The Covid-19 Pandemic and Conflict Dynamics in Syria
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NO. 21 MAY 2020 Introduction The Covid-19 Pandemic and Conflict Dynamics in Syria Neither a Turning Point Nor an Overall Determinant Muriel Asseburg, Hamidreza Azizi, Galip Dalay and Moritz Pieper Nine years into the (civil) war, Syria is in an extraordinarily poor position to confront the Covid-19 pandemic. Instead of the pandemic leading towards the uniting of local, regional, and international actors involved in Syria around a common purpose, con- flict dynamics have hampered an effective response to Covid-19. Yet, the pandemic is unlikely to become a decisive turning point in conflict dynamics or an overall deter- minant of its future trajectory. Rather, in the mid-term, the relevant actors are likely to continue to follow their strategic interests in Syria, while some will have to adjust their operational priorities, as well as the strategies to pursue them, against the back- drop of the pandemic. Cooperation among external actors in solving the conflict is not set to get any easier. Trends of destabilisation and erosion of state capacity in the war-torn country are also likely to continue. Europeans should prioritise helping fight the pandemic in all areas of Syria and re-engage in diplomacy aimed at conflict settlement and the prevention of military escalation among involved actors. At first glance, it seems as if Syria has not overall testing and the difficulties of con- been severely affected by the Covid-19 pan- fronting the pandemic and its fallout in the demic as of today. According to official war-torn and fragmented country. figures of the Syrian Ministry of Health, by 5 May 2020, there were 44 Syrians who had tested positive, 3 had died of the virus, and Pandemic Hits a Country in Crisis 27 had recovered. On 30 April, the Kurdish- dominated self-administration in the north- After nine years of (civil) war, Syria is in east of the country announced two more an extremely poor position to confront the cases; the oppositional Syrian Interim Gov- pandemic, putting Syrians at very high risk. ernment, nominally in control of the north- The country’s health system as well as the west, reported no infections until 3 May. energy, water, and sanitation infrastructure Yet, these numbers are unlikely to be reli- have been largely destroyed in nine years able indicators of the pandemic’s spread in of fighting, in particular in former and cur- Syria. Rather, they reflect the low level of rent rebel-held areas. The Syrian Arab Army and Russia’s air force have both deliberately Conflict Dynamics Impede targeted hospitals, clinics, and health work- Confronting Covid-19 Challenges ers. According to the UN, at the outbreak of the pandemic, only 57 hospitals and clinics Rather than the pandemic uniting local, were fully operational in Syria. In early regional, and international actors around March 2020, there were an estimated 325 a common purpose, conflict dynamics have ICUs with ventilators available throughout hampered an effective response to Covid- the country. These were distributed very 19. The fragmentation of territorial control unevenly, with some two-thirds in Damas- in Syria – between Damascus and its cus and the provinces of Latakia and Tar- backers (Russia, Iran, Iran-backed militias); tous, i.e. the regime heartlands, and none the Kurdish dominated self-administration in Deir ez-Zor. Even those hospitals and and its supporters (mainly a reduced num- clinics that are operational lack equipment, ber of US troops); Turkey and allied militias; trained personnel, and medicine. as well as the Syrian Salvation Government Also, against the backdrop of a severe linked to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an economic crisis in Syria – exacerbated al-Qaida offshoot of Salafist jihadis – and by the financial crisis in Lebanon – state continued conflict between the players revenues have been severely reduced, leav- have rendered a joint or coordinated ap- ing few resources for Damascus to upscale proach to Covid-19 impossible. Also, none health capacities and cushion the impact of the crucial external actors has changed of preventive measures on the population, course so as to allow for an effective tack- thus further increasing dependency on ling of the humanitarian needs resulting international humanitarian aid. With an from the pandemic. expected drop in the remittances on which In addition, interventions by international many Syrians depend and the impact of humanitarian actors have been severely lockdown measures, living conditions are hampered by the lack of access to territories set to worsen. Already before the epidemic outside the control of Damascus. This prob- hit the country, according to the UN, more lem has been compounded by restrictions than 80 per cent of the population was liv- on mobility imposed by Damascus and de ing below the poverty line, some 11 million facto authorities to contain the pandemic Syrians were receiving humanitarian assis- as well as by the closure of two border cross- tance, and some 8 million of them were ings (al-Ya’rubiya on the border with Iraq, dependent on food aid. al-Ramtha on the border with Jordan, both The risk of being affected by Covid-19 formerly used for international cross-border is highest for some 6 million internally dis- aid to circumvent Damascus) based on Secu- placed persons (IDPs), around 130,000 de- rity Council Resolution 2504 of January tainees in regime prisons, and tens of thou- 2020. It has also been magnified by inter- sands of suspected Islamic State (IS) fighters national actors such as the WHO relying and their families detained by the Kurdish- on Damascus as their main counterpart dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in addressing the Covid-19 challenge while in camps and detention facilities. Most of avoiding to deal with de facto authorities these vulnerable groups live in cramped in the north-west and north-east of the conditions that do not allow for social dis- country. The problem has been especially tancing, they lack access to health services, stark east of the Euphrates, where the WHO suffer from catastrophic hygienic condi- shunned contacts and refrained from aid tions, and often do not even have access to deliveries until mid-April 2020. What is clean water. A spread of the virus among more, Damascus and Ankara have both IDPs, prisoners, and detainees would be used the denial of access to north-east Syria next to impossible to contain and lead to for humanitarian actors and aid deliveries large numbers of fatalities. as a means of putting pressure on the Kurd- ish-dominated self-administration to, re- SWP Comment 21 May 2020 2 spectively, agree to a deal on terms set by (attempted) prison outbreaks, in particular Damascus or respect Turkey’s red lines. from the SDF’s detention facilities. Turkey has also repeatedly withheld drink- ing water to areas in the north-east. In the same vein, humanitarian access to the Covid-19 Impacts the Rukban Camp on the Jordanian border has Military Balance of Power been denied by Damascus (and by Russian troops stationed in the area) to increase the Actors involved in the Syrian conflict have pressure on US-backed rebels in the enclave been impacted differently by the pandemic, to surrender. In the wake of the pandemic, depending on how much they have been Jordan also no longer allows direct cross- afflicted by Covid-19, the repercussions on border aid deliveries to the camp. available resources (e.g. state revenues), and Measures adopted by local actors to con- the manner of involvement in the conflict tain the spread of the virus and prepare (e.g. reliance on ground troops vs. air force). for dealing with infections have also been The respective impacts have reflected on undermined by conflict dynamics. The actors’ military capabilities, and thus on the government of Syria and de facto authori- overall military power balance. In contrast, ties in other parts of the country have each the pandemic has not had a pacifying effect. adopted similar, yet uncoordinated meas- As a case in point, some observers have ures to prevent the spread of the pandemic, held that one effect of the pandemic is such as: a partial closure of borders, mob- that a cease-fire in Idlib province has lasted ility restrictions, curfews, the suspension of longer than originally expected. Yet, it seems non-essential economic activities, the intro- that the relative calm in the area agreed duction of part-time hours for the public upon is less a direct effect of involved actors sector, and the closure of schools and uni- adjusting to Covid-19 than an expression of versities. Two communities that turned out the main parties – in particular, Turkey, to be hotspots of infections (Manin and al- HTS, and Damascus and its backers – pre- Sayyada Zainab) have been quarantined to paring for the next round of fighting so as prevent the spread of the virus. Damascus to defend what each sees as vital interests. has also granted amnesty to criminals and The limited ceasefire arrangement agreed defectors (although to date no meaningful upon by Russia and Turkey on 5 March release of prisoners has been registered) and 2020 was to establish a secure corridor postponed parliamentary elections that had along the M4 motorway connecting Latakia been scheduled for mid-April. Damascus on the coast and Aleppo, Syria’s commer- and the SDF apparently have suspended cial centre. Although it stopped the regime’s military recruitment, and the SDF declared offensive aimed at re-conquering the whole a unilateral cease-fire. Yet, border closures of the former de-escalation zone, it did not and travel restrictions have been under- provide lasting arrangements for any of the mined by the continued movement of fight- points of contention.