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SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 704Th -. ., ~ United Nations SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 704th GENERAL MEETIMG (~\ ASSEMBLY Wednesday, 21 October 1970, ot 11 a.m . TWENTY-FIFTH SESSION ~._., ~ Official Records NEW YORK Chairman: Mr. Abdul Samad GHAUS 5. His delegation would support any draft resolution (Afghanistan). which could bring apartheid tc an end, for it was convinced that secufity could not be based on injustice and that enforced submission could not be called peace. AGENDA ITEM 34 6. Mr. VINCI (Italy) said that at the twenty-fifth session The policies of apartheid of the Government of the of the General Assembly the civilized wodd was once more Republic of South Africa: report of the Special Com­ viewing with concern one of the most flagrant violations of mittee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the fundamental principles of the Charter and the Universal the Republic of South Africa (continued) (A/8022 and Declaration of Human Rights, namely the policy of Add.1, A/8109, A/8117, A/SPC/L.181) apartheid. It was natural that a system as odious as apartheid was a source of indignation not only to the independent African States, which saw it as a direct affront, 1. Mr. ORTIZ (Ecuador) said that although apartheid was but also to the overwhelming majority of the States an anachronism, it persisted, despite the numerous deci­ Members of the United Nations. It was therefore all the sions and recommendations of the United Nations, because more important for the Organization to reaffirm i~s the West was giving the racist regime material support in the position on what was fundamentally a moral proble_m. H1s form of military aid and trade. Racial segregation had delegation had consistently condemned the pohcy of tormented the conscience of the United Nations, for it was apartheid from the outset, and had voted in favour . of an affront to human dignity which could lead to war in General Assembly resolution 1663 (XVI). since nothmg southern Africa. The gulf between the two ethnic groups could be more alien to the Italian people or more opposed was widening and the United Nations should take decisive to its culture which was based on humanism and the steps to remedy that sitmtion. equality of all men. 2. The apartheid system, which was indefensible on legal 7. That. extremely complicated situation could change or humanitarian grounds, could be described only as the only if the policy of apartheid were gradually replaced by a fruit of folly. It assured prosperity to the whites by dialogue between the various communities. As the Lusaka dispossessing and exploiting the Africans. The differences in Manifesto 1 emphasized, that could be achieved only by the wealth, income, education and legal status revealed the peoples of South Africa themselves. The duty of the United state of slavery in which the Coloured population of South Nations was to assist that process in all possible ways, Africa was kept by the contemptuous whites. whilst, however, upholding its commitment to peace. Ideas were always stronger than force in the end. and nothing 3. The peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations were could halt the historic process whereby the idea of the constantly being hampered by South Africa's defiance of equality of all men would prevail in South Africa, as General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. The elsewhere in the world. policy of apartheid and the arms build-up in S~uth A~rica were a threat to international peace and secunty. Umted 8. Since apartheid was essentially a moral problem, South Nations efforts to solve the problem were not commen­ Africa should be m~de to feel the full weight of the moral surate with the results obtained. South Africa had merely opinion of other societies. However tempting it might be to intensified its policy, with the backing of the major western isolate those responsible for the ugly practices of racic1 Powers which were more concerned with protecting their segregation, no channels of communication with South interests than with the miserable plight of millions of Africa should be closed; instead, opportunities should be human beings. Thus, twenty-five years after the founding of left open for reaching the majority of South Africans and the United Nations, the effective implementation of the making them realize that the United Nations strongly relevant resolutions, more particularly of General Assembly condemned the policy of apartheid and vigorously sup­ resolution 1761 (XVIII) and the resolutions adopted by the ported the rights and wishes of the African peop~e~. The Security Council in 1963 and 1964, was still a dim hope. report of the Special Committee on the Pohc1es of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South 4. His delegation was deeply concerned by the fact that Africa (A/8022 and Add.l) contained suggestions for the situation in South Africa was deteriorating, while the prestige of the United Nations was declining. Was a gigantic holocaust in South Africa the only way in which an end 1 Manifesto on Southern Africa, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African could be put to the system of apartheid? That must be Umty at its sixth ordinary session; for the text, see Offzcial Records avoided at all costs, for then mankind would be set on the of th~ General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes, agenda path of self-destruction. item 106, document A/7754. 71 AISPC!SR ?04 72 General Assembly -Twenty-fifth Session - Special Political Committee exlending and improving information activities and pro­ Secretary-General had replied to that question in the grammes for enlightening world public opinion and public introduction (A/800 1/ Add.1) to his report on the work of opinion in South Africa in particular. University exchanges the Organization, when he had said that it was with a heavy and contacts between the young people of South Africa heart that he must once again report that the efforts made and other countries would be particularly effective. His by the United Nations to solve the question of the policies delegation had made several suggestions to that effect in the of apartheid of the Government of South Africa had not past and specifically in 1967, 1968 and 1969. yet resulted in the elimination of this continuing affront to human dignity nor resulted in alleviating the situation 9. With 1egard to the economic sanctions advocated by the which still prevailed in southern Africa. majority of Member States, he recalled that Italy had contributed to a study on the feasibility and effectiveness 14. After pointing out that the record was discouraging, of sanctions, undertaken pursuant to Security Council he reviewed the measures adopted by the United Nations. resolution 191 (1964) and published as document S/6210 Over the years, the resolutions adopted by the United and Add.1.2 Sanctions and related measures were the Nations system had become more explicit and had paid prerogative of the Security Council and should be decided more attention to co-ordination and practicality; the on in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Pretoria reginte had been expelled from all the specialized Charter. Italy would, of course, abide by any decisions agencies; there had been wider dissemination of informa­ taken on those terms. In any case, apartheid would, in the tion denouncing the evils of apartheid, and anti-apartheid long run, prove incompatible with economic and social committees were creating difficulties for South Africa's development, even that of the dominant ethnic group, as partners, who were abetting its oppressive regime; support was shown by the frictions caused by the policy of of the legitimate struggle of the freedom fighters had apartheid in universities. unions and in the functioning of increased, giving encouragement to the oppressed peoples. the economy as a whole. Yet all those developments had only barely aroused in the racist criminals a vague feeling of being under siege. 10. Limited measures which would help to make the censure of the United Nations and of world public opinion 15. What were the actual results of all that activity? felt in South Africa might well be envisaged, such as the South Africa, outlawed by humanity, was devising new arms embargo recommended by the Security Council and repressive laws, applying its system more rigorously, inten­ reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 2624 (XXV). sifying its exactions, torture and murder, exporting its Italy had supported the operative parl of that resolution practices to the whole of southern Africa, training for and had faithfully implemented the relevant Security guerrilla warfare, filling its arsenals to the brim, increasing Council resolutions. the prosperity of its economy, buying the collusion of the great western Powers with high dividends. In other words it 1 I. In conclusJoii, he wished to reiterate that the United gave the impression of becoming a veritable fortress. Thus, Nations action against apartheid should be primarily moral the Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, had deemed it possible to in nature. Such action could be meaningful only if based on say that he had every reason to hope that there was growing an authentic unity of views. Thus, the decisions taken understanding of the pcsition adopted by South Africa and should not be open to equivocal interpretation nor to of its internal policy. far-reaching and justified reservations which detracted from their significance. The United Nations should help to make 16. What lessons could men of goodwill draw from such the full weight of international public opinion felt in South an analysis? The lack of progress was possibly ~ttributable Africa, thus opening the way to a peaceful change of policy to two factors: the intransigence of the Government of in that country.
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