Democratization in Scandinavia: the Case of Sweden Rune Premfors

1 Democratization in Scandinavia: The Case of Sweden Rune Premfors Score Rapportserie 2003:8 ISBN 91-89658-16-7 ISSN 1404-5052 2 Democratization in Scandinavia: The Case of Sweden Rune Premfors Phone int +46 674 74 61 E-mail: [email protected] Score (Stockholm Center for Organizational Research) SE-106 91 Stockholm Sweden 3 ABSTRACT This report has been produced within the framework of a project on comparative democratization in Scandinavia. The purpose of the work for the paper has been to survey the international literature on democratization in search of a useful theoretical framework for the project. In the paper the international literature is also scanned for the insights provided on the specific case of Sweden. The litera-ture may quite neatly be sorted into three theoretical traditions: the moderniza-tion approach, the structural approach, and the transitional approach. These tra-ditions are characterized and assessed in terms of their usefulness for the task at hand. The conclusion is that for historical and comparative studies of democra-tization, the most fruitful perspective may be described as a synthesis between the structural and transition approaches. This composite theoretical framework actually fits Dankwart Rustow’s classical version of the transitional approach quite well. But his ‘genetic model’ has to be amended and modified in several respects. In particular, the paper argues, it needs a more elaborate understanding of the impact of the state-building process. In the case of Sweden, for example, the importance for the democratization process of the formidable political insti-tution which has been labelled Ämbetsmannastaten should be accounted for both theoretically and empirically. 4 1. Introduction A bird’s-eye view of democratization in Scandinavia suggests several significant similarities among the three major countries.1 They were all early democratizers by global standards – by about 1920 the process had been accomplished in all three – but only average or worse among West European countries. The transformation was rather piecemeal and peaceful in Scandinavia in comparison with other countries and regions even though emotions certainly ran high there as well at times. In all three countries small farmers and workers and their organizations were key actors in the process. In the labour movement of all three countries there were revolutionary elements – in Norway they even dominated for a while - but no-where did they eventually win out. The fact that in all three countries monarchy survived indicates a comparably high level of consensus and willingness to compromise in the transition process. And all three countries stayed democratic during the interwar years when so many fellow European countries saw democracy break down. A somewhat closer look at the same set of transformations will reveal many substantial differences as well. For example, an important feature which separates Norway from the other two countries is that the Nor- wegian case must basically be understood against the background of that country’s national struggle of liberation. Democratization and nation-building ran parallel and were closely intertwined in Norway; in Denmark and Sweden nation-building was not unimportant but constituted an established background condition rather than a process evolving in parallel fashion with the arrival of mass politics and democratic institutions. Other differences concern the relative strength of both the various collective actors and the character of their relations in the process of democratization in the three countries. Briefly put, while liberals and liberalism were significant in all countries at the key moments of democratization, they were relatively less so in Sweden where the labour movement had gained the upper hand by the time of the democratic breakthrough. Such brief and preliminary observations on similarities and differences between the Scandinavian countries apart, this paper will focus on the case of Sweden. I will here primarily scan the international literature on democratization in order to put the Swedish case in perspective. The paper does not contain a full narrative of the Swedish developments and events 1 For English-language overviews, see e.g. N. Andrén, “Five Roads to Parliamentary Deomocracy”, in E. Allardt et al, eds., Nordic Democracy. Det Danske Selskab, 1981, p. 44-52; B.J. Nordstrom, Scandinavia Since 1500. University of Minnesota Press, 2000, p. 213-227. 5 which by about 1920 had produced the political institutions considered necessary for a parliamentary, liberal democracy. However I will towards the very end hint at what such a new narrative might look like.2 2. Theories of democratization Over the past two decades, the study of democratization has become a growth industry in political science and related disciplines. Evidently this has been largely due to the greater salience of the phenomenon of democratization itself. What is now, following Samuel Huntington, generally called the ‘third wave of democratization’, spanning in his terminology, the period from 1974 onwards, has greatly increased the number of democratic countries in the world.3 According to one estimate no less than 117 or 61 percent of the world’s countries were democracies in 1998. This was up from 39 countries or 27,5 percent in 1974.4 Most of the recent literature has in empirical terms no doubt concerned these third- wave transitions in a single or several or sometimes even all countries affected. Often such comparative studies have involved two or more cases selected on a regional basis – Southern Europe, Latin America, East and Central Europe etc, with suggested generalizations limited to a specific region.5 But there has also been a much greater interest in recent years in democracy and democratization processes in earlier periods – during the first and second waves in Huntington’s terminology – sometimes also as part of efforts at theory-building through generalization across all ‘waves’ of democratization. The literature abounds with propositions concerning what conditions or factors may have most effectively brought about democracy. In his careful inventory of the literature published until about 1990, Huntington identifies no less than 27 variables or sets of variables that are purported to have been instrumental in transitions to democracy; several among which are clearly contradictory.6 Despite this plenitude and variation, it seems to 2 A full-length narrative is contained in my forthcoming book, with the working title Democracy in Sweden: A Historical and Comparative Perspective. 3 S. Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. U. of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 4 L. Diamond, ”The End of the Third Wave and the Start of the Fourth”, in M.F. Platter and J.C. Espada, eds., The Democratic Invention. The Johns Hopkins U.P., 2000,p.14f; for another somewhat less optimistic estimate, see R. Dahl, On Democracy. Yale University Press, 1998, Ch. 2 and Appendix C. 5 For overviews, see B. Geddes, ”What do we know about democratization after twenty years?”, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol 2, 1999, p. 129-148, and V. Bunce, ”Comparative Democratization. Big and Bounded Generalizations”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 3 No. 6/7, 2000, p. 703-734. 6 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 371f. 6 me to be possible to identify a few reasonably coherent categories of theories in the field of democratization theory. The most fruitful effort in this vein that I have come across is that of David Potter et al in their work Democratization. They argue persuasively that most important theorists and theories in the field can usefully be divided into three types: the modernization, transition, and structural approaches respectively. In Figure 1 below I have briefly summarized some pertinent features of these three schools of thought.7 Fig. 1: Three approaches in democratization theory Modernization approach Structural approach Transition approach Key text Lipset 1959 Moore 1966 Rustow 1970 Explanatory Socio-economic Changing structure Elite agency in Focus conditions of class power political conflicts Method Variable-oriented Case-oriented Case-oriented Issues -Economic versus -Role of trans- Historic within other variables national power versus proximate approach -Emergence versus -Which class? causes survival -Role of civil society The basic claim of the modernization approach is, in Lipset’s own words, that the ”more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy.”8 The well-known theory behind the claim, modernization 7 D. Potter, D. Goldblatt, M. Kiloh, and P. Lewis, eds., Democratization. Polity Press, 1997, p.10ff. For authors who have largely followed suit, see J. Grugel, Democratiza- tion: A Critical Introduction. Palgrave, 2002; and G. Pridham, The Dynamics of Democratiztion: A Comparative Approach. Continuum, 2000. 8 S.M. Lipset, ”Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, APSR, Vol 53 No 1, March 1959, p. 69-105. 7 theory, argues that there is one general process of societal development characterized by a gradual separation and specialization of social structures; one of the final facets in this chain of development is a specific political structure, democracy. Lipset’s path-breaking study has been followed by a legion of similar investigations, typically confirming the original findings while adding nuances to them.9 In addition, however, several studies have argued that other

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