Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements / Daniel Byman
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Daniel Byman Peter Chalk Bruce Hoffman William Rosenau David Brannan Prepared for the Office of Transnational Issues National Security Research Division R Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The research described in this report was sponsored by the Office of Transnational Issues. The research was conducted through the International Security and Defense Policy Center (ISDPC) of RAND’s National Security Research Division (NSRD). Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Trends in outside support for insurgent movements / Daniel Byman ... [et al.]. p. cm. “MR-1405.” Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8330-3052-3 1. Insurgency. 2. World politics—1989– I. Byman, Daniel, 1967– JC328.5 .T74 2001 322.4'2—dc21 2001048219 RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND® is a registered trademark. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. Cover design by Maritta Tapanainen © Copyright 2001 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2001 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 201 North Craig Street, Suite 102, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] PREFACE This report assesses post–Cold War trends in external support for insurgent movements. It describes the frequency with which states, diasporas, refugees, and other non-state actors back guerrilla move- ments. It also assesses the motivations of these actors and which types of support matter most. The report concludes by assessing the implications for analysts of insurgent movements. This report’s findings should be of particular interest to the intelli- gence community, policy analysts, and scholars who seek to better understand the nature of insurgency in a post–Cold War era. This study should also be of interest to U.S. government policymakers concerned with adapting American foreign and defense policy to address the challenges posed by insurgent movements today and in the future. This research was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center (ISDPC) of RAND's National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis for a broad range of clients, including the U.S. Department of Defense, allied foreign governments, the intelligence community and foundations. iii CONTENTS Preface ......................................... iii Figure .......................................... ix Tables.......................................... xi Summary ....................................... xiii Acknowledgments................................. xxi Acronyms ....................................... xxiii Chapter One INTRODUCTION .............................. 1 What Is an Insurgency? .......................... 4 Methodology.................................. 6 Organization .................................. 8 Chapter Two STATE SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES .............. 9 State Support for Insurgencies in the 1990s: An Overview .............................. 9 Where State Support Occurs ...................... 17 State Supporters and the Democratic Republic of the Congo ................................ 18 The Benefits of State Support ..................... 20 Motivations of State Supporters .................... 23 Regional Influence ............................ 23 Destabilize Neighbors ......................... 32 Regime Change .............................. 33 Payback.................................... 34 v vi Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements Ensuring Influence Within the Opposition .......... 34 Internal Security ............................. 35 Prestige .................................... 36 Support Coreligionists ......................... 36 Support Co-Ethnics ........................... 37 Irredentism ................................. 38 Leftist Ideology .............................. 39 Plunder .................................... 39 Chapter Three DIASPORA SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES ........... 41 The LTTE and the Tamil Diaspora .................. 42 Publicity and Propaganda ...................... 43 Fundraising ................................. 49 Conclusion ................................. 54 Motivations for Diaspora Support .................. 55 Why Host Governments Do Not Block Diaspora Support .......................... 57 The Limited Range of Diaspora Support .............. 59 Chapter Four REFUGEE SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES ........... 61 The Taliban and Afghanistan’s Refugees ............. 62 Refugee Motivations ............................ 65 The Limited Range of Refugee Support .............. 67 Chapter Five OTHER NON-STATE SUPPORTERS OF INSURGENCIES ............................... 71 Liberia and the Creation of the RUF ................. 74 The Impact of NPFL External Activities .............. 77 Religious Leaders and Organizations ................ 79 Wealthy Individuals ............................ 80 Aid Agencies and Human Rights Groups ............. 80 Limits to Support .............................. 81 Chapter Six ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT ..... 83 Insurgent Requirements ......................... 83 Critical Forms of Support ........................ 84 Safe Haven and Transit ........................ 84 Financial Resources ........................... 87 Contents vii Political Support and Propaganda ................ 88 Direct Military Support ........................ 91 Valuable Forms of Support ....................... 92 Training ................................... 92 Weapons and Materiel ......................... 93 Minor Forms of Support ......................... 95 Fighters .................................... 95 Intelligence ................................. 97 Organizational Aid ............................ 98 Inspiration.................................. 99 The Costs of External Support ..................... 100 Chapter Seven IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF INSURGENCY ................................. 103 Moving Beyond the Cold War ..................... 103 Distinguishing Among Insurgency Stages ............. 104 The Importance of Passive Support ................. 106 Final Words .................................. 107 Appendix A. OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES, 1991–2000 ... 109 B. THE LTTE’S MILITARY-RELATED PROCUREMENT ..... 117 References ...................................... 123 FIGURE 7.1. A Comparison of External Actors’ Contributions .... 105 ix TABLES 2.1 Insurgencies and Their State Supporters (1991–2000)................................ 11 2.2 State Supporter Motivations ................... 24 4.1 Total Number of Refugees ..................... 62 5.1 Other Types of Non-State Support ............... 72 6.1 Insurgent Requirements ...................... 84 A.1 Outside Support for Insurgencies (1991–2000)................................ 110 xi SUMMARY State support or sponsorship of an insurgency as an instrument of foreign policy was common during the Cold War. The United States, the Soviet Union, and a host of regional powers backed their favored proxies, often transforming local quarrels into international contests. The end of the Cold War did not end the use of insurgents, but the dimensions and nature of outside aid and the identity of the providers have changed significantly. Hundreds of millions of dollars no longer regularly flow from Washington’s and Moscow’s coffers. Leading state sponsors today such as Iran, Rwanda, Angola, and Pakistan, for example, devote far smaller amounts of money and resources to their proxies. Indeed, state support is no longer the only, or necessarily the most important, game in town. Diasporas have played a particularly important role in sustaining several strong insurgencies. More rarely, refugees, guerrilla groups, or other types of non-state supporters play a significant role in creating or sustain- ing an insurgency, offering fighters, training, or other important forms of support. This report analyzes these changes in the nature of outside support for insurgencies starting with the end of the Cold War.1 It describes the nature and motivations of state backers and examines the role of diasporas, refugees, and other non-state supporters of insurgencies. The report concludes by assessing which forms of outside support ______________ 1A complete accounting, of course, would require a survey of Cold War insurgencies as well as those in the post–Cold War period, something we do not attempt in this report. However, we instead draw on secondary literature from the Cold War period to make many of our conclusions regarding comparisons of the two periods. xiii xiv Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements are most important and also offers implications for the analysis of insurgency today. STATE SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES State support has had a profound impact on the effectiveness of many rebel movements since the end of the Cold War. In Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, states have supported many insurgencies. Out of the 74 post–Cold War insurgencies surveyed, state support, we believe, played a major role in initiating, sustain- ing, bringing to victory,