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Como Embajador Extraordinario Y Plenipotenciario De México Ante La 2017

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Como Embajador Extraordinario Y Plenipotenciario De México Ante La 2017 DOCUMENTO DE APOYO CON MOTIVO DEL PROCESO DE RATIFICACIÓN DEL H. SENADO DE LA REPÚBLICA, AL NOMBRAMIENTO DEL C. JOSÉ IGNACIO MADRAZO BOLÍVAR COMO EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO DE MÉXICO ANTE LA REPÚBLICA LIBANESA 2017 Líbano 28/08/17 Contenido LÍBANO A. Datos básicos ............................................................................................................................................... 2 A. 1 Características generales .......................................................................................................................... 2 A.2 Indicadores sociales .................................................................................................................................. 3 A.3 Estructura del Producto Interno Bruto ..................................................................................................... 3 A.4 Coyuntura económica ............................................................................................................................... 3 A.5 Comercio exterior...................................................................................................................................... 4 A.6 Distribución de comercio por países ......................................................................................................... 5 A.7 Distribución del comercio por productos ................................................................................................. 5 B. Situación política ......................................................................................................................................... 7 B.1 Política interna .......................................................................................................................................... 7 B.2 Política exterior ....................................................................................................................................... 12 C. Relaciones bilaterales ................................................................................................................................ 13 C.1 Relaciones diplomáticas .......................................................................................................................... 13 C.2 Relaciones económicas ........................................................................................................................... 13 C.3 Cooperación ............................................................................................................................................ 15 C.4 Visitas en ambos sentidos en los últimos años ....................................................................................... 15 C.5 Relación de principales declaraciones, tratados y acuerdos firmados ................................................... 18 C.6 Cronología histórica de Líbano ................................................................................................................ 18 PROGRAMA DE TRABAJO .................................................................................................................................. 20 PERFIL BIOGRÁFICO DEL EMBAJADOR .............................................................................................................. 23 1 Líbano 28/08/17 LÍBANO A. Datos básicos A. 1 Características generales Denominación oficial: República Libanesa Superficie total: 10,450 km2 Límites: al norte y al este con Siria, al sur con Israel y al oeste con el mar Mediterráneo Población: 5.9 millones de habitantes Capital: Beirut Idioma: árabe (oficial), francés Moneda: libra libanesa Religión: islam (59.7%), cristianismo (39%) Forma de gobierno: Es una república parlamentaria dentro de un marco confesional. Los principales cargos del gobierno se dividen proporcionalmente entre diferentes comunidades religiosas. El Presidente es el Jefe de Estado. Lo elige el Parlamento por un período de 6 años y debe ser cristiano maronita. El Primer Ministro es el Jefe de Gobierno. Lo designa el Presidente después de consultar con el Parlamento y debe ser musulmán sunita. El Parlamento es unicameral. La Asamblea Nacional está integrada por 128 miembros elegidos de manera proporcional por un período de 4 años. Cada comunidad religiosa tiene un número asignado de escaños, pero se eligen por voto popular. El Presidente de la Asamblea 2 Líbano 28/08/17 Nacional debe ser musulmán chiíta. El poder Judicial está compuesto por cuatro Cortes de Casación, el Consejo Constitucional, el Consejo Supremo y cortes militares. A.2 Indicadores sociales Índice de desarrollo humano: 0.763 (ranking mundial: 76) Esperanza de vida: 76 años (hombres), 79 años (mujeres) Tasa de alfabetización: 94.1% Núm. de hijos por mujer: 1.73 Población urbana: 87.8% Densidad de población: 571.9 hab/km2 Tasa de natalidad: 14.4/1,000 hab. Tasa de mortalidad: 4.9/1,000 hab. Tasa de crecimiento poblacional: 4.2% Tasa de desempleo: ND PIB per cápita PPA: US$18,276.9 Núm. de mexicanos en Líbano: 1,428 (IME, 2016) Núm. de libaneses en México: 444 (INM, 2009). La comunidad mexicano-libanesa es de cerca de 500,000 personas. Entradas de visitantes libaneses a México: 1,173 (INM, 2016) A.3 Estructura del Producto Interno Bruto Distribución por sectores Sector % del PIB Agricultura 4.8 Industria 16.6 Servicios 78.6 A.4 Coyuntura económica Indicadores económicos 2016 PIB: US$52 mil millones PIB % crecimiento real: 1% 3 Líbano 28/08/17 PIB per cápita PPA: US$18,276.9 Tasa de inflación: 3.1% Tasa de desempleo: ND Balanza cuenta corriente: -US$10.6 mil millones Exportaciones totales (bienes): US$3.9 mil millones Importaciones totales (bienes): US$19 mil millones Reservas en moneda extranjera y oro: US$48.6 mil millones Deuda pública: 143.4% del PIB Deuda externa: US$30.9 mil millones Tipo de cambio por dólar: 1,511.5 libras libanesas por dólar Tipo de cambio por euro: 1,702.7 libras libanesas por euro Índice de competitividad “Doing Business 2017” del Banco Mundial (190 economías): lugar 126 (México: 47) Fuente: DGREB A.5 Comercio exterior Estructura 2016 balanza (miles de millones de comercial dólares) Importaciones 19 Exportaciones 3.9 Saldo -15 4 Líbano 28/08/17 A.6 Distribución de comercio por países Principales proveedores de Líbano, 2015 Principales clientes de Líbano, 2015 País % total de País % total de importaciones exportaciones 1. China 11.5 1. Arabia 12.1 Saudita 2. Italia 7.1 2. Emiratos 10.6 3. Alemania 6.8 Árabes Unidos 4. Francia 6 3. Iraq 7.6 5. Estados 5.7 Unidos 4. Siria 7.1 6. Rusia 4.6 5. Sudáfrica 6.6 A.7 Distribución del comercio por productos Exportaciones e importaciones (Top 3, 2015) Productos % del total Productos % del total 1. Metales, 39.8 1. Metales, maquinaria y 33.7 maquinaria y equipo equipo 2. Madera y químicos 12.5 2. Petróleo 21.4 3. Alimentos 10.2 3. Madero y químicos 15.2 5 Líbano 28/08/17 PIB en 2016 (FMI):1 80ª economía del mundo con un PIB de $52.0 miles de millones de dólares (mmdd) Crecimiento de 1.0%, mismo nivel que en 2015 o El turismo, el sector inmobiliario y la construcción, motores tradicionales de crecimiento, han sido afectados fuertemente por las condiciones políticas y de seguridad. Los precios más bajos del petróleo apoyaron la demanda interna y redujeron los costos fiscales (Líbano es importador neto de petróleo). Efectos del conflicto en Siria (FMI): El conflicto entró en su séptimo año. Los refugiados sirios desplazados hacia Líbano contabilizan más de un cuarto de la población del país (1.5 millones de personas, BM). La presencia de refugiados está aumentando la pobreza y el desempleo, y presionando aún más las débiles finanzas públicas e infraestructura de la economía. Políticas públicas (FMI): La situación fiscal es cada vez más difícil: o Los ingresos fiscales como proporción del PIB continúan disminuyendo, mientras que los pagos de intereses han subido en línea con la deuda pública. o Los superávit primarios de 1.4% y 1.1% del PIB en 2015 y 2016, respectivamente, no fueron suficientes para compensar el impacto de la desaceleración del crecimiento y el aumento de los pagos de intereses. o En 2016, el déficit fiscal fue de 8.1% del PIB y la deuda pública aumentó a un estimado de 143.4% del PIB. Bajo un régimen de tipo de cambio fijo, las entradas de divisas se desaceleraron en la primera mitad de 2016, resultando en una caída de las reservas internacionales. Recomendaciones del FMI: El nuevo gobierno que inició en octubre de 2016, se enfrenta a grandes retos que requieren: o Restaurar la sostenibilidad fiscal o Anclar la estabilidad financiera 1 FMI: Fondo Monetario Internacional. BM: Banco Mundial. UIE: Unidad de Inteligencia de The Economist. 6 Líbano 28/08/17 o Promover un desarrollo sostenible mediante reformas que resuelvan el déficit de infraestructura que padece, particularmente en el sector eléctrico Perspectiva para 2017: Crecimiento: 2.0% sustentado en la mejoría de los sectores turismo, inmobiliario y de la construcción, si no se cae en un estancamiento político (FMI-BM). Perspectiva para el mediano plazo: • Crecimiento promedio anual: 2.9% proyectado entre 2017 y 2021 (UIE). • Obstáculos al consumo privado y la inversión derivados de: o La continua incertidumbre en la escena política interna. o La inestabilidad regional, incluida la actual crisis diplomática en Qatar. o La moderación de los precios mundiales del petróleo que limitarán el crecimiento de la ayuda, la inversión y las entradas de remesas provenientes de los países exportadores de petróleo. B. Situación política B.1 Política interna Situación
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