DOCSLIB.ORG

The European Union's Role As a Conflict Mediator: the Cases of the Russo- Georgian War and the Ukrainian Crisis

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The European Union's Role As a Conflict Mediator: the Cases of the Russo- Georgian War and the Ukrainian Crisis Master’s Degree in Comparative International Studies Final Thesis The European Union's role as a conflict mediator: the cases of the Russo- Georgian War and the Ukrainian Crisis Supervisor Ch. Prof. Stéphanie Novak Assistant supervisor Ch. Prof. Stefano Petrungaro Graduand Francesca Pia Nista Matricolation number 870245 Academic Year 2019 / 2020 A Giulio Regeni 2 Table of Contents Abstract………………………………………………………………………….…......6 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………11 CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .................................. 14 1.1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 14 1.2 DEFINITION OF MEDIATION ......................................................... 14 1.3 INDIVIDUALS, STATES, ORGANIZATIONS .......................................... 15 1.3.1 INDIVIDUALS ................................................................................................ 15 1.3.2 STATES ........................................................................................................ 16 1.2.1 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS .................................................................. 16 1.4 THE QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY ..................................................... 17 1.4.1 DEFINITION OF NEUTRALITY .......................................................................... 17 1.4.2 MEDIATORS’ INTERESTS ................................................................................18 1.5 STRATEGIES .............................................................................. 22 1.5.1 BARGAINING STRUCTURE ............................................................................. 22 1.5.2 CONTEXT .................................................................................................... 23 1.5.3 MEDIATOR’S ROLES ..................................................................................... 23 1.5.4 LEVERAGE ................................................................................................... 25 1.6 HOW CAN MEDIATION BE EVALUATED? .......................................... 26 1.6.1 CLASSIFICATION OF EVALUATION CRITERIA ................................................... 26 1.7 MULTIPARTY MEDIATION ............................................................ 29 1.7.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF MULTIPARTY MEDIATION ............................................. 30 1.7.2 CONTACT GROUPS ........................................................................................ 30 1.7.3 SUCCESSFUL MEDIATION? ............................................................................. 31 CHAPTER 2: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK ....................... 35 3 2.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 35 2.2 THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S FOREIGN POLICY IN TERMS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION..................................................... 37 2.3 “EUROPE’S FINEST HOUR”: THE BALKANS EXPERIENCE .................... 41 2.3 THE LISBON TREATY .................................................................. 48 2.4 LEGAL BASIS OF EU PEACE MEDIATION ........................................ 53 2.4.1 THE CONCEPT ON STRENGTHENING EU MEDIATION AND DIALOGUE CAPABILITIES ......................................................................................................... 54 2.4.2 OTHER MEDIATION INSTRUMENTS ................................................................57 2.5 THE BELGRADE-PRISTINA DIALOGUE ........................................... 60 2.5.1 ASSESSMENT ............................................................................................... 62 2.5.2 LEVERAGE .................................................................................................. 63 2.5.3 MEDIATION STRATEGIES ............................................................................. 63 2.5.4 COHERENCE ............................................................................................... 66 2.5.5 CONTEXT .................................................................................................... 66 2.6 CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 68 3. CASE STUDIES: THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR OF 2008 AND THE UKRAINIAN CONFLICT OF 2014 ........................................... 70 3.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 70 3.2 THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AND THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP ................................................................................... 71 3.2.1. ENP INSTRUMENTS .................................................................................... 74 3.2.2. APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE ENP .................................. 76 3.2.3 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY ........................................................... 77 3.2.4 THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP ....................................................................... 78 3.2.5 THE REVISED ENP ..................................................................................... 79 3.3 THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN CONFLICT OF 2008 ................................... 81 3.3.1 CONFLICT CONTEXT .................................................................................... 82 3.3.2 EU-GEORGIA RELATIONS BEFORE THE CRISIS .............................................. 84 3.3.3 THE ROSE REVOLUTION .............................................................................. 85 3.3.4 THE NATO BUCHAREST SUMMIT AND ESCAALTION OF THE CONFLICT ........... 86 4 3.3.5 THE MEDIATED CEASEFIRE .......................................................................... 89 3.3.6 GENEVA INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION (GID) ................................................ 91 3.3.7 MEDIATION STRATEGIES ............................................................................. 94 3.3.8 COHERENCE ............................................................................................... 97 3.3.9 POST-CONFLICT RELATIONS WITH EUROPE ................................................... 99 3.3.10 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 99 3.4 THE UKRAINIAN CONFLICT OF 2014 ........................................... 102 3.4.1 EU-UKRAINE RELATIONS BEFORE THE CRISIS............................................. 102 3.4.2 THE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT AND EUROMAIDAN .................................... 104 3.4.3 CRIMEA’S ANNEXATION AND THE OUTBREAK IN EASTERN UKRAINE ............ 106 3.4.4 THE AZOV CRISIS ...................................................................................... 108 3.4.5 EU RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS ..................................................................... 109 3.4.5.1 ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT ...................................................................... 109 3.4.5.2 SANCTIONS ............................................................................................. 110 3.4.7.3 EU MISSION TO UKRAINE .........................................................................111 3.4.7.4 DIPLOMATIC AND MEDIATION EFFORTS..................................................... 112 3.4.7.5 THE GENEVA GROUP ............................................................................... 112 3.4.7.6 MINSK I .................................................................................................. 113 3.4.7.7 MINSK II AND THE (FAILED) IMPLEMENTATION ......................................... 115 3.4.7.8 THE STEINMEIER FORMULA .................................................................... 117 3.4.7.9 WHAT WENT WRONG IN THE MINSK AGREEMENTS? .................................. 118 3.4.8 WHAT ROLE FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE PEACE TALKS? .................... 121 3.4.8.1 MEDIATION STRATEGIES .......................................................................... 123 3.4.9 COHERENCE .............................................................................................. 125 3.5 CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 125 3.6 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE CASES ........ 127 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………..130 BIBLIOGRAPHY: ......................................................................... 134 5 Abstract In questa tesi è stato preso in esame il ruolo che l’Unione Europea ha nella mediazione dei conflitti internazionali, partendo dalla definizione di cosa sia la mediazione dei conflitti, definendo il quadro istituzionale in cui l’Unione Europea opera in qualità di mediatore, e infine, analizzando nel particolare i casi del conflitto Russo-Georgiano del 2008 e della crisi Ucraina post-Maidan del 2014. I due conflitti hanno rappresentato una questione importante negli equilibri geopolitici all'interno del continente europeo, e in particolare in relazione diretta con gli obiettivi della politica estera europea, che si basa sui principi del mantenimento della pace, della prevenzione dei conflitti e del rafforzamento della sicurezza internazionale. La Georgia e l'Ucraina fanno parte del Partenariato orientale, l'iniziativa di cooperazione multilaterale nell'ambito della politica europea di vicinato, il cui obiettivo è quello di costruire una cooperazione efficace tra l'UE e i suoi vicini orientali in termini politici, socioeconomici e di sicurezza. Il caso georgiano rappresenta il "primo grande caso in cui l'UE ha dovuto sviluppare una vera e propria politica estera, utilizzando strumenti diversi da quelli dell'allargamento" (Lynch, 2008, citato
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Welfare Reforms in Post-Soviet States: a Comparison
    WELFARE REFORMS IN POST-SOVIET STATES: A COMPARISON OF SOCIAL BENEFITS REFORM IN RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN by ELENA MALTSEVA A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Political Science University of Toronto © Copyright by Elena Maltseva (2012) Welfare Reforms in Post-Soviet States: A Comparison of Social Benefits Reform in Russia and Kazakhstan Elena Maltseva Doctor of Philosophy Political Science University of Toronto (2012) Abstract: Concerned with the question of why governments display varying degrees of success in implementing social reforms, (judged by their ability to arrive at coherent policy outcomes), my dissertation aims to identify the most important factors responsible for the stagnation of social benefits reform in Russia, as opposed to its successful implementation in Kazakhstan. Given their comparable Soviet political and economic characteristics in the immediate aftermath of Communism’s disintegration, why did the implementation of social benefits reform succeed in Kazakhstan, but largely fail in Russia? I argue that although several political and institutional factors did, to a certain degree, influence the course of social benefits reform in these two countries, their success or failure was ultimately determined by the capacity of key state actors to frame the problem and form an effective policy coalition that could further the reform agenda despite various political and institutional obstacles and socioeconomic challenges. In the case of Kazakhstan, the successful implementation of the social benefits reform was a result of a bold and skillful endeavour by Kazakhstani authorities, who used the existing conditions to justify the reform initiative and achieve the reform’s original objectives.
    [Show full text]
  • Ukraine's Foreign Affairs
    No. 2 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, JANUARY 12, 2003 5 2002: THE YEAR IN REVIEW came in a letter to the National Remembrance Institute, and Germany, while meeting in St. Petersburg, signed a Ukraine’s foreign affairs: addressed to a conference being held on the matter. statement of understanding and cooperation on the con- Poland and Ukraine also worked to continue to tinued use of Ukraine’s pipeline for transporting Russian strengthen economic ties in 2002. Poland’s recently natural gas to Germany. pluses and minuses elected Prime Minister Leszek Miller made his first visit The document envisaged European participation in a to Kyiv on February 4 to meet with his Ukrainian coun- multinational consortium that would guarantee the gas kraine’s foreign affairs this past year, like a terpart, Anatolii Kinakh, as well as with President supply. The signing came a day after Presidents Kuchma potluck dinner, consisted of good and bad Kuchma. Talks centered on the Odesa-Brody-Gdansk oil and Putin signed a separate declaration of strategic coop- moments. At the top of a very uneven year in for- pipeline. Prime Minister Miller expressed his full sup- eration in the natural gas sector, which would give eign relations was the Kolchuha affair, which increasing- port for the plan and Poland’s intention to find business Russia joint management and developmental influence ly overshadowed other developments as the year wore U partners to complete the pipeline’s Polish section over the Ukrainian tube in return for its agreement to on. However, even with accusations of President Leonid through to the Baltic seaport city of Gdansk.
    [Show full text]
  • Making Waves
    Making Waves Sea Blindness and Australia’s Second Sea Navy (RAN), HMAS Stirling, at Garden Island, off Fre- Brian K. Wentzell mantle, Western Australia. The base is now the home of all Collins-class submarines, five Anzac frigates and a It is interesting to examine countries with coasts on more single fleet tanker. There is also a heliport to support he- than one ocean. Which coast is emphasized illustrates licopters assigned to the ships. Other resources, includ- much about the country’s history. Thus in Canada, the ing the landing ships, air warfare destroyers, coastal pa- focus has historically been on the Atlantic Ocean. Only trol vessels and mine warfare forces would have to deploy recently has focus changed to the Pacific coast and even from the east coast and northern areas to counter a major more recently the Arctic coast. For Australia the focus has maritime threat in the eastern Indian Ocean. been on the Pacific Ocean, and not the Indian Ocean. The Royal Australian Air Force has three air bases, two of David Brewster, writing for the Australian Strategic Policy which are in a maintained but inactive status in the north Institute, has highlighted the importance of the Indian coast area of Western Australia, and the other is a training Ocean as a waterway to world markets from the west and airfield shared with the Republic of Singapore Air Force northwest of the Australian continent. His article, entitled near Perth, which is on the southwest coast. Aside from “Australia’s Second Sea: Facing Our Multipolar Future in two training squadrons, there are no dedicated combat, the Indian Ocean,” exposes Australia’s national blindness early warning, maritime patrol or cargo aircraft based in to the importance of this ocean to the economy and secur- the region.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Strategy Towards Ukraine's Presidential Election
    BULLETIN No. 49 (49) August 19, 2009 © PISM Editors: Sławomir Dębski (Editor-in-Chief), Łukasz Adamski, Mateusz Gniazdowski, Beata Górka-Winter, Leszek Jesień, Agnieszka Kondek (Executive Editor), Łukasz Kulesa, Ernest Wyciszkiewicz Russian Strategy towards Ukraine’s Presidential Election by Jarosław Ćwiek-Karpowicz Dmitry Medvedev’s letter to Viktor Yushchenko is a clear signal of Russia’s intention to influ- ence internal developments in Ukraine, including the course of the presidential campaign. In the run-up to the January 2010 poll, unlike in the period preceding the Orange Revolution, Russia will very likely refrain from backing just a single candidate, and instead will seek a deepening of the existing divisions and further destabilization on the Ukrainian political scene, destabilization which it sees as helping to protect Russian interests in Ukraine. Medvedev’s Letter. In an open letter to Viktor Yushchenko, dated 11 August, Dmitry Medvedev put the blame for the crisis in bilateral relations on the Ukrainian president, and he explained that the arrival of the new ambassador to Kiev, Mikhail Zurabov—replacing Viktor Chernomyrdin, who was recalled last June—would be postponed. Medvedev accused his Ukrainian counterpart of having knowingly abandoned the principles of friendship and partnership with Russia during the past several years. Among the Yushchenko administration’s alleged anti-Russian actions, he listed weapons shipments and support extended to Georgia in last year’s armed conflict in South Ossetia; endeavors to gain
    [Show full text]
  • List of Persons and Entities Under EU Restrictive Measures Over the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine
    dhdsh PRESS Council of the European Union EN 1st December 2014 List of persons and entities under EU restrictive measures over the territorial integrity of Ukraine List of persons N. Name Identifying Reasons Date of information listing 1. Sergey Valeryevich d.o.b. 26.11.1972 Aksyonov was elected “Prime Minister of Crimea” in the Crimean Verkhovna Rada on 27 17.3.2014 Aksyonov February 2014 in the presence of pro-Russian gunmen. His “election” was decreed unconstitutional by Oleksandr Turchynov on 1 March. He actively lobbied for the “referendum” of 16 March 2014. 2. Vladimir Andreevich d.o.b. 19.03.1967 As speaker of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Konstantinov 17.3.2014 Konstantinov played a relevant role in the decisions taken by the Verkhovna Rada concerning the “referendum” against territorial integrity of Ukraine and called on voters to cast votes in favour of Crimean Independence. 3. Rustam Ilmirovich d.o.b. 15.08.1976 As Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Crimea, Temirgaliev played a relevant role 17.3.2014 Temirgaliev in the decisions taken by the Verkhovna Rada concerning the “referendum” against territorial integrity of Ukraine. He lobbied actively for integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation. 4. Deniz Valentinovich d.o.b. 15.07.1974 Berezovskiy was appointed commander of the Ukrainian Navy on 1 March 2014 and swore an 17.3.2014 Berezovskiy oath to the Crimean armed force, thereby breaking his oath. The Prosecutor-General’s Office of Ukraine launched an investigation against him for high treason.
    [Show full text]
  • The Ukrainian Weekly 2014, No.31
    www.ukrweekly.com INSIDE: l In the press: op-eds by Poroshenko, Harper – page 3 l Focus on Chicago’s Ukrainian National Museum – page 10 l Temple U. prof’s book on Kyiv’s ‘domes and demons’ – page 11 THEPublished U by theKRAINIAN Ukrainian National Association Inc., a fraternal W non-profit associationEEKLY Vol. LXXXII No. 31 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, AUGUST 3, 2014 $2.00 EU adopts broad Rada approves budget amendments, economic sanctions rejects resignation of PM Yatsenyuk against Russia by Zenon Zawada KYIV – Ukraine’s Parliament voted on July 31 to approve RFE/RL amendments to Ukraine’s budget and tax code, a week BRUSSELS – The European Union has agreed to after rejecting them despite warnings from the Cabinet of impose broad economic sanctions on Russia over its Ministers that they are essential for ensuring financing for alleged role in the Ukraine crisis. EU ambassadors agreed Ukraine’s army and the next round of Western loans. on the measures at a meeting in Brussels on July 29. The Verkhovna Rada also rejected the resignation letter EU President Herman Van Rompuy said in a state- submitted by Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk on July 25, ment the measures will restrict access to EU capital the day after two parliamentary factions – the Ukrainian markets for Russian state-owned banks, impose an Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR) and Svoboda – embargo on trade in arms, and restrict exports of declined to support the amendments and announced their dual-use goods and sensitive technologies, particular- exit from the majority coalition, which also included the ly in the field of the oil sector.
    [Show full text]
  • 17 February 2015 1 List of Individuals Subject to Eu
    17 FEBRUARY 2015 1 LIST OF INDIVIDUALS SUBJECT TO EU SANCTIONS (ASSET FREEZE) BASED ON COUNCIL REGULATION 208/2014 AS AMENEDED BY REGULATIONS 381/2014 AND 138/2015 1.1 Regulation 208/2014, published 6 March 2014 1. Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych, former President of Ukraine (6 March 2014) 2. Vitalii Yuriyovych Zakharchenko, former Minister of Internal Affairs (6 March 2014) 3. Viktor Pavlovych Pshonka, former Prosecutor General of Ukraine (6 March 2014) 4. Oleksandr Hryhorovych Yakymenko, former Head of Security Service of Ukraine (6 March 2014) 5. Andriy Volodymyrovych Portnov, former Adviser to the President of Ukraine (6 March 2014) 6. Olena Leonidivna Lukash, former Minister of Justice (6 March 2014) 7. Andrii Petrovych Kliuiev, former Head of Administration of President of Ukraine (6 March 2014) 8. Viktor Ivanovych Ratushniak, former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs (6 March 2014) 9. Oleksandr Viktorovych Yanukovych, son of former President, businessman (6 March 2014) 10. Viktor Viktorovych Yanukovych, son of former President, Member of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (6 March 2014) 11. Artem Viktorovych Pshonka, son of former Prosecutor General, Deputy Head of the faction of Party of Regions in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (6 March 2014) 12. Serhii Petrovych Kliuiev, businessman, brother of Mr. Andrii K1iuiev (6 March 2014) 13. Mykola Yanovych Azarov, Prime Minister of Ukraine until January 2014 (6 March 2014) 14. Oleksii Mykolayovych Azarov, son of former Prime Minister Azarov (6 March 2014) 15. Serhiy Vitaliyovych Kurchenko, businessman (6 March 2014) 16. Dmytro Volodymyrovych Tabachnyk, former Minister of Education and Science (6 March 2014) 17. Raisa Vasylivna Bohatyriova, former Minister of Health (6 March 2014) 18.
    [Show full text]
  • The Ukrainian Weekly 2012, No.52-53
    www.ukrweekly.com ХРИСТОС НАРОДИВСЯ! CHRIST IS BORN! THEPublished U by theKRAINIAN Ukrainian National Association Inc., a fraternal W non-profit associationEEKLY Vol. LXXX No. 52-53 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY DECEMBER 23-DECEMBER 30, 2012 $1/$2 in Ukraine Self Reliance New York presents Yanukovych cancels trip to Moscow $25,000 for Holodomor Memorial as Customs Union membership looms by Zenon Zawada experts and people familiar with the situa- Special to The Ukrainian Weekly tion spoke of uniting with Moscow as a nearly resolved matter.” KYIV – Ukraine came as close as ever The newspaper described a Kremlin this week to losing its independence as arrangement that resembled a scam. The President Viktor Yanukovych was within Russians arranged just 15 minutes of dis- hours of signing away Ukraine’s Euro- cussion between the two presidents before integration future in Moscow, reported the the scheduled signing, preventing any Kommersant-Ukrayina newspaper, a Kyiv- attempt by Mr. Yanukovych to negotiate based business daily published in the only partial conformity to the Customs Russian language. Union, which was his administration’s stat- At midnight at December 18, he can- ed goal. No advisors were invited to the celed a trip that was to take place the fol- 15-minute meeting. lowing afternoon to the Kremlin, where Only afterwards did the Kremlin sched- Russian President Vladimir Putin was wait- ule talks between the two delegations, ing for him with a stack of documents that including leading ministers, a scenario that would have sealed Ukraine’s membership Kommersant described as “unprecedented in the Customs Union, a precursor to the for international meetings.” In the days Eurasian Union that is aimed at reviving leading up to the trip, its status had been the Russian empire.
    [Show full text]
  • THE CRISIS in UKRAINE: Root Causes AND
    valdaiclub.com THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE: ROOT causes AND Moscow, September 2014 Moscow, SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE Valdai Discussion Club Report ISBN 978-5-906757-07-4 Introduction 3 Scenarios 57 The Ukrainian Economy 58 The Root Causes 6 in the Near-Term Can Ukraine Retrace its 62 of the Crisis Steps? Internal Causes 7 Scenario 1. The Military 65 Operation in Southeast Historical Causes 7 Ukraine Turns into a Civil War Political Causes 17 Scenario 2. Federalization, 68 Economic Causes 26 or a Dayton for Ukraine The Role of External Players 34 Scenario 3. Ukraine’s 70 and Factors Disintegration The Players’ Positions 35 Best-case Scenario 71 Russia and the West: the Ukrainian 38 Clinch An Information War: a New Type 44 of Warfare Civil War and 46 the End of the Revolution War in Southeastern Ukraine 47 Presidential Elections: 52 End of the Revolution and Onset of the Oligarchs’ Rule This report was prepared by the Valdai International Discussion Club based on contributions from Andriy Blinov, Project Director, League for Financial Development (Ukraine); Kost Bondarenko, Director, Ukrainian Policy Institute (Ukraine); political analyst Dmytro Vydrin, Deputy, Verkhovnaya Rada (Ukrainian parliament) of the fifth convocation (Ukraine); Eduard Zolotukhin, Director, Research & Branding Group (Ukraine); Rostislav Ishchenko, President, Center for Systems Analysis and Forecasting (Ukraine); social ana- lyst Yevgeny Kopatko, Founder, Research & Branding Group (Ukraine); Fyodor Lukyanov, Presidium Chair, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Editor-in-Chief,
    [Show full text]
  • UNIVERSITÀ DI PISA Dipartimento Di Civiltà E Forme Del Sapere Corso Di Laurea Magistrale in Scienze Per La Pace Curriculum Trasformazione Dei Conflitti
    UNIVERSITÀ DI PISA Dipartimento di Civiltà e Forme del Sapere Corso di Laurea Magistrale in Scienze per la Pace curriculum Trasformazione dei Conflitti Tesi di Laurea Ucraina: alla ricerca di una nuova identità condivisa? Candidata: Relatore: Alessia Moratto Chiar.mo Prof. Alessandro Polsi Anno Accademico 2015/2016 !1 !2 SOMMARIO PREMESSA……………………………………………………….…… p. 6 Introduzione LA CRISI……………………………………………………………… p. 10 1.1 Le ragioni delle manifestazioni……………………………………………….. p. 10 1.2 Є́ вромайда́ н…………………………………………………………………… p. 12 1.3 La Crimea: una questione irrisolta………………………………………….….. p. 22 1.4 I separatisti del Donbass……………………………………………………..… p. 28 1.5 Elezioni e mutamenti di governo………………………………………………. p. 38 1.6 I costi umani della guerra civile……………………………………………….. p. 41 1.7 Vertice di Minsk: accordo duraturo o mera facciata?………………………….. p. 42 Capitolo 1 STORIA DEI TERRITORI UCRAINI. DALL’ANTICHITÀ ALL’EREDITA’ DELLA RIVOLUZIONE ARANCIONE…………… p. 46 2.1 Dalle origini alla metà dell’Ottocento……………………………………….… p. 46 2.2 Nascita della coscienza nazionale……………………………………………… p. 51 2.3 La reazione russa ai movimenti nazionali ucraini…………………………..…. p. 52 2.4 Nascita dei partiti politici ucraini …………………………………………..…. p. 53 2.5 La rivoluzione del 1905……………………………………….……………….. p. 54 2.6 L’Ucraina nell’Impero Austro-Ungarico………………………………………. p. 55 2.7 Gli ucraini divisi nella Prima Guerra mondiale……………….……………….. p. 56 2.8 La rivoluzione in Ucraina……………………………………………………… p. 57 2.9 Soviet Ukraine (Ukrainian SSR)………………………………………………. p. 65 2.10 L’Ucraina occidentale tra le due guerre………………………………………. p. 69 2.11 La seconda guerra mondiale………..………………………………………… p. 72 !3 2.12 L’Ucraina unita nell’URSS…………………………………………………… p. 74 2.13 Indipendenza………………………………………………………………..… p. 78 2.14 La nuova era………………………………………………………………..… p. 81 2.15 La Rivoluzione Arancione…………………………………………………….
    [Show full text]
  • US Imposes Sectoral Sanctions Against Russia, EU Targets Individuals, May Expand Sanctions
    CLIENT ALERTS US Imposes Sectoral SaNctioNs AgaiNst Russia, EU Targets INdividuals, May ExpaNd SaNctioNs July 21, 2014 Authors Edward J. KraulaNd, Meredith RathboNe, Richard J. Battaglia, Guy SoussaN, Maury SheNk, AlexaNdra Baj, Jack R. Hayes Overview ON July 16, 2014, the US Treasury DepartmeNt, Office of ForeigN Assets CoNtrols (OFAC) issued the Sectoral SaNctioNs IdeNtificatioNs List (SSI List), imposiNg saNctioNs oN several eNtities iN the RussiaN finaNcial aNd eNergy sectors. OFAC also desigNated as Specially DesigNated NatioNals (SDNs) several other iNdividuals aNd eNtities, iNcludiNg KalashNikov CoNcerN, maNufacturer of the AK-47 assault rifle. The EuropeaN UNioN also has beeN active iN imposiNg UkraiNe-related saNctioNs. First, oN July 11, 2014, the EU adopted CouNcil DecisioN 2014/455/CFSP aNd CouNcil ImplemeNtiNg RegulatioN No. 753/2014, imposiNg saNctioNs oN 11 iNdividuals iNvolved iN destabiliziNg easterN UkraiNe. SecoNd, oN July 16, 2014, the EuropeaN CouNcil adopted coNclusioNs (the CommuNique) expressiNg williNgNess to expaNd targetiNg of eNtities coNtributiNg to the crisis iN UkraiNe; block New project fuNdiNg for Russia from the EuropeaN INvestmeNt BaNk, aNd coordiNate Member State positioNs to similarly block fuNdiNg from the EuropeaN BaNk of RecoNstructioN aNd DevelopmeNt; aNd restrict iNvestmeNts iN Crimea aNd Sevastopol. New US SaNctioNs IssuaNce of Sectoral SaNctioNs IdeNtificatioN List IN NamiNg eNtities to the SSI List, OFAC has imposed the first “sectoral” saNctioNs oN Russia uNder Executive Order 13662, targetiNg certaiN eNtities iN the RussiaN finaNcial aNd eNergy sectors. OFAC has stopped short of “blockiNg” the listed eNtities as Specially DesigNated NatioNals (SDNs). Rather, OFAC has restricted US persoNs aNd persoNs withiN the UNited States from traNsactiNg iN, providiNg finaNciNg for, or otherwise dealiNg iN New “debt” of loNger thaN 90 days’ maturity issued for saNctioNed persoNs, aNy eNtity such saNctioNed persoN owNs, directly or iNdirectly, 50 perceNt or more, their property, or their iNterests iN property.
    [Show full text]
  • A Demonstration of Organized Hypocrisy?
    Russian Foreign Policy: a demonstration of organized hypocrisy? An analysis of Russian foreign policy discourse during the Crimean crisis Master’s thesis Supervisor: Prof. Max Bader Giorgio Alesiani (s2282437) International Relations - Global Conflict in the Modern Era Word count: 14,956 0 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 2 1. Sovereignty and intervention: an introduction 5 1.1. Sovereignty: definition 5 1.2. Contemporary era: an outdated concept? 7 1.3. Intervention 9 1.4. Sovereignty as organized hypocrisy 13 2. Russian Foreign Policy 16 3. Case study: the Crimean Crisis 22 3.1. The role of Ukraine and Crimea in Russian foreign policy 22 3.2. The crisis 24 4. Russian discourse on the Crimean crisis 32 4.1. Methodology 32 4.2. Discourse analysis 35 4.2.1. Content analysis 35 4.2.2. Context analysis 40 4.3. Russian foreign policy: a demonstration of organized hypocrisy? 45 Conclusion 50 Bibliography 52 Appendix A 64 Appendix B 66 1 INTRODUCTION Although the concept of sovereignty is one of the pillars of the international system since 1648, scholars, jurists and practitioners alike have failed to produce an incontrovertible and enduring definition. After having overcome innumerable transformations in its theoretical assumption as well as in its practical interpretations, some have come to contend that novelties of the modern era might shake even the basic assumptions of this principle. Others, instead, are confident that this concept will adapt to recent challenges and thus remain a bulwark of the international system. However, most scholars agree that there are some issues that require a concerted effort from the international community, in order to reach a common framework that will enable it to be effectively operationalized.
    [Show full text]