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Botswana, REGIONAL and INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

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Botswana, REGIONAL and INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES Botswana, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES Most African countries achieved independence in the 1960s, but several Southern African countries, namely, Rhodesia, South Africa, South West Africa, Angola, and Mozambique, remained under colonial rule. The launching of a democratic South Africa in 1994 ended white settler domination in the region. In these countries, liberation movements emerged to fight for independence. Botswana became independent in 1966, and together with Zambia and Tanzania, played a crucial role in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. Botswana was a landlocked state surrounded by the racist settler regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa and she became embroiled in the conflict between these white racist regimes and the liberation movements. Botswana was caught in a dilemma, in that at independence, she was one of the poorest countries in the world and was heavily dependent on South Africa and Rhodesia. The geographical location of Botswana determined her foreign policy in the Southern African and international systems. In this section of the Struggles digital library, readers will find documents that deal with Botswana’s policy on refugees who fled political persecution in South Africa, Rhodesia, South West Africa, Angola, and Mozambique. Here, the Botswana government worked with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other nongovernmental organisations such as the World Council of Churches, World Food Programme, the Botswana Christian Council, and the Lutheran World Federation. Refugee centres were established at Francistown, Selibe Phikwe, and Dukwe in the mid 1970s. Botswana’s policy on the granting of refugee status and political asylum was conditional: asylum seekers were not to use the country as a conduit to attack their countries of origin. Botswana adopted an ‘open-door’ policy as a matter of principle and human rights and she adhered to the 1951 UN General Convention on Refugees, the 1967 UN Protocol for Refugees, and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention on Refugees to which she was signatory. Estimates put the number of refugees in Botswana at about 30 000 from 1976 to 1978. Some of these refugees were in transit to Zambia and Tanzania and the documents during this period provide lists of refugees who were airlifted to the north. Angolan refugees also entered the country starting in 1967 fleeing Portuguese persecution; they were settled at Etsha in northwestern Botswana. The largest contingent of refugees came from Rhodesia. Rhodesian refugees numbered close to 24 000, with an additional 2000 from South Africa. During the years of the liberation struggle, several refugees from the two countries were declared prohibited immigrants because they were considered a security risk to the country and they were deported to Zambia and other countries to the north. For instance, in 1972, about 16 Rhodesian refugees were deported for disobeying the laws of the country. Again in 1978, 1000 Patriotic Front fighters were rounded up and sent back to Zambia, and in 1979, 60 armed Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) combatants were arrested to avoid reprisals from the Smith regime. Botswana shouldered the costs of hosting the refugees in travelling expenses, medical care, education, and administering refugee centres. She was attacked by her powerful neighbours for allegedly harbouring ‘terrorists’. For instance, in February 1974, a South African refugee, Onkgopotse Tiro, was killed by a parcel bomb, and in 1974 and 1978, several Rhodesians were kidnapped by the Smith regime in its efforts to crack down on ZAPU fighters. Researchers will find documentation relating to Botswana’s dealings with the liberation movements of Southern Africa. These were the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the ZAPU, the United African National Council (UANC), and the Patriotic Front, all from Zimbabwe; the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) of South Africa; the South West Africa Peoples Organisation (SWAPO), the South West Africa National Union (SWANU); the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO); and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Botswana leaders met with leaders of UANC, ZANU, ZAPU, ANC, and PAC on numerous occasions and encouraged them to form a united front in the liberation struggle. Botswana urged ZANU and ZAPU to form a joint military command (JMC) to co-ordinate the struggle for liberation. Leaders of UANC, ZAPU, and ZANU visited Botswana to solicit support and brief the government on the progress of the struggle. Throughout the period, Botswana reiterated her policy of moral and diplomatic support for the liberation movements and urged them to rein in some of their people who wanted to wage armed struggle from Botswana. Together with leaders of Zambia and Tanzania, Botswana supported the formation of the Patriotic Front, which united ZAPU and ZANU. Botswana, together with Zambia and Tanzania, played a crucial role in the liberation of Southern Africa as members of the Frontline State (FLS). The FLS was formed in order to bring about majority rule in Southern Africa. It was formed during the period of ‘détente’ after the leaders of Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, and South Africa opted to negotiate for the independence of Zimbabwe and Namibia in order to prevent a full scale guerrilla war. The FLS encouraged the different liberation movements to accept a negotiated settlement. FLS leaders held several meetings after its inception and they worked toward the unification of liberation movements so that the latter would struggle for independence effectively, promote security and territorial integrity of the FLS, and assist the OAU in its efforts to liberate the remaining parts of Southern Africa still under colonial domination by liberating Zimbabwe, South West Africa, and South Africa and prevent a regional racial war. One major achievement of the FLS was the unification of ZAPU and ZANU combatants into the Zimbabwe Peoples Army (ZIPA) under joint command and the avoidance of war between the two liberation movements after independence was attained. Botswana endorsed the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto crafted by Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere to liberate Southern Africa. Botswana worked with other African countries in the Anglo-American negotiations and the Contact Group for the independence of Namibia. She participated as a member of the FLS at the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference of July 1979 and at the Lancaster House talks, which resulted in the independence of Zimbabwe. She also provided a forum for talks between the apartheid South African regime and independent African states on the liberation of Southern Africa. This is exemplified by her hosting of negotiations between the South African Premier P. W. Botha and President Kaunda in 1979. On the international front, Botswana offered moral and diplomatic support to the liberation movements of Southern Africa through continental and international organisations such as the OAU, the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), the Commonwealth, and the United Nations. In the 1970s, Botswana endorsed these organisation’s denunciation of apartheid South Africa and racist Rhodesia. In 1973, Botswana voted for a UN resolution that supported a legitimate liberation struggle against colonialism and racism by means including armed struggle. Although Botswana vociferously opposed Rhodesia and South Africa, she did not apply sanctions recommended by the OAU and the United Nations because of her geographical location, which made her dependent on the two for economic needs. In 1973, at the OAU council of ministers, Botswana did not vote for the OAU call for Arab countries to impose an oil embargo on South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese government in Mozambique because she depended on oil supplies from South Africa. In 1969, President Khama addressed the international community, starting with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in January, then the OAU, and finally the UN General Assembly. In his addresses, he called for international action against the racist Rhodesian regime to bring about majority rule. When the UN General Assembly voted in 1974 to exclude South Africa from UN membership, Botswana was among the majority in favour. Botswana used international bodies to lobby for a peaceful resolution of the racial conflict in Southern Africa and called on the international community to assist countries facing consequences of the liberation struggle. During the liberation struggle, Botswana continued to maintain strong economic ties with South Africa because of her dependent position. Periodically, she renegotiated the Customs Union Agreement (SACU) with South Africa and received a share of South Africa’s customs revenue. However, she continued to refuse to accept economic assistance or establish diplomatic relations. She accepted South African investment only because of the reality of the situation. Botswana criticised British’s and other Western countries’ arms sales to South Africa. She rejected dialogue with South Africa and criticised South Africa’s Bantustan policy. Certain individual Batswana and their families also played an important role in the liberation struggle. In 1963, the Kgaboesele family in the town of Lobatse accommodated Samora Machel on his way to Tanzania after fleeing from the Portuguese colonialists in Mozambique. Michael Dingake spent years in Robben Island for his political activism in the ANC. Klaas Motshidisi worked as a courier for South African refugees in transit to the north. There are many other unsung heroes whose contribution can be discovered from oral sources. Wazha G. Morapedi.
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