The Remarkable Rise of the Brazilian President's Social Liberal Party

A Working Paper May 2019

Mark S. Langevin, Ph.D. and Edmund Ruge

Abstract

Jair Bolsonaro’s extraordinary victory triggered a remarkable coattail effect in Brazil’s 2018 elections. In a single year, the president’s Partido Social Liberal (PSL) was transformed from a small liberal- oriented political faction with a couple of federal deputies to a game-changing political force. The PSL elected 52 candidates in the 513 seat Chamber of Deputies as well as four senators and now rivals the Workers Party (PT) as the largest party in the highly fragmented National Congress. The PSL’s conservative brand expanded through social media as the party’s candidates and activists pushed out anti-PT and anti-establishment messages, often voiced by their presidential candidate, to increase the aggregate number of followers across multiple social media platforms. The party’s low cost-high impact campaign strategy reached millions of citizens during the second half of 2018 and eventually triggered a historic political realignment in the 2018 elections. This special BrazilWorks Working Paper examines the remarkable rise of the PSL and its congressional delegation to better understand its impact on governance and democratic development in Brazil under the Bolsonaro administration.

Mark S. Langevin, Ph.D. is Director of BrazilWorks and Senior Fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Arizona. Follow him on Twitter @brazil_works or contact him via [email protected].

Edmund Ruge is a freelance journalist and researcher based in Rio de Janeiro. He holds a Master’s degree in International Economics and Latin American Studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Follow him on Twitter at @edmundruge or contact him via [email protected].

BrazilWorks (www.brazilworks.net) provides analysis and advisory services to decision makers. We engage our policy research and evaluation expertise alongside our dialogue and negotiation services to support leaders and organizations as they take decisions to advance their mission and goals. We specialize in Brazilian policy research and evaluation, and work in collaboration with associates throughout Brazil and around the world. BrazilWorks maintains offices in Washington, D.C. and Brasília.

© Copyright 2019 Mark S. Langevin and Edmund Ruge

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The Remarkable Rise of the Brazilian President's Social Liberal Party

Mark S. Langevin, Ph.D. Edmund Ruge

Jair Bolsonaro, the new president of Brazil, is bent on rewriting political history and changing the course of Brazilian democracy for decades to come. Bolsonaro may govern but his Partido Social Liberal (Social Liberal Party or PSL) now drives the conservative-nationalist movement that swept the president to victory and triggered an historic political realignment in last year’s critical elections.1

Bolsonaro’s presidential campaign began with his vote to impeach then-president Dilma Rousseff on April 17, 2016. In Brasilia’s Chamber of Deputies. Bolsonaro dedicated his vote to Colonel Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra, the man who administered the military dictatorship’s intelligence operations (DOI-Codi) and its infamous clandestine detention center where Rousseff was tortured.2 In his short speech, Bolsonaro mocked Rousseff and the Workers Party (PT) before yelling out his campaign slogan, “Brazil first, God above all else.” His parliamentary theatrics thrust him to the center-stage of the nation’s politics and polarized the nation behind his explicit commemoration of Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964 to 1985). Thereafter, increasing numbers of Brazilians understood Bolsonaro as a charismatic man of destiny, a salvador da patria in Brazilian terms. His growing legion of followers called him the “Myth” and the “Captain.” It did not hurt that his middle name was Messias, the Portuguese word for messiah. Bolsonaro may have spent nearly three decades as a backbencher in congress,3 but in 2018 he emerged as the solution for a majority of Brazilian voters ready for an “outsider.”

In the October 7th first round balloting, Bolsonaro beat all comers with 46.03 percent of all valid votes. In the second-round, he easily outpaced the PT’s Fernando Haddad with 57,797,847 votes, or 55.13 percent of all valid votes.4 Today, Jair Bolsonaro is president of the world’s fourth largest democracy,

1 This article is partially based on two shorter pieces published by the authors in the London School of Economics and Political Science- Latin America and Caribbean blog. “Wilderness to wildest dreams: the remarkable rise of Bolsonaro’s Social Liberal Party in Brazil.” Published on March 1, 2019 and accessed at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2019/03/01/wilderness-to-wildest-dreams-the-remarkable-rise-of-bolsonaros-social- liberal-party-in-brazil/ and “Bolsonaro’s base: the Social Liberal Party’s strengths in Rio de Janeiro could yet become weaknesses. Published on March 13, 2019 and accessed at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2019/03/13/bolsonaros- base-the-social-liberal-partys-strengths-in-rio-de-janeiro-could-yet-become-weaknesses/. 2 For a review of Bolsonaro’s admiration of Ustra see “Quem é Ustra, o torturador celebrado por Bolsonaro até hoje.” Carta Capital. October 17, 2018 and accessed at: https://www.cartacapital.com.br/politica/quem-e-ustra-o-torturador-celebrado-por- bolsonaro-ate-hoje/. 3 For Bolsonaro’s legislative record see “Jair Bolsonaro, o mito de pés de barro.” Congresso em Foco. 26th edition (2018) and accessed at: https://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/jair-bolsonaro-o-mito-de-pes-de-barro/. 4 BBC News Brasil. “Bolsonaro presidente: veja os resultados da apuração.” October 28, 2018 and accessed at: https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-45995934.

3 BrazilWorks.net the leader of the fastest growing political party in Brazil, and the center of a disruptive conservative- nationalist movement that promises to redirect the course of Brazilian democracy for a generation. Bolsonaro’s surging popularity in 2018 and the remarkable rise of his PSL emerged from the wreckage of the compounding crisis that shipwrecked Brazil by late 2014.5 The combination of the Lava Jato (Car Wash) corruption scandal,6 stemming from Petrobras procurement kickbacks to politicians and political parties, and the deep recession that shaved off some seven percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 2015 to 2017, cracked the political and institutional foundation of Brazilian democracy while opening the door to its loudest voices. Politicians gained popularity by bashing the PT and the political establishment for the “sins” of Brazil.7 Bolsonaro learned to couple the powerful reach of social media platforms with his rant and rave populism, obtaining the most votes of any Rio de Janeiro federal deputy candidate in 2014. Thereafter he multiplied this powerful political recipe across every region of Brazil just as trust in the political establishment and the approval levels of President Michel Temer hit rock bottom. The only obstacle standing between Bolsonaro and the presidential palace was former president Luis Inácio Lula da Silva of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party or PT).

Support for Lula intensified as federal prosecutors worked to convict him on Lava Jato-related corruption charges. While Lula held the media spotlight in late 2017 and early 2018, Bolsonaro campaigned to increase his name recognition and expand his legion of social media followers, known by some as bolsominions. Datafolha measured voters’ intentions in March 2017 and detected a 36 percent plurality ready to return Lula to the presidency. The same poll revealed that Bolsonaro was running second with a modest 18 percent approval.8 One year later, Lula was convicted and jailed despite a rise to 39 percent support among prospective voters. However, his conviction nullified his campaign registry under the Ficha Limpa or Clean Slate law that forbids candidates with criminal convictions from seeking elected office.9 Bolsonaro continued in second place with 19 percent and relatively high voter rejection levels, casting doubt on his ability to garner a majority down the home stretch. In September of 2018, everything changed.

5 For background see Langevin, Mark S. “Brazil’s Compounding Crisis.” Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). May 22, 2016 and accessed at: http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Brazil%E2%80%99s-Compounding- Crisis_M.Langevin.pdf. 6 Claire Felter and Rocio Cara Labrador. “Brazil’s Corruption Fallout.” Council on Foreign Relations. Updated on November 7, 2018 and accessed at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/brazils-corruption-fallout. 7 Mark Langevin. “Brazil’s crisis of political legitimacy has opened the door to rant-and-rave populist Jair Bolsonaro.” London School of Economics and Politics Latin America and Caribbean Blog. November 29, 2017 and accessed at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2017/11/29/brazils-crisis-of-political-legitimacy-has-opened-the-door-to-rant-and-rave- populist-jair-bolsonaro/ and for a contrasting view see Alfredo Saad-Filho And Armando Boito. “Brazil: The Failure Of The PT And The Rise Of The ‘New Right.” Socialist Register. 2016 and accessed at: https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/41269007/Alfredo_Armando_Failure_of_PT_Rise_New_Right.pdf?AW SAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1556895990&Signature=9aHqGLvoUjSDnAHvm8bn9xZxeI0%3 D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DBrazil_The_Failure_of_the_PT_and_the_Ris.pdf. 8 Datafolha. “Intenção de voto presidente: 29 e 30/11/2017.” Accessed at: http://media.folha.uol.com.br/datafolha/2017/12/04/4c20823b9d511594f43a6557cc76bb46.pdf. 9 Estado de São Paulo. “TSE usa Lei da Ficha Limpa para barrar Lula.” August 31, 2018 and accessed at: https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/tse-forma-maioria-contra-registro-de-lula-e-para-barrar-horario-eleitoral- do-pt/. Also, Geoffrey Robertson. “The Case for Lula.” Foreign Affairs. April 19, 2018.

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Bolsonaro was stabbed on September 6th at a campaign rally in Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais10 leaving him hospitalized for the remainder of the month. Bolsonaro’s injury was near fatal but did not stop him from tweeting from his hospital bed. Bolsonaro continued to mobilize social media throughout the remainder of the campaign season, blaming everything from Lava Jato to pedophilia on the PT and other left leaning parties. His support surged in September as Lula sat behind bars and the remaining candidates stumbled over questions about the former president’s conviction and how best to counter corruption and crime. Meanwhile, Bolsonaro and his PSL offered simple answers: they promised to hunt down criminals and jail corrupt politicians. The PT scrambled in early September, eventually deciding to substitute Lula with his vice-presidential running mate Fernando Haddad, the former Mayor of São Paulo and favored “son” of Lula who also served as Minister of Education under both Lula and Rousseff administrations (2005 to 2012).11 The fumbled switch stood in stark contrast to Bolsonaro’s improvement with key segments of the electorate. In September, Bolsonaro increased his approval among women from 18 to 28 percent.12 He also multiplied his support among evangelicals, Afro- Brazilians, and poor working families throughout most of Brazil with the exception of the PT-leaning Northeast. Also, as traditional establishment candidates slumped in the polls, including Henrique Meirelles of the Brazilian Democratic Movement party (MDB) and Geraldo Alckmin of the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), business and political elites began to throw their support behind Bolsonaro, deeming him the candidate most likely to beat the PT.13 Haddad easily surpassed the pack of presidential candidates trailing Bolsonaro, but it became clear by the first round that a majority of Brazilians favored a political realignment. Brazilians wanted change and Bolsonaro promised major disruptions to the political order.

During the campaign season, Bolsonaro avoided presidential debates and offered few detailed policy proposals.14 He promised to leave economic and fiscal policy making to his University of Chicago trained economic policy advisor Paulo Guedes. Bolsonaro commanded the public narrative, turning the election into a referendum on the PT and Brasilia’s political establishment while promising to end corruption and fight crime. With Lula in prison and barred from running, Bolsonaro won the presidential election handily. Moreover, Bolsonaro broke up the presidential monopoly enjoyed by the PT and PSDB since the 1994 elections and thereby earned a convincing mandate to make dramatic changes in economic, fiscal and social policy.

10 The Guardian. “Jair Bolsonaro stabbing: knife attack plunges Brazil's election into disarray.” September 7, 2018 and accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/07/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-stabbing-knife-attack-election. 11 Dom Phillips. “Fernando Haddad aims to be Brazil's new Lula – but does anyone know who he is?” The Guardian. September 18,2018 and accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/18/fernando-haddad-lula-brazil-election. 12 See Daniel Weterman. “Ibope: Bolsonaro lidera entre mulheres e evangélicos.” Estado de São Paulo. September 11, 2018 and accessed at: https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/eleicoes/2018/noticias/agencia-estado/2018/09/11/ibope-bolsonaro-lidera- entre-mulheres-e-evangelicos.htm and Úrsula Passos. “Bolsonaro mantém liderança também entre as mulheres, segundo Datafolha.” Folha de São Paulo. October 4, 2018 and accessed at: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/bolsonaro- mantem-lideranca-tambem-entre-as-mulheres-segundo-datafolha.shtml. 13 Mariana Desidério. “Os empresários que apoiam a candidatura de Bolsonaro.” Exame. September 27, 2018 and accessed at: https://exame.abril.com.br/negocios/os-empresarios-que-apoiam-bolsonaro/ and Matias Spektor. “It’s Not Just the Right That’s Voting for Bolsonaro. It’s Everyone.” Foreign Policy. October 26, 2018 and accessed at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/26/its-not-just-the-right-thats-voting-for-bolsonaro-its-everyone-far-right-brazil- corruption-center-left-anger-pt-black-gay-racism-homophobia/. 14 See Bolsonaro’s plan for government, “O CAMINHO DA PROSPERIDADE,” which can be found in Portuguese at the TSE website, http://www.tse.jus.br/arquivos/jair-bolsonaro-proposta-de-governo-1o-turno.

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Jair Bolsonaro’s extraordinary victory triggered a measurable coattail effect in the national congressional elections. In a single year, the president’s PSL was transformed from a small liberal- oriented political faction with a couple of federal deputies to a game-changing political force. The PSL elected 52 candidates in the 513 seat Chamber of Deputies as well as four senators and now rivals the PT as the largest party in the highly fragmented Chamber of Deputies. Borges and Lloyd examine Brazilian elections up to 2014 and document the presence of a coattail effect between successful presidential candidates and their chosen gubernatorial candidates in Brazil.15 At first glance many assume that the PSL’s overall success at the ballot box was due to Bolsonaro and his bandwagon. However, the presidential candidate’s coattails may represent a more complex dynamic driven by an interactive set of relationships found within the budding conservative-nationalist movement. The PSL’s conservative brand expanded as candidates (led by Bolsonaro and his politician sons), party members, and social media activists pushed out anti-PT and anti-establishment messages, often voiced by their presidential candidate, to increase the aggregate number of followers across multiple social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp.16 The party’s reliance on social media reduced campaign costs, mitigated the lack of free television and radio time granted by the Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE), and allowed the movement to quickly reach millions of Brazilians and ultimately operationalize followers into loyal voters on election day.

Bolsonaro’s spike in approval ratings during the month of September could not have been secured without a broader social media campaign populated by the followers of the conservative-nationalist movement. The coattail effect was just the last step in a longer process of political mobilization that intersected with Bolsonaro and the PSL in the second half of 2018 and peaked in October. For now, President Bolsonaro attracts most of the attention, but his political party will decide the final outcome of Brazil’s extraordinary political realignment.

This special BrazilWorks Working Paper examines the remarkable rise of the PSL and its congressional delegation to better understand how the party may impact governance, law-making, and democratic development in Brazil.17 The first section explores the Brazilian party system and the rise of the Social Liberal Party. The second section provides a focused analysis on the party and the 2018 elections at the federal level. The third section explores the initial performance of the PSL in congress, its alliances and leadership. The fourth section synthesizes the major findings to understand the party’s ongoing impact on Brazilian democracy.

15 Andre Borges and Ryan Lloyd. “Presidential coattails and electoral coordination in multilevel elections: Comparative lessons from Brazil. Electoral Studies. Volume 43 (2016:104-114). 16 In the case of systematic use of WhatsApp, see ITS Rio. “Computational Power: Automated Use of WhatsApp in the Elections.” October 26, 2018 and accessed at: https://feed.itsrio.org/computational-power-automated-use-of-whatsapp-in-the- elections-59f62b857033?gi=b4041bcb140, as cited by Caio C. V. Machado. “WhatsApp’s Influence in the Brazilian Election and How It Helped Jair Bolsonaro Win. Council on Foreign Relations. November 13, 2018 and accessed at: https://www.cfr.org/blog/whatsapps-influence-brazilian-election-and-how-it-helped-jair-bolsonaro-win. 17 Our research on the Social Liberal Party was first published by the London School of Economics and Politics Latin American blog, see “Wilderness to wildest dreams: the remarkable rise of Bolsonaro’s Social Liberal Party in Brazil,” published on 1 March 2019 at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2019/03/01/wilderness-to-wildest-dreams-the- remarkable-rise-of-bolsonaros-social-liberal-party-in-brazil/; and “Bolsonaro’s base: the Social Liberal Party’s strengths in Rio de Janeiro could yet become weaknesses,” published at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2019/03/13/bolsonaros- base-the-social-liberal-partys-strengths-in-rio-de-janeiro-could-yet-become-weaknesses/.

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The Brazilian Party System and Political Realignment

The PSL’s remarkable rise is made all the more improbable by Brazil’s highly fragmented party system and contestation over public office, public monies, and free television and radio airtime. The Brazilian party system provides clear incentives for elected politicians to establish new, smaller registered political parties, but the system also limits their potential for growth. Since the return to civilian rule in 1985 and the enactment of the 1988 federal constitution, the number of political parties in Brazil has grown to 35 officially registered entities. Since 2011, eight additional political parties were registered, a 30 percent increase. In 2018 thirty parties elected members to the Brazilian National Congress (see Appendix 1: Brazilian Political Parties). The Social Liberal Party reflects this pattern. Its founder, Luciano Bivar, broke away from the Liberal Party (PL) in the mid-1990s to set up his own shop, control party finances, and decide who could run for public office under the party’s registry.18 The PSL, like so many Brazilian political parties, largely served to fragment the system in order to render private benefits for a select faction or politician. Many of these smaller parties, including the PSL until the 2018 elections, served as a “rental” for enterprising candidates in need of a registered party to file their candidacy with the TSE.

However, this trend could be reversed by the implementation of the 2017 legislation that establishes stricter, minimum eligibility requirements to qualify for public monies distributed through the Party Fund (Fundo Partidário), the Special Electoral Fund (Fundo Especial de Financiamento de Campanha), and free radio and television time for candidates.19 The newly established minimum requirements (known in Brazil as the “clausula de barreira”) take effect in 2019 and stipulate that party eligibility is dependent upon garnering 1.5 percent of the valid vote distributed in at least a nine of the states and federal district with at least one percent of the jurisdiction’s total valid vote; or a party can simply elect nine federal deputies representing at least nine states or the federal district. The bar will be raised in future elections to include at least two percent of the vote or 11 deputies in 2022, 2.5 percent of the vote or 13 deputies in 2026 and 3 percent or 15 deputies by 2030.

As a consequence of the 2018 elections, nine parties that elected members to congress did not reach the minimum requirements for the Party Fund or free radio and television time. Political parties can continue to operate without qualifying for the Party Fund, but their organizational capacity and resource base will be significantly reduced. According to the TSE, 21 of the 35 registered political parties represented in congress are eligible for public financing in 2019. Over R$927 million will be dispersed with the PSL receiving the largest share, 12.81 percent, followed by the PT (11.32), PSDB (6.6), PSD (6.43), PP (6.12), PSB (6.02), MDB (6.08), DEM (5.12), and the PDT (5.08) among others.20 The following registered parties did not qualify for public funding: Rede Sustentabilidade, Patriota, Partido Humanista da Solidariedade (PHS), Democracia Cristã (DC), Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCdoB),

18 Evandro Éboli. “Empresário e cartola do futebol: quem é o dono do partido que acolheu Bolsonaro.” Gazeto do Povo. January 10, 2018 and accessed at: https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/politica/republica/eleicoes-2018/empresario-e-cartola- do-futebol-quem-e-o-dono-do-partido-que-acolheu-bolsonaro-42isb2kzimxgoygpp21r2ff67/. 19 Agência Brasil. “Political reform approved in Brazil, some rules apply for 2018 elections. October 9, 2017 and accessed at: http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/politica/noticia/2017-10/political-reform-approved-brazil-some-rules-apply-2018- elections. 20 Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). “TSE publica portaria com relação de partidos que terão acesso ao Fundo Partidário em 2019.” January 29, 2019 and accessed at: http://www.tse.jus.br/imprensa/noticias-tse/2019/Janeiro/tse-publica-portaria-com- relacao-de-partidos-que-terao-acesso-ao-fundo-partidario-em-2019.

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Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB), Partido da Causa Operária (PCO), Partido da Mulher Brasileira (PMB), Partido da Mobilização Nacional (PMN), Partido Pátria Livre (PPL), Partido Republicano Progressista (PRP), Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro (PRTB), Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado (PSTU), and the Partido Trabalhista Cristão (PTC).21

Parties who failed to meet the minimum requirements now face a difficult choice: forge ahead without public financing and free radio and television time during campaigns, or fuse with another registered political party. The PSL not only survived the stricter requirements but is now the biggest beneficiary of the 2017 reform. Dozens of federal deputies and senators affiliated with parties that failed to meet the minimum public financing requirements will consider switching affiliation to the PSL. This movement holds out the possibility of consolidating the PSL as the dominant conservative political force in Brazil in the coming years.

The enactment of the 2017 public funding requirements will lessen political party fragmentation but may fall short of transforming the Brazilian political party system into a more concentrated formation offering voters clear and distinct ideological and programmatic options. Most Brazilian political parties downplay ideology and organize around subterranean efforts to obtain patronage from the president and congressional leaders while also representing powerful private interests. Mello and Spektor argue that

“While Brazil’s multiparty presidential system benefits legislators when they are on the prowl for patronage, it effectively takes away any meaningful tools that they could use to establish programmatic links with their voters.”22

In 2018 then-candidate Jair Bolsonaro and the PSL took advantage of the accountability gap between established politicians and their electoral constituencies by offering a straightforward policy guide, framed by the fight against corruption and crime, and delivered through low cost social media channels.23 The PSL’s clear message was transmitted to millions of prospective voters without much distortion or interpretation by the mainstream media. The party built meaningful links between its candidates and followers based on patriotic symbols, a relevant message, and low cost-high impact social media engagements. This approach stood in stark contrast to the major political parties’ dependence on professional media consultants and public relations firms to make the most of their free television and radio time. These differences in campaign marketing paralleled the deeper political cleavages that separated Bolsonaro and his PSL from the rest of the political party system.

Hunter and Power detail these cleavages and argue that they led to the political realignment that ushered in Bolsonaro and the PSL.24 They propose that Brazil’s major political parties lost favor with the electorate as the recession deepened and the Lava Jato corruption scandal widened with prominent

21 Globo1. “14 partidos devem cair na cláusula de barreira e ficar sem fundo partidário e tempo de TV.” October 10, 2018. Accessed on March 29, 2019 at: https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2018/10/09/14-partidos-devem-ser-enquadrados-na- clausula-de-barreira-e-ficar-sem-fundo-partidario-e-tempo-de-tv.ghtml. 22 Eduardo Mello and Matias Spektor. “Brazil: The Costs of Multiparty Presidentialism. Journal of Democracy. Vol. 29, No. 2 (April 2018:119). 23 See Bolsonaro’s plan for government, “O CAMINHO DA PROSPERIDADE” can be found in Portuguese at the TSE website, http://www.tse.jus.br/arquivos/jair-bolsonaro-proposta-de-governo-1o-turno. 24 Wendy Hunter and Timothy J. Power. “Bolsonaro and Brazil’s Illiberal Backlash.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 30, No. 1 (2019).

8 BrazilWorks.net prosecutions and convictions, including those of former president Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) and former president of the Chamber of Deputies Eduardo Cunha (MDB). The fall out with most voters was confirmed when the respective presidential candidates of the MDB and PSDB tanked early in the campaign season. Accordingly, these conditions created an opportunity for a “hostile takeover” of the political center by the organized political forces of an insurgent conservative-nationalist movement that worked to deepen polarization and disseminate a decidedly fervent form of “anti-petismo” against the PT.25 Hunter and Power conceptualize these developments into two distinct cleavages within the 2018 Brazilian electorate, one decidedly anti-establishment and the other dead set against the PT returning to power. Bolsonaro and his PSL adroitly employed these two cleavages to distinguish their campaign from the MDB and PSDB candidates and then juxtapose their political program with that of the PT and other left of center political parties, most notably the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL) in Rio de Janeiro. Ultimately, this strategy catapulted Bolsonaro into first place among the presidential contenders and effectively branded PSL candidates as “patriotic outsiders” who could effectively represent the conservative-nationalist movement in the National Congress and state assemblies throughout Brazil.

Most of the initial attention paid to the 2018 Brazilian elections directs analysis to the underlying economic and political conditions that gave rise to an “outsider” and “law and order” presidential candidate in a “change” election. This explanatory approach is necessary but insufficient to understand the rapid rise of the PSL and consequent political realignment. A full explanation requires a closer examination of the president’s party and its role in fueling the Bolsonaro bandwagon and providing national leadership to the insurgent conservative-nationalist movement. How did the PSL grow so quickly? How will the party organize itself as the political anchor of the Bolsonaro government in Congress as well as the leadership of the conservative-nationalist movement? Will the PSL outlast the president’s popularity and move on to recast Brazilian democracy in the years to come?

Bolsonaro and the Origins of the Social Liberal Party

The PSL was founded by ultra-liberal Luciano Bivar from the state of Pernambuco in 1994 and obtained its official registry in 1998.26 Bivar was a perennial, failed candidate for mayor of Recife but ultimately won election to the Chamber of Deputies in 1998 as the PSL’s sole representative. In 2002, Lincoln Portela of Minas Gerais (now a deputy of the Republic Party or PR) replaced him as the single PSL member in congress. Bivar ran for president in 2006 as a staunch liberal voice while his party made very modest electoral gains at the state and municipal levels. His platform included a federal 3.4 percent flat tax, the deployment of the armed forces into the country’s poorest neighborhoods, and a constitutional amendment permitting the death penalty.27 He is a consistent critic of bureaucratic politics and even warned that a president could be held hostage by what he refers to as the “bureaustocracy.”

25 Ibid. 26 Milton Gamez. “Bivar: “Sou o anticandidato.” Istoé. August 30. 2006 and accessed at: https://istoe.com.br/5340_BIVAR+SOU+O+ANTICANDIDATO+/. 27 For a comparative analysis of the PSL under Bivar and in comparative perspective with a sample of Brazilian conservative political parties see Flávia Roberta Babireski, “Pequenos partidos de direita no Brasil: uma análise dos seus posicionamentos políticos.” Universidade Federal do Paraná (ufpr)- núcleo de pesquisa em sociologia política brasileira (nusp). Newsletter, May 2016 and accessed at: http://bibliotecadigital.tse.jus.br/xmlui/bitstream/handle/bdtse/2490/2016_babireski_pequenos_partidos_direita.pdf?sequence =1&isAllowed=y,

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Bivar’s policy priorities are framed by his notable wealth and the kidnapping of his son in 2000. His politics combine liberal economic prescriptions with a forceful offensive against violent crime, a framing that may best explain the PSL’s strategic alliance with Bolsonaro. The party continued to scratch out its survival in the political desert following Bivar’s failed 2006 presidential bid by operating as a “party for hire” and the founder’s personal bullhorn. The PSL’s state and local representation was limited and concentrated in the North and Northeast regions. The party could only muster enough votes to elect one federal deputy in 2010 and 2014. During the 2014 elections, the PSL aligned with the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) to hitch a ride on the expected coattails of Marina Silva’s presidential campaign.28 Silva lost in the first round, sending Bivar and his PSL back to the drawing board to find another route to political survival.

Bivar financed the party but needed something bigger than his wallet and liberal economic outlook to take the PSL and his ideological vision to a nationwide audience. The party needed a lightning rod to jolt the nation’s attention and disrupt the perennial rivalry between the PT and PSDB. Bivar, and his junior political operative Julian Lemos, circled the wagons in 2015 to reaffirm their commitment to economic liberalism while also preaching law and order in the face of the Lava Jato corruption scandal. They reached out to a new generation of right-wing activists eager to impeach then-president Dilma Rousseff and launch full-throated attacks on the PT and the broader social democratic establishment.29 Bivar and Lemos continued to rent out the party registration to opportunistic candidates across the board. Yet, they also understood that the party and the cause of economic liberalism needed a big bang. Then came Bolsonaro.

Jair Bolsonaro may be the “captain” of Brazil’s conservative-nationalist political realignment, but he has never built a political organization from scratch. Bolsonaro served in the Brazilian Army as a paratrooper, reaching the rank of captain before retiring to politics in 1988. He exhibited “excessive financial ambitions” and a leadership style that lacked “logic, rationality and balance, according to many of his commanding officers”30 In 1986 he published an opinion piece in Brazil’s major weekly magazine, Veja, promoting higher salaries for soldiers and junior officers.31 His commanders jailed him for insubordination and then sent him off with a cozy pension. Bolsonaro learned that advocacy through confrontation in the name of patriotism could win over supporters.

After his forced retirement, Bolsonaro launched his political career with the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in 1988 to win election to the Rio de Janeiro city council. He would later win election to the Chamber of Deputies in 1990 and begin an unremarkable congressional career. For the next 28 years

28 Lara Rizério. “Presidente do PSL volta atrás e apoiará campanha de Marina Silva.” InfoMoney. August 22, 2014 and accessed at: https://www.infomoney.com.br/mercados/politica/noticia/3534258/presidente-psl-volta-atras-apoiara-campanha- marina-silva. 29 For a comprehensive study of the emergence of new liberal political organizations in Brazil during the past several years see Alexia Oliveira Barbieri’s “A NOVA ONDA LIBERAL: uma análise antropológica do protagonismo e engajamento pró- liberalismo no Brasil contemporâneo. M.A. Thesis. Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. 2018 and accessed at: https://lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/handle/10183/189495/001088297.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 30 Mark Langevin. “Brazil’s crisis of political legitimacy has opened the door to rant-and-rave populist Jair Bolsonaro.” London School of Economics and Politics Latin America and Caribbean blog. November 29, 2017 and accessed at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2017/11/29/brazils-crisis-of-political-legitimacy-has-opened-the-door-to-rant-and-rave- populist-jair-bolsonaro/. 31 Veja. “O artigo em VEJA e a prisão de Bolsonaro nos anos 1980.” May 15, 2017 and accessed at: https://veja.abril.com.br/blog/reveja/o-artigo-em-veja-e-a-prisao-de-bolsonaro-nos-anos-1980/.

10 BrazilWorks.net

Bolsonaro operated as a party-crasher who spent most of his congressional tenure as a brash but inconsequential backbencher, switching party membership eight times while serving in Congress. Graph 1 reports his party affiliations from 1988 to his adoption of the PSL in early 2018.

Graph 1: Jair Bolsonaro’s Political Party Affiliation, 1988 to 2019

PDC PPR PPB PTB PP PSC PSL PP PFL (1988- (1993- (1995- (2003- (2005- (2016- (2018- (1993) (2005) 1993 1995) 2003 2005) 2016) 2018) current

After initially joining the PDC in 1988 he would later switch party affiliation to include: the former Liberal Front Party (now the Democratas or DEM), the Brazilian Labor Party, the Brazilian Progressive Reform Party, and twice with the Progressive Party (first with the PP in 1993 and then again with a larger fused version now known as the “Progressistas” from 2005-2016). Most recently, he was a member of the Social Christian Party (PSC) before he and his presently estranged political partner Gustavo Bebbiano32 made a deal with Bivar and joined the PSL in early 2018.33 Bolsonaro, more than any other politician, embodies Brazil’s fragmented party system. His incessant party switching kept him at a distance from political power from 1991 to 2018 but allowed him to nominally configure his presidential campaign as an “outsider,” uncompromised by the pork barrel politics and campaign finance scandals that alienated voters from the PT, MDB, PP, and PSDB in 2018. His adoption of the PSL was just another opportunistic step that promised to fuse his broader conservative-nationalist movement with the forces of economic liberalism. This match was not made in heaven, but it did provide an organizational foundation for the party and its candidates in 2018.

The Remarkable Rise of the Social Liberal Party

Bolsonaro partnered with Bivar in exchange for influence over party spending and the appointment of Gustavo Bebbiano as the PSL president, largely at Bivar’s expense and the purity of its liberal economic heritage. Bivar argues that Bolsonaro and the PSL share more similarities than differences, but the partnership prompted the departure of the PSL’s “Livres” faction that advocated for party modernization, strict adherence to liberalism, and full transparency (many of these Livres members migrated to the New Party (Novo).34 The partnership with Bivar offered Bolsonaro just enough organizational capacity to coordinate the rebellious conservative-nationalist movement and direct it

32 Bebbiano was fired by President Bolsonaro in February after a social media duel with the president’s son Carlos, see Simone Preissler Iglesias. “Brazil's Bolsonaro Fires Ally in Crisis That Raises Reform Doubt.” Bloomberg. February 18, 2019 and accessed at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-18/brazil-s-bolsonaro-fires-ally-in-crisis-that- raises-reform-doubt. 33 Lilian Venturini. “O que é o PSL, partido que Bolsonaro escolheu para se candidatar à Presidência.” Nexo. January 8, 2019 and accessed at: https://www.nexojornal.com.br/expresso/2018/01/08/O-que-%C3%A9-o-PSL-partido-que-Bolsonaro- escolheu-para-se-candidatar-%C3%A0-Presid%C3%AAncia. 34 Livres. “Livres deixa o PSL.” January 5, 2018 and accessed at: https://www.eusoulivres.org/noticias/livres-deixa-o-psl/. For a comprehensive treatment of the emergence of modern liberalism in Brazil and the role of the PSL and Livres movement see Alexia Oliveira Barbieri. “A Nova Onda Liberal: uma análise antropológica do protagonismo e engajamento pró- liberalismo no Brasil contemporâneo.” Dissertation presented at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul-Social Anthropology. Porto Alegre. 2018 and accessed at: https://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/handle/10183/189495/001088297.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

11 BrazilWorks.net toward electoral ends. For example, in 2014 the PSL fielded 832 candidates for federal and state offices, or 3.18 percent of the total, but in 2018 the party increased its numbers to 1,543 or 5.31 percent of the total number of candidates, an increase of 85 percent.35 The PSL was an ambitious party under Bivar, but Bolsonaro and Bebianno worked to multiply the probability of greater electoral victories in 2018.

This strategy was anchored to efforts to expand party membership and recruit candidates across Brazil. The advent of social media-based campaigning curbed party affiliations across the party system by 2018 but the PSL was still able to outpace its competitors between 2017 and 2018, including the PT. Table 1 reveals the distribution of party affiliation by party and year. The MDB leads the party system with over 2.3 million registered members with the PT a distant second place with nearly 1.6 million. The PSL is far behind in the number of registered members, growing from 99,842 in 2002 to 241,152 by the 2018 elections. However, the PSL’s absolute growth between 2017 and 2018 outpaced all parties, including the MDB and PT. The PSL increased its membership by 13,432 during the period while the PT grew by 8,324, the PP by 7,332 and the PSDB by 5,308. The increase in membership mirrors the surge in the number of candidates between 2014 and 2018 and reflects a substantial upturn in the numbers of committed activists that played central roles in the low cost, social media driven campaigning of most PSL candidates. While the other parties spent money, the PSL focused on rapidly increasing the number of social media followers who could multiply candidate name recognition at little cost.

It is important to note that party affiliation in Brazil is not popular and can only be elicited by filing a registration form with the local or national party organization. Disaffiliation requires that registered party members write a formal letter to the party’s municipal directorate or local electoral authorities to formally request formal separation from a party’s membership. Older parties accumulate registered members over time, but the more recent affiliations serve as a more reliable indicator of party growth in terms of candidates and core activists. The PSL’s recent growth in candidates and registered members surpasses all other parties in the last election cycle to demonstrate just how big the party’s footprint was by the October elections.

Table 1: Major Brazilian Political Parties and Member Affiliation, 2002 to 2018*

Party 2002 2006 2010 2014 2016 2017 2018 Growth from 2017 to 2018 MDB/PMDB 2,217,027 2.032.290 2.315.943 2.353.716 2.402.264 2.395.359 2.393.313 -2,046 PT 828.781 1.048.160 1.394.405 1.587.383 1.587.916 1.584.646 1.592.970 8,324 PSDB 1.049.902 1.096.753 1.315.731 1.349.293 1.446.854 1.455.199 1.460.507 5,308 PP (PPB) 1.410.864 1.268.563 1.369.852 1.414.372 1.438.392 1.437.712 1.445.044 7,332 PDT 974.030 958.053 1.130.043 1.206.991 1.251.350 1.252.731 1.257.409 4,678 DEM/PFL 1.022.275 1.028.460 1.103.261 1.085.906 1.096.537 1.094.417 1.093.732 -685 PSL 99.842 136.799 168.831 200.445 226.551 227.720 241.152 13,432 Source: Estatísticas do eleitorado – Eleitores filiados. Tribunal Supremo Eleitoral (TSE). Accessed on March 29, 2019 at: http://www.tse.jus.br/eleitor/estatisticas-de-eleitorado/filiados.

35 See Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). Estatísticas Eleitorais and accessed on March 29, 2019 at: http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/estatisticas/estatisticas-eleitorais and Clara Velasco and Gabriela Sarmento. “PSL mais que dobra número de candidatos e desbanca PT nas eleições 2018.” Globo. September 29, 2018 and accessed at: https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2018/eleicao-em-numeros/noticia/2018/09/24/psl-mais-que-dobra-numero-de- candidatos-e-desbanca-pt-nas-eleicoes-2018.ghtml. These two sources report different numbers of candidates, but we report the TSE numbers above.

12 BrazilWorks.net

The PSL’s member affiliation performance in 2018 parallels the party’s candidate recruitment efforts that outperformed all other political parties despite the funding disparities. Table two reports the total number of candidates registered by a select sample of the most important Brazilian political parties for 2018. The PSL leads the pack with 1543 or 5.31 percent of all candidates for president, senator, federal deputy, governor, vice-governor and state deputy races. The PSOL ran the second largest field of candidates but performed at a much lower level by electing an additional four federal deputies for a total of ten in the lower chamber. The PSOL did not elect a senator. The PT also fielded a large number of candidates, 1308 or 4.50 percent, and retains a large congressional delegation with 56 federal deputies and 6 senators despite losing 5 seats in the lower house and 3 in the senate.

Table 2: Select Brazilian Political Parties, Total Number of 2018 Candidates, and Distribution of Total as Percent

Political Party PSL PSOL PT MDB PDT PSDB DEM

Total Number of 1543 1347 1308 1126 955 952 692 2018 Candidates

Percent of Total 5.31 4.63 4.50 3.87 3.28 3.27 2.38 Candidates Source: Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). Estatísticas Eleitorais and accessed on March 29, 2019 at: http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/estatisticas/estatisticas-eleitorais.

The lower numbers of MDB and PSDB candidates preceded their respective congressional delegation reductions in 2018. With 1.46 million members the PSDB could not field a thousand candidates, substantially lowering the probability of retaining seats in the congress. The MDB performed better in candidate recruitment but still lost seven seats in the senate and 16 in the Chamber of Deputies. The PSDB lost four in the senate and 20 in the lower chamber. The Democratas (DEM), the party of Chamber of Deputies President Rodrigo Maia and Senate President Davi Alcolumbre, ran only 692 candidates or 2.38 percent of the total and ended up gaining two seats in the senate for a total of seven but losing fourteen in the lower chamber for a total of 29.

The PSL outperformed all other parties in terms of membership growth in 2018, the total number of candidates, and electoral victories. The party elected 44 first-term members to the Chamber of Deputies for a total of 52 and four new senators-including the president’s son Flávio from Rio de Janeiro. The PSL also elected three governors and 76 state deputies (an increase of 60) distributed around the nation; the third highest total following the MDB (93) and PT (85). PSL member Janaína Paschoal of São Paulo hauled in some 2 million votes alone, more than any other state deputy in Brazilian history and largely due in to her very public role in the impeachment of former president Dilma Rousseff in 2016.36

Considering all votes for federal deputy by political party also reveals the overwhelming surge of the PSL and how the party out-matched the most important political parties in the 2018 elections. The PSL candidates for federal deputy hauled in 11.4 million votes or 11.65 percent of all valid votes cast for

36 O Globo. “Janaína Paschoal é a deputada mais votada na história do país.” October 7, 2018 and accessed at: https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/eleicoes/2018/noticia/2018/10/07/janaina-paschoal-e-a-deputada-mais-votada-da-historia- de-sp.ghtml.

13 BrazilWorks.net federal deputy races in Brazil.37 The PT ran second with 10.1 million or 10.3 percent of the votes. In 2014 the PT ran well ahead of all political parties with 13.5 million votes. In 2018 the PSDB was a distant third with 5.9 million votes or 6.01 percent of the total. The PSOL ran the second highest number of candidates for all offices but only garnered 2.78 million for its slate of federal deputy candidates, or 2.83 percent of the total nationwide. PSL federal deputy candidates Delegado Waldir from Goiás, Marcelo Alvaro Antonio from Minas Gerais, Nelson Barbudo from Mato Grosso, Helio “Bolsonaro” Fernando Barbosa Lopes from Rio de Janeiro, and Eduardo Bolsonaro from São Paulo all received more votes than any other candidate in their respective statewide races. These results are overlooked by analyses that focus exclusively on the election of President Bolsonaro. Moreover, the sheer numbers of votes cast for PSL candidates indicate the powerful association between the insurgent conservative- nationalist movement and the PSL, the preferred party of movement activists.

The PSL also followed a more balanced strategy in 2018 by increasing its numbers of senate and federal deputy candidates. The party spent only 6.5 per cent of its total campaign disbursements on the presidential campaign so that it could broaden the distribution of its scarce financial resource across a much larger group of candidates distributed across the entire country. Table three shows that in 2014 over 70 percent of the PSL’s candidates ran for state deputy while in 2018 this fraction dropped to 61 percent. The number of federal deputy candidates rose from 215 to 488 and senate candidates increased from 1 to 22 during the same period. These increases positioned the PSL to take full advantage of the Bolsonaro bandwagon during the weeks prior to the October election and fully extend the coattail effect throughout most of Brazil. The result was the rapid emergence of the PSL as a decisive legislative force and unquestioned leader of the conservative-nationalist movement.

Table 3: Comparison of Social Liberal Party Candidate Distribution by Type of Race, 2014 and 2018*

Office 2014 Percent of Total Number of 2014 2018 Percent of Total Number of Candidates 2018 Candidates State Deputy 585 70.31 942 61.05 Federal Deputy 215 25.84 488 31.63 Senator 1 0.12 22 1.43 Governor 1 0.12 14 0.91 *The table does not include district deputy, vice-governor, substitutes (known as suplentes) or presidential candidates. Source: Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). Estatísticas Eleitorais and accessed on March 29, 2019 at: http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/estatisticas/estatisticas-eleitorais.

The PSL Congressional Delegation

If the PSL is the motor of Brazil’s conservative-nationalist movement then most of the propulsion comes from the Chamber of Deputies, where the party elected 52 members and has since added another three. Newly elected federal deputies Bia Kicis and Pastor Gildenemyr left their original parties to affiliate

37 Folha de São Paulo. “Puxado por Eduardo Bolsonaro, PSL é o campeão nacional de votos para a Câmara.” October 8, 2018 and accessed at: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/puxado-por-eduardo-bolsonaro-psl-e-o-campeao- nacional-de-votos-para-a-camara.shtml.

14 BrazilWorks.net with the PSL upon assuming their seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Federal deputy Onyx Lorenzoni (DEM) also vacated his seat to serve as Bolsonaro’s chief of staff (Casa Civil). He left his seat to his substitute (suplente), Marcelo Brum of the PSL. Enéias Reis (PSL) is also substituting for federal deputy-turned-Minister of Tourism Marcelo Alvaro Antonio (PSL) of Minas Gerais. The PSL now holds 55 seats in the 513 seat lower house but this number could grow as federal deputies from small parties migrate toward parties with large Party Fund disbursements.

The PSL’s federal deputy delegation is distributed across 20 of Brazil’s 26 states and the federal district (see Appendix 2: 2019 PSL Federal Deputies). This distribution reflects the party’s transformation from a regional faction to a national political party. The party’s anchor shifted from the Northeast region to the Southeast with the largest state delegation hailing from the president’s political base in Rio de Janeiro and followed by São Paulo and Minas Gerais. Together these three states comprise 53.7 percent of the PSL Chamber of Deputies delegation. The southern states of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina also contribute significant numbers to the congressional delegation.

● Rio de Janeiro – 12 members (23% of the total delegation) ● São Paulo – 10 members (19.2%) ● Minas Gerais – 6 members (11.5%) ● Rio Grande do Sul – 4 members (7.3%) ● Santa Catarina – 4 members (7.3%)

Table 4 reports measures for Bolsonaro’s first round performance by state, number of apportioned federal deputies by state, the number of PSL members elected, and the PSL’s relative share of each state’s delegation. These measures show the close association between Bolsonaro’s first round performance and his party’s electoral victories in most of Brazil’s 26 states and the federal district. The PSL’s best performing states were Rio de Janeiro with 26% of the total state delegation, followed by Mato Grosso do Sul (25%), Santa Catarina (25%) and São Paulo (14.2%). Jair Bolsonaro’s total valid vote total in the first round surpassed 55 percent in all four of these states. Of these states, Santa Catarina featured the biggest margin at 65.82 percent.

The PSL also performed well in a number of second tier states including: Amazonas, Ceará, Espirito Santo, Goiás, Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso, Paraíba, Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul, Rondônia, and Roraima. In all of these states Jair Bolsonaro’s first round valid vote totals exceeded his national first round share of 46.03 percent except for the cases of Amazonas, Ceará and Paraíba. Bolsonaro performed poorly in Ceará but the party was able to elect one member to the state’s 22-member delegation. In stark contrast, the president racked up 62.24 percent of the vote in Acre, but the party failed to elect a single federal deputy to the 8-member state delegation. With the exceptions of Acre and Ceará, these results underscore the positive association between the Bolsonaro bandwagon and the PSL’s surge at the ballot box.

15 BrazilWorks.net

Table 4: State distribution of Bolsonaro First Round Vote Share, Number of Federal Deputies, Number of Elected PSL candidates and PSL Share of State Delegation as Percent

State Bolsonaro First Number of Number of PSL Share as Round Percent of Federal Elected PSL Percent of Valid Votes Deputies Members State Delegation Acre 62.24 8 0 0 Alagoas 34.40 9 0 0 Amazonas 43.48 8 1 12.5% Amapá 40.74 8 0 0 Bahia 23.41 39 1 2.5% Ceará 21.74 22 1 12.5% Distrito Federal 58.37 8 0 12.5% Espírito Santo 54.76 10 1 10% Goiás 57.24 17 2 11.7%% Maranhão 24.28 18 0 0.5% Minas Gerais 48.31 53 6 11.3% Mato Grosso do Sul 55.06 8 2 25% Mato Grosso 60.04 8 1 12.5% Pará 36.19 17 0 0 Paraíba 31.30 12 1 8.3% Pernambuco 30.57 25 1 4% Piauí 18.76 10 0 0 Paraná 56.89 30 3 10% Rio de Janeiro 59.79 46 12 26% Rio Grande do Norte 30.21 8 1 12.5% Rondônia 62.24 8 1 12.5% Roraima 62.97 8 1 12.5% Rio Grande do Sul 52.63 31 3 12.9% Santa Catarina 65.82 16 4 25% Sergipe 27.21 8 0 0 São Paulo 53.0 70 10 14.2% Tocantins 44.64 8 0 0% Totals 46.03 513 52 n/a Sources: G1Globo. Mapa da apuração por estado. Accessed on March 29, 2019 at: http://especiais.g1.globo.com/df/distrito-federal/eleicoes/2018/apuracao-estado-presidente/1-turno/ and Gazeta do Povo. Eleições 2018. Accessed on March 29, 2019 at: https://especiais.gazetadopovo.com.br/eleicoes/2018/candidatos/ac/deputado-federal/#PSL

The PSL electoral victories also demonstrated the party’s capacity to amass huge vote totals for “superstar” candidates, most notably Eduardo Bolsonaro, who received more votes for federal deputy from São Paulo than any other federal deputy candidate in the history of Brazilian elections. Of the 27 federal deputy candidates who surpassed their state’s electoral quotient,38 7 are affiliated with the PSL

38 A party has to achieve the electoral quotient, that is the result of the number of valid votes cast in the election (all votes that have been cast, except blank and invalid votes) divided by the number of seats to be filled by each state in the distribution of seats at the Chamber of Deputies or respective state assemblies. After calculating the electoral quotient, it is necessary to calculate the party quotient, which will establish the number of seats assigned to each party. The party quotient

16 BrazilWorks.net and include: Eduardo Bolsonaro (SP), Joice Hasselmann (SP), Carlos Jordy (RJ), Helio “Bolsonaro” Fernando Barbosa Lopes (RJ), Delegado Waldir (GO), Felipe Francischini (PR), and Marcelo Alvaro Antonio (MG).39 These candidates’ high vote totals contributed to the effective election of the remaining 45 winning PSL candidates who did not meet the electoral quotient. No other political party came close to this performance, with the PT, PSB and PSD each electing 3 federal deputies who exceeded the electoral quotient. This capacity to elect “superstars,” with little money or legislative experience, demonstrates the historic nature of the PSL’s rise and its political promise. The superstars are in a class by themselves and will likely lead the party’s congressional strategy and the conservative-nationalist movement in the coming years.

The PSL’s federal deputy delegation is disproportionately male, like most Brazilian political parties. However, the party made a concerted effort to recruit and finance female candidates, especially from the ranks of the military and law enforcement agencies. The PSL exceeded the Chamber of Deputy’s 15 per cent female average by electing ten women (19.2%). This result was partially achieved through substantial PSL donations (mostly financed through the Party Fund and the Special Election Campaign Fund) made to the campaigns of five winning female candidates, including (noted with the share of the PSL donations as percent of total donations to the candidate):

• Prof. Dayane Pimental from Bahia (99%) • Dra. Soraya Manato from Espirito Santo (99%) • Chris Tonietto from Rio de Janeiro (94%) • Major Fabiana from Rio de Janeiro (95%) • Joice Hasselmann from São Paulo (41%)

The party’s success with women candidates stemmed from recruiting candidates that add credibility and popularity to the party’s brand and hold the potential for multiplying the number of PSL associated social media followers. The PSL’s scarce monetary resources were spent on party leaders, like Luciano Bivar and Julian Lemos, as well as recruitment of credible, popular candidates that helped the party comply with the 30 percent quota for female candidates (a public funding requirement) and shore up voter support among reluctant women voters. This strategy was best reflected by the selection of superstar Joice Hasselmann, who garnered the most votes of any female federal deputy candidate in Brazil and received 41 percent of her donations from the PSL-administered share of the Special Election Campaign Fund.

Overall, the PSL federal deputy candidates enjoyed much less public financing than their established electoral adversaries. The party was more reliant on bombastic social-media posts and networked WhatsApp messaging than expensive, highbrow media consultants.40 During the 2018 electoral

is determined by dividing the number of votes received by each party candidate slate by the electoral quotient. The higher the number of votes won by parties, the higher the number of seats to be assigned to them in either the Chamber of Deputies or state assembly. 39 Fernanda Vivas. “De 513 deputados eleitos na Câmara, só 27 dependeram dos próprios votos para se eleger.” Globo. November 9, 2018 and accessed at: https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2018/noticia/2018/10/09/de-513-deputados-eleitos- na-camara-so-27-dependeram-dos-proprios-votos-para-se-eleger.ghtml. 40 See DAPP-FGV. “Debate sobre eleições gera mais de 130 milhões de tuítes em 3 meses.” Accessed on April 8, 2019 at: http://dapp.fgv.br/debate-sobre-eleicoes-gera-mais-de-130-milhoes-de-tuites-em-3-meses/ and Luca Belli. “WhatsApp skewed Brazilian election, proving social media’s danger to democracy.” The Conversation. December 5, 2018 and

17 BrazilWorks.net campaign, Jair Bolsonaro dominated Twitter messages.41 Bolsonaro was mentioned on Twitter accounts over 85.6 million times while second place finisher Fernando Haddad (PT) attracted 21.4 million mentions.42 Bolsonaro outpaced all other presidential candidates taken together on Twitter by millions of mentions, most retweeted by PSL candidates and activists multiple times during the campaign. The PSL’s reliance on the currency of social media stood in stark contrast to the established parties, including the MDB and the PT, that spent millions more on their respective federal deputy candidates. According to the Folha de São Paulo, the PSL distributed R$9.2 million from the Special Electoral Fund to its federal deputy candidates or on average R$151,000 per candidate while the MDB spent over R$230 million or R$1.4 million per candidate for the Chamber of Deputies.43 The average spent for elected federal deputies in 2018 was over a million reais. Incredibly, 25 of the PSL’s 52 elected federal deputies spent less than R$100,000 each and many of these candidates relied on their own resources or those of family and friends.

For example, Dr Luiz Ovando of Mato Grosso spent a meagre R$21,000 and mostly from his own pocket. Superstar Carlos Jordy, a first term city councilman from Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, spent less than R$60,000 and surpassed the electoral quotient to contribute to the election of fellow partisans in the state. These examples reflect the PSL’s effective strategy of harnessing modest resources and social media savvy to maximize the number of votes and attain the lowest vote-to-outlay ratio of any party in the 2018 elections. This efficiency allowed the party to spread its scarce resources over a wider base of candidates during the 2018 congressional elections. The PSL’s low cost-high impact campaign strategy was also successful among several of the party’s senatorial candidates.

Senate Candidates

The PSL’s performance to win senate seats was also unprecedented. The party had never elected a member to the senate before winning four seats in 2018, two of them won by women from the Center- West region in their first electoral campaigns (see Appendix 3: 2019 PSL Senators). The PSL senators include:

● Flávio Bolsonaro of Rio Janeiro ● Juíza Selma of Mato Grosso ● Soraya Thronicke of Mato Grosso do Sul ● Major Olimpio of São Paulo

Major Olimpio of São Paulo won the most votes of any senatorial candidate in Brazil with over 9 million from the country’s most populous state. He also had the most efficient vote to expenditure

accessed at: https://theconversation.com/whatsapp-skewed-brazilian-election-proving-social-medias-danger-to-democracy- 106476. 41 Caio Machado, et al. “News and Political Information Consumption in Brazil: Mapping the First Round of the 2018 Brazilian Presidential Election on Twitter.” Comprop Data Memo 2018.4 / October 5, 2018 and accessed at: https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2018/10/machado_et_al.pdf. 42 DAPP-FGV (2019). 43 Felipe Bächtold. “Campanhas ricas para a Câmara não se elegem, e PSL vence com baixo orçamento.” Folha de São Paulo. October 14, 2018 and accessed at: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/campanhas-ricas-para-a-camara-nao- se-elegem-e-psl-vence-com-baixo-orcamento.shtml.

18 BrazilWorks.net ratio.44 Soraya Thronicke spent a paltry R$76,001 to win her first elected office. Flávio Bolsonaro, the eldest son of Jair and a career politician, garnered the third highest vote total for a senatorial candidate in Brazil. With the exception of former judge Selma Arruda of Mato Grosso, three of the four winning PSL candidates won election by spending less than one million reais. Major Olimpio and Flávio Bolsonaro both relied on party-related donations. Olimpio took in monies from both the PSL and Vice-President Hamilton Mourão’s PRTB (the only party included in the PSL’s electoral coalition).45 Flávio received some 29 percent of his donations from the PSL-Rio de Janeiro state directorate and another 28 percent from his father’s presidential campaign coffers. Selma Arruda’s expensive campaign received over R$ 1.8 million in donations with large shares financed by her senate substitute (suplente) Gilberto Possamai, and his wife Adriana. With the exception of Arruda, the PSL’s winning senate candidates demonstrate the successful strategy of waging low cost-high impact social media campaigns to transform the conservative-nationalist movement into millions of votes.

The PSL senators hold five percent of the chamber’s seats and comprise the seventh largest delegation. While this outcome does not rival the presidential election or the numbers in the Chamber of Deputies, it does confirm the party’s noteworthy electoral victory and leading voice in Brazil’s highly fragmented party system and politically divided bicameral legislature. Overall, the success of PSL congressional candidates demonstrate the political reach of the conservative-nationalist movement during the second half of 2018. This surge in PSL popularity was anchored to the presidential campaign of Jair Bolsonaro but organized through social media outlets by the PSL’s vast contingent of candidates and activists. Rather than explain the PSL’s congressional campaign success as the logical outcome of a coattail effect, the evidence suggests a more dynamic set of relationships. between the party’s presidential candidate, the increased numbers of PSL congressional candidates, and the legions of social media followers associated with the conservative-nationalist movement that spread the party’s message to expanding circles of voters during the final months of the 2018 campaign.

While the entire PSL congressional delegation benefited from this extraordinary dynamic, the party’s legislative contingent is also divided between those dependent on party financing and those who ran inexpensive and efficient campaigns. Most PSL federal deputies raised and spent well below that of their colleagues in the National Congress. A majority of winning PSL congressional candidates reported very modest expenditures, mostly on campaign materials and social media advertising (see Appendix 2 for Percent of Donations from the Party Fund and Special Electoral Fund). However, Prof. Dayane (BA), Heitor Freire (CE), Dra. Soraya Manato (ES), Delegado Waldir (GO), Julien Lemos (PB), Luciano

44 Gabriela Caesar. “Custo do voto dos senadores eleitos varia de R$ 0,03 a R$ 26,21.” Globo. November 12, 2018 and accessed at: https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2018/eleicao-em-numeros/noticia/2018/11/12/custo-do-voto-dos- senadores-eleitos-varia-de-r-003-a-r-2621.ghtml. 45 It is important to note that Vice-President Mourão’s PRTB failed to elect one federal deputy or senator in 2018 and will not receive any public monies from the Party Fund for 2019. President of the PRTB Levy Fidelix stated in late January of 2019 that nine elected Brazilian congressional representatives were prepared to switch affiliation to his party, but as of May 2019 the party continued without representation in the National Congress. The PRTB’s precarious situation may lead to fusion with another party in the future, but reports indicate significant tensions between the PSL and the Vice-President’s PRTB, possibly eliminating any possibility of a merger between the two parties that coalesced during the 2018 presidential campaign. For the PRTB’s January announcement see Monica Bergamo. “Partido do vice-presidente deve anunciar filiação de nove parlamentares.” Folha de São Paulo. Accessed at: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/monicabergamo/2019/01/partido-do-vice-presidente-deve-anunciar-filiacao-de-nove- parlamentares.shtml. For reports about tensions between the PSL and PRTB see Tales Faria. “Mourão negocia base própria contra Bolsonaro, desconfia o filho Carlos.” UOL Noticias. Accessed at: http://talesfaria.blogosfera.uol.com.br/2019/04/24/mourao-negocia-base-propria-contra-bolsonaro-desconfia-o-filho-carlos/.

19 BrazilWorks.net

Bivar (PE) Cris Tonietto (RJ), and Major Fabiana (RJ) received at least 83 percent of their respective donations from the PSL. The party “dependent” members spent well above average expenditures among their PSL colleagues. Bivar alone spent nearly two million reais and Prof. Dayane and Delegado Waldir spent almost one half million reais each. These PSL federal deputies resemble their peers in the older established political parties, including the PT, PSDB, MDB, and DEM, where party funds comprise most of their campaign donations. On the other hand, the majority of PSL federal deputies, and Senators Flávio Bolsonaro and Soraya Thronicke, received less than R$100,000 in total donations. These campaign finance outcomes indicate that most members of the PSL congressional delegation are not reliant on the party but do hold deep-seated loyalty to the president and the conservative-nationalist movement.

The Party’s Winning Formula

The PSL’s low cost-high social media impact strategy mitigated the party’s infinitesimal free radio and television time and reduced the overall cost of winning campaigns. The strategy also depended upon a hypnotic, albeit toxic brew of misinformation and outrage against the PT and Brasilia punctuated by repeated efforts to characterize opponents as corrupt, criminal, perverts and pedophiles.46 Indeed, during the campaign Eduardo Bolsonaro implied that shutting down the Supreme Court would be easy and openly called for the criminalization of the PT. The party and its candidates launched sustained attacks on mainstream media outlets, including Globo and the Folha de São Paulo, to push followers away from professional journalistic coverage of the campaign and toward the more candidate managed media environments of Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp.47 The strategy was an overwhelming success at the polls and may transform the way that future campaign strategies are planned and carried out. Yet, the very strengths of the PSL’s social media driven electoral strategy do not prepare the party’s elected officials to broker sustainable political alliances in congress. To the contrary, the PSL’s reliance on adversarial social media posts to rivet followers can also alienate allies and prospective partners in the National Congress as leaders across the political spectrum negotiate daunting fiscal and economic reforms. The PSL’s strategic edge in campaigns can easily become a weakness in the legislative process, especially given the congressional delegation’s paucity of legislative experience and inter-party bargaining.

The Social Liberal Party and Congress

The new Brazilian Congress (2019 to 2022) displays the highest level of renovation since the constituent assembly elections in 1986. The last congress (2015 to 2018) instituted measures to reinforce incumbency by shortening the official campaign period from 90 to 45 days and offering up R$2.6 billion in public funding, mostly to the largest parties. Of the 32 senators seeking reelection only eight survived. In the Chamber of Deputies 362 of the 513 incumbents sought reelection with only 157 winning back

46 For an analysis of the PSL’s campaign messages and the use of “fake news” see Eduardo Meinberg de Albuquerque Maranhão, Fernanda Marina Feitosa Coelho, and Tainah Biela Dia. “Fake news acima de tudo, fake news acima de todos”: Bolsonaro e o “kit gay”, “ideologia de gênero” e fim da “família tradicional.” Revista Eletrônica Correlatio. Vol. 17, No. 2 (December 2018). 47 Miguel Lago. “Procura-Se Um Presidente.” Piauí. Edition 152. May 2019 and accessed at: https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/procura-se-um-presidente/.

20 BrazilWorks.net their seats, a 43 percent incumbency effect.48 The extraordinary turnover overlaps with a decided realignment toward more conservative parties including the PSL. The biggest losers were the centrist parties, especially the party of former President Michel Temer (2016-2018), the MDB, and the PSDB of former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002). According to Congresso em Foco, conservative parties grew their Chamber of Deputies representation from 247 seats to 264 in the 2018 elections while the left of the political spectrum, comprised of PT, PCdoB, Psol, Rede, PSB, PPS, PPL, PMN e PDT, increased its total number of seats from 136 to 153.49 These outcomes not only leave the new legislature fragmented, but amplify the ideological polarization and political cleavages that vex congressional negotiators and complicate efforts to compose governing majorities.

The PSL and DEM Alliance

President Bolsonaro worked to assemble a governing coalition in the congress during the weeks following his inauguration on January 1, 2019. His chief of staff (known in Brazil as the Ministro da Casa Civil) Onyx Lorenzoni (DEM), an elected federal deputy from Rio Grande do Sul, articulated a plan to build the coalition around a PSL-DEM alliance, beginning with the reelection of Rodrigo Maia (DEM) as President of the Chamber of Deputies. Maia was re-elected to the top leadership post by 333 votes of the 512 ballots cast or 77 more than necessary for his election.50 In July of 2016 Maia won his first bid for the lower house presidency in the second-round voting with 285 votes. Maia’s winning coalition was comprised of 15 political parties, including the center-left PDT and the PCdoB of Manuela d‘Ávila, vice-presidential running mate to the PT’s Fernando Haddad.

Curiously, the president’s party supported Maia’s candidacy but could not rein in newly elected Federal Deputy General Peternelli (PSL). Peternelli defected from his party’s decision to support Maia. Peternelli was elected as a substitute state deputy in 2014 and successfully won a seat in congress by surpassing the electoral quotient and spending only R$ 52,562 on his campaign.51 During the 2018 election he also served as coordinator for candidates associated with the Brazilian Armed Forces.52 He justified his decision to run for the Senate’s top leadership post by claiming that it was his democratic option to oppose the chamber’s established leadership. He did not count on the support of PSL President Luciano Bivar or President Bolsonaro. His candidacy exposed latent cleavages within the party. In the end, Maia’s victory did not depend on the PSL delegation but did anchor the chamber’s leadership to the PSL-DEM alliance moving forward.

Lorenzoni doubled his political feat in the senate just weeks later by successfully electing his partisan colleague Davi Alcolumbre (DEM) of Amapá to the presidency. Alcolumbre won in a contested election

48 Congresso em Foco. “O que você precisa saber para entender o novo Congresso brasileiro.” 9 October 2018 and accessed at: https://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/eleicoes/o-que-voce-precisa-saber-para-entender-o-novo-congresso-brasileiro/. 49 Edson Saldanha. “Com renovação histórica, Congresso assume com o desafio de superar velhas práticas políticas.” Congresso em Foco. February 1, 2019 and accessed at: https://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/legislativo/com-renovacao- historica-congresso-assume-com-o-desafio-de-superar-velhas-praticas-politicas/. 50 O Globo. “Rodrigo Maia é reeleito presidente e comandará Câmara até 2021.” Accessed on 8 April 2019 at: https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2019/02/01/rodrigo-maia-e-reeleito-presidente-e-comandara-camara-ate-2021.ghtml. 51 Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). Divulgação de Candidaturas e Contas. Accessed on 9 April 2019 at: http://divulgacandcontas.tse.jus.br/divulga/#/candidato/2018/2022802018/SP/250000613307. 52 O Estado de São Paulo. “General Peternelli lança candidatura à Câmara apesar do apoio do PSL a Maia.” Accessed on 9 April 2019 at: https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,general-peternelli-lanca-candidatura-a-camara-apesar-do-apoio- do-psl-a-maia,70002698327.

21 BrazilWorks.net that featured a public campaign to oppose the candidacy of the old guard candidate and former president of the Senate Renan Calheiros (MDB) from Alagoas. Calheiros was thrashed throughout social media outlets by such conservative, pro-Bolsonaro organizations as Vem Pra Rua53 and his behind the scenes candidacy openly divided senators across the political spectrum. He was seen as too friendly to Lula and the PT by Bolsonaro followers and too corrupt by many others. In the end, Alcolumbre garnered only 42 votes, one more than necessary for the victory, with Calheiros squeezing out only 5 votes. The remaining 30 votes cast were divided up between Esperidião Amin (PP), Angelo Coronel (PSD), Reguffe (independent), and the former impeached president Fernando Collor (Pros-AL).54 These results also display how party fragmentation cracks the legislative process congress. The vote also affirms the DEM’s growing influence within congress and the Bolsonaro government. Alcolumbre’s victory reflects this influence as well as his party’s increased senate delegation, from 5 to 7 members after the 2018 elections. The DEM is a center-right political force whose leaders, most notably Rodrigo Maia, exercise considerable influence across the political spectrum. The party’s alliance with the PSL raises its political caliber, extends its influence within the executive branch and strengthens the personal position of Lorenzoni, and may ultimately play the pivotal role in passing the very difficult economic and fiscal reforms advocated by Bolsonaro’s Minister of the Economy, Paulo Guedes. Yet, these gains for the DEM and the success of its alliance with the PSL can only be secured through discreet, results oriented cooperation with PSL congressional leaders and the party’s restless rank and file.

The PSL and Congressional Leadership

The president chose Major Vitor Hugo from Goiás to represent the government in the Chamber of Deputies. Hugo is a newcomer and has never held elected office prior to his election in 2018. Hugo is often criticized by coalition party leaders for ineffectiveness but appears to enjoy a close personal relationship with President Bolsonaro because of their mutual military ties. The president selected Senator Fernando Bezerra Coelho (MDB), also known as FBC, of Pernambuco to be leader of the government in the Senate. Bolsonaro passed over the four newly elected PSL senators to pick FBC. Coelho is an experienced politician and senator but is under a cloud of suspicion related to corruption allegations stemming from the Lava Jato investigations. FBC provides the government and the PSL with a trusted conduit to the largest party in the senate, the MDB, as well as an effective interlocutor with Senator Renan Calheiros who remains a prominent behind the scenes leader across the political spectrum. The selection of Coelho, a former Minister of National Integration under the PT administration of former President Dilma Rousseff, extends the governing coalition in the Senate. Coelho’s son, Fernando Coelho Filho (DEM), is a federal deputy and former Minister of Mines and Energy under the former Temer administration, Coelho Filho recently left the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) for the MDB in 2018 and then switched again to become a member of Maia’s DEM. This move reinforces his critical role in working with Major Victor Hugo and Rodrigo Maia to advance the president’s agenda in the lower house. The PSL’s approximation with FBC and his son strengthened the government’s congressional coalition and consolidates the alliance between the PSL and the DEM while building a political bridge to the largest political party, the MDB.

53 See Vem Pra Rua at: https://www.vemprarua.net/. 54 O Globo. “Após desistência de Renan e duas votações, Davi Alcolumbre é eleito presidente do Senado em 1º turno.” Accessed on 8 April 2019 at: https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2019/02/02/apos-desistencia-de-renan-e-duas-votacoes- davi-alcolumbre-e-eleito-presidente-do-senado-em-1o-turno.ghtml.

22 BrazilWorks.net

Last, superstar Federal Deputy Joice Hasselmann was appointed by Bolsonaro to become the government’s roving congressional representative. She does not have any prior legislative experience. The appointment awards greater prestige to Hasselmann and restricts her capacity to openly challenge the leadership of the PSL but does not necessarily increase her influence within the corridors of the legislative branch. Overall, Hugo and Hasselmann are representatives of the conservative-nationalist movement and loyal to President Bolsonaro. However, they will likely be challenged by coalition allies and congressional opponents as they attempt to push forward and whip majorities for the social security reform and other fiscal adjustment efforts that confront the vast array of vested interests and rent- seeking policies that now threaten the federal government’s fiscal stability.

In addition to these institutional leadership roles, the PSL selected Delegado Waldir to lead the president’s party in the Chamber of Deputies. Waldir is an experienced federal legislator and earned the most votes of any federal deputy candidate in his home state of Goiás. He is also a leader of the so called “bullet” caucus that represents the interests of law enforcement and the armed forces. Senator Major Olimpio was named to lead the party in the Senate after openly considering a run for the senate presidency. Olimpio is an experienced legislator but a newcomer to the Senate and will need to work in tandem with Davi Alcolumbre and Fernando Bezerra Coelho to advance President Bolsonaro’s policy agenda. Already Olimpio has voiced his frustration with relations between Bolsonaro’s representatives, namely Onxy Lorenzoni and General Santos Cruz, and the PSL congressional delegation. He reported in April that Santo Cruz had yet to contact him as leader of the president’s party in the Senate. Olimpio remarked,

“I am trying to do my homework, through research and media reports, to offer technical arguments to defend the president’s policy agenda, but there is little coordination with the executive branch. I’m not sure if we are speaking the same language.”55

During the first 100 days the new government and its congressional coalition failed to gain congressional approval for any significant legislation. Congress reversed President Bolsonaro’s executive order restricting access to government information and then voted to move toward obligatory expenditures under a new budget law (orçamento impositivo) that now mandates the spending of congressionally authorized expenditures as a matter of law. If passed, the legislation would restrict executive authority to informally cut government outlays, especially for discretionary, non-recurrent expenditures. Moreover, PSL federal deputies and their allies in the Judiciary and Citizenship Committee failed to openly defend Minister of Economy Paulo Guedes during his April 3rd testimony on the government’s social security reform proposal. However, the government and the PSL did come back to approve a motion in the Constitution, Judiciary and Citizenship committee on April 23rd to approve the social security reform and send it on to the special advisory committee before moving it to a floor vote in the coming months. All seven PSL members of the committee voted for the motion, including committee president and superstar PSL Federal Deputy Felipe Francischini of Paraná.

55 Translated from the Portuguese to English by the authors. Consuelo Dieguez. ““PSL É A GENI DO GOVERNO BOLSONARO” Piuai/Folha de Sao Paulo. April 25, 2019.

23 BrazilWorks.net

The Governing Coalition

Early legislative mishaps, ongoing criticism of the government’s leader in the lower house, Major Victor Hugo, and the on again, off again Twitter attacks by leading members of the PSL and the president’s son Carlos against Vice-President Hamilton Mourão and legislative allies, including Chamber of Deputies President Maia, continue to cast doubt over the governing coalition. These snags prompted President Bolsonaro to personally intervene and meet with the leaders of his own party as well as the MDB, PSDB, PP, PRB, PSD, DEM, SD, PR and Podemos before the all import vote on social security reform in the Constitution, Judiciary and Citizenship committee. Table 5 reports the total number of senators and federal deputies affiliated with the PSL and those parties aligned with the new government. As it stands, the government’s congressional coalition constitutes approximately 63 percent of the Senate and 60 percent of the Chamber of Deputies. These shares will shift but the numbers indicate that the Bolsonaro administration is capable of directing legislative majorities but may have to expand the coalition to galvanize super majorities required for constitutional amendments, including the controversial social security measure. The governing coalition is capable of mustering the 49 votes needed in the Senate to pass constitutional amendments but is just shy of the 308 required in the Chamber of Deputies. The PSL’s federal deputy delegation may have to extend its reach in the coming months to guarantee passage of the social security related constitutional amendment. This effort will test the political skills of the PSL’s congressional leadership as well as the party’s commitment to avoiding the politics of patronage, or “old politics.”

Table 5: Distribution of Senators and Federal Deputies by Government Coalition Political Party

Party Senate Chamber of Deputies PSL 4 54 DEM 7 29 PP 6 37 PRB 1 30 PSD 7 34 MDB 11 34 PSDB 8 29 SD 0 13 PR 2 33 Podemos 5 11 Totals 51 or 63% of Senate 304 or 60% of the Chamber

The work of patching together and preserving congressional majorities will also be carried out by PSL leaders selected to chair critical committees. Flávio Bolsonaro, the president’s eldest son and beleaguered new senator from Rio de Janeiro, was named 3rd Secretary of the Senate’s institutional leadership body. This position is largely ceremonial but does lend recognition and status to Flávio, who faces significant corruption charges in his home state and widespread allegations that he is tied to militia gangs, including those responsible for the assassination of Rio de Janeiro City Council Representative

24 BrazilWorks.net

Marielle Franco in March of 2018.56 In the Chamber of Deputies, the PSL’s founder Luciano Bivar was named as 2nd Vice-President. Also, Senator Soraya Thronicke of Mato Grosso do Sul was named as president of the Agriculture and Land Reform Committee. She is the only PSL member to chair a standing committee in the Senate.

The PSL obtained three committee presidencies in the Chamber of Deputies. Felipe Francischini of Paraná was named head of the all-important Constitution, Judiciary and Citizenship committee (CJC). Francischini, a former state deputy, is a newcomer to the national legislature but comes from a well- known political family. His father, Delegado Francischini, is a former federal deputy and Secretary of Public Security for the state of Paraná. He was elected as a state deputy in 2018 and is also affiliated with the PSL. Léo Matta of Minas Gerais, a former Contagem City Council Representative, presides over the Finance committee. Motta was originally affiliated with the PSL in 2012 then switched to the PSDC before returning to the PSL for his 2018 campaign. Superstar Eduardo Bolsonaro, the president’s son, will chair the National Defense and Foreign Relations committee. This is Eduardo’s first leadership position and comes after his influential role in Jair Bolsonaro’s campaign and transition team. Eduardo advocated for the selection of mid-level diplomat Ernesto Araújo as Minister of Foreign Relations. Both Eduardo and Ernesto Araújo are fervent followers of Jair Bolsonaro’s favorite political commentator, Olavo de Carvalho.57 Eduardo is expected to play a key role in representing the conservative-nationalist movement in President Bolsonaro’s foreign policymaking.

The party’s congressional leadership and delegation are further characterized by membership in distinct issue-area caucuses that serve as policymaking communities that often stretch across the political spectrum and party system. The PSL is most highly identified with the so called “bullet” or public security caucus that comprises mostly active (on leave) and retired law enforcement and BAF members. The bullet caucus includes nearly 20 percent of the Chamber of Deputies. All 54 PSL deputies are associated with this political formation or 58% of the total caucus membership. In the senate all four PSL members joined the caucus and comprise 40% of the total membership. The PSL’s notable participation in the bullet caucus provides a recognizable “law and order” brand to the party that parallels Jair Bolsonaro’s long standing personal advocacy for the interests of law enforcement agencies and the Brazilian Armed Forces in the National Congress. Moreover, it reinforces the party’s mantra that a “good criminal is a dead criminal.” The PSL congressional contingent also includes members in the so called “bible” or evangelical caucus and the “rural” or agricultural caucus. Both Eduardo (Federal Deputy) and Flávio Bolsonaro (Senator) are members of the bible caucus as well as notable PSL deputies Joice Hasselmann and Leo Motta among several others. The PSL also is closely associated with the agricultural caucus with 25 members. The “ruralistas” by Center-West region party members Senator Soraya Thronicke of Mato Grosso do Sul and Senator Selma Arruda and Federal Deputy Nelson Barbudo of Mato Grosso.

Just like any other Brazilian political party, the PSL congressional delegation is differentiated by sex, age, profession, state and region. However, the PSL stands apart because it is the president’s party and leads a political realignment that promises to shift the policy agenda toward liberal economics and conservative policy positions on education and social policy. Moreover, it promised to discard patronage

56 The most comprehensive reporting on Flávio Bolsonaro can be found at Agência Pública and accessed at: https://apublica.org/tag/flavio-bolsonaro/. 57 For more on Olavo de Carvalho see Brian Winter’s “Jair Bolsonaro’s Guru.” Americas Quarterly. December 17, 2018 and accessed at: https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/jair-bolsonaros-guru.

25 BrazilWorks.net politics in favor of low-cost, improved public services. In the past, Brazil’s fragmented party system and state-wide races for both federal deputies and senators discouraged moderation on the campaign trail, party discipline in the legislative arena, and efficient government spending with several notable exceptions.58 As Mello and Spektor argue, too many Brazilian legislators exchange votes for personal or political gain at the expense of others rather than building coherent, disciplined political organizations with prescribed policy agendas. The PSL may be different than its counterparts, allies and opponents alike, but it will need to negotiate with political parties and legislators who adopt a decidedly transactional bent if they are to push forward with their conservative-nationalist reform agenda. That is, the PSL congressional delegation may choose to forego the political gains made through patronage but their legislative allies do not seem willing to play by these same rules. Rather, allies will demand plum jobs in the executive branch and earmarked funds for their constituents back home.

Can the PSL Congressional Delegation Govern?

The pivot from campaigning to legislating is critical to the future of the party and requires sustained collaboration between congressional leaders, namely Rodrigo Maia (DEM) in the Chamber of Deputies and Davi Alcolumbre (DEM) and Fernando Bezerra Coelho (MDB) in the Senate. The PSL’s leaders will need to prove themselves to political partners and opponents alike in order to consolidate their leadership positions. Both Delegado Waldir and Eduardo Bolsonaro spent the last congress (2015-2018) as backbenchers with little interest in drafting laws and negotiating their passage. Major Hugo served as a legislative advisor but has never exercised a decision-making role in a deliberative, democratic arena. Joice Hasselmann is an experienced journalist and successful social media manager but is a controversial novice that inspires fanatical support and fervent opposition. The PSL founder and current president, Luciano Bivar, has served several stints in the lower house but has rarely taken center-stage to negotiate and draft legislative texts. Major Olimpio served one term in the Chamber of Deputies but has not distinguished himself as a legislator or political broker. These PSL leaders may be able to work together and hold party discipline in check but in a fragmented party system the PSL will need to lead a broader legislative majority to obtain passage of the government’s ambitious economic, fiscal and social policy agenda.59

The challenge faced by the PSL congressional delegation can be compared to the situation of former President Lula and his PT in 2003. The PT carried out a mobilizing campaign in 2002 and Lula’s “Brazil for All” governing agenda sought incremental steps toward greater social inclusion. These efforts represented a modest rupture with the political establishment built from the anti-inflationary Real Plan and the governing coalition led by then-President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) from 1995 to 2002. The PT government’s social inclusion agenda dovetailed with its efforts to construct a congressional, multi-party majority. Yet, this policy agenda did not galvanize a congressional majority on its merits. Rather, the Lula administration was also compelled to trade monthly payments for key

58 Katherine Bersch, Sérgio Praça and Matthew M. Taylor. “ Some parts of the Brazilian government actually aren’t corrupt. Here’s what they have in common. Washington Post. June 20, 2016 and accessed at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/20/can-you-measure-brazils-political-corruption-yes-and- it-explains-a-lot/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.55584eeba3dd. 59 For a full description of President Bolsonaro’s congressional agenda in Portuguese see, “Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional 2019.” Accessed at: https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/arquivos/2019/02/04/mensagem-presidencial.

26 BrazilWorks.net votes, later exposed in 2005 as the Mensalão scandal.60 The governing party may sidestep the snag of patronage politics in Brazil but allies demand payoffs.

The PSL’s rise also represents an historic rupture sparked by an active and mobilizing movement. But rather than social inclusion, the party promises an existential fight against corruption and crime. The outstanding question is whether the movement and its political representatives, most notably the PSL and its congressional delegation, can also construct a compatible legislative coalition to push forward the campaign’s priorities while avoiding transactional relations, even corruption, or what many in the PSL refer to as “old politics.” Lula and his PT chose to engage in the transactional nature of legislative relations, but Bolsonaro has openly castigated those who practice “old politics.” Yet, there are increasing signs that even the PSL is not immune to corrupt practices. Senator Flávio Bolsonaro is neck deep in a kickback scandal wherein employees of his Rio de Janeiro state deputy office sliced off portions of their salaries and handed them back to the newly elected senator. Minister of Tourism Marcelo Álvaro Antônio, elected as a superstar federal deputy candidate from Minas Gerais, is under investigation for illegal campaign finance practices.61 He is alleged to have set up false PSL candidacies (called “laranjas” or oranges in Brazil), transferred PSL funds to the campaigns, and then paid off cronies through misreported expenditures. Last, an increasing number of reports allege that President Bolsonaro and leaders of the PSL are trading earmarked government funds for votes on social security reform.62 These reports raise suspicions over the party’s dedication to circumventing patronage politics and avoiding campaign finance offenses. However, these allegations suggest that the PSL is falling into the traditional patronage politics trap described by Mello and Spektor,

“In Brasilia, successive occupants of the presidential palace and the chambers of Congress have avoided deadlock only by joining forces in an unsavory compact with corrupt public- and private-sector interest groups.”

President Bolsonaro and Minister of the Economy Paulo Guedes decided that the credibility of the government and the efficacy of the government’s reform agenda rests with passage of their New Social Security reform. This political and legislative challenge will test the PSL and its leadership’s ability to expand and sustain the governing coalition while simultaneously holding on to the campaign promise to fight corruption and reject patronage politics. The odds are not promising. Arko Advice polled a large sample of Brazilian legislators in March and found that dissension within congress increased since the installation of the new government. Over 60 percent of respondents reported that executive-legislative relations were bad, a considerable jump from the 17.4 percent responding to the same question in January.63 The same survey found that support for the government’s social security reform had fallen from 68.8 to 55.96 percent. Also, national approval for the Bolsonaro government fell in April and may

60 The Economist. “What is Brazil’s Mensalão”? November 18, 2013 and accessed at: https://www.economist.com/the- economist-explains/2013/11/18/what-is-brazils-mensalao. 61 Poder360. “PF vê participação do ministro do Turismo em esquema de laranjas.” April 5, 2019 and accessed at: https://www.poder360.com.br/governo/pf-ve-participacao-do-ministro-do-turismo-em-esquema-de-laranjas/. 62 Antonio Temóteo. “Oferta de R$ 40 milhões para aprovar reforma é "criminosa", diz Olímpio.” UOL Noticias. April 24, 2019 and accessed at: https://economia.uol.com.br/noticias/redacao/2019/04/24/oferta-de-r-40-milhoes-para-aprovar- reforma-e-criminosa-diz-olimpio.htm. 63 Money Times. “Cai apoio ao governo e à reforma da Previdência entre deputados, mostra pesquisa da Arko Advice.” Accessed on 7 April 2019 at: https://moneytimes.com.br/cai-apoio-ao-governo-e-a-reforma-da-previdencia-entre-deputados- mostra-pesquisa-da-arko-advice/.

27 BrazilWorks.net further decline amidst fraternal social media warfare waged between members of the PSL over the proper roles for Rodrigo Maia, Olavo de Carvalho and Vice-President Hamilton Mourão.

Serious fiscal adjustments are never easy, but they are made even more difficult without constructive, crisis-free relations between the president and leaders of the legislative branch. To secure passage of the social security reform, the PSL will need to tone down its social media engagements while simultaneously building sturdy political and personal relationships with legislators who practice the “old politics.” On occasion, the PSL legislative leaders may even have to work with opposition leaders to secure passage of specific legislative projects. Continued PSL social media campaigning threatens to limit coalition-building precisely when the Bolsonaro government needs super majorities to carry out its most ambitious economic and fiscal reforms through constitutional amendments. Indeed, the PSL congressional delegations’ performance on the social security reform could define the party for years to come and determine its electoral fortunes for the 2020 municipal elections.

The Social Liberal Party and the Future of Brazilian Democracy

Democracy needs ample citizen participation, fair contestation between competing political projects, and regular renovation to increase competition, improve representation and increase accountability between citizens and their government. Brazil’s 2018 elections offered the nation all three of these democratic ingredients and voters took full advantage to elect Jair Bolsonaro and send a large Social Liberal Party delegation to the national congress. If democracy and elections work, then the PSL will either improve governance or lose in the next elections. The PT, PSDB, and MDB can all testify to this essential democratic rule.

The PSL pinned its winning strategy to low cost-high impact social media campaigns that successfully sidestepped the mainstream media and engaged voters directly on the issues of biggest concern. This innovation may become the most significant contribution of the PSL to Brazilian democracy, offering a path toward greater citizen engagement at a much lower cost than average winning campaigns. Yes, the PSL’s reliance on bombast, misinformation, and outright fake news poses evident risks, but these can be overcome with rules based electoral monitoring that increases accountability and punishes candidates and parties who do not play by the rules. Also, the same social media strategy that propelled the party to victory can just as easily lead it to defeat if electoral opponents adopt similar campaign tactics and citizen engagement actions.

Like the PSL or not, the party’s capacity to elect federal deputies that spend less than R$100,000 in 2018 opens the possibility of greater electoral participation for thousands of would be candidates without significant financial backing. Ironically, the success of the PSL in 2018 and its new-found treasure in the 2019 Party Fund disbursements may weaken the party as its leaders and members fight over allocation of these public monies. Indeed, the center-right New Party (Novo) promises to return all public monies on elections or party activities and will challenge the PSL to do the same in coming election cycles. Supporters and opponents now ask, will the PSL push for reforms and adopt practices that lessen the accountability gap or will party leaders fall into the transactional practices of patronage politics?

This all-important question may be partially answered by the PSL’s conduct as it works to secure passage of the social security reform, downsize the government, and reboot the national economy to become more productive and competitive globally. The party’s future intersects with the government’s

28 BrazilWorks.net efforts to unleash a robust economic recovery that employs more workers and raises their compensation. Anything short of these outcomes will likely shift the political balance back to center-left parties in the upcoming 2020 municipal elections and the 2022 presidential race.64 The PSL may support social security reform but successful fiscal consolidation often leads to greater unemployment in the short term. Fighting “communism,” jailing corrupt politicians, waving the Brazilian flag, even passage of the social security reform will not matter if the national economy continues to underperform.

The PSL’s message to voters was crystal clear but the policy path toward cuts to recurrent expenditures and economic recovery is chock full of political obstacles and structural limits. The president and his party will need to tackle these challenges in the coming months or risk the wrath of their legislative allies, social media followers, and eventually, voters.65 The PSL has already made notable, albeit controversial contributions to Brazilian democracy but winning elections does not guarantee effective governance. The PSL and its leaders thrive on bombast, provocations, and persistent efforts to disrupt the party system and leaders of Brasilia’s political establishment. Yet, the president and his party do not offer a well-defined policy agenda to push the nation toward greater economic and social development for most Brazilians. The same electoral majority that brought them to power will also decide whether the PSL represents progress or disorder.

64 See Mark S. Langevin. “Brazil’s Persistent Unemployment Challenge.” The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. May 3, 2019 and accessed at: https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/2019/5/3/brazils- persistent-unemployment-challenge. 65 Reinaldo Gonçalves details four distinct scenarios to understand the development of the Bolsonaro administration, but his analysis does not consider the Social Liberal Party in congress or its leadership of a broader conservative-nationalist movement. Therefore, we do not directly respond to his working paper, “Governo Bolsonaro, Brasil 2019-22: Cenários.” UFRJ-Insituto de Economia. Texto para Discussão 016| 2018 and accessed at: http://www.ie.ufrj.br/images/pesquisa/publicacoes/discussao/2017/tdie0162018goncalves.pdf.

29 BrazilWorks.net

Appendix 1: Brazilian Political Parties

Nome de Partido Party Name Acronym Avante Avante AVANTE Partido Comunista Brasileiro Brazilian Communist Party PCB Movimento Democrático Brasileiro Brazilian Democratic Movement MDB Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro Brazilian Labour Party PTB Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro Brazilian Labour Renewal Party PRTB Partido Republicano Brasileiro Brazilian Republican Party PRB Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira Brazilian Social Democracy Party PSDB Partido Socialista Brasileiro Brazilian Socialist Party PSB Democracia Cristã Christian Democracy DC Partido Trabalhista Cristão Christian Labour Party PTC Partido Comunista do Brasil Communist Party of Brazil PCdoB Partido Democrático Trabalhista Democratic Labour Party PDT Democratas Democrats DEM Partido Verde Green Party PV Partido Humanista da Solidariedade Humanist Party of Solidarity PHS Partido Novo New Party NOVO Partido da Mobilização Nacional Party of National Mobilization PMN Partido da Mulher Brasileira Party of the Brazilian Women PMB Partido da República Party of the Republic PR Patriota Patriot PATRI Podemos Podemos PODE Progressistas Progressives PP Partido Republicano da Ordem Social Republican Party of the Social PROS Order Partido Social Cristão Social Christian Party PSC Partido Social Democrático Social Democratic Party PSD Partido Social Liberal Social Liberal Party PSL Partido Socialismo e Liberdade Socialism and Liberty Party PSOL Partido Popular Socialista Socialist People's Party PPS Solidariedade Solidarity SD Rede Sustentabilidade Sustainability Network REDE Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores United Socialist Workers' Party PSTU Unificado Partido da Causa Operária Workers' Cause Party PCO Partido dos Trabalhadores Workers' Party PT

30 BrazilWorks.net

Appendix 2: 2019 PSL Federal Deputies

Name State Educational Birth Percent of Percent of Donations Total Level* Year Donations from from Special Electoral Donations in Party Fund Fund $Reais Delegado Pablo AM Superior 1976 0 3 56965

Prof. Dayane BA Superior 1986 36 63 484950 Pimentel

Heitor Freire CE Superior 1981 0 83 64280

Bia Kicis DF Superior 1961 29 0 320714 (switched from PRP) Dra. Soraya ES Superior 1961 52 47 295643 Manato

Delegado GO Superior 1962 0 85 495539 Waldir GO Major Vitor Hugo GO Superior 1977 0 0 132938

Pastor MA Superior 1971 0 100 107800 Gildenemyr (switched from PMN) Alê Silva MG Superior 1974 0 0 83700

Cabo Junio MG Medio 1987 0 0 36147 Amaral

Charlles MG Superior 1984 0 0 153557 Evangelista

Delegado Marcelo MG Superior 1976 0 0 364411 Freitas

Léo Motta MG Medio 1973 0 0 254675 Marcelo Alvaro MG Superior 1974 0 13 598069 Antonio

Dr. Luiz Ovando MS Superior 1949 0 0 21648

Tio Trutis MS Medio 1982 0 0 12075

31 BrazilWorks.net

Nelson Barbudo MT Medio 1960 0 16 331815

Julian Lemos PB Medio 1976 0 99 368948

Luciano Bivar PE Superior 1944 0 92 1950000

Aline Sleutjes PR Superior 1979 0 0 101260

Felipe PR Superior 1991 0 0 59150 Francischini

Filipe Barros PR Superior 1991 0 0 393006

Carlos Jordy RJ Superior 1982 0 0 59150

Chris Tonietto RJ Superior 1991 0 94 78396

Daniel Silveira RJ Superior 1982 0 0 34344

Delegado Antônio RJ Superior 1972 0 0 77940 Furtado

Felício Laterça RJ Superior 1967 0 0 114450

Helio Fernando RJ Medio 1969 0 0 78717 Barbosa Lopes

Lourival Gomes RJ Medio 1955 0 0 201791

Luiz Lima RJ Superior 1977 0 0 263661 Major Fabiana RJ Superior 1980 0 95 95567

Márcio Labre RJ Medio 1974 0 0 22595

Professor Joziel RJ Superior 1966 0 0 37524

Sargento Gurgel RJ Superior 1980 0 0 50480

General Girao RN Superior 1955 0 13 33747

32 BrazilWorks.net

Coronel RO Superior 1959 0 0 50300 Chrisóstomo

Nicoletti RR Superior 1981 0 36 108440

Bibo Nunes RS Medio 1957 0 0 237216

Nereu Crispin RS Superior 1963 0 0 38108

Sanderson Federal RS Superior 1969 0 0 95929

Caroline de Toni SC Superior 1986 0 0 82637

Coronel Armando SC Superior 1957 0 0 53428

Daniel Freitas SC Superior 1982 0 0 329200

Fabio Schiochet SC Medio 1988 0 0 244955

Abou Anni SP Superior 1966 0 4 447044

Alexandre Frota SP Medio 1963 0 0 24758

Carla Zambelli SP Superior 1980 0 0 517468

Coronel Tadeu SP Fundamental 1965 0 0 70515

Eduardo SP Superior 1984 0 0 218330 Bolsonaro General Peternelli SP Superior 1954 0 0 52562

Guiga Peixoto SP Superior 1961 0 0 137984

Joice Hasselmann SP Superior 1978 0 41 262592

Junior Bozzella SP Superior 1980 0 0 392500

Luiz Philippe O. SP Superior 1969 0 0 196625 Bragança

* Educational Levels are: Fundamental/Elementary; Ensino Medio/High School and Superior/University

33 BrazilWorks.net

Appendix 3: 2019 PSL Senators

Name State Level of Birth Percent of Percent of Total Donations in Education Year Donations Donations from $Reais from Party Special Electoral Fund Fund Flávio Bolsonaro RJ Superior 1981 0 0 71.2212

Major Olímpio SP Superior 1962 0 0 380.323

Juíza Selma MT Superior 1963 0 0 1.831.456 Arruda

Soraya Thronicke MS Superior 1973 0 0 76.001

34 BrazilWorks.net