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Génocide Rwandais : Le Peuple Crie Justice !

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Génocide Rwandais : Le Peuple Crie Justice ! Génocide rwandais : Le peuple crie justice ! Mémorandum adressé au Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies Plaidoyer pour une enquête globale, objective et impartiale sur le génocide rwandais et ses conséquences : Résultats d'investigations menées par la Cellule de la Documentation & Sécurité du PARTENARIAT-INTWARI. Février 2008 1 Liste des abréviations et acronymes AFDL Alliance des Forces Démocratiques de Libération APR Armée Patriotique Rwandaise CDR Coalition pour la Défense de la République CVTD Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités DIR Dialogue Inter Rwandais DMI Directorate of Military Intelligence EAC East African Community ESO External Security Organisation FAR Forces Armées Rwandaises FDC Forces Démocratiques de changement FOCA Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi FPR Front patriotique rwandais GTBE Gouvernement de transition à base élargie ICN Intelligence communications network IRC International Rescue Committee ISO Internal Security Organization ITT International Telephone and Telegraph JDR Jeunesse démocratique rwandaise MDR Mouvement démocratique républicain MINUAR Mission des nations Unies au Rwanda MONUOR Mission d’observation des Nations Unies en Ouganda et au Rwanda MRND Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement NRM National Resistance Movement NRA National Resistance Army ONU Organisation des Nations Unies PDC Parti démocrate chrétien PL Parti Libéral PPU Presidential Protection Unit PSD Parti Social Démocrate RAGL Région de l’Afrique des Grands Lacs RDC République démocratique du Congo RDF Rwanda Defence Forces TIP Tutsi International Power SPLA Armée populaire de libération du Soudan UPDF Uganda Peoples Defence Force URSS Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques 2 1. Synthèse Un criminel de guerre promu «Héros» du Rwanda et de l'humanité! Le juge espagnol Fernando Andreu Merelles a lancé, mercredi 6 février 2008, des mandats d'arrêts à l'encontre de quarante hauts responsables de l'armée rwandaise pour actes de génocide, crimes de guerre et terrorisme1 commis au Rwanda et en République démocratique du Congo entre le 1er octobre 1990 et 2002. Le général Paul Kagame2, dont la responsabilité est désignée sans ambiguïté, est épargné, pour l'instant, en raison de son statut de chef d'Etat en exercice. A la faveur de sa victoire militaire sur les forces du régime Habyarimana et solidement soutenu par ses puissants parrains américains et anglais, le général Paul Kagame s'est imposé au peuple rwandais comme son « Sauveur » et son «Libérateur»! Le «Héros» partout célébré pour avoir arrêté un génocide pourtant entièrement consommé. Curieusement, l’article 14 de la Constitution rwandaise affirme en des termes clairs et précis que le génocide s’est étalé sur la période du 01 octobre 1990 au 31 décembre 1994 : «L'Etat, dans les limites de ses capacités, prend des mesures spéciales pour le bien-être des rescapés démunis à cause du génocide commis au Rwanda du 1er octobre 1990 au 31 décembre 1994, des personnes handicapées, des personnes sans ressources, des personnes âgées ainsi que d'autres personnes vulnérables». Comment, dans de telles conditions, ne pas se demander par quelle magie aucun membre Tutsi du FPR n’a jusqu'à ce jour été jugé, ni par le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda (TPIR) ni par les juridictions nationales rwandaises ou étrangères? Est-ce à dire qu'aucun d'entre eux n'ait trempé dans les crimes de guerre, crimes de viols, crimes de paix3, crimes contre l’humanité et crimes de génocide qui ont émaillé cette sombre période? Tout se déroule comme si au Rwanda la culpabilité et la justice devaient être à sens unique, la mémoire de la guerre et du génocide être sélective et exclusive. Le peuple rwandais est littéralement pris au piège de l’instrumentalisation du génocide des Tutsi. Ces derniers sont parfois considérés comme des «Juifs d’Afrique4» dans l'intention manifeste de prévenir la moindre tentative de «révisionnisme» susceptible de conduire à la relecture des événements tragiques survenus au Rwanda, une relecture qui, cependant, semble de plus en plus inéluctable. Tout se passe en effet comme si au Rwanda il n’y avait eu qu’une seule et unique partie belligérante, en l’occurrence celle où se retrouvent globalisés sans doute à tort tous les Hutu du Rwanda. On fait comme si les victimes étaient d'un seul camp, à savoir celui des 1 Au terme d’une enquête ouverte en 2005, l’Audience nationale, la plus haute instance de la Justice espagnole, vient d’annoncer la poursuite en justice pour « génocide, crimes contre l’humanité et terrorisme» de 40 hauts responsables militaires rwandais membres du FPR. 2 Libération du 09/02/2008. 3 Le Traité de paix d’Arusha signé le 04/08/1993 réunissait toutes les causes de nullité absolue telles que stipulées dans les articles 46 à 53 de la Convention de Vienne sur le Droit des traités du 23 mai 1969. 4 Voir HAVILA, une organisation de coordination mondiale de la diaspora hébraïque tutsi. Lire aussi Paul Del Perrugia dans son ouvrage « Les derniers rois mages ». 3 Tutsi et les bourreaux de l'autre, à savoir celui des Hutu. On se retrouve piégé dans un schéma aussi cynique que simpliste dans lequel s'opposeraient à mort les «méchants» Hutu et les «gentils» Tutsi! Aux yeux de l’ONU, le FPR serait pourtant qualifié pour la mission délicate de réconcilier les composantes d’une nation dont il constitue, à notre avis, l'un des principaux fossoyeurs. Comment un Etat fondamentalement partial pourrait-il rassurer tous ses citoyens? Le FPR, juge et partie dans la tragédie rwandaise Financées à coup de millions de dollars par des bailleurs de fonds en apparence sans scrupule, les fameuses juridictions «gacaca5» taillées sur mesure font rage dans le pays où elles attisent l'injustice, encouragent la délation et la haine et consacrent l'inégalité des citoyens devant la loi, au sein d'une société toujours aussi traumatisée par les conséquences d'une tragédie mal assumée. Il s’agit manifestement d’une justice de vainqueur, taillée sur mesure et ayant pour mission d'assurer l’impunité à une certaine catégorie de la population rwandaise. Mais malgré tous les subterfuges utilisés, le gouvernement FPR ne parvient pas à stabiliser en profondeur la situation politique dans le pays. Au contraire, des milliers de familles continuent d’être spoliées de leurs biens, d'autres sont détenus parfois depuis 14 ans et sans le moindre dossier, on relève tant de disparitions forcées et tant de gens contraints à l’exil. On assiste aujourd'hui à une situation politique toujours aussi instable et très dangereuse dans la mesure où le conflit rwandais est loin d’être résolu et de révéler sa cause et sa finalité véritables. Il s’est même considérablement régionalisé et internationalisé au point que l'on peut affirmer sans le moindre risque de se tromper que la source de la crise prévalant dans le Nord-Kivu en RDC se trouve bel et bien au Rwanda. Au chevet de la RDC depuis plusieurs années déjà, la Communauté internationale aurait dû s'en apercevoir mais rien n'indique réellement que la paix et la stabilité de cette région tant convoitée soient inscrites sur son agenda. Le génocide des Tutsi, la partie visible de l'iceberg Le génocide des Tutsi du Rwanda est une réalité indéniable. Mais aussi effroyable qu'il puisse paraître, ce génocide dans sa version officielle à plusieurs égards contestable, ne constitue que la partie visible de l'iceberg du génocide rwandais planifié par Museveni. Dans une décision rendue le 1er décembre 2006 à Arusha, la chambre d'appel du Tribunal pénal international sur le Rwanda (TPIR) a réitéré son « constat judiciaire » du génocide perpétré contre les Tutsi du Rwanda en 1994. Dans une précédente décision rendue le 16 juin 2006 dans le cadre du procès de trois dirigeants nationaux de l'ex-parti présidentiel, le 5 Ce sont des tribunaux inspirés de la justice traditionnelle mais récupérés par le régime. Par exemple, Dr Théoneste Niyitegeka, candidat indépendant à la présidentielle de 2003, vient d’être condamné à 15 ans de prison ferme au terme d’un procès politique conclu le 05/02/2008 par la juridiction gacaca de Gihuma, Province du Sud. Le 23 janvier 2008, Ambroise Cyubahiro a été condamné à 30 ans de prison ferme par la juridiction gaca de Ngoma après avoir été blanchi par des témoins rescapés Tutsi de Kinazi où se sont déroulés les faits jugés. Parmi les charges retenues contre M. Cyubahiro figure le fait d’être le fils d’un ancien dignitaire membre imminent du MDR-Parmehutu et bourgmestre sous le régime du Président Grégoire Kayibanda. 4 Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement (MRND6), la chambre d'appel avait conclu que le génocide des Tutsi du Rwanda constituait « un fait de notoriété publique » faisant partie de l'histoire de l'humanité et qui n'est plus à démontrer. La chambre d'appel du TPIR avait néanmoins tenu à souligner que le «constat judiciaire» du génocide ne dispense pas le Procureur d'apporter les preuves de sa thèse d'un plan du génocide. Il serait donc permis de poursuivre les investigations afin de découvrir le plan du génocide. C'est ce que nous avons tenté de faire en élucidant certains points qui nous semblaient cruciaux et que le Procureur a préféré ignorer soit par omission soit par action et pour des motifs encore mal expliqués. Remodelage de l'Afrique sur fond d'une guerre inavouable entre puissances dites «civilisées» Après avoir remonté aux sources du drame rwandais qui n’est en réalité qu’un des maillons de la chaîne dans le cadre d’une conflagration mondiale, nous démontrons, preuves à l’appui, pourquoi l’agression de l’Ouganda contre le Rwanda a été orientée dans un certain sens, celui de la reconnaissance du génocide des seuls Tutsi alors que celui-ci s'inscrit indiscutablement dans le plan d'une plus large extermination qui, initialement, visait plutôt les Hutu du Rwanda.
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