UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY
Waltzing in 4/4 March Tempo: Viennese Music in the Third Reich
by
Keith M. Fewster
A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
DEPARTMENT OF GERMAN, SLAVIC AND EAST ASIAN STUDIES
CALGARY, ALBERTA
APRIL, 2012
© Keith M. Fewster 2012 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et Canada Archives Canada
Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition
395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-87909-2
Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-87909-2
NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distrbute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats.
The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation. without the author's permission.
In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privee, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de thesis. cette these.
While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis. Canada Abstract
Research into music in the Third Reich has been relatively neglected by historians since
WWII. This study investigates the impact of Third Reich policies on the Gesellschaft der
Musikfreunde (GdMf), a major Viennese music Society, while the Society was under the
Nazi Regime from 1938-1945. The GdMf case study evidence is measured against Primo
Levi's "gray zone" theory of human behaviour in a totalitarian state. GdMf music programs flourished under Franz Schiitz, a professional musician and Nazi Party member. Under his GdMf leadership, the Nazis were not just perpetrators and the
Viennese were not just victims. The study shows the response of the Viennese to the Nazi takeover of the Society can best be classified as collaboration, compromise and complicity. This case study also sheds light on the question of Austria as the first victim of Nazi aggression and how Austrians today are coming to terms with their Nazi past.
ii Acknowledgements
This thesis would not have come to fruition without the encouragement, assistance and support of many people and organizations. Firstly, I want to acknowledge my deceased wife Christine who introduced me to and encouraged my venture into German language studies and Viennese music culture. Her support in connecting me to key people in
Viennese music institutions contributed greatly to the success of my thesis research in
Vienna.
I owe a sincere expression of gratitude to my supervisors Dr. Florentine Strzelczyk and
Dr. Horst Mastag. Without their expertise, guidance, commitment, kindness, patience and dedicated hard work to help me every step of the way, I would not have been able to complete this work. I also gratefully acknowledge their encouragement, interest and support in my thesis topic over several years. My thanks are also extended to Dr. Sandra
Hoenle and Dr. Barbara Schneider for agreeing to participate on my thesis defense committee and to Dr. Michael Taylor for acting as neutral chair. I acknowledge and appreciate the staff in the GSEA department for their support and encouragement and for providing me with teaching opportunities and financial support during my Masters program. My thanks are extended to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for financial support, approvals for care giving and bereavement Leaves of Absences, and for an extension of time to allow completion of my Masters program.
I especially want to acknowledge Prof. Dr. Dr.h.c Otto Biba, Direktor of the Archiv,
Bibliothek und Sammlungen, and his staff Frau Ilse Kosz and Mag. Julia Kirnbauer in the
Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Vienna. Their assistance in finding and interpreting research materials for me over several years has been outstanding and an invaluable
iii resource. Professor Biba's encouragement and continuing interest in my study has also been a significant source of inspiration to me. As well, I appreciate the approval from the
Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde to use copyright materials in the Appendix of this thesis.
Similarly Dr. Erwin Barta, the archivist at the Konzerthansgesellschaft in Vienna, has been very generous in providing me with materials from that society and offering general guidance in my understanding of musical life in Vienna. I want to thank my friend
Helmuth Rapp in Vienna who shares my interest in music and has offered me encouragement and support and provided me with materials and information over the years for my research in Vienna. I am grateful to Leslie Potter at the Taylor Family
Digital Library at the University of Calgary and to my son Robert Fewster for their computer technical support in finalizing my thesis. Finally I want to acknowledge my friend and music colleague Jiirgen Bahr, along with Austrian authors Heinrich Kralik and
Thomas Weyr, who provided the inspiration for the reference to "waltzing in march tempo" in my thesis title.
iv Dedication
My thesis is dedicated to the memory of my beloved wife Christine. Together we experienced many wonderful visits to her native Vienna where I was introduced to the musical life of the city. We shared the rich Viennese musical experience for many years which inspired my interest in, and provided the opportunity for, the research on my thesis topic. Her support, encouragement and interest in my German studies and language acquisition are her legacy to me which will continue to enrich my life forever.
v Table of Contents
Abstract ii Acknowledgements iii Dedication v Table of Contents vi List of Tables viii List of German Terms ix
INTRODUCTION 1 Music and the Third Reich—a neglected area of study 4 Researching Viennese Music in the Third Reich 9 Vergangenheitsbewdltigung in Austria 10 Collaboration, Compromise and Complicity 14
THIRD REICH MUSIC POLICIES AND IDEOLOGY 22
NATIONAL SOCIALISM IN AUSTRIA AND VIENNA 37 Austrian Political History 1918-1938 37 Viennese Music under the Hakenkreuz 44 Viennese music institutions under the Nazi regime 49 Wiener Konzerthaus 49 Wiener Philharmoniker 53 Wiener Staatsoper 58 Denazification 62
GESELLSCHAFT DER MUSIKFREUNDE (SOCIETY OF THE FRIENDS OF MUSIC) 1938-1945 65 GdMfhistory—1812-1938 65 National Socialism in the GdMf. 76 GdMf under the Hakenkreuz 76 Franz Schtitz—the GdMf s "man of the hour" 78 Compromise and Coercion: Six Cases 82 Friedrich DlabaC 82 Wilhelm FurtwSngler 85 Anthony van Hoboken 88 Karl Geiringer 91 Franz Schmidt 93 Friedrich Wildgans 95 Schtttz's "Modus Operandi" 97 Schfltz's 6-week self-congratulatory Report Card 97 Nazi sympathizers "IN"—Jews "OUT" 100 From Vienna to Berlin 102 Concerts "unter dem Hakenkreuz" 109
vi Wahrend die Russen vor den Toren Wiens stehen —(Russians at Vienna's gates) 117 Art vs. Atrocity 122 Schutz on Schtitz 126
CONCLUSION 128
BIBLIOGRAPHY 131
APPENDIX A MUSIKVEREIN BUILDING 146
APPENDIX B 147 Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde - Brochure 147
APPENDIX C 151 Concert Programs—GdMf 1937/38 to 1944/45 and 1950/51 151
vii List of Tables
Table 1 Page 115 GdMf concerts 1937-1951
viii List of German Terms (excluding terms translated in the text and titles of books and music compositions)
German English
Gegenwart present (time) Geschichte history, story Hakenkreuz swastika (hooked cross) Lager camp e.g. Nazi concentration camp MSnnergesangverein men's choir Musikverein music society—also name of the GdMf concert building Nfirnberger Rassengesetze Nazi racial laws announced in the city ofNurnberg, Germany in 1933 Schrammelmusik Viennese folk music named after folk composers Johann and Josef Schrammel Vergangenheit past (time) Verdffentlichung publication, disclosure Volkischer Beobachter official Nazi party newspaper Wiederhersteliung reconstitution or reestablishment Zentralfriedhof central cemetery, e.g., in Vienna where great Viennese composers are buried
ix 1
INTRODUCTION
Soil man das Thema nicht „endlich" ruhen lassen? Hat man nicht schon „genug" getan, bedacht, gedacht? Muss es sein, dass sich die hoch lebenden Mitschuldigen schlechter flihlen und die iiberlebenden Unschuldigen dadurch auch nicht besser? .. .Fragen dieser Art werden wohl immer noch, immer wieder gestellt. Die Antwort kann nur lauten, dass man nie genug getan hat, solange es Erinnerung an die Greuel gibt. Und dass das Wachhalten der Erinnerung an Geschichte—an gute so wie an schreckliche Zeiten—den Kulturmenschen erst ausmacht. Das Thema ruht nicht Wir konnen uns also nur selbst zur Ruhe begeben, um ihm auszuweichen.1
Despite the tomes that have already been written about the Third Reich since 1945, there is a continuing interest by historians and scholars in continuing research and study of this topic. Although the political impact of National Socialism had come to an end, there has been a veritable explosion of discussion about the National Socialist past in the public realm—involving media, intellectuals, politicians of all parties and the general public.
This has been especially reflected in the recent changed attitudes of German and Austrian governments in terms of memorials, exhibitions, special anniversaries, speeches, books and films and reparation payments to victims of the Third Reich.2 At the same time there are conservatives who think it is in the best interests of those directly involved in Third
Reich victimization and atrocities to "put the Holocaust behind them, take pride in aspects of their pre-1933 history and [also their] achievements of postwar democracy.. .and unification."3
1 Schlestttger, Robert. Gott sei mit unserm FUhrer. Der Opernbetrieb im deutschen Faschismus. Mit einer Einleitung von loan Holender. Wien: LOcker Verlag, 1997.9. Print. 2 Niven, Bill. Facing the Nazi Past. United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich. London: Routledge, 2002.1. Print. 3 5. 2
In 1997 Robert Schlesinger's book about the operation of the Wiener Staatsoper
(Vienna State Opera) during the Nazi Regime in Vienna from 1938 tol945 was published. In his book he describes how the opera flourished during that time supported by the enthusiastic audiences—despite the fact that Jewish people were banned from the city and eminent musicians performed willingly to support the Nazi propaganda. In the prologue to this book with which this chapter begins, loan Holender, the director of the
Wiener Staatsoper in 1997, poses the following question: "Should we allow this theme to finally rest? Haven't we already done enough, remembered enough?" He suggests that the only answer is that we have never done enough as long as the memory of the horror and atrocities remains—that as civilized people we must keep the historical memory of both good and bad times alive. He concludes that the topic cannot rest and that we can only allow it to rest if we want to avoid or evade the issues.
Other historians support Holender's view that society has not done enough in the area of keeping the memory of the Third Reich alive. Klaus Neumann says that
.. .as a historian, I feel compelled to conjure the past in the present rather than divorce the past from the present, and to scrutinize the past in order to recognize the present and glimpse the future. The future.. .does not reveal itself if one turns one's back to the past.4
Similarly Neumann also quotes Karl Biedermann, the designer of the Jewish memorial
Der verlassene Raum (the abandoned space), at its dedication in Berlin in 1996, who stresses the importance of memorials and states "to be forgotten means to have died
4 Neumann, Klaus. Shifting Memories. The Nazi Past in the New Germany. Ann Arbor: University Press, 2003. 8. Print. 3 forever."5 On this same theme editors Richard Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner and Claudio
Fogu suggest that "an understanding of the past not only helps to interpret the present; it tells us who we are."6
In a keynote speech in London on February 16,2009 Barbara Prammer, the
President of the National Council of the Republic of Austria, noted both sides of the discussion paraphrased as follows:
Why can't we stop commemorating the Holocaust? Why should we keep stirring up old wounds? Why can't we once and for all draw a line under all the terrible events that humiliated, tortured and cost the lives of millions of European Jews, Roma and Sinti, of the gay and disabled and all the other victims of Nazi terror? Why can't we think about the future, which is already difficult enough for us and our children?7
Her response to her own question is that although some effort in the field of education has been made by teachers to keep the memory alive, silence is still too pervasive in the classroom—there is too much ignorance of history. She observes that anti-Semitism is again increasing and then questions how these developments should be dealt with. Her direct answer is:
.. .remembering the Holocaust must never stop. Cultivating sensitivity and a sense of conscience for all the visible and invisible developments that led to the unprecedented human tragedy must never stop.8
5 Neumann. —. 3. 6 Lebow, Richard Ned, Wulf Kansteiner and Claudio Fogu, eds. The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe. Durham and London: Duke University, 2006. 3,4. Print 7 Prammer, Barbara. "Keynote Speech by the President of the National Council of the Republic of Austria." London: 16 February, 2009.2. Web. 7 Nov. 2011.
Holocaust survivor Margit Meissner further broadens the perspective to a current world-wide concern in a film entitled Justice and Accountability in the Face of
Genocide—what have we learned? in her presentation at the National Days of
Remembrance in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum May 1-8,2011. She suggests that learning from the past should significantly influence our present attitudes and actions so that the world would never permit the Holocaust to happen again— implying however that this has not occurred and we therefore need still more education to understand and deal with this theme saying . .you see what happened in Bosnia, what happened in Rwanda, what happened in Darfur. So there are still millions of people being persecuted because of their ethnicity despite the world's shock at the WWII Holocaust."9
The debate for most historians, in other words, is weighted toward continuing to research and learn from the Nazi atrocities during the Third Reich and therefore to continue with the Third Reich as an important research topic as I have done in this study.
Music and the Third Reich—a neglected area of study
Contemporary scholars suggest that the study of music during the Third Reich has been a relatively neglected area and only a few scholars have tackled this subject since the end of WWII. In an article in the National Socialist Cultural Policy compilation in 1997
Pamela Potter states that:
The bibliography of cultural history of the Nazi period has revealed a curious lacuna: Scattered among the impressive number of titles dedicated to architecture, painting, literature, and film are surprisingly few works dedicated to
9 Meissner, Margit. "Justice and Accountability in the Face of Genocide—what have we learned? Why we remember the Holocaust." National Days of Remembrance May 1-8, 2011.2. Web. 9 Sep. 2011.
music, the area Goebbels has dubbed "the most German of the arts."10
Potter attributes this gap to the fact that many successful musicians continued as prominent musical figures before and during the war and after 1945 hid and suppressed their Nazi associations. She notes also that historians have been reluctant to "confront the complexity of the interconnections between music and politics in the Third Reich."11
The limited available research is focused mainly on the organization developed by the Third Reich to control music in Germany and to be used as a propaganda tool for
Nazi policies and anti-Semitic goals. Michael Meyer raises the question "how is it that, for so long, music and musicians have escaped all the questions addressed to the totality of the Nazi experience?"12 Erik Levi notes that "given Germany's undisputed historical pre-eminence in both the performing and creative aspects of music, the paucity of scholarly material on musical life in Nazi Germany appears to be somewhat surprising."13
Levi also observes that there is a significant shortfall of information regarding music and the Third Reich in the two major multi-volume music handbooks existing in the world today, i.e., the New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians and Musik in Geschichte und Gegemvart.14 Michael Kater suggests that "these themes have only rarely been reflected in the existing literature" and, based on his own extensive archival research, goes on to question the factual and interpretive accuracy of the few works on the topic
10 Potter, Pamela M. "The Nazi Seizure of the Berlin Philharmonic, or the Decline of a Bourgeoisie Musical Institution." Chapter 3. 39. National Socialist Cultural Policy. Glenn R. Cuomo, Ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. Print. 11 —. 39. 12 Meyer, Michael. The Politics of Music in the Third Reich. New York: Peter Lang, 1993. Introduction: 2. Print. 13 Levi, Erik. Music in the Third Reich. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. 11. Print. 14-.11. 6 which have been published.15 The opening comments in an anthology documenting articles by fourteen authors at a Berlin conference in 1984 also reflect that, compared to scholarship in other areas of culture, music in the National Socialist state is/was the last to be researched.16 The documentation of another international conference of sixteen authors in 1999 observed that because of the complexities of the subject, there were no
"far-reaching conclusions" drawn and "this is likely an indicator of the early state of the 17 research."
During the last two decades there has been a growing interest in research to document the roles that eminent musicians played as part of the Third Reich. Demokratie der Konige: Die Geschichte der Wiener Philharmoniker—a 685-page documentation of the history of the Wiener Philharmoniker (Vienna Philharmonic orchestra)—contains one chapter devoted to the orchestra's role as a Reichsorchester (orchestra of the Reich) during the Nazi Regime in Vienna. The book, published in 1992, was written by Clemens
Hellsberg, the current president of the orchestra.18 Schlesinger's 1997 book referred to earlier, documented the role of musicians during the Nazi Regime in the Wiener
Staatsoper,19 More recently two important studies have been completed for the Berliner
Philharmoniker (Berlin Philharmonic orchestra) related to its role as an official orchestra
15 Kater, Michael H. The Twisted Muse: Musicians and Their Music in the Third Reich. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Preface vii. Print. 16 Heister, Hanns-Werner and Hans-Gunter Klein, eds. Musik und Musikpolitik im faschistischen Deutschland. Frankfurt an Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984. Preface. Print. 17 Feinstein, Margarete Myers. Rev. of Music and Nazism: Art under Tyranny by Michael H. Kater and Albrecht RiethmQller. Central European History. Volume 38 Number 1.2005:163-165. Print. 18 Hellsberg, Clemens. Demokratie der Kdnige: Die Geschichte der Wiener Philharmoniker. Wien: Kremayr & Scheriau, 1992.459-502. Print 19 Schlesinger. —. 7 of the Reich from 1933-1945. The Canadian scholar Misha Aster's book Das
Reichsorchester20 was published in 2007 in German and a film documentary on the same subject entitled The "Reichsorchester "21 in German was also published in 2007 with
English subtitles.
The specific topic of this study is to determine the impact of the Nazi Regime in
Vienna from 1938-1945 on the Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde—GdMf—a major
Viennese music institution which had played a significant role in Viennese classical music life for 125 years at the time of the Nazi annexation of Austria into the Third
Reich. My own research also supports the argument by a majority of scholars that there has been limited scholarly interest in specifically researching and documenting this topic as it applies to Austria and Vienna, except for the following two symposia: Die Wiener
Schule und das Hakenkreuz: Das Schicksal der Moderne in der Gesellschaft des 20.
Jahrhunderts published in 1990 and Musik in Wien 1938-1945 Symposion 2004—Eine
Verdffentlichung der Franz-Schmidt-Gesellschaft Studien zu Franz Schmidt XV published in 2006. The two publications from these symposia contain articles by various authors related to music and events during the Nazi occupation of Vienna. One article in each compilation describes the conceit politics of the Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde
(Society of the Friends of Music—GdMf) and is of special interest as a source for the case study of this thesis—including an article by Professor Otto Biba, the director of the
20 Aster, Misha. Das Reichsorchester. Die Berliner Philharmoniker und der Nationalsozialismus. Siedler Verlag: MQnchen, 2007. Print. 21 Sanchez Lansch, Enrique. The Reichsorchester: the Berlin Philharmoniker and the Third Reich. Lansch Arthaus Musik GMBH. Cat. No. NTSC 101 453.www.ARTHAUS-MUSIK.com. 2007. Film/DVD. 8 archive, library and music collection at the GdMf, for the 2004 symposium entitled: "Die
Jahre 1938-1945 im MusikvereinsgebSude: Musik in Wien 1938-1945"22 and an article
by Hartmut Krones entitled "Die Konzertpolitik der Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in
Wien in den Jahren 1938 bis 1945."23
Two recent publications demonstrate the current and continuing interest in music
in the Third Reich: Settling Scores: German Music, Denazification & the Americans
1945-19531A by David Monod (2005) is an in-depth study of how musicians who continued their careers during the Nazi Regime were subjected to the denazification
process (similar to but less aggressive than the Niirnberg trials) for active Nazis after the
war, e.g., conductors Wilhelm FurtwSngler, Karl Bohm and Herbert von Karajan; and
The Arts in Nazi Germany: Continuity, Conformity, Change25 edited by Jonathon Huener and Francis R. Nicosia (2006) which consists of six essays by prominent Third Reich historians on the subject of the arts during the Nazi Regime.
This brief overview of available sources indicates that scholarship has given
relatively little attention to researching music in the Third Reich. The recent publications
referred to above indicate there is currently however a growing interest in understanding
what role music played as a propaganda and "Aryanization" tool of National Socialism.
22 Biba, Otto. "Die Jahre 1938-1945 im MusikvereinsgebSude. Musik in Wien 1938-1945." Symposium 2004. Studien zu Franz Schmidt XV. Wien: Doblinger Verlag, 2004. 311-329. Print. 23 Krones, Haitmut "Die Konzertpolitik der Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien in den Jahren 1938 bis 1945." Die Wiener Schule und das Hakenkreuz. Studien zur Wertungsforschung. Band 22. Wien: Otto Kolleritsch, 1990.188-201. Print 24 Monod, David. Settling Scores: German Music, Denazification, & the Americans, 1945-1953. Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 2005. Print 23 Huener, Jonathon and Francis R. Nicosia, eds. The Arts in Nazi Germany: Continuity, Conformity, Change. New York: Berghahn Books, 2006. Print. 9
Researching Viennese Music in the Third Reich
The methodology for my research is a qualitative, historical, social and political analysis employing a case study approach to the Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde—GdMf—one of the two major Viennese music societies responsible for the main concert programs in the city. The framework for my research at the GdMf was focused specifically on the impact of Nazi music policies on the operation of this Society. Most of my research was conducted using the archives and library at the GdMf in Vienna.
My thesis should therefore be viewed in the context of the following questions relating specifically to the GdMf: (a) how did the Nazi takeover affect the Society's organization; (b) how was the number and quality of the Society's music programs affected; (c) what type of music, i.e., the ratio of traditional versus contemporary music was included in the GdMf programs; (d) what was the impact of the Nazis purge of the
Society's Jewish members; (e) to what extent did the Nazis ban music composed by
Jewish musicians from GdMf programs; (f) what was the range of GdMf members and audience responses in general to the implementation of Nazi policies, e.g., did they resist, compromise, collaborate, comply or were they opportunists; (g) what was the behaviour and attitude of the Nazis who implemented the changes at the GdMf, e.g., were they perpetrators, collaborators or opportunists; and (h) was the GdMf reconstituted after the war and what changes, if any, occurred in the Society immediately after the end of the
Nazi Regime.
Other broader questions began to emerge during the research process based on the case study results, e.g., (a) was Viennese music a victim of National Socialist rule; (b) was it possible to make good music in a Society managed by the Nazi Party; (c) did 10
GdMf music programs suffer after the loss of the Society's democratic and independent traditions; (d) did the loss of Jewish musicians and music have a significant negative effect on the GdMf programs and what was the audience reaction; (e) was the Nazi
Party's support of the GdMf based on support for classical music or did the Nazis use the
GdMf as a propaganda tool to gain Viennese acceptance of the Regime. The evidence collected using this framework of specific questions, along with Primo Levi's "gray zone" theory of human behaviour in a totalitarian state,26 formed the basis for my interpretation of the GdMf case study results.
Much of the published material on music in the Third Reich is in the German language and relates primarily to Germany rather than Austria. This study in English could therefore provide a new perspective and understanding for a broader audience of
English-speaking readers. It became readily apparent that because almost all of my research documents were in the German language, writing a thesis on this topic in the
English language further substantiates the uniqueness claim.
Vergangenheitsbew<igung in Austria
This case study on the GdMf during the Third Reich also needs to be situated in the larger framework of Vergangenheitsbewaltigung, i.e., Germany's and Austria's postwar efforts to come to terms with their implications in the Third Reich. According to David
Art, in Germany the political debate has had two distinct frames—first is one of
"normalization" demanding that the Nazi past be allowed to "pass away" in order to develop a healthy national identity. The second German political frame is one which has
Levi, Primo. The Drowned and the Saved. Trans. Raymond Rosenthal. New Yoric: Summit, 1986. 36. Print. tended toward acts of "contrition" toward its Nazi history—exemplified by atonement for the past where the "Nazi past must remain a permanent political duty for all Germans"— within certain limitations however as to what is an acceptable interpretation of the Nazi period. More recently, there has been a movement toward political discourse that
Germans themselves were victims of their own Nazi past.27 In Austria on the other hand, the debate has been whether or not Austrians were the first victims of Nazi aggression and until recently Austrians have generally resisted dealing with their widespread complicity with National Socialism.
This Austrian victimization attitude was further reinforced by the Moscow
Declaration of October 30,1943 which stated that "Austria as the first free country to fall
victim to Hitlerite aggression shall be liberated from German domination after the war."
The treaty also declared that Austria should be a free and independent country with
economic and political security. At the same time it was acknowledged that Austria,
having participated in the war on the side of Hitler, must in some way take responsibility
for its German involvement.
The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 also reinforced the notion for Austrians that
they were indeed victims of the Third Reich. This treaty terminated the ten year postwar
27 Art, David. The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria. Cambridge: University Press, 2006. 10. Print. 28 Keyserlingk, Robert H. "The Moscow Declaration on Austria, 30 October 1943 - Dokument 1." Die Dokumente sind abgedruckt in: Robert H. Keyserlingk, 1 November 1943: Die Moskauer Deklaration - Die Alliierten, Osterreich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, in M. Gehler/R. Steininger (Hrsg). Osterreich im 20. Jahrfaundert. Ein Studienbuch in zwei Banden. Vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zur Gegenwart (BOhlau-Studien-BQcher. Grundlagen des Studiums), Wien-Kdln-Weimar 1997, S. 34 - 36. Kingston-Montreal, 1988 p. 207 f. Web. 5 Feb 2012.
Allied occupation of Austria and was seen by the Allies as a goal to make Austria a free and independent state. The Austrian situation was unique in postwar Europe as
... in 1938, it had been the only nation to be annexed in its entirety by Nazi Germany, a fact that raised consistent questions during the war about the extent to which the country was a victim of Nazi aggression or whether it had been a collaborator.
After 1945 the Austrian government remained in power despite the ten-year Allied occupation which had veto power over any governmental decisions. The demands of the
Russians for wartime reparations from Austria were eventually dropped because of the
Austrian desire for neutrality in postwar Europe.29 Researchers such as Heidemarie
Uhl30and Robert Knight31 have investigated and critiqued Austria's official identification of themselves as the first victims of the Third Reich and have called for a more critical self-examination.
Periodically there has been an Austrian effort to address its Third Reich role and the following few examples show the extent and timing of these efforts. In 1986 the
Austrians set up an international committee of jurists to respond to the Waldheim Affair when Kurt Waldheim, who had been Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1972 to 1982, was investigated for his alleged participation in WWII war crimes. The study concluded that Waldheim was aware of, but did not participate in the war crimes, and he was successful in his bid to become Austria's president in 1986, a position he held until
29 U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C. "Austrian State Treaty -1955." Web. Oct 2008.
1992. A majority of Austrians therefore had supported Kurt Waldheim as Secretary-
General to the United Nations from 1972-1982 and also as Austrian President in the
1980s despite allegations of his sympathy to the Nazi regime and being barred from travel to the USA until his death in 2007.
The historian Robert Edwin Herzstein suggests
.. .that many Austrians apparently viewed Waldheim's life as a parable of their own. They identified with his attempts to deny complicity with the Nazis and to view himself as a citizen of a nation occupied by German invaders and forced into their military service.33
Recently Austrians have set up funds for restitution to Jewish victims of Nazi appropriation culminating in the setting up of the Historikerkommission in 1998 to settle these claims.34 In 2006 five original Gustav Klimt paintings were returned from Vienna to the Jewish heirs of the original owners who now live in Los Angeles.35 Also in 2006, the current Austrian President Heinz Fischer criticized Austria's postwar declaration of independence (the 1955 Austrian State Treaty) for representing his country as a victim of the Nazis instead of as a participant in the atrocities of that era. Fischer said the 1955
Declaration of Independence "presented a false picture of the country" and that "many
Austrians enthusiastically backed the triumphs of the Hitler army." He also complained
32 "Kurt Waldheim dies at 88; ex UN Chief hid Nazi past" New York Times. 2007/06/14. Web. 31 Jan 2012.
—describing the city as "friendly to Jews."37 From these recent examples it appears that being the first victim of Nazi aggression is solidly entrenched in the Austrian psyche and only very recently are the Austrian and Viennese people slowly moving away from the long-held perception that they were the first victims of the Third Reich.
Collaboration, Compromise and Complicity
When considering the operation of the GdMf under the Nazi Regime, debates like the one about Austria's status as victim or collaborator and whether or not the Nazis were perpetrators are hampered by the difficulty in judging the behaviour of people in a totalitarian regime and the labelling of such behaviour as that of victims, perpetrators or collaborators. Kater suggests that regardless of political convictions . .political opportunism and career considerations prevailed over moral ones" and
.. .musicians and singers, composers and conductors, all of whom had to make a living in the Third Reich—emerged in May 1945 severely tainted, with their professional ethos violated and their music often compromised: gray people against a landscape of gray.38
36 Fischer, Heinz. "Holocaust: Austrian President Says Official Document Whitewashes Nazi-Era Collaboration." 2006. Israel Insider. Web. 31 Jan 2011. <^ttp://web.israelinsider.com/Articles/Diplomacy/8242.htm>. 37 Oleksyn, Veronika. "Vienna Woos Jews in Wake of Nazi Past." 2007. Washington Observer-Reporter. Web. Oct. 2008.
Similarly Huener and Nicosia suggest that, despite a wide spectrum of political convictions and career considerations, political opportunism existed and that professionals in all disciplines were no more courageous than the average citizen with the result that "for the most part, artists too, opted for compliance with the overall policies of •>Q the regime, adapting to circumstances in order to preserve their own interests.
Primo Levi, the distinguished Holocaust author and Auschwitz survivor referred to earlier, provides specific detailed insight and understanding of how to assess human individual behaviour exemplified in situations such as the totalitarian Nazi Regime. In his last book The Drowned and the Saved (1986), Levi elaborates extensively on the victim, perpetrator and collaborator concept from his own experiences and observations in the
Auschwitz concentration camp. He begins his reflections by suggesting that in our attempt to understand history, historians feel compelled to simplify and "reduce the knowable to a schema." He notes that historical events are not easily identified in an unequivocal way and indeed "different historians may understand and construe history in ways that are not compatible with one another."40
Levi posits that as researchers and historians we are tempted to simplify our view of historical events and trap ourselves into adopting an approach of polar opposites. He summarizes the dilemma by saying that the need to divide the field into "we" and "they" is so strong that this pattern, this bipartisan-friend/enemy, prevails over all others.41
Popular history, and also the history taught in schools, is influenced by this Manichean
39 Huener. —. 5. 40 Levi, Primo. The Drowned and the Saved. Trans. Raymond Rosenthal. New York: Summit, 1986. 36. Print. 41 36. 16 tendency, which shuns half-tints and complexities: it is prone to reduce the river of human occurrences to conflicts, and the conflicts to duels—we and they, Athenians and
Spartans, Romans and Carthaginians.42 Levi suggests this as the reason for the enormous popularity of spectator sports such as soccer, baseball and boxing, the contenders are two teams or two individuals, clearly distinct and identifiable, and at the end of the match there are vanquished and victors.43 If the result is a draw, spectators feel defrauded and disappointed. At the more or less conscious level, they wanted winners and losers, which they identified with the good guys and the bad guys, respectively, because the good must prevail, otherwise the world would be subverted.44 Levi continues by suggesting that some simplification is required to try and make sense of the events to form a working hypothesis. However, historical events are usually not simple and using the concentration camps as an example, he states that they "could not be reduced to the two blocks of victims and persecutors.. .to separate evil from good, to be able to take sides.. .here the righteous...there the reprobates."45
Research on the Third Reich has certainly adopted some of these complications
Levi discusses. My initial research expectation was that the music scene in Vienna under the Nazi regime promised to eliminate ambiguity and clearly identify the Nazi Regime as the perpetrators/prosecutors when they took over every aspect of the Society. In this context the next step was to determine whether the Viennese in reacting to the takeover were collectively and individually victims, resistors, collaborators, compromisers,
42 Levi, Primo. 37. 43 —. 37. 44 —. 36,37. 45 ~. 37. 17 opportunists or indeed perpetrator accomplices. It was my expectation that I would be able to easily and neatly classify those involved into one or the other of these categories.
Levi encourages researchers to explore the "space which separates victims and perpetrators" and suggests that "only a schematic rhetoric can claim that the space is empty" and indeed from his observations "it never is."46 He refers to this space as "a gray zone" where the two camps of masters and servants both diverge and converge.47 He suggests that the "gray zone of collaboration" is often directly correlated to the
"harshness of the oppression," i.e., the greater the oppression, the greater the likelihood that the response is one of collaboration or cowardice motivated by "terror, ideological seduction, servile imitation of the victor" or "myopic desire for any power whatsoever" with all of these responses driven by the need for survival and to "preserve and consolidate established privilege."48
He further suggests that "provocateurs and oppressors.. .are guilty not only of the evil they commit, but also of the perversion into which they lead the spirit of the offended" and that in the "hierarchical structure of the totalitarian state...all power is invested from above and control from below is almost impossible." He cautions that the word "almost" is critical as no totalitarian state is ever completely totalitarian—and indeed even in the Third Reich there was always some form of reaction which to a
"greater or lesser extent acted as a brake." This reaction as a corrective to prevent total tyranny has never been lacking—"not even in the Third Reich"—and in all cases "public
46 Levi, Primo. —. 37. 47-.42. 48 —. 47. 18 opinion, the foreign press, the churches, the feeling of justice and humanity" to some extent negated total tyranny.49
Another of Levi's observations is that opportunists who are greedy for power will always take advantage of the climate in the "gray zone" between victims and perpetrators and "seduced by the material advantages of the position become totally intoxicated by the power at their disposal."50 Similarly frustrated people seek power and in a totalitarian state, "power is granted to those willing to pay homage to the hierarchical authority" even
"without regard to ability and merit."51 Levi also observes that there are always "gray, ambiguous persons ready to compromise."52
This thesis scrutinizes the events at the GdMf from 1938 to 1945 under the Nazi
Regime as a case study in order to more productively get to the core of actual human
behaviour using Levi's "gray zone" theory to illuminate the analysis. Using a case study
as the framework for documenting the actual events replaces generalities about how
people reacted with very specific actions and reactions, thereby better validating the assessment of human behaviour. Based on Levi's observations on this topic, it is clear to
me that the "gray zone" of collaboration, compromise and complicity were in fact the
behaviours exhibited by the Viennese in the field of music, using the events in the GdMf
from 1938 to 1945 when the Society was under the leadership of Nazi Party member and
musician Franz Schiitz, as supporting evidence.
49 Levi, Primo. —. 47. 50 —.47. 51 —. 48. 52-.49. 19
My decision to use a framework designed to explain human behaviour in a totalitarian state based on Levi's experience in concentration camps does not in any way equate camp inmates to German people in Vienna. They are obviously not the same, but it is possible to observe human behaviour in the two situations within the common denominator of the Nazi totalitarian state, where in both situations National Socialism under Hitler forced its way onto humanity.
Hitler's military entourage crossed the border into Austria on March 12,1938 and by the next day he was enthusiastically received by the people in Vienna without any negative incidents, bloodshed or resistance. The Party moved swiftly to immediately take over the city. On the following day, the Party took over the GdMf in order to stifle the
Society's support of Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg who was promoting Austrian independence immediately before the annexation. The evidence will show that subsequent operation and events of the Society from March 1938 to the end of the war in
1945 under this Nazi leadership clearly support the collaboration, compromise and complicity interpretation of the Viennese reaction to the Nazi takeover of the Society.
Under Franz Schtitz, the Nazi leader of the GdMf, the operations of the Society flourished in a positive way despite the fact that the 125-year democratic operation of the
Society was totally obliterated and taken over by Nazi Party members. The Nazi hierarchy moved quickly to remove Jewish musicians from the Society's membership and similarly music by Jewish musicians was forbidden to be included in concert programs. Initially concert attendance fell off as Jewish concert goers (who were many) left the city or withdrew to avoid being identified by the Nazi police who were already rounding up Jewish people, taking over Jewish businesses and forcing Jewish people into 20 demeaning tasks. The swiftness of the takeover and immediate replacement of the
Society's officers and directorate by Nazi Party members, although not reflecting the
"harshness of the oppression" referred to by Levi, could easily be interpreted as a driving force toward a collaborative role on the part of the Viennese.
There was very little resistance to the Nazi takeover and the Nazi control of the
Society was apparently transparent to the Viennese music public. Anti-Semitism was rampant in Vienna53 and there was little objection to the removal of Jewish musicians. As well, the Jewish concert-goers were apparently not significantly missed by their non-
Jewish colleagues—at least not sufficiently to resist the anti-Semitic actions of the Nazis.
Franz Schutz's passion for classical music and also for the continued success of the
Society itself were balanced equally with his support of the Nazi Regime. Dressed in his brown Nazi uniform, the Viennese audience was content to accept Schutz as GdMf leader and "look the other way" as long as their concert life was not negatively affected.
The following terminology definitions contextualize the specific terms collaboration, compromise and complicity used in this study. Collaboration means cooperating reasonably with one's enemy who is occupying your country. The Society membership and the Viennese public were quite prepared to accept the Nazi authority immeditely following the March 1938 annexation. Compromise means giving up or surrendering one's interests, principles and integrity and giving up one's rights. The
Society was agreeable to relinquish its 125-year democratic and independent status to be replaced by an autocratic Nazi organization. Complicity means being an accomplice in a
53 Weyr, Thomas. The Setting of the Pearl: Vienna under Hitler. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 98-107. Print. 21 wrongdoing. In the removal of Jewish musicians and Jewish music from the organization and concert programs, the Society and the Viennese music-going public offered virtually no resistance to the implementation of the Nazi anti-Semitic action—which generally is recognized as a grossly immoral time in our world history.
As will be shown in the following chapters, the evidence of this case study suggests that the GdMf during the Third Reich acted in ways that can be more appropriately explained by using these definitions which are also representative of Levi's
"gray zone" theory between perpetrators and victims. The study shows that the Viennese were not victims and the Nazis generally speaking were not negative perpetrators in the music operation of the GdMf. For the Society, adjusting to the Nazi regime and waltzing in 4/4 march tempo seemed to be an acceptable alternative to its previous 125-year history as a democratic, independent organization.
In contrast to the collaboration, compromise and complicity behaviour evident in their positive acceptance of the Nazi occupation in the GdMf musical life during the Nazi
Regime from 1938-1945 in this study, the Viennese and Austrians, with reinforcement from the 1943 Moscow Declaration and the 1955 Austrian State Treaty, have instead considered themselves to be the first victims of Nazi aggression rather than collaborators, and only recently have they begun to acknowledge their Nazi past and participation in the
Third Reich. 22
THIRD REICH MUSIC POLICIES AND IDEOLOGY
Prior to 1933, there was virtually no tie between musical affairs and politics. Despite the
proliferation of musical institutions in major cities and towns throughout the country,
Berlin had become Germany's centre for music culture. Its four opera houses presented
works of all the great composers and the city attracted "star singers, performers, chamber
groups and conductors" from around the world. Berlin was also the centre for
"experimentation in literature, art, the theatre and film" and "had become the most liberal
and active cultural centre of Europe." In 1923, Josef Goebbels was quoted as recognizing
that Berlin "represented the centre of political, intellectual, economic and cultural forces
of the country."54 The location of the Nazi headquarters and German government in
Berlin enhanced the ease of Nazi implementation of its control over music activities. This
well-developed music infrastructure in Germany, the correlation between nationalistic
Nazi goals and nationalism in German music and the general disinterest of German
musicians in political matters created a natural and receptive built-in propaganda system
for the Nazi Party to disseminate its ideology. However, this infrastructure in German
music and na?vet£ on the part of German musicians did not prepare the German music
world for the politicisation of music during the Nazi era.
The National Socialist Party sought to change and control every aspect of German society and culture. The Party also recognized the potential of music as a significant cultural component to further the implementation of its "Aryan" and fascist ideals.
54 Meyer.--. 11,12. 23
Huener and Nicosia offer the following summary of Nazi policy and ideology in the area of arts and culture:
Hitler and his followers came to understand German culture and the role of the arts primarily in political terms. Specifically, they believed that it was the responsibility of the party and the state to rescue German culture through political means, from allegedly degenerate, largely foreign influences that threatened to destroy it. They believed that art and culture were expressions of race, and that "Aryans" alone were capable of creating true art and preserving true German culture.55
Nazi policies and ideology in the field of music were firmly established in
Germany during the first five years of the Nazi Regime from 1933 to 1938 before the annexation of Austria in March 1938. At the Nazi Party congress shortly after the
Austrian annexation, Hitler asserted that "National Socialism is in its organization a people's movement... and pointed to architecture, music, sculpture and painting as representative expressions that spoke to the whole of the nation..—he equated Nazi identity with the arts.56
Historically, Germany had a celebrated music tradition, not only domestically, but also internationally. It was a clever strategy for the Nazi Party to attempt to infiltrate and impose its policies on this apolitical deep-seated music establishment which for so long had played a significant role in the lives of the German people. For many years German music had also enjoyed a relatively autonomous development under the old idealistic tradition of paternalism with the ruling elites supporting cultural activity. The music
55 Huener. —. 2. 56 —. 123. 24 environment was therefore traditionally accustomed to subservience and this attitude was a perfect foil for the authority with which the Nazi Party proceeded to implement its control.57
When the Nazi Party came to power in 1933, Huener states that music was already firmly established in Germany on a "national basis, nationally acknowledged, and
CO praised as a special German art." Potter reinforces Huener's perspective of Berlin as the hub of music in Germany:
By the end of the Weimar Republic, Berlin had grown to become the most musically active city in all of Germany, home to the largest number of amateur and professional music organizations and a hub of popular music.59
When one considers the rich German history of cultural achievement in the field of music, it is therefore not surprising that the Nazi Party would focus heavily on this area to achieve its objectives to regiment the thought and culture of the German people.
The implementation of the Nazi Gleichschaltung, i.e., the coordination by which
"political parties, state governments, and cultural and professional organizations were brought in line with Nazi goals" resulted in the establishment of a complex formal Nazi organization to control culture, art and music.60 It was relatively easy for the Party to
57 Huener. —. 6. 54-. 1,2. 39 Potter, Pamela M. "Musical Life in Berlin from Weimar to Hitler." Music and Nazism: Art under Tyranny 1933-1945.90. Michael H. Kater and Albrecht RiethmQller, eds. Laaber, Germany: Laaber-Verlag, 2003. Print 60 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C. "Germany: Establishment of the Nazi Dictatorship." 2005. (1): 3.10/6/2005. Web. 7 Nov 2011.
The majority of the Regime's attitudes toward culture and music was based on strong beliefs which Hitler had developed through his personal life experiences as a young man in Austria and through his early political aspirations in the Nazi Party in
Germany. The Regime's philosophy toward culture and music were officially documented in 1926 at the Nazi Party's first gathering in Munich where Hitler decreed that the two Nazi policy key elements of anti-Semitism and propaganda should be incorporated into the field of music.61
Since March of 1933, Goebbels had been the head of the Reichsministerium fur
Volksaufldarung und Propaganda—RMVP (Ministry of Enlightenment and
Propaganda for the Reich). In September 1933 the Reichskulturkammer (Reich Culture
Chamber—RKK) came into law and in November it was unveiled to the public in Berlin.
Hitler also appointed Goebbels to the position of President of the new Reich Culture
Chamber. In these two roles, Goebbels had finally achieved his goal and was now in the position to assert his complete authority over the regulation of all cultural matters in the
Reich.62
The new Reich Culture Chamber (RKK) reported to the Ministry of
Enlightenment and Propaganda under Goebbels. The RKK was the central organization
61 Ley, Robert. Ed. Translation of Document 1708-PS - Central Publishing House of the N.S.D.A.P. "The 25 Points 1920: An Early Nazi Program." Modern History Sourcebook. Web. 7 Nov 2011. <.http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/25points.html>. 62 Levi, Erik. 16-24. 26 which embraced all members of the creative professions. There were seven cultural sub- chambers in the RKK identified as follows: Fine Art Chamber, Theatre Chamber,
Literature Chamber, Press Chamber, Radio Chamber, Film Chamber and Music
Chamber. The tripartite structure is summarized as follows:
1. an inner council of politicians and administrators, with Goebbels as its President, which was responsible for overseeing and controlling major details of cultural policy. 2. the seven chambers. 3. the 31 Cultural Organizers appointed at the local level to supervise affairs in the local Gauen or districts. These persons combined the functions of head of the regional propaganda department of the Party, head of the provincial office at the Ministry of Propaganda and the provincial manager of culture (Landeskulturwalter).63
The Music Chamber was named the Reichsmusikkammer (Reich Music
Chamber—RMK). It was divided into four components and mirrored the RKK organization:
1. a ruling committee comprising a President, Vice-President, Business Manager, and inner council. 2. the internal administrative organization, which comprised departments dealing with the areas of publicity, cultural propaganda, financial control and laws. 3. seven departments comprising the various music professions, e.g., composers, performers, concert and copyright management, choral and folk music, music publishers, music stores and instrumented manufacturers—often with further subdivisions for more specific music areas. 4. local organizations in 31 districts in which provincial branches were set up under the control of the Landeskulturwalter 64 65
63 Levi, Erik. 25,26. 64 —. 26. 65 —. 25,27. Meyer. —. Illustration at end of book. Excellent graphic portrayals of the RKK and RMK organizations are available in Levi, Erik. Music in the Third Reich. New York St Martin's Press, 1994.25 and 27. Print. Also for the RMK in Meyer, Michael. The Politics of Music in the Third Reich. New York: Peter Lang, 1993. Illustrations at the end of the Meyer book. Print 27
To enhance the profile of the RMK, Goebbels appointed two of Germany's foremost musicians to the official leading positions. The composer Richard Strauss and conductor Wilhelm FurtwMngler were appointed President and Vice President respectively, neither of whom were members of the Nazi Party.66 Strauss was forced to resign as President in 1934 because of his collaboration with and support of his Jewish opera librettist Stefan Zweig. FurtwSngler also resigned as Vice President in 1934 in protest against the Reich's negative attitude to the contemporary music of the "Aryan" composer Paul Hindemith whom FurtwSngler supported.67 The Nazi hierarchy allowed
FurtwSngler to continue his career as conductor of the Berlin Philharmoniker and also with the Wiener Philharmoniker, whereas Strauss never completely regained the favour of Hitler and Goebbels, although he continued to be held in high esteem by the Viennese.
It appears that the most notable overt resistance to Nazi music policy came from these two prominent German non-Jewish musicians.
Music in the Third Reich was used as an effective propaganda tool to support and embellish Nazi ritual, myths, symbols and ideology and "art was no longer permitted to 68 develop in response to its intrinsic tensions." Meyer suggests that although "Goebbels had consolidated his hold over all cultural expressions and die media" in order to accomplish the "propagandistic needs of the Nazi state" the "considerations of power and propaganda had priority over the implementation of volkisch (folkish) ideas in music."69
66 Levi, Erik. 29. 67 —. 30. 68— 5. 69 Meyer. —. 254. 28
German musicians were generally naive and unaware and/or disinterested in politics because of the traditional autonomy, benevolence and entrenched importance of music in
German culture. In describing this situation Meyer further suggests:
It is the story of an external power thrusting itself upon an inward-directed, socially conservative eighteenth-century music community whose political innocence.. .ought to have secured extraterritorial immunity from the Nazis.70
One of the Regime's first acts was to pass a law for the Gesetz zur
Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums—a law for the restoration of tenure for the civil service passed in April 1933. This law effectively removed all Jewish influence from public service and "barred Jews from holding teaching posts at music conservatories or working in state opera houses" and the next step was removal of Jewish musicians from the music academies.71
With the formation of the Reichskulturkammer (RKK) and Reichsmusikkammer
(RMK) under Goebbels, the active registration of all Jewish musicians was implemented to ensure no Jew was participating in any music activitiy outside of the isolated
Kulturbund (cultural organization) formed for Jewish musicians. The Kulturbund was a clever concept to gather Jews together and temporarily appease Jewish musicians who were forbidden to participate in regular Reich musical activities. This consolidation of
Jewish musicians in the isolated Kulturbund later led to the formation of the Jewish ghettos and finally to the deportation of Jews to concentration camps.72
70 Meyer. —. 7. 71 Levi, Erik. —. 41. 72 Kater. Twisted Muse. —. 97,99. 29
Music quite naturally provided an excellent vehicle for the Nazi Party to implement its anti-Semitic and "Aryan" goals. The great classical musicians, e.g., J.S.
Bach, Georg Friedrich Handel, Josef Haydn, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Ludwig van
Beethoven, Franz Schubert, Johannes Brahms, Anton Bruckner and Richard Wagner were German speaking and of "Aryan" ancestry. The Nazi Party was able to appropriate these musicians as examples of the great German music tradition to support Hitler's
"blood and soil" and "blood and iron" philosophy.73
Similarly this long history of "Aryan" German musicians provided ammunition for the Nazi Party to denounce Jewish composers such as Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy,
Gustav Mahler and Arnold Schonberg who had emerged during the 19th and early 20th centuries.74 Many leading musicians in 20thcentury Germany were also Jewish, had achieved international prominence, or were the heads of major German music institutions in 1933. German speaking Jewish conductors such as Bruno Walter and Walter
Klemperer, Jewish singers such as Richard Tauber and other artists such as Jewish pianist
Artur Schnabel held prominent positions in Germany's musical life and traveled and performed internationally. By denouncing these musicians as unfit to represent the purity of the German race and by expelling them from their positions and forbidding them to perform in Germany, the musicians were forced into exile and held up as the cleansing that must be accomplished in order to implement the anti-Semitic and "Aryan" goals of the new Regime. As a result of the implementation of the Nazi music policies, many
73 Meyer. —. 19. 74 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C. "Culture in the Third Reich." 2005. Web. 3 Jan 2012.
German Jewish musicians emigrated to other countries after 1933. Some prominent conductors such as Bruno Walter and Walter Klemperer moved first to Vienna and then subsequently to America just before the Anschluss.
Anti-Semitic books regarding Jews and music began to appear already in the
1930s. Richard Eichenauer's book Musik und Rasse was written in 1932. The dictionary entitled Musikalische JudenA-B-C was published in 1935 and again in 1936 and 1938, offering a comprehensive list of musicians of Jewish origin. Many anti-Semitic articles appeared in Alfred Rosenberg's Nazi Party journal Die Musik These publications often contained inaccuracies which over time were corrected but in the meantime created difficult situations for some musicians—either for being wrongly included or wrongly excluded.
In 1940 the Nazi Party musicologist Herbert Gerigk published the Lexikon der
Juden in der Musik using the most up-to-date Party documents and archives. The book
was published under the auspices of the Institute for Research into the Jewish Question
by Rosenberg in his role as educational and ideological leader of the Party. The purpose of the Lexikon was to create a dictionary which "documents all facts and interconnections on Jews that [were] advanced within the area of music and to pass these on now, as it may be impossible to present and prove these things at a later date." The Lexikon
received wide distribution and was reprinted in a second edition in 1943. To specifically address the Nazi "Jewish cleansing" thrust, the 1939 edition of a book by Karl Blessinger entitled Mendelssohn, Meyerbeer, Mahler: Drei Kapitel Judentum in der Musik was a propaganda tool to identify the main Jewish composers who were banned from German 31 programs. The book was expanded in 1944 as Judentum und Musik: Ein Beitrag zur
Kultur und Rassenpolitik,75 These examples demonstrate not only the extent to which anti-Semitism had been festering in Germany before 1933 but also the extent to which the
Nazi Party after 1933 tried to ensure that all German Jews involved in the field of music were identified and their names communicated to the German people as an enhancement to Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda.
All of these Nazi initiatives eventually paved the way for the banning of performances and publications of all Jewish musicians, the interruption of concerts to arrest Jewish performers and the general purge of Jews from every area of German musical life. The combination of the high profile of many Jewish musicians and the effective use of Nazi propaganda provided the Party with an effective way to implement and gain acceptance for their anti-Semitic and "Aryan" objectives.
A fundamental goal of the Nazi Regime was that "all music produced had to fit within certain standards defined as 'good' German music."76 This definition meant that
"good" German music must be or must have been composed by a German composer of
"Aryan" ancestry, that "good" German music must adhere to the old German Teutonic tradition and must not be contemporary or modernistic. Music composed or performed by any musician with Jewish ancestry was immediately considered "bad" or "degenerate."
73 Levi, Erik. —. 57-70. 76 "Nazi Approved Music." A Teacher's Guide to the Holocaust. 2004. University of South Florida 9/19/2005 2005. Web. 7 Nov 2011.
Hitler and the Party leaders promoted art and music "rooted in the realism and neoclassicism of the previous century."77 In order to reinforce these Nazi beliefs and values of restoring and building on Germany's historical and traditional culture, a focus on Nazi approved music was implemented. In particular, the Party canonized the music of four 19th century composers as German Nazi ideals. The music of Richard Wagner,
Ludwig van Beethoven, Anton Bruckner and Johannes Brahms was the prime representative of "good" German music even though they lived before the 20th century.
The music of these composers was played at concerts and most events organized by the
Party. This strategy was an effective propaganda tool and Lebrecht observes that:
From their first day in office, the Nazis were intent on harnessing German culture to their crooked star, cleansing it of'non-Aryan' elements and casting themselves as the sole legitimate custodians of Bach and Beethoven, Goethe and Wagner.78
Although German music had enjoyed a relatively long history of pre-eminence both at home and abroad, the international recognition of German music after unification in 1871 was given a significant boost with the world-wide acclaim of Richard Wagner's music in the last half of the nineteenth century. German music had now stretched beyond the German borders and Europe and had developed a truly international cultural significance. This "national awareness" and "advertising of national ideals" through music meshed positively with the nationalistic and totalitarian ideals of the Nazi Party
77 Cuomo. —. 2. 78 Lebrecht, Norman. "Power of Song." The Lebrecht Weekly. 9/19/2005. Web. 4 Jan 2012.
Richard Wagner's music headed the list of Nazi approved music and was based on Hitler's affection for this composer and his music. Hitler's fondness for Wagner is well documented and Frederic Spotts refers to Hitler as "The Perfect Wagnerite." Hitler and Wagner were aligned in their anti-Semitic beliefs and Hitler believed that Wagner's music was the epitome of "pure" German music. Although written over 50 years before
Hitler's ascent to power in Germany, Wagner's 1850 anti-Semitic essay on Judaism in
Music resulted in a close affinity between Hitler's and Wagner's German anti-Semitic ideals.80
When looking at all the various musical genres, Erik Levi suggests that "the relationship between music and Nazi politics is seen at its most tangible in the area of Of opera.' Hitler's interest in Wagner's operas from his early days in Linz and Vienna and his later support of Wagner's family in Bayreuth along with Hermann Gearing's active
Nazi involvement in the artistic policy of the Berliner Staatsoper reinforced this Nazi emulation of Wagner's ideals and music. In addition to his love for Wagner and his music, Hitler had also canonized the Austrian composer Anton Bruckner as a National
Socialist—even though he was a composer whose music he [Hitler] did not greatly care for at the time,82 but later compared him to Wagner. To reinforce the Nazi preference and
79 Meyer. —. 8. 80 Spotts, Frederic. Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics. New York: The Overlook Press, 2002. Ch. 13/14. Print. 81 Levi, Erik. —. 166. 82 Spotts. —. 232. 34 belief in traditional rather than contemporary music, Nazi ideology and propaganda created a new definition of the term "German." Cuomo suggests that Nazi music fit nicely into this concept of a "fictitious German norm" and it was Jewish and contemporary music and "anything deviating from this norm that needed to be removed like a cancer from the fictitious body of a German people, or Volk."
As part of its aggressive program to define German and encourage traditional
German culture, the Party denounced traditional and contemporary classical music by
Jewish composers and jazz as being degenerate. In order to enforce stricter controls over contemporary repertoire, a special Entartete Musik (degenerate music) exhibition was
held in Dtisseldorf in May 1938, in conjunction with the Reichsmusiktage (Reich music days).84 It also did not matter whether the music was composed or performed by "Aryan"
musicians or whether it was contemporary music such as the classical atonal music by
Jewish composers like Arnold SchSnberg, or the "Aryan" composers Anton von Webern and Alban Berg in the atonal Second Viennese School. Paul Hindemith for example was a renowned "Aryan" German composer and although not Jewish, the Nazi Party considered his compositions too contemporary and therefore foreign music—the Party believed they totally destroyed the Nazi-supported German music art form because they were too untraditional. Fred Prieberg quotes the following published Nazi comment about
Hindemith, likening him to the Jewish mentality:
Wenn Hindemith auch kein Jude ist, so segelte er doch bisher ganz in dem Fahrwasser jOdischer Mentality. (Even
*3 Cuomo. —. 7. 84 Levi, Erik. —. 93,94. 35
if Hindemith is not a Jew, he has so far been wholly caught up in the mentality of Jews).85
As a result of this narrow view, only traditional and contemporary classical music by acceptable "Aryan" composers along with German propaganda war songs were encouraged as qualifying for the label of "true" German music.
As a further control mechanism against "degenerate" contemporary music, the
Party staged concerts throughout the Reich to encourage performance of "true" German
music. "Aryan" musicians were encouraged to compose new music in the old tradition as
well as military music to be used as an integral part of Nazi Party and local festivals. Of
all the arts, "music aroused Hitler's deepest anxiety when he was scrabbling for power" and he saw contemporary music as "symptomatic of a sick society" seeing in it from his
perspective an "artistic degeneration paralleling the country's political decay."86 Potter
suggests that the attempt by the Nazi party to replace the Jewish composers and their
music was a great success, but the encouragement of "Aryan" musicians to compose
"true" German contemporary music to replace Jewish music "proved far more difficult or completely unfeasible."87 It is therefore not surprising that the Nazi Party focused extensively on the area of traditional music in its attempt to regulate the thought and culture of the German population. Similarly, with Austria's and Vienna's long history and world-wide recognition in the field of music, it is also not surprising that the Nazi
85 Prieberg, Fred K. Musik im NS-Staat. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH, 1982.61- 70. Print. 86 Spotts. —. 267,268. 87 Potter, Pamela M. "Music in the Third Reich: The Complex Task of Germanization." Ch. 4. 86. The Arts in Germany: Continuity, Conformity, Change. Jonathon Huener and Francis R. Nicosia, eds. New York: Berghahn Books, 2006. Print 36
Party would endeavour to capitalize on this aspect of Austrian culture to further its propaganda and "Aryan" goals following the 1938 annexation.
As the case study of the GdMf in the following chapters will demonstrate, by the beginning of 1938 the GdMf, during its 125-year history, had not only achieved its original goals set out in the statutes of 1812 but also had become a venerable and revered musical institution with a significant impact on the classical music life of the city of Vienna and the world.
Kralik in 1951 waxes eloquently about the ideology and the soul of the GdMf
which in his view had the capability to independently survive any negative circumstances, including being taken over by National Socialism. He suggests that the dedication and spirit of its original founders had been sustained and expanded through the
leadership of several generations, despite periodic set-backs. He also states that the
success of the organization was largely the result of this commitment achieved through
an independent and essentially democratic Society whose goals and individuality rose
above the aggrandizement of its individual membership. It was this spirit and
individuality and in essence its personality rather than its material existence or its cultural
function which was about to be taken over by Hitler and the Nazis in March 1938. Kralik
says the historic musical success of the GdMf and the Society's anti-Nazi support of
Austrian chancellor Schuschnigg made it a natural target for immediate Nazi takeover
after the annexation.88 The discussion of this takeover and the resulting Viennese reaction
w Kralik, Heinrich. Das Buch der Musikfreunde. Wien: Amalthea Verlag. 1951.206. Print. 37 of collaboration, cooperation and complicity under the Nazi regime is the subject of
chapter 4. 38
NATIONAL SOCIALISM IN AUSTRIA AND VIENNA
Austrian Political History 1918-1938
The general political, economic, social and cultural environment in Austria and Vienna at the time prior to the Nazi occupation considerably influenced the growth of National
Socialism in Austria and its reaction to the Anschluss (annexation) and is therefore an important context for this study.
Several political developments in Austria prior to 1918 greatly impacted a feeling of conformism and anti-Semitism accompanied by an identity crisis and the growth of
Pan-Germanism in the country. In his book Hitler's Austria: Popular Sentiment in the
Nazi Era 1938-1945, Bukey identifies four significant developments prior to 1918 that began in the seventeenth century and "left a legacy of myths, customs and composite feelings that continue to shape popular [Austrian] sentiment."89
First was the impact of the Counter Reformation, which imposed Roman Catholic thought and cultural beliefs on the previous Lutheran or Calvinist provinces. These initiatives encouraged unforgiving God-sanctioned actions against the perceived Austrian enemies—Protestants, Turks and Jews and which, because of their control thrust, resulted in an attitude of "conformism and expediency" on the part of the people. Second was the so-called enlightened Austro-Hungarian despotism in the late 1700s when Kaiser Joseph
II envisaged a united German state and encouraged standardized German language for
go Bukey, Evan Burr. Hitler's Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938-1945. Chapel Hill and London: The Univeristy of North Carolina Press, 2000. 3. Print. government and commerce and granted a measure of civic equality to the Jews throughout the Habsburg realm. These actions created an Austrian identity crisis and later encouraged Austrian anti-Semitism. Third was the expulsion of Austria from German affairs by Otto von Bismarck following Austria's defeat after the Austro-Prussian War of
1866. This exclusion further added to the Austrian identity crisis, as Austria was no longer considered a participant in German Nationalism.90
The fourth and most significant event was the influence of the Austrian German
Pan-German Nationalist Georg von Schdnerer, who in the late 19th century was a proponent of Pan-Germanism and was also considered the "founder of modern political anti-Semitism."91 His Pan-German philosophy was "anti-Habsburg, anti-liberal, anti-
Catholic, anti-capitalist, anti-socialist, and above all anti-Semitic." He appealed to the middle classes who felt threatened by Jewish competition following the large influx of
Jewish immigrants to Austria after the middle 1800s. Von Schonerer left a legacy of
"populist nationalism and ethnic hatred" for subsequent generations. His teachings provided the base for the Austrian German Worker's Party in 1904, which later became the precursor for the Austrian Nazi Party promoting Nationalism and rejecting
"foreigners, clericals, Jews, capitalists and Marxists."92
With the end of WWI in 1918, the Austro-Hungarian Empire ceased to exist and
Austria was forced into a transition from "imperial power to dwarf state." This resulted in adjustment in the loss of territory, independence and autonomy and a requirement to pay
90 Bukey. —. 3-6. 91 Karbach, Oscar. "The Founder of Modern Political Anti-Semitism: Georg von Schdnerer." Jewish Social Studies. Vol.7. No.l. Jan. 1945. Web. 29 Jan. 2012.
League of Nations. As a result many Austrians "yearned for Anschluss with the postwar
Weimar Republic in Germany." These postwar problems "ushered in two decades of rancorous political conflict" for the new Republic.93
Three main Austrian political parties emerged after WWI to compete as the governing party in the First Austrian Republic—one of which was the emergence of the nationalist Greater German People's Party—GDVP (formerly the Deutsche
Arbeiterpartei or DAP which was influenced by von SchSnerer's Pan-German ideals) and which had almost 20% of the vote in the parliament. The remaining 80% was divided almost equally between the Social Democrats and the Christian Socials. The Christian
Socials formed coalitions with the GDVP and other splinter parties and together had representation in the eight rural Austrian provinces. The Social Democrats were the majority party in Vienna. The ideological conflict between these three parties from 1919 to 1938 ultimately created a chaotic government situation, which deeply divided and demoralized the Austrian people, opened the door for further growth of the Nazi Party and led to Austrians opting for annexation with Nazi Germany in 1938.94 These differences caused political instability—both major parties developed armies resulting in
93 Bukey. —. 8, 9. « a 41 frequent physical clashes. Five different chancellors attempted to deal with the political and economic problems before the Nazi annexation.95
From 1918 to 1938 the Christian Socials were the ruling party and supported the private Heimwehx army to manage Social Democrat opposition threats.96 The Great
Depression reinforced the economic hardship since the end of WWI with food shortages, hyperinflation, unemployment, collapse of the banking system and reduced farm income 97 The Austrian Nazi Party continued to make large political gains after taking Oft over the nationalist GDVP party. Economic disaster continued and with unemployment at one-third of the work force the country was on the verge of civil war.
By 1933 with the threat of a stalemate and no-confidence vote instigated by the
Viennese Social Democrats and growing Nazi representation in the parliament, the
Christian Socialist chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss "dissolved the parliament and created the Vaterland (fatherland) Front—a corporate state which was an improvised dictatorship backed by the army, the Catholic Church and Italy."99 He banned the Nazi Party and his political rivals the Social Democrat Party. In early 1934 a four day Civil war erupted mainly in Vienna between the two main parties resulting in many deaths and the defeat of the Social Democrats in the city. A new wave of underground Nazi terror tore through the land supported by the Third Reich in Germany.
95 Weyr. —. 44-53. 96 Bukey. 10. 97-. 16. 9810. 99 n 42
In response to Dollfiiss's rule by decree initiative the Nazi Party demanded national elections and started terrorist bombings.100 An illegal Nazi black-shirt squadron unit stormed the chancellery and murdered Dollfuss in a botched attempt to force him to resign and be replaced by a Nazi. The Nazi uprising was quickly quelled in a few days by the Austrian army. In reaction to the Dollfuss assassination,101 Hitler sent his Nazi subordinate Franz von Papen to Vienna as ambassador as a gesture of friendliness to placate the Austrians.
Kurt von Schuschnigg, a Christian Socialist, was appointed Dollfiiss's successor.
His efforts to retain Austrian independence against annexation by the Third Reich played a significant role in the events leading up to and immediately following the Anschluss and also indirectly affected the immediate Nazi takeover of the GdMf. Schuschnigg continued with rule by decree for three years while his opposition—illegal Social Democrats and
Nazis—went underground.102 He sought a settlement with Germany and in 1936 he and von Papen made an agreement whereby Austria would conduct its foreign policy as a
German state. This collaboration gave "quasi official status to a terrorist [Nazi] organization" allowing Nazis in Austria to carry on operations both legally and illegally as the Dollfuss ban of the Nazi Party was still in effect.103
Hitler began to plan his immediate annexation of Austria by influencing the
Austrian Nazi Party opposition and on February 28, 1938 he summoned Schuschnigg to his Berchtesgaden retreat. There he browbeat him to accept stringent terms including the
100 Bukey. —. 10,11. 101 —. 15. 102 Weyr. —.54,57. 103 Bukey. —. 16. 43 appointment of the Viennese Nazi lawyer, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, as minister of the
[Austrian] interior with responsibility for the Austrian police.104 This meant "National
Socialism could be practiced freely; economic affairs were to be policed under the control of another Austrian Nazi; and one hundred German officers were to be assigned to the Austrian army."105
Schuschnigg was determined to defy Hitler's encroachment into Austrian politics, and on February 24 he made an impassioned and famous speech to a full assembly in the country's parliament in Vienna wherein he denied that Austria was coming under Nazi domination and decreed that Austria would remain a free country. The speech was enthusiastically received with prolonged cheering from the assembly.106 107 On March 9 he announced his proposed plebiscite for March 13 which would "ask Austrian people if they wanted a free and German, independent and Social Christian and united Austria"— hoping for a two-thirds majority to offset the Austrian Nazi 30% expected vote.108 In response Hitler organized an immediate assembling of Nazi troops on the Austrian border, "gave Austrian Nazis the signal for a domestic uprising and on March 11 ordered
German forces to invade Austria at dawn the next day."109 The complete Austrian Nazi takeover was essentially a non-resistant annexation of the country.
104 Bukey. —. 6. 105 Weyr. —. 2. 106 "Chancellor Schuschnigg Speaks To Packed Assembly." BBC Four. The Story of British Pathe. Web. 7 Nov 2011.
Following annexation Hitler initiated a plebiscite for April 10 asking Austrians to endorse the Anschluss. Anyone voting Neirt (no) had their names put out on a separate list and along with the general euphoria that had accompanied Hitler's arrival in Austria on March 12, the resultant Ja (yes) vote was a resounding 99.75% of all Austrians who voted (after cancelling 18% of the votes—presumably nein or Jewish voters).110 Weyr notes that "most historians believe that a majority of Austrians in fact favoured Anschluss on April 10, whereas at least 65 to 70% would have backed Schuschnigg on March 13" if his proposed plebiscite to keep Austria free had not been blocked by Hitler's invasion of the country. He also suggests that historians believe the following reasons explain the change in Austrian allegiance:
Schuschnigg's support may have been broad but it was not deep. Much of it must have been burned away by the surge of hope for better times that accompanied Hitler's arrival. The grinding economic hardships played a role, but so did the fact that tens of thousands had already found new jobs [already by April 10] .Viennese cynicism played a role—a lust for advantage and personal aggrandizement, a coldness of character hidden behind the fa9ade of waltzes and wine so often presented to the world.111
The steady growth of the Austrian Nazi Party after 1918 had developed a large group of
Nazi Party members and sympathizers who were ready and eager to join Hitler in his annexation of Austria.
The accumulated effects of the aforementioned loss of Austrian identity, the impact of the postwar economic woes, the political chaos including the growth of the
Nazi Party, the aggressive Nazi infiltration of the Austrian government and the long
110Weyr.—. 75. 111 —. 75. 45 standing pervasive Austrian anti-Semitism, explain why the Austrian people were so
willing to abandon Schuschnigg.
Viennese Music under the Hakenkreuz
Immediately after annexation, Hitler appointed Josef Bttrckel as "Reich Commissioner
for the reunification of Austria with the German Reich and gave Burckel full authority for
the governmental, economic and cultural reintegration of Austria into the German
Reich"—reporting directly to the Fiihrer himself.112 Burckel quickly "created a seamless
organization that reached down to every city, town and village precinct across the
country."113 Under his tenure the full scale Nazification of Austria was then underway.
Vienna's cultural aspirations under the Third Reich seemed assured when Hitler
made his famous speech in the City Hall on the day of the Ja vote, telling the Mayor:
... rest assured that in my eyes this city is a pearl, I will give it a setting that is worthy of this pearl and place it in the care of the whole German Reich and the German people.114
The Nazi support of the arts could be seen especially by the Party's clever use of music to
support its propaganda goals. At the Wiener Staatsoper on March 17, one week after the
annexation, there was a festive presentation of Beethoven's opera Fidelio—Nazi officers
sat in the orchestra and boxes, the Deutschland (German) National Anthem and the
Horst-Wessel-Lied (Nazi military song) were played while the "public listened standing
up, hands raised in the Hitler salute. Clearly, ideology would come first with art a distant
112 Weyr. —. 84. 113-.84. 114 —. 72,73. 46 second."115 Goebbels saw all good art as a way to exert political control and impose Nazi doctrine and he knew that "Vienna could best be harnessed through the arts" but favoured making Berlin the cultural centre of the Reich. Athough he shared Hitler's long-standing ambivalence to Vienna, "he nevertheless did what was needed to keep the performing arts
[in Vienna] solvent—and in line with party decrees."116
By June 1939, the Viennese were totally disenchanted with Biirckel's lack of support to the arts—his focus was on preparation for war with severe economic restrictions. There was a general consensus by the Viennese that "Biirckel doesn't know us and can't adapt to our ways."117 In August of 1940, Hitler realized the situation in
Vienna was completely out of hand and that Biirckel had to be replaced if he wanted to avoid further Viennese resistance. He chose Baldur von Schirach, the head of the Hitler
Youth, as the new Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter (Reich regional manager) in Vienna with the following expectations:
Gauleiter Biirckel did not understand how to win the Viennese for the Reich. I can't afford to have a mutinous large city at the southeast corner of the Reich. In Vienna you need sensitivity and tact for questions of cultural policy and that's why I thought of you.
He also told von Schirach that he would be completely in charge and nobody, not even
Goebbels "will be allowed to contradict you."118
us Weyr.—.81. 116 -.84-91. 117 —. 143. 118 —. 170. 47
Von Schirach was the antithesis of Btirckel—culture was his passion. He was described as the "poet laureate of the Reich" who also knew "how to perform on the political stage"119 and who was prepared to see Vienna as his new life's work. He
"attended all the operas and plays, courted the prominent local and visiting musicians— seeing Vienna as a great opportunity to display and unfold his talents as a man of culture and a patron of the arts."120
Recognizing the importance of opera for political reasons, von Schirach took over the opera himself and brought the young non-Nazi German dramaturg, Walter Thomas, from the Ruhr in Germany as his assistant. With von Schirach's support, Thomas as a non-Nazi emerged as "the cultural czar of Vienna in charge of all its institutions— museums, orchestra, theatres, opera, exhibitions, concerts, writers, publishers, actors and singers—as a kind of secretary general for the arts."121 It is an interesting observation that a non-Nazi person was allowed to have this level of control and responsibility in managing Viennese musical life under the Nazi Regime.
In his famous Burgtheater (main theatre for plays) speech in 1942, von Schirach unveiled his cultural program for Vienna defending his role in the opera and outlining his plans for the upcoming Mozart Week as well as celebrations and financial support for the
Wiener Philharmoniker, the Volkstheater (people's theatre for plays), the Burgtheater and contracts with the major conductors, e.g., Wilhelm Furtw&ngler and Clemens Krauss and also proposing new arts learning centres for music, dance, acting, art exhibitions and
l" Weyr. —. 144. 120 —. 171, 172. 121 —. 179, 180. 48 museums.122 He appealed further to the advocates of the broad Viennese cultural tradition at the 100th anniversary of the Wiener Philharmoniker in which he stated that "all music, including music of the present, must have a home in Vienna. Here in Vienna all art is at home."123
Choosing von Schirach to replace Biirckel was an astute call on Hitler's part to placate the Viennese. Von Schirach's Viennese arts tradition focus had a huge appeal and positive impact on the Viennese people. He aspired to making Vienna the hub of intellectual, cultural, political and economic activities in south-east Europe.124 These initiatives were welcomed by the Viennese and to some extent soothed the negativism toward the Nazi Regime that had developed under Biirckel.
Expulsion of the remaining Jews in Vienna was also "one of the major mandates
Hitler had given von Schirach." Von Schirach was an anti-Semite but lacked the anti-
Semitic passion of other Nazi leaders and with his interest in the arts, tended to "dawdle over this problem."125 As well, Thomas had developed a reputation for trying to save
Jews126 which added to von Schirach's lack of support to the Nazi program in the eyes of the Nazi leaders. By 1943 therefore "Vienna's role as magnet of artistic freedom within the Reich had been played out" under von Schirach and Karl Bdhm came from Dresden to take over the opera. Goebbels had finally succeeded in convincing Hitler to put him in
122 Weys.—. 198,199. 123 —. 209. 124 —. 174, 177,190. 125 —. 176, 177. 126 — .207. 49
charge of the cultural life of Vienna.127
By early 1943 Hitler too was concerned about von Schirach but was unsuccessful
in finding a replacement. Von Schirach managed with Hitler's support to survive and stay
in Vienna as Gauleiter to the end of the war. After the war, he was tried at Niirnberg for
crimes against humanity and sentenced to 20 years in prison.
It is evident from the foregoing that von Schirach's commitment to the arts and
his cultural success, especially in music and opera, went a long way to placate the
Viennese into acceptance of the Nazi Regime from 1940 to 1943. It was eventually
necessary to allocate all resources to the Nazi war effort and cultural activities suffered
with the closing in September 1944 of most concert halls and theatres. In retrospect, one
can only wonder what the music-going Viennese reaction to the Nazi Regime would have
been if Btirckel had remained as Gauleiter instead of being replaced. Von Schirach was
really a patron of the arts and fit in well with the Viennese music expectations.
Weyr states that when the war started going badly, the mood of the city darkened and the population turned against the Regime—suggesting that "the Viennese liked the
Nazis just fine—better when they were winning of course, but well enough."128 A young
Viennese soldier returned from the Front near the end of the war, surveyed the deplorable situation in the city and made the following observation of the Viennese at that time:
Music and culture, those were things we believed were worth fighting for. I look at the faces around me and begin to doubt. Nothing could arouse these people. They'd never
127 Weyr.—.220,221. 128 —. 247. 50
lift a finger to help themselves. They just want to preserve the values of culture, with or without a battle.129
Viennese Music Institutions under the Nazi Regime
Nirgends, so sagt man, wild die Kunst, vor allem die Musik, so wichtig genommen wie in Wien. Naturlich ist das eine Legende, aber es steckt ein Kdrnchen Wahrheit in ihr. (It is said that art, especially music, is no where taken more seriously than in Vienna. Of course that 1 is a legend, but there is a kernal of truth in the saying)
Despite the fact that both Hitler and Goebbels disliked Vienna (Hitler because of his experience in the city as a young man and Goebbels because he wanted Berlin to be the cultural centre of the Reich), they both accepted the reality that the way to gain acceptance of Viennese support for the Reich was by supporting the arts and particularly music. This is evident in the way the Nazi takeovers of the music societies were accomplished. The following brief look at three venerable Viennese music institutions attests to the Nazi approach and how quickly the Viennese adapted to the change by collaborating with the new Nazi leadership. A fourth society, the GdMf, is the society of main importance for this study and the supporting evidence of the collaborative and cooperative mode of the Viennese in the GdMf is developed in Chapter 4. Suffice to state here that the immediate appointment of the professional musician and Nazi Party member
Franz Schfltz as provisional head of the GdMf Society on the day after the annexation met with very little resistance and the Society's music program flourished under his direction thereby appealing to the Viennese concert-goers.
129 Weyr.~. 266-273. 130 Schlesinger. —. 56. 51
Wiener Konzerthaus
The second major concert Society was the Wiener Konzerthausgesellschaft (Vienna
Konzerthaus Society)—which with its own Society, concert house and direction offered, along with the GdMf, the main Viennese concert seasons since its inception. This Society was founded in 1913 about 100 years after the GdMf and by 1938 was firmly established in its role as a major Viennese music institution.
At the Society's last director's meeting before the annexation on March 10,1938 the Jewish Vice President Felix Stransky was announced as the first honorary member of the Society along with pension arrangements for retiring Jewish General Secretary Hugo
Botstiber—a member since 1912. With Hitler's arrival in Vienna on March 13, the takeover and changes at the Society began immediately. Already by the April 22 director's meeting, a change in the officers had been completed. Vice-president Stransky and another director, both Jews, had announced their departure from the Society and the resignation of the Jewish General Secretary Botstiber was also imminent.
After thanking the departing members, the President then stated that finally the
Konzerthaus could now expect an improvement and upswing in the arts—recognizing
Hitler as the man who had made Austria free again and who had returned the country to the Reich—and then closed the meeting with a threefold Sieg Heil (Hail Victory) .I31
As in many organizations in Vienna, there was a history of National Socialistic activities supported by the illegal Nazi membership in the Konzerthaus Society. The
131 Barta, Erwin. "Kunst, Kommerz und Politik: Das Wienerkonzerthaus 1938-1945." Musik in Wien 1938- 45. Symposium 2004. Studien zu Franz Schmidt. BandXV. Wien: Doblinger Musikverlag, 2004. 291-310. Print. 52
Society's original 1913 statutes were firmly committed to German art—as witnessed by the Meistersinger quote on the facade of the concert house above the main door—"Ehrt
Eure deutschen Meister, dann bannt Ihr gute Geister" (Honour your German masters, then you captivate good spirits).132
At the first director's meeting after the annexation, the President made reference to his predecessor's handling of conductors in previous years. There had been at least three examples of camouflaged National Socialist performances in the Konzerthaus before the annexation, e.g., the 1938 celebration of the 5-year anniversary of the Nazi assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss, the 1937 celebration of the Fflhrer's birthday and the countless concerts of the National Socialist camouflaged Wiener
Tonkunstlerorchester (Lower Austria Vienna and St. Polten orchestra) after February
1937. Although Nazism was still officially illegal in Austria, there obviously were many committed Nazi sympathizers who were already active in the Konzerthaus programs at 111? the time of the annexation.
Since 1937 von Papen had supported a program to establish the Konzerthaus as the centre of National Socialist music activities in Vienna. By working closely with the
Reich, he hoped to drive a wedge into the perceived monopoly of Jewish influence on
Austrian music. A significant step in the proposed program was a plan to engage renowned conductor Karl B6hra from Dresden as the conductor for the subscription concerts, with half of his salary paid by Goebbels through his
132 Barta. —.292. 133 —. 292,293. 53
Reichspropagandaministerium in Berlin. After the annexation the Society's President proposed a full collaboration with Goebbels to implement the Konzerthaus/Reich arrangement. 134
In implementing the Konzerthaus Society takeover, the Nazis did not feel it was necessary to install a Nazi as provisional head of the Society as was done for other major music institutions. It appeared that the President and the Society Directors, many of whom were previously illegal Nazis, could be entrusted to "toe the Party line."135
The Konzerthaus Society received significantly increased financial subsidies directly from the Reichsgau (Reich administration) in Vienna. Hall rental revenue increased through the Nazi Kraft durch Freude (Strength through Joy) oncerts. Whereas the Konzerthaus Society earlier had concentrated mostly on serious music, there was a significant shift to lighter Viennese music (operetta, Schrammelmusik, theatre, and film).
Concurrently serious music concerts increased as a result of more chamber music concerts. The Nazi party understood the Viennese cultural environment and encouraged the staple music Viennese diet of their own lighter music to enhance their acceptance of the Reich.136
Barta makes four significant observations regarding the Konzerthaus Society under the Reich. First, orchestral music did not decline until 1944/45, mainly because of the increase in chamber music concerts. Second, contemporary music concerts
(challenging Reich policy) were held in the Konzerthaus as a result of the relative cultural
134 Barta. —. 293,294. 135 294. 136 — .296,298-301. 54 liberty that von Schirach brought to his Gauleiter role, (which were normally not acceptable in the Reich). Third, most private concert agencies disappeared because of racial reasons (presumably many of these agencies were Jewish-owned or perhaps under the Nazi Regime artists were engaged directly through the Society). Fourth, and most importantly, the balance sheets of the Konzerthaus Society either balanced or showed gains after the annexation—for the first time in its history. All represent a positive upturn in the operation of the Society under the Nazi Regime.137
Before the annexation the Konzerthaus Society had obviously begun to collaborate with the National Socialist goals. The Society's focus was to preserve and honour great German art and this focus aligned with the goals of the Nazi Party. With the blurring of Austrian political unrest, Hitler's infiltration into the Austrian government and the general acceptance of illegal Nazi sympathizers in prominent music positions in
Konzerthaus Society programs, it was a short step to acknowledge the contribution of the resigning Jewish Society officers and without many other officer changes move into the role as a Viennese music representative for the Reich. In the case of the Konzerthaus
Society, it is indeed difficult to think that the Viennese were the first victims of the Third
Reich or that the Nazi Party was an evil perpetrator and intruder into the field of
Viennese music.
Wiener Philharmoniker
In 1938, the Wiener Philharmoniker was just four years away from celebrating its 100th anniversary. The independent and democratic orchestra, founded in 1842, had a
137 Barta. —. 304,305. 55 reputation as one of the finest orchestras in the world. The main hall for orchestra performances was in the Musikverein building built by the GdMf in 1870. The orchestra was "artistically, organizationally and financially autonomous, and all decisions were reached on a democratic basis during the general meeting of all members." Since 1933 the orchestra had not had a permanent conductor but instead the membership decided on various guest conductors during the concert season.138
On March 13 1938 the Board of Directors and the President were replaced when double-bass player Wilhelm Jerger, a member of the orchestra since 1922 and a member of the Nazi Party since 1932, assumed the orchestra's leadership role and one month later was officially appointed permanent leader. Jerger's strategy was firmly aligned with the
Reich—almost immediately the orchestra made three tours of Germany to impress Hitler and the German people and in May they presented a concert in an iron-works factory in
Munich. Hitler was delighted with the orchestra and at his request, they played at the
Nazi Party Day in Niirnberg with Wilhelm FurtwSngler conducting. Hitler suggested that they play every year in Niirnberg thereafter and tour Germany to show how Wagner's opera overture to Die Meistersixnger von Niirnberg should be played.139
Twelve Jewish members of the orchestra were immediately dismissed. Before the annexation there were several orchestra members who were illegal Nazi sympathizers and the number of Party members in the orchestra increased from 36 to 42 percent of total membership during the war. By the end of the war 50 players were members of the
138 Hellsberg, Clemens. "The History of die Wiener Philharmoniker." Web. 10 Nov 2011.
Nazi Party. With support from Furtwangler, Jerger was able to save nine endangered orchestra members who were not fully "Aryan" and who continued in the orchestra until the end of the war. The orchestra was used as a Nazi propaganda instrument throughout the war but the members were not held to account for their support of the Regime by the
Viennese denazification process.140
In September there was a move by the Nazi Viennese office to combine all artistic societies and organizations in Vienna under one Nationalized society. With the assistance of FurtwSngler the orchestra was excused from the order and remained independent. In
December 1938, the orchestra was appointed as a Reichsorchester along with a statute change that the orchestra would follow the principles of the Reich and retain its artistic independence. However, the independent right to choose their conductors as they had in the past was denied by Goebbels because it conflicted with Nazi policy. In 1940
FurtwSngler was appointed the permanent conductor of the orchestra.141
Three of the greatest conductors of the period—Wilhelm FurtwSngler, Hans
Knappertsbusch and Karl BShm conducted 57 of the 424 orchestra concerts during the
1000-day Reich. Music by the traditional great masters e.g. Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven,
Schubert, Schumann, Bruckner, Brahms, Dvorak and Tchaikovsky made up 54% of the concerts with the remainder of the music by contemporary German composers such as
Richard Strauss and Hans Pfitzner as well as other "Aryan" Nazi Party supporters.142
140 Hellsberg. Demokratie der Konige . —. 466, 502. 141-.466. 1*2 Alt 57
Hellsberg states that the Nazi concessions to the orchestra were not based on respect but rather to use the orchestra as a propaganda instrument for the Reich and that the orchestra members adjusted easily to this role. The long list of concerts in Austria and throughout the Reich reflected the orchestra's propaganda role with celebrations of special Nazi Party days, concerts for soldiers, factory concerts, Kraft durch Freude concerts and, after 1940, special concerts to commemorate the opening of many of von
Schirach's special projects in the city. In addition to Vienna, the orchestra toured regularly to Germany and German occupied countries and appeared annually at the
Salzburg summer festival, celebrating its 100th anniversary with twelve special concerts in 1942.143
Following Goebbels 1944-order to reduce concerts and close concert halls and theatres to support the war effort, von Schirach cleverly negotiated a compromise between Vienna and the Berlin propaganda ministry when he arranged that henceforth the orchestra's activities would fall under the direction of the Wiener Staatsoper and therefore continue to operate. Until the end of the war the orchestra continued as a Nazi propaganda instrument—with 106 concerts between September 1944 and April 1945.144
Hellsberg concedes that despite its outstanding musical success the orchestra must confront its dark Nazi past and prove now that it is a strong supporter of freedom, tolerance and peace. It is a fact that the orchestra was designated as a Nazi orchestra and that the members went along with the removal of some of its Jewish members in line with the Nazi "Aryianization" goals. He lists the names of the five Jewish players who were
143 Hellsberg. Demokratie der Konige. —. 476-482. 144 -.497. 58 deported and died in concentration camps along with several others who immigrated to
New York, London or South America and found employment in orchestras there.145
There is a lingering controversy over the orchestra's role in the Third Reich regarding the extent to which the orchestra has or has not dealt with its Nazi past—
(Vergangenheitsbewaltigung). As recently as December 2010, Harald Walser, the
German historian and director of the Austrian Feldkirch Gymnasium (Feldkirch
Secondary Scshool) and also the education speaker for the Green party in Austria, wrote an article as guest commentator for the Viennese newspaper Die Presse. The article entitled Es klang wunderbar: Ganz judenrem! with the subtitle: Die Wiener
Philharmoniker haben den Stellenwert des Umgangs mit der eigenen Vergangenheit noch immer nicht kapiert states that the orchestra was free of Jews and has not acknowledged its particiapation in the Third Reich.146 He also quotes the bitter comments of a reporter in London after a concert two years after the war who said: "I've heard your voice—it sounds wonderful—totally free of Jews. Dead silence." The English reporter then continues by saying that this "Dead Silence" has existed until the present time (2010).
Walser notes that for anyone who goes to the orchestra's internet Homepage to obtain the names of orchestra members deported to concentrations camps and who died there, the answer provided is unfortunately that no documentation was found. Similarly articles about the orchestra's history are few and mentions Hellsberg's book as being the main standard (and problematic) work. He also identifies the questionable roles of
145 Hellsberg. Demokratie der Kdnige. —. 502-505. 146 Walser, Harald. "Es klang wundeibar Ganz judenrein." Die Presse Wien. [email protected]. 30 Dec 2010. 59
Clemens Krauss, Karl Bohm and Herbert von Karajan as leading conductors of the orchestra in the Third Reich. He concludes the article by saying that in the run-up to the
January 2011 Wiener Philharmoniker annual televised New Year's concert, the Austrian
Philharmonic "Men's Club" had still not understood the significance of the exposure of their own Nazi past—a strong challenge to the orchestra sixty-five years after the end of the Nazi Regime.
In the context of this study the foregoing description of events that occurred in the
Wiener Philharmoniker from March 1938 to April 1945 clearly shows once again that the orchestra was not a victim of the Third Reich. Rather, by being anointed as a
Reichsorchester, the members enjoyed a privileged life as a propaganda instrument under the Nazi Regime. Orchestra members received pay increases, were not conscripted into military service and some of the members who were not quite pure "Aryan" escaped deportation for the duration of the war, unlike those who were deported and murdered in concentration camps. The orchestra obviously collaborated and cooperated with the Nazi
Party in adjusting easily to their new role as Hitler's musical ambassadors and was complicit with the Nazi Regime without resistance in the implementation of the Party's anti-Semitic goals. It is significant in the context of Vergangenheitsbewaltigung that the controversy continues over the orchestra's Nazi role during the Third Reich and its apparent inability to come to terms with its Nazi past.
Wiener Staatsoper
Similar to the Konzerthaus Society and the Wiener Philharmoniker, the Nazi Party
"pulled out all the stops" after the annexation to ensure the continued success of the 60
Wiener Staatsoper artistically, financially and mostly as a propaganda instrument to encourage party acceptance by the Viennese people.
In his chronological historical book The Vienna Opera, the Viennese opera icon
Marcel Prawy devotes a chapter to the opera during the Nazi Regime entitled The Vienna
Opera in the Third Reich 1938-1945—to a Counterpoint of Gunfire.147 After Hitler and his troops arrived on March 13, 1938, the opera had been closed until March 27 when
Beethoven's opera Fidelio was performed with Hans Knappertsbusch conducting and with Hitler's deputy Field Marshall Hermann Goring in attendance. It was reported by the
Nazi newspaper Volkischer Beobachter as follows:
Lavishly decorated with swastika flags and brilliantly lit, the Opera presents a more magnificent and festive picture than ever in its history.148
Prawy observes that a true assessment of activities at the Vienna Opera during the war is difficult. Goebbels had decreed the end of artistic criticism (he believed it was a Jewish invention) to be replaced with what he called "reflections on art"—where the Press was expected to reflect Nazi propaganda goals. He notes this was great for the artists—there
147 Anderson, Martin. Ed. "A Tribute to Marcel Prawy (1911-2003): The End of an Era—and the End of a Research Project" Jewish Music Institute - Suppressed Music. Newsletter # 6. February 2004. Marcel Prawry. Web. 31 Jan 2012.
The opera was able to attract the best conductors, e.g., Wilhelm Furtwangler,
Hans Knappertsbusch and Karl Bohm as well the best singers from the Reich. The musicians were apparently more comfortable in Vienna than in the German parts of the
Reich and there was unanimous agreement that "the Vienna opera was an oasis of peace amid the political and military horrors of total war."150
The Nazis recognized the importance of Viennese opera and that they needed to be tolerant as witnessed by von Schirach's desire to retain the true Viennese opera traditions as a significant addition to the overall Reich—"a notion that cut clean across the assimilation policy of Goebbels and his henchmen."151 As part of the immediate implementation of Nazi propaganda, Hitler's speeches were broadcast live throughout the opera house even during opera performances. On Hitler's first birthday in the new Reich in April 1938, a live Hitler speech interrupted a performance of Wagner's Die
Meistersanger von Niirnberg being conducted by Furtwangler. Opera performances were exchanged between the major Reich opera houses as a propaganda tool to emphasize the
Reich's "one big brotherhood." As Nazi ambassadors, the Wiener Staatsoper performed in Prague and Brno after the annexation of Czechoslovakia and also in Nazi occupied
Netherlands, France and Bucharest.152
149 Prawy. —. 154. 130 154. 151 Schlesinger. —. 54. 152 Prawy. 154,155. 62
The competent non-Nazi Erwin Kerber, as first opera Director after the Anschluss, was eventually replaced—unfortunately by two weak Nazi directors Karl Heinrich
Strohm and Ernst August Schneider. Finally in 1943, the native Austrian and respected, professional, and self-professed anti-Semite conductor Karl B6hm, was appointed
Director of the Wiener Staatsoper where he remained until the end of the war.153
Prawy describes the relaxed day to day activities in the opera house. The initially compulsory Hitler Gruss (Hitler greeting) sign on the stage door soon went out of fashion. The Nazis did not badger the artists and they were exempt from military service.
The esteemed German composer Richard Strauss lived in Vienna and for the whole Nazi period he "enjoyed the poetic licence accorded to genius" despite being out of favour with Hitler and Goebbels. The Nazis knew they needed the glamour of his name as he was a German and the most respected composer in the Reich.154
Most of the performances were sold-out but the audience was not only Viennese as before the war, but there were always Nazis in uniform, Nazi dignitaries sitting in the
Imperial Box and often soldiers on leave. Soldiers who were sick or wounded were paraded before the audience as a propaganda tool to generate support for the war effort.155
Although most of the performed operas were by the great traditional opera composers, von Schirach challenged the Nazi policy of eliminating most contemporary music and allowed some contemporary operas such as Carl OrfFs Carmina Burana to be
153 Prawy.—. 155,156. 154158. 155 —. 157, 158. 63 performed. Another new opera Johanna Balk by Rudolf Wagner-Regeny and sponsored by von Schirach was a complete failure because it was too contemporary for the traditional ear of the Viennese public—the booing and shouting from the audience was aimed at von Schirach and the Regime without any fear of Nazi retaliation.156
Schlesinger claims that the years 1943 and 1944 count among the best in the history of the opera house.157 He suggests that the singers and conductors had a very strong need to live as if they were apolitical but realized they had an eminent political function—they lied to themselves about the consequences of the active political role they played. He also claims that compared to other groups, the Nazis did not push for the administration and musicians to join the Party on the premise that they (the Nazis) had a heart for the opera This shows how perfectly the tactics of the Nazi propaganda worked—they ruled the Viennese music world after they got their racist goals in order.158
Despite the trappings of Nazi propaganda in the opera house, the breadth and quality of operas presented were obviously of a very high standard and mostly sold-out— making it relatively easy for the Viennese audience to accept the Nazi opera program.
Overarching the whole scene is also the general acceptance of Nazi anti-Semitism—as with the other music institutions (Konzerthaus Society and Wiener Philharmoniker) there was no resistance to the loss of Jewish opera colleagues who either left the city or were rounded up by the Nazis and deported to concentration camps.
156 Prawy. —. 157-161. 157 Schlesinger. —. 63. 154 —. 65,66. 64
Denazification
One further aspect of Austrian National Socialist tendencies to consider in the field of music is the subject of the Allied denazification process organized for musicians who during the war were either blatantly members of the Nazi Party or were deemed to be supportive of the Nazi Regime by participating in Nazi-sponsored concerts. Although there was initially strong support of the Allied-initiated denazification process, this support was relatively short-lived, especially in Austria and Vienna.
Conductors Herbert von Karajan, (who twice joined the Nazi party), was back conducting in Vienna within two years of the end of the war and Karl B8hm (an ardent participant in Nazi sponsored concerts throughout the war and who was very upfront about his anti-Semitic beliefs) were both cleared of wrongdoing during the denazification process. The most famous of the denazification efforts was for Wilhelm Furtwangler who maintained "art had nothing to do with politics, with political power, with the hatred of others or with that which arises from the hatred of others" and was eventually cleared after a long denazification process.159 Kater suggests that it was hard to draw conclusions about the extent of Nazi support and involvement of many of those who were brought before the tribunal and so they fell into the "gray-acceptable" category of suspected
Nazis.160
Monod makes several observations about denazification in Austria. He states that for Austria, the goal was to return to and maintain a high quality music life by immediately engaging musicians, even those who had been active in the Regime. In his
159Monod.—. 53. 160 Kater. The Twisted Muse. —. 191. 65 view, pursuing an even course as though nothing had happened was the Austrian objective and that Austria did not regard the failure to give up one's career for political reasons as grounds for prosecution. He concludes by saying that "in Germany everything
[in denazification] seemed black and white" whereas "in Austria it was all tones of gray."161
From this discussion, it is clear that the Viennese seemed most anxious to just get on with the music. The square in front of the Wiener Staatsoper is today called the
"Herbert von Karajan Square" and both Karajan and Karl Bdhm along with the others were revered musicians and very active in the Viennese music scene until their deaths.This reaffirms the characteristics of the Austrian and Viennese public, where for them music trumped concerns about political persuasion and support to Nazi goals and ideology.
161 Monod. —. 86. 66
GESELLSCHAFT DER MUSIKFREUNDE (SOCIETY OF THE FRIENDS OF
MUSIC) 1938-1945
Finally after Napoleon's fall, Vienna swung the baton as conductor of the conceit of Europe.162
GdMf history—1812-1938.
With the end of the Napoleonic wars, the old order had changed in Vienna including the end of historic employment of musicians by the aristocracy. It was in this environment that the "institution that would play the most significant role [for classical music] in the city, the Gesellschaft der Musihfreunde, was officially founded in 1814."163
Around the turn of the century a group of music lovers and amateurs with members from both the professional and middle class had begun organizing public concerts. Two large concerts presenting Haydn oratorios had been publically extremely successful and provided the impetus to form the GdMf In early 1813 the new Society was formally announced164 and during that year the statutes were developed under the Society's main goal of nurturing music in all its branches. There were six main points in the original statutes: the building of a conservatory of music, the presentation of concerts and support of existing classical works, the organization of regular musical competitions, the initiation of a musical magazine, the development of a music library and archive and the patronage support of outstanding artistic musical talent. The four main initial elements were the conservatory, public concerts, the library and an archive. Although not included
162 Weyr. —.108. 163 Sadie, Stanley. Ed. The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians. Second Edition. Volume 6. Vienna 546-582. London: Macmillan Publishers Limited, 2001. 560. Print 164 Lessing, Erich and Franz Endler. Der Wiener Musikverein. Wien: Edition Wien. 1987. Print. 67 in the original list, the desire to build its own concert hall was in the thoughts of the
Society founders.165
In 1814 the Society received official authorization for its statutes from the
Emperor Franz with support from the Emperor's brother Archduke Rudolph.166 He was a music lover and close friend of Beethoven and his support as the benefactor and sponsor of the GdMf was a significant step to ensure the initial success of the Society.167 The first official Society concert took place in December 1815 and was an interesting mixture of symphonies, overtures, song and instrumental solos, choirs and ensembles, lasted for several hours and people came and went during the performance.168
The conservatory began inauspiciously in 1817 with a small group of 24 singers under the direction of Antonio Salieri. Instrumental classes began under the direction of the violinist Joseph B8hm, who later was credited as the founder of the Wiener
Geigenschule (Vienna Violin School)—laying the groundwork for the Viennese style of violin playing which culminated later in the unique sound in the strings section of the world famous Wiener Philharmoniker.169 The conservatory continued under the operation of the GdMf for almost 100 years until 1908 when the Society turned its operation over to the state because of financial difficulties. During the period from 1817 until 1908 the conservatory grew from 2 teachers and 24 students to 71 teachers and 871 students.170 In
165 Kralik. —. 17-19. 166 Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde. Statuten -1814. Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde. Print. 167 Kralik.—. 17. 168 —. 25-27. 169 —. 33-35. 170 Hirschfield, Robert. Geschichte der Gesellschaft der Musihfreunde in Wien. Abteilung 1870-1912. Wien: Herausgaben von der Direktion der K.K. Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde Wien. 1912.346. Print. 68
1913 the new Academy for Music and the Performing Arts was opened under the auspices of the state. At this time the conservatory had 893 students and 56 professors and 22 faculties.171
When the Society was founded unofficially in 1812, committees were formed to organize the Society's archives, library and instrument collection. Large collections of original music scores and books from many prominent composers and musicians were bequeathed to the GdMf. Archduke Rudolph, the composers Carl Czemy, and in the late nineteenth century Johannes Brahms and Johann Strauss Jr. among others donated their extensive collections of their own and others' works. Most significant are works from
Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Strauss, Mahler, Webern and Berg. These collections were carefully preserved and have survived floods and two world wars. They are now housed in steel safes behind steel doors in the Musikverein building and contain thousands of pieces 1TJ of music and books. By the early 1900s the world-wide recognition of the value of the archives was being recognized with visitors from Europe and from the United States and
Japan. The fame of the unique archive collections was enhanced through international music and theatre exhibitions held in the city. By this time the curators of the archives were also purchasing additions for the collection from around the world including Indian and
Asian instruments and song-books from the 1500s.
The Vienna collection of ancient musical instruments owes its finest objects to the rulers of the House of Habsburg who had an enthusiastic interest in music and zeal as
171 Lessing. —. 145, 146 172 Mitringer, Hedwig. "Das Archiv der Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien." Wien: Osterreichische Musikzeitschrif—Register 1970.25. Jahrgang 1970.317-319. Print. 173 Lessing. —. 145,146. 69 collectors. With the fall of the monarchy in 1918, these instruments were turned over to the GdMf for safe-keeping with a goal of adding to and developing the collection. In
1938 the instruments and objects numbering over 1,000 were loaned to the
Kunsthistorisches Museum (historical art museum) in Vienna for storage and public exhibition.174
Initially the concerts presented by the Society took place in a caf<§ and later a house was purchased where the Society could undertake all its activities. In 1829 a building was purchased and renovated by the Society as the first concert hall in Vienna.
In keeping with its goal, the Society presented concerts which mainly included the works of the great composers, e.g.,' Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Mendelssohn-
Bartholdy and Schumann. By 1848 the GdMf was well established in Vienna's concert life—"between 1812 and 1848 the society sponsored 131 regular concerts, 36 large-scale concerts, 8 operas and 240 salon-style evenings."175
As in other European cities, the Revolution of 1848 was a significant turning point in Vienna's life where many social, political, cultural, national and societal problems had smouldered during Metternich's rule of absolutism—especially the lack of freedom. It created a financial crisis and forced the closing of the GdMf s conservatory for three years. The public would no longer tolerate concerts performed by amateur musicians, which had been the case since the inception of the Society, and therefore the
GdMf began sponsoring regular concerts with professional musicians and began the
174 Hopfiaer, Rudolph. A Stroll through the History of Austrian Music. No. 1. January-March 1996. Wien: 19%. 15-21. Print. 175 Sadie. —. 562. 70 tradition of having professional people at the helm of the Society. A new set of statutes for its operation in the city's new musical environment was developed. In 1858 two choirs were formed—the Wiener Sirtgverein and the Wiener Singakademie—both with the goal of improving the professional standard of singing in amateur choirs. The Wiener
Singverein began immediately to present concerts under the banner of the GdMf and this alliance has remained to the present day. The GdMf organized its own orchestra in 1859 and set a new high standard of performance.176
During the 1860s there was a growing demand for sheet music, instruments and music publishing. The waltz and operetta music of the Strauss family was becoming ever more popular leading to the "great golden era of Viennese operetta which began in the mid-1860s and ended in 1900."177 Egon Gartenberg describes Vienna in 1862 as "the
Holy City of Musicians" and states that:
Vienna was then regaining the crown of "music capital of the world" which it had temporarily lost to Paris. In background, musical history, prestige and creative climate, it had more to offer than any other city and the chances of success were infinitely greater than anywhere else in Europe. Its opera ranked among the foremost in the world, its philharmonic orchestra was nearing its peak; together with the older Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde (Society of the Friends of Music) which carried the names of Beethoven and Schubert on its roster, and the famed seat of learning, the Vienna conservatory, they attracted artists from every corner of the globe.
176 Kralik. —. 94-106. 177 Sadie. —.563,564. 178 Gartenberg, Egon. Vienna-Its Musical Heritage. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press - Heritage Printers. 1968. 118. Print. 71
In 1857 the Kaiser decreed that the old city walls be torn down and replaced by the wide tree-lined boulevard named the Ringstrasse. In 1863 a resolution from the Kaiser gave the GdMf a large area of land near the Ringstrasse for the development of a concert house in keeping with the other new buildings being constructed around the boulevard.
Financial arrangements were negotiated and the GdMf held an architectural competition for the construction of its own building. In 1867 the Society contracted with the architect
Theophil von Hansen and the laying of the cornerstone took place the same year. For the opening in January 1879, concerts and balls were presented in the large concert hall including orchestras, choirs, solo instruments and singers representing the great composers such as Bach, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven und Schubert. A chamber music concert and a piano recital by Clara Schumann opened the smaller concert hall.179As
Heinrich Kralik says, it was an outstanding accomplishment for the GdMf that it could crown its golden decade with the erection of a spacious, noble and dignified music palace.180 Since its inception this concert hall, called the Musikverein, has been world renowned not only as one of the world's most beautifully designed concert halls but also because of its outstanding acoustics from which the annual New Year's concert with the
Wiener Philharmoniker orchestra has been for several decades transmitted world-wide.
The GdMf celebrated its 100-year anniversary in 1912 with week-long concerts with the Wiener Philharmoniker and the Wiener Tonkunstlerorchester along with the Wiener
Singverein and Wiener Mdnnersingverein choirs. Featured were a Brahms piano concerto,
179 Angyan, Eva, Otto Biba, and Manfred Wagner. Goldene Klange. Wien: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde Verlag Holzhausen. 1995.3,238,239. Print. 180 Kralik. —. 107. 72
Schubert and Bruckner symphonies and scenes from Wagner's Parsifal in the Musikverein concert hall. A special presentation of Beethoven's opera Fidelio took place in the Wiener
Staatsoper. Receptions were held in the Hofburg (Habsburg Imperial Palace) and the
Rathaus (City Hall) and wreaths were laid at the graves of the great music masters in the
Zentralfriedhof{central cemetery). In describing the festival, Kralik notes that not only all of Vienna and Austria celebrated the occasion but celebrities and music lovers from around the world came to experience the magic and to taste and enjoy the ambience of the rich musical life of the city.181 The guests came not just to exchange greetings but to honour the relationship of the GdMf with musicians from around the world who had studied at the conservatory and to experience the high quality of the music presented during the celebration—to confirm that the GdMf at the centre of Viennese musical life had indeed become a part of Austrian history.182
The moving of the conservatory to the state in 1913 made more space available in the
Musikverein for the GdMf archives, library and collections. The renowned music publisher
Universal Edition (publishers of unedited authentic editions of the music of the great masters), the Wiener Philharmoniker, the Wiener-Mdnnergesang and the Bosendorfer piano firm (Ludwig Bdsendorfer had been a loyal friend and strong financial supporter of the Society) also moved to the Musikverein building. The small concert hall in the
Musikverein was renovated and later named the Brahms-Saal.m
181 Kralik. —. 184. 182 von Perger, Richard and Robert Hirschfield. Geschichte der K.K. Gesellschaft der Muiskfreunde Wien: Herausgaben von der Direktion der K.K. Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien. 1912.274. Print 183 Lessing. —. 147. 73
The First World War severely impacted the cultural events in Vienna and all of
Europe.184 The war had a significant negative impact on the cultural life of the city. Men were being called to active duty at the front or to assist in the war administration. The lack of coal for heating and restrictions on lighting reduced the times available for rehearsals.
Franz Schalk was appointed director of the GdMf and head of the Wiener Staatsoper reflecting the change in the Staatsoper leadership after the fall of the Habsburg dynasty.
Despite the reduced influence of the nobility, Prince Alexander von Thurn und Taxis was
tar elected President of the GdMf. After the war Carl Lafite explains that anyone expecting an immediate and orderly return to business as usual after the end of the war was horribly disappointed.186
In Vienna after World War I "hunger stalked the land, and there were outcries that the young Republic should sell the art treasures of the Habsburgs to keep its people from starvation." However, despite standing in line for bread, coal, flour and soap "they also stood in line to hear music." In 1920 "Austria, though at the brink of starvation, was determined to make music, no matter what the sacrifice." The concert series known as the
Wiener Festwochen (Vienna Festival Week) began and in 1921 "each subscription concert of the Philharmonic had to be given three times."187
Despite the public transportation, lighting and heating problems, the GdMf concerts under the direction of Franz Schalk continued with the works of the great masters—the
184 Lafite, Carl und Hedwig Kraus. Geschichte der Musikfreunde in Wien 1912-1937. Wien: Adolf Holzhausens Nachfolger in Wien. 1937. IS, 17. Print. 185 —. 22-27. 186 —. 15,17. 187 Gartenberg. —. 207-225. 74 mystique of Vienna as a musical city had not been totally afflicted. The revered German conductor Wilhelm FurtwSngler returned to conduct the GdMf concerts which, despite the chaotic inflation, were often sold-out. The Society forged a relationship with the new radio technology of the Rundfunkgesellschaft (RAVAGE [radio society]—and was the first concert organization to arrange broadcasts of its concerts. Despite continuing financial challenges, the GdMf ensured its continuity through its relationship with a regular orchestra—the Wiener Symphoniker—and concerts on the radio.188 To increase its membership and raise additional funds, the Society amended its statutes in 1932 to accept a broader group of new members.
The year 1937 prior to the Nazi annexation of Austria was a banner year for the
GdMf with a full year of concerts and events celebrating its 125th anniversary. After surviving the after-effects of World War I, the GdMf by 1937 was on relatively solid footing.189 The extensive celebrations included eight Beethoven symphony concerts with the Wiener Symphoniker and acclaimed soloists—pianists Robert Casadesus and Walter
Gieseking, and well-known organist Franz Schiitz—all with Oswald Kabasta as conductor.
Other composers represented on the programs were Hindemith, Bruckner, Stravinsky,
Debussy, Chopin, Bartok, Schubert, Tchaikovsky, R. Strauss, Brahms, Respighi, Dvorak and Handel. Three orchestral and choral concerts were planned for the 1937/38 season— fall 1937 concerts of the Mozart Requiem and Bruckner Te Deum with the renowned conductor Bruno Walter as well as a spring 1938 Bach concert and April 1938 Franz
1W Kralik. —. 192,194,197,202. 1*9 one 75
Schmidt concert with Oswald Kabasta conducting.190 A special anniversary concert of
Haydn's oratorio Die Schdpjung was held on December 8,1937 with the Wiener
Symphoniker and the Wiener Singverein with Wilhelm Furtwangler conducting. Two other anniversary concerts included a Brahms piano concerto with pianist Wilhelm Bachhaus and the Bruckner Seventh and Beethoven's Fifth and Sixth symphonies all under FurtwSngler's direction.191 Bruno Walter also conducted a Haydn-Mozart-Schubert concert.192 This was indeed a fitting musical feast led by two of the world's greatest conductors to celebrate the
Society's success over the previous 125 years.
The German Jewish conductor Bruno Walter had emigrated from Germany to
Austria in 1933 when Hitler became chancellor to avoid the Nazi anti-Semitic Niirnberg laws. Walter had a world-wide reputation and he was a regular conductor of Viennese orchestras. At the end of 1937 the GdMf offered both Walter and Arturo Toscanini honorary memberships in the Society. The October and December 1937 concerts conducted by Walter would be his last in Vienna until after the war—as a Jew he chose to flee the country with the pending Nazi annexation of Austria.193
It is important here to mention the names of a few of the key people on the 22 member December 1937 GdMf directorate as they played a significant role in the Nazi takeover of the Society. Despite being in his 80s, Prinz Alexander von Thurn und Taxis
190 Grasberger, Franz, Lothar Knessel and Hanne Lacchini. Hundert Jahre Goldener Saal. Das Ham der Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde am Karlsplatz. Statistik: Konzerte im grofien Saal 1870-1970. Programme der Saison 1937/38. Wien: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde, 1970. Print. 191 Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde. Jahresarbeit der Direktion fbr die Vereinsjahre 1937/38 und 1938/39. Wien: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde, 1940. Print. 192 Kralik. —. 205. 193 —. 205,208. 76 was still President in 1937 after being elected to this position in 1918. Mauriz Krumpholz was the Society's Director, Dr. Ernst Kraus and Dr. Eugon Beck-Mannageta were Vice-
Presidents and Dr. Friedrich Dlabad was the Society's General Secretary. Board representatives from several other musical institutions included the Wiener Philharmoniker and Wiener Symphoniker and Austrian radio as well as ministerial representatives from the
City of Vienna and prominent professor/musicians such as Carl Lafite.194
Despite the underlying threat of Nazi annexation, the concert season to the end of
June 1938 had been planned and conductors and soloists had been engaged. The names of the new members of the GdMf and the Wiener Singverein and Wiener Mannergesang had
been accepted. A three-year contract was signed with Oswald Kabasta as GdMf concert director and conductor in February 1938. Contracts to broadcast concerts over the RAVAG radio station were renewed and a cycle of eight symphony concerts was offered to
subscribers.195
By the beginning of 1938 the GdMf during its 125-year history had not only
achieved its original goals set out in the statutes of 1812 but also had become a venerable and revered musical institution with a huge impact on the classical music life of the city of
Vienna and the world. Despite periodic set-backs, the dedication and spirit of its original founders had been sustained and expanded through the leadership of several generations.
The success of the organization was largely the result of this commitment achieved through
194 Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1937 und 1938.48. Print. 195-.48. 77 an independent and essentially democratic Society whose goals and individuality rose above the aggrandizement of its individual membership. It was this spirit and individuality and in essence its personality rather than its material existence or its cultural function196 which was about to be taken over by Hitler and the Nazis following the annexation of
Austria in March 1938.
National Socialism in the GdMf.
Hitler and his Nazi entourage crossed into Austria at the village of Braunau (Hitler's birthplace) on the Austrian/German border at noon on March 12,1938. His triumphal entry into Vienna took place on the afternoon of March 13—the annexation of Austria had occurred without any violence or resistance. 107 The Nazi organization moved swiftly to take control of Vienna and acted equally quickly to take over the operation of cultural organizations including the GdMf. The breadth and depth of the Nazi organization developed since coming to power in 1933 in Germany, along with the proactive Nazi movement in Austria during the 1930s, enabled the swift takeover of the city of Vienna coincident with annexation.
GdMf under the Hakenkreuz
At first glance it seems incredible that the Nazi Party would move so quickly to establish control of this music Society. Karl Geiringer who was at that time the curator of the
Society's archive, library and collections recalls the following in his memoirs:
When I arrived at the Musikfreunde [the Society's Musikverein building] on the morning of the 13th [March 13, 1938], I found a German Nazi blocking the entrance to
196 Kralik. —. 206. 197 Zentner, Christian. Heim ins Reich: der Anschluss Osterreichs. 1938. Mflnchen: SQdwest Verlag, 1988.96. Print. 78
the building. The Society had been closed by the Nazis and the officers dismissed.1
What compelled the Nazis to move so quickly to establish their presence in a cultural musical institution on the same day as Hitler's first major speech in the Heldenplatz
(Hero's Square) —on the day he arrived in Vienna? The reason for this immediate action was the result of a letter dated February 26, 1938 that the officers of the GdMf had written to Chancellor Schuschnigg after his passionate anti-Nazi February speech in the
Viennese parliament. In his speech Schuschnigg asked the Austrian government to exert every effort to retain Austria as an independent country against the looming Nazi threat of annexation. The GdMf letter to Schuschnigg praised the chancellor for his superb address and expressed its deepest support and thanks for his uplifting words to the nation—reminding the chancellor that he had recently taken part in the 125th anniversary of the GdMf—a noble Austrian music institution. The letter was signed by the GdMf
President, Prinz Alexander Thurn und Taxis; the General Secretary, Dr. Friedrich DlabaS; and the Vice President Dr. Ernst Kraus.| QQ The contents of this letter and the support to
Schuschnigg from the GdMf were well-known to the official Nazi authorities in the government, (e.g., Seyss-Inquart). Also, despite the fact that the Nazi movement was illegal in Austria, there were several members of the GdMf who were Nazi sympathizers and who were also aware of the GdMf support to Schuschnigg. Hitler and the Austrian
Nazis recognized the esteemed tradition of the GdMf in the cultural life of Vienna. In his
198 Geiringer, Karl with Bernice Geiringer. This I Remember. Wien: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde Archiv. 1987. 52,53. Print. 199 Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1937 und 1938. 98. Print, and Franz Schtttz. Die Geselhschaft der Musikfreunde von 1938-1945. Ober Aufforderung 1950 an Dr. Mayr. Wien: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde Archiv. 15125/157. Wien, 1950. Print. 79 famous speech in the square in front of the city hall (which had already been renamed the
"Adolf Hitler Square") on the day before the so-called Ja Nazi organized plebiscite on
April 10, Hitler acknowledged that he considered Vienna a "pearl" to be added to the
Third Reich.200
In the context of the GdMf s reputation in Viennese arts and music and its support to Schuschnigg, it is not surprising that Hitler and the Nazis, who recognized music as a powerful propaganda tool, were eager to act swiftly to take over the GdMf. They wanted to overtly nullify the GdMf support of Schuschnigg and to quickly convert the GdMf to a Nazi musical "pearl" and add it to the Third Reich.
Franz Schiitz—the GdMfs "Man of the Hour "
Biba recounts in his 2004 Schmidt Symposium article that on March 14, the day after the annexation, the only person allowed to pass the Nazi guard at the door to the Musikverein was Frau Barbara Heberlein, the personal secretary to the President, Director and General
Secretary. As she entered her office, she was met by Professor Franz Schutz whom she knew personally as Professor of Organ at the Academy for Music and Performing Arts.201
SchUtz as a member of the GdMf and a well-known organist, had performed regularly at "7fYJ GdMf concerts since 1919, and had been an illegal member of the Nazi Party since
1934. He was dressed in the Nazi brown uniform and advised Heberlein that he had taken over the leadership of the GdMf.203
200 Weyr. —. 72 and originally in the Vdlkischer Beobachter April 10,1938—Hitler's speech the day before the "Ja" plebiscite. Print. 201 Biba.—.311. 202 Grasberger. —. Programme der Orgelkonzerte Gesellschaft der Mtisikfreunde 1912-1937. Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde, Wien. 1970. Print. 203 Biba.—.311. 80
Schutz knew how to meet the demands of the political Regime and to generally comply with the Nazi agenda and propaganda—which he believed in and to which he was fully committed. He had the ability to find a workable relationship between the Nazi
Party demands and his own appreciation of the importance of the GdMf as a world- renowned Viennese music institution. He was a professional musician and within the confines of his passion for great music, understanding and appreciation of the value of the GdMf on one hand coupled with his administrative ability, personal ego and his commitment to the Nazi Party on the other, he appears to have tried valiantly to succeed at all levels to create a high class professional music environment during his tenure as
GdMf President.
After the war in 1950, Dr. Otto Mayr, a Vice President in the postwar GdMf democratic Society, invited Schiitz to prepare a memorandum of his personal views and perspectives of the operations of the GdMf during his time as President from 1938-1945.
In this report to the postwar GdMf directors, Schutz offered the following explanation as to how his role as GdMf provisional leader came about and how he proceeded to change the Society to meet the Nazi demands.
Immediately after the Anschluss, Schutz was requested by Nazi Austrian
President Arthur Seyss-Inquart to prepare a report as soon as possible on the structure, competence, responsibilities and goals of the GdMf. Schiitz claimed he was not previously acquainted with Seyss-Inquart nor had he ever applied for a position but he 81 saw no reason to decline the subsequent offer to become the provisional leader of the
GdMf with the support of the Nazi Party.
Obviously Seyss-Inquart saw the necessity to make some changes in the organization in response to the Society's support of Schuschnigg. He claimed it was necessary to replace the existing GdMf membership with Nazi personnel in compliance with demands decreed by the Party. He specifically referred to General Secretary Dlabad who later was terminated because he was perceived to be too committed to Schuschnigg and Austrian nationalism.204
Seyss-Inquart asked Schtitz for his recommendations regarding the qualities needed for the new head of the GdMf. In his response, Schtitz humbly suggested that
Seyss-Inquart consider three possibilities for the leadership of the "venerable" GdMf: first, to entrust the leadership to a person with a high social standing whose name would be recognized positively by the cultured world; second, to assign the position to a businessman as President who would personally assume the financial risks along with a subordinate who was an expert in artistic and cultural matters; or third, to name a qualified musician as leader who had the capability to bring his expertise and knowledge to the enterprise to ensure that it conforms to the reputation of a world-wide music metropolis. Seyss-Inquart and his Nazi colleagues decided on the third option and appointed Schtitz as provisional GdMf leader. (In his postwar account of his tenure as
GdMf President, Schtitz certainly solidified the image of himself as a professional
204 SchQtz. —. 1. 82 musician rather than a Nazi politician). There was no reference at all in his response to
Seyss-Inquart to suggest that the head of the GdMf should be a Nazi.
In his recollection report, Schiitz said he insisted that as provisional GdMf leader he would have a complete free hand in all artistic matters and that there would be an absolute separation between the arts and politics. He recommended that the Society should continue to receive on-going financial support from the city. After his official appointment as provisional leader he felt he was able to proceed to constitute a new
Board of Directors of appropriate public figures (i.e., who were Nazi Party members or sympathizers) who would be totally committed to work with him to ensure the acceptable and proper GdMf Nazi operation.205
It was also significant that his first major goal was to find a prominent, intellectual, authoritative, and politically independent expert (i.e., not necessarily a Nazi
Party member) who would be prepared to represent the musical city of Vienna with the
Nazi authorities in Berlin. Dr. Wilhelm FurtwSngler, the conductor of the Berlin
Philharmoniker, accepted this official offer. Schiitz stated that FurtwSngler as an "Aryan" non-Nazi made an important contribution in helping to maintain a highly professional level of classical music in Vienna during the war years at both the GdMf and as head of the Wiener Philharmoniker.206
The foregoing shows that Schtitz was intent on showing himself as a high quality musician and not first and foremost a Nazi Party member. Schiitz's personal agenda seems clear—he wanted the GdMf to continue as a front-line music institution within the
205 SchOtz. —. 2, 3. 206 o 83
Nazi Regime and he had been a Nazi sympathizer long before the annexation. In his mind he certainly tried to further the musical goals of the GdMf under the Nazi dictatorship.
Nazi power was conferred on Schiitz from above and as Primo Levi's theory suggests, it is "normal for power to tolerate and encourage privilege"—this is how
"privilege is born and proliferates."207 Schiitz was given the power from the Nazi Party perhaps as a reward for his Nazi beliefs and support of the Party, but at the same time it was not undeserving privilege because of his musicianship and administrative capability.
Levi suggests that "power of such magnitude attracted the human type who is greedy for power... [who is] seduced by the many material advantages of the position.. .and [who] becomes fatally intoxicated by the power at their disposal."208 Whether or not Schiitz was
"fatally intoxicated" by this conferred Nazi power remains an open question but he certainly took advantage of this power to achieve his goals for both the GdMf and the
Nazi Party. The following section shows that when Schiitz was finally given the full opportunity as GdMf President rather than only as provisional leader, he had the ability to act ruthlessly and swiftly to move competitors out of the way.
Compromise and Coercion: Six Cases
The case study evidence reveals that Schiitz adopted an integrative operating style of both compromise and coercion to implement his Nazi policy and music goals. This manner of balancing the extremes of compromise and coercion in dealing with key people during his tenure as GdMf President in the following individual cases supports this premise.
207 Levi, Primo. —. 42. 208-.47. 84
Friedrich DlabaC
On his first day [March 14] as GdMf leader, Schutz wrote a letter to the GdMf General
Secretary Dr. Friedrich Dlaba£ informing him that he (Schutz) had been appointed by the
Nazi Party to act as provisional leader of the GdMf. Dlaba£ was ill at the time and Schtitz
respectfully suggested that he return as soon as possible to assist in carrying out the
duties as General Secretary of the GdMf but now under Schutz's supervision. He also
expressed hope that the new arrangement would not damage their personal relationship—
they knew each other both personally and professionally. This initiated a long series of
correspondence between Schtitz and Dlaba£. Despite Schtitz's offer of a compromise in
their working relationship, Dlabafi's initial response only acknowledged Schtitz as lieber
Herr Professor (Dear Professor) and said that he had not been informed of the
organizational change by the Director Moritz Krumpolz, implying that he did not accept
that SchUtz was now in charge of the GdMf. Over the next several months Schutz's correspondence became more aggressive and eventually he advised Dlaba6 that he was
being divested of all his duties as General Secretary of the GdMf.209
It appears that Dlaba£ had been "fingered" as the "fall guy" by the Nazis to demonstrate their displeasure over the GdMf s overt support to Chancellor Schuschnigg.
It is not entirely clear whether this was Schtitz's idea or whether some direction came
from Seyss-Inquart. Dlabad was obviously considered by the Nazis to be the person responsible for drafting the letter to Schuschnigg, even though a letter had been written earlier by the President Alexander von Thurn and Taxis indicating that he personally had
209 Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1937 imd 1938. 98. 85 arranged and certified the letter to Schuschnigg and that Dlaba£ in his role as General
Secretary was merely carrying out the wishes of the Society as a whole.210
No doubt taken aback by Dlabafi's resistance, Schtitz needed to find some other excuses to implement DlabaS's divestiture. Schtitz questioned Dlabafi's Czech roots and name as to whether or not he was eligible to be called an "Aryan" German and in his role as General Secretary he even accused DlabaC of not previously presenting enough true
German National music in the GdMf programs. To add to the general confusion, a later letter from the President's lawyer appeared stating that the President had declared that he knew nothing about the Schuschnigg speech—that he had neither heard of nor read it, nor had he any interest in politics generally as he was an Auslander (foreigner)—all this despite the fact he was one of the three signatories on the original letter to
Schuschnigg.211 It was suspected that the President, in his late 80s, was suffering from dementia which played nicely into the hands of the Nazis by his refuting of his earlier involvement in the Schuschnigg letter.
Eventually Dlabad's fate was sealed and his contract with the GdMf was officially terminated on June 9. In keeping with Schtitz's developing style of caution and respect embellished with Nazi Party discipline and philosophy, he said that the new Nazi directorate of the Society had unanimously voted to express their thanks to DlabaC for everything he had done for the Society in his prior position of General Secretary, expressed hope that in the future he would see Dlaba£ as an honoured guest in the
2,0 Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1937 und 1938. —. 98. 211 —. 98. 86
Musikverein concert loge reserved for members of the Directorate and signed off sincerely with Heil Hitler,212
In dealing with DlabaC's dismissal, Schutz demonstrated his style of offering an initial compromise to Dlabad and then when Dlaba£ resisted and refused to accept either the offer or Schutz's Nazi-appointed GdMf leadership role, Schtitz reverted to coercion, using his position of Nazi-supported power to forge ahead with the dismissal. By complimenting Dlaba£ again on his fine service over many years along with his dismissal notice, Schutz used his two-headed, cynical and even arrogant approach of generosity which cost him nothing. This is again a fine example of Levi's theory that if power has been conferred from above, the person in power can "compromise [the subordinates] as much as possible, thus establishing a bond of complicity [from the subordinates] so that they can no longer turn back."213 This eventual complicit reaction on the part of Dlabafi is evident when he some time later sent a very gracious letter to Schutz requesting a pair of tickets for a special GdMf concert. Schtitz could honour this request with no threat or resistance to his position as GdMf head, realizing that DlabaS had eventually buckled under and accepted Schutz in his role.
Wilhelm Furtwangler
Schtitz showed extreme respect bordering on grovelling in his early dealings with the esteemed German conductor Wilhelm Furtwangler, who was briefly in Vienna on April
26. In a long letter to the conductor, Schutz expressed his regrets that as the new
2,2 Archiv: Gesellschqft der Musikfreunde 1937 und 1938. —. 96. 213 Levi, Primo. —. 43. 87 provisional leader of the GdMf, he had not had the opportunity to meeet with the conductor.214
Being aware that FurtwSngler had enjoyed a long relationship with Dlaba£,
Schiitz went to great lengths to explain why it was necessary for Dlabad to be terminated as General Secretary. Schiitz was aware of FurtwSngler's special esteemed position in the
Reich, including his continued support from Hitler and Goebbels despite their periodic differences. FurtwSngler's reputation of not complying with Nazi policy was well established in Nazi organizations—both for himself and especially for musicians with whom he was associated. As conductor of the Berlin Philharmoniker orchestra he had successfully supported and protected the Jewish musicians in the orchestra from dismissal by the Nazi authorities through most of the war. His support to German composer Paul Hindemith and public argument with Goebbels over Hindemith's music was also well-known. (Hitler and Goebbels considered Hindemith's music too contemporary, even though he was a full "Aryan"). Furtwangler's overt anti-Nazi attitude had resulted in his being ousted earlier by Hitler and Goebbels from his position as the first Vice-President of the Nazi Reichsmusikkammer in Germany in 1934. Furtwangler succeeded throughout the war to be the foremost conductor in the Reich, proclaiming his music contribution was neutral and apolitical and thereby retained the support of the
Regime. It was certainly in Schiitz's best interest from both the GdMf and Nazi Party perspectives to not in any way offend the conductor.
In his letter, Schutz assured Furtwangler that he would do everything in his power
214 Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1937 und 1938. 48. 88 to avoid any fallout for Dlaba£ from his termination and that he would also arrange the best pension possible. To lay the groundwork for his potential future dealings with
Furtwangler (who conducted regularly at the Musikverein and was scheduled to conduct already arranged programs in the coming season), Schiitz said he would make every possible attempt with the Nazi hierarchy to separate art and politics—a position which
Furtwangler would strongly personally endorse. Schiitz expressed a concern that in future he might have no other alternative but to comply with the Nazi orders—an obvious attempt to absolve himself from future decisions which might further irritate Furtwangler.
Apparently Furtwangler had threatened not to conduct again in the Musikverein if the
General Secretary [DlabaC] was dismissed and this was the concern that prompted Schiitz to write this letter.
In a further attempt to placate this concern and in a slightly veiled threat, Schiitz implied that either he himself or Dlabafi (it is not clear in the letter whether he meant himself or Dlabad) could be replaced with a much more aggressive Nazi Party
•*« c member. Schiitz was obviously a master manipulator in his dealings with Furtwangler who was known to be flamboyant and arrogant and he did not want to be the target of
Furtwangler's scorn. In his recollection report after the war Schiitz uses his relationship with the conductor as a testimony to his (Schiitz's) own professional musicianship. He said Furtwangler would have requested and enforced his termination as GdMf President by the Nazi Party for incompetence if he had ever once so much as described a piece of 01 & music in the incorrect key.
215 Biba. —.312/313. Also original in Archiv der Gesellschafi der Musikfreunde 1937 und 193%. 98. 216 Schiitz. —. 9. 89
It was important for Schiitz in his new role as GdMf leader, to collaborate with
Furtw9ngler. Even though he had not personally met FurtwSngler before, he wanted to pre-empt any negative reaction from the conductor regarding his appointment as GdMf head or FurtwSngler's earlier relationship with DlabaC. He wanted to ensure that
Furtw8ngler would continue to conduct at future GdMf concerts—anything less would have created a negative mark against Schiitz. It was important to explain to FurtwSngler the need for DlabaC's dismissal and to assure the conductor that Dlabad would receive an adequate pension.
Similar to his dealings with Dlaba£, Schiitz was not above subtlety resorting to coercion by suggesting to the conductor that both his [FurtwSngler's] relationship with the GdMf and Schiitz's handling of the Dlabad situation could be much worse if another
Nazi Party member who was more of a Nazi and less of a musician and music connoisseur had assumed the GdMf role—thereby getting Furtwangler's support for his role as new GdMf leader. Schiitz even as provisional GdMf leader felt very sure of himself in the GdMf leadership role. His power had been conferred from above by Seyss-
Inquart whom Hitler had just appointed as the Nazi Austrian chancellor following the dismissal of Schuschnigg. Schiitz portrays an interesting dynamic with the well-known conductor who was equally well-known for his "Aryan" non-Nazi neutral beliefs. Even in this potential "David and Goliath" relationship, Schiitz was confident enough to "play the
Nazi card" with the conductor, or in Levi's words, employ power conferred from above—gambling that his backing from the party would if necessary support his cause. 90
Anthony van Hoboken
The most active and overt protest to the dismissal of the previous directorate came from
Anthony van Hoboken—a German who was the only non-Austrian member of the directorate. On March 30 Hoboken responded in strong disagreement to Schiitz's letter of
March 14 (in which Schfltz stated he was the new leader of the GdMf and that henceforth
Hoboken should abstain from any activity on behalf of the Society).217
Hoboken's contribution to the Society had predominately been an allocation of foreign funds to support the Society's operations. He had provided funds annually to the
Society and had contributed generously to the new seats in the GdMf small concert hall.
He advised Schfltz that these benefits would no longer be forthcoming if he was terminated from the directorate. At the same time Hoboken admonished Schutz for the terse wording of his March 14 letter (where Schfltz had told Hoboken to henceforth abstain from GdMf activity) and requested some answers about why he had been summarily dismissed. Schfltz replied immediately telling Hoboken that he could not give him any definitive answers, that his appointment was provisional and that he must await further direction until after the appointment of the new directorate. He requested that
Hoboken be patient and that he would address his letter again as soon as possible— signing the letter with the usual Heil Hitler which had become his standard closing salutation. In this case, and contrary to his dealings with Furtwangler, Schfltz was refusing to take responsibility for his actions—showing himself to be a pawn of the Nazi
Party which was typical of the Party hierarchy.
217 Biba. —. 314-316. Also ill Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1937 und 1938. 104. 91
Finally over six months later on October 18 Schtitz replied to Hoboken that his letter of March 14 had been sent to all the Society members and that the reason for the dismissal of all the members was that the Society's support of Schuschnigg was a direct slap in the face of the German people. He also explained the situation around Dlaba&'s dismissal and noted that the final decision about the President (Prinz Alexander von
Thurn und Taxis) was in abeyance because of the new information from his lawyer that he knew nothing of nor had any interest in politics nor the Schuschnigg parliamentary oi it speech. Schtitz respectfully addressed Hoboken in his usual gracious yet condescending style and went further to suggest that Hoboken could use these reasons for dismissal in any way he needed to avoid conflict with the German Embassy in Berlin. But again in his manner of using his new position to issue Nazi threats, Schtitz said he had a copy of the letter from the GdMf to Schuschnigg in his possession and that he could if necessary reactivate the whole matter of the guilt of the directorate in supporting the
Schuschnigg speech and involve the Gestapo in the resolution of the matter. Biba notes that this was one of the few times in his correspondence that Schtitz used such a blunt threat—he obviously wanted to silence Hoboken from any further overt resistance to his appointment or further discussion about why the members of the GdMf were terminated "710 after the Anschluss. Hoboken's political orientation is not clear but one can assume he was not a Nazi Party member or supporter—otherwise Schtitz would have invited him to stay on as a Director and would not have issued the "Gestapo" threat.
2,8 Biba. —. 312. Also in Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1937 und 1938. 98. 219 —.314-316. Also in Krones, Hartmut. "Die Konzertpolitik der Gesellschafi der Musikfreunde in Wien in den Jahren 1938 bis 1945." Die Wiener Schule unddas Hakenkreuz. Studien zur Wertungsforschung. Band 22. Wien: Otto Kolleritsch, 1990. 190-191. Print 92
Schutz was initially very cautious in his approach when dealing with Hoboken.
Instead of his more direct approach with DlabaC and FurtwSngler, he felt the need to
"hide behind the source of his power"—saying he had no definitive answers, that his appointment was provisional and that he would have to wait on the decisions of the new
Nazi directorate. He was then able to defer responding to Hoboken (perhaps hoping that he would not have to deal with him further) for six months after the new directorate was in place and he had officially been appointed as GdMf President. This positive affirmation from the Nazi hierarchy placed Schutz firmly in control and in power at the
GdMf and he was now in a position to threaten Hoboken and stop him from any further interference. The threat of the copy of the Schuschnigg letter and potentially taking the matter to the Gestapo was no doubt enough to keep Hoboken quiet in the future. This handling is another example of Schtitz's political versatility—to employ "power privilege" of the party to effectively side-track and postpone an issue and then when he was sure of his ground to use threats to accomplish his goals.
Karl Geirineer
Schiitz's handling of the situation with the GdMf Jewish archive curator Karl Geiringer seems to show yet a different side of his character. In his new position as GdMf leader, he showed a unique appreciation and short term respect and sensitivity of the situation when dealing with Geiringer. He and Geiringer had been good friends and although
Geiringer was denied access to his office on March 13, Schtitz subsequently invited him to come to the Musikverein. This time the ever-present brown-shirted Nazi guard allowed 93
Geiringer to enter the building. In his meeting with Schtltz, Geiringer was strongly advised to seek emigration as quickly as possible.
In the meantime Schfltz cordially offered Geiringer the use of his former office in order to assemble materials to assist him in building an academic position in a new country. Geiringer proceeded immediately to act on this advice and in his memoirs he states he was extremely grateful to have had the opportunity to assemble these materials.
He applied for visas to Great Britain, where he already had a respected reputation as well as the United States. Then abruptly on April 13, Schutz wrote to Geiringer stating that the offer of a working space in his old office was immediately cancelled. Presumably Schiitz was nervous that the Party hierarchy would become aware of his cooperation with his friend, or perhaps he was pressured by the Party—especially after all other Jewish members of the Society had been summarily dismissed. It is however significant that
Schutz seemed to respect his Jewish friend and went out of his way to help him, even to the extent of initially contravening Nazi Party policy related to Jews. In this case he did not sign the letter to Geiringer with Heil Hitler but rather signed it simply with a respectful and friendly close—even though he had for some time already been using Heil
Hitler as the closing salutation for other correspondence.220
Geiringer emigrated from Austria to Santa Barbara in the United States and had a long and successful career there until his 80s. In his 1998 memoirs entitled This I
Remember, Geiringer states that initially he had no intention of leaving the country.
However, he respected Schiitz's warning and was grateful for the advice and the
220 Biba. —.318. Also in Geiringer, Karl with Bernice Geiringer: This I Remember, Santa Barbara 1993. Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde. S. 70. Print. 94 opportunity to use the office in the Musikverein for a period of time to gather and photograph materials and arrange for visas to Great Britain, where he already had a respected reputation, as well as to the United States. He said it was evident that when
Schtitz abruptly cancelled the use of the Musikverein office there was no tolerance for negotiation of a longer term usage of the office.221
Once again Schiitz put his personal objectives in place using his privilege of power when he wanted to accommodate his friend. One can only wonder what instigated the immediate withdrawal of his offer to Geiringer after one month, but his handling of the matter shows that he was only prepared to take the risk of protecting a Jew against
Party policy for a short time in order not to jeopardize his position with the Nazi Party.
This handling is somewhat similar to how he dealt with his long time friend Dlaba£.
Initially he suggested to DlabaC that he could continue as GdMf General Secretary as long as he was prepared to accept him [Schtitz] as the new provisional GdMf leader. In both cases when his tolerant attitude had expired, he either imposed his Nazi "power privilege" or had been told by the Party how to proceed, i.e., to no longer support his
Jewish friend within the confines of the Nazi Party policy. Schiitz does not elaborate on the extent of interference or demands from the Party in carrying out his actions.
Franz Schmidt
The case of Franz Schmidt is a good example of how Schiitz took advantage of his position to organize programs to meet his own personal needs as well as appeal to the
221 Biba. —. 318. Also in Geiringer, Karl with Bemice Geiringer: This I Remember, Santa Barbara 1993. Archiv: Gesellschaft der Mmikfreunde. S. 70. Print.—. 314. 95
Viennese concert public. In February 1944 Schiltz organized a Franz-Schmidt-Woche
(Franz Schmidt Week) with seven concerts to honour the fifth year anniversary of the
death of his former teacher. Schmidt was a renowned Austrian composer who had died in
February 1939. The Nazi authorities feted Schmidt as the greatest living composer of the
so-called Ostmark (Nazi name for Austria). Richard Strauss had the generally accepted
reputation at the time as the greatest twentieth century German composer—but Strauss
had earlier fallen out of favour with the Nazi Party for his support to his Jewish librettist
•Stefan Zweig. To show that the Party had shifted its allegiance from Strauss to Schmidt,
the Party gave Schmidt a commission to write a cantata which he entitled Die Deutsche
Auferstehung (The German Resurrection). After 1945, this was taken by many as a
reason to brand Schmidt as having been tainted by Nazi sympathy. These facts placed
Schmidt's posthumous reputation under a cloud. Some respected musicians claim that
Schmidt was never anti-Semitic but was extremely naive about politics. It would seem
that Schmidt appreciated the commission to write the cantata and being feted by the party
but was not involved nor interested in politics.222
The first evening of the celebratory week was a lecture about the composer
followed by six concerts featuring symphonies, chamber music, choral, piano and organ
works by Schmidt with the Wiener Symphoniker and Wiener Philharmoniker.and the
Nazi conductor Oswald Kabasta among others conducting. As well there were works
with the Wiener Konzerthausquartett (Vienna Konzerthaus String Quartet)and Franz
Schutz presented an organ concert as soloist for Schmidt's organ works.
222 Finscher, Ludwig. Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Allgemeine Enzyklopadie der Musik. Fanz Schmidt. Personenteil 14. Stuttgart: Barenreiter Verlag, 2005.1430. Print. 96
Today Schmidt is a revered Austrian composer—the Franz-Schmidt-Gesellschaft was formed in 1951 to conserve his works and pursue interpretations of the composer's compositions. Since 1986 there has been an annual symposium of prominent Viennese musicians and historians entitled the Franz-Schmidt-Gesellschaft Studien.223 Some of my research for this thesis comes from the publication of the fifteenth symposium entitled
Musik in Wien 1938-1945. The week's concerts not only featured the works of a composer highly valued by the Reich but also gave Schiitz the opportunity to showcase his own abilities as a concert organist while showing his allegiance to the great musician and also to the Nazi Party. In other words in his order of priorities, he was a professional musician first and a Nazi Party member second.
Friedrich Wildgans
Hartmut Krones presents a different view of Schtltz regarding Jews and Jewish contemporary music as evidenced in Schtitz's handling of a request from Friedrich
Wildgans, who had been active for several years in a concert series entitled Musik der
Gegenwart (Contemporaiy Music). Krones reports that Wildgans asked Schtttz to support the independent Internationale Gesellschaft fur neue Musik (International Society for
New Music) which had presented a series of "new music" concerts in 1936/37 and
1937/38. Krones quotes Schtitz's reply to Wildgans verbatim—it was a stinging and loathing anti-Semitic letter in which Schtltz suggested that the Internationale Gesellschaft fur new Musik was totally verjudet (taken over by Jews), that the music was all jiidische
Versippung (tainted by Jews) and the composers were committed to maintaining the
223 Franz-Schmidt-Gesellschaft. Web. 1 Dec 2011< http://www.franzschmidtgesellschaft.at/>. 97 atonal style of [Jewish composer] Arnold Schdnberg and non-Jewish atonal music composer Anton Webern, who was the President of the Society.
In his letter Schtitz expressed the view that this music was not appropriate for the concert programs of the new German music style and therefore could not be supported.
He continued to say that he would decide in the future what was, and what was not, appropriate contemporary music. In developing concert programs at the GdMf, Schutz did include new music by some new "Aryan" and apparently acceptable composers to the
Nazi mould. As a committed Nazi Party member, Schutz would naturally be against
participating in any "international" society that was outside of the Reich. Schtitz went
further with his damning of the project, saying that these composers might try to emulate
the style of Gustav Mahler, a Jewish composer whom Schtitz respected, but that they did
not have the technical skills to even properly compose a four-part movement. The depth and detail of the continuing derogatory remarks made by Schutz in this letter seem extreme.224
It appears that Schutz evaluated each situation according to a number of factors:
the degree to which it fit— his own personal music preference; Nazi views on contemporary music; whether he considered a composer to be established or even
224 Biba. —. 332. This reference for Krones is found in the discussion notes following Biba's presentation, in "Die Jahre 1938-1945 im Musikvereinsgebaude. Musik in Wien 1938-1945." Symposium 2004. Studien zu Franz Schmidt XV. Wien: Doblinger Verlag, 332.2004. Print It also appears in an article by Krones in the following symposium: Krones, Hartmut. "Die Konzertpolitik der Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien in den Jahren 1938 bis 1945." Die Wiener Schule und das Hakenkreuz. Studien zur Wertungsforschung. Band 22. Wien: Otto Kolleritsch, 1990.189,199. GdMf library signature 17368/175. Print. 98 classical; his own position in the Nazi hierarchy; his degree of power at a specific point in time and his personal friendship and likings. He must have weighed the situation carefully before taking a stand, e.g., in the case of his friend Geiringer and in the cases of
Dlaba5 and Wildgans. The letter to Wildgans was written on September 15,1940 after
Schutz was well entrenched in his role as President of the GdMf and had no need for diplomacy any longer.
One wonders why he came down so heavily on Wildgans's request with such a strong anti-Semitic approach—with his authority he could have simply refused to support the program. In any event he obviously wanted to dispose of any further challenge as to who was in charge of decision-making regarding what contemporary music would be acceptable during the Nazi Regime in the GdMf. Perhaps he wanted to show again the extent to which he was in control of the GdMf and as well he had maybe already become more Nazified himself. It also appears true that Schiltz's stance on anti-Semitism seemed to ebb and flow with whatever suited him best, i.e., to respect the music of traditional
Jewish composers, e.g., Mahler (to support his music decisions) even though they were banned from performance. He also wanted to retain for himself the decisions about appropriate contemporary music (to honour the party demands for new German composers and to satisfy his ego by not supporting an independent music organization).
He apparently felt secure in his position with the Nazi "power privilege" to take the risks within the Nazi party policies and at the same time to have a selective attitude compared to the Nazi hierarchy when it came to Jewish issues. Schutz's "Modus Operandi"
Schiitz developed a versatile "Modus Operandi" style as provisional leader of the
GdMf—combining a respectful, flexible, tactful, cautious and occasionally acerbic and coercive approach which was always heavily laced with the well-known Nazi Party jargon. He was an excellent communicator who showed great skill in adapting his discourse to accommodate his various audiences. This is evidenced through his correspondence in the GdMf files. The discussion of his handling of the preceding six individual cases along with the following discussion of his "Modus Operandi" illustrate how he used these adapatable communication skills to accomplish his goals as GdMf
President.
Schutz's 6-week self-congratulatory Report Card
Schiitz lost however no time in establishing himself in his new GdMf role with the new
Nazi hierarchy in Vienna. On March 26 he prepared a report as provisional Nazi GdMf leader to the Nazi authorities in Vienna, outlining his accomplishments in less than two weeks after the annexation. In this report he clarified six points related to the future of the organization. 1. The honorary function of the GdMf President Prinz Alexander von Thurn und Taxis (a Czech citizen and 87 years old) was terminated after a discussion with the director Mauriz Krumpholz. 2. The Vice-President Dr. Ernst Kraus, a lawyer who also held an honorary position, was ousted "for the time being" because of his opposition to
German Nationalism—(a good example of Schutz's cautionary style by not saying the dismissal was permanent). 3. The existing membership had carried out its duties voluntarily but there could now be no guarantee about their future role. The new goal of the Society would be to make the old Viennese musical city the centre of the unified 100
German Reich. In this regard Schiitz suggested that an alteration to the membership would be demanded immediately so that the membership would properly reflect the new agenda of the German Vaterland. Although not stated outright, this was a suggestion that
Society members would have to comply with Nazi Party goals and be acceptable to the
Party, i.e., be minimally Nazi supporters and that Jewish members would be dismissed.
Schiitz also advised that in his provisional capacity as GdMf leader he had already met on
March 16 with Nazi representative Dr. Fritz Zoder. In an informal meeting they had decided on the artistic agenda for the GdMf but that the new arrangement of duties was not firm. 4. Dr. Friedrich DlabaS was suspended from his earlier position as General
Secretary because of his Czech citizenship and anti-German attitude (presumably a reference to his support of the letter to Schuschnigg although not mentioned specifically).
5. The Society's archives, library and music collection had been closed from May 14 to
17 because of the Nazi lockdown immediately after the May 13 Anschluss. On May 18
Dr. Viktor Luithlen took over the responsibility for these areas to ensure no disruption in the operation. Dr. Hedwig Kraus, daughter of the ousted honorary Vice President Dr.
Ernst Kraus, replaced two other officials in this area after Schiitz had satisfied himself that she would not continue her father's intolerable attitude to the greater Germany. 6.
The curator of the archive, Dr. Karl Geiringer was suspended because he was a Volljude
(full Jew) with termination almost immediately on April 1. Schtttz noted that other staff in lesser positions would not be questioned at this time. The rental contract of a room in the Musikverein to a private "non-Aryan" music school was cancelled. He said he was 101 awaiting further directions regarding the status of the concert director Georg Kugel who was Jewish.225
This was an impressive list after two weeks in the role as GdMf head—there was no suggestion of subtlety or lack of confidence as provisional leader in this report. It is important to note that up to this time the GdMf General Secretary DlabaC had been the only person in the Society who was offering any resistance to Schtttz's appointment as the Society's Nazi leader. The report enabled Schtttz to not only impress the Nazi officials with his ability as provisional leader and prove his effectivness in restructuring the GdMf but, also to lay the groundwork to be considered as an eventual candidate to be appointed as permanent leader, i.e., GdMf President. Given his obvious commitment to the Nazi Regime, it is surprising that despite his earlier appointment as GdMf provisional leader, he did not immediately use the established formal Nazi greeting of Heil Hitler in his correspondence until March 18.
Schtttz knew how to effectively exercise his new-found power. He demonstrated a rapid "ascent of the privileged"227 in his GdMf role. It is not clear whether or not Schtttz had aspired to a GdMf leadership role as a GdMf member before the annexation, but he certainly was not averse to taking advantage of the opportunity when it was presented to him. In Levi's words, the "ascent of the privileged, not only in the Lager but in all human coexistence, is an anguishing but unfailing phenomenon: only in Utopia is it absent."228
Schtttz took advantage of the power and privilege bestowed on him to achieve his
225 Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1937 und 1938.101. Print. 226 Biba. —.314. 227 Levi, Primo. —. 42. 228 102 personal goals, i.e., for his own greatest benefit. It is one thing to have power "bestowed from above" and equally important to observe how that power is used in the context of
"ascent of the privileged." Schutz used his power effectively to capitalize on his growth toward additional power by preparing this significant report for the Party hierarchy. At the same time it needs to be acknowledged that his goals were for good music and the success of the GdMf with himself as GdMf head—using his Nazi Party position to put this into effect. From many perspectives (except for the Jewish question) this combination created a positive result for the GdMf under Schutz's tenure.
Nazi sympathizers "IN"—Jews "OUT"
In his immediate report to the Party hierarchy, Schiitz made it clear that not only had the leaders of the previous GdMf been quickly terminated but that he was firmly in charge of
his tentative leadership role in the Society. In addition to dismissing Jewish GdMf
members, he advised the GdMf Singverein and GdMf Orchester that the Niirnberger
Rassengesetze applied to them as well. He also made it clear that all GdMf members who
were not Nazi sympathizers were in jeopardy and that their future was unkown. This ambiguity was cleared up shortly thereafter when on March 18 he called a new GdMf
general assemblty to dissolve the exisitng membership and replaced it with a group of
advisory committees which Biba suggests reads today like a list of "Who's Who" in 1938
Nazi Vienna.229
229 Biba. —. 314 and 321. Also found in Mikoletzky, Lorenz. "Die Politic und die Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien." In: Ingrid Fuchs (Hg): Festschrift Otto Biba zum 60. Geburtstag. Tutzing. 2006. p, 472. Print. 103
The extent of Schtitz's personal anti-Semitism is not clear. He complied quickly
with the Party's expectation to dismiss Jewish members from the Society. On the other
hand he took some risk in helping his friend Geiringer prepare to immediately leave the country by offering him the use of a GdMf office and materials. This could imply that in
this case, helping his Jewish friend "trumped" the Nazi Party expectations of getting rid of everything Jewish. Schtitz clearly was prepared to take some risks against Nazi policy
for Jewish people he respected. On the other hand, his letter of refusal to support the
independent Internationale Gesellschaft fur neue Musik discussed earlier under the
Friedrich Wildgans case showed clearly his strong anti-Semitic side. He accused the
international society of being run by and totally influenced by Jews. At the same time
however, he obviously respected the music of Jewish composer Gustav Mahler when he
told Wilgans the composers in the Internationale Gesellschaft could only make forced attempts to compose in Mahler's style.
The anti-Semitic remarks made by Schutz in the Wilgans letter seem to contradict
his actions and along with his earlier treatment of his Jewish friend Geiringer, perhaps suggest that Schtitz was less of an anti-Semitic than others in the Nazi Party. He replaced the Jewish members of the GdMf in line with Party policy, but this can be seen as a compliance that did not negatively affect his goals as a professional musician. His support of Mahler's music indicates that he was first and foremost a musician and could comply or not comply with Nazi Party expectations depending on his musical ideals. He apparently felt secure in his position with the Nazi "power privilege" to take the risks 104 within the Nazi Party policies and at the same time to have a selective attitude compared to the Nazi hierarchy when it came to Jewish issues.230
From Vienna to Berlin
In addition to the comprehensive report of his immediate actions as provisional GdMf leader which he made to his Nazi superiors on March 26, Schutz continued to work hard to establish himself favourably with the new Viennese and Berlin Nazi hierarchy. By
May 5 he was regularly using the title of kommissarischer Leiter der GdMf (temporary
GdMf leader) for all his correspondence.231 By May 21 he had sent a letter to all GdMf members advising them of the requirement of rein arischer Abstammung (pure "Aryan" family origin) as a first step toward "Aryanization" of the GdMf membership. By May
27 he had submitted requests for financial subsidies to the mayor of Vienna as well as to
Dr. Heinz Drewes in the Nazi headquarters in Berlin—stating that the Nazi annexation of
Austria had resulted in the loss in attendance of "non-Aryan" [Jewish] people at concerts and that, as a German artist committed to advocating for German music, he felt it was vitally important to avoid the catastrophe of a GdMf financial deficit. Both requests resulted in substantial contributions to the GdMf from both Vienna and Berlin which continued until near the end of the war.233
230 Biba. —. 332. This reference for Krones is found in the discussion notes following Biba's presentation. It also appears in an article by Krones in the following symposium: Krones, Hartmut. "Die Konzertpolitik der Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien in den Jahren 1938 bis 1945." Die Wiener Schule und das Hakenkreuz. Studien zur Wertungsforschung. Band 22. Wien: Otto Kolleritsch, 1990.198,199. Print. 231 Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1937 und 1938.72. 232 —. 127. 233 77, 78. 105
He offered special ticket prices to the Nazi Kulturgemeinde (culture authority) for
the Kraft durch Freude concerts which the party held regularly in the Musikverein.234
Starting in the fall of 1938 he corresponded regularly with the Reichsmusikkammer and
the Reichspropagandaministerium in Berlin regarding concert undertakings as well as
questionnaire forms required to be completed to show the ancestral background of the
GdMf members and officers.235 He offered special invitations to the Nazi hierarchy such
as Reichsstaathalter Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Reichskommissar Josef Btirckel, the
mayor of Vienna and the heads of the Police and Vienna Radio—stating that he hoped to
see them often in the concert hall and looked forward to greeting them personally.236 He
initiated the continuance of the long-standing working relationship with the neighbouring
Konzerthaus Society which was also responsible for major music programs in Vienna—
expressing strong confidence that the cultural mission of the two institutes would always
be accomplished in a friendly solidarity in genuine National Socialist comradeship.237
He took initiatives with the Reichsversicherung (Reich insurance office) in Berlin
to ensure that the employees in the GdMf as well as orchestra members, conductors,
soloists etc. had insurance coverage for accident and sickness.238 He wrote to the commander-in-chief of the Nazi army in the Ostmark acknowledging his great efforts and
wishing him many more years as head of the Wehrmacht (army) troops.239 He wrote
234 Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1937 und 1938.—. 77, 78. 235 Archiv: Gesellschaft der Mvsildreunde 1938 und 1939. 3. 236 _ 74 237 —. 25. 238-.69. 239-. 83. 106 directly to Hitler asking him to acknowledge Austrian composer Franz Schmidt as a composer of the Altreich (old Reich) and requested that Hitler include one of Schmidt's works in the next Parteitag in Niirnberg.240 He revised the GdMf statutes to reflect the required "Aryanization" changes at the request of the Berlin headquarters.241
He arranged annual inspections of the Musikverein building for heat, fire protection, gas, lighting, and electricity and suggested that because the building was built with public funds in the 1870s for the betterment of musical life in Vienna, the GdMf could not be considered an object of Nazi taxation.242 When he appointed Nazi Party member Dr. Fritz Zoder as the new GdMf General Secretary, he sent out a letter to other authorities, (e.g., the leader of the audit department of the Nazi secret commission for associations, organizations and alliances) confirming Zoder's appointment and assuring them that his choice of Zoder as General Secretary would be faithful to the Party goals— no doubt to show his superiors that he was complying with Party expectations in making
GdMf Nazi appointments. Similarly he sent letters of congratulation to the newly appointed Colonel and Lieutenant of the brown-shirts Nazi squadron and assured them that he was dedicated to serve them in the Nazi cause. On April 20 Schtitz sent congratulations to Party member Franz Langoth on his appointment in the German
Reichstag, paying homage to and acknowledging his total belief in the Fiihrer and requesting Langoth's assistance to carry out the work of the Vaterland.243
240 Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1938 tind 1939. —. 93. 241-.31. 242-.93. 243 Biba.—.318,319. 107
Obviously Schutz's efforts to develop cautious and close relationships with the
party functionaries paid off. On September 30, 1938, Reich Governor Bilrckel announced
the official appointment of Franz Schfttz as GdMf President.244 After six and one-half
months as the provisional leader, Schiitz finally had unequivocal power and authority over the full operation of the GdMf within the direction of the Nazi Party.
By the end of September the Nazi Party had taken over full control of the GdMf
with only Nazi Party members in President, General Secretary and Attorney positions and
with all previous members of the Society replaced by known Nazi Party members or sympathizers. As a further step in total control and consolidation, the new Nazi umbrella organization for all Viennese societies—the Stillhaltekommissar fiir Vereine,
Organisationen und Verbande (Commissioner for organziational suspensions) in May
1939 decided to integrate the GdMf with the Staatstheater- und Biihnenakademie (State
Theatre and Stage Academy) with a strong emphasis that there would be no removal of
the Reich's Nazi personnel resulting from the consolidation. The other two main subordinate GdMf supported societies—the Wiener Singverein and the GdMf
Orchester—both of which had existed since the 1800s, were also disbanded along with their directors, and incorporated into the GdMf.245 The musical instrument collection was removed from the jurisdiction of the GdMf in the Musikverein and combined with the collection in the Runsthistorisches Museum (Historical Art Museum). Similarly a consolidation of the archives and library with the Nationalbibliothek (National Library) was being planned. Meanwhile Schtitz delicately revoked the original GdMf plans for
^Biba—.314. 108 future concert seasons and assumed the full role as program director for the Musikverein concerts.246
This was obviously an attempt by the Nazi dictatorship to totally abolish the democratic organizational concept of the 125-year old Society and to break up the traditional Society components to ensure that the Society activities could be controlled by the Party and would represent the Party ideology. Interestingly the name of the Society
was retained even though it was organizationally only an empty shell of the previous democratic and independent organization. The expertise of the Nazi propaganda machine
was clever enough to realize the benefit of publically presenting its cultural goals under the banner of this venerable music institution. There was no similarity between the independent Society operations before and after the March 14, 1938 Anschluss—the original democratic goals and spirit laid out by the founders in 1812 and successfully
implemented for 125 years had been totally replaced by the politically driven Nazi agenda with Nazi members and new statutes to reflect the Nazi principles of the
Fflhrer.247
In his 1951 publication Kralik comments on the impact of the political upheaval on the structure of the GdMf. He suggests there was no escape from the totalitarian demands of the Regime—especially for a public institution that did not want to go
"totally under" and which therefore had to adjust. He suggests that after the annexation,
Austrian enthusiasm and joy had escalated, but the Annual Report of the GdMf at the end
245 Archiv: Gesellschqfi der Musikfreunde. Jahresarbeit der Direktion fur die Vereinsjahre 1937 und 1938 und 1938 und 1939. Wien: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde, 1940.8. Print 246 Biba. —. 314. 247 -.319. 109 of 1939 made only a slight reference in one sentence about boosting and strengthening the Nationalistic spirit of the Society. This is true as shown in the Annual Report in the archive248 and one wonders how this apparent slight to the Party with scant reference of homage to Nationalization could have occurred when Schtttz was already President. It appears there was some resistance or at least lack of acceptance of the Nazi takeover in some quarters, e.g., the Annual Director's Report. This however could also reflect
Schutz's influence in wanting to separate arts and politics. The Annual Report was about
GdMf music matters and its success—not about its role in strengthening Nazi recognition and policy. Kralik notes that, although the Party had taken over Vienna, the country, art, and music— culture blossomed in the middle war years. He acknowledges that the Nazi takeover in March 1938 affected the inner essence and intrinsic basic nature of the GdMf.
It was not the Society's physical existence or artistic function that were impacted but rather Kralik sees these changes as a form of spiritual distress for the GdMf. The open, free and veritable humanistic world of thought and ideas from which the Society had come and upon which its existence, reputation and success had thrived, was abhorred by the new rulers. What the time-honoured institution faced—irrespective of the inhumane discrimination against the long-time Society members and the racial ostracization—was nothing more than the total shattering of the individuality on which the free and independent Society was based. The Regime had indeed broken the Society's leadership and seduced its character—but in Kralik's view the institution itself and its ideas turned
244 Archiv: Gesellschafi der Musikfreunde. Jahresarbeit der Direktion fur die Vereinsjahre 1937/38 und 1938/39. Wien: Gesellschafi der Musikfreunde, 1940. Print. 110 out to be stronger and less perishable than the people. He states that the GdMf was able to survive through this dire and dangerous time.249
It is obvious that Kralik believed the independent and democratic Society was
indeed a victim of the Regime and he attributes a "life of its own" to the institution—
regardless of who was at the helm. He does however positively acknowledge that the
Society flourished during the middle years of the Regime under Schtttz's tenure. That the
Society could flourish artistically under an autocratic totalitarian Regime seems to be a
contradiction to the argument that it became a victim of Nazism. At the same time,
immediately after the end of the war, Schtitz was dismissed and the pre-war Society
leaders returned and in short order grew the Society to an even more successful level than
it was under Schtttz's time as President.250 In Kralik's mind, this swift restoration to the
pre-1938 independent and democratic Society seems to reinforce his earlier premise that
good music is successful independent of the environment in which it is performed. I
disagree with Kralik's premise that the Society would have survivied and succeeded
regardless of who was at the helm 1 believe the evidence shows that the success of the
GdMf under the Nazi Regime was clearly the result of Franz Schutz being in charge as
President.
Kralik's premise is a postwar abstraction which allows him in hindsight to see the
association as untainted by the politics of the day. Because he attributes a life of its own
to the Society, he can safely uphold the quality of music performance during this era. He
does not have to deal with the uncomfortable insight that Nazis capable of horrendous
249 Kralik. —.206,207. 250 Ill inhuman actions could also be capable musicians or supporters of quality music—despite all the racial bleeding of the Society, good music had prevailed. A survey of the quality and quantity of concert programming during the Nazi period under Schtttz's tenure in the next sub-chapter will serve to further substantiate this claim.
While the previous democratic organizational style of the Society was compromised by the autocratic Regime, the music programs flourished under the Nazi organization with Schiitz as leader. The GdMf s democratic structures may have been a victim of Nazism, but the Society's music output during the Third Reich shows that its collaboration with the Nazi organization also enabled it to excel, grow and flourish.
Concerts "unter dem Hakenkreuz"
Despite the total reorganization of the Society to reflect Nazi principles, the programming of GdMf concerts under Schtttz's Nazi leadership maintained the quality of pre-Anschluss concert seasons. The following discussion shows and compares the make-up of the concert programs before and after the Anschluss. The frequency and number of concerts actually increased under the Nazi Regime. This continued up to the later years of the war when concert programming was forced to be restricted because significant resources had to be allocated to the war effort. The programs for all of the concert seasons from 1870 to
1970 are documented in the book HundertJahre Goldener Saal published by the
GdMf.251 The details of the annual concert seasons from 1937/38 to 1944/45 and for
1950/51 are included in Appendix C.
251 Grasberger. —. 1937-1945 and 1950/51. The table on page 115 shows that the number of concerts presented by the GdMf under the Nazi Regime increased from 18 concerts in the 1937/38 season to a peak of 58 concerts in both the 1942/43 and 1943/44 concert seasons, decreasing to 34 concerts in
1944/45. This significant increase is a testimony to Schiitz's success as the President and concert organizer. Despite the large reduction in concerts in the 1944/45 season, the evidence will show that maintaining even this level was the direct result of Schiitz's ability to keep the programming going even when available resources were required to be allocated to the losing war effort. By the 1950/51 season, the new postwar GdMf directorate following SchQtz's dismissal in March 1945 had succeeded in the necessary rebuilding of the Society and the damaged concert hall to reach a new level of programming at 69 concerts.
It is meaningful to briefly compare some of the details of the concert seasons during the Nazi Regime to support the concert quality premise. The September to June
1937/38 concert season including the celebrations of the 125-year GdMf anniversary was alluded to earlier and was nearly complete by the time of the March 13 annexation.
The concerts which Schiitz organized as the new leader of the GdMf for the first full September 1938 to June 1939 Nazi season continued with a pattern similar to previous years in terms of quality but with an expanded number of concerts offered.
Typically this pattern through to the end of the war included a series of symphony concerts with the Wiener Symphoniker with music composed by the great German traditional classical composers. There were usually three or four choral concerts with the
Wiener Singverein and the Wiener Symphoniker performing the great oratorios, e.g., J.S.
Bach's St. Matthew Passion, Verdi's Requiem, Brahm's Requiem, Handel's Messiah, 113
Schmidt's Das Buck mit sieben Siegeln and Pfitzner's Von deutscher Seele. There were typically also additional concerts featuring Beethoven symphonies, piano concerto or
Lieder concerts with famous pianists, singers, and instrumental soloists as well as chamber music concerts. Often concerts commemorating a special occasion, e.g., the death of esteemed Austrian composer Franz Schmidt or the 70th birthday of Richard
Strauss were presented. Schiitz frequently arranged organ concerts with himself as soloist.
The music of these mainline German composers was considered by the Nazi Party as "true" German music. These oratorios with choir and orchestra had been a regular staple at the GdMf for many years—in both pre-Nazi Austria and Germany as well as internationally. Schmidt as noted earlier was sponsored as the greatest living German composer in the Ostmark by the Nazi Party.
The main conductor initially was the resident GdMf conductor Oswald Kabasta.
Other frequent guest conductors included Wilhelm Furtwangler and other well-known
Austrian and German conductors, e.g., Rudolf Moralt, Eugen Jochum, Hans
Knappertsbusch, Willi Boskowsky and Josef Keilberth. These conductors all had well- established reputations in Austria, Gennany and overall in Europe. They were recognized in Europe as the creme of the remaining conductors in Europe after the emigration of such notable Jewish conductors as Bruno Walter and Otto Klemperer. Furtwangler in particular had an international reputation and had declined an offer to come to the United
States as conductor of the New York Philharmonic in 1936. His decision to stay in
Europe as an "Aryan" non-Nazi in order to continue to promote the tradition of great
German classical music has been the centre of a long controversy over many years and 114
resulted in a very long and involved denazification process after the war to clear his
name. This pattern of concert programming under Schutz's leadership continued for the
1939/40,1940/41,1941/42,1942/43 and 1943/44 seasons. In addition to these annnal subscription series of concerts, Schiitz often programmed special concerts to commemorate or to honour the music of specific German composers such as Beethoven,
J.S. Bach, Haydn, Mozart, Bruckner, Schubert, Schumann, Wagner etc. whose music the
Nazi Party valued as being representative of "pure" German art.
For example, in 1941 there were additional concerts presented in the Musikverein concert hall as part of the renowned "Mozart Third Reich Festival" held in Vienna from
November 28 to December 5 to commemorate the 150th year since Mozart's death. The
week's events were a music extravaganza to celebrate Mozart who was considered by the
Nazi Party one of the true geniuses of German culture. The events were sponsored by
Reichsminister Dr. Josef Goebbels and Reichsleiter Baldur von Schirach. The 12-page program included a day-by-day, hour-by-hour schedule of the various events, speeches and musical performances held all over Vienna including, such venues as the Grosser
Musikvereinssaal, Grosser Konzerthanssaal, Staatsoper, Schlosstheater Schonbrunn,
Winterpalais des Prinzen Eugen, Palais Lobkowitz, Palais Pallavicini, the Redoutensaal der Hofburg as well as the Rittersaal der Ho/burg. A wide selection of Mozart's music including symphonies, operas, chamber music, piano recitals and the Requiem oratorio was performed by the best musicians from throughout the Reich. Speeches were given by
Nazi notables such as Viennese Reichsleiter Baldur von Schirach along with
Reichspropagandaminister Dr. Josef Goebbels and Reichsmusikkammerleiter Dr. Heinz
Drewes from the Nazi Berlin headquarters 115
GdMf Concerts 1937-19S1
80
70
60 SO I I 40
30
20 H
10
A ,/ ./ _/ ./ _/ _/ .• s*N k k V V V S?> s9> n9> ' ,p> k9i
r Performances • Repeats 116
. Music was conducted by such eminent musicians as Wilhelm Furtwangler,
Richard Strauss, Karl Bohm, Clemens Krauss, and Leopold Reichwein. Participating orchestras were the Wiener Symphoniker and Wiener Philharmoniker and world-famous pianists Wilhelm Backhaus and Wilhelm Kempf. During the eight-day event concerts were presented three or four times each day starting with morning concerts at eleven a.m. followed by afternoon concerts and evening programs at the various venues in the city.252
The extent to which Schtitz was involved in the organization of this huge music festival is not clear, but certainly there were several concerts held in the two concert halls of the GdMf. The Mozart festival was a major accomplishment and it is hard to imagine a similar level and standard of classical music being offered at that time in any other city in the world. From the perspective of the Viennese music public it is easy to understand why they embraced the Nazi organization with its emphasis on the great German composers with the best conductors and soloists which traditionally were such an integral part of the Viennese culture. Clearly, Goebbels and the Nazi Propaganda Ministry were skilful in appropriating the beloved classical music as a tool to promote the acceptance of
Nazi goals by the Viennese. The Nazi reorganization of the GdMf and removal of Jewish musicians, society members and fellow Jewish concert colleagues seemed to have been overlooked or accepted by the Viennese concert-going public which was enjoying even more concerts and celebratory music weeks than before the annexation—all supported by
252 Die Mozartwoche des Deutschen Reiches in Wien vom 28. November bis 5. Dezember 1941. Published by the BOro der Mozartwoche des Deutschen Reiches 1941. The program is available in the Archiv: Gesellschaft derMusikfreimde 1940/41.33. It is also available electronically on the Internet at USMBOOKS.com. Web. 20 May 2011.
In the 1942/43 season there were several concerts with guest German Reich orchestras from Munich and Prague as well as a special concert to celebrate the ISO*11 birthday of Richard Wagner. This was an important celebratory event as Wagner had been canonized as a favourite of the Nazi Party because of Hitler's love for his music and also because of Wagner's well-known anti-Semitic views which meshed nicely with the beliefs of National Socialism. The 1943/44 season also included concerts with three guest orchestras from Prague, Linz and Munich. In February 1944 Schfltz organized a Franz-
Schmidt-Woche with seven concerts to honour the fifth-year anniversary of the death of the renowned Austrian composer who died in February 1939. With full Nazi Party support, Schiitz encouraged these concerts with visiting orchestras from other cities in the
Reich as well as sponsoring the finest soloists for GdMf programs. Under Schiitz's leadership there was a discernable reorientation of musical programming to emphasize intra-national talent over inter-national talent inside the Reich.This trend can be observed in other areas of culture within the Reich, e.g., literature, film, and also travel and tourism during the Nazi Regime.
WUhrend die Russen vor den Toren Wiens stehen —(Russians at Vienna's gates)
By the 1944/45 season the Reich's propaganda administration decreed the abandonment of the GdMf which meant that thereafter all of the performances in the concert halls of the Musikverein building would have been controlled and arranged by the Reich's propaganda administration in Vienna. However because of a successful intervention 118
(presumably by von Schirach and Schtitz) the abandonment of the Society was averted.
The 1944/45 concert season was a significant change from the typical programming of previous years, reflecting the disbandment of several music institutions which had previously been part of the regular GdMf programming. The Wiener Staatsoper choir along with the Wiener Sangerknaben (Vienna Boys Choir) and the Wiener
Philharmoniker replaced the Wiener Singverein and the Wiener Symphoniker as both these organizations had been disbanded by Goebbels "all out war" initiative. Also
Clemens Krauss and Wilhelm Jerger were new conductors. Jerger in 1938 was a Nazi sympathizer and bassist in the Wiener Philharmoniker and was appointed as President of the orchestra after the Nazi annexation—similar to Schutz's role as President of the
GdMf. The Linzer Reichs-Bruckner-Orchester presented symphony concerts and among the prominent soloists in the season were soprano Elisabeth Schwarzkopf and of course
Franz Schtitz as soloist for an organ concert.
The reduction in the number of concerts in the 1944/45 season reflects the struggle to keep the GdMf musical programming alive as the fortunes of the Nazi war effort began to wane. In the spring of 1944 Schtitz received a letter from the central culture office of Baldur von Schirach in Vienna responding positively to Schutz's suggestion that orchestras from other cities from occupied or neutral countries could be invited to Vienna, (e.g., Bucharest, Budapest, Switzerland) for the coming season.253 The threat of having to abandon the orchestras in Vienna because of the war effort had already been looming on the horizon. A September 1944 letter to Schtitz from the
253 Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1944 und 1945. 3. Print. 119
Ministry of Enlightenment and Propaganda under Goebbel's direction in Berlin advised
the list of November and December concerts that would be cancelled in Vienna as well as
cancelled concerts in Dresden, Berlin, Magdeburg and other cities.254 Also in the fall of
1944 Schiitz wrote to the conductor of the orchestra, Oswald Kabasta: alles ist zu Wasser
geworden (everything was lost).255 Nevertheless Schiitz wrote to Seyss-Inquart requesting
approval and financial support to invite the Concertgebouw orchestra from Amsterdam
for three concerts in the fall of 1944. The response to this request from Amsterdam was
that the Reichstransport (Reich Transport) rejected the possibility of the orchestra
travelling to Vienna.
Schiitz was also engaged in regular correspondence with Joseph Keilberth, the conductor of the Prague orchestra, to try and arrange continuing guest visits of that orchestra to Vienna to ensure a viable concert season at the GdMf. Despite von
Schirach's encouragement to invite outside orchestras to participate in GdMf concerts, it appears that the demands of the war effort took precedence. Schiitz however continued his relentless campaign to maintain or get increased financial grants from the city as well as approval for an increase in ticket prices to support the GdMf operations—this however was negated from the responsible body in Berlin because of the war austerity measures.
These requests from Schiitz were always reinforced with strong closing statements about the need to keep up the high standards for the GdMf as the oldest and most distinguished cultural institution in Vienna, noting that this was the responsibility of
254 Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1944 ttnd 1945—. 3. 255 -.3. 120 the Reichsleiter (von Schirach) to uphold.256 In May and June 1944 Schfttz invited the
Strassburg orchestra and the Munich Staatsoper to come to Vienna for three concerts from December 1944 to April 1945. He also arranged six concerts to be broadcast on the
RAVAG radio station for the 1944/45 concert season. He requested Walter Thomas in the
Kulturamt (Culture Bureau) in von Schirach's Vienna office to confirm the planning for the coming year as soon as possible. He was also busy inviting revered German and
Austrian conductors such as Hans Knappertsbusch and Willi Boskovsky to commit to concerts in the upcoming season. Problems were emerging with the lack of paper for printing the programs and Schfttz requested a supply of paper be sent from the Nazi office in The Hague which was granted in June 1944.257
The archival correspondence clearly demonstrates the effort and commitment
Schiitz invested during this time to ensure a viable 1944/45 concert season for the GdMf.
However, he received a letter in July 1944 from the mayor of the city of Vienna outlining his concerns about the planned programming at the GdMf for the coming year, noting that the costs would be prohibitive and also that it would not be feasible to bring outside orchestras to Vienna and billet them in the city—all because of the war situation. In
September 1944 further concerts of the main orchestra for the GdMf—the Wiener
Symphoniker—were shut down and cancelled, along with two other orchestras in the city.
This left the Wiener Philharmoniker, (which had been labelled a Reichsorchester along with the Berlin Philharmoniker) as the only remaining active orchestras in the Reich.
256 Arehiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1944 und 1945. —. 3. 237 ^ 121
Schiitz requested that the orchestra cancellation decision be rescinded and recommended that one orchestra be formed to replace the three cancelled orchestras but his
Fecommendation was not accepted. These efforts seem to override Schiltz's commitment to the declining fortunes of the party in the context of not wanting to allocate all resources to winning the war—again strong evidence that Schiitz's music professionalism superseded his Nazi Party commitment.
The correspondence between Schiitz in Vienna and Keilberth in Prague from the fall of 1944 to the spring of 1945 describes first hand the concerns about the viability of the proposed concert season—that despite their strong commitment to the musical programming it was becoming evident that all was for naught—that the loss of the war by the Nazis was imminent. Concerts continued to be routinely cancelled and the few concerts in the GdMf were described as taking place wahrend die Russen vor den Toren
Wiens stehen (while the Russians were standing at the gates of Vienna). Schiitz soldiered on to the end of the war promoting every possibility with the Nazi hierarchy to maintain a viable concert season, apparently unaware or unwilling to accept the inevitability of the pending Nazi defeat and the end of his seven year tenure as President of the GdMf.258
These continued efforts on Schiitz's part to organize and maintain a music program at the GdMf show the high level of his commitment to music and to the Society.
It is however also evident that music was not only important for its own sake, but that it was perceived as a way of uplifting the flagging spirits of the Viennese as they continued to throng to available concerts between trips to the air raid shelters after the Allied bombing attacks on the city began. Schiitz did not "abandon ship"—he tried diligently to 122 deliver high quality music until the end—and consistently came up with new ideas to try and accomplish this despite the closing down of the music resources, e.g., trying to amalgamate three closing orchestras into one, trying to bring in outside resources and requesting paper for the concert programs. At the same time one cannot ignore Schiltz's lack of reality of the situation in which he found himself—that the war was ending along with his seven years as GdMf leader.
Primo Levi's argument about people's behaviour in extreme, totalitarian settings is this: Through collaboration, compromise and complicity in these extreme social settings, certain people rise through their individual capabilities to power and prestige and in the course of the ascent forget the fragility of their own status that is based on the continuation of an essentially fragile system. Schiitz's decision to strive for continued music programming and to remain until the end of the Third Reich may have been based on a similar misjudgement of his personal but also of the larger political circumstances.
Art vs. Atrocity
The evidence has shown that Schutz was a capable administrator, a reliable Nazi, and an accomplished music professional. He was ruthless and coercive, but also caring and helpful. He impoverished the Society by cleansing it from Jewish influence, but also led the Society artistically to new heights. In this broad context, how should we interpret his tenure as GdMf leader?
Heinrich Kralik and Otto Biba both recognize that art, music and culture at the
GdMf blossomed through the war years until the spring of 1945 when problems because of the war effort began to emerge. As noted earlier, Kralik posits that it was the
258 Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1944 and 1945. 3. Print 123 independent and democratic spirit of the Society that was victimized while the number of concert programs increased and the high quality of the music was maintained.
Hartmut Krones however offers a different perspective in a 1990 article.259 He describes the Nazi takeover of the GdMf as the atrocious reality of the concert operation of a Viennese music institution—a reality which he found immensely distressing after a thorough review of the [GdMf] files. He suggests that to gain a full understanding of this reality, one must not only consider the concert politics of the GdMf between 1938 and
1945, but also demonstrate the total field of personal politics and the currying of favour in the state-run and Nazi Party positions. He acknowledges that compared to the years before 1938, there was not a significant difference in the concert programs themselves.
Krones's stance suggests however that the continued pattern of programming that Schutz implemented, which was very similar to the years before the annexation, was not acceptable, i.e., he appears to take issue with the conservative programming of the pre- annexation GdMf management. Kralik and Biba on the other hand see this pattern of programming by Schutz as positive.
In his 1990 article Krones in hindsight describes Schiltz as a submissive, obedient and convinced person prepared to act as an instrument of Nazi power. He notes that the first concert of a Bruckner symphony on March 11, 1938 just before the annexation, had cast a consecrative spell over the concert hall which showed the best evidence of the orchestra's competence. In describing a second concert which had to be postponed
259 Krones, Hartmut. "Die Konzertpolitik der Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien in den Jahren 1938 bis 1945." Die Wiener Schule und das Hakenkreuz. Studien zur Wertungsforschung. Band 22. Wien: Otto Kolleritsch, 1990.189-203. Print. 124 following March 11 because of all the upheaval related to the pending annexation,
Krones implies that the cancellation was unfortunate for the audience who did not
support the Nazi spirit and who as resistors still today are all too easily overlooked.
He points out that the only change Schiitz had to make in the remainder of the
1937/38 programs was to change his organist role from a minor one in a H&ndel organ concerto with orchestra to a solo presentation of a Bach Passacaglia. Krones saw this change and Schiitz's later promotion of Schmidt's (his former teacher's) music as examples of Schiitz's Nazi "personal politics." He notes that the inclusion of new
"Aryan" composers doesn't suggest they were all Nazi Party members or sympathizers,
but rather they were "'Aryan" and therefore reliable and acceptable to the Party. His concern was about their artistic ability which he believed naturally encouraged corruptibility. Krones says composers wanted their works performed, conductors wanted to conduct and pianists wanted to play—suggesting that even today people join political parties or organizations in order to obtain a teaching position or city appointment—that the difference compared to 1938-45 is marginal. Krones takes serious issue with Schiitz's denial of Wildgans's request for support of the Internationale Gesellschaft fur neue
Musik contemporary programs. Apparently this was based on Schiitz's dislike of contemporary Jewish music and also his desire to have total control over the choice of contemporary music programs at the GdMf. From Krones's perspective, this is a further example of "personal politics" taking precedence on Schtttz's part.
Krones describes Schiitz's plans for the 1944/45 season not as concerted efforts to try and continue to offer GdMf music programs but rather that Schtttz's "imagination exceeded his grasp." At the conclusion of his article, Krones quotes the author of the 125
1970 book Hundert Jahre Goldener Saal celebrating the 100-Year celebration of the
Musikverein building. The author states that the leadership of the GdMf from 1938 to the end of the Second World War was under the "distinguished musician Franz Schtitz" and continues that "Schtitz had saved the independent character of the GdMf so that the transition in 1945 to a fully independent and autonomous society was made easier."
Krones concludes his article by saying this positive 1970 statement about Schutz is as stereotypical an interpretation of Nazi propaganda as saying Arbeitslose hat es kerne gegeben unter'm Hitler (there was no unemployment under Hitler).260
It is difficult to fully understand Krones's position as he takes serious issue with
Schutz's programming as being too conservative, disagreed with Schiitz's position regarding contemporary music, perceived Schiitz's behaviour as typical of Nazi "personal politics" and "currying of favour" and believed that Schtitz was simply an instrument of the Nazi Party. He does not acknowledge Schutz's contribution as a competent musician and administrator with a passion for good music and a desire to maintain and grow the quality programming of the GdMf under his regime. Krones sees only Schiitz's passion for his role as a Nazi Party member. Clearly Schiitz's case is neither black nor white— there are obviously still today opposing views about Schiitz's tenure as GdMf President from 1938-1945. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that Schtitz was an example of a Nazi career in an area in which he was competent
260 Krones. 198-201. 126
Schfitz on Schutz
Perhaps a final word about Schfitz's own postwar perspective of his tenure is meaningful to this study. In his 1950 report to the new GdMf directorate261, Schtltz presents a very positive account of his leadership as the GdMf President from 1938-45. As noted previously he describes how he was appointed President after Austrian Nazi President
Seyss-Inquart solicited his ideas about the attributes required for leadership of the GdMf; he explains how he worked effectively in this role despite challenges with musicians at all levels as well as with the Nazi hierarchy; he describes his role as an effective business administrator and claims he had the full support from the GdMf staff, and he describes his persistent efforts to maintain a viable 1944/45 concert season despite the increasing demands of the war effort.
He makes only scant reference to his role as a Nazi Party member in the report but instead focuses almost entirely on his role as a competent professional musician and administrator. He refers to always acting in a respectful and subordinate role in his dealings with preeminent conductors such as Clemens Krauss, Hans Knappertsbusch and especially Wilhelm FurtwSngler in order to ensure their continued commitment to conducting the GdMf concert programs. The overall tone of the report is one of committed musicianship and success for the GdMf—presented relatively humbly with respect and yet with pride of his accomplishments and also regret at his termination at the end of the war.
261 Schtltz. 1-9 127
It may be questionable to accept ScMtz's self-assessment in hindsight after his term in office—especially when it was perhaps in his best interest to focus on his music contribution rather than his Nazi role in light of the postwar situation in Allied Vienna.
The report however seems consistent with and supports the evidence found in the GdMf files. The musical success of the GdMf under Schtttz's tenure is supported by the facts and certainly the Viennese music public seemed to enjoy and support the GdMf programs throughout the war. It is difficult to challenge this aspect of his tenure as GdMf president.
The wartime success of the concert seasons tends to overlook the fact that many
Jewish people under the Nazi Regime were forced to withdraw from the Society, could no longer perform as musicians, emigrated to other countries to escape the Nazi occupation or were rounded up by Adolf Eichmann's program under Nazi police and anti-Semitic initiatives to be sent to concentration camps. The success of the Nazi experience at the GdMf under Schutz is certainly not unequivocally positive—the successful programs from 1938 to 1945 are at best tainted by this unresolved Jewish moral dilemma and clearly fall into Levi's "gray zone" theory in a totalitarian state.
It seems that based on the GdMf case study, the presentation of quality music was the priority for the Viennese. As far as the Viennese people were concerned, the political persuasion of those composing or making music was of little or no consequence.
As well, whether because of the residual effect of the many years of anti-Semitism in the country or because of general racial indifference from a moral perspective, there was essentially no resistance to the Nazi takeover at the GdMf and implementations of Nazi policies. 128
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this study supports the premise that from a music perspective the programs at the GdMf during the Nazi Regime under Franz Schutz's tenure were extremely successful. The evidence also shows that based on the case evidence and
Schtttz's own reporting of events, there was little if any overt control over his role as
GdMf President exerted by the Nazi Party. Schiitz was very successful in achieving his goals of separating art and politics to ensure a high level of classical music programming and concurrently to ensure the continued success of the GdMf. The most negative side of the Nazi takeover of the GdMf was the elimination of Jewish music, Jewish musicians,
Jewish attendance at concerts and Jewish membership in the Society—all in compliance with Nazi anti-Semitic policy. The replacement of the democratic and independent GdMf organization was a philosophical change but in reality did not negatively affect the music goals and success of the organization because of Schutz's passion as a professional musician and efficient manager.
Levi's "gray zone" theory of human behaviour in a totalitarian regime has served to illuminate the situation at the GdMf from 1938 to 1945. He suggests that the
Manichaean tendency to reduce human behaviour to two blocs of victims and persecutors is not possible in a totalitarian state. He posits that human behaviour in a totalitarian state falls instead into the "gray zone" between perpetrators and victims.262 Similarly the evidence in this study shows that the leaders of the totalitarian regime at the GdMf were not perpetrators capable only of atrocious activities. In the GdMf case under the Nazi
Regime, the democratic and free GdMf organization was demolished and replaced by an 129 autocratic society with only Nazi members. However, the original purpose and goal of the organization, i.e., to provide good classical music programming at the GdMf in
Vienna continued and indeed flourished under the Nazi Regime. The GdMf music programs and concert audiences were therefore not victims of Nazi perpetration. The success of the GdMf operation can clearly be attributed to Franz Schutz whose passion as a professional musician ensured the success of the GdMf within the structures of the Nazi
Regime. This is the significant conclusion to this study.
Did Schiitz "rescue" the GdMf during the war to transition it easily to a democratic and independent organization again after 1945? Would the programming at the GdMf firom 1938 to 1945 have been so successful if under the direction of another
Nazi Party member rather than Schutz? Was Kralik's premise correct that the GdMf was indomitable and would have survived regardless of what occurred during the Nazi regime? These questions are perhaps interesting but only hypothetical and therefore irrelevant for this study.
The definitions I established in the introduction define how the meanings of collaboration, compromise and complicity should be viewed and interpreted in this sudy.
To conclude, it is important to restate these specific definitions here to again clarifiy the contextual usage of these terms. The Viennese in the GdMf collaborated with the Nazi
Regime by cooperating reasonably with the Nazi enemy who occupied their country.
They compromised with the Nazi Regime by giving up and surrendering their principles and rights of an independent and democratic Society and accetped the autrocratic Nazi- run Society. They complied with the Nazi Regime by being an accomplice in a wrong
262 Levi, Primo. 37. 130 doing—by not resisitng the implentation of the anti-Semitic goals of the Party which eliminated Jewish musicians and Jewish music from the Society—the result of which is generally recognized as a grossly immoral time in our World History.
The Viennese desire for quality classical music at the GdMf was not only achieved but exceeded—one might even say that the Viennese enjoyed "waltzing in 4/4 march tempo" during Schfitz's tenure as the Nazi GdMf President. After 1945 the Society was quickly reconstituted and has grown extensively to unprecedented heights for another 67 years—continuing with its original music goals as it prepares to celebrate its
200-year anniversary in 2012. 131
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, Martin. Ed. "A Tribute to Marcel Prawy (1911-2003): The End of an Era and the End of a Research Project." Jewish Music Institute—Suppressed Music. Newsletter # 6. February 2004. Marcel Prawy. Web. 31 Jan 2012. Print.
Angyan, Eva, Otto Biba, and Manfred Wagner, Goldene Klange. Wien: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde—Verlag Holzhausen, 1995. Print.
Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1937 und 1938. 48; 72; 77; 78; 96; 98; 101; 104; 127. Print.
Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreundel938 und 1939. 3; 24; 25; 31; 69; 83; 93. Print.
Archiv: Gesellschaft derMusikfreunde 1940 und 1941.33. Print.
Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde1944 und 1945. 3. Print.
Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde. Statute—1814. Print.
Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde. Jahresarbeit der Direktion fur die Vereinsjahre 1937/38 und 1938/39. Wien: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde, 1940. Print.
Art, David. The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria. Cambridge: University Press, 2006. Print.
Aster, Misha. Das Reichsorchester. Die Berliner Philharmoniker und der Nationalsozialismus. Siedler Verlag: Mtinchen, 2007. Print.
Auzinger, Susanne. Die Wiener Philharmoniker und ihre Rolle als Propagandainstrument im Nationalsozialismus. Analyse der Propagandatatigkeit zwischen 1938 und 1945 anhand ausgewahlter Artikel des "Volkischen Beobachters." Diplomarbeit. UniversitSt Wien. 2004. Print
Barta, Erwin "Das Wiener Konzerthaus zwischen 1945 und 1961." Eine vereinsgeschichtliche und musikwirtschaftliche Studie. Band 39. Tutzing, Germany: Hans Schneider, 2001. Print.
—. "Kunst, Kommerz und Politik: Das Wiener Konzerthaus 1938-1945." Musik in Wien 1938-45. Symposium 2004. Studien zu Franz Schmidt. Band XV. Wien: Doblinger Musikverlag, 2004.291-310. Print.
Beck, Hermann. Rev. of The Third Reich Between Vision and Reality: New Perspectives on German History. Ed.Hans Mommsen. Central European History. 2003:297- 299. Print. 132
Beetz, Wilhelm. Das Wiener Opemhaus. IIAuflage 1869 bis 1955. Wien: Panorama, 1955. Print
Bergauer, Joseph. Das klingende Wien: Erinnerungsstatten beriihmter Tondichter. Wien: Johannes Gtibther, 1941. Print.
Biba, Otto. "Die Jahre 1938-1945 im Musikvereinsgeb&ude." Musik in Wien 1938-1945. Symposium 2004. Studien zu Franz Schmidt XV. Wien: Doblinger Verlag, 2004. 311-329. Print.
Birkner, Gabrielle. "Once Home to Adolf Hitler, Vienna is reaching out to New York Jews." 2007. New York Sun. Web. Oct 2008.
Blaukopf, Herta und Kurt. Die Wiener Philharmoniker: Wesen, Werden, Wirken eines grossen Orchesters. Wien: Zsolnay, 1986. Print.
Bdhm, Karl. Ich erinnere mich ganz genau. Wien: Fritz Molden, 1975. Print.
Bracher, Karl Dietrich The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure and Effects of National Socialism. Berlin: Verlag Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969. Trans. Jean Steinberg. New York: Praeger, 1970. Print.
Brinkmann, Reinhold and Christoff Wolff, eds. Driven into Paradise: The Musical Migration from Nazi Germany to the United States. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Print.
Brown, Adam. "Bounty Hunters in the Grey Zone: Dutch Collaboration during the Holocaust." New York: Deakin University, 2007. Rev. of Hitler's Bounty Hunters: Betrayal of the Jews, by Ad van Liempt. New York: Berg, 2005. Print.
Brusatti, Otto. Nationalismus und Ideologie in der Musik Beitrdge zur geistesgeschichtlichen Entwicklung einer Kunstform. Band 13. Diss. Universitat Wien. Hans Schneider, 1978. Print.
Bukey, Evan Burr. Hitler's Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938-1945. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. Print.
Burns, Rob. Ed. German Cultural Studies: An Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Print.
Carsten, F.L. Fascist Movements in Austria: from Schonerer to Hitler. London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1977. Print.
"Chancellor Schuschnigg speaks to packed Assembly." BBC Four. The Story of British Pathe. Web. 7 Nov 2011.
Charles, Antony. "Wilhelm FurtwSngler and Music in the Third Reich." The Journal for Historical Review.Volume 17. Number 3.1998. Print.
Christian, Hans und Harald Hoyer. Die Wiener Staatsoper 1945-1980: Eine Dokumentation von Hans Christian. Kiinstler-Generalregister, zusammengestellt von Harald Moyer. Wien, 1980. Print.
Cuomo, Glenn R. Ed. National Socialist Cultural Policy. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1995. Print.
Dambdck, Thomas. Die Organisation der Kulturkontrolle im Dritten Reich. Diplomarbeit. Universitat Wien. 1988. Print. de la Grange, Henry-Louis. Wien: Eine Musikgeschichte. Trans, from French by Christina Mansfeld. Frankfurt an Main: Insel Verlag, 1995. Print.
Die Mozartwoche des deutschen Reiches in Wien vom 28. November bis 5. Dezember 1941. Published by the Biiro der Mozartwoche des Deutschen Reiches, 1941. Print. The program is available in the Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1940/41. 33. Print. It is also available electronically on the Internet at USMBOOKS.com. Web. 20 May 2011.
Eichler, Jeremy. "Music buried by the Nazis but reborn as Memorials." 2005. New York Times. 9/19/2005. Web. 5 Mar 2012.
Eichstadt, Ulrich. Von Dollfuss zu Hitler: Geschichte des Anschlusses Osterreichs, 1933- 1938. Band 10. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1955. Print.
Endler, Franz. Musik in Wien—Musik aus Wien. Eine kleine Wiener Musikgeschichte. Wien: Osterreichischer Bundesverlag Gesellschaft m.b.H., 1985. Print.
Evans, Richard J. The Coming of the Third Reich. New York: The Penguin Press, 2004. Print.
Feinstein, Margarete Myers. Rev. of Music and Nazism: Art under Tyranny, 1933-1934. by Michael H. Kater and Albtrecht Riethmiiller. Central European History. 2003: 163-65. Print.
Finscher, Ludwig. Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Allgemeine Enzyklop&die der Musik—Begriindet von Friedrich Blume. Sachteil 7. Stuttgart: B&renreiter, 1997. Print. 134
Fischer, Heinz. "Holocaust: Austrian President Says Official Document Whitewashes Nazi-Era Collaboration." 2006. Israel Insider. Web. 31 Jan 2012.
Fischer, Klaus P. Nazi Germany: A New History. New York: Continuum, 1995. Print.
Flotzinger, Rudolf. Geschichte der Musik in Osterreich: Zum Lesen und Nachschlagen. Wien: Styria, 1988. Print.
Form, Wolfgang and Oliver Uthe. NS-Justiz in Osterreich: Lage und Reiseberichte 1938- 1945. Schriftenreihe des Dokumentationarchivs des osterreichischen Widerstandes zu Widerstand, NS-Verfolgung undNachkriegsaspekten. Band 3. Wien: Oct, 2004. Print.
Franz Schmidt Gesellschaft. Web. 1 Dec. 2011.
FriedlMnder, Saul. Nazi Germany and the Jews. Volume 1. The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939. New York: Harper Collins, 1997. Print.
Fulbrook, Mary. A Concise History of Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Print.
Gaich, Petra. Neue Musik im Wiener Konzerthaus in der Ara Seefehlner. Diplomarbeit. Universitat Wien, 1998. Print.
Gal, Hans. The Golden Age of Vienna. London: M. Pairish, 1948. Print.
Gartenberg, Egon. Vienna—its Musical Heritage. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press-Heritage Printers, 1968. Print.
Gavin, Philip. "The Rise of Adolph Hitler: From Unknown to Dictator of Germany." The History Place. 10/26/2006. Web. 5 Mar 2012.
Geiringer, Karl with Bernice Geiringer. This I Remember. Wien: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde Archiv, 1987. Print
Geissmar, Berta. Two Worlds of Music. New York: Da Capo Press, 1975. Rpt. of The Baton and the Bootjack. New York: Creative Age Press, 1946. Print.
Gellately, Robert. Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Print.
Gillis, Daniel. Furtwangler in America. New York: Maryland Books, 1970. Print. 135
Goldsmith, Martin. "The Inextinguishable Symphony." 2000. John Wiley & Sons. 9/19/2005. Web. 9 Feb 2012..
Graf, Max. Die Wiener Oper. Wien: Humboldt, 1955. Print.
—. Legend of a Musical City. New York: Philosophical Library, 1945. Print.
Grasberger, Franz, Lothar Knessel and Hanne Lacchini. Hundert Jahre Goldener Saal. Das Haus der Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde am Karlsplatz. Statistik: Konzerte im grofien Saal 1870-1970. Wien: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde, 1970. Print.
Grimm, Margarethe. Massenpsychologie und Propaganda im Dritten Reich. Diss. Universitat Wien, 1950. Print.
Grunberger, Richard. A Social History of the Third Reich. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971. Print.
Gulick, Charles Adams. Austria from Habsburg to Hitler. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1948. Print.
"Gustav Klimt: The Story of this Klimt Painting reads like a sweeping, romantic Epic of Loss and Redemption." 2007. Los Angeles County Museum of Art. Web. Oct 2008.
Hadamowsky, Franz. Klassiker der Wiener Kultur. Wien: Belaria-Verlag, 1947. Print.
Hamann, Brigitte. Hitler's Vienna: A Dictator's Apprentice. Trans.Thomas Thornton. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Print.
Hammerstingl, Werner. "Entartete Kunst." 1998. Web. 9 Feb 2012.
Harwood, Ronald. Taking Sides. 2004. Web. 7 Feb 2012.
Heister, Hanns- Werner and Hans-Gunter Klein, eds. Musik und Musikpolitik im faschistischen Deutschland. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984. Print.
Heller, Friedrich C., and Peter Revers. Das Wiener Komerthaus: Geschichte und Bedeutung. 1913-1983. Wien: im Selbstverlag der Wiener Konzerthausgesel1 schaft, 1983. Print. 136
Hellsberg, Clemens. Demokratie der Konige: Die Geschichte der Wiener Philharmoniker. Wien: Kremayr & Scheriau, 1992. Print.
—. "Riickblick - Ausblick": Musikbldtter: der Wiener Philharmoniker. 59. Jahrgang. Folge 10.Wien: Wiener Philharmoniker, 2006. Print.
—. "The History of the Wiener Philharmoniker." Web.10 Nov 2011.
Herf, Jeffrey. Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Print.
Hersh, Paul. "Two Worlds of Music: a Consideration." 2003. Web.Oct 2008.
Hilberg, Raul. The Destruction of the European Jews. Third Edition. Volume 1. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. Print.
Hirschfield, Robert. Geschichte der Gesellschafi der Musikfreunde in Wien. Abteilung 1870-1912. Wien: Herausgaben von der Direktion der K.K. Gesellschafi der Musikfreunde Wien, 1912. Print.
Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Trans. Ralph Manheim. London: Hutchinson, 1983. Print.
Hoffmann, Peter. The History of the German Resistance 1933-1945. Trans. Richard Barry. London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1970. Print.
H6gler, Fritz. Geschichte der Musik: von der Wiener Klassik bis zur Gegenwart. Wien: Osterreichische Bundesverlag, 1949. Print.
Hopfher, Rudolph. A Stroll through the History of Austrian Music. No.l. January-March 1996. Wien: 1996.15-21. Print.
Housden, Martyn. Resistance and Conformity in the Third Reich. London: Routledge, 1997. Print.
Hovorka, Nikolaus. Der Kampf um die geistige Wiedergeburt Osterreichs: Vortrag, gehalten im Wiener Konzerthaus am 26. Janner 1946. Wien: Stern-Verlag, 1946. Print.
Huener, Jonathon and Francis R. Nicosia, eds. The Arts in Nazi Germany: Continuity, Conformity, Change. New York: Berghahn Books, 2006. Print
Jenks, William Alexander. Vienna and the Young Hitler. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. Print. 137
Jerger, Wilhelm. Die Wiener Philharmoniker: Erbe und Sendung. Wien: Wiener Verlagsgesellschaft m.b.H., 1942. Print.
Jones, J. Sydney. Hitler in Vienna: 1907-1913. New York: Stein and Day, 1983. Print.
Karbach, Oscar. "The Founder of Modern Political Anti-Semitism: Georg von Schfinerer." Jewish Social Studies. Vol.7. No.l. Jan. 1945. Web. 29 Jan. 2012.
Kater, Michael H. —. The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983. Print.
—. The Twisted Muse: Musicians and Their Music in the Third Reich. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Print.
—. Composers of the Nazi Era: Eight Portraits. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Print.
Kater, Michael H., and Albrecht Riethmiiller, eds. Music and Nazism: Art under Tyranny, 1933-1945. Laaber, Germany: Laaber-Verlag. 2003. Print.
Kershaw, Ian. Hitler. New York: Longman, 1991. Print.
—. The Nazi Dictatorship; Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation. London: Edward Arnold, 1993. Print.
—. Hitler: 1889-1936: Hubris. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999. Print.
Keyserlingk, Robert H. "The Moscow Declaration on Austria, 30 October 1943 - Dokument I." Die Dokumente sind abgedruckt in: Robert H. Keyserlingk, 1 November 1943: Die Moskauer Deklaration - Die Alliierten, Osterreich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, in M.Gehler/R. Steininger (Hrsg). Osterreich im 20. Jahrhundert. Ein Studienbuch in zwei BSnden. Vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zur Gegenwart (Bdhlau-Studien-Bficher. Grundlagen des Studiums), Wien- Kdln-Weimar: 1997, S. 34 - 36. Kingston-Montreal, 1988 p. 207 f. Web. 5 Feb 2012.
Kindermann, Gottfried Karl. Hitler's Defeat in Austria, 1933-1934: Europe's First Containment of Nazi Expansionism. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1988. Print.
Klahr, Alfred. "Heidemarie Uhl: die Moskauer Deklaration und der Umgang Osterreichs mit der Opfer-These." 2003 Symposium der Alfred Klahr Gesellschaft "60 Jahre Moskauer Delkaration" am 25. Oktober 2003 in Wien. Web. 7 Feb 2012.
Klein, Franz. Geschichte des Orchestervereins der Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde von 1859-1934: zur Feier seines 75jahrigen Bestandes. Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde. Print.
Knight, Robert. "Austria and Nazism: Owning up to the Past." 2003. BBC History. Web. 20 Mar 2012.
Kommentierte Filmdokumente zum Anschlussjahr. Ostmark Wochenschau. 1938. Filmarchiv Austria, 2008. DVD.
Korstvedt, Benjamin M. Rev. of Musikbolschewismus: Die Politisierung der Musik in Deutschland, by John Eckhard and Music in the Third Reich, by Erik Levi. The Journal of Modern History. 70.1 1998: 247-49. Print.
Kralik, Heinrich. Die Wiener Philharmoniker, Monographie eines Orchesters. Wien: W. Frick, 1938. Print.
—. Das Buch der Musikfreunde. Wien: Amalthea Verlag. 1951. Print.
—. Das grosse Orchester: Die Wiener Philharmoniker und ihre Dirigenten. Wien: W. Frick, 1952. Print.
Kraus, Ernst. Stenographisches Protokoll der ordentlichen Versammlung der Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien: 16. Dezember 1937. Wien: Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde Wien, 1937. Print.
Krenek, Ernst. Musikleben in Wien. Ziirich: Verlag Gebr. Hug & Co., 1935. Print.
Krones, Hartmut. "Die Konzertpolitik der Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien in den Jahren 1938 bis 1945." Die Wiener Schule und das Hakenkreuz. Studien zur Wertungsforschung. Band 22. Wien: Otto Kolleritsch, 1990.188-201. Print.
"Kurt Josef Waldheim Biography." Journal of Life. 7, 8. Web. 31 Jan 2012.
"Kurt Waldheim dies at 88; ex UN Chief hid Nazi past." New York Times. 2007/06/14. Web. 31 Jan 2012.
Kurtz, Birgit Christine. Neue Musik im Nationalsozialismus anhandvon Konzerten im Wiener Konzerthaus. Diplomarbeit. UniversitSt Wien, 2001. Print. 139
Lafite, Carl und Hedwig Kraus. Geschichte der Musikfreunde in Wien 1912-1937. Wien: Adolf Holzhausens Nachfolger in Wien, 1937. Print.
Lebow, Richard Ned, Wulf Kansteiner and Claudio Fogu, eds. The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe. Durham and London: Duke University, 2006. Print.
Lebrecht, Norman. The Maestro Myth: Great Conductors in Pursuit of Power. New York: Birch Lane Press, 1991. Print.
—. "Power of Song." 2004. The Lebrecht Weekly. Web. 4 Jan 2012.
—. "Karl Amadeus Hartman—One Good German." 2005. The Lebrecht Weekly. 1/29/2006. Web. 15 Feb 2012.
Lessing, Erich and Franz Endler. Der Wiener Musikverein. Wien: Edition Wien. 1987. Print.
Levi, Erik. Music in the Third Reich. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. Print.
Levi, Primo. The Drowned and the Saved. Trans. Raymond Rosenthal. New York: Summit, 1986. Print.
Ley, Robert. Ed. Translation of Document 1708-PS. Central Publishing House of the N.S.D.A.P. "The 25 Points 1920: An Early Nazi Program" 2003. Modern History Sourcebook. Web. 7 Nov 2011.
Loomis, George W. "Before the Nightmare." Opera News 60. January 20 (1996): 16-19. Print.
MacMillan, Margaret. Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World. New York: Random House, 2002. Print.
Manoschek, Walter, Giinther Sandner and Birgitt Haller. "Geschichte und Vergangenheitspolitik in Osterreich." 2002. Web. Oct 2008.
Marchand, Suzanne. "Nazi Culture: Banality or Barbarism." The Journal of Modern History. 70.1 (1998): 108-18. Print.
Maser, Werner. Hitler's Mein Kampf: An Analysis. Trans. R.H. Barry. London: Faber and Faber, 1970. Print.
Matejka, Viktor. Widerstand istalles. Wien: LScker-Verlag, 1984. Print. 140
McKale, Donald. The Nazi Party Courts: Hitler's Management of Conflict in his Movement. 1921-1945. Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1974. Print.
Meissner, Margit " Justice and Accountability in the Face of Genocide - what have we learned?Why we remember the Holocaust." National Days of Remembrance. May 1-8, 2011.Web. 9 Sep 2011.
Meyer, Michael. The Politics of Music in the Third Reich. New York: Peter Lang, 1993. Print.
Micklethwait, Brian. "On what Hitler did to Classical Music by loving it" 2004. Web. 8 Feb 2012.
Millich, Manuella. Publizistischer Widerstand im Wiener Raum in der Zeit 1938 -1945. Diplomarbeit. Univeristat Wien. 1993. Print.
Mitringer, Hedwig. "Das Archiv der Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien." Wien: Osterreichische Musikzeitschrift. Register 1970.25. Jahrgang 1970. 317-319. Print.
Mittag, Erwin. A us der Geschichte der Wiener Philharmoniker. Wien: Wiener Philharmoniker: Gerlach & Wiedling, 1950. Print.
—. The Vienna Philharmonic. Published for the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra. 1950. Print.
Mohs, Wolfgang. Verboten und verbannt: Komponisten und Interpreten im Dritten Reich. Wien: Motivgruppe V, 1996. Print.
Mommsen, Hans. Ed. The Third Reich between Vision and Reality: New Perspectives on German History 1918-1945.2001: Oxford, 2001. Print.
Monod, David Settling Scores: German Music, Denazification, & the Americans, 1945- 1953. Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 2005. Print.
"Nazi Approved Music." A Teacher's Guide to the Holocaust. 2004. University of South Florida. Web. 7 Nov 2011.
Neumann, Klaus. Shifting Memories. The Nazi Past in the New Germany. Ann Arbor: University Press, 2003. Print. 141
Niven, Bill. Facing the Nazi Past. United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich. London: Routledge, 2002. Print.
Oleksyn, Veronika. "Vienna woos Jews in Wake of Nazi Past." 2007. Washington Observer-Reporter. Web. Oct 2008.
Orlow, Dietrich. The History of the Nazi Party: 1919-1933. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1969. Print.
Osborne, William. "The Image of Purity .The Racial Ideology of the Vienna Philharmonic in Historical Perspective." 2005. Web. Oct 2008.
—. "The Special Characteristics of the Vienna Philharmonic's Racial Ideology." Web. 8 Feb 2012.
Pauley, Bruce E. Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis: A History of Austrian National Socialism. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981. Print.
Pelinka, Anton and Erika Weinzierl. Das grosse Tabu; Osterreichs Umgang mit seiner Vergangenheit. Wien: Verlag der Osterreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1987. Print.
Pohanka, Reinhard. Eine kurze Geschichte der Stadt Wien. Wien: Bohlau, 1998. Print.
Potter, Pamela M. —. "The Nazi Seizure of the Berlin Philharmonic, or the Decline of a Bourgeoisie Musical Institution." Ch. 3. 39. National Socialist Cultural Policy. Glenn R. Cuomo, Ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. Print.
—. "Musical Life in Berlin from Weimar to Hitler" Music and Nazism: Art under Tyranny 1933-1945.90. Michael H. Kater and Albrecht RiethmUller, eds. Laaber, Germany: Laaber-Verlag, 2003. Print
—. "Music in the Third Reich: The Complex Task of Germanization." Ch. 4. 86. The Arts in Germany: Continuity, Conformity, Change. Jonathon Huener and Francis R. Nicosia, eds. New York: Berghahn Books, 2006. Print.
Prammer, Barbara. "Keynote Speech by the President of the National Council of the Republic of Austria." London: 16 February, 2009. Web. 7 Nov 2011.
Prawy, Marcel. The Vienna Opera. Wien: Fritz Molden, 1969. 154. Print.
Prieberg, Fred K. Musik im NS-Staat. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH, 1982. Print. 142
Prieberg, Fred. K. —. Trial of Strength: Wilhelm Furtwdngler in the Third Reich. Trans. Christopher Dolan. Boston: Northwestern University Press, 1994. Print.
Rathkolb, Lydia. Musikkritik zwischen Kultur und Politik Eine Analyse von Kritiken und Printmedienberichterstattung iiber die Ara Karajan an der Wiener Staatsoper 1956-1964. Diss. Universitat Wien. 2002. Print.
Rathkolb, Oliver, Wolfgang Duchkowitsch and Fritz Hausjell. Die Veruntreute Wahrheit: Hitlers Propagandisten in Osterreich '38. Salzburg: Otto Muller, 1988. Print.
Rich, Norman. Hitler's War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1973. Print.
Ross, Alex. "Ghost Sonata: What Happened to German Music?" The New Yorker 2003. Print.
Rotter, Ingeborg. Der Einfluss der NS-Kulturpolitik auf der Wiener Staatsoper 1938- 1945. Diplomarbeit. Univeristat Wien. 2000. Print.
Sadie, Stanley. Ed. The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians. Second Edition. Volume 6. London: Macmillan, 2001. Print.
Sanchez Lansch, Enrique. The Reichsorchester: the Berlin Philharmoniker and the Third Reich. Lansch Arthaus Musik GMBH. Cat. No. NTSC 101 53.www.ARTHAUS- MUSIK.com. 2007. DVD.
Schlesinger, Robert. Gott sei mit unserm Fiihrer. Der Opernbetrieb im deutschen Faschismus. Wien: Ldcker Verlag, 1997. Print.
Scholl, Gundula. Strategien, Problematik und Trends der Kulturdjfentlichkeitsarbeit. Untersucht am Beispiel des Wiener Konzerthauses. Diplomarbeit. UniveristSt Wien, 1998. Print.
Schulze, Hagen. Germany: A New History. London: Harvard University Press, 1998. Print.
Schuschnigg, Kurt von. The Brutal Takeover. The Austrian Ex-Chancellor's Account of the Anschluss of Austria by Hitler. Trans, by Richard Barry New York: Atheneum, 1971. Print.
Schtitz, Franz. Die Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde von 1938 -1945. Ober Aufforderung 1950 an Dr. Mayr. Archiv: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde 1937 and 1938. Archiv. 15125/157. Wien: Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde, 1950. Print. 143
Skyllstad, Kjell. "Music and Ethnic Cleansing in Europe: Die Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts by I.H.S. Chamberlain." 2006 Web. Oct 2008.
Spielvogel, Jackson J. Hitler and Nazi Germany: A History. Upper Saddle Lake New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988. Print.
Spotts, Frederic. Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics. New York: The Overlook Press, 2002. Print.
Stark, Gary D., and Bede Karl Lackner, eds. Essays on Culture and Society in Modern Germany: Songs and Nazis: Political Music and Social Change in Twentieth- Century Germany. Arlington: University of Texas, 1982. Print.
Staudacher, Gudny. Musik als Instrument nationalsozialistischer Propaganda, untersucht und dargestellt am Beispiel der Musikberichterstattung in der Wiener Ausgabe des Vdlkischen Beobachters. Diss. Univeritfit Wien, 1987. Print.
Staudinger, Hans. The Inner Nazi: A Critical Analysis of Mein Kampf. Ed. Peter Rutkoff and William B. Scott. Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1981. Print.
Steiner, Herbert. Gestorbenfiir Osterreich: Widerstand gegen Hitler, eine Dokumentation. Wien: Europa Verlag, 1968. Print.
Strasser, Otto. ...unddafur wirdman noch bezahlt: Mein Leben mit den Wiener Philharmonikern. Wien: Paul Neff, 1974. Print.
Taylor, Ronald, ed. and Trans. Furtwangler on Music: Essays and Addresses. London: Scholar Press, 1991. Print.
Tolzmann, Don Heinrich. ed. Thomas Mann's Addresses Delivered at the Library of Congress. New German-American Studies Vol. 25. Germany: Peter Lang, 2003. Print.
Uhl, Heidemarie. Zwischen Versdhnung und Verstdrung: eine Kontroverse um Osterreichs historische Identitat fiinfzig Jahre nach dem Anschluss. Wien: Bohlau Verlag, 1992.
—. "Das 'erste Opfer.' Der osterreichische Opfermythos und seine Transformationen in der Zweiten Republik." Wien/Graz. 2001. Web. 3 Jan 2012.
Ullrich, Hermann. Fortschritt und Tradition: Zehn Jahre Musik in Wien. 1945-1955. Wien: Osterreichischer Bundesverlag fiir Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1956. Print. 144
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C. "Germany: Establishment of the Nazi Dictatorship." 2005. (1): 3. Web. 7 Nov. 2011.
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Washington, D.C. "Culture in the Third Reich." Web. 3 Jan 2012.
Urban-Fahr, Susan. "Germany, 'Historikerstreit' and the 'Goldhagen Debate.' " 2000. Nativ - A Journal of Politics and the Arts. Volume Thirteen. Number 4-5 (75-76). Web. Nov 2005.
U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C. "Austrian State Treaty - 1955." Web. 5 Mar 2012.
Valerian, Rudolf. Wiener Musik, ihr Wesen und Werden. 1947. Print. von Perger, Richard and Robert Hirschfield. Geschichte der K.K. Gesellschaft der Muishfreunde Wien: Herausgaben von der Direktion der K.K. Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien, 1912. Print.
Wagner, Dieter and Gerhard Tomkowitz. Anschluss: The Week Hitler Seized Vienna: Trans, by Geoffrey Strachan. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971. Original: Ein Volk. Ein Reich. Ein Fiihrer. Mtinchen: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1968. Print.
Walser, Harald. "Es klang wunderbar: Ganz judenrein." Die Presse Wien.
Warren, Ian B. "Throwing Off Germany's Imposed History: The Third Reich's Place in History—a Conversation with Professor Ernst Nolte." 1994. Journal of Historical Review. 11/5/2005. Web. 9 Feb 2012..
Welch, David. The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda. London: Routledge, 1993. Print.
Weyr, Thomas. The Setting of the Pearl: Vienna under Hitler. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.
Wistrich, Robert S. "Hermann Goering." Excerptedfrom Who's Who in Germany, Routledge. 1997. Jewish Virtual Library.
Witeschnik, Alexander. Musik aus Wien: Die Geschichte einer Weltbezauberung. Wien: Wiener Verlag, 1949. Print. 145
Wlasits, Paul M. and Ronny Dietrich. 75 Jahre Wiener Konzerthausgesellschaft 1913- 1988. Festschrift. Wien: Wiener Konzerthausgesellschaft, 1988. Print.
Wolf, Franz Ferdinand. Ein Jahrhundert Osterreich 1900-2000. Wien: Verlag Holzhausen, 1999. Print.
Wulf, Joseph. Musik im Dritten Reich—Eine Dokumentation. Gtitersloh, Germany: Sigbert Mohn Verlag, 1963. Print.
Zentner, Christian. Heim ins Reich: der Anschluss Osterreichs. 1938. Mtinchen: Sfidwest Verlag, 1988. Print. APPENDIX A MUSIKVEREIN BUILDING
Concert Hall and Archive of the Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde
PHOTO: Peter Schramek - Musikverein Wien 147
APPENDIX B
Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde - Brochure
GESELLSCHAFT DER MUSIKFREUNDE IN W1EN ARCHIV - BIBLIOTHEK • SAMMLUNGEN A-1010 Win. BJheadorfwsraUe 12 Tekfoo; +431505868144 • "Weta: <43! 505 86 8166
Page 1 148
Archiv und Bibliothek der Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien, gegrUndet 1812, sind offentHcbe und jedermann zu Studienzwecken zugHngliche Privauaminlungcn. lm ange- schlossenen Museum werden fallweise Ausstellungen gc- zeigt. Im besonderen werden gesannneh: Musikautographe Briefe Musikdrucke (Original- and Erstausgaben wie Musica practica) Musikmanuskripte Musiktiteratur Musikzeitschriften und andere musikalische Periodika Verlags-, AntiquarUts- und Auktionskaialoge Libretti Programme (Konzerte, Oper, Theater) Partezettel Handschriftliche Musikerbiographien Dokumente Portraits Musik- und Instrumentendarstellungen Musikinstrumente Musikalische Erinnerungsgegenst&nde, Medaillen, BU- sten. Unter den Bestinden befinden sich zahlreiche Nachiflsse. Femer werden hier die Akten der Gesellschaft der Musik freunde in Wien und andere Unterlagen zu ihrer Ge- schichte verwahrt. Archiv und Bibiiothek sind nicht der internationalen Femleihe angeschlossen. Alle Materialien kOnnen nur im Lesesaal eingesehen. nicht aber auBer Haus emlehnt wer den. Der Lesesaal ist in den Monaten Oktober bis Juni Monug, Mittwoch und Freitag von 9.00 bis 13.00 Uhr zugsnglich; vom 24. Dezetnber bis 6. Jtnner sowie w«h- rend der Karwoche ist der Lesesaal geschlossen. Die Anfertigung von Mikrofilmen ist mdgbch. Sofern es sich nicht um Autographe handeh Oder sofern nicht dadurch der Einband besclildigt wOrde, kOnncn auch Photokopien an- gefertigt werden. Mikrofilme und Photokopien dtlrfen nur for persOnliche Studienzwedce verwendet und nicht an Drit- te weitergegeben werden. Auswftrtige BenUtzer erhalten er- betene Mikrofilme Oder Photokopien nach der Ausfertigung der Ublkhen Verpflichtungserkliningen, die von uns zu- gesandt werden. Geschlocsene Teilbestlnde - wie etwa Nachltsse, Proven ienzgruppen, Klassen oder dergleichen - kOnncn allerdings nicht kompiett verfilmt oder kopiert wer den. Femer ist die Anfertigung von ReproduktionsvoriagcJi,
Page 2 149
Papierbildem und Diapositiven m jeder gcwtlnsduen GrOBe und Ausfuhning mOglich. Ober Preise und Gebuh- rcn unterrichtet cine dgene Lisle- Den Bentttzem ist cs nichi gestattei, Archiv- oder Bibliotheksbestinde zu photo- graphieren. Das Archiv ist nach Klassen aufgestellt und dor Katalog nach diesen angelegt. Innerhalb elnes Komponisien sind die Katalogkaiten nach Klassen und innerhalb dieser nach Opus* oder Wcrkverzeichnisnummern geordnet; fehlen diese, so folgt die Oidnung innerhalb der Klassen numerisch den Signatures Die Signaturen sind a us einer rOmischen Ziffer (Klasscn- zuweisung) und einer arabiscben Ziffer (Einlauf- und ln> ventarnummer) zusanunengesetzt For einen Tei! der Be- sUnde gibt es auch eigene Standomignaturen (erVenntlich an der Kombi nation von Q oder H mil arabischen Ziffem). Die 1? Klassen sind wie folgt gegliedert: I Geistliche Musik II Musikdrucke des 16- und 17. Jahrhunderts III Oratorien, Kantaten und grofiere Vokalwerke ver- sehiedener Art IV Oper, Melodram V Chomtusik VI Lieder und mehrstimmigc Gesftnge, mit und ohne Beglcitung VII Musik far Tasteninstrumente (Klavier, Cembalo, Or gel), solistisch und konzertant (keine Kammer- musik) VIII Musik for Blasinstrumente (Harmonicmusik), Konzertc Air Blasinstrumente IX Stretcherkammermustk und Konzene for Streich- instrumente X Werke fur Harfe, Gitarre, Zither, Laute, Mandoline, Harmonika, Glockenspiel (auch mit anderen In- stnunenten, auch Konzertc) XI Gcmischte Kammermusfltbesetzungen (Tasten instrumente. Streichinstrumente. Blasinstrumente) XII Ouverturen XIII Symphonicn und verschiedene Orchcsterwerke. die nicht in anderen Klassen vertreten sind XIV Ballettmusik XV Tanzmusik XVI MiliUrmusik XVII Gesamtausgaben und musikalische Anthologien Instrumental- und Vokalschulen. Beispielsammlungen, GesangbOcher und Tabulaturen sind unter den BOchern
Page 3 150
(MusikKtcratur) katalogisiert. Dieser (Catalog ist ata Kreuz-Katalog angelegt. Die Katalogkaitei ist in fdgcodc Berekhe gegliedert: Musikdrucke und Manuskripte Musikdrucke des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts Tfcschenpartituren Musikliteratur Libretti Vertags- und Antiquariatskataloge Ponraiu, Musik- und Instrumentendarsiellungen Musikinstrumeote Fttr alie anderen Sammelgebiete bestehcn Bandkataloge. Oberdics steben die b» um 1900 in Verwcndung gewcsenen Bandkataloge der einzelnen Klassen zur Einsicht zur Ver- fttgung. Die Einsichtnahine in die Katalogkaitei ist jcderaiana ge- stattet. For Auskttnfte stchen alle Mitartoeitcr des Archivs zui Vetfdgung. Benutzer mit einem grOBeren Arbeitsvor- haben werden gebeten, dieses und alle MOglichkeitcn einer zielfflhrenden Einsichtnahine in die Bestftnde mit dent Saounlungsleiter zu besprecben. Beztigjich der Zahl der zu bestellenden Werke oder Binde besteht keine Einschrinkung, doch werden nicht mehr als fUnf Signaturen giekfazeitig ausgegeben. Weilere ktanen miter dem Namen des Bentltzers bereitgelegt werden. Alle BenQtzer werden gebeten, einen Lichtbildausweb zu hin- terlegen. Mancbe Katalogkarten tragen in der linken und in der rech- ten oberen Ecke cine Signatur. Ftlr das Ausfllllen eines Be- stelischeincs genOgt die recbts oben angegebene Signatur (Standortnuouner). Bei Zitatcn in wissenschaftlichen Pu- blikationen oder Editkmen mOge erst die links oben ste- bende Signatur und danach in Klammer die aui der Kar- teikane rechts oben stehende Standortnununer angegeben werden. Mit der Eintragung in das BenUtzerbuch verpfliditei sich jeder Besucher, die Bcntttzungsbestimmungen einzubalten, Mikrofibne und Pbotokopien nicht an Drittc weiterzugcben oder zu vervielfxltigen, keinc Sammlungsbestlnde ohne Publikationsbewilligung zu edieren oder zu verOffentlichen und im gegebenen Fall die erbetcnen Belegexempiare bereit- zustellen.
Page 4 151
APPENDIX C
Concert Programs—GdMf 1937/38 to 1944/45 and 1950/51 ! 1 < i
X! 1 S3
E M if ill 1 is!Is ili.sl 4i *y> si*? i iiiifid % £3 III *1222 " llpp* m ill i§i Is§fos5o z s O3 3 a i i' illI1 I\
5a siDi •« * . •{. {s* ?_ As * I? 151 is |i I is. iialti Ijj in!11 «} ilii (j) Njui S i if | ililiSz is ir Is sSii l S& :q h ill III Isih Jsi:£z5 E«t«ssis Onfelis i s i 152
I?HIS
I i £ ' 5 s S gS I i i t i * = 3 i o 0 ii oH -X I 2
I !Ws is! ~twMiUlli i-til i=1 pl II «f isi| Mi a|i Ow : M:1 ^ fe ills. is Ha s II§5* HI °lii '<~l III:3s*i 9\ mm h ii i I]h i I if mk inm\ nil
SSI 9SI 157
IlipMiiiM i 5Nil 1 *8 Mil*5s s i "•tfs 3slilIsfeM>5 4 .s.is* 8 li y in i? h li L 15 llh |ih §1li §1Si Uli |1II h teiiiS i££g ?
"US5s3* ilii mnv mhm ivi i
8 8 » if f ? i i i i
3|I S3|?lHf 3* 5 ®B1P® 11 f! wliv rs^3ol iliiiiii *s | i uss si | HSg !, S? S \vml s f » !;iifz m*4 bZ« z > • o iliS1 2 it ? ii?
omgi Uh*»r ir!W?ih4? Ii
6SI 31. Okt. KAMMBRKONZBRT . BUCSBRVtRBINIOUNO PBR WIBNBR PHILHARMON9KBR MOZART - R. STRAUSS - SPOHR 10711. KONZBRTVBRBINIOUNO WIBNBR STAATSOPIRNCHOR - CLEMENS KRAUIS Dos. 9. Nov. KAMMBRMUSIKABBND - WOLFOANO SCHNBIDBRMAN-QUARfBTI wimn miiHAMONim i^>Hi-Bw NtMiom BEETHOVEN SCHUBERT .0«wng dtr GeUter AiHm Dinmli - Korl Ober den Woinrn* Ooorj Hoon Oram M in Ci-Dur 17. Nov. . WOiPOANO BCHNBIDBRHAN-QUABTBTT wii 25. Do*. 13/14. KONZBRTVBftRtNIOUNO WIWII STAATSOPBRNCHOR - CUMINS KRAUSS JAA. WIMBB PMtiHARMOMIKSR Ontfroto Ripperfe - latoo Wliler 21. Nov. UBDBRABSND MARTHA ROHS - Klovior i Viktor Oroof GLUCK - HANDEL - SCHUBERT - BRAHMS - WOLF * DVORAK - WIT2HH Von dMhdwr Seelo R. STRAUSS KONZBRTVBRBINIOUNO WNNBR STAATSOPBRNCHOR - CLBMBNS KRAUSS SKNOBRKNABBN VOM WIBNBRWALD - Bribe Bokyto - Blooo NIcoloH 2. DM. KAMMBRMU1KAMNP - WOiPOANO SCHNBtDBRHAN-QUARTBTT WIKNCR PHIiHARMONIKBR A«rton Be nolo - Or. AIM Noll MOZART - BRAHMS - SCHUBERT KODAIY To Dewm W. JIKOER Hymnon on don Horrn 3. DM. OROBUCONZBRT FRANZ SCHUTZ Ein VolktoratoHwm nodi Twlon dwiHditr J. S. BACH Myifiktr (Erste voll*MndiQe AvrtfOhrung) 12. DM. MBDBRABBND BUSABBTH SCHWARZKOPP. Klovior. Viktor Oroof SCHUBERT - BEETHOVEN - REOER - WOLF
13. DM. UBOBIABBND IRMOARO S88FRIBD - Klovion Viktor Oroef AUSSBRORDBNTUCHB SYMPMONMKONZBBTB MOZART - SCHUBERT - WOLF - PFITZNER
26. DM. KAMMBRMUSIKABBND « WIBNBR KONZBRTMAUSQUARTBTT ORCHBSTBRVBRBIN DU OBSBLJLSCHAFT OBB MUSIKPRBUNDB SCHMIDT BEETHOVBN Eomont^wertwre ANTON KONRATH VTolinkonsert VIII. f ' ' 9. Jan. SONATBNABBND WOiPOANO SCHNBIDBRHAN - PRIBDRICH WUHRBR BEETHOVEN OBORO LUOWIO JOCHUM DBS OROSSDBUTSCHBN BUNDPUNKS 4. Jan. UBDBRAB8ND VIORICA URSUiBAC. Klovior s CT»noi Knwm YSERT VIII. SympHonle BRAHMS - MARX - WOLF - R. STRAUSS isassKNER IX. Bympftonio 21. Jan. KAMMBRMUSIKABBND - WOiPOANO SCHNBIOSRHAN-QUABTBVT 29 JU. WIBNBR PHIiHARMONIKBR JOSEPH KBILBBRTH HAYDN - MOZART - DVORAK MOZART Owvertwre sit .Die ZowberflAte* KlevioHtoniert KV 537 Sympbonie KV 543 1. Fob. KAMMBRMUSIKABBND - WIBNBR KONZEBTHAUSQUARTBTT WoHor BRAHMS - DVORAK W1LHBLM JBBOBB HAYDN Owvortwro D-Our Mwd Krendfcok 2. Fob. UBOBRABBND HBRBBBT AUKN - Klovior < liipiH Betdwlo Sywipbowlo No. 44 * Kerf OMborfor LIEDER. BALLADEN UNO ARIEN VONt _ Sinfonie eon coHon to B*Dvr SCHUBERT - WOLF - LOEWE - VERDI - REICHWEIN - ROSSINI MOZART Oroi tfewtMbe TBnse KV 405 Sywipbonlo KV9B4 14. Fob. KAMMBRMUSIKABWID • WOiPOANO SCHNBIDRRHAN-QUARTSTT HAYDN - BRUCKNER - SCHUBERT 15. Fob. KtAVtBRABSND WALTER PANHOFBB SOilSTBNKONZMtTB - KAMMBRMUSIKABMDfi SCHUBERT - BEETHOVEN - CHOPIN
4. Okt. SONATBNABSNO WOiPOANO SCHNBIOBRHAN - PRIBDRICH WUHRBR 21. M6rt UBDBRABBND IBMOABD SSCPRIBO - Klovion Viktor Oraof BRAHMS R. FRANZ - SCHUBERT - REOER - R. STRAUSS 12. Okt. KAMMBRMUSIKABBND WOiPOANO SCHN BIDBRHAN-QU ARTBTT 22. MOn KAMMBRMUSIKABBNO - WOiPOANO SCHNBIDBRHAN-QUARTBTT BEETHOVEN BEETHOVEN - BRAHMS 22. Okt. KLAVIBRABEND NURNtlCH WUHRBR 29. MArv SONATBNABBND WOiPOANO SCHNBIDBRHAN - PRIBDBICH WUHRBR SCHUBERT - BEETHOVEN - CHOPIN BEETHOVEN - SCHUMANN - ORIEO
as © On
WOOWP1 ilwio - ai«au«ci Mmy HDVS s r «M«tH mwia - hhwi AON 4«MWX •**•! |u«f s uittnbag tavaA WSl • NIHnNMf tOftHSA ONSSVNliVNOS1 Wl *ON •WUD* 19* AX Wuov»j|*•tuesduiAs 'A 18VZOW8ni13fllS 'AON U ®N •Wuo* mmn Mf •juo^dttiAs || NSAOHXiii IVil i'*» IC *®N •WW®* HDV1 S 7 6Mim»ttany j»uj* Mp|i( laAVS-nXSOSOSSOW •AON NWVI SIMiNflO aixiNotwms uniim - ioiovinvwoha moiuisi i««r c •nbijiajooj •(u£t4dtuA§ ZO(1S3fl *S/> HDVt S 7 •tuoijduiX$- , -|UA S3N5»Dnaa WIS'•*> iimi u*tAOix - Nimraw tonMSA onbsvnsivnos u twnt t Nvnmw '* uiniH I»INOMWJH SSNBIM NIWVS VIHiNflO lunf 1 sniMAZ-NvnravN wwwi^N—»»SH euo IIS - HW^ _... •MM| W»H - ^M«W4 M||