompany the HR/VP progress report on the implementation of the Council Conclusions, which has now issued. The attached [not printed] document is being provided to the Committee under the Government’s authority and arrangements agreed between the Government and the Committee for the sharing of EU documents carrying a limite marking. It cannot be published, nor can it be reported on in any way which would bring detail contained in the document into the public domain. The report gives a useful and broadly factual update of the progress on the numerous taskings from the December Council. This report was discussed in the 16 July Political & Security Committee (PSC) and was noted at the 22 July Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). The document was not for open for negotiation.

Whilst there has been limited further progress since my last update to the Committee, the Government is pleased with developments in areas such as the Joint Communication on the Comprehensive Approach, Maritime with the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and on the defence industry with the Commission’s Roadmap on implementation, which have all been submitted for scrutiny. Many work streams are still in their preparatory phases. The Government is, however, encouraged by the Commission and EDA’s efforts to date to work with Member States on December Council implementation, particularly consultation on capabilities and the defence industry. EU partnerships have also been strengthened through holding further consultations, particularly with the UN, NATO and African Union. We have also worked hard to ensure that December Council taskings with direct relevance to NATO have been developed in such a way as to reduce unnecessary duplication and enhance complementarity. Areas where we have successfully pushed for references to coordinate with international institutions, particularly NATO, include the EUMSS, Policy Framework for Defence Cooperation and Cyber defence. In the Autumn we will continue to work towards operationalising the Comprehensive Approach, particularly on: Transition Strategies; concluding the review of CSDP financing and the separate Athena mechanism review; maintaining pressure on the EEAS to enable roll-out of the Shared Services agenda; operationalising the EU MSS with an Action Plan to be agreed by the end of the year; and we will play an active role in the forthcoming review of training policy. Operation Althea’s executive mandate is due for renewal and EU member states will consider next steps in the Central African Republic. Work also continues on defence capabilities, including on member state led collaborative projects such as Air-to-Air Refuelling, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) and Governmental SatCom. The UK will be involved only where we see added value. Other capability areas in development are the Cyber Defence Policy Framework. Our priority here is to ensure that is focused on protecting information/networks which support CSDP, or raising awareness of cyber amongst member states and encouraging cooperation with international partners, particularly NATO. Work on the Policy Framework for Defence Cooperation is gathering pace. We will ensure that member states retain control over its development and that its development is in full coherence with NATO planning processes. On the defence industry, we will remain fully engaged as work progresses to develop the actions within the Commission’s Roadmap for Implementation. We will continue to work closely with the Commission, other Member States (including the LOI2) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) and industry to support areas we like (for example, support to SMEs, increasing access to Commission funding for R&D) and to resist the areas we consider represent the greatest risk. As I previously highlighted, during these negotiations there will be certain challenges for the UK, but we will work to negate risks and challenge areas which might limit our ability to procure the best capability for our armed forces, undermine the transatlantic relationship or interfere with matters of national sovereignty. EU Defence Ministers will meet informally on 9 September to discuss CSDP and December Council progress and at the FAC (Defence) and EDA Steering Board on 18 November Events in Ukraine have highlighted the importance of NATO and EU cooperation and coordination. The Government will use the upcoming NATO Summit to further highlight NATO’s primacy in European Defence, whilst recognising that the EU has a niche and complementary role to play and the need for all Euro-Atlantic institutions to continue to work together to address shared security challenges. Finally, we and EU partners are beginning to consider planning for the June 2015 European Council which “will assess concrete progress on all issues…and provide further guidance, on the basis of a report from the Council drawing on inputs from the Commission, the High Representative and the European Defence Agency”. We will keep the Committee informed. 28 August 2014

1. Letter of Intent Grouping of leading EU defence industrial countries – UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden

HUMANITARIAN AID AND CIVIL PROTECTION POLICIES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION IN 2013 (12770/14)

Letter from the Chairman to Lynne Featherstone MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for International Development The Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above proposal at its meeting of 16 October and decided to clear it from scrutiny. However, we do have grave concerns about the funding gap between payments and commitments to ECHO which we would like further information on. In particular, how has the €466 million financing gap impacted the work of ECHO? Are there programmes that will have to be deferred and will others have to be stopped altogether? If so, can you offer us more details of which ones? In addition, could you please provide us with details of the total funding gap between payments and commitments for the development instruments under Heading 4 of the EU Budget and the particular programmes that will be adversely affected? We would be grateful if your reply could be as detailed as possible including the exact sums and programmes involved. We look forward to your response in the usual ten working days. 16 October 2014

Letter from Lynne Featherstone MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 16 October regarding the European Commission’s 2013 Annual Report on Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection. The UK is working with like-minded Member States in Council to identify a sustainable solution to issues within the EU budget. At present discussions are ongoing. With regard to the amount spent by the Commission in 2013 beyond the allocated budget, ECHO took several steps to try to manage the impact of this on their operations for 2014. It reduced the level of pre-financing to NGO partners and international organisations from 80% to 50%. It also imposed a ‘freeze’ on final payments in contracts. Additionally, ECHO has received €100m in budgetary reinforcements over 2014. We urge the commission to step up its efforts. In terms of the gap between payments and commitments for the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) under Heading 4 of the EU Budget, the agreed commitments level for 2014 is €2.3 billion while the payment level is €1.7 billion. Similar gaps have been carried for many years; this has meant that the first call on each year’s resources has been the overhang of financial obligations from previous years. The Commission estimates that the available payment appropriations this year are not sufficient to cover all the obligations, with a currently estimated shortage of around €1.3 billion (38% of the available budget of €3.4 billion). It proposes to give priority to payments that have to be made urgently and to safely delay some other payments to 2015. In this regard, we understand that it plans to delay some budget support payments. The UK has made it clear that the current financial problems cannot continue to be carried forward into the 2015 and future budgets and is taking a robust line in the current budget negotiations. 3 November 2014

Letter from the Chairman to Lynne Featherstone MP Thank you for your letter of 3 November on the above report, which the Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered at its meeting of 19 November. We are grateful for the information provided in your letter on the gap between commitment appropriations and payment appropriations. However, as we requested in our original letter, we would welcome further clarification on the possible impact of the funding gap on ECHO’s work. You say that similar gaps have been carried for many years and have been managed by the Commission. Does this mean that you are satisfied that, despite the gap between commitments and programmes, there will be no impact on ECHO’s programmes? Furthermore, are you satisfied that the steps taken 88

by the Commission, such as reducing pre-financing to NGOs and delaying budget support payments, will not have a negative impact on ECHO’s work? If not, we would be grateful to understand which programmes will be affected and how. We look forward to your response in the usual ten working days. 20 November 2014

Letter from Lynne Featherstone MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 20 November regarding the European Commission’s 2013 Annual Report on Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection. Your letter asked for further clarification on the possible impact of the funding gap on ECHO’s work. The steps that ECHO took in 2014 to manage the shortfall, which were outlined in the previous letter, such as reducing levels of pre-financing and phasing contracts, have had an impact on ECHO’s implementing partners. It is normal practice for ECHO to phase contracts across the year and to shift resources to meet higher priority needs. However, the size of the discrepancy between payments and commitments in 2014 meant that several contracts were delayed and reduced in a DG-wide prioritisation exercise which ring-fenced resources for life-saving interventions. Resilience programming has, as a result, been disproportionately affected. NGOs report that late and unpredictable payments have made it difficult for them to plan and manage their programmes effectively. Whilst some of the larger NGOs have been able to cover gaps by shifting resources from other programmes, the impact has been greater on smaller organisations. NGOs presented six case studies to DFID which outline some of the challenges they have faced. These suggested that ECHO’s financial situation caused a reduction in the delivery of goods and services, compromises in programme quality and gaps in project implementation alongside the bureaucratic burden of having to cut and then re-hire staff and in re-writing project proposals and budgets to fit the smaller levels of funding. ECHO has not presented an assessment of the impact of its financial position across all of their projects and programmes. DFID is, therefore, not in a position to verify the impact of the funding gap across ECHO’s portfolio. Going forward, there will be a further negative impact on ECHO’s work if the funding issue is not rectified and the UK will continue to work with like-minded Member States in Council to identify a sustainable solution to this ongoing issue. 4 December 2014

Letter from the Chairman to Lord Livingston of Parkhead, Minister of State for Trade and Investment, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Thank you for your Explanatory Memorandum on the above Regulation which was considered by the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs at its meeting on 9 September. The proposal has already been cleared from scrutiny, but is of particular interest in light of the Committee’s ongoing inquiry into EU-Russia relations. We have received evidence outlining Russia’s concerns that an EU free trade agreement with neighbouring countries could have a detrimental impact on Russian trade with those countries and that the Eurasian Customs Union is incompatible with EU free trade agreements. We were therefore wondering whether any account has been taken of these issues when developing these proposals. Has there been an impact assessment of how the EU’s exceptional trade measures as part of the package of the Stabilisation and Association process in the Western Balkans might impact Russia’s trade with those countries? Have the Russians made any representations to the EU, or to the Western Balkan countries, on the matter of the exceptional trade measures or indeed of the Stabilisation and Association process?

Finally, is there any forum that engages the Russians, the EU and the countries of the Western Balkans in mutual dialogue on shared economic interests? We look forward to receiving your response within the usual 10 working days. 9 September 2014

INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT TRIBUNALS (11868/12)

Letter from the Chairman to Lord Livingston of Parkhead, Minister of State for Trade and Investment, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Thank you for your letter of 3 June, which was considered by the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs at its meeting on 26 June. We are grateful to you for providing further details on the ongoing dispute between the European Commission and member states regarding the extent of EU competence over investment. This has clearly been a long-running dispute but we are glad to hear that you feel that the Regulation on Financial Responsibility will not prejudice any future court ruling. As you note, this proposal is of major importance, particularly in the light of the Committee’s recent TTIP inquiry and, as we have noted in previous correspondence, it is regrettable that the Committee’s scrutiny reserve was overridden in this instance. However, we are grateful to you for providing further information and we have decided to now formally clear this document from scrutiny. We continue to take a close interest in this matter and would be grateful if you could provide us with further updates on any developments relating to the Member States’ ongoing dispute with the Commission about EU competence on investment matters in due course. 26 June 2014

IRAN: SECURING A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I last wrote to you about the Iranian nuclear issue after the Joint Plan of Action (JPoA) began on 20 January (please see my attached [not printed] letter of 20 January). On 20 July, the six month period of the JPoA ends. The E3+3 are currently working hard with Iran in Vienna to agree a deal before this deadline. Talks have been constructive, and we have begun to draft the text of a comprehensive agreement. However, significant differences remain between the two sides. A deal is far from guaranteed, and talks are likely to continue up to the 20 July deadline. Whether we secure a deal or not, Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 will need to be amended immediately after 20 July. This is when the JPoA expires, and the interim EU sanctions relief (provided to Iran under the JPoA) comes to an end. Given this, and that it is unlikely we will know the outcome of negotiations until 20 July, it is likely that I will need to approve adoption of any amendments to the Council Regulation without being able to give the Committee the opportunity to scrutinise the document in advance of adoption. Keeping your Committee informed on issues concerning EU restrictive measures is something I take seriously. Given the circumstances, I hope that the Committee will understand the likely need to override on this occasion. 15 July 2014

ITALIAN EU PRESIDENCY 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 2014 (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman In line with our commitment to proper scrutiny of EU business, the Government has promised to keep Parliament informed on issues relating to each EU Presidency programme. I attach [not printed] a summary of the Italian priorities for their Presidency of the Council of the European Union, as well as a provisional calendar of Ministerial meetings and key events. I have also placed a copy of the summary in the library of the House, in the interest of informing all members. As always, I very much look forward to hearing your views and engaging with you on the key issues. The Italians have set out three broad areas for their Presidency: Growth, Migration and Mediterranean (encompassing foreign policy). There is a good degree of alignment between the UK’s priorities and those of the Italian Presidency, particularly on policies aimed at promoting growth. The Italians will seek to promote initiatives to boost growth and investment, including support for SMEs. Other priorities that we share include deepening the Single Market and Better Regulation. The Italians will also want to make significant progress on TTIP negotiations, an ambition that we support. Under the migration agenda, we expect the Italians to push for a more coordinated EU response to the large influx of migrants from the Near East and Africa that are crossing the Mediterranean Sea. They are keen to increase financial support for search and rescue operations and discuss options for burden sharing. We will continue to stress to them the importance of practical cooperation and action in countries of origin and transit. On foreign policy, the Italians are likely to focus on the Mediterranean neighbourhood, particularly on Syria, Libya and Egypt. Like us, they are pro-EU Enlargement, and strong supporters of Albania and Serbia. We would also expect them to take a leading role on Ukraine should the crisis deepen. We will support the Italians across the full range of our shared Western Balkans policy priorities. I will of course be happy to provide your Committee with more information on any of these issues or the Presidency priorities, and I and my officials stand by to assist with an informal briefing session. 24 June 2014

MINERALS ORIGNATING IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS: AN INTEGRATED EU APPROACH (7704/14, 7701/14)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thank you for your letter of 22 May on the above proposals, which the Committee considered at its meeting on 3 July. We are grateful to you for answering our questions so thoroughly and have decided to clear the documents from scrutiny. We would be grateful if you could keep the Committee informed of any updates on the areas still under discussion as matters progress. We look forward to further updates in due course. 3 July 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 3 July on the draft Regulation setting up a Union system for supply chain due diligence self-certification of responsible importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating in conflict affected and high-risk areas and the associated Joint Communication, where you agreed to clear the draft Regulation and its associated Joint Communication from scrutiny. You asked me to keep the Committee informed of progress. I have not written until now as deliberations on technical issues around this dossier have been relatively slow. Discussion is now beginning to pick up in the Council. The European Parliament is moving ahead with its consideration of the dossier and is aiming to reach a common position in June of this year. 91

We have received clarification from the Commission on our questions concerning the legal base. We asked the Commission to explain why it chose Article 207 TFEU as the sole legal base, and did not include Article 209 TFEU. The Commission explained that the scheme promotes, facilitates and governs trade and has direct and immediate effects on trade, that a number of precedents exist, and that ECJ case law clearly limits the number of possible legal bases for a legislative proposal to the most relevant one. We have concluded that Article 207 TFEU is an appropriate legal base. Article 207 TFEU can be construed very broadly, and this proposal clearly supports trade measures and similar proposals have been based on Article 207 TFEU. We have jointly proposed with other Member States that there should be a reference to Article 209 TFEU, as well as Article 208 TFEU, in the recital to the Regulation. This would highlight that development aid objectives are also a key aim of the Regulation. The issue of implementation of the draft Regulation is still under discussion in the Working Party on Trade Questions. We have asked the Commission to investigate the benefits of hosting one competent authority in the Commission, rather than the 28 Member States hosting one separate authority each. This approach could help ensure uniformity of audit across the EU, helping ensure a level playing field for all participating companies. We are also considering proposals put forward by other Member States that the Commission could produce a ‘conformity assessment framework’. Companies could be certified to this by certification bodies accredited by national accreditation bodies as set out in Regulation 765/2008. This proposal would help ensure independence of a company’s certification, and could reduce the burden of implementation for Member States and the Commission. We will consider the merits of this approach. The Commission is investigating how this proposal could recognise existing industry responsible sourcing schemes. It is vital to avoid duplicating expensive audits. We will continue to play an active role in negotiations, and I will update the Committee again when there is more progress. 5 March 2015

PARTICIPATION OF ARMENIA IN UNION PROGRAMMES (14062/12, 14061/12)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing to inform the Committee that the above Council Decision on the Conclusion of a Protocol to the Armenia’s Partnership and Cooperation Agreement has now been cleared by the European Parliament and was adopted by the Council on 21 February 2014. The draft Council Decisions on signature and conclusion of the Protocol to the EU-Armenia Partnership and Co- operation Agreement (PCA) on the extension of Union programmes to Armenia were cleared by the Commons’ European Scrutiny Committee on 17 October 2012 as not legally or politically important. On 5 December 2012, the Lords’ European Union Select Committee cleared the document at the Chairman’s sift. This Protocol to the EU-Armenia Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) will allow Armenia access to the full range of EU programmes and agencies and has been extended to Armenia through its participation in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In September 2013, Armenia’s declared its intention to join the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union. This meant Armenia could no longer continue towards signing an Association Agreement as the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area element was incompatible with membership of the Customs Union. However, Armenia has been clear that it wishes to continue engaging with the EU as far as its Eurasian Customs Union commitments will permit. Closer political and economic association with the EU remain the most effective way to promote reform and modernisation in Armenia. The Government therefore supports the signature, provisional application and conclusion of this proposed Protocol. 10 June 2014

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP Thank you for your letter of 10 June 2014 on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Armenia, which was considered by the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs at its meeting on 26 June. The Committee noted with interest the fact that, since the initial proposal for the PCA was considered in December 2012, Armenia has declared its intention to join the Eurasian Customs Union but that it also wishes to engage with the EU as far as its obligations will allow. You note in your letter that “closer political and economic association with the EU remain the most effective way to promote reform and modernisation in Armenia”. The Committee would be interested to hear your views on whether that approach applies towards other countries who were formerly part of the Eastern Partnership but are now members of the Eurasian Customs Union, or whether there is a need for a different approach which takes account of the formation of the Eurasian Customs Union. For example, should the EU’s approach towards Armenia, Ukraine and Belarus continue to be to promote reform using the EU’s existing models and instruments, or are different tools now required to take account of the Eurasian Customs Union? How confident are you that those tools can deliver the necessary reforms? Is there now a need for a more strategic and differentiated approach towards countries which have joined the Eurasian Customs Union? The Committee will be exploring issues such as these in its forthcoming inquiry into the EU and Russia, so would welcome hearing your views on these matters. We look forward to receiving your response in due course. 1 July 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 1 July 2014 on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Armenia, and the EU’s relations with Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine. Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine all have different relationships with both the EU and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Belarus will become a member of the EEU when it is established on 1 January 2015, Armenia plans to join, but Ukraine will not joining the EEU. At the same time, all three countries continue to be members of the EU’s Eastern Partnership, which enables partner countries to have a closer relationship with the EU across a range of fields including political, economic and cultural. Armenia and Ukraine are committed to closer relations with the EU. Ukraine signed the political chapters of its Association Agreement (AA) with the EU on 21 March and the remaining chapters on 27 June (when Georgia and Moldova also signed their AAs). When fully implemented, these agreements will reinforce our shared values of respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Although Armenia decided last September not to pursue its AA (and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)) and instead signalled its intention to join the EEU, it remains keen to have a close relationship with the EU. I believe that it is in our strategic interest for the EU to encourage Armenia into a Euro-Atlantic alignment and further develop and strengthen cooperation aimed at, amongst other things, democratic and judicial reform, the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, the fight against corruption, and the further improvement of the framework for enhanced trade and investment. You make a valid point regarding whether the EU is able to promote reform using the current tools at its disposal with those countries not moving towards AAs or whether different instruments are required. The EU and Member States are committed to continued, and where possible, closer engagement with current non-AA Eastern Partnership members Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan. I support this. The EU and Member States are currently considering what form this cooperation should take, including the option of differentiated, pragmatic and flexible approaches tailored to individual countries requirements. This will be on the agenda for the next Eastern Partnership Summit, to be held in Riga in May 2015. Any future engagement will continue to have core values, including respect for democracy and human rights at its heart. It is also worth noting that until negotiations are completed between the future members of the EEU it may not be possible to completely determine all the commitments of Armenia and Belarus to that organisation, and therefore the full scope of their future cooperation with the EU.

17 July 2014

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP Thank you for your letter of 17 July, which the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered at its meeting of 24 July. We are grateful to you for providing further information and note that the EU and its Member States are still currently considering what form the EU’s cooperation with countries in the neighbourhood should take. The Committee continues to take a close interest in this matter, especially as it is so closely related to the Committee’s ongoing inquiry into the EU and Russia. We would therefore be grateful if you would continue to provide us with updates on relevant discussions or negotiations regarding these countries in the run up to the Eastern Partnership Summit in May 2015. We look forward to your response in due course. 24 July 2014

PARTICIPATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON IN UNION PROGRAMMES (9248/14, 9264/14)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thank you for your Explanatory Memoranda of 2 June on the above proposals, which were cleared at the Chairman’s sift on 10 June and considered by the Sub-Committee on External Affairs on 26 June. We note that the Government contends that its opt-in rights apply in part to these agreements and that relevant deadlines apply as a consequence. As you know, we do not consider that the opt-in Protocol is triggered when a proposal does not specifically cite a Title V legal base. We therefore wish to make clear that we do not accept the opt-in Protocol applies to these agreements in the absence of a Title V legal base, so none of the deadlines mentioned apply. We think the Government’s opt-in policy in these circumstances is misguided, being without legal foundation and liable to lead to legal uncertainty. We do not expect an answer to this letter. 26 June 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman As set out in my Explanatory Memoranda of 2 June, the deadline for the eight week enhanced Parliamentary Scrutiny of these agreements ended on 27 June. The Chair of the European Union Committee cleared our submission on the documents on 10 June at the Chairman’s sift from scrutiny, which I am grateful for. The Government considers that the opt-in is triggered by the above mentioned Framework Agreements because they include access to Fiscalis 2020 and Customs 2020. Both Fiscalis 2020 and Customs 2020 contain JHA obligations related to fighting fraud and as such we consider that the JHA opt-in is engaged. The Government has decided to opt into the decisions on signature and conclusion because the UK already participates in these underlying programmes. As you are aware the Code of Practice on enhanced scrutiny of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) asks that the Written Ministerial Statement (WMS) is laid within 2 weeks of the opt-in letter issuing to the EU. Taking into account Parliament is in recess on the deadline of 16 August, we are planning to lay a WMS in Parliament at the first possible opportunity, i.e. on Monday 13 October. 1 August 2014

PARTICIPATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA IN UNION PROGRAMMES (9289/14, 9294/14)

POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA AND FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from Baroness Northover, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for International Development, to the Chairman The Latvian Presidency of the European Union commenced on 1 January 2015. The Latvians will form a new Presidency Trio in a crucial year for development, coming as it does in the final year of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the negotiation of the successor international development framework (“the post-2015 development agenda”) and the Conference of the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 21). I am taking this opportunity to update the Committee on the main development files in the Latvian Presidency’s work programme and to set out the UK’s objectives for them over the next six months.

POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA AND FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT The Post-2015 Development Agenda will be a significant priority throughout the Latvian Presidency. Following the Council Conclusions agreed in December, the Presidency will play a critical role in the further developing the common EU position through the international negotiations. The negotiations will run throughout the year until the Summit in September 2015 (coinciding with the UN General Assembly). We aim to continue to build consensus on the key UK priorities, which include poverty eradication, inclusive and sustainable growth, gender, and peace and good governance. The UK will 95

also build support for ambitious, sound and implementable goals and targets to underpin the framework. The Presidency will also play a critical role in shaping Council conclusions, which will form the position of the EU and its Members States on the global partnership at the Third Financing for Development Conference in July 2015 and the Post-2015 Summit in September 2015. We will use this process to push hard for an EU re-commitment to the zero point seven percent official development assistance target. The UK will also press that the conclusions set out core principles of development finance and the global partnership, as well as the elements of the EU offer.

EBOLA Ebola continues to be the most immediate health and development challenge facing the international community, and Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea in particular. As a result of UK lobbying through the Foreign Affairs Council and the October European Council, we have realised a dramatic shift in the EU response on Ebola in financial terms (around €1 billion have been pledged, including over €350 million from the Commission). We shall use the Latvian Presidency to focus on the key UK priorities over the next 6 months, paying especial focus on the lead-up to the joint EU-UN Ebola Conference, scheduled for 3 March. The UK believes the focus of the conference should be four-fold: ensuring a flexible response to the current epidemiology and maintaining a focus on getting it to zero; strengthening regional and global preparedness to avoid a future crisis; ensuring there is a coordinated, comprehensive and costed recovery plan under the Ebola Recovery Assessment; and an agreement to a clear set of principles between governments and donors to guide future recovery.

GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT Gender equality and women’s empowerment will be a priority and there will be significant activity throughout the Latvian Presidency, including hosting a high-level conference on women’s economic empowerment and sustainable development in the post-2015 agenda on 2 March 2015. The Commission will adopt its 2014 Annual Report on the implementation of the “EU Plan of Action on gender equality and women’s empowerment in development 2010-2015” (GAP) and review the “Evaluation of the Gender Mainstreaming in development cooperation for the period 2007-2013”. In parallel the Commission is aiming to present the first draft of the GAP successor to a Member State expert group by April 2015. The UK strongly welcomes this effort to raise EU ambition on girls and women, and will continue to ensure ambitious actions are taken and strong Council Conclusions are agreed.

RESULTS FRAMEWORK A Staff Working Document entitled “Launching the EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework” will be published by the Commission in the first quarter of 2015, along with a special report by the European Court of Auditors on EuropeAid’s evaluation and results-oriented monitoring systems. Improving the results-focus is a focus for the Latvian presidency, as well as being a key priority for the UK. Over the last year, the UK has been very active in driving progress on the results agenda within the EU. Once the Staff Working Document is published, the UK will work with the Presidency to ensure an appropriate Council response which recognises the importance of implementing this framework quickly and efficiently. The UK will also continue to encourage the Commission to move to ongoing reporting of results, explore setting high-level targets and in due course review how results are attributed within the framework. The published results framework will present the indicators and related measurement methodology and reporting approach. This will build on a pilot of the results framework which took place in 2014, and a previous Staff Working Document “Paving the way for an EU Development and Cooperation Results Framework” published in December 2013.

FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY The Commission’s 1st biennial report on implementing food and nutrition security policy commitments was adopted in December 2014. It provides information on the implementation of EU policy priorities set out in 2010 in this field and assesses how effective the EU and its Member States have been in delivering on commitments, including in terms of coherence, complementarity and coordination of activities. Under the Latvian presidency, CODEV will prepare Council Conclusions. The UK will focus its efforts now on encouraging an approach which is embedded in a long-term 96

economic development perspective and in particular a greater focus on emerging priorities such as climate-smart agriculture, rural transformation, food systems, the role of the private sector and support to regional food markets and trade.

ANNUAL EU ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT ON FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT The UK has always been a strong supporter of the EU Accountability Report as an important element of ensuring accountability for the EU’s commitments on Financing for Development (FFD). As one of only four EU member states to meet the collective EU target to commit 0.7% of GNI to ODA by 2015, we are keen to encourage other member states to follow suit – as well as keeping commitments on wider aspects of the FFD agenda, such as support to domestic resource mobilisation, and private investment. The Accountability Report will play a particularly important role in the post-2015 agenda (as noted earlier). We therefore welcome the Latvian Presidency’s decision to bring forward the publication date of the Accountability Report, to allow it to feed into the preparations for the Conference in a timely manner. The UK will be pushing for a high quality Report which will demonstrate the EU’s considerable progress on its FFD commitments, and help to generate confidence among partners during preparations for the Addis Conference; as well as maintaining pressure on EU member states to raise their ambition even further in order to reach consensus on a new comprehensive FFD framework.

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS (ECA) SPECIAL REPORT ON HAITI We welcome the Commission’s acceptance of all the ECA Report recommendations on Haiti, and that a range of remedial measures to address the principal concerns are already being implemented by the EU. These measures include, but are not limited to, preparing a joint Humanitarian-Development Framework to support a more coherent and effective approach between humanitarian and development actors and adopting rapid response measure for the deployment of additional staff and technical capacity. We recognise that it is too early to judge how effective these measures will prove to be. However, the UK believes there is still scope to further improve internal coordination between the EU Delegation and ECHO in Haiti, which should be assisted by a joint Humanitarian and Development Framework.

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS (ECA) SPECIAL REPORT ON BLENDING CODEV will prepare Council Conclusions in response to a Special Report by the European Court of Auditors entitled “The effectiveness of blending regional investment facility grants with financial institution loans to support EU external policies,” which was published in October 2014. The UK will continue to encourage the Commission to develop the evidence base underpinning the use of blending and diversify the sources of financing that it unlocks. The UK is a bilateral donor in one of the blending facilities – the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund – and will work to ensure that the Council Response is sensitive to the UK’s interests in this investment. It will also be important for the UK to continuously monitor and scrutinise the results of blending activities as reported by Development Finance Institutions (DFIs).

EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND (EDF) The 11th EDF Internal Agreement is expected to be ratified by March 2015. Both the Implementation Regulation, describing the programming and monitoring framework, and the Financial Regulation, which lays out the rules for Member States’ contributions and budget implementation, have been agreed and await final adoption in Council. Agreement will also be sought in ACP Working Party on the rules of procedure for both the EDF Committee and the Investment Facility Committee which oversees the European Investment Bank funds to ACP countries.

ARTICLE 96 Article 96 decisions will be reviewed for Guinea-Bissau and will expire for Fiji under the Latvian Presidency. At its most severe, Article 96 involves suspending all EU development funds to the partner government, though it does not prevent the EU from providing assistance in direct support of the population through NGOs, multilaterals or the private sector. Decisions on continuing to apply, suspend or lift Article 96 appropriate measures involve discussion in the Working Party on Africa (COAFR) or the Asia-Oceania Working Party (COASI), as appropriate, and the ACP Working Party 97

to examine progress made. The UK will want to be sure that the partner government’s adherence to the essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement is proven before appropriate measures are lifted.

EPAS After over ten years of efforts, last year the EU concluded negotiations on EPAs (development- focused trade agreements) with three regions in Africa. These deals will provide governments and businesses with a long-term framework on trade policy which can be used to further support investment and economic development – creating jobs, raising incomes, and reducing poverty. The first of these EPAs, with West Africa, was signed by EU Member States in December 2014, as agreed by the Committee. Once the 16 ECOWAS West African states have concluded the signature process, the ratification of this deal is expected. Also expected for consideration are proposals to sign and provisionally apply the EPAs with Southern Africa and East Africa in the first half of the year, following legal scrub and translation of these texts.

EU-ACP RELATIONS POST-2020 The Cotonou Partnership Agreement between the group of ACP countries and the EU is due to expire in 2020. The Latvian Presidency will work with the EEAS and the Commission to advance EU reflection on future relations with the ACP countries. This will include a series of expert roundtable meetings which will include Council participation.

HUMANITARIAN AID AND RESILIENCE The Latvian Presidency will continue to take forward the agenda’s set by the Italian Presidency. Leading discussions in the Council Working Party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA), they will monitor ongoing emerging and protracted humanitarian crises, in particular the Ebola epidemic, look for gaps in the international response and work to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian aid. They will also champion the engagement of the EU and Member States on planning for the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 to ensure it is adaptive, inclusive and efficient. They will also continue to advance the implementation of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, particularly following up on the recent Consensus evaluation, and strengthen links with between development and humanitarian actors using the EU approach to Resilience. Negotiations in preparation for the 3rd UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in March 2015 will be important as will ensuring follow-up to the Conference outcome. The UK’s objectives will be to support opportunities to increase the overall effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid without duplicating broader donor coordination mechanisms and fora. Other priorities for the Latvian Presidency include the prevention of violence against women and girls in emergencies. These are high priorities for the UK and we will be very supportive of enhanced EU action in these areas, whilst maintaining UK competence on this issue. 29 January 2015

REDUCTION OR ELIMINATION OF CUSTOMS DUTIES ON GOODS ORIGINATING IN UKRAINE (13466/14)

Letter from Lord Livingston of Parkhead, Minister of State for Trade and Investment, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, to the Chairman I am writing with regard to the proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No374/2014 on the reduction or elimination of customs duties on goods originating in Ukraine. On 16 April 2014, the Council of the European Union and European Parliament adopted Regulation (EU) No364/2014 to provide autonomous trade preferences for Ukrainian goods exported into the EU market. These preferences were to last only until 01 November 2014, at which point it was anticipated that the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) elements of the EU/Ukraine Association Agreement, including these tariff reductions, would be provisionally applied. Following the trilateral discussions held between the EU, Ukraine and the Russian Federation on 12th September, it was proposed that the DCFTA elements of the Association Agreement would not be applied until 01 January 2016, and that the EU would extend the autonomous trade preferences to Ukraine to last for the interim period. By extending these autonomous trade preferences, it is the intention of the EU to 98

support the political and economic stability of Ukraine following the recent months of upheaval in the country. The attached [not printed] Explanatory Memorandum explains the issue in full. Ukraine is facing a severe economic situation following months of fighting in the east of the country and continuing economic pressure from Russia. Additionally, this extension of autonomous trade preferences is very closely linked to the Council Decision to defer implementation of the DCFTA elements of the EU/Ukraine Association Agreement, which must be adopted by 30 September to enable provisional application of the non-trade elements of the Association Agreement on 01 November. Therefore, the Commission is eager that this new Regulation should be adopted by the Council and Parliament as soon as possible to clearly signal the EU’s economic and political support for Ukraine at this time. Due to these considerations, it is likely that the Council will be called on to adopt the measure in the immediate future, before the House returns from recess and your Committee has had an opportunity to scrutinise the proposed Regulation. If this is the case, I will need to override scrutiny in this instance in order to allow the Council Regulation so that the autonomous trade preferences for Ukrainian goods can be extended in accordance with the political imperative of sending a clear signal of support to Ukraine in the given timeframe. This measure is in line with the UK’s firm and clear policy of support for Ukraine in the exercise of its sovereign decision move towards closer integration with the EU. As the Explanatory Memorandum makes clear, it is not expected that this measure will greatly impact economically on the UK. Therefore, I trust that you will appreciate my decision to agree to the adoption of this Regulation without your scrutiny if adoption is indeed required before the House returns. 30 September 2014

Letter from the Chairman to Lord Livingston of Parkhead At its meeting of 16 October, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document and the reasons given in the Explanatory Memorandum for the override of the scrutiny reserve. In the circumstances, the Committee considers it reasonable for the Government to proceed without the usual parliamentary scrutiny procedures and we are grateful to you for explaining your reasons. For the purposes of our inquiry we would be grateful if you would keep us updated in due course on two related issues. First, we recall that you wrote on 22 May: At the 12 May Foreign Affairs Council the EU reiterated its strong condemnation of the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and welcomed the Commission’s initial evaluation of the legal consequences of the annexation of Crimea that could include but not be limited to economic, trade and financial measures. The FAC asked the Commission to take forward more detailed thinking so that measures could be implemented as swiftly as possible. The UK is intimately engaged in this. We would be grateful to understand this “detailed thinking” when it has been achieved and what measures will be implemented, swiftly or otherwise. Further, we note that the assessment of the Commission of the benefits accruing to Ukraine as a result of the reduction or elimination of tariffs with the EU remains unchanged since April (“nearly EUR 500 million (£390.5 million) in tariff reductions, of which almost EUR 400 million (£312.4 million) would accrue to the agricultural sector”). However, of course, the area over which Kyiv now exercises effective control has considerably diminished. Therefore, if a revised assessment should become available or if you have a view on the accuracy of these figures, we would be grateful to receive it. I look forward to your response in due course. 16 October 2014

Letter from Lord Livingston of Parkhead to the Chairman I would like to take this opportunity to address some points that you raised in your letter to me of 16 October, in which you informed me that the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs consented to the override of the scrutiny reserve to approve the amendment to Regulation (EU) No.374/2014 on the reduction or elimination of customs duties on goods originating in Ukraine. 99

In the event, the override was not used. This is because scrutiny approval from both the EU Sub- Committee on External Affairs and the European Scrutiny Committee was received on 15th October, before the letter was sent to the Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) informing the INTA Chair of the Council’s support for the Commission’s proposal. The European Parliament voted to adopt the Commission’s proposal to extend autonomous trade preferences to Ukraine until 31 December 2015 without amendment on 23 October. The European Parliament, in plenary session, voted by 497 votes in favour, 78 votes against and 56 abstentions. Subsequently, Regulation (EU) No.1150/2014, extending autonomous trade measures for goods originating in Ukraine to 31 December 2015, was issued on 29 October, published in the Official Journal of the European Union 31 October, came into force on 1 November and was applied from 2 November. In your letter, you asked me to provide you with an update on the Commission’s work to explore further measures relating to Crimea and Sevastopol. This followed the Foreign Affairs Council’s reiteration on of its strong condemnation of these Ukrainian territories by the Russian Federation at the FAC meeting on 12 May. At the time, I could not report to you further on the work that the Commission was tasked to carry out on this matter. This was because circumstances – both the situation on the ground in Ukraine and the measures taken by our international partners – meant that the Commission has only recently been able to propose clear measures to the Council and Member States. I have written to you separately to explain the rapid development of these proposals and the new measures that they have led to. In your letter you also noted that the Commission’s estimates of the benefits accruing to Ukraine as a result of the autonomous trade measures must surely have changed given the disruption to Ukraine’s economy resulting from the conflict with separatists in the south-east of the country. The Commission has not issued a revision of its initial assessment. Nevertheless, you are of course right that Ukraine’s economic production has been significantly diminished since the Commission’s previous assessment. In September, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) predicted Ukrainian GDP would contract by 9% in 2014. In October, the World Bank predicted a contraction of 8%, whilst the IMF predicted a contraction of 6.5% (4.9% in PPP terms). The range of these estimates highlights the difficulty in accurately estimating the damage caused to the Ukrainian economy by the seizure of areas of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions by separatists. This is because the contraction of Ukraine’s GDP is a result of various but inseparable factors, all of which are dependent on the changing situation on the ground. These include the direct costs of Ukraine’s military operations in the region, the damage sustained to national infrastructure and private property in the conflict, disruption of tax and revenue sources, Russia’s trade import bans, and investor confidence in the Ukrainian economy. What is not in dispute is that the economic impact of the conflict is very significant and further supports the case for adopting measures to support Ukraine. If the Commission does make available any further economic analysis on the benefits accruing to Ukraine as a result of the autonomous trade measures, I will share it with you. 5 January 2015

RESTRICTIONS ON GOODS ORIGINATING IN CRIMEA OR SEVASTOPOL, IN RESPONSE TO THE ILLEGAL ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA AND SEVASTOPOL (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from Lord Livingston of Parkhead, Minister of State for Trade and Investment, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, to the Chairman I am writing with regard to the Council Decision and Council Regulation concerning restrictions on the import into the EU of goods originating from Crimea and/or Sevastopol and on the direct or indirect financing or financial assistance, insurance or reinsurance related to the import of such goods. The attached [not printed] Explanatory Memorandum explains the issue in full but, in sum, the intention of this ban is to implement an EU-wide trade policy that is in line with the clear messages made by the UK and our EU partners that we view the annexation as invalid and that Crimea and Sevastopol remain part of Ukrainian sovereign territory. 100

Due to the on-going Ukraine crisis and the EU’s need to respond to Russian actions, the European Council needed to agree the above Council Decision and Implementing Regulation within a very short space of time to send a clear message on the illegal nature of the annexation; furthermore the documents had to remain classified throughout the negotiating process. I was therefore in the position of having to agree to the adoption of this Council Decision and Implementing Regulation before your Committee had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning EU trade regulations is something I take seriously and the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion was regrettably unavoidable. 4 July 2014

Letter from the Chairman to Lord Livingston of Parkhead At its meeting of 24 July, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document and the reasons given in the Explanatory Memorandum for the override of the scrutiny reserve. In the circumstances, the Committee is not clear why, considering that this proposal has been under discussion for a few months, it has now proven necessary to speed the proposal through Council and thereby override parliamentary scrutiny procedures. As for the matter of classification, the Minister for Europe already apprised the Committee of the upcoming export ban in June. The Council Decision and Regulation do not appear to us to necessitate classified negotiation. Therefore, we would be grateful to receive further clarification on the necessity for an override. On the matter of the export ban, has there been any sort of impact assessment or evaluation undertaken on the likely impact on the Crimean economy and consequences for the Crimean people? There is a danger that by imposing trade and economic sanctions on Crimea, the effect will be to disproportionately hurt the Crimean economy and its people, without influencing Russian political calculations. We hope that this trade embargo is not an open-ended policy but has realistic and achievable goals which will be evaluated regularly. Have you set any criteria on which to review the effectiveness of this proposal and, if so, have these been signalled to Russia? We look forward to your reply within the usual ten working days. 24 July 2014

Letter from Lord Livingston of Parkhead to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 24 July regarding the Council Decision and Regulation restricting imports of goods originating in Crimea and Sevastopol. You ask for further clarification on the need for an override. Unfortunately, it was not the case that the proposal was under discussion for “a few months”. The issue was discussed in principle at the European Council on 21 March, but the Presidency only scheduled detailed discussions on the proposal once the draft text had been made available to Member State governments some five days before the Foreign Affairs Council adopted the Regulation. It was right to act quickly once the European External Action Service had produced the draft text to ensure that trade policy was in line with wider government policy (see below). Moreover, as stated in my Explanatory Memorandum, the security classification given to the draft text was also an impediment to scrutiny. I can confirm that these security classifications are not ascribed lightly to documents by the EU institutions, and documents marked “restreint” or in this case “limité” do contain sensitive information that should not enter the public domain whilst still under negotiation. This was very much the case in relation to this measure. You also ask about the impact on the Crimean economy and Crimean people of this decision, the duration of the ban, evaluation of the policy against realistic and achievable goals, and criteria for reviewing the policy. I should be clear: this regulation was designed neither to put pressure on the Russian government nor to have a particular impact on Crimea. The regulation was put in place as a direct consequence of the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia. It would be inconsistent for this government or for other governments which share our view of the annexation to allow Crimean goods to enter our territory that had Russian certificates of origin. The prohibition does not apply to goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol which have been granted a certificate of origin by the customs authorities of the Government of Ukraine.

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I am not aware of any EU analysis of the likely impacts on Crimea of this regulation and UK officials have not undertaken any such analysis. Data on parts of countries exports (Crimean trade data being previously always subsumed into Ukrainian data) is hard to come by. Any impact will depend on the behavioural response of Crimean businesses and in particular whether they turn to the significantly increased “domestic” market in the form of improved access to Russian consumers resulting from the Russian annexation. For the same data issues, evaluation of the impact of the ban in the future will remain difficult. No criteria for evaluation have been signalled to Russia but these are built into the regulation with the clear exemption from the ban of goods processed by Ukrainian officials. 30 July 2014

Letter from Lord Livingston of Parkhead to the Chairman I am writing with regard to the Council Decision and Council Regulation amending the regulation concerning restrictions on trade and investment relating to Crimea and Sevastopol. The new measures extend the existing restrictions on exports to Crimea or Sevastopol of goods and technologies related to the development of infrastructure in Crimea, and investment and financing of entities in Crimea or Sevastopol. The new measures also place new prohibitions on acquiring real estate in Crimea or Sevastopol and on the provision of services directly related to tourism in Crimea or Sevastopol. The objective of the extended measures (the “Crimean Consequences”) continues to be to make it more difficult for Russia to integrate the Crimean economy in to the Russian economy. The new measures are targeted towards sectors through which Russia seeks to profit from the annexation and is trying to develop Crimea into a showcase for its continuing interventionist policies in Ukraine. By complying with the extended measures, UK businesses can be certain that they are not inadvertently abetting Russia’s policy of annexation. The exemptions provided for within the new Regulation are designed to ensure that they are not targeted at the general public in Crimea or Sevastopol. The attached [not printed] Explanatory Memorandum explains the issue in full. The introduction of these extended measures follows growing concern about developments in eastern Ukraine and on the Crimean peninsula, particularly the continuing persecution and intimidation of the Crimean Tatar community. It has been important that the EU sends a clear and immediate signal about the costs of Russia’s interventionist policies, and is able to do so in concert with our international partners. As a result, the European Council needed to agree the above Council Decision and Council Regulation at very short notice. Following a short period of discussion within Council working groups, final texts of the Regulation and Decision were shared with Member States on Wednesday 17th December, for approval via written procedure on 18th December. Furthermore, there was a necessity for the draft documents circulated during working group discussions to remain confidential during the rapid negotiating process. This meant that there was not an opportunity to seek scrutiny from the Parliamentary Committees, or to inform you of the Commission’s proposals at an earlier date. Therefore, I felt that I needed to override scrutiny on this occasion. Decisions relating to the crisis in Ukraine continue to have to be made in response to the fast changing situation on the ground. As a result, override of scrutiny has again been regrettably unavoidable, and I would like to thank your Committee for their understanding on this matter to date. 5 January 2015

Letter from Lord Livingston of Parkhead to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 15 January providing clearance from scrutiny for the above documents, and for the understanding from the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs of my reasons for agreeing to the adoption this Regulation and this Decision without the usual parliamentary scrutiny procedures. It is not possible to quantify precisely the impact on UK exporters and investors of the restrictive measures relating to Crimea and Sevastopol. This is because there is no data that records which UK goods, or which funds, are specifically sold in, or invested in, Crimea having entered Ukraine. Furthermore, it is difficult to extrapolate impacts on UK exporters and investors of the measures from historic data of total exports to Ukraine given that Ukraine’s, and Crimea’s, economic situation has changed significantly during the course of 2014, and continues to do so.

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However, we judge that the impact on UK exporters and investors is minimal. We have been informed by Ukrainian customs authorities that the value of Ukrainian imports from the UK cleared through Crimea in 2013 amounted to $643,370, of which $579,470 was frozen fish (which, due to the Russian import embargo of 7 August 2014, cannot currently be exported from the UK to the illegally annexed region). Furthermore, UK investment in the whole of Ukraine was about £200 million in 2012 – about 0.01% of UK overseas FDI – and the share of that investment in Crimea is likely to have been very small. Additionally, we have consulted key UK business representative groups to identify any impacts on UK exporters and investors as a result of these restrictive measures. They have not alerted the UK Government to any significant direct impacts on UK exporters or investors. Regarding the impact of the restrictive measures on Crimea itself, the UK Government has been clear that these are targeted measures, designed to prohibit support to the sectors from which Russia seeks to profit from Crimea’s annexation and to not affect the general public in Crimea or Sevastopol. For instance, in October 2014, the so-called Crimean “Minister for Resorts and Tourism” estimated that tourists contributed 76bn roubles (just under £1bn) to the Crimean economy in the 2014 tourist season alone. Significant carve-outs have been included within the measures to allow for exemptions for purposes such as the support of medical or educational establishments, the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to endanger human health and safety, and for official purposes of consular missions or international organisations. The above documents amend the original restrictive measures relating to Crimea and Sevastopol, which are due to be reviewed by the European Union by 23 June 2015. Any decisions to extend the restrictive measures beyond this date will be through agreement by consensus within the European Union and based on a full appraisal of the situation in the currently illegally annexed region. You also asked about the reasons for the negotiations remaining confidential. Reconciling the need for confidentiality with the need for transparency is not always a straightforward judgement. The Government does share some restricted (LIMITE) texts where relevant with the Committees in confidence. Furthermore, the FCO and the Cabinet Office are developing guidance for central government departments to ensure that desk officers and policy officials understand when and how they should be sharing some LIMITE documents in confidence, and/or pushing for the removal of the LIMITE marking in particular circumstances. This will be shared with the Committees shortly. However, in this particular instance, it was necessary to keep the draft documents and discussions of these latest restrictive measures strictly confidential. This was to maintain an environment in which frank and open discussions of possible measures could take place between member states, without fear of positions and views becoming public. It is vital that the European Union continues to present a united front in the face of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. To do so requires the ability to arrive at a final position of agreement by consensus in full confidence. In the event, it was also necessary for a rapid adoption of the agreed measures, which did not allow time to share the documents with the Committee, to enable the EU to introduce them in unison with further measures by our international partners. I hope that this explanation addresses your concerns. 6 February 2015

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST COTE D’IVOIRE (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office The EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document at its meeting on 3 July. It is regrettable that the Committee’s scrutiny reserve was overridden in this instance but we are grateful for your explanation as to the reason why and have decided to clear this document from scrutiny. Your Explanatory Memorandum notes that the drafting of the Council Decision was delayed following a dispute between Member States and we would be grateful if you could provide further information on what the areas of dispute were, which Member States were involved, how the disputes were resolved, and when. We would wish to receive this information in time to consider it alongside the forthcoming implementing regulation, which you have undertaken to deposit for scrutiny. 103

3 July 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter dated 3 July 2014, in which you asked for further information regarding the Council Decision amending restrictive measures against Cote d’Ivoire to be included in the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Council Implementing Regulation. However, we have established that a Council Implementing Regulation is not required in this case and therefore I am now writing to provide the additional information. I am grateful for your decision to clear the Council Decision from scrutiny and I am very sorry for the length of time that it has taken to respond to your query. The Explanatory Memorandum submitted for Parliamentary Scrutiny on 18 June 2014 stated that the Council Decision was due for adoption on 23 June 2014. As previously highlighted, this unfortunately left very little time to allow for Parliamentary Scrutiny. The delays to the drafting of the Council Decision were the result of discussions over the interpretation of UNSCR 2153 (2014) at the Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party (RELEX). Unfortunately, due to the confidentiality of the EU Council’s deliberations, I am unable to disclose the national positions of those EU Member States who discussed the interpretation of UNSCR 2153, nor am I able to provide information on how the differences were resolved. I am, however, able to confirm that any discussion that arose was resolved in time for the Council Decision to be adopted on 14 July 2014. It is not unusual for discussions of this kind to take place whilst sanctions are being negotiated. Whilst we had initially anticipated that a Council Implementing Regulation would also be needed to introduce the amendments included in Council Decision 2014/460/CFSP, my officials have now clarified that a Regulation is not necessary as the amendments that have been agreed only needed to be introduced into the Decision and not the Regulation. Therefore, there will not be one deposited with your Committee for consideration. I include below further detail why a Council Regulation is not needed.

IMPORT BAN ON ROUGH DIAMONDS The import ban on rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire comes originally from paragraph 6 of UNSCR 1643 (2005). This was then adopted by the Council of the European Union through article 2 of Common Position 2006/30/CFSP. The import ban on diamonds was not included in Council Regulations 174/2005 or 560/2005 (which initiated the restrictions on the supply of assistance related to military activities, and certain specific restrictive measures against certain persons and entities, in Cote d’Ivoire, respectively). This was because it was already being applied as a result of Council Regulation 2368/2002 (consolidated version as at date of Common Position 2006/30/CFSP) which implemented the Kimberley Process certification scheme for the international trade in rough diamonds. When the decision to scrap the ban was adopted in article 1(2) of Council Decision 2014/460/CFSP (the Cote d’Ivoire restrictive measures Council Decision), there was no need for a corresponding Regulation because (preventing and) allowing import, subject to certification, identification and transport conditions, was already included in Council Regulation 2368/2002, which lists in Annex II Cote d’Ivoire as a participant in the Kimberley Process certification scheme through its Ministry of Mines and Energy.

COUNCIL DECISION 2010/656/CFSP: AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLES 1 AND 2 The key change in Council Decision 2014/460/CFSP was to change the prohibition in Article 1 of Decision 2010/656/CFSP from: The sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, as well as equipment which might be used for internal repression To: The sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related lethal materiel, as well as equipment which might be used for internal repression.

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However, at that time the prohibition in the implementing measure Regulation 174/2005 was “to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, equipment which might be used for internal repression as listed in Annex I” (the equipment in Annex I included lethal materiel such as fire-arms and grenades, as well as non-lethal materiel such as vehicles), therefore the existing language in the Regulation did not require amending. Similarly, the reworded exceptions in article 2 of Decision 2010/656/CFSP already feature in article 4a (2) of Regulation 174/2005. Decision 2014/460/CFSP makes clear in its preamble that its purpose is to ensure that Decision 2010/656/CFSP reflects the wording of UNSCR 2153 (2014), which already appears to have been caught by the alternative way that Regulation 174/2005 is worded to prohibit specific listed equipment which might be used for internal repression. 23 October 2014

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST IRAN - COUNCIL DECISION 2014/829/CFSP OF 25 NOVEMBER 2014 AMENDING DECISION 2010/413/CFSP (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 15 December, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document and the reason given for the override of the scrutiny reserve. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that it was reasonable for the Government to proceed without following the usual parliamentary scrutiny procedures, and we are grateful to you for explaining your reasons. We do, however, have some questions on the substance of the deal and would welcome an update on the negotiations. In the past, your officials have been kind enough to brief the Committee off the record on this issue, and the Clerk will be in touch with your officials to see whether such a briefing could be arranged in the new year. In the meantime, we will retain the Council Decision under scrutiny. There is no need to reply to this letter unless, of course, you wish to do so. 16 December 2014

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST IRAN - COUNCIL DECISION AMENDING COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman Since then, the Council has concluded that an amendment to the Decision is now required and that the extension can be agreed through an amendment to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran. The E3+3 and Iran agreed in the early hours of 19 July to extend the JPoA for a further four months until 24 November, which is exactly one year after the JPoA was agreed. This Council Decision amends the ‘end date’ of EU sanctions from 20 July 2014 to 24 November 2014. This amendment was agreed on 21 July and published in the Official Journal on the same day. We hope this will provide the additional time needed to conclude an agreement. We believe that a deal is still possible - we would not have agreed to an extension had this not been the case - but reaching an agreement will be challenging. It is vital both sides continue efforts to reach a comprehensive deal as soon as possible. Under the extension, both sides will continue to implement all measures agreed under the Geneva interim deal that have not yet expired. This means the limited sanctions relief under the JPoA will remain in place until 24 November 2014. In addition to these measures, Iran has committed to convert an agreed amount of uranium oxide into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor and to dilute its UF6 enriched up to 2% into natural uranium. In return, the E3+3 has committed to enable the repatriation of $2.8 billion in instalments

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over the course of the 4 month extension period. The IAEA will continue to be responsible for verification of all nuclear-related measures. No additional sanctions have been suspended. All other EU sanctions and restrictions remain in place and in force and the Government’s position remains not to encourage trade with Iran. In order to achieve a comprehensive solution, Iran has to show more flexibility and have more realistic expectations - given our concerns about break out - about the future scope of its nuclear programme, in particular on the core issue of enrichment. All parties will now need to reflect and evaluate the best way forward. We will reconvene in the coming weeks with the clear determination to reach agreement on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action by 24 November. As set out in my last letter, I regret that I have had to agree to the adoption of this Council Decision before your Committee has had an opportunity to scrutinise it. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning EU restrictive measures is something I take seriously, but the need to override scrutiny on this occasion was, regrettably, unavoidable. 6 August 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing with regard to EU Council Decision 2014/776/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran. As detailed in the attached [not printed] Explanatory Memorandum, the Council Decision relists an individual and three entities after their listings were annulled by the European General Court in June and July 2014. The Council Decision also updates the listings of three entities and delists one entity. All of the above actions are in line with the Joint Plan of Action, agreed between the E3+3 and Iran in November 2013. They are also in line with the EU Council’s drive to improve the accuracy and impact of sanctions, ensuring they are reviewed and updated as necessary. Having reviewed the evidence underlying each case, the EU Council wanted to relist the individual and three entities as quickly as possible following the annulment of their listings at the General Court. The summer recess in Brussels, as well as a focus on the Ukraine crisis, meant that it was not possible to progress these listings as quickly as anticipated. However, once the draft Decision was tabled in Brussels, the EU Council wanted to agree them as far in advance of the 24 November 2014, when negotiations with Iran are due to end. Therefore I regret that I find myself in the position of having to agree to the adoption of this Council Decision before your Committee has had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning Iran sanctions is something I take seriously and the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion is regrettably unavoidable. I understand from officials that you agreed to exempt the listing amendments and the delisting from Parliamentary Scrutiny. However, the attached [not printed] Explanatory Memorandum explains these changes in full. 17 November 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman As detailed in the attached [not printed] Explanatory Memorandum, the Council Decision extends the EU sanctions relief offered to Iran under the Joint Plan of Action (JPoA) until 30 June 2015. We hope this will provide additional time needed to reach an agreement. We believe a deal is still possible. A comprehensive, lasting deal is in all our interests. For the international community it would mean reassurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. For Iran, a deal would bring significant economic benefits. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning Iran sanctions is something I take seriously. However, given that negotiations went down to the wire, and the sensitivity of the agreement, the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion is regrettably unavoidable. 3 December 2014

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Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 15 January, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above document, your EM on it, and correspondence from the solicitors representing the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) and Mr Gholam Golparvar. We were grateful to your officials for providing us with a briefing on the E3+ 3 negotiations at the same meeting. The briefing they provided on the relistings did not, however, allay any of our concerns about the fairness of the procedures for relisting individuals and entities after their original listings have been annulled by the General Court. As a consequence we decided not to clear the document from scrutiny. We are increasingly concerned by the unfairness of the relisting process, to the extent that we might inquire into it further in the new Parliament. Since that meeting we have received your letter of 19 January, for which we thank you. However, we still have some remaining questions. We would be grateful for an explanation of the following points which arise in the context of relistings under the Iran sanctions regime, but which could also arise in the context of relistings under other EU sanctions regimes. We hope we have framed our questions so that they can be answered without disclosing information that you say is confidential. We expect the fullest response possible.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS We were surprised that you concluded in your EM that "no fundamental rights issues apply" for either listing, given that both were annulled for serious breaches of fundamental rights, namely insufficient evidence, and given that the new statements of reasons appear on their face not to differ significantly from their predecessors. We have noticed that it is common in EMs on EU restrictive measures for you to conclude that no fundamental rights issues apply. We would be grateful to know why you think this is the case for these two relistings; otherwise we are left with the impression that little, if any, thought was given to the fundamental rights of NITC and Mr Golparvar in the drafting of the EM. We ask that all future EMs on EU restrictive measures contain full fundamental rights analyses, including justifications for why the Government thinks they do not apply.

NITC We ask you to confirm whether the new evidence for the relisting of NITC comes from open-source material alone. In its judgment (T-565112) the General Court said that the transport of oil is unrelated to the alleged existence of links between NITC's shareholders and the Government of Iran (paragraph 58); and that "neither the proposals for its listing submitted by three Member States, dated 19, 24 and 28 September 2012, nor the other documents in that file identify the applicant's shareholders or contain the slightest evidence capable of supporting the claims that the applicant is controlled by the Government of Iran or provided financial support to the Government of Iran through its shareholders, which are said to maintain ties with the government" (paragraph 61 ). As a consequence, NITC's listing was annulled. It appears therefore that, in relisting NITC, a significant burden rests on the Council to ensure that evidence exists to show that the shareholders, now named in the revised statement of reasons, provide financial support to the Iranian Government. We would be grateful if you could confirm that such evidence exists. The statement of reasons for NITC's relisting states that a corollary ("accordingly") of it being "one of the largest operators of crude oil carriers in the world and one of the main transporters of Iranian crude oil" is that it provides "logistical support to the Government of Iran through the transport of Iranian oil." In relation to the previous listing, which alleged that NITC provided financial support to the Government of Iran, the General Court said that "the mere fact that, through its transport business, the applicant is involved in the Iranian oil and gas sector, which represents one of the Government of Iran's main sources of revenue, cannot be regarded as being covered by the legal criterion of provision of financial support to the Government of Iran" (paragraph 60). We ask you to confirm whether the relisting on the basis of logistical support is supported by evidence other than an inference drawn from the fact that NITC is a significant carrier of Iranian crude oil.

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The Joint Plan of Action suspends U.S. and EU sanctions on Iran's oil exports, as well as sanctions on associated services. A footnote explains that '"sanctions on associated services' means any service, such as insurance, transportation, or financial, subject to the underlying U.S. or EU sanctions applicable, insofar as each service is related to the underlying sanction and required to facilitate the desired transactions. These services could involve any non-designated Iranian entities." As a consequence, the Council amended the sanctions regime to permit the transportation of Iranian crude oil and the making available of vessels that may be used to transport Iranian crude oil (Articles I I (3) and 37b(3) of Council Regulation 267/2013 (as amended)). We ask you to clarify how NITC's relisting is consistent with the suspension of sanctions on associated services such as the transportation of oil.

GHOLAM GOLPARVAR You say in your letter of 19 January that a "well-established mechanism" exists between the EU and the individual concerned for consultation and review of a decision to list or relist. Yet the letter from Mr Golparvar's solicitor leads us to doubt whether that is so. You also say that the evidence against Mr Golparvar is the link that was established between him and IRISL, which the General Court affirmed in case T-58/ I 2. Mr Golparvar's solicitor's letter to us suggests that that link is out of date. The letter to us states that Mr Golparvar has provided documents to the Council explaining that the proposed reason for his relisting is "factually wholly incorrect", but that he has not yet received a response. As far as he is aware, there are no new factual allegations against him, and his solicitors comment that "If there is new evidence, it is fundamental to Mr Golparvar's rights of defence and a matter of basic fairness that he should see it". We wholly agree with those words. We ask you to confirm whether the Council has taken into account the evidence he has submitted that he is fully retired from acting on behalf of any of the companies mentioned in the new statement of reasons; and if it has done so, the reason why it has continued to seek his relisting, and also why it has not responded to him.

THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF EVIDENCE SUPPORTING EU RESTRICTIVE MEASURES We ask you to confirm the legal basis on which you say the Council negotiations and evidence supporting these relistings are confidential, and so cannot be shared with the Committee. We note the proposed relistings come approximately 13 and 7 months after the original listings of, respectively, Mr Golparvar and NITC were annulled, rather than being re-imposed without a continuity gap. We assume therefore that the risk of asset flight as a consequence of the relistings is minimal, and that this would not be a reason for confidentiality. More generally, we ask you to explain the extent to which both listings and relistings are based on open-source information, and to what extent on confidential information. Are there any cases in which open-source information is not disclosed to an individual or entity before a relisting decision is adopted, other than through administrative oversight? We would also like to know the reasons open-source information cannot be disclosed to us. As you know, NITC's solicitors have shared with us the evidence provided by the Council supporting the relisting. They say they do not understand why you class this information as confidential, when it has been provided to them on a "non-confidential basis". In a letter of 14 January to Sir William Cash you say that "[w]hilst the Council is permitted to share this information with the individual/entity concerned, this information is not for public consumption. This is why the underlying evidence for these relistings cannot be shared with either the ESC or the House of Lords Select Committee." We ask you to explain the basis (legal or otherwise) on which the Council is permitted to share this information with the individuals and entities concerned, and the basis (legal or otherwise) on which it is not for public consumption. If it is not for public consumption, have NITC's solicitors breached a prohibition in sending us the evidence; and, if so, which? We would be grateful if you could explain whether there is a separate process in Whitehall by which a Minister certifies the non-disclosure to the scrutiny committees of evidence supporting EU restrictive measures; or whether the confidentiality asserted in Government EMs simply flows from the classification applied by the Council Secretariat in Brussels, without further certification in Whitehall. We note you say in your letter of 19 January that, although this information cannot be disclosed to us, it is "not high classification material".

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FURTHER QUESTIONS ARISING FROM YOUR LETTER OF 19 JANUARY As mentioned, we have doubts about how well-established the consultation is between the Council and the concerned individual or entity before a relisting proposal is adopted. Can you confirm how many staff in the EEAS/Council Secretariat are employed full-time to work on EU sanctions, and whether you think this number is sufficient? We were grateful for the information you provided on the UK's Smarter Sanctions Policy. To what extent are the principles underlying this policy applied by the other Member States who regularly propose EU restrictive measures, and also by the EEAS/Council? In cases where the UK proposes a listing or relisting, you say that the decision is taken by FCO Ministers if it is "controversial". We would be grateful to know who takes the decision when it is not considered to be controversial, for a clearer explanation of what "controversial" means, and for a rough idea of the proportion of UK proposals taken by FCO Ministers. As you know, all correspondence between· .the Committee and die- Government is eventually published. I also wanted to inform you that we also intend to share your correspondence with the solicitors representing the NITC and Mr Gholam Golparvar, who have been in contact with the Committee. We look forward to your response to this letter within two weeks. 22 January 2015

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing in response to letters from both the European Union Committee of the House of Lords, on 22 January 2015, and the European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons, on 21 January 2015, requesting further information regarding the EU Council’s proposed relisting of the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) and Mr Gholam Golparvar. In your letters, a number of questions were posed which I seek to address below. In summary, I believe that the relistings of NITC and Mr Golparvar are appropriate, proportionate, adequately supported by open-source evidence, and consistent with our broader Government policy towards Iran. Whilst I understand the desire for the Parliamentary Scrutiny Committees to have access to the open-source evidence which supports relisting proposals, I am unfortunately not in a position to share such information. This is a consistent position which is taken in respect to all such requests, the reasons for which I set out below. I will first elaborate the processes both within Her Majesty’s Government and the EU, by which individuals or entities are proposed for listing or relisting under an EU restrictive measures regime, with a focus on Parliamentary Scrutiny.

SCRUTINY It is clearly desirable for Government processes to be as transparent as possible, and I confirmed my intention in this regard during my recent evidence session in the Commons on scrutiny reform. However, as the Committees are aware, there are particular sensitivities with regard to EU restrictive measures which limit the instances in which the normal Parliamentary Scrutiny process may be followed. By way of example, the risk of asset flight, if a designated individual or entity becomes aware that they are being proposed for listing under a sanctions regime, precludes scrutiny in most instances of new listings; the use of a Ministerial override is well established in this scenario. It is not unusual for the decision to relist an individual or entity to be the subject of a scrutiny override. This may be due to time pressures (often dictated by EU business) involved in negotiating and adopting a revised Statement of Reasons, which will also need to be supported by evidence for the relisting. It is preferable for agreement to have been reached before the effect of any annulment by the Court is realised (usually two months and ten days post notification of judgment). Failure to relist the individual or entity within this timeframe risks asset flight and can undermine the effectiveness of restrictive measures. With regards to the scrutiny history for NITC and Mr Golparvar, the situation is unusual for two reasons. First, the risk of asset flight was considerably reduced (both had been delisted since the Court’s annulment decisions had taken effect). Second, the sensitivity and timing of nuclear

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negotiations between the E3 + 3 and Iran were significant factors in considering proposals for relisting, and when proposals could be negotiated and adopted by the Council.

EU PROCESSES I recall my previous letter of 20 January 2015 to the European Union Committee, copied to the European Scrutiny Committee, in which I elaborated on the EU process for sanctions listings and reviews. I should here like to clarify a particular point. Listing decisions require unanimity by the Council. Agreement may be reached at meetings of the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) but agreement may also be reached at any time by way of the Council’s written procedure. In circumstances where Ministers judge it appropriate to do so, for example where there are pressures of timing, a scrutiny override may be used in conjunction with the written procedure at any time. For the avoidance of doubt that option is available in the case of NITC and/or Mr Golparvar.

INFORMATION SHARING The Committees have asked for access to the open-source evidence which supports the relisting proposals for certain individuals and entities. The Government adopts a consistent policy of declining to provide the evidence which supports listing, or relisting, proposals to the Parliamentary Scrutiny Committees. The reasons for this I set out below. The listing proposals which the Parliamentary Scrutiny Committees scrutinise may be put forward by the UK or one of the other EU Member States, or the EEAS. The underlying evidence is made available to the Council and held on file. Information that forms part of the Council’s internal decision making can be shared between Member States, however the Council decides collectively on the sharing of information externally. Member States are bound by a duty of professional secrecy with respect to Council documents unless they have been made publicly available, as set out in the Council's Rules of Procedure. Article 6 (1) states “...the deliberations of the Council shall be covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, except in so far as the Council decides otherwise”. Professional secrecy maintains non-disclosure of the identity of the proposing Member State, and limits the scope for third countries to play divide and rule with the EU’s sanctions policy. There are specific procedures for sharing information with the designated individual or entity. All open-source evidence is disclosed to them, upon their request, by the Council. They may share this information with their legal representatives in preparing their defence. The sharing of information externally with other actors is a collective decision for the Council. The Council Secretariat holds the responsibility to disclose such documents, or not, in accordance with applicable EU law.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS In its letter of 22 January 2015, the European Union Committee of the House of Lords note that Explanatory Memoranda on EU restrictive measures commonly conclude that “no fundamental rights issues apply”. The designation of an individual under a regime of restrictive measures may engage fundamental rights, however any interference with those rights is considered to be proportionate which is why, on analysis, no fundamental rights issues apply. Consideration is given to this during the process of targeting an individual or entity and gathering the evidence to support their listing. Restrictive measures against an individual often include a travel ban and an asset freeze. It is standard practice to make exemptions to both of these constraints in order to address humanitarian needs, such as travel for medical treatment or access to funds to pay for basic expenses. The fundamental right of defence has been the focus of many sanction related court cases; notably Kadi II, OMPI I and OMPI II. The Kadi II judgment created the requirement for a listing to be supported by open-source evidence in order to provide for the individual’s right of defence. I consider that current practice does not breach the fundamental rights of a designated individual. Future Explanatory Memoranda will include a more expansive description of why it is felt that fundamental rights are not breached.

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NITC OPEN-SOURCE EVIDENCE You ask us to explain the extent to which listings and relistings are based on open-source versus confidential information. Specifically you enquire whether the relisting of NITC is supported exclusively by open-source material. The European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) judgment in Kadi II made clear that the relevant EU institution must substantiate at least one of the reasons for listing with open-source material. There is, however, no requirement for all supporting evidence to be open-source. I am unable to go into the details of specific cases.

NITC FINANCIAL SUPPORT You note that “a significant burden rests on the Council to ensure that evidence exists to show that the shareholders... provide financial support to the Iranian Government”. On this point, the Statement of Reasons reads, “The National Iranian Tanker Company provides financial support to the Government of Iran through its shareholders the Iranian State Retirement Fund, the Iranian Social Security Organization, and the Oil Industry Employees Retirement and Savings Fund, which are State- controlled entities”. The Council takes its responsibilities with regard to relisting individuals and entities extremely seriously.

CONSISTENCY OF NITC RELISTING WITH JOINT PLAN OF ACTION The Joint Plan of Action (JPoA) agreed between the E3+3 and Iran in November 2013 does not have the effect of suspending in their entirety U.S. and EU sanctions on oil exports and related sectors; it allows Iran to maintain, at current levels, oil exports to existing customers, consistent with U.S. measures under the National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA). In support of that, the EU suspended articles of the EU Regulation related to transport, insurance, and related finance. This was, however, entirely without prejudice to listings, or relistings, where an individual or entity meets the criteria for designation under Article 23 of the Council EU Regulation 267/2012, as amended. JPoA suspensions do not apply to designated persons or entities, unless an explicit exemption is made in the legislation. The relisting of NITC is therefore consistent with the JPoA.

MR GOLPARVAR’S EVIDENCE TO THE COUNCIL I understand, from your letter, that you have been made aware by Mr Golparvar’s solicitor that he has provided documents to the Council explaining that the proposed reason for his relisting is factually incorrect and that a link with the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) is out of date. The Council takes all material provided to them into consideration when determining the evidential basis supporting an individual’s relisting. When an individual is proposed for relisting, a pre-notification letter is sent to them; the Council usually provides some supporting documents to the individual at this time. If an individual asks for access to their file, all open-source evidence held by the Council will be provided to them, upon their request, in order that they may prepare their defence.

EU FULL TIME SANCTIONS STAFF With regard to your query on staffing, we have been informed that there are eight staff in the EEAS sanctions unit who work full-time on sanctions. There are no staff in the CLS / Council Secretariat who work full time on sanctions. There are three CLS lawyers and two Council Secretariat (RELEX) staff who work mainly but not exclusively on sanctions, with an additional three CLS lawyers (including a Director) who work partly on sanctions and a further five lawyers whose work focuses partly on sanctions litigation. These figures we understand do not include secretarial assistants.

SMARTER SANCTIONS POLICY AND OTHER MEMBER STATES The UK’s Smarter Sanctions Policy codifies our desire to use appropriately targeted and legally robust restrictive measures as a foreign policy tool. The views of the CLS, which demonstrate great awareness of legal risk, weigh heavily in decision making. EU sanction regimes are usually subject to annual review and decisions are adopted by unanimity; the UK can, and has, significantly influenced proceedings where necessary. The evolving jurisprudence around EU sanctions regimes have necessitated all Member States to adhere to similar best practices. Elements of the UK’s approach to sanctions are followed by other Member States. 111

“CONTROVERSIAL” LISTINGS You note that where the UK proposes a listing or relisting, the decision is taken by FCO Ministers if it is “controversial”, and ask for clarification of what is meant by this term. I will illustrate by way of example. Decisions pertaining to listings or re-listings under the Iran sanctions regime are taken by FCO Ministers, in view of the sensitivity of the nuclear talks and the effects of considering a listing or relisting on the negotiations process at a given moment. Further examples may be where a proposed listing carries a small risk of unintended, detrimental humanitarian impact for instance. In clear cut cases, where broader political considerations are not in play, the decision to propose a listing is made by a Civil Servant at a senior level; Head, or Deputy Head of Department. There is extensive Ministerial involvement in decisions relating to sanctions, I am unable, however, to provide a clear indication as to the actual proportion of UK listing proposals directly considered by FCO Ministers. Listing proposals are worked up by a range of officials across the FCO and data on Ministerial involvement is not centrally held nor systematically collected at present. I hope that the above information will fully answer the questions of the Committees. 4 February 2015

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP I am writing in response to your letter of 4 February 2015 regarding the above document. We understand that the relistings of the NITC and Mr Golparvar were agreed by written procedure on Thursday 12 February. We were very surprised and concerned by your decision to support the relistings despite our continuing scrutiny of them. We ask for a full explanation of the timing of the adoption of the relistings and the reason for using the written procedure. We also have a number of other questions, as outlined below.

SCRUTINY We understand that the risk of asset flight will preclude scrutiny in most cases of new listings, leading to overrides. However, we are concerned here with relistings following annulment by the General Court (the Court). Our scrutiny mandate includes assessing the legality of EU measures. We therefore think it important to be able to scrutinise the open-source evidential basis for relistings following an annulment of the original listing for lack of a “sufficiently solid factual basis”, in the words of the Court. We think it equally important to be able to do so before the relisting takes place, if Parliament is to play a meaningful role in scrutinising relistings. We infer from your letter of 8 December to NITC’s solicitors, in which you advise them that “your client’s proposed redesignation is to be scrutinised by the Parliamentary EU External Affairs Sub-Committee C”, that you think Parliament should too. We therefore ask what practical steps both the Council and the Government could take to ensure that fewer Parliamentary overrides take place with regard to relistings. We also ask you to confirm that no separate process in Whitehall exists whereby a Minister certifies the non-disclosure to the scrutiny committees of evidence supporting EU restrictive measures; rather that the confidentiality asserted in Government EMs flows from the classification applied by the Council Secretariat in Brussels. You say in your letter of 19 January that, although this information cannot be disclosed to us, it is “not high classification material”. Can you explain what you mean in terms of Council classifications?

EU PROCESSES In your letter of 4 February, you say that a “scrutiny override may be used in conjunction with the written procedure for adopting EU sanctions at any time”, and that “[f]or the avoidance of doubt” this option is available in the case of NITC and Mr Golparvar. That statement implies that agreeing relistings before we have lifted a scrutiny reserve is a readily available option for the Government at any time, rather than a last resort. We would be grateful for further clarity on what you mean, particularly by the words “in conjunction with”. Could you tell us what evidential test the Council applies before agreeing that there is sufficient evidence to list, or relist, individuals and entities? 112

INFORMATION SHARING Thank you for explaining the procedures for sharing Council documents externally. We understand this is a decision for the Council Secretariat and that Member States are under a duty of professional secrecy not to disclose information held on the Council’s file. However, once open-source evidence for a relisting has been shared with the individual or entity to be relisted, it seems to us there can be no further justification for the Council to withhold it from third parties—the individual or entity not being under a duty to keep this information confidential, it is in the public domain. Do you agree? If not, which of the exceptions in the Public Access to EU Documents Regulation (1049/2001) would, in your view, justify withholding this information? We ask again that you confirm whether NITC’s solicitors breached any EU legal prohibition in sending us the open-source information used as support for NITC’s relisting.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS We welcome your undertaking to provide better analyses of compliance with fundamental rights in EMs; we look forward to seeing this put into practice. We note, however, that you say: “The designation of an individual under a regime of restrictive measures may engage fundamental rights, however any interference with those rights is considered to be proportionate which is why, on analysis, no fundamental rights issues apply.” Yet the number of annulment decisions by the Court would suggest just the opposite. On what basis do you judge that the interference with human rights is proportionate?

NITC FINANCIAL SUPPORT We asked whether evidence existed linking the shareholders in the revised statement of reasons with financial support to the Iranian Government. Your reply referred us to the revised statement and said that the Council takes its responsibilities extremely seriously. This is not a reply to our question. Given that the Government has agreed to relist NITC, we ask whether the Government has reviewed the evidence supporting the relisting and what conclusions it drew.

NITC LOGISTICAL SUPPORT We asked you to confirm whether NITC’s relisting on the basis of logistical support was supported by evidence other than an inference drawn from the fact that NITC is a significant carrier of Iranian crude oil. We would be grateful for your response.

CONSISTENCY OF NITC RESISTING WITH JOINT PLAN OF ACTION We were grateful for your replies.

MR GOLPARVAR’S EVIDENCE TO THE COUNCIL We asked you to confirm whether the Council had taken into account the evidence submitted by Mr Golparvar that he was fully retired from acting on behalf of any of the companies mentioned in the new statement of reasons; and if it had done so, the reason why it had continued to seek his relisting, and also why it had not responded to him. Your reply is limited to general terms about Council processes. Given that the Government has agreed to relisting Mr Golparvar, we ask you to answer the questions in full. Your answer should confirm whether the Council Secretariat responded to Mr Golparvar before the relisting was adopted.

SMARTER SANCTIONS POLICY AND OTHER MEMBER STATES We were grateful for your replies.

CONTROVERSIAL LISTINGS We were surprised that there is no record of the number of EU sanction decisions approved by Ministers and the number by senior officials. Surely there must be a record kept of this? Could you explain how sanction decisions are recorded? 113

We look forward to your response to this letter within 15 working days. 16 February 2015

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing in response to a letter from the European Union Committee of the House of Lords, on 16 February 2015, requesting further information regarding the relisting of the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) and Mr Gholam Golparvar under the EU’s restrictive measures against Iran. In your letter, a number of questions were posed which I seek to address below. We also discussed these relistings in my appearance before the Lords Committee on 2 March 2015.

SCRUTINY - TIMING OF RELISTING, AND WRITTEN PROCEDURE The Council Decision and Regulation relisting NITC and Mr Golparvar were adopted by written procedure on 12 February 2015 and published in the Official Journal of the EU on 14 February 2015. I regret that it was not possible to complete parliamentary scrutiny for the reasons I gave at the evidence session. Following the annulment of the listings by the General Court, the Council decided not to appeal the judgments but opted instead to relist both. The initial Explanatory Memorandum relating to the relisting of NITC and Mr Golparvar was submitted for Parliamentary Scrutiny on 15 December 2014; the document was under scrutiny for ten weeks prior to adoption. The UK was under considerable pressure from other EU Member States to support/agree to the relisting of NITC and Mr Golparvar following agreement to the proposed relisting which was initially agreed in October 2014. The increasing time gap between annulment and relisting risked opening the possibility of other parties portraying the imposition of restrictive measures against NITC and Mr Golparvar as new listings, rather than relistings. Any claim that new listings were being imposed could have negatively impacted on the Iran nuclear negotiations. Furthermore, it was desirable to relist NITC and Mr Golparvar before negotiations reached a more sensitive stage. This explains why I felt I had to agree these relistings without completing the scrutiny process. However, be in no doubt that the UK only agreed to relisting of this individual and entity following careful consideration of the relevant judgments of the General Court and a thorough assessment of the evidence presented by the proposing Member State.

APPLICATION FOR AN INJUNCTION OF THE UK DECISION TO SUPPORT THE RELISTING For information and as I mentioned at the Committee appearance, on 6 February 2015, NITC and Mr Golparvar brought an urgent application to the High Court, seeking a mandatory order prohibiting the Foreign Secretary from taking any action that would give effect to their relisting under the EU’s Restrictive Measures regime against Iran. The Court dismissed the application inter alia on the basis that there was an adequate alternative remedy for damages available to the Claimants through the EU Courts and that the Court needs to avoid being sucked into quintessentially political matters. During this hearing, it was also disclosed that the UK was not the proposing state for these relistings.

SCRUTINY OVERRIDE IN CONJUNCTION WITH WRITTEN PROCEDURE In my letter of 4 February 2015, I set out an explanation of the processes by which relistings may be adopted: at a Council meeting, or by written procedure. A scrutiny override may be used in either instance, without influencing the manner in which the draft documents are adopted. It is therefore possible that a scrutiny override is employed and legislation subsequently adopted by written procedure. I referred to this eventuality as the use of a “scrutiny override... in conjunction with the written procedure”. The use of written procedure for the adoption of sanction listings or relistings is common practice and not a remarkable feature of this case.

PRACTICAL STEPS TO REDUCE OVERRIDES OF RELISTINGS You asked whether overrides are an option that is considered available to the Government at any time, or as a last resort. As you know I take my scrutiny commitments very seriously – overrides are always a last resort, which I make best endeavours to avoid. For example, in this case, the documents 114

were shared with the Committees ten weeks ahead of adoption and I wrote on 20 January and 4 February to answer requests for information from the Committee. In the case of most sanctions relistings, an override is necessary due to the time pressure of adopting a new statement of reasons, and ensuring continuity of the restrictive measures before they expire after an annulment. This timeframe is usually two months and ten days (which is the period of time within which a relisting or appeal must be made by). The timescales involved, and late availability of draft legislation, limit the practicality of these cases passing through the normal scrutiny process. The current situation, in relation to NITC and Mr Golparvar, is extremely unusual. At my appearance before the Committee, I suggested that there may be circumstances where we can engage with the Committee, on an informal basis, in cases where the UK was considering supporting a proposal for the relisting of an individual or entity under an EU restrictive measure. Those circumstances would be limited to cases where (a) the annulment of a listing decision by the Court had taken effect and (b) pre-notification of the proposed listing decision had been made to the individual or entity. The reason for this would be that any other situation could result in asset flight as the work of the Committee is a matter of public record. In addition, while I would make best endeavours to work with the Committee, any “informal engagement” that involved the sharing of Council material may require prior consultation with and agreement by the EU Council. Lastly but significantly, it is important to emphasise here that any engagement may be subject to a tight timeframe because of the pace of EU Council business. For all other cases, the timescales involved and late availability of draft legislation, limit the practicality of these cases passing through the normal scrutiny process.

DOES A SEPARATE WHITEHALL PROCESS EXIST FOR MINISTERS TO CERTIFY NON-DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE TO THE SCRUTINY COMMITTEES AND WHAT IS THE RELEVANCE OF COUNCIL CLASSIFICATIONS? There is no separate Whitehall process whereby Ministers could or do certify non-disclosure of evidence. Confidentiality flows from the EU Council and our duty of professional secrecy as a Member State. The evidence underlying a listing may have been provided to the Council by the UK, another Member State or the EEAS. Information gathered and held by the UK will be given a classification in the usual way. Once information is shared with the Council it is held on the Council’s file and becomes a Council document, obtains a Council classification, and the Council collectively decides on its release. This information itself may not be of high classification in terms of Council classifications but Member States are bound by a duty of confidentiality with respect to Council documents unless they have been made publicly available. This is set out in Article 6 of the Council Rules of Procedure.

WHAT TEST DOES THE COUNCIL APPLY TO DETERMINE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE? The Council considers the evidence to support each proposed listing or relisting on a case by case basis, in light of the jurisprudence, to decide whether or not it meets the listing criteria set out in the relevant Council Decisions and Regulations and can be defended in the event of a legal challenge.

ONCE EVIDENCE IS SHARED WITH AN INDIVIDUAL, WHY KEEP IT FROM THIRD PARTIES? There are specific procedures for the Council to share information with the designated individual or entity and the basis on which the Council does so depends on the information in question. A listing proposal, including any analysis and evidence provided in support, is usually only shared on a ‘privileged’ basis, even where it includes open source information. Where there is additional open source evidence, which does not form an integral part of the listing proposal then it may be disclosed to a listed person without any caveat. Such information may be shared more widely. When information is shared by the Council on a ‘privileged’ basis, an express caveat is included to the effect that access is granted only for the purpose of defending the listed person’s interests with regard to the designation. The covering letter expressly states that the information is not being provided on the basis of public access, and that the recipient must not make it public. Sharing information on this ‘privileged’ basis does not override the Member State duty of confidentiality and therefore does not mean that the UK or any other Member State would be entitled to share the information externally.

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DID NITC’S SOLICITORS BREACH EU LEGAL PROHIBITION IN SHARING EVIDENCE WITH THE SCRUTINY COMMITTEE? The Council provided disclosure of the evidence basis for relisting to NITC pursuant to its pre- notification requirements, unique to relistings. The information shared with NITC, comprising the Correspondance Européenne (COREU) from the proposing Member State containing the reasons for listing and supporting open source evidence, was shared on a privileged basis and subject to an express caveat that it was not to be shared beyond their legal advisers. Some additional information on the Council file on NITC was shared without that caveat so has effectively now been made publicly available. NITC’s legal representatives will wish to consider the implications of any disclosure they may have made.

ON WHAT BASIS IS INTERFERENCE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS PROPORTIONATE? In my previous letter to the Committee on this matter, I undertook to provide “a more expansive description of why it is felt that fundamental rights are not breached” in future Explanatory Memoranda. I refer you to the language below, which is the standard text that my officials will include in future Explanatory Memoranda. I hope this offers a more complete explanation. “The procedures for designating individuals [under this Council Decision/Council Regulation/Council Decision and Regulation/ OR under the principal Council Decision/Council Regulation/Council Decision and Regulation] are considered to be compliant with fundamental rights. Provision is made for competent authorities of Member States to authorise the release of frozen funds where necessary in certain circumstances, for example, to satisfy the basic needs of listed persons or their dependents and where necessary for extraordinary expenses. Decisions by competent authorities of Member States in this regard would be subject to challenge in Member States’ courts. In addition, Member States may grant exemptions from the travel ban where travel is justified, inter alia, on the basis of urgent humanitarian need. The principal Decision and Regulation respect fundamental rights, notably the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial and the right to the protection of personal data. The principal Decision and Regulation state that the [Council/Commission] shall provide designated persons and entities with an opportunity to present observations on the reasons for their listing. Where observations are submitted, the EU will review its decision in the light of those observations and inform the person or entity concerned accordingly. In addition, the measures will be kept under review. Furthermore, the Courts of the European Union must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them, ensure the review of the lawfulness of all European Union acts in respect of fundamental rights. Those fundamental rights include respect for the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection.”

NITC FINANCIAL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, REVIEW OF EVIDENCE The decision by the UK, to support the relisting of NITC, was taken in light of all relevant and available evidence provided by the proposing Member State.

MR GOLPARVAR’S EVIDENCE Mr Golparvar’s legal representatives wrote to the Council on 6 and 7 January 2015 providing additional documents for consideration in light of his proposed relisting. The Council responded to Mr Golparvar in a letter dated 16 February 2015, wherein it made clear that the Council “considers that your further observations do not cast doubt on the Council’s assessment” and that Mr Golparvar had been included again on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures.

RECORDING OF SANCTIONS’ DECISIONS Sanctions’ decisions are prepared by a range of departments across the FCO for agreement either by senior officials or Ministers. Individual departments keep records of their decisions, but there is no central register of information bringing all the data together and showing the proportion of decisions taken by Ministers versus senior officials. I hope that the above information answers the questions of the Committees. 4 March 2015 116

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington Thank you for your letter of 4 March. We are grateful for the thoroughness of your response. Our officials will contact the FCO sanctions team in the new Parliament to follow up on some of the points raised in this and previous correspondence with you on Iranian and Syrian relistings. We have considered your explanation of the scrutiny override, but remain disappointed by your decision. Nonetheless, we have decided to now formally clear the document from scrutiny. We intend to send a copy of all our correspondence with you on this matter to the solicitors representing the NITC and Mr Golparvar. As usual, the correspondence will also be published on the Committee’s website in due course. 19 March 2015

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH SUDAN (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing with regard to the Council Decision and Council Regulation concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in South Sudan. These documents provide for the creation of a new sanctions regime imposing restrictive measures against individuals obstructing the peace process. The Council remains seriously concerned about the situation. Following the failure of both sides to fully honour their commitments to cease hostilities and engage in meaningful talks, new measures have been imposed to include travel restrictions and the freezing of funds and economic resources of two listed individuals, one from each side of the conflict. The listing of the two individuals will send a strong message about resolving the conflict through dialogue. The documents also provide for the continuation of an arms embargo on South Sudan, as first implemented in 1994 by Council Decision 94/165/CFSP under the Sudan sanctions regime before South Sudan gained independence. For the sake of clarity, the new Council Decision and Regulation seek to separate the measures concerning South Sudan from previous measures concerning Sudan, and integrate them into a single legal act. I regret that to ensure details of the designations were not made public until after the measures were in place, to mitigate any risk of asset flight, I found myself in the position of having to agree to the adoption of the Council Decision and Regulation before your Committee had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning sanctions is something I take seriously and the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion is regrettably unavoidable. 22 July 2014

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 9 September, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above documents and the reasons given in your accompanying letter for the override of the scrutiny reserve. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that it was reasonable for the Government to proceed without following the usual parliamentary scrutiny procedures, and we are grateful to you for explaining your reasons. On this basis, the Committee agreed to clear the documents from scrutiny. There is no need to reply to this letter unless, of course, you wish to do so. 9 September 2014

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Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing with regard to the EU Council Decision and Council Regulation concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria. Twelve Syrian Government Ministers have been added to the list of designations by the EU. As Government Ministers, they share responsibility for the violent repression of the Syrian civilian population. As detailed in my attached [not printed] Explanatory Memorandum, the situation in Syria continues to be of serious concern. It is therefore important that the UK continues to send a strong message to the Syrian regime that its continued intransigence is unacceptable. The listing of these twelve Syrian regime Ministers signals our determination to step up the pressure on the Assad regime and its key supporters. I regret that to ensure details of these designations were not made public until after the measures were in place, to mitigate the significant risk of asset flight, I found myself in the position of having to agree to the adoption of the Council Decision and Regulation before your Committee had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning Syria sanctions is something I take seriously and the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion was regrettably unavoidable. I wish to make you aware that we also expect to agree further EU designations in the near future, which will again be unable to be released to your Committee until after adoption. My officials will ensure that you have a copy of the amended list once it is made public. 26 June 2014

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 10 July, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above documents and the reasons given in your accompanying letter for the override of the scrutiny reserve. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that it was reasonable for the Government to proceed without following the usual parliamentary scrutiny procedures, and we are grateful to you for explaining your reasons. There is no need to reply to this letter unless, of course, you wish to do so. 10 July 2014

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I regret that to ensure details of these designations were not made public until after the measures were in place, to mitigate the significant risk of asset flight, I found myself in the position of having to agree to the adoption of the Council Decision and Regulation before your Committee had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning Syria sanctions is something I take seriously and the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion was regrettably unavoidable. 29 July 2014

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 9 September, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above documents, which had already been cleared from scrutiny. The Committee also considered your letter of 29 July and the reasons given for the override of the scrutiny reserve. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that it was reasonable for the Government to proceed without following the usual parliamentary scrutiny procedures, and we are grateful to you for explaining your reasons. There is no need to reply to this letter unless, of course, you wish to do so. 9 September 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Chairman I am writing with regard to the Council Decision and Council Regulation concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria. These documents provide for the relisting of the individual Samir Hassan under the EU Syria sanctions regime on the basis of a new statement of reasons, following the judgment of the General Court of the European Union to annul the original designation on 16 July 2014. The Court’s decision to annul the listing was primarily due to the lack of sufficient open-source evidence that the Council could share with the Court to back up the allegations made in the statement of reasons. As detailed in my attached [not printed] Explanatory Memorandum, the policy imperative for listing Hassan remained strong following the Court’s decision to annul the listing: he has substantial political and economic ties with the regime, and has close business links with key regime figures. Hassan’s relisting is now supported by evidence from open sources that can be shared with the Court in the event of challenge. The situation in Syria continues to be of serious concern. It is therefore important that the EU continues to send a strong message to the Syrian regime that its continued intransigence is unacceptable. The re-listing of this individual signals the EU’s determination to step up the pressure on the Assad regime and its key supporters. I regret that due to the time constraints surrounding the date that the annulment was due to take effect, I found myself in the position of having to agree to the adoption of the Council Decision and Regulation before your Committee had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents, in order to avoid the risk of the asset flight. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning sanctions is something I take seriously and the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion is regrettably unavoidable. 9 October 2014

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Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 23 October, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above documents, which will be recorded as an override, and decided to clear them from scrutiny. The policy of re-listing an individual after the General Court has found that the Council was unable to produce any evidence at all to justify the listing is troubling. Mr Hassan may have to wait a number of years before a further appeal will be heard on the re-listing (this appeal took three years), and many would argue that as a consequence he is being unfairly denied an effective remedy. In a number of cases where the General Court has annulled a restrictive measure, such as this one, the Council has been able to issue a revised statement of reasons, which we are told is based on sufficient open- source evidence. As we do not see the evidence, we have to rely on the limited explanation in the Government’s EM as proof of this. In this case, we would be grateful if you could provide us with as much detail as possible on the open- source evidence that supports the revised statement of reasons for the re-listing. We also be grateful to know whether any progress is being made on the possibility of the General Court hearing appeals against targeted sanctions in camera. We look forward to a reply to this letter within the usual ten working days. 23 October 2104

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing with regard to the EU Council Decision and Council Regulation concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria. At the Foreign Affairs Council on 20 October 2014, EU Foreign Ministers agreed the designation of 16 individuals and 2 entities under Syria restrictive measures. The designations include 12 new members of the Syrian Government, individuals and entities involved in the supply of oil to the Syrian Regime, and individuals responsible for grave human rights abuses in Syria. As detailed in my attached [not printed] Explanatory Memorandum, the situation in Syria continues to be of serious concern. I am clear that the cause of instability in Syria is Assad. The only long-term solution to the Syrian conflict, and ISIL, is a negotiated solution. It is therefore important that the EU continues to send a strong message to the Syrian regime that its continued intransigence is unacceptable, and that the Syrian regime must negotiate an end to its brutal war. These new listings signal the EU’s determination to step up the pressure on Assad and those propping up his regime. I regret that to ensure details of these designations were not made public until after the measures were in place, to mitigate the significant risk of asset flight, I found myself in the position of having to agree to the adoption of the Council Decision and Regulation before your Committee had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning Syria sanctions is something I take seriously and the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion was regrettably unavoidable. 24 October 2014

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST SYRIA - COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION IMPLEMENTING DECISION 2013/255/CFSP & COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) NO.36/2012 (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 29 January, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above documents and your EM on them. We regret to say that we concluded that your EM was a further example of a hastily drafted EM on a proposal to re-impose restrictive measures after annulments by the General Court, a matter which we think requires careful consideration. We drew this conclusion for the following reasons:

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— The statement in the EM that “the Court’s main reason for annulment in each case was that the EU Council was unable to provide the Court with sufficient open-source evidence to back up the assertions made in the statement of reasons” gives a misleading impression of the findings of the General Court. In each of the three cases the Court considered open- source information form a variety of sources, but found that in each the open-source information did not provide an evidential link between the individual or entity and the Statement of Reasons. Your EM is silent about whether the new open-source material supporting the relistings provides the necessary links. — Your assertion that the re-imposition of restrictive measures is in accordance with fundamental rights is, again, without any justification. Whilst we understand the political imperative to ensure that a robust sanctions regime remains in place against those supporting the Syrian regime, EU law requires the Council to show that restrictive measures are taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis, and that they take account of the fundamental rights of the individual or entity concerned. We would, therefore, be grateful to know why you conclude that these four relistings are in accordance with fundamental rights. Your answer should explain when each of the four individuals/entities was informed of the relistings; whether they were shown the new open-source evidence supporting the relistings; whether they commented on it; and whether the Council took those comments into account. It should also explain how the new open-source evidence goes further than that considered by the General Court, by proving an evidential link to the Statement of Reasons. Finally, we understand from your officials that these measures have now been adopted, before the Committee even had the chance to consider them. We are disappointed to learn of this override, and would be grateful if you could inform us when these measures were adopted and the reasons why they were not deposited in time to allow proper parliamentary scrutiny. In the meantime, we have decided to retain the documents under scrutiny. 29 January 2015

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 29 January 2015 requesting further information on the the Council’s recent relisting of 3 individuals associated with the Assad regime in Syria; Ayman Jabir, Khalid Qaddur and Mohamed Hamcho; and one entity, Hamcho International. I am writing to address two questions that your Committee posed regarding the aforementioned instruments: whether the relistings are in accordance with fundamental rights and why the documents were not deposited in time to allow for proper parliamentary scrutiny. I have also addressed the issues you raise about the factual basis for the relistings.

EVIDENCE The Committee has asked for an explanation as to how the new open-source evidence goes further than that considered by the General Court. The EU General Court annulled the listings of Mohamed Hamcho and Hamcho International from EU Syria restrictive measures on 13 November 2014 and those of Ayman Jabir and Khalid Kaddour on 17 November 2014. The Court suspended the effects of the annulment until the expiry of a 2-month and 10 day appeal period, meaning the annulment would not take effect until 28 January 2015, at which time any assets held in the EU would be unfrozen. It has been accepted by the EU Courts that, where listings are annulled, the Council may remedy the infringements established by adopting, if appropriate, new restrictive measures against the individuals or entitles. These are cases where the Council considered the adoption of new measures to be appropriate. The Council agreed on 11 December that there was a new evidential basis for relisting under revised statements of reason and that the evidential basis was sufficiently robust. This was a position the Council was entitled to take. Unfortunately the evidence supporting a listing or relisting, although it may be open-source, is not made publicly available. The reasons for the Government’s position on this were elaborated in a letter to your Committee regarding the relisting of NITC and Mr Golparvar under the Iran sanctions regime on 4 February 2015. 121

It is with regret that I am therefore not in a position to share the evidence with the Parliamentary Scrutiny Committees or to explain how it goes further than that considered by the General Court. However I can confirm that the Council does not take relisting decisions lightly. The material relied upon to support the relisting was available to all Member States for scrutiny. In these cases there was a significant amount of open source material and it is our view that this met the legal threshold for the listing criteria.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS The Committee has further asked why I have concluded that the relistings are in accordance with fundamental rights. I am satisfied that the procedures for the relistings respected the fundamental rights of those affected. In particular, the individuals and entity concerned were given the opportunity to present observations related to the proposal for their relisting. On 18 December, the Council agreed letters notifying the individuals and entity of its intention to relist them under EU Syria restrictive measures, and gave them an opportunity to seek further detail on why they were being relisted and make any observations to the Council. The Council shares open-source evidence with designated individuals or entities, upon request, in order to address their fundamental right of defence. Depending on the type of disclosure given, an individual or entity may not be entitled to share the material beyond their legal representatives. I have written to you in more detail on this point in my letter of 4 February. The individuals and entity submitted observations on the Council’s decision to relist within the 3 week timeframe for doing so. These were considered by the Council on 22 January 2015 but no evidence was provided that altered the Council’s decision to relist. There are further protections of fundamental rights in the principal Council Decision and Regulations, which apply to the listings. In particular, provision is made for competent authorities of Member States to authorise the release of frozen funds where necessary in certain circumstances, for example to satisfy the basic needs of listed persons or their dependents or where necessary for extraordinary expenses. Decisions by competent authorities of Member States in this regard would be subject to challenge in Member States’ courts. In addition, the principal Council Decision and Regulations provide that the measures must be kept under review. Furthermore, the Courts of the European Union must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them, ensure the review of the lawfulness of all European Union acts in respect of fundamental rights. Those fundamental rights include respect for the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection.

SCRUTINY It is not unusual for the decision to relist an individual or entity to be the subject of a scrutiny override. This may be due to time pressures (often dictated by EU business) involved in negotiating and adopting a revised Statement of Reasons, which will also need to be supported by evidence for the relisting. In this case, it was important to re-impose sanctions before the funds were unfrozen. The Syrian regime relies on the support of individuals and entities such as these to continue its brutal war on the Syrian people. There was a risk that any funds which were held, once unfrozen, would be at the disposal of the regime. You have asked when the measures were adopted and why there was not time for proper parliamentary scrutiny beforehand. The measures were submitted for scrutiny on 15 January and were adopted by written procedure on 26 January 2014. We did therefore endeavour to give both Committees the time to scrutinise the documents, and the Commons Committee was able to scrutinise before adoption. Unfortunately, a Council Decision and Regulation were not drafted until late in the relisting process. In this instance we did not receive draft legal texts until 14 January. This therefore gave very little time in which to adopt the legal documents before the annulment took effect on 28 January. Regrettably, I therefore had to agree to the adoption of this Council Decision and Implementing Regulation before your Committee had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning Syria sanctions is something I take seriously and the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion was regrettably unavoidable.

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26 February 2015

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing with regard to the attached EU Council Decision and Council Regulation concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria. On 6 March 2015, the EU Council agreed the designation of 7 individuals and 6 entities under Syria restrictive measures. The new designations target individuals and entities supplying oil to the Syrian regime, those involved in chemical weapons use and production, and prominent Syrian businessmen and regime officials. The policy imperative for listing these individuals and entities is high. Each provides substantial financial and material support to the Syrian regime or is closely associated with those that do. By adding them to the EU sanctions list we continue to limit their ability to provide support to Assad and further isolate his brutal regime. However, in order to ensure that details of these designations were not made public before they entered into force, I agreed to the adoption of the Council Decision and Regulation before your Committee had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. This was regrettable, but as I have discussed with your Committee previously, a necessary step in order to mitigate the risk of asset flight on this occasion. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning Syria sanctions is something I take seriously and the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion was regrettably unavoidable. 10 March 2015

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP Thank you for your letter of 26 February. We are grateful for the thoroughness of your response. Our officials will contact the FCO sanctions team in the new Parliament to follow up on some of the points raised in this and previous correspondence with you on Iranian and Syrian relistings. We remind you again of our concern that the engagement of fundamental rights in the listing and relisting processes under EU sanctions should be properly analysed in future EMs. We now formally clear the document from scrutiny. We do not expect a reply to this letter unless, of course, you wish to do so. 19 March 2015

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST UKRAINE (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing with regard to the EU Council Decision and Council Regulation concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Ukraine. On 28 November 2014, the EU Council agreed the designation of 13 individuals and 5 entities under Ukraine restrictive measures. These measures focus on individuals and entities involved in the holding of “presidential and parliamentary elections” in Donetsk and Luhansk, which are illegal and illegitimate, and the aim of which was to further destabilise Ukraine. As detailed in my attached [not printed] Explanatory Memorandum, the crisis in Ukraine is of continued concern to the UK Government. The ceasefire agreed in Minsk has been breached multiple times. It is vital that all parties implement the ceasefire fully without delay and without further loss of life, and that decisive measures are taken to de-escalate tensions and engage constructively with the Government of Ukraine. The illegal elections held in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine on 2 November served only to destabilise further the situation on the ground. The individuals and entities listed in the EU Regulation and Council Decision were all designated because of their close involvement in the conduct of the 2 November elections.

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In order to ensure that details of these designations were not made public before they entered into force, which creates a risk of asset flight, I agreed to the adoption of the Council Decision and Regulation before your Committee had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. This was regrettable, but a necessary step in order to mitigate the significant risk of asset flight. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning Ukraine sanctions is something I take seriously and the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion was regrettably unavoidable. 12 December 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing with regard to the EU Council Decision and Council Implementing Regulation concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine. These restrictive measures were first adopted in March 2014, and needed to be renewed before 6 March 2015. You will recall that I wrote to you on 2 February explaining that the Council had adopted a new Council Decision and Council Regulation that sought to clarify the criteria to be met before an individual can be identified as being responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds. This amendment to the criteria had to be adopted at short notice, so that the wider review of the whole measures could be concluded to allow adoption of new legal documents by the 6 March renewal date. There were lengthy discussions amongst EU Member States after 2 February on the review of these measures. As you will have seen from my Explanatory Memorandum dated 2nd March, these discussions led to a package of changes to the current listings: four individuals were removed from the annex of listed persons; and a further four individuals became subject to a shorter rollover of 3 months. Due to the length of these discussions, the first drafts of a Council Decision and Council Regulation covering this renewal and the amendments were only circulated to EU Partners on 25 February. I subsequently found myself in the position of having to agree to the adoption of these documents on 5 March, before your Committee had had an opportunity to complete your scrutiny of the documents. Any delay in adoption would have resulted in the entire package of measures, and the asset freezes set in place by them, falling away. Your Committee has previously expressed concern that renewals of this type are not considered earlier in the EU, reducing the possibility of the documents being scrutinised. This is something I take seriously and I have instructed my officials to continue to raise these concerns with colleagues in the EU. 9 March 2015

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing with regard to the attached [not printed] EU Council Decision and Council Regulation concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Ukraine. These measures were first adopted on 16 March 2014, and needed to be renewed before 16 March 2015. On 29 January 2015 the Foreign Affairs Council at an extraordinary meeting agreed that EU restrictive measures in respect of Ukraine should be renewed for a further six months. This was part of the EU’s response to the increase in violence in January 2015, including the separatist shelling of civilians in Mariupol and assault on Debaltseve (which was subsequently captured) and was agreed in order to sustain the pressure on Russia and the separatists to fulfil their commitments under the Minsk agreements. The Council reviewed the individual designations as part of the renewal process and decided that the entries for fifty persons should be amended. These amendments ensure the statement of reasons and identifying information for each individual remains accurate and up to date. One individual was delisted. Unfortunately, due to the length of these discussions, and the requirement to pre-notify individuals where changes to their listings have occurred, the first drafts of the Council Decision and Council Regulation were only circulated to EU Partners on 3 March. These drafts were then revised on 6 March.

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I therefore found myself in the position of having to agree to the adoption of these documents on 13 March, before your Committee had had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. Any delay in adoption would have resulted in the entire package of measures falling away. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning Ukraine sanctions is something I take seriously but unfortunately the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion was regrettably unavoidable. 18 March 2015

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST ZIMBABWE (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing about the EU Council Decision and Commission Implementing Regulation concerning Restrictive Measures against Zimbabwe. These documents were published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 20 February 2015, having been subject to a Ministerial override. I attach the Explanatory memorandum. This letter sets out why the use of an override was necessary in this case. EU Restrictive Measures against Zimbabwe were due to expire on 20 February 2015 unless an extension was adopted before that date. Unfortunately, draft Council documents were not available in time to allow for Parliamentary Scrutiny ahead of the 20 February deadline. Allowing measures to expire would seriously undermine the effectiveness of the sanctions regime, and risk asset flight from previously frozen bank accounts in the EU. On 4 February, the EU’s Political and Security Committee agreed to a full 12 month rollover of the EU’s Restrictive Measures against Zimbabwe. This agreement continues: i) asset freezes and travel bans against President Mugabe, the First Lady and one entity, Zimbabwe Defence Industries; ii) an arms embargo; and iii) suspended asset freezes and travel bans against a further 84 individuals and 8 entities. It was also agreed that five deceased individuals would be removed from the suspended listings. This was an excellent result and met all of our policy objectives. On 12 February, a draft Council Decision to this effect was circulated to Member States for discussion. The Decision was officially adopted by written procedure on 19 February. Ideally the draft Council Decision would have been available several weeks earlier, to allow the UK to undertake the normal scrutiny process. In ESC Report 35761-35762 the Scrutiny Committee expressed their concern that the 2014 Restrictive Measures annual review had “come down to the wire”, and asked that this situation not be repeated. Sharing your concerns, I wrote to High Representative Federica Mogherini in December 2014 to highlight the importance of early publication of documents to allow adequate time for scrutiny to take place. Negotiations in Brussels, on the annual review of Restrictive Measures, were primarily based on a Harare Heads of Mission’s report. Drafting of this report commenced in early December but was only finalised on 10 January. Earlier completion was not feasible as Heads of Mission needed to take account of ZANU-PF’s (five yearly) Party Congress in December and the significant political upheaval that followed. This included the purge of 16 Ministers and elevation of Grace Mugabe to the Politburo. A report that failed to take account of these issues would not have been a sound basis for discussions in Brussels. Despite UK officials engaging other Member States on the review at the earliest opportunity, many Member States were unable to confirm their respective positions until late January. Given the wide range of views held by Member States, and the fact that any extension of the Measures required unanimous agreement of all 28 Member States, discussions took a number of weeks before agreement was reached. Failure to reach a unanimous agreement would have resulted in all the Measures lapsing on 20 February. The UK worked hard to secure the best outcome for continuation of sanctions listings, including lobbying at the highest level. As a result, obtaining draft Council documents in a timelier manner was not possible. Ministerial scrutiny override was regrettably unavoidable in this case. While I think, given the timescales involved, an override was necessary, I also believe that the FCO should have sent you an Explanatory Memorandum earlier and I apologise for the fact that this was not done. 5 March 2015 125

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing with regard to the EU Council Decision and Council Regulation concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine. As detailed in the attached [not printed] Explanatory Memorandum, the Council has sought to provide further clarification of the criteria that need to be met before an individual is identified as being responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian State funds and can be listed under these measures. A Council Decision and Council Regulation have been adopted that make amendments to the designation criteria These restrictive measures, first adopted in March 2014, are currently under review and will need to be renewed before 5 March. To ensure that the listings of those targeted by these measures remain robust, all individuals who meet the amended criteria will need to be re-listed. Because of the legal requirement that individuals are notified of their relisting ahead of the renewal of the measures, and to ensure they are provided adequate time to make any representations against their re-listing, it has been necessary to adopt this Council Decision and Council Regulation at short notice. If prompt action had not been taken, it might have been impossible to re-list any of the 22 individuals before the current measures expire, and any assets currently frozen under those measures would have been released. I therefore regret that I found myself in the position of having had to agree to the adoption of these Council Decisions and Council Regulations before your Committee had had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. Your Committee has previously expressed concern that renewals of this type are not considered earlier in the EU, reducing the possibility of the documents being scrutinised. This is something I take seriously and I have instructed my officials to continue to raise these concerns with colleagues in the EU. In this case we only received the draft documents in mid-January and the need to override scrutiny was regrettably unavoidable. 2 February 2015

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 26 February, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above documents and the reasons given in your letter for the override of the scrutiny reserve. We are grateful to you for explaining your reasons. In the circumstances, we consider it reasonable for the Government to have proceeded without following the usual parliamentary scrutiny procedure. We have now formally cleared the documents from scrutiny. 26 February 2015

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing with regard to the attached [not printed] EU Council Decision and Council Regulation concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Ukraine. 126

On 9 February 2015, the EU Foreign Affairs Council agreed the designation of 19 individuals and 9 entities under Ukraine restrictive measures. These measures target individuals and entities involved in repeated violations of the Minsk ceasefire agreements and those whose aim is to further destabilise Ukraine. As detailed in my attached [not printed] Explanatory Memorandum, the crisis in Ukraine is of continued concern to the Government. The September 2014 Minsk agreement was breached multiple times, most acutely in January when the civilian population in Mariupol were shelled by Russian-backed separatists and a major separatist offensive was launched against Debaltseve. These additional measures are an appropriate and necessary response to that escalation. It is vital that all parties fully implement the ceasefire agreed in Minsk on 12 February without delay and without further loss of life, and that decisive measures are taken to de-escalate tensions and engage constructively with the Government of Ukraine. We have been consistently clear that we will not lift sanctions before Russia complies with Minsk fully and completely, and that if the situation deteriorates further we will look at adding more sanctions. In order to ensure that details of these designations were not made public before they entered into force, I agreed to the adoption of the Council Decision and Regulation before your Committee had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. This was regrettable, but a necessary step in order to mitigate the significant risk of asset flight. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning Ukraine sanctions is something I take seriously and the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion was regrettably unavoidable. 25 February 2015

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 12 March, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above documents and the reasons given in your Explanatory Memorandum and letter for the override of the scrutiny reserve. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that it was reasonable for the Government to proceed without following the usual parliamentary scrutiny procedures, and we are grateful to you for explaining your reasons. There is no need to reply to this letter unless, of course, you wish to do so. 12 March 2015

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN RESPECT OF ACTION UNDERMINING OR THREATENING THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE - COUNCIL DECISION 2014/265/CFSP OF 12 MAY 2014 AMENDING DECISION 2014/145/CFSP (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office The documents listed above were cleared at the Chairman’s sift on 3 June 2014. At its meeting of 12 June, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the documents and the reasons given in the Explanatory Memoranda for the override of the scrutiny reserve. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that it was reasonable for the Government to proceed without following the usual parliamentary scrutiny procedures, and we are grateful to you for explaining your reasons. There is no need to reply to this letter unless, of course, you wish to do so. 12 June 2014

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RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN RESPECT OF ACTION UNDERMINING OR THREATENING THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE - COUNCIL DECISION 2014/265/CFSP OF 12 MAY 2014 AMENDING DECISION 2014/145/CFSP (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 16 October, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the documents and the reasons given for the override of the scrutiny reserve. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that it was reasonable for the Government to proceed without following the usual parliamentary scrutiny procedures, and we are grateful to you for explaining your reasons. 16 October 2014

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integrity to 72. There remain two confiscated entities in Crimea and Sevastopol subject to the asset freeze under these sanctions. The 11 people are:- — Aleksandr Yurevich BORODAI - So called ‘Prime Minister of People's Republic of Donetsk’. Responsible for the separatist ‘governmental’ activities of the so called ‘government of the Donetsk People's Republic’ (e.g. on 8 July stated ‘our military is conducting a special operation against the Ukrainian “fascists”’), Signatory of the Memorandum of Understanding on ‘Novorossiya union’. — Alexander KHODAKOVSKY - So called ‘Minister of Security of People's Republic of Donetsk’. Responsible for the separatist security activities of the so called ‘government of the Donetsk People's Republic’. — Alexandr Aleksandrovich KALYUSSKY - So called ‘de facto Deputy Prime Minister for Social Affairs of DPR’. Responsible for the separatist ‘governmental’ activities of the so called ‘government of the Donetsk People's Republic’. — Alexander KHRYAKOV - So called ‘Information and Mass Communications Minister of DPR’. Responsible for the pro-separatist propaganda activities of the so called ‘government of the Donetsk People's Republic’. — Marat BASHIROV - So called ‘Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers of the People' s Republic of Luhansk, confirmed on 8 Jul’. Responsible for the separatist ‘governmental’ activities of the so called ‘government of the People's Republic of Luhansk’. — Vasyl NIKITIN - So called ‘Vice Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Luhansk’, (used to be the so called ‘Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Luhansk’, and former spokesman of the ‘Army of the Southeast’). Responsible for the separatist ‘governmental’ activities of the so called ‘government of the People's Republic of Luhansk’ Responsible for the statement of the Army of the Southeast that the Ukrainian presidential elections in the ‘People's Republic of Luhansk’ cannot take place due to the ‘new’ status of the region. — Aleksey KARYAKIN - So called ‘Supreme Council Chair of the People's Republic of Luhansk’. Responsible for the separatist ‘governmental’ activities of the ‘Supreme Council’, responsible for asking the Russian Federation to recognize the independence of ‘People' s Republic of Luhansk’ Signatory of the Memorandum of Understanding on the ‘Novorossiya union’. — Yurij IVAKIN - So called ‘Minister of Internal Affairs of the People's Republic of Luhansk’. Responsible for the separatist ‘governmental’ activities of the so called ‘government of the People s Republic of Luhansk’. — Igor PLOTNITSKY - So called ‘Defence Minister of the People's Republic of Luhansk’. Responsible for the separatist ‘governmental’ activities of the so called ‘government of the People's Republic of Luhansk’. — Nikolay KOZITSYN - Commander of Cossack forces. Responsible for commanding separatists in Eastern Ukraine fighting against the Ukrainian government forces. — Oleksiy MOZGOVY - One of the leaders of armed groups in Eastern Ukraine. Responsible for training separatists to fight against the Ukrainian government forces. Each person has two months in which to challenge his listing in the European Court, and may apply to the Council of the EU for exceptions to the asset freeze (licences) and for reconsideration of the decision to include them. I regret that due to the fast-moving pace of events on the ground in Ukraine and the need to agree further sanctions at short notice, I find myself in the position of having to agree to the adoption of

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these Council Decisions and Regulations before your Committee has had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning Ukraine sanctions is something I take seriously and the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion is regrettably unavoidable. 18 July 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing with regard to the Council Decision and Council Regulation concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Ukraine. These documents expand the listing criteria under which individuals and entities can be listed under Ukraine restrictive measures and entered into force on 19 July 2014. The listing criteria have been expanded in line with European Council Conclusions, which instructed the EU to “expand the restrictive measures, with a view to targeting entities, including from the Russian Federation, that are materially or financially supporting actions undermining or threatening Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.” Previously the measures only provided for the listing of individuals under this part of the criteria. In addition to expanding the listing criteria, the criteria was restructured and split into sub-criteria for greater ease of reading and interpretation. I regret that due to the fast-moving pace of events on the ground in Ukraine and the need to agree further sanctions at short notice, I find myself in the position of having to agree to the adoption of this Council Decision and Regulation before your Committee has had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning Ukraine sanctions is something I take seriously and the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion is regrettably unavoidable. I wish to make you aware of additional EU designations expected in the near future. At the time of writing, no additional designations under these criteria have been agreed. However, the Foreign Affairs Council reconvened on 22 July 2014 and therefore it is anticipated that further additions to Ukraine restrictive measures will be agreed over the coming weeks and months which will be unable to be released to your Committee until after adoption. My officials will ensure that you have a copy of the amended list once it is made public. 28 July 2014

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 9 September, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above documents and the reasons given in your Explanatory Memoranda and letters for the overrides of the scrutiny reserve. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that it was reasonable for the Government to proceed in all of the above cases without following the usual parliamentary scrutiny procedures, and we are grateful to you for explaining your reasons. There is no need to reply to this letter unless, of course, you wish to do so. 9 September 2014

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN VIEW OF RUSSIA’S ACTIONS DESTABILISING THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE - COUNCIL DECISION 2014/512/CFSP OF 31 JULY 2014 (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing with regard to the abovementioned Council Regulations, Implementing Regulation and Decisions concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Ukraine.

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TIER TWO SANCTIONS In view of the gravity of the situation in the Ukraine, the Council adopted Council Decision 2014/658/CFSP, Council Regulation 959/2014 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 961/2014 on 8 September 2014, expanding the listing criteria of the EU Ukraine sanctions regime, subjecting an additional 24 individuals to ‘Tier 2’ asset freeze and travel ban measures, and extending the effect of these measures for a further 6 months until 15 march 2015. These measures were published and took effect on 12 September 2014, following a period of consideration by EU Member States regarding the progress of a ceasefire agreement in Eastern Ukraine. Following the expansion of the listing criteria on 8 September 2014 (to include category five below), the regime now targets persons in the following categories:

1) Those responsible for, actively supporting or implementing, actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine, or which obstruct the work of international organisations in Ukraine, and natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them;

2) Legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine;

3) Legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine;

4) Natural or legal persons, entities or bodies actively supporting, materially or financially, or benefiting from, Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine.

5) Natural persons conducting transactions with the separatist groups in the Donbass region of Ukraine.

Criterion five was added following the specific tasking of the Conclusions of the European Council of 30 August, for “the Commission to include in its proposal a provision on the basis of which every person and institution dealing with the separatist groups in the Donbass will be listed”.

THE 24 INDIVIDUALS LISTED ON 8 SEPTEMBER ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1. Alexander ZAKHARCHENKO: “Prime Minister” of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”.

2. Vladimir KONONOV, aka “Tsar”: the new “Defence Minister” of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”.

3. Miroslav Vladimirovich RUDENKO: Commander of the Donbass People’s Militia.

4. Gennadiy Nikolaiovych TSYPKALOV: “Prime Minister” of the so-called “Lugansk People’s Republic”.

5. Andrey Yurevich PINCHUK: “State Security Minister” of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”.

6. Oleg BEREZA: “Internal Affairs Minister” of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”.

7. Andrei Nikolaevich RODKIN: Moscow Representative of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”.

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8. Aleksandr KARAMAN: “Deputy Prime Minister for Social Issues” of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”.

9. Georgiy L'vovich MURADOV, Deputy Prime Minister of Crimea and Plenipotentiary Representative of Crimea to President Putin.

10. Mikhail Sergeyevich SHEREMET, aka Mikhail Sergeevich SHEREMET: First Deputy Prime Minister of Crimea

11. Yuri Leonidiovich VOROBIOV: Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation.

12. Vladimir Volfovich ZHIRINOVSKY: Member of the Council of the State Duma.

13. Vladimir Abdualievich VASILYEV (aka Vladimir Abdualiyevich VASILIEV, Vladimir Abdualievich VASILIYEV, Vladimir Abdualievich VASILEV): Deputy Speaker, State Duma

14. Viktor Petrovich VODOLATSKY: Chairman of the Union of the Russian Foreign Cossack Forces.

15. Leonid Ivanovich KALASHNIKOV: First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, State Duma

16. Vladimir Stepanovich NIKITIN: First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Relations with CIS Countries, Eurasian Integration and Links with Compatriots, State Duma

17. Oleg Vladimirovich LEBEDEV: First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Relations with CIS Countries, Eurasian Integration and Links with Compatriots, State Duma

18. Ivan Ivanovich MELNIKOV (aka Ivan Ivanovych MELNIKOV): First Deputy Speaker, State Duma

19. Igor Vladimirovich LEBEDEV (aka Igor Vladimirovych LEBEDEV): Deputy Speaker, State Duma

20. Nikolai Vladimirovich LEVICHEV (aka Nikolay Vladimirovich LEVICHEV, Nikolai Vladimirovych LEVICHEV: Deputy Speaker, State Duma

21. Svetlana Sergeevna ZHUROVA (aka Svetlana Sergeyenva ZHUROVA): First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, State Duma

22. Aleksey Vasilevich NAUMETS: Major-general of the Russian Army.

23. Sergey Viktorovich CHEMEZOV (aka Sergei Viktorovich CHEMEZOV): Chairman of Rostec

24. Alexander Mikhailovich BABAKOV: State Duma Deputy, Chair of the State Duma Commission on Legislative Provisions for Development of the Military Industrial Complex of the Russian Federation.

Each person or entity has two months in which to challenge their listing in the European Court, and may apply to the Council of the EU for exceptions to the asset freeze (licences) and for reconsideration of the decision to include them.

TIER THREE SANCTIONS In addition to the expansion of tier two sanctions set out above, on 8 September an expansion of the previous package of economic sanctions measures against Russia was formally adopted (‘tier three’ measures). The relevant instruments are Council Decision 2014/659/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No.960/2014 of 8 September 2014. The sanctions came into effect on 12 September 2014 and, 132

in line with the first round of tier three measures, will remain in place until 31 July 2015. There will be an initial review of such measures no later than 31 October 2014. With effect from 1 August 2014, the EU had already agreed a measure to prevent five state owned Russian Banks and their subsidiaries from accessing EU primary and secondary capital markets. In practice this means these banks will be unable to purchase, sell, or receive brokering for new transferable securities such as bonds and shares and money-market instruments such as treasury bills. In addition to previous tier three measures, the recent Regulation provides for further restrictions on access to the EU’s capital markets for Russia’s largest state-owned banks: — The five targeted banks are now preventing from accessing all types of loans, another way to limit their access to financing. The only exception to this measure concerns trade financing. — The EU has also limited the banks’ access to short-term financing by only permitting financing with a maturity of 30-days or less (down from the previous 90-day limit). — The package also extends these measure to other sectors; specifically three major entities in the oil sector, and three in the defence sector. These entities now also have major restrictions on access to the EU’s capital markets:

OIL: — ROSNEFT; — TRANSNEFT; — GAZPROM NEFT.

DEFENCE: — OPK OBORONPROM; — UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION; — URALVAGONZAVOD. Furthermore, previous tier three measures (1 August 2014) preventing the export, or financing of supply, of dual-use goods for military use or to military end users in Russia have now been extended to a list of non-military entities in Russia, with an exception for aeronautical products. Similarly, previous restrictions on the export of sensitive technologies in the deep water, shale and Arctic oil sectors have been tightened. From 12 September 2014, it shall be prohibited to provide services associated with these activities (drilling, well testing, logging and completion services, or the supply of specialised floating vessels). This measure applies only to new provision of such services; existing agreements are not covered. These measures will further ensure that the EU plays no inadvertent role in facilitating the supply of goods which could contribute to Russia’s efforts to support separatists in the Ukraine. The areas of the embargo targeting provision of services to shale gas projects and oil exploration & production will ensure that the long-term development of Russia’s oil sector is further slowed by the denial of vital technology from the EU and other countries imposing similar measures. The expansion of financial measures is designed to raise the cost of borrowing in Russia, for state corporations, including those involved in the provision of arms to actors in the conflict in Ukraine. Although the full practical impact of these measures and listings cannot yet be assessed, as a whole they send the message that the UK and the EU will not accept the efforts of Russia to destabilise and undermine the sovereignty of the Ukraine. I regret that due to the fast-moving pace of events on the ground in Ukraine and the need to agree further sanctions at short notice, I find myself in the position of having had to agree to the adoption of these Council Decisions and Regulations before your Committee has had an opportunity to scrutinise the documents.

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As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning Ukraine sanctions is something I take seriously and the need for the override of scrutiny on these occasions was regrettably unavoidable. 25 September 2014

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN VIEW OF RUSSIA’S ACTIONS DESTABILISING THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE - COUNCIL DECISION 2014/512/CFSP OF 31 JULY 2014 (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 9 September, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the documents and the reasons given for the override of the scrutiny reserve. In the circumstances, the Committee considers that it was reasonable for the Government to proceed without following the usual parliamentary scrutiny procedures, and we are grateful to you for explaining your reasons. However, we do have some questions on the substance of the restrictive measures and would be grateful for your views. We note that the more expansive wording of “sale, supply, transfer or export” which occur in the Council Decision and Regulation. Are we right to understand that those terms can be interpreted differently by Member States? Can you clarify what interpretation HMG will choose – a strict interpretation which means that any commercial activity inside the UK, inside the EU and export to outside the EU will be caught by the prohibition or will it simply mean export from the EU? Will the individual interpretation be the responsibility of national authorities or will the Commission have a role in ensuring consistency across the EU? On the matter of prior authorisation for gas and oil exports to be secured from the competent authority, are there already the necessary measures and structures in place to facilitate that prior authorisation? If not, it occurs to us that there might be an additionally chilling effect as companies wait for the necessary procedures to be clarified. We look forward to your reply in the usual ten working days. 9 September 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I am writing in response to your letter of 9 September 2014, following up on the questions you have raised in your letter. You have asked several questions regarding the use of ‘sale, supply, transfer or export’ and regarding the need for prior authorisation for oil and gas exports. Since your letter, the EU has adopted a further round of restrictive measures. A separate EM on these restrictive measures has been submitted to your Committee. For completeness, I have referred to these additional measures where relevant in my reply below.

‘SALE, SUPPLY, TRANSFER OR EXPORT’ ‘Sale, supply, transfer or export’ appears in Article 2 and Article 3 of the Council Regulation and prohibits the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use goods and technology to military end-users. In addition, since the original Council Regulation was agreed, an additional Article 2a has been added to the restrictive measures. This prohibits the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual use goods and technology to a list of companies included in Annex IV in the Regulation.

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You ask whether these terms can be interpreted differently by Member States, and how HMG will interpret these terms. ‘Export’ is defined in EU Customs law and essentially means the removal of EU goods from the customs territory of the Union. In our view the other terms apply to activities other than ‘export’ and are fairly straightforward to interpret. Indeed they have been used widely across other sanctions regimes in the past. It is of course possible that other Member States might interpret these terms differently, however, a mechanism has been created in Brussels for Member States to discuss questions of interpretation and implementation to reduce the scope for divergence.

PRIOR AUTHORISATION FOR GAS AND OIL EXPORTS Article 3 of the Regulation refers to the requirement for prior authorisation for the ‘sale, supply, transfer or export’ of ‘certain technologies suited to the oil industry for use in deep water oil exploration and production, Arctic oil exploration and production, or shale oil projects in Russia’. You ask whether there are already the measures and structures in place to facilitate the prior authorisation, and whether there might be an additional chilling effect whilst companies wait for the procedures to be clarified. Applications for prior authorisation are to be made via the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’ (BIS) SPIRE export licensing system, as is already in use on other export licensing regimes such as those for military and dual-use items. Many exporters will be familiar with this system. In addition BIS issued initial guidance on the new sanctions on 5 August, which was updated on 14 August and 12 September, and this includes instructions on how to make applications. Therefore we do not anticipate a further chilling effect created by lack of clarity. I hope this has fully answered your questions. My officials are available to answer any further questions you may have on any of the Ukraine restrictive measures. 25 September 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing with regard to EU Council Decision 2014/872/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No.1290/2014, concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. On 4 December 2014, the EU Council adopted the above-named Decision and Regulation, amending Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No.833/2014 of 31 July 2014 which imposed a number of sectoral sanctions against Russian entities. These included an arms embargo, ban on the supply of equipment and services to Russian deep water, Arctic and shale oil exploration and production projects, and a ban on Russian access to certain EU financial instruments and services. The new amendments provide clarity and legal certainty to these restrictive measures. This will give the suppliers of goods and services, across the EU, the clarity they need to make informed decisions about how and when they can conduct business with Russian end-users. The amendments are not designed to create new obligations for business, and do not change the strength or scope of the sanctions regime. Unfortunately ongoing discussions in Brussels meant the draft Council Decision and Council Regulation underwent several revisions and suffered delays as a result. I regret that due to the importance of clarifying these measures and minimising the risk of litigation, I was unable to delay further the adoption of the Council Decision and Regulation in order to give your Committee an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. As you know, the responsibility to keep your Committee informed on issues concerning Russia/Ukraine sanctions is something I take seriously and the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion was regrettably unavoidable. 15 December 2014

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Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP At its meeting of 15 January, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered the above documents and the reasons given in your letters for the override of the scrutiny reserve. We are grateful to you for explaining your reasons. In the case of Council Decision 2014/855/CFSP of 28 November and the accompanying Council Regulation, the Committee considers that it was reasonable for the Government to proceed without following the usual parliamentary scrutiny procedure. However, in the case of Council Decision 2014/872/CFSP and its accompanying Regulation, the Committee would be grateful to know the reasons for which a draft version of the documents could not have been shared with the Committee before 4 December. You do not suggest that they were confidential. Nor is it clear what you mean when you say that “the importance of clarifying these measures and minimising the risk of litigation” meant that their adoption could not be delayed. We would be grateful if you could provide further clarification on these points. 15 January 2015

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 15 January 2015 regarding restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. In the letter, you ask for the reason why draft versions of the aforementioned documents could not have been shared with the Committee before adoption, and what the specific threat of litigation was that the Council was seeking to guard against via swift adoption of the texts. As outlined in my Explanatory Memorandum, the restrictive measures were agreed at very short notice in July and September 2014. Subsequent engagement with economic operators identified a number of areas where further clarification would help to ensure the consistent application of the measures across the EU. This became the basis for EU Council discussions. The areas where further clarification was required were discussed over a number of months in the EU Council. Part of the negotiations involved agreeing which areas could be clarified by Commission guidance (published on 16 December 2014: http://europa.eu/newsroom/files/pdf/c_2014_9950_en.pdf), and which areas would benefit from clarification in legal instruments. Although the negotiations themselves took a significant amount of time, a draft Council Decision and a draft Council Regulation were only circulated to the EU Council for consideration on 21 November 2014. The documents were placed under an EU silence procedure on 01 December 2014 and were adopted on 04 December 2014. Thus there was only one week between the UK receiving a copy of the draft documents and the EU Council agreeing the texts. Given the potential impact on economic operators of the EU texts, it was considered necessary to avoid the draft texts from becoming public before their adoption (hence the decision not to share these documents with the Committee at that stage). Making these texts public before they had been agreed may have created uncertainty and confusion within the private sector. Additionally, it was felt that it would be more useful for the Committee to receive the final version of the text with our explanation of the contents, rather than an interim copy which was still subject to change in the negotiations. Once agreement within the Council had been reached on the texts, it was imperative that the measures were adopted as soon as possible. This was in order to give businesses across the EU the additional clarity they needed to make informed decisions about how and when they conduct business with Russian end-users. Without this, there was a risk that EU operators would not have sufficient certainty in all cases that they were complying with the terms of the Regulation, and that the competent authorities of the Member States could be left exposed to legal challenge, where measures were not adequately defined. It is in the public domain that Rosneft, a Russian entity subject to these restrictive measures, has challenged the validity of the EU Regulation in the General Court of the EU and has launched a Judicial Review in the High Court against the UK Government’s implementation of the Regulation, in both cases citing a lack of certainty over the meaning of certain terms used in the Regulation as one of the grounds of challenge. The existence of this legal action contributed both to our desire to see the measures adopted as quickly as possible, and the decision not to share a draft copy of the EU texts before they had been adopted. 28 January 2015

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TRADE IN CERTAIN GOODS WHICH COULD BE USED FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, TORTURE OR OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (6083/14)

Letter from Matthew Hancock MP, Minister for Skills and Enterprise, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, to the Chairman In retaining this document under scrutiny, the Committee asked to be kept informed on the progress of negotiations in relation to a proposal to prohibit the brokering of goods that are banned for export and import under Regulation 1236/2005. The Committee asked the Government to take a robust line so that our existing UK brokering controls are not weakened by this proposal. I am pleased to be able to provide you with an update in my capacity as the Minister with responsibility for export controls. These proposals were discussed in a number of meetings at the relevant Working Party (Trade Questions) at the Council of the EU throughout 2014 but progress was slow and piecemeal. The pace has picked up since the turn of the year and the Working Party is now into more systematic discussions. In the course of these recent discussions my officials have taken a robust line in requesting a derogation from the current Regulation, with the aim of maintaining our current national brokering controls. I can reassure you that the Government will continue to make a clear and robust case for a derogation as this process continues. In light of the above I hope the Committee will now agree to release this document from scrutiny. 2 March 2015

Letter from the Chairman to Matthew Hancock MP At its meeting of 12 March, the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs considered your letter on the above regulation. We are encouraged to hear that the Government has taken a strong line in protecting the UK’s robust brokering controls in this area. We would be grateful if you could update us on the final outcome of the negotiations on the above point. In the meantime, as per your request, we are content to release the document from scrutiny. 12 March 2015

UK JHA OPT-IN TO A COUNCIL DECISION RELATING TO THE ACCESSION OF THE SEYCHELLES TO THE WTO (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from Lord Livingston of Parkhead, Minister of State for Trade and Investment, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, to the Chairman I am writing to inform you that the UK has opted in to the Council Decision relating to the accession of the Seychelles to the World Trade Organisation. Opting in will help to achieve the Government’s trade policy objective of expanding the WTO’s membership. The Government has supported the accession of the Seychelles to the WTO on the right terms. In acceding to the WTO, the Seychelles will embrace a series of rules and commitments which form the foundation of an open, transparent and non-discriminatory global trading system and which will provide important guarantees for the Seychelles and for other WTO Members. Accession to the WTO will bring the Seychelles more firmly into the global economy and make the Seychelles a more attractive place to do business. The Council Decision has the effect of extending to the Seychelles the horizontal commitments the UK makes to all WTO members, including in the provision of services by natural persons from third countries, otherwise known as “Mode 4”. It is the presence of these Mode 4 commitments in the relevant instruments which triggers the UK Justice and Home Affairs opt-in. 12 December 2014

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UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL) TRANSPARENCY CONVENTION (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from Lord Livingston of Parkhead, Minister of State for Trade and Investment, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, to the Chairman I am writing to update you on progress towards the UK’s accession to the “Mauritius Convention” on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (the Convention) at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). You will be aware of the unease that Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are causing amongst proportions of civil society. Many of the concerns are rooted in mistrust of the arbitral procedure. The government has recently been taking steps to improve the operation of ISDS by opening tribunals and treaty negotiations to greater public scrutiny. Central to our efforts are the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules (the Rules). The Convention will allow the retroactive application of the Rules to treaties signed before 1 April 2014. The Rules which came into effect on 1 April 2014 comprise a set of procedural rules that provide for greater transparency and access by the public to key arbitration documents and the proceedings in treaty-based investor-state arbitration in future treaties. The Mauritius Convention provides for the retroactive application of the Rules to existing treaties. The UK has already signed up to the Rules and intends to sign the Convention in Port Louis, Mauritius on the 17th March 2015. Ratification will take place in the new Parliament. The UK Government supports the application of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules and the Convention. The European Commission is similarly supportive and is actively encouraging all Member States to accede to the convention as early and widely as possible. The Rules and Convention are a well-balanced package of measures that will enable greater public scrutiny of investor-state arbitration proceedings without imposing burdensome costs on business. Broad acceptance of the Convention will enable and encourage greater public scrutiny of investor-state arbitration. This is of crucial importance to informing the public discussion of investor-state arbitration and in particular the debate around the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The Rules make the publication of key arbitration documents mandatory and tribunal hearings involving the presentation of evidence or oral argument open to the public, subject to certain restrictions regarding confidential information. They also require consideration of amicus briefs submitted by third parties or non-disputing parties. It also provides for a repository of published information at UNCITRAL. The European Union is currently a signatory to only one treaty containing an ISDS mechanism, the ECT. For the EU and Member States to accede to the Convention for the ECT requires common accord and a Council Decision. The EU is supportive of the Convention and the UK is pressing for a Decision to be made; however, since it has not yet been achieved, the EU will not accede in Mauritius. I will write to you for scrutiny clearance as soon as any Decision is published. The UK expects to sign the Convention in Port Louis, Mauritius for all of our Bilateral Investment Treaties and other treaties containing ISDS mechanisms on the 17th March 2015. 11 March 2015

UPDATE ON EUBAM LIBYA (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman Due to recent developments in Libya, I am taking this opportunity to provide the committee with a short update on the latest security and political situation and the current status of EUBAM Libya. Fighting has escalated in Libya over the past few months, particularly in Tripoli and Benghazi. In Tripoli, fighting has closed the main international airport and there have been several airstrikes on the capital. This increased insecurity has led to the majority of the diplomatic community closing their Embassies and withdrawing staff, including the UK. The FCO has changed the travel advice for Libya, advising against all travel to the country. 138

Following relatively peaceful elections on 25 June, a new House of Representatives was elected. It has been sitting in Tobruk, in the East of the country, due to the security situation in Tripoli, since its inaugural meeting on 4 August. However, not all members have taken up their seats and some members of the expired General National Congress have convened sessions in Tripoli, declaring it as the sole legislative authority. EUBAM Libya took the decision on 4 August to withdraw staff from Libya due to the security situation. The mission’s core staff have temporarily relocated to Tunis and a small number are temporarily co-located with the EEAS in Brussels. I will write in due course to update the committee once discussions in Brussels have progressed in regards to the future structure of the mission. 28 August 2014

UPDATE ON EUFOR CAR AND FCO EU BUSINESS AFTER WINTER RECESS – FROM 5 JANUARY 2015 (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I am writing to provide an update on EUFOR CAR and to make the Committee aware of FCO- related EU business that is subject to scrutiny after the Winter Recess. I would like to apologise for not sending the Committee the usual pre-Recess letter, this was missed in the exceptionally busy period before Christmas. This does not meet the high standards we set for ourselves but please be reassured that processes have been put in place to avoid this happening again.

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SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN CAR It is clear that, to ensure sustainable security in CAR, it is vital to have security sector reform. The under-utilised CAR national army is known as the FACA and is now considered to be the biggest risk of stability to CAR. The CAR interim Prime Minister has said that if no direction is given to the FACA there is a real risk they will turn against the population of CAR and further destabilise the country. The UN are currently going through and cleansing the database of FACA personnel – removing people that have been involved in threatening the peace and stability of the country. The CAR interim President has requested that priority be given to reforming and training the FACA. The UN (which has the lead on security sector reform in CAR) has requested that the EU starts the process of security sector reform of the FACA in CAR. The UN would then look at putting together a wider plan on security sector reform following elections ensuring it has the buy-in of the newly elected CAR government. In November, the EU started to consider the possibility of developing an advisory mission to the FACA, which might also provide non-operational training if conditions allow.

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UPDATE ON PROPOSALS FOR A CIVILIAN COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY MISSION FOR UKRAINE (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the Chairman I thought you would appreciate an update on the discussion at the 12 May Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), and the joint proposal by UK, Sweden and Poland to establish a civilian capacity-building CSDP Mission in support of Ukraine’s reform agenda. The Committees expressed interest in the discussions which took place at the Foreign Affairs Council on 12 May. The Foreign Affairs Council agreed, in response to their concerns about the deteriorating political and security situation in Ukraine, Conclusions that reaffirmed the EU’s support for Ukraine’s unity, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and called upon Russia to do likewise. The FAC also expressed alarm at the continued efforts by pro-Russian separatists to destabilise Eastern and Southern Ukraine and called on all parties to support free and fair Presidential elections. On the joint proposal to establish a civilian CSDP Mission for Ukraine, the FAC recalled its readiness to assist Ukraine in the field of civilian security sector reform, including police and rule of law. The Council tasked the EEAS to prepare a Crisis Management Concept – an initial planning document - for a possible civilian CSDP mission with a view to a decision on further steps at its next meeting. Since then, a draft Crisis Management Concept for the Ukraine mission has been circulated to EU member states for consideration and possible agreement at the FAC on 23 June. The civilian mission is expected to adopt a twin-track approach to addressing Ukraine’s urgent, as well as longer-term, stability-related needs by: — Mentoring and advising Ukrainian bodies on the design and implementation of security sector reform strategies, which will result in Ukrainian security services which uphold the rule of law credibly and accountably, with public confidence and respect for human rights. — Coordinating EU support with parallel justice, defence and border management reforms, which are being supported by other EU mechanisms and international actors (notably the OSCE and NATO), with an emphasis on the need for clear division of responsibilities and de-confliction of activities. There is growing support for the concept of a CSDP mission as part of the EU’s overall response to a political and security crisis, which has the potential to de-stabilise a key region within the EU’s and the UK’s neighbourhood. There is therefore a clear imperative for the UK to play a role in supporting Ukraine to implement essential reforms that will address fundamental governance issues, including corruption and judicial reform, and make the country less susceptible to external pressures in future. The prospective Mission would address Ukraine’s key needs, in a manner which plays to the EU’s supportive strengths, as well as our own expertise in security sector reform and accountable governance structures. For these reasons, I am encouraged by the Mission’s intent to focus on capacity building, and the explicit recognition of the importance of coordination with other international and bilateral actors. The exact details of the civilian Mission’s expected budget and activities will not be confirmed until the draft Crisis Management Concept is agreed by the FAC, and further planning conducted. I continue to believe that a rapid, yet thoroughly planned, deployment is necessary to help mitigate the risk of further instability in Ukraine. It is in our interest, and the interest of our EU partners, to support the efforts of the newly elected and inaugurated President Petro Poroshenko to deliver a safe, democratic and prosperous future for the people of Ukraine. I will write again with a further update on the status of planning for the civilian CSDP Mission after the 23 June Foreign Affairs Council. 16 June 2014

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Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I thought you would appreciate an update on the discussion at the 23 June Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), and the joint proposal by UK, Sweden and Poland to establish a civilian capacity-building CSDP Mission in support of Ukraine’s reform agenda. On 23 June the Foreign Affairs Council agreed to establish the civilian CSDP mission to assist Ukraine, and approved the Crisis Management Concept I referred to in my previous letter. Ministers agreed that operational planning could be pursued ahead of a decision on next steps at the July Council and an early deployment of the mission in the summer. The Council recalled the importance of coordination and coherence with other EU efforts, with the OSCE, and with other international actors, and Ministers also commended the work of, and expressed their continued support for, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission. The EU subsequently confirmed that the mission would have an initial mandate of two years. Its headquarters would be based in Kyiv, and would be expected to develop its capacity to carry out regional visits as soon as feasible. An advance team for the mission would deploy “in a few weeks” to begin establishing initial contact with Ukrainian and other EU and international actors in order to promote strong coordination and cooperation. Following the political agreement of the Council to proceed with operational and budgetary planning, preparations have begun to recruit a Head of Mission and members of the advance team. The advance team would be expected to travel to Ukraine in July, in order to provide timely input to the EU’s mission planning. The Head of Mission would be expected to take up post in August. Further details of the mission’s expected sequencing and budgetary requirements will be confirmed as the operational planning process develops. However my officials continue to press for early circulation of information on all aspects of the civilian mission, particularly as we approach the summer parliamentary recess. In this light, we have asked for, and expect to receive, an early version of the first Council Decision for scrutiny.

BACKGROUND ON THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT (CMC) The Committees asked for further information on the CMC, and its place in the planning process. Once EU Foreign Ministers have agreed to consider a proposal to conduct CSDP activities, they task the EEAS to develop a CMC, as an initial planning tool to guide Ministers’ political decision-making. The CMC is a conceptual framework document describing CSDP activities which should be conducted, in order to address a particular crisis within the EU’s comprehensive approach. The CMC broadly defines the overarching mandate, as well as political strategic objectives for CSDP engagement. Within the EEAS, it is prepared by Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, in consultation with EU Member States and the EU’s Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. As this was approved by Foreign Ministers on 23 June, the EEAS is now able to proceed with operational planning activities. These activities will result in the production of a budget, Concept of Operations (CONOPS), an Operational Plan (OPlan). As you noted, Council Decisions are required formally to agree the budget, establish and launch the mission. I hope this explanation is helpful. I will write again with a further update on the status of planning for the civilian CSDP Mission in July. 27 June 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I thank the Committee for its support for the civilian CSDP mission for Ukraine. I am particularly grateful for the Committee’s early consideration, and approval, of the Explanatory Memorandum deposited on 9 July in advance of the Foreign Affairs Council on 22 July. Foreign Ministers’ discussions on Ukraine that day focussed on the tragedy of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17. Ministers also formally agreed the Council Decision establishing the CSDP mission, which has now been named the “EU Advisory Mission for civilian security sector reform” (EUAM).

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BACKGROUND ON THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION STATE BUILDING CONTRACT In the European Scrutiny Committee’s Report on my Explanatory Memorandum, the Committee asked for clarification on the European Commission’s State Building Contract for Ukraine. I believe this information will also be of interest to your Committee. On 29 April 2014, the European Commission adopted a €355 million package aimed at supporting Ukraine’s reform agenda, by boosting the role of civil society, as well as promoting and monitoring democratic reforms and inclusive socio-economic development in Ukraine. The overarching goal of the package was to support the Government of Ukraine in addressing short-term economic problems which have weakened institutions, and contribute to Ukraine’s long-term reforms and preparation for political and economic association with the EU. The programme was conditional, subject to progress in reforms in several areas: anti-corruption, public administration, constitutional reform, electoral legislation and justice reform. The Commission and the Ukrainian government signed the programme on 13 May, and on 13 June, the Commission announced the disbursement of the first tranche of €250 million. The State Building Contract is a major part of the €11 billion international support package to Ukraine, and will provide short-term budgetary assistance to the Government of Ukraine through support to improved governance, anti-corruption, and reforms of the judiciary and public administration. These reforms are an integral part of the Association Agreement/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. I hope this explanation is helpful. I have encouraged my officials to stay in close contact with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), on the status of mission operational planning. As before, my officials will continue to press for early circulation of information on all aspects of the civilian mission, as well as the second draft Council Decision for your due consideration. At an appropriate moment, we will provide information on the benchmarking and exit strategy exercise as the European Scrutiny Committee has requested. More generally, the situation on the ground in Ukraine continues to cause serious concern. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have been in contact with President Poroshenko and Foreign Minister Klimkin to underline the UK’s support for Ukraine and encourage them in their efforts to pursue a diplomatic solution to the current unrest. We will continue to raise Ukraine at international meetings with our allies, and maintain our pressure on Russia to cease supplying the separatists with weapons, withdraw its troops, weapons and vehicles already in Ukraine, and commit to a negotiated solution. 28 August 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman I wanted to thank the Committee for clearing my two Explanatory Memoranda on the EU Advisory Mission for civilian security sector reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) ahead of the Foreign Affairs Council on 17 November. The two Council Decisions were adopted by EU Foreign Ministers, although I am pleased to note that the final Budget for the Mission was lower than the figure contained in my Explanatory Memorandum. Further detail on this is provided below.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN UKRAINE In its Report of 29 October, the Committee asked for an update on the political situation in Ukraine and specifically on the formation of a new government; our assessment of the nature of the new parliament; and the capacity of the two institutions to work together. The formation of a coalition government is well underway following the 26 October parliamentary elections. On 14 November, President Poroshenko released the first draft of a coalition agreement. This draft agreement covers a wide range of reform measures, including: the establishment of the Anti-corruption Bureau and implementation of anti-corruption legislation passed before the elections; judicial reform, strengthening the independence and removing political influence; decentralisation; energy sector reform - decreasing energy dependence, phasing out state subsidies on gas/heating, privatisation of coal-mines and limiting state involvement across the board; electoral reform – changing to a 100% open party list system; cancellation of Ukraine’s ‘non-bloc’ status regarding NATO. Since then, the agreement has been expanded to include a key Maidan demand of lifting immunity for MPs.

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I expect the first session of the new parliament (Verkovna Rada) - which includes a majority of pro- European and pro-reform parties - will be held on 27 November. As yet, there has been no public announcement on ministerial positions, as this responsibility will lie with the new Prime Minister. By law, the new government must be formed within 30 days of the first Verkovna Rada session, i.e. 27 December. Given this timetable, we will have a better sense of the interaction between the new Ukrainian government and the Verkovna Rada in the New Year.

MISSION READINESS TO LAUNCH In its Report of 29 October, the Committee also asked for the view of EUAM’s Operational Commander with respect to EUAM’s Initial Operational Capacity (IOC) and readiness to deploy on 1 December. My officials have contacted the Mission on this question and have been advised that, by 1 December, the IOC will have been reached, and up to 55 Mission staff deployed.

UPDATE ON MISSION BUDGET In my Explanatory Memorandum of 23 October, I informed the Committee that a proposed budget of €13,350,000 for the period of 1 December 2014 to 30 November 2015 was under negotiation. I can now advise that the final budget will be €13,100,000. My officials were successful in leading efforts to achieve a lower budget, principally in the form of a reduction of €129,000 to proposed expenditure on software. A revised overview of the final budget is contained within the table below. Figures for the current four-month budget are also included, for ease of reference.

Final Budget 1 December 2014 Budget Line Current Budget to 30 November 2015 (Euros)

Personnel 949,573 7,163,207.30

Missions 58,512 537,520

Running costs 800,710 2,769,465

Capital Costs 743,825 2,451,845

Representation 4,000 24,000

Contingencies 123,380 153, 962.70

Total 2,680,000 13,100,000

— Personnel Costs (€7,163,207.30): — Personnel costs account for approximately 54% of total expenditure. Under the new OPLAN, the maximum authorised strength is 105 international staff. — Missions Expenditure (€537,520): — This expenditure relates to the costs incurred in implementing the mandate and includes transportation, per diems and accommodation.

RUNNING COSTS (€2,769,465): This covers a range of costs such as transport, IT, communications and goods & services: 144

— Transportation and generators (€350,800): The mission will have a fleet of 35 vehicles, including four armoured cars. This budget line covers fuel, maintenance, insurance, registration and fleet monitoring. — IT Services (€309,200) — Communications (€155,040): This covers GSM and landline services, satellite communications and rental for a radio repeater. — Office rent and services (€946,800): This covers rent for the temporary office location, HQ (including VAT for first three months of rent, maintenance, and cleaning services), drinking water, buildings insurance, utilities, and temporary storage space. — Office Supplies (€28,000) — PPIO & Visibility (€112,500): This covers polls and public surveys; media campaigns, press visits, visibility items, and newspaper & TV subscriptions. — Security (€417,000): Expenditure covers security guards, consumables, maintenance and emergency rations — Welfare (€12,000) — Financial Costs (€39,600): Covers external audit and bank fees — Consultation & Other Services (€100,000): This covers external consultants, legal consultancy and medical evacuation. — Training (€151,025): Expenditure for training in field operations, administration, security, and internal seminars. — Transport Costs (€147,500)

CAPITAL EXPENDITURE (€2,451,845): Expenditure covers necessary IT and communications equipment, building equipment, office furniture, office works, miscellaneous equipment and security and medical equipment: — IT Equipment (€1,352,525): The majority of expenditure is for software licenses, IT equipment and a data centre. The reduction of €129,500 to the proposed budget is due to efforts of UK officials to lower expenditure on software. — Communications Equipment (€443,920): This budget line covers phones (including satellite and secure phones), radio equipment and software. — Building Equipment and Furniture (€232,400): This budget line allows the missions to furnish a new HQ and purchase a generator. — Office Works (€270,000): Expenditure is for the improvement of physical security measures at mission HQ. — Miscellaneous Equipment (€10,000) — Security & Medical Equipment (€143,000): This covers improvement of physical security at staff accommodation; security equipment related to access control; sweeping of premises and medical equipment. — Representation (€24,000) — Contingencies (€153,962.70): The contingency reserve is 1.19% of the budget. 26 November 2014

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UPDATE ON THE FUTURE OF CSDP IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

Letter from the Chairman to David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thank you for your letter of 2 June, regarding the future of the CSDP mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which was considered by the Sub-Committee on External Affairs at its meeting on 26 June. At that meeting, the Committee also considered your letter of 19 September, which unfortunately only reached us recently. We note that the EU is downgrading its security posture even though the situation in the east of the country continues to remain tense and we remain concerned about the difficulty and importance of ensuring that there is coherent, joint approach between the number of different actors involved in security sector reform (SSR). We would therefore welcome some assurances about how the work of the various actors (Commission development programmes, national actors, and the small CSDP mission) will be coordinated. We are also concerned that the exit strategy appears to have been dictated by an exit timetable rather than by an agreed end state and we would like to hear your assessment of whether you are confident that the situation in the DRC is stable enough to move to a primarily Commission focused engagement and whether the Congolese police or armed forces will be able to deliver in very challenging conditions. Furthermore, it would be useful to know whether there will be an option to extend the mandate of EUSEC if security conditions deteriorate further. Finally, we would like to draw your attention to the Stabilisation Unit’s assessment of EUSEC, which concluded the following: “EUSEC has great value as a multilateral organisation that has extensive understanding of FARDC (armed forces of Congo) and has established relationships of trust. Congolese military leaders, including those in the east, strongly value EUSEC’s strategic advice and expertise. The assessment team would therefore support continued EU engagement in defence reform along the lines established by EUSEC, noting that because most military-related assistance is non-ODAable, there are few other funding mechanisms on which to draw.” Can the tasks currently supported by EUSEC be satisfactorily delivered by the proposed development instruments and truncated CSDP mission? The Stabilisation Unit makes recommendations on how to improve the delivery of SSR and it would be useful to know how the Government intends to act upon these recommendations. 26 June 2014

Letter from David Lidington MP to the Chairman Thank you for your letter of 26 June, regarding the considerations of the House of Lords European Union Committee with regard to the future of the CSDP mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). I am writing to you in response to the points you raise. I would like to take this opportunity to stress our commitment to working with the DRC and its neighbours to deliver greater peace and security in the region. Security Sector Reform (SSR) is an integral part of this. As you are aware, current EU support to SSR in the DRC focuses on three key areas: advice on a strategic level; the modernisation of the administration, in particular the management of personnel; and the education of military and non-commissioned officers. I remain satisfied that these tasks can satisfactorily be delivered by EU development programming, and the truncated CSDP mission. We will, of course, continue to keep this under review, but I remain confident that the proposals represent a good deal for the DRC and for the UK. In your letter you raised concerns about the exit strategy for EUSEC. To some extent I agree with your assessment; the reality of working through the EU means that programmes are reviewed and agreed according to clear timescales, and commitments are made for set periods and are judged against not only the needs on the ground at the time, but also against other conflicting priorities requiring our support. CSDP is primarily a short term crisis management tool. It remains our policy that we should look where we can to deliver programmes through the Commission and other instruments. However, when reviewing the EUSEC closure decision in light of the challenges that remain in the DRC, we were minded that the work undertaken by EUSEC should continue, albeit not necessarily in the guise 146

of a full CSDP mission. We pushed for this in the EU, and while we will, as ever, continue to keep CSDP commitments under review, I remain confident that we are now in a suitable position to enable transfer of the bulk of the work of EUSEC to Commission focused engagement. I share your concern about the need to ensure that there is a coherent approach to SSR in the DRC. This is particularly important in order to ensure that the achievements of EUSEC to date are not lost. There remain a number of actors working on SSR in the DRC, and coordination remains a significant and important challenge. The majority of actions identified for transition from EUSEC are eligible for EDF funding which funds long term development programmes. The Commission will therefore be the key partner responsible for coordination of EU activities, the contributions of member state actors in this field and the small CSDP mission carrying out ‘military to military’ activities. I am confident that the Commission recognises the importance of this task and is fully appraised of the store we put by effective delivery in this regard. The Commission currently regularly engages with, and will continue to coordinate its work very closely with MONUSCO, the UN mission to the DRC. UN Security Council Resolution 2147 (2014) extended the mandate of MONUSCO until 31 March 2015, mandating it to "play a leading role in coordinating the support for security sector reform provided by international and bilateral partners and the UN system". I am confident that the relationship and close coordination between MONUSCO and the Commission will continue and develop. You pointed to the Stabilisation Unit report on EUSEC which concluded that SSR is crucial to stabilisation in the Great Lakes and will help to ensure that money spent on development programmes makes the necessary difference. We shared much of the report with member states and the report was helpful in setting out why we felt that a review of the decision to close EUSEC for good in September 2014 was required. The recommendations of the Stabilisation Unit will continue to be considered by the UK government and by colleagues in the EU when formalising the nature of the programmes of support to DRC in the field of SSR. 14 July 2014

UPDATE ON THE ITALIAN EU PRESIDENCY DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from Lynne Featherstone MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for International Development, to the Chairman The Italian EU Presidency began on 1 July 2014. Italy will start the new Presidency Trio, followed by Latvia and Luxembourg in the first and second halves of 2015 respectively. I am taking this opportunity to update the Committees on the main development files in the Italian Presidency’s work programme for the CODEV (development), ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific states) and COHAFA (humanitarian and food aid) working groups and to outline the UK’s objectives in relation to these, set out below. The Italians are hosting an informal meeting for Development Ministers in Italy on 14/15th July to discuss priorities for their presidency. I will attend on behalf of the UK. My priorities for the meeting will be to progress UK objectives on a new post-MDG framework, as well as sharing UK learning on doing more with the private sector in development.

POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA The post-2015 Development Agenda will be a significant priority throughout the Italian Presidency. The Presidency will play a critical role in shaping Council Conclusions which will form the common EU position for the international negotiations which are expected to run until a Framework is adopted at the UN General Assembly in September 2015. The UK would like to see Conclusions reached in late 2014 after the Secretary General has released his Synthesis Report on the Post MDGs and ahead of the start of the intergovernmental negotiations. We will want to build consensus on the key themes discussed with EU member states over the last year which cover inclusive development, inclusive and sustainable growth as well as peace and good governance. The UK will continue to work to build alliances with key member states and the Commission. We also expect the Commission to prepare a Communication in the autumn in advance of the Finance for Development Conference in July 2015.

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FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY The Commission will report on the implementation of policy commitments by the EU and its Member States on food and nutrition security, with a focus on coherence, complementarity and coordination of activities. This Report is expected to be adopted by the end of July 2014. In addition, in early July, the Commission presented its Nutrition Action Plan in the form of a staff working document. It sets out strategic priorities, how the Commission will operationalize its Communication and Council Conclusions on enhancing maternal and child nutrition and how the Commission aims to reach the WHO target of reducing by 7 million the number of stunted children by 2025. The EU commitment was made at the Olympic Hunger Event hosted by the Prime Minister in August 2012. The UK supports the comprehensive approach taken and welcomes the action plan. CODEV will draft Council Conclusions and officials will seek to secure an explicit reference to support and advocacy for the new annual Global Nutrition Report which will provide a comprehensive authoritative view of the status of nutrition globally and at country level.

MIGRATION-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS CODEV will advance discussions on mainstreaming migration into development policies/interventions. The link to the post-2015 MDG framework and related negotiations will also be addressed. The UK will encourage an evidence-based approach to discussions on migration and development. We expect the Italians to be particularly focused on the issue of irregular migration and the need for EU action to prevent dangerous Mediterranean crossings.

ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN DEVELOPMENT The Italian Presidency will focus on progressing action on doing more with the private sector through EU development programmes. A Commission Communication on “Strengthening the Role of the Private Sector for Achieving Inclusive and Sustainable Development” was published on 13 May, and presented at the Development Foreign Affairs Council on 19 May. A first set of Council Conclusions was adopted at the June Foreign Affairs Council. The UK welcomed the Communication which proposes the adoption of a strategic framework for strengthening the role of the private sector in achieving inclusive and sustainable growth. The EU has many levers at its disposal such as trade negotiations, development assistance (including innovative finance), and political dialogue The UK will continue to encourage the Commission to use these levers with partner governments to support reforms and create stable and pro-business environment, and unlock private sector development and growth. The UK welcomes the emphasis on economic empowerment of girls and women featured in the framework, and the focus on results.

EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND (EDF) The legal texts of the 11th EDF - the Implementation Regulation, describing the programming and monitoring framework, and the Financial Regulation, which lays out the rules for Member States’ contributions and budget implementation – have now been agreed and await final adoption in the ACP working group and Council. Agreement will also be sought on the rules of procedure for both the EDF Committee and the Investment Facility Committee which oversees the European Investment Bank funds to ACP countries.

ARTICLE 96 Article 96 decisions will be reviewed for Guinea – Bisseau, Zimbabwe and Fiji during the Italian Presidency. At its most severe, Article 96 involves suspending all EU development funds to the partner government, though it does not prevent the EU from providing assistance in direct support of the population through NGOs, multilaterals or the private sector. Decisions on continuing to apply, suspend or lift Article 96 appropriate measures involve discussion in the Working Party on Africa (COAFR), the Asia-Oceania Working Party (COASI) and the ACP working group to examine progress made. In each case, the UK will want to be sure that the partner government’s adherence to the essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement is proven before appropriate measures are lifted.

ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS (EPAS) Existing duty-free market access arrangements for countries negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (trade and development deals) will expire on 1 October 2014, leading to tariff increases 148

for 8 countries including Kenya and Ghana. Negotiations for EPAs with East, Southern, and West Africa are close to conclusion. Once negotiations are finished or interim agreements ratified, the Commission will introduce legislation to extend duty-free access to the EU market, and we hope the European Council and European Parliament will give their quick approval over the summer.

HUMANITARIAN AID AND RESILIENCE Following the evaluation of the implementation of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, the Italian Presidency will lead discussions on recommendations through the Council Working Party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA). Recommendations include maintaining the organisational and procedural independence of humanitarian aid in the EU institutions, clarifying objectives of coordination and complementarities and designing and implementing a communication strategy for the European Consensus. The UK’s objectives will be to support opportunities to increase the overall effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid without duplicating broader donor coordination mechanisms and fora. A priority for the Italian Presidency will also be improving cooperation between civil protection and humanitarian aid within the EU. The UK thinks that good progress has already been made in this area, but we are supportive of increasing complementarity between the two tools whilst recognising their distinct objectives and methodologies. Other priorities for the Italian Presidency include the prevention of sexual violence in conflict, the protection of women and children and resilience. These are high priorities for the UK and we will be very supportive of enhanced EU action in these areas. 14 July 2014

UPDATE ON THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (UNNUMBERED)

Letter from Lord Livingston of Parkhead, Minister of State for Trade and Investment, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, to the Chairman I am writing to update you on the progress made on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The fifth round of negotiations took place in Arlington, Virginia on 19-23 May. The lead negotiators were openly upbeat about the progress being made, with talks having mostly moved away from a conceptual phase to more technical discussions. However, in some areas the pace of progress needs to accelerate. There was clarification of the initial tariff offers, and a second set of offers are expected at the next round. There were productive discussions on regulatory coherence both at the horizontal and sectoral levels, notably in the pharmaceutical and automotive sectors, two of the UK’s priorities. On public procurement - a key area for many EU Member States - discussions on state level procurement are especially sensitive, notably ahead of the mid-term elections, with the US not yet fully engaging with the states. As with the previous round, two well received stakeholder events took place. The first event was an opportunity for organisations, representing a broad cross section of interests from the EU and US, to present directly to the lead negotiators of both sides issues of concern in their respective areas. This was followed by a debriefing by the chief negotiators to stakeholders followed by a Q&A session. To keep on track for a deal in 2015, we need to make significant technical progress by the end of this year. We are increasing pressure on the Commission to plan a path through the technical work, and continue to offer our support in the US and with other EU Member States. The next round is expected to start 14 July. We expect that progress at this round will be crucial. This will be followed by a political stocktake between Commissioner De Gucht and Ambassador Froman in the Autumn, by which time we hope the EU and US will have begun to develop some shared objectives, particularly on public procurement and regulatory coherence. The next rounds of negotiations will also play out in a changing political landscape in both the EU and the US. We therefore need to make swift progress whilst the politics are right. The EU has a new Parliament (which is still controlled by parties that are largely supportive of TTIP), and will have a new College of Commissioners towards the end of this year. The US will have mid-term elections on 4 November, and the attention of both the administration and Congress are currently focused on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), for which a deal has been repeatedly delayed, and Trade Promotion 149

Authority (TPA), which means that completed deals (including TTIP) will only be subject to a single Yes/No vote in Congress, rather than amendments which risk reopening the details of the agreement. TPA also sets out the negotiating objectives of Congress, and it is therefore similar to the mandate negotiation in the EU. We do not expect TPA to be passed before the mid-term elections. 17 June 2014

Letter from Lord Livingston of Parkhead to the Chairman With the seventh round of negotiations currently underway, I am writing to update you on the progress made on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The negotiating round of 14-18 July in Brussels covered all areas with the exception of investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), tariffs and financial services. The lead negotiators were positive about good progress being made, with productive technical discussions building on the work of the previous rounds. Our assessment of the round is that useful progress has been made in important areas, with discussions beginning to move away from preliminary exchanges to discussion of texts. There continue to be differences between in EU and US ambition in public procurement and financial services, areas of priority for the UK. Discussions are likely to become more difficult especially as we get into the technical detail. However, this is to be expected given the stage of the negotiations, and we will continue to support the Commission to press for an ambitious deal. In regulatory coherence, we have begun to see constructive technical exchanges involving EU and US regulators, both in horizontal and sectoral discussions. There was good progress particularly in the pharmaceuticals and chemicals sectors, two important areas for the UK. The first, largely exploratory, discussions were also held on sanitary and phyto-sanitary issues. There were also productive discussions in customs and trade facilitation, where there was agreement between both sides on more technical issues. We now expect the EU and US to work together to produce the first consolidated texts in some areas where discussions are more advanced. The EU and the US also exchanged services offers ahead of the around. A first discussion was held, where both sides explained and clarified their respective offers. In particular, the US asked detailed and largely tactical questions about the EU offer to question its level of ambition. We expect a further discussion at the negotiating round this week. There continue to be numerous challenges, including public procurement, where discussions were again restricted to federal level procurement, and where the US remain reluctant to engage with the states ahead of their mid-term elections. The US are also continuing to be reticent about the inclusion of financial services, a priority for the UK, stating that direction at a political level is required before any progress can be made. As with the previous round, the negotiators held a stakeholder event where organisations representing a broad spectrum of interests were invited to present their issues of concern, followed by a debriefing by the chief negotiators. Responding to calls for greater transparency in the negotiations, the European Commission has also published a state of play document outlining progress in each area of TTIP. This can be found at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/152699.htm. The Government is continuing to increase its communications efforts in response to increasing volume and media coverage of public concerns about TTIP. Recent concerns have centred around the potential impact of TTIP on the NHS and other public services, on investor protection and the right of governments to regulate, and on a potential lowering of regulatory standards. The Government is implementing a comprehensive communications strategy to highlight the benefits of TTIP for consumers and businesses, as well as to emphatically refute accusations and claims about negative consequences of TTIP. Vince Cable recently wrote to all Members of Parliament to clarify these points, and he, other Ministers and myself will continue to meet with industry and civil society group representatives to convey these messages. The current (seventh) negotiating round is likely to focus on regulatory issues and we are expecting further technical progress. However, there is likely to be little progress in some other areas, such as public procurement, ahead of the mid-term elections. I will write again following this round to update you. The negotiating round will be followed by discussions between Commissioner De Gucht, EU Trade ministers and the US Trade Representative Michael Froman in mid-October. We hope that this

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political stocktake will be an opportunity for the EU and US to confirm some shared objectives, identify a clear path forward and task their regulators for further work so that an ambitious deal can be agreed in 2015. Discussions in the coming months will take place against a background of political and institutional change. A new College of Commissioners is expected to take office on 1 November, subject to approval by the European Parliament. In the US, mid-term elections will take place on 4 November. We will continue to push the Commission to clearly identify the technical work which needs to be done for the rest of this year, to ensure that good progress is made, as well as directly engage with the US and other EU Member States to support the Commission and press for rapid progress. 1 October 2014

Letter from Lord Livingston of Parkhead to the Chairman I am writing to update you on the progress made on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The seventh negotiating round took place between 29 September and 3 October in Chevy Chase, Maryland. As expected, negotiations were largely focused on regulatory issues. Discussions were mostly on a technical level, and also covered energy, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and services. There was useful technical progress, particularly on regulatory coherence, but little movement on substantive issues. This was to be expected, in the light of the upcoming mid-term elections in the US, as well as confirmation hearings of the new EU Commissioners. Nevertheless, this technical progress is crucial and prepares the ground for an ambitious and comprehensive agreement. Discussions on horizontal regulatory coherence focused on issues in the rule-making process and establishing a framework for cooperation between EU and US regulators. Sectoral regulatory discussions again made good technical progress, particularly in pharmaceuticals and medical devices, where productive collaboration between EU and US regulators continued and both sides agreed to make progress on aligning inspection regimes. Discussions on energy and raw materials were positive on a technical level, but the US remained adamant that an ambitious agreement was possible without the inclusion of a separate chapter for energy. There was a substantial discussion on SME-specific provisions, where negotiators are working to identify specific and practical tools to enable SMEs to take advantage of the market access opportunities under TTIP. There were brief discussions on market access, covering both goods and services (but not tariffs). Discussions on both sides’ services offers continued from the previous round. Progress was slow, with the US again tactically pointing to a lack of clarity in the EU offer. Negotiators devoted discussions to explaining in detail all the elements of the offers. The US remains to be persuaded on the inclusion of financial services. The UK is continuing to work with the Commission to highlight the importance of greater regulatory coherence in this area, and demonstrate that this would not undermine existing processes which have been in place since the financial crisis. There were also sessions on sanitary and phyto-sanitary issues, based on text tabled by the EU, as well as geographical indications, where again the US gave no ground. As with previous rounds, the negotiators held a stakeholder day where industry and NGOs presented their issues of concern, followed by a debriefing by the chief negotiators. Importantly, both chief negotiators reiterated their approach to public services, emphasising that governments will remain free to decide how their public services should be run and that nothing in the deal would lower environmental, worker or safety standards. Dan Mullaney, the US chief negotiator said: We heard the concern that our negotiations should not require privatization of public services such as water utilities, education, national healthcare, and that they not limit the ability of governments to regulate those services as they see fit; for example, to protect consumers, the environment, and health and safety. So we welcome the opportunity to confirm that the United States does not include such provisions in its trade agreements and will not do so in this negotiation. Ignacio Garcia-Bercero, the EU chief negotiator said: 151

I would stress that our approach to services negotiations excludes any commitments on public services: governments remain free to decide at any time that certain services should be provided by the public sector. This echoed the position of the Trade Commissioner-designate, Cecilia Malmström, at her hearing before the European Parliament on 29 September. She confirmed that TTIP “is not about lowering any standards when it comes to consumer protection, environmental or health”. She reiterated that whether to open public services to competition would remain the decision of each Member State government. Commissioner-designate Malmström also stated that transparency of the TTIP negotiations and engagement with the public would form an important focus of her role. She is expected to take up her role from 1 November, and the Government will work closely with her and her officials to ensure that good progress is made and that UK priorities continue to be reflected in the EU’s position. In response to calls for further transparency, on 9 October the Council decided to make publicly available the TTIP negotiating mandate, a copy of which is attached [not printed]. The UK was in favour of publishing the mandate, as we see this as a useful step in pushing for improved transparency. I attended an informal Trade Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 15 October, where the discussion between EU trade ministers focused on ISDS and the associated public concern across the EU. I reiterated our unwavering support for an ambitious agreement on TTIP, which was echoed by my colleagues. The meeting also included a session with the US Trade Representative, Michael Froman, where we reflected on some of the differences in position between the EU and the US. I expect the next meeting of EU trade ministers in November to take stock of the negotiations, particularly in relation to the scope as specified by the EU negotiating mandate, and set out an expected timeline for future progress. The next negotiating round is expected in December or January next year. I will write again after this to update you on progress. 17 October 2014

Letter from Lord Livingston of Parkhead to the Chairman In February Edward Barker, Head of BIS’s Transatlantic and International Unit, appeared before the Committee to provide an update on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). During the meeting Committee members specifically requested that I write to set out for a wide audience why the NHS will be safe in TTIP. I hope that the key facts below, the information in this letter and the Annexes (recent letters sent by the Trade Commissioner and the Director General of the European Commission’s Trade Department) will provide greater reassurance to the public. The UK has been involved in trade agreements with around 160 international partners for many years. None has affected our ability to deliver public services. We have always protected our right to choose how we deliver public services in trade agreements. We will continue to do so in TTIP. As your Scrutiny Committee rightly assessed we do not expect TTIP to change the status quo with regards to the NHS. TTIP will not give US firms any greater access to the NHS than they have at present. TTIP has not yet been drafted. However, based on our experience of other trade and investment agreements, the EU’s stated approach and the scope of the EU negotiating mandate there is no evidence or foundation to claims that the procurement, trade in services and investment protection chapters will require governments to make changes to the NHS, or prevent them from doing so.

KEY FACTS - WHY THE NHS IS NOT AT RISK IN TTIP — The rules governing which companies can run NHS clinical services in the UK are always set by the government of the day (or the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). These rules have never been, and will never be, set by trade deals, including TTIP. — Under the existing rules NHS England does not discriminate against foreign firms wishing to bid for clinical contracts provided that they meet UK requirements and standards and are approved by UK regulators. In practice this means that American companies are already eligible to bid for NHS

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England clinical contracts. TTIP will give American firms no greater access to these NHS services than they have at present under English domestic law. — Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provides a mechanism for investors to take action when they are subjected to unfair or discriminatory action: it is not intended to provide substantial new protections beyond those in existing UK law. Due to its strong record on respect for the rule of law, the UK has never lost an ISDS case. — Concerns have been raised that the ISDS provisions in TTIP would allow foreign businesses to sue the UK if their NHS contracts were terminated, possibly resulting in expensive pay outs. UK contract and property law already protects both local and foreign individuals and businesses from unlawful action by the state, such as breaching contracts and expropriating property without compensation. If this happened the Government could be held to account in court and potentially be required to pay compensation, regardless of TTIP. — ISDS provisions in TTIP will provide a similar level of protection to US investors throughout the EU and to EU investors throughout the US, ensuring that they cannot be treated less favourably than local companies. — Lawful termination of outsourced NHS contracts in accordance with the agreed terms would not enable investors to obtain damages under either UK law or ISDS provisions.

MARKET ACCESS IN PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES Under existing international obligations, non-health services provided to the NHS, such as construction, maintenance, cleaning, telecommunications, and IT services, may already be provided by international companies on the same basis as UK companies. This has been the case since the mid- 1990s when the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) was signed. The GPA requires that when the Government opens certain types of contracts to competition by UK companies, these contracts must also be opened to companies from all other countries that have signed the GPA. Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) signatories have agreed to allow foreign- owned businesses to operate in certain services sectors and in some cases to allow those businesses to operate without any additional conditions related to the fact that they are foreign-owned. However, crucially, publicly-funded health services are excluded from the GPA, and from trade in services obligations in GATS and other free trade agreements. NHS England health services are therefore only governed by domestic legislation (The National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) Regulations 2013) and EU public procurement rules on transparency and equal treatment for EU member states. Aside from EU requirements, there are no international trade obligations for public health services. However, the Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition Regulations do not allow NHS Commissioners to discriminate against foreign firms wishing to bid for contracts for NHS clinical services in England, provided that they meet national regulatory requirements. This means that where NHS commissioners have decided to open services to competition, American companies can already bid for NHS England contracts including clinical services provided that they meet the required safety and quality standards. The European Commission has confirmed in writing that they will not change trade in services obligations for publicly-funded health services to give US firms any additional market access to provide these services in TTIP. They have also confirmed that the procurement chapter in TTIP will not include procurement obligations for health services. Accordingly, responsibility for deciding on UK services and procurement obligations in TTIP will continue to rest with the UK and decisions on whether to outsource NHS health services and to whom to award contracts will continue to be made by the relevant UK authority.

INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS) Your Committee raised the concern that the investment protection and ISDS provisions in TTIP could prevent the NHS’s delivery model being changed in the future or allow foreign businesses to sue if their NHS contracts were terminated, possibly resulting in expensive pay-outs.

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Any ISDS provisions in the final TTIP agreement will not stop NHS contracts being revoked or terminated if a future government wishes to do so. ISDS tribunals cannot prevent a government from acting, but they can award compensation if they find that the UK’s actions have been unfair or discriminatory towards foreign investors. We would want these protections for British investors overseas. However UK contract and property law already protects both local and foreign individuals and businesses from unfair and unlawful action by the state, such as breaching contracts. Investment provisions in TTIP will provide a similar level of protection to US investors throughout the EU and to EU investors throughout the US, ensuring that they cannot be treated less favourably than local companies. A decision to terminate public service outsourcing in breach of contract will, in most instances, require compensation to be paid regardless of the nationality of the contracting party. This is already the case with or without TTIP. Some are concerned that the awards that investors could receive through ISDS tribunals for a breach of contract will be higher than what a domestic court would order. However, there is no evidence that ISDS tribunals assess compensation differently or award higher pay outs than domestic courts for the same type of breach. The European Commission’s public consultation on investment protection and ISDS also provides more information to UK citizens explaining what investment protection and ISDS obligations aim to achieve. I recognise there is a huge degree of public scepticism around ISDS, but it is important that people understand that the investment protection provisions only protect foreign investors from unfair or discriminatory state action. ISDS tribunals can only provide compensation for unfair or discriminatory action by a state. They cannot overturn UK policy nor stop national decisions on public service delivery models, including decisions on NHS services. As a result of the public consultation on the provisions in TTIP the Commission has identified four areas that merit further consideration: the protection of the right to regulate; the establishment and functioning of arbitral tribunals; the relationship between domestic judicial systems and ISDS; and the review of ISDS decisions through an appellate mechanism. We are seeking interested parties’ views on the Commission’s findings and whether we should do more to ensure that the right to regulate is fully protected in order to meet the EU negotiating mandate position.

THE NEGOTIATING MANDATE The TTIP agreement has not yet been written so there is no agreed text to share with you. However, the EU’s negotiating mandate for TTIP contains the EU negotiating position both on services and ISDS. The TTIP mandate contains a clear direction to the European Commission that explicitly rules out liberalisation of public services. Market access rights in these services are not up for negotiation with the US. The mandate also states that any ISDS provisions included in the final deal should be without prejudice to the right of the EU and the Member States to adopt and enforce, in accordance with their respective competences, measures necessary to pursue legitimate public policy objectives such as social, environmental, security, stability of the financial system, public health and safety in a non- discriminatory manner. We will make sure that the European Commission sticks to the position agreed in the mandate and ensures the final text contains sufficient protection for NHS health services. You will no doubt do the same when you come to scrutinise the final deal.

THE RECENT PUBLISHED EU-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CETA) A good example of how the European Commission put heath protections in to practice can be found in the recently published EU Canada Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement. It states: “The EU reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure with regard to the provision of all health services which receive public funding or State support in any form...” We expect that TTIP will contain very similar wording. This text covers all EU Member States’ health delivery systems – including publicly funded health services delivered by the NHS, or by private companies on behalf of the NHS. The service sectors that are covered in the EU’s procurement offer to Canada in the Agreement exclude any public health service procurement obligations. As health services are excluded, it remains for national governments to decide whether to procure public health services and whether to allow non-EU businesses to bid for the contracts. The European Commission has confirmed that TTIP will take the same approach and not cover public procurement obligations for health services.

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I hope that this letter and the material in the Annexes demonstrate that TTIP will not force any changes to the NHS. The position remains – as with all trade agreements the UK has signed – that it will be for the government of the day to decide how NHS services are delivered. 16 March 2015

Letter from the Chairman to Lord Livingston of Parkhead Thank you for your letter of 16 March, regarding the TTIP. We are grateful to you for providing such a detailed explanation, and we are also very grateful to Mr Barker for coming to give evidence to the Committee on 26 February. As outlined in our report published last year, TTIP offers the potential for enormous gains. However, as we reported, clear communication from the UK government is key to ensuring that the benefits of the TTIP are communicated effectively, and to build public support for the agreement. In our evidence session with Mr Barker we raised the public concerns about possible threats to the NHS posed by the ISDS provisions within the TTIP. We are pleased to see your argument, that the NHS is not under threat, set out so clearly in your letter and hope that this message can be promulgated more effectively in the future. In an attempt to help with this communication, we intend to publish your correspondence, and this letter, on our website as soon as possible. 19 March 2015

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