No. 37 29 March 2012 Abkhazia South Ossetia caucasus Adjara analytical digest Nagorno- Karabakh resourcesecurityinstitute.org www.laender-analysen.de www.res.ethz.ch www.crrccenters.org THE FOREIGN POLICY OF AZERBAIJAN AND GEORGIA Special Editor: Lili Di Puppo ■■Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy: Seeking a Balance 2 By Rashad Shirinov, Baku ■■Georgia’s Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny 4 By Kornely Kakachia, Tbilisi ■■Georgian Foreign Policy: Holding the Line amid Uncertainty 8 By George Khelashvili, Tbilisi ■■OPINION POLL Georgian Public Opinion on the Country’s Foreign Policy 11 ■■CHRONICLE From 16 February to 26 March 14 Institute for European, Russian, Research Centre Center Caucasus Research German Association for and Eurasian Studies for East European Studies for Security Studies The George Washington Resource Centers East European Studies University of Bremen ETH Zurich University The Caucasus Analytical Digest is supported by: CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 37, 29 March 2012 2 Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy: Seeking a Balance By Rashad Shirinov, Baku Abstract Azerbaijan’s initial preference for the West has evolved into efforts to balance among the established democ- racies, Russia, and Iran. The growth of the country’s energy wealth has given the country’s elite greater con- fidence that they can pursue an independent foreign policy course. The most symbolic manifestation of this new policy was the decision to join the non-aligned movement. Introduction Thus, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, like that of many Last year Azerbaijan celebrated twenty years of indepen- countries, is tightly linked to its domestic context and dence. In 2012, the Azerbaijani people will mark twenty reflects the features of the political regime inside the years from the moment when the first (and probably the country. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is based therefore last) democratic elections of modern times took place on two issues: national interest and the interests of the in their country. Starting in 1993, Azerbaijan became ruling elite. Certainly, sometimes these two overlap and an authoritarian country with a powerful presidency succeed in working together. At the beginning of inde- at the top of the executive branch, which completely pendence, the ruling elite under Heydar Aliyev opted monopolizes power and blocks legislative and judicial for a pro-Western orientation (joining the NATO Part- independence. nership for Peace, Council of Europe and other Western In this overview I will provide a holistic picture of institutions). This stance promoted the broader national Azerbaijani foreign policy as run and advocated by the interest of European integration, while also providing government and also will describe different views from the ruling elite with useful Western and international inside society on what the government does. Also I will recognition as well as opportunities to realize economic explain the underpinnings of the state’s behavior vis-à- benefits from the production and sale of oil and natu- vis the rest of the world. My argument here is that it ral gas on global markets. The newly independent Azer- would be difficult to understand Azerbaijani foreign pol- baijani ruling elite had just left the cage of the Soviet icy and relations with other countries without taking Union, so it made sense for them to look to the West, into account the nature of the regime and the domestic which had always seemed attractive from the “prison of political context of the country. nations.” Energy contracts with big western companies provided the desired security for the regime and helped What Has Influenced Azerbaijan’s Relations to establish necessary networks. During these first years, with the West? Azerbaijan’s dependency on the West was visible in the Azerbaijan’s foreign policy throughout the last twenty behavior of the country’s leaders: they were very atten- years has gone through oscillations that can best be tive to everything spelled out in the West. Heydar Aliyev described as a “policy of balancing”, which reflects real- once joked that “the Politburo is in Washington now- ist as opposed to idealist stances. There was a short period adays.” The survival of the ruling elite was closely con- in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy (between 1992 and 1993) nected to its relations with Western powers interested when the new democratic leadership of the country based in oil and gas and Azerbaijan accepted without much its policies on extremely idealistic and nationalistic prin- discussion all the conventions, treaties and agreements ciples. The Popular Front government under Elchibey in order to become a well-mannered member of inter- emphasized Western integration at the expense of rela- national and, most importantly, Western institutions. tions with Russia and Iran. This was a foreign policy based In the 1990s Azerbaijan took seriously the obliga- on the ideals of anti-colonialism and ethnic brotherhood. tions it made to the Organization for Security and Coop- Russia and Iran were seen as two evil powers ready to eration in Europe (OSCE) and, later, the Council of encroach on Azerbaijan’s sovereignty at any moment. Europe (after 2001). Also, Heydar Aliyev and his estab- The defining feature of Azerbaijan’s foreign pol- lishment paid considerable attention to using the OSCE icy after 1993 was that it never took sharp turns. Its and CoE as international forums to promote the coun- steadiness reflected the fact that it expressed the will of try. The Lisbon Summit of the OSCE in December 1996 the same political force since 1993. However, with the was remarkable in this respect. The Azerbaijani govern- change from father to son (from Heydar Aliyev to Ilham ment managed to include in the resulting resolution a Aliyev) in 2003, we can see a different approach to for- clause which confirmed “Azerbaijan’s territorial integ- eign policy that will be examined later in this article. rity.” This success was widely celebrated by the govern- CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 37, 29 March 2012 3 ment and the local mass media promoted stories about cial from the European Commission said off-the-record, “the great victory of Azerbaijani diplomacy.” At the time, “the EU has no leverage on Azerbaijan, because the gov- the opposition criticized and ridiculed this exaggerated ernment of Azerbaijan is not in need of money as they feeling of self-importance. are in Georgia, Armenia or Ukraine. Thus, condition- ality is not working in relation to Azerbaijan.” “It’s All Our Domestic Issue” A turning point came when Azerbaijan’s ruling elite Russia and the “Hegemony of Culture” started to become more self-confident and more inde- After Azerbaijan started to benefit from the influx of pendent. The rule of Ilham Aliyev has brought a differ- oil revenues, it has moved closer to Russia in terms of ent logic into the management of the country and its its political culture. Russian understandings of “sover- foreign relations. As one observer correctly explained: eign” or “managed” democracy reflect the thinking of “Under Ilham Aliyev the country is run like a huge com- the Azerbaijani ruling elite in terms of its preference for pany. Heydar Aliyev was a statesman, Ilham Aliyev is avoiding any external interference into domestic issues a businessman. This is the biggest difference between based on “excuses of human rights and democracy.” policies before and after 2003.” Russia as the “other side of the balance” became more Heydar Aliyev was an old-time politician, who attractive vis-à-vis the West, although the Azerbaijani appreciated the political arena, enjoyed playing polit- establishment realizes that it cannot trust Russia. The ical games, and, most importantly, knew how to cali- Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008 confirmed brate political action to achieve the desired result. Ilham that these fears are legitimate. The Russian leadership Aliyev does not engage in political struggle; as a man of made it clear “who’s the boss in the Caucasus” and the business, he is more excited about profit, efficiency and Azerbaijani leadership did not make any statement in results. Under his rule, the authorities’ political restric- support of Georgia, although it allegedly tacitly sent tions and the changing economic situation effectively humanitarian support to its besieged neighbor. restrict opposition parties and civil society organizations. Another sign of Azerbaijani–Russian rapprochement The current government possesses huge energy resources was that both of President Aliev’s daughters married that it can use to mitigate any foreign or domestic risks. Russian businessmen of Azerbaijani origin and live in After 2003 the role of European institutions in Azer- Moscow. Some observers say that these family ties are a baijan’s foreign affairs decreased significantly. President factor that makes Azerbaijan vulnerable in its relation- Ilham Aliyev made it clear that “Europe does not wait ship vis-à-vis Moscow. for us with outstretched arms” and Azerbaijan’s entry into either the EU or NATO has never been a realis- Relations with the US tic possibility. Although the relations between the US and Azerbai- During this period, Baku was particularly dis- jan have been cold in recent years, the ruling elite in pleased with Western criticism of Azerbaijan’s poor Azerbaijan enjoys the current situation in which the human rights record, widespread corruption and lack US states its priorities for Azerbaijan as “energy, secu- of good governance. Sometimes the government became rity and development” in that particular order. As US paranoiac and blamed western governments for critical officials point out, development includes building insti- articles published in those countries’ newspapers. For tutions and improving governance. The rhetoric shows instance, the US came under attack by Azerbaijan’s offi- how policies have changed throughout the last decade cial, pro-governmental media after a Wall Street Jour- and how the current US administration prioritizes secu- nal article disclosed the existence of extremely expensive rity and energy over other issues.