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1 Military Entrepreneurialism in the Ugandan-Congolese Borderland Koen Vlassenroot and Sandrine Perrot Summary Early August 19

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1 Military Entrepreneurialism in the Ugandan-Congolese Borderland Koen Vlassenroot and Sandrine Perrot Summary Early August 19 Military entrepreneurialism in the Ugandan-Congolese borderland Koen Vlassenroot and Sandrine Perrot Summary Early August 1998, Ugandan troops re-entered the Democratic Republic of Congo, as part of a joint strategy with Rwanda to oust the Congolese President Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Even if in May 2003 these troops officially left the DRC, Ugandan politico-military and commercial networks, including Ugandan politico-military leaderships, Ugandan and Congolese business people and Congolese rebel leaders, would continue to play a dominant role in the north- eastern parts of the DRC. This paper wants to illustrate how military intervention and these networks have shaped and reshaped existing patterns of transborder economic exchange and political processes. In most explanations of Uganda’s military involvement in the DR Congo conflict, these networks have taken central stage but have hardly been defined. In most accounts, these are considered as predatory forces and socially destructive forms of organisation, undermining political stability, the functioning of state institutions and economic efficiency in Uganda. This paper will argue that the informal political structures and networks linking Uganda’s political centre to Congo’s war complex can also be important tools for regime consolidation. Even if it can be argued that the military intervention caused a political crisis at the end of Uganda’s intervention, that it meant a loss of formal economic revenues and, as the different military confrontations between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in Kisangani reveal, that the state proved to have limited control over the military, on the longer term state authority was hardly affected. To comprehend this seeming paradox, it is crucial to get a better understanding of the particular links between the shadow networks of politico-military and economic control that became visible during the intervention, and the Ugandan regime. This paper therefore wants contextualise these networks from a historical perspective and to evaluate their embedment in localised and transborder networks. Introduction Early August 1998, Ugandan troops re-entered the Democratic Republic of Congo, as part of a joint strategy with Rwanda to oust the Congolese President Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Two weeks prior to this military campaign, President Kabila, who had come to power in May 1997 with Rwandan and Ugandan military support, had urged his former allies to leave the Congolese territory as part of an attempt to gain domestic legitimacy and consolidate power. Even if in 1998 security concerns had again been raised as the official reason for Uganda’s armed intervention in the DR Congo (Uganda’s western border areas witnessed continuous infiltrations and attacks from the Ugandan ‘Allied Democratic Forces’), some observers argued that this campaign was mainly inspired by economic incentives1 (see Clark, 2001a; Reno, 2000). Different perspectives on these economic reasons have been articulated though. For Clark and Reno, economic resources generated in the DR Congo were of crucial relevance for its regime building process and national economy. For Prunier in order to help explain Uganda’s intervention, dynamics of regional economic integration should be taken into account (Prunier, 1999). Others have limited their attention to the involvement of Ugandan politico-military elites in the fraudulent exploitation of Congo’s resources. This perspective was particularly echoed in the different reports of the UN Panel of Experts, which 1 For some, Uganda’s involvement in the DRC war was proof of an ambition to create a Hima or Tutsi empire in the Great Lakes Region (see Maindo Ngonga, 2003). 1 in its first report described Presidents Museveni and Kagame as the “godfathers of the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the continuation of conflict in the DRC” (UN, 2001: 41). In the case of the UPDF, after the beginning of the second war, security governance in eastern DRC was mainly aimed at nourishing networks of military commercialism. As part of UPDF’s presence in the DR Congo, these patterns evolved from a parasitic structure of military businessmen and petty thieves already active in Northern Uganda for example, to a paroxysmal entrepreneurial logic of conflict economy linked with international illegal and criminal networks (Perrot 1999). The existence of these networks of “military entrepreneurs” for the first time was brought to light with the accident of a little Tropical Airways Cesna plane close to Beni (North Kivu) on September 25, 1998. On board was Lt. Col. Jet Mwebaze, who was the head of the reserve force of the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (Prunier, 1999: 55). Mwebaze was the brother of the head of the Ugandan expeditionary corps in the DRC (Gen. James Kazini) and the First Lady Janet Museveni’s nephew. Businessmen specialised in gold exploitation, civil representatives and kin of other Ugandan military officers were also aboard. More than a million dollars in cash was lost in the crash, money that was supposedly aimed to buy fraudulently exploited gold under control of UPDF officers based in the DR Congo. Two years later, senior UPDF officers, linked to Congolese militias and international commercial networks were mentioned by a UN Panel of Experts report on the illegal exploitation of resources as key players of what was referred to as an elite network. Among them were General James Kazini, the Chief of Military Intelligence Colonel Noble Mayombo, Uganda’s presidential adviser on Congo Col. Kahinda Otafiire, President Museveni’s brother and UPDF Lieutenant General (Ret) Salim Saleh and his wife Jovia Akandwanaho, UPDF Colonel Kahinda Otafiire and Colonel Peter Karim (UN, 2002)2. The existence of this network (which involved Congolese, Rwandese and Ugandan political leaders, military commanders, businessmen, leaders of armed groups, local administrators and international commercialisation networks) would be presented as an illustration of a new type of warfare aimed at maximising profit through military control over resources and based on a new type of partnership between military commanders and businessmen. Through the control of the pre-war chain of transactions and intermediaries between mining centres and urban trading posts, or through direct exploitation of mining centres, top-ranking officers from Rwanda and Uganda could lay their hands on most of the local mining production. Price- fixing, forced monopoly, and the direct or indirect control over customs helped to consolidate a total control of the exploitation of resources. Different financial networks had to back this system and to guarantee the financing of the war efforts, while new networks of transportation, increasingly based on air transport, eased the exchange of goods with the Congolese interior. In this paper we do not want to question the validity of the different motives of Uganda’s second intervention in the DR Congo. Rather we want to document the role played by different transborder networks and how military intervention has shaped and reshaped existing patterns of transborder economic exchange and political processes. In most explanations of Uganda’s military involvement in the DR Congo conflict, these networks 2 Interestingly, James Kazini, former head of the 4th division and accused of corruption and embezzlement, was promoted to general in 1997 and then Chief of Staff. At the time of writing the UN Report, he was the field commander of the expeditionary troops in the DRC. In March 1998, he was deployed to command Operation Mountain Sweep against the ADF, a Ugandan rebel movement that operated in the Ruwenzori Mountains and used the Congolese territory as a rear base. As several reports would illustrate, after the start of the second Congolese war in 1998, Kazini would play a pivotal role in an elite network that was involved in the exploitation of natural resources in eastern DRC. In November 2009, Kazini was killed by his girlfriend. 2 have taken central stage but have hardly been defined. Political scientists tend to see these economic and political networks though as non-state forms of organisation or informal institutions, and usually focus on the ‘informal’, ‘illicit’ or ‘criminal’ behaviour of those involved. Networks are considered as predatory forces and socially destructive forms of organisation, undermining political stability, the functioning of state institutions, and economic efficiency (Reno, 2000; Bayart et al, 1999). Based on his research in Uganda, Reno also introduced the term ‘shadow state’, which relates to the informal commercial networks that operate parallel to state bureaucracies and undermine formal governance. Even if state agents are involved, according to Reno, these networks have their own channels of exploitation and commercialisation outside of the state (Reno, 2000). Other authors have argued though that these networks, which in most cases are understood as very centralized structures of control and regulation, can shape political processes and political authority (Lund, 2007; Roitman, 2004; Callaghy et al, 2001), particularly in Africa’s war-torn societies or fragile states. This perspective on transborder networks as ‘loci of power and authority’ is the starting point of our evaluation of the informal political structures and networks linking Uganda’s political centre to Congo’s war complex. It will be argued that these networks do not necessarily lead to further state fragmentation but can be an important tool for regime consolidation and
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