When Land Powers Look Seaward by Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and Carnes Lord

When Land Powers Look Seaward By Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and Carnes Lord

A continental-to-maritime transformation has been attempted frequently through the ages, but only rarely with success. The past offers lessons to a navally expanding China.

18 • April 2011 www.usni.org s European naval powers decline rapidly and the mercial and anti-imperial attitudes were widespread among U.S. Navy diminishes quantitatively, China is the elite; a weak financial system hobbled naval construc- going to sea. This ends a great historical trend that tion and supply; and relations between the navy and the began six centuries ago, in which China withdrew army were consistently poor or nonexistent. Ainward and European naval expansion spread Western in- The French case may be particularly relevant to China. fluence worldwide. It suggests that internal consolidation is a prerequisite for Now, for the first time in history, a robust and enduring maritime focus. Like France, China enjoys good ports and debate pervades Beijing: Is China a continental power, a ready access to the sea, but also an inland capital and maritime power, or both? To what extent will its persist- a system of inland waterways that lessened the nation’s ing political and strategic geography and the continentalist dependence on seagoing commerce. Like France, China strategic culture it helped to form constrain its develop- has three relatively distinct maritime frontiers, and a his- ment as a maritime power? tory of suboptimal coordination between fleets stationed in each, facilitating defeat in battle. Both nations share a Historical Insights history of fitful naval development together with skepti- The ancient Persians lacked a maritime tradition, but cism or outright hostility toward naval power or maritime their leaders were open to new ideas. Initially viewing the expansion among important elements of their elites. The sea as a barrier, they came to see it most compelling explanation for that as a communications highway and Naval Operations of the continentalism: long-standing elite developed extensive naval experi- Ming Dynasty, 1360-1683 ence. By devoting major financial Imperial frontier resources, they were subsequently Imperial boundary able to build the first truly sub- Provincial boundary stantial navy in history. The scale Great Wall Early Ming frontier Canal and economic dynamism of these River Later Ming boundary efforts suggest parallels to China. Note: Imperial and provincial boundaries are approximations The Ottoman Empire had signifi- only, particularly in the northeast. 0 250 500 Sea of cant resources but also insuperable Japan Miles continentalist limitations. Ottoman Chen Xun’s land frontiers continued to pose Counter-piracy Operations (1406) a threat, consuming attention and LIAODONG BEIZHILI resources. Ottoman use of oared JAPAN Battle of Noryang galleys to transport ground forces Beijing KOREA (1598) Jinzhou was suitable for the Mediterranean, Dengzhou but not for the much larger and less Liaodong Grand Canal Haining land-constrained Indian Ocean. Un- Peninsula able to keep up with economic glo- SHANXI SHANDONG Yellow Hirado balization, the Ottomans forfeited Wei River Sea Nagasaki their chance to dominate the first Huang River HENAN Tanegashima global market. Chongming Battle of Nanjing As the center of naval competition Suzhou Shanghai Zheng Chenggong’s Lake Poyang Northern Offensive (1658-59) moved into the Atlantic and beyond (1363) NANZHILI Yangzi River Ningbo during the modern era, several major Ryukyu Islands Taizhou continental powers made earnest at- Battle of ZHEJIANG Counter-piracy East tempts at maritime transformation, Qutang Gorge Operations (1540-80s) (1371) JIANGXI China FUJIAN Sea with limited success. France, for ex- Yanping Zhu Yuanzhang’s Conquest ample, made four major attempts at HUGUANG Fuzhou of the Southeast Coast GUIZHOU Quanzhou Jilong (1367-68) maritime transformation and failed Zhangzhou Xiamen (Amoy) Fort Zeelandia/Anping each time. Weakness and disorga- GUANGXI GUANGDONG (1624-62) nization in the central government Xi RiverWuzhou Canton Shantou TAIWAN were chronic problems; anti-com- Battle of Penghu Lianzhou Macau (1683) PACIFIC By Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and Carnes Lord OCEAN national geographic Sino-Dutch War China’s emergence as a powerful maritime Sino-Portuguese War (1623-24) Leizhou (1521-22) entity is, in fact, a re-emergence. Decades Gulf of Tonkin before the explorations of Columbus, 15th- HAINAN Lingayen PHILIPPINES century Admiral Zheng He commanded South Gulf the largest wooden ships in history on Annam Invasion China Manila-Lin Feng Affair far-ranging voyages for the greater glory of (1406) Sea (1574-75)

Ming emperors. All maps kelly erlinger

www.usni.org PROCEEDINGS • 19 preoccupation with threats to—or opportunities afforded the Strait of Malacca across the Indian Ocean to the Persian by—the land frontier. Gulf and East Africa. But Zheng’s costly voyages brought Imperial Germany’s access to the oceans was handi- few tangible benefits to the empire, the imperial bureau- capped by chokepoints controlled by unfriendly powers. cracy opposed them as risky and wasteful, and he made Unlike Russia, Germany overextended itself by attempting just one voyage after Emperor Yongle’s death. to use naval transformation to obviate, not complement, In the 1500s, harsh but unevenly enforced imperial edicts land power. The navy simply could not compensate for discouraged long-distance maritime commerce and drove Germany’s two-front continental challenge. Chinese and foreign merchants into piracy. Though still a for- The German case has several parallels to China, and one midable sea power in aggregate capabilities and trade, Ming major difference. Both had ancient maritime traditions, but China lost its lead in nautical technology and took years to were geopolitical latecomers. Both used comprehensive rescind prohibitions and dissipate piracy along its own coast, (economic, technological, and educational) means to assist which flourished during the Wokou Raids of the 1540s–80s. maritime transformation. At the center was government-led Qing China’s (1644–1912) geostrategic orientation was industrialization supported by a capitalist maritime econ- the subject of major debate between Li Hongzhang, head omy. But thus far, drawing in part on historical lessons, of the Beiyang Navy; and Zuo Zongtang, leader of the China has avoided precipitating disastrous great-power war. expeditionary force to recover Xinjiang. The Qing chose land power, and both General Li and the nation suffered China’s Experience the consequences. Historians have exaggerated Chi- nese neglect of the sea. The South- Naval Operations in and ern Song Dynasty (1127–1279) had ZHILI SHENGJING Around Qing China Dagu Repulse Hangzhou, a seaport on the Yangtze (1859) River, as its capital. Large shipyards Provincial boundary Great Wall KOREA supported a significant naval force, Canal Beijing Dalian which the Mongols inherited when River Port Arthur Tianjin Battle of the Yalu their Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) 0 125 250 Weihai (1894) overthrew the Song. The Mongols Miles Yantai Japanese Seizure launched (albeit unsuccessfully) the of Weihai Qingdao (1895) largest amphibious operations of the SHANXI SHANDONG Middle Ages—against Japan, Viet- Japanese Seizure Wei River of Port Arthur nam, and Java. In the 1300s, the Chi- (1894) nese made cutting-edge innovations Grand Canal Yellow Sea JIANGSU in shipbuilding and naval armaments, Huang River and invented the magnetic compass. SHAANXI HENAN Yangzi Campaign (1841-42) The Ming Dynasty had a strong Huai River Nanjing naval element from start to finish. It Shanghai ANHUI first established itself by defeating HUBEI Hangzhou East China Sea its rivals in southern China largely Yangzi River Ningbo Wuhan through the use of naval power. ZHEJIANG Taizhou French Blockade Larger than all but a few sea bat- Wenzhou of Taiwan tles in history, the decisive battle (1884-85) JIANGXI French Halted of Lake Poyang in 1363 involved Near Danshui HUNAN (1884) hundreds of warships on both sides. Fuzhou The peak of Ming maritime ac- French Occupation GUIZHOU of Jilong (1884) complishment came with the seven Quanzhou Danshui Jilong voyages of eunuch admiral Zheng Xiamen (Amoy) Luermen Landing He (1405–33). Supported by Em- GUANGDONG (1661) Shantou peror Yongle, Zheng commanded GUANGXI Guangzhou Zeelandia/Tainan (Canton) expeditions of hundreds of ships Penghu Captured by Zeng Chenggong (1662) and tens of thousands of men on MACAU HONG KONG French Seizure history’s largest wooden ships, some Battle of Penghu of Penghu (1885) perhaps more than 440 feet long (1683) Hanoi Leizhou Bay Japanese Annexation and displacing 20,000 tons. These Leizhou of Penghu and Taiwan Bombardment Island (1895-1945) voyages nurtured trade, (re)opened of Canton relations with tributary kingdoms, Qiongzhou (1857) Battle of Chuanbi HAINAN (1839) demonstrated hard and soft power, South PHILIPPINES and brought the Ming flag through China Sea

20 • April 2011 www.usni.org In addition to existing internal political problems, the ally from scratch was only possible with technical assis- Qing were suddenly confronted with the threat of rising tance provided by the Soviet Union, which ended in 1960. British, French, and Japanese naval power in Asia. Qing It became clear in the course of the 1960s that the great- China proved incapable of meeting the maritime challenge est security threat to China was in fact that posed by the posed by the modern navies of the Western powers. In the Soviet Union itself. In 1969, the two nuclear-armed com- First Opium War (1839–42), a British fleet penetrating to munist powers carried on a series of border skirmishes in the heart of China’s riverine network threatened to shut Siberia that might well have sparked a larger conflict (the down the country’s internal commerce, thus forcing the Soviets at this time appear to have contemplated a preemp- regime to sue for peace; Britain acquired Hong Kong. tive attack on China’s nuclear forces and facilities). By the The Qing eventually purchased ships from abroad but end of the Cold War, both countries maintained substantial had neither the reliable infrastructure nor the professional conventional forces along their common border. Given navy to operate them effectively in battle, with disastrous the severe underdevelopment of the Chinese economy, results. In the 1880s, defeat of China’s nascent fleet at the China’s military resources were sharply constrained; and hands of the French sealed the end of its traditional influ- its ground forces had to be accorded top priority. ence in Indochina. By the last decade of the century, in A third factor was Beijing’s functional entente with the spite of their acquisition of significant naval capabilities, United States during this period, which may have allowed the Chinese proved no match for their rapidly modern- the People’s Republic to take a more relaxed view of the izing island neighbor and suffered humiliating defeat in not inconsiderable potential threat posed by the Soviet Navy the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, leading to the loss of in Asian waters than might otherwise have been the case. Taiwan and to a Japanese protectorate in Korea. Pressed by the Russians from the north as well as by the Turning a Corner at Last . . . Western maritime powers, the imperial court was forced Looking to the Deng era and beyond, then, is China to accede to rising demands for commercial and territorial finally overcoming its historical difficulties to achieve concessions. In 1905, China suffered terribly but without enduring maritime development? China’s commercial recourse as the Russo-Japanese War was waged on its maritime trajectory suggests that this may indeed be the land territory and in nearby waters, in part over access to case. It is led by an exceedingly dynamic commercial strategically located Port Arthur. maritime and shipbuilding sector, which is in turn creating All of these developments would fatally weaken the ample synergies for naval development—thereby offering foundations of the dynasty and indeed the legitimacy of a sound basis for transformation that was frequently lack- the empire itself. The fall of the Qing in 1911 led to a ing in other land powers that went to sea. long period of internal instability. Qing China’s maritime Unlike the shipbuilding industries of such land powers defeats thus stemmed from its failure to wholeheartedly as Germany and Russia, China’s is driven by the “pull” of embrace Western naval techniques following the first commercial interests rather than the “push” of the state. Opium War—in sharp contrast to its rival Japan. China is gradually surpassing South Korea as the world’s foremost shipbuilder in gross tonnage, and commands Land-Centric Cold War roughly 50 percent of the world market by that metric. During the Cold War, China’s naval development was But China is still far from emulating such great maritime constrained by U.S. dominance of maritime East Asia powers as the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the and later by internal policy debacles and deterioration of United States—all of which dominated all levels of com- relations with the Soviet Union. China’s navy primarily mercial shipbuilding in their rise to global power. To reach supported ground forces, and did not even have its own this level, China would have to increase not only its mar- strategy until around 1988. ket share, but also its personnel quality and innovation The outlook of Chinese Communist Party elites was ability—although the globalization of the shipbuilding in- formed by the experience of land warfare; few of the dustry offers new opportunities for technological progress. party’s leading commanders knew anything about naval For the first time in centuries, China is developing a truly warfare or the advanced technologies critical to modern operational modern navy, the product of three decades of naval (or air) combat. Though Mao Zedong initiated plans favorable conditions. With the end of the Cold War and the for an invasion of Taiwan in 1949–50, it was quickly dis- collapse of the Soviet Union, China no longer faced an exis- covered that this lay well beyond the current or foresee- tential threat on its inner Asian frontier. Instead, its primary able capabilities of the People’s Republic of China. security concerns were clearly in the process of shifting to Chinese involvement in the Korean War diverted re- the maritime domain. In the first instance, territorial dis- sources and the leadership’s attention to ground combat. putes in offshore waters with various regional states assumed The border war against India in 1962, in which the Chi- increasing salience, beginning with the PRC’s clash with nese performed well (but against an unprepared Indian Vietnam over the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea in Army in uniquely difficult terrain), was another example 1974. Second, the evolution of Taiwan’s domestic politics in of Maoist China’s continental focus. What progress Bei- a democratic direction was threatening to move the Republic jing was able to make in building up a modern navy virtu- of China away from its long-standing “One China” policy www.usni.org PROCEEDINGS • 21 toward de facto and even de jure independence. At the same ography matters—even amid technological advances. time, the apparent willingness of the United States to act as “Continentalist” powers have generally been disadvan- Taiwan’s protector, particularly during the 1995–96 Taiwan taged by their geographic situation. The more severely Strait Crisis, forced China to face the eventual prospect of disadvantaged powers have sometimes engaged in ambi- engaging the U.S. Navy in a conflict in East Asian waters. tious strategic projects designed to change the stubborn Finally, the rapid growth of China’s economy as a result of facts of geography in their favor (China built the Great the bold reforms instituted by Deng and pursued by his suc- Wall, the Grand Canal, and Three Gorges Dam, and is cessors made comprehensive modernization of China’s naval now constructing an oil pipeline through Burma). China forces a feasible objective of Chinese Communist military has reasonable ocean access in many respects, but retains policy for the first time ever. unsettled maritime claims with all its maritime neighbors. It remains hemmed in by “island chains” in the view of many of RUSSIA its strategic thinkers. Land bor- Lake Baikal ders represent a greater potential KAZAKHSTAN challenge. China has settled all save with India and Bhutan, but has fought substantial wars with MONGOLIA Changchun India and Vietnam, and could face KYRGYZSTAN future discord with Russia. At the Shenyang NORTH XINJIANG KOREA core of potential for continental- Beijing Chinese Line SOUTH ist distraction are ongoing ethnic of control Tianjin Bohai Sea er KOREA autonomy/separatist movements CHINA iv llow R Yellow in Xinjiang and Tibet. Indian claim Ye Sea Zhengzhou JAPAN Second, maritime transforma- Possible Indian line Nanjing tion is a difficult and treacher- Chinese East of control Wuhan Shanghai China NEP claims Chengdu Sea ous process that no modern land AL Lhasa . Chinese Nanchang power has fully accomplished. Claim INDIA Yangzi RiverChangsha YUKYU IS The opportunity costs are many, Fuzhou /R BHUTAN WA Guiyang A and the potential to unnerve other Kunming OKIN powers is great. The only cases China’s Territorial and Nanning MACAU DIAOYU/ TAIWAN SENKAKU in the entire historical record of Maritime Claims, c. 2011 SAR HONG IS. BURMA KONG SAR successful and enduring maritime China’s South China LAOS Haikou PHILIPPINES transformations are Persia and Sea Claim. There is HAINAN no consensus, even Rome. Even in those cases, how- XISHA/ in China, concerning THAILAND PARACEL IS. ever, the empires retained their the precise nature of South original continentalist imprint— this claim. China “once a land power, always a land CAMBODIA Sea Maritime Boundary VIETNAM power”—at least to some extent. Delimitation with Vietnam NANSHA/ SPRATLY IS. It would be difficult to argue that China’s East China Sea a maritime transformation was Continental Shelf Claim BRUNEI fully realized. The Persians never China’s 200NM Exclusive MALAYSIA INDONESIA really used their navy as an offen- Economic Zone Claim MALAYSIA sive instrument; rather, they spe- Disputed Status Note: Taiwan’s status is disputed. China claims the Bohai Sea as internal waters and has not published its maritime claims in 0 250 500 cialized in what today would be Disputed Territory relation to North Korea in the Yellow Sea. China also claims a Miles 200 NM exclusive economic zone from all its claimed territory. called joint maritime operations, in which their fleet provided lo- gistic support and flank protec- In the naval realm, China is becoming a regional naval tion for large Persian armies advancing along an enemy’s power with formidable anti-access capabilities. But it has coast. The Romans were also slow to establish permanent not yet invested the resources and manpower necessary fleets (this occurred only under the empire) and a regime to achieve high-end warfighting capabilities substantially of maritime policing; one result was the persistence of a beyond its immediate maritime periphery. This is still “a serious piracy threat in the western Mediterranean down tale of two navies.” to the first century B.C. Third, the geostrategic outlook of great powers is shaped Geography Lessons not only by geography proper but by economic factors. Studying the attempts of China and other continental The aggregate wealth created by natural resources and powers to go to sea offers enduring lessons. First, ge- production sustains a certain level of population, which (in

22 • April 2011 www.usni.org combination with financial resources and industrial tech- that expelled the Nationalists from all offshore islands save nology) translates into military capability. As the ancient Taiwan, the Penghus, Jinmen, and Mazu. Chinese short/ Persians were the first to demonstrate, large revenues can medium-range ballistic-missile development (e.g., of the buy large navies. China has the resources, and increasingly DF-21D antiship ballistic missile) represents in part an up- the technology, to make such an investment. Unlike the dated version of this approach—“using the land to control Soviet Union or other continentalist predecessors, China the sea.” China has ongoing limitations that give its naval truly has comprehensive national power, with a strong eco- development unique Chinese characteristics, but they are nomic component. Its measured, long-term approach to no longer fatal to it. Chinese naval warfare may look very naval development is economically rational. The question different from that of the United States, but may be no less is whether acquisition of such capabilities by China would successful when applied to China’s own situation. in fact be wise given other pressing demands as well as The experience of land powers that have previously at- possible adverse international repercussions. tempted to become sea powers has generally been nega- A fourth critical factor is a state’s strategic outlook. This tive. China is thus sailing into a strategic headwind. The is shaped by international and domestic considerations, very extent to which China should attempt such a trans- primarily regime survival. It is frequently difficult for formation remains under debate in Beijing. Yet China is states to balance and prioritize strategic objectives when clearly going to sea. It enjoys several advantages that its they pose multiple and potentially conflicting challenges. predecessors have generally lacked: In China’s case, an ongoing continentalist preoccupation • A robust maritime economy with internal stability is increasingly balanced by concern • A dynamic shipbuilding industry for economic development and great-power status to erase • Settled borders with nearly all its continental neigh- the “Century of Humiliation” and return China to its right- bors ful position. • A leadership that supports maritime development as a Fifth, leadership is perhaps the most critical factor en- natural phenomenon and does not attempt to “decree” it. abling (or frustrating) maritime transformations. It en- China has very likely turned the corner on a genuine abled Zheng He, and frustrated Qing reformers. Admiral maritime transformation. If that proves indeed to be the Liu Huaqing, with Deng’s support, directed a gradual but case, it would be a remarkable—if not singular—event limited rise in the PLA Navy’s status. China’s leadership in the history of the last two millennia. China will have clearly appreciates Alfed Thayer Mahan’s ideas concern- learned the lessons of history, but will not have been con- ing commerce protection and the importance of sea lines demned to repeat them. of communication. The overall climate of opinion in China today is more favorable to maritime transformation than Dr. Erickson, an associate professor in the Strategic Research Depart- at any time in its long history. But countervailing factors ment at the U.S. Naval War College and a founding member of the remain. department’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), may be accessed at www.andrewerickson.com. Unique Characteristics, Rare Transformation Dr. Goldstein is the founding director of CMSI and has worked in the Of- A successful transformation ultimately is shaped by naval fice of the Secretary of Defense. Goldstein and Erickson are co-editors of, and contributors to, the Naval Institute Press Studies in Chinese strategy and operational art. Continental powers typically Maritime Development series. cannot match maritime powers, and employ a different ap- Dr. Lord, professor of military and naval strategy at the Naval War Col- proach. The Ottomans used amphibious and littoral-war- lege, is director of the Naval War College Press and editor of the Naval fare operations to seize offshore islands in the Mediter- War College Review. This article draws on the three authors’ co-edited ranean. This parallels China’s own campaigns (1949–55) volume China Goes to Sea (Naval Institute Press, 2009).