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Five Years of Egypt's War on Terror

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Five Years of Egypt's War on Terror FIVE YEARS OF EGYPT’S WAR ON TERROR The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP) is dedicated to influencing policy toward the Middle East and North Africa through rigorous research and targeted advocacy efforts that promote local voices. TIMEP is fully registered and acknowledged under Section501(c)(3) in the District of Columbia. For more information about TIMEP’s mission, programming, or upcoming events, please visit timep.org. This report is the product of the collaborative efforts of TIMEP's staff and fellows. Cover image: A security checkpoint in the Egyptian Western Desert and the Bahariya Oasis in Siwa, Egypt, May 15, 2015 (pho- to by Amr Abdallah Dalsh for Reuters) CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 TERRORISM 5 COUNTER-TERRORISM 10 LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 14 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 TERRORISM 17 ACROSS EGYPT: Intensification and evolution in terror attacks after 2013 17 NORTH SINAI: Violence has become an entrenched insurgency 19 MAINLAND: Low-scale violence gives way to sporadic, deadly attacks 26 COUNTER-TERRORISM 35 ACROSS EGYPT: Tens of thousands of citizens ensnared in the war on terror 35 NORTH SINAI: Continuous military occupation 36 MAINLAND: Sweeping and broad crackdown 39 LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 43 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL CONTEXT: The war on terror trumps rule of law 43 DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT: The war on terror as pretext for political consolidation 46 GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT: Continued global support 49 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 52 SUMMARY FINDINGS 52 METHODOLOGY 54 Egypt Security Watch 3 Five Years of Egypt’s War on Terror INTRODUCTION On July 24, 2013, then-Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah El Sisi asked for a popular mandate to fight terrorism, marking the declaration of the “war on terror” that has lasted five years. The war on terror has been used to justify a wide range of activity in the name of establishing security. As attacks and assassinations occurred with greater regularity after the summer of 2013, so too did counter-terror operations and arrests across the country. New or amended legislation broadened the scope of crimes and actors that could be prosecuted to establish “national security,” and, despite the increased evi- dence of rights abuse, torture, and other forms of repression over the past four years, most domestic and international actors have offered nearly unconditional support. A year after the tafweed (mandate) speech, the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy established its Egypt Security Watch project to address questions that, despite the significance of the developments occurring around the war on terror, remained unanswered: How severe was the problem of terrorism in Egypt? Who were the actors carrying out these attacks? Were the state’s efforts adequate and ap- propriate to mitigate violence? What are the long-term prospects for establishing security in Egypt? TIMEP’s first Egypt Security Watch report warned that the country’s “current strategy appears poised to achieve only a tenuous suspension of terror activities in Egypt at best and may simply drive violent actors to hone their recruitment strategies.” Our findings today indicate that, while the number of attacks reported each day have abated somewhat, Egypt is in a similar place as it was when the war on terror was declared. Those governing Egypt and its security bodies have failed to adapt tactics to evolving security threats; to develop a long-term, strategic counter-terror policy; or to carry out a holistic program to prevent radicalization that opens channels to peacefully express grievances, rath- er relying on collective punishment and politicized tactics. This approach leaves Egypt no closer to eradicating extremism, preventing future radicalization, or achieving long-term stability than at the start of the war on terror. This report outlines trends and developments that have taken place in the past five years of the war on terror and examines the legal and political context in which they have occurred. Finally, it offers summary findings with the aim of furthering efforts to establish peace and security that center rights and the rule of law as their foundation. After our four years of data collection and research, we have firmly concluded that only a rights-based framework can establish the long-term security and stabil- ity sought by the Egyptian government, its citizens, and its allies around the world. Egypt Security Watch 4 Five Years of Egypt’s War on Terror EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EXECUTIVE 14 10 16 12 40 60 20 80 0 0 0 0 0 Jan-10 Apr-10 Egypt Across Reported Attacks mechanism defensive a than rather state, under duress, protests from erupted often that violence spontaneous and random but frequent than rather 2013, of summer the of course the Over • Egypt Across andDevelopments Trends TERRORISM 2013 to Present 2013 to Claimed Attacks Jul-10 Violence across Egypt increased after the revolutionary events in 2011, but it changed in character. Oct-10 Jan-11 Apr-11 Jul-11 Un Cl aimed cl Oct-11 aime Jan-12 d Apr-12 Jul-12 evolved. have trends such inwhich context explaining the finding are furtherclarified inthe respective sections ofthe report, particularly mainland. andthe detailsofeach inSinai The andcounter-terrorism terrorism in anddevelopments trends isasummarythatbrieflystates following The Egypt Security Watch Egypt claimed attacks until September 2017. September until claimed attacks emerged in December 2014; or Hassm and Liwaa which al-Thawra, Popular Resistance Movement and Revolutionary Punishment that pledged its allegiance to the Islamic in State 2014; groups such as the groups such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) in North Sinai, which 1,343 attacks have had claims of either responsibility, by established others of neutralization the and with evolution in existing groups, the emergence of new groups, ror was declared, • Oct-12 While 56 percent of attacks remain unclaimed since the war on ter on war the since unclaimed remain attacks of percent 56 While Jan-13 Apr-13 Jul-13 , taking on a premeditated, organized, and political character. character. political and organized, premeditated, a on taking , violence increasingly violence became a tool of theoffense against Oct-13 Jan-14 the actor landscape has undergone major shifts, 5 Apr-14 Jul-14 Five Years of Egypt’s War onTerror War of Egypt’s Years Five Oct-14 Jan-15 Apr-15 . From the end of 2013 to the present, present, the to 2013 of end the From . Jul-15 Oct-15 Jan-16 Apr-16 Jul-16 Oct-16 Jan-17 Apr-17 Jul-17 Oct-17 Jan-18 - Apr-18 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 10 40 60 90 80 10 20 50 30 70 0 0 attacks reported on average per month in the year following the declaration of the war on terror on war the of declaration the following year the in month per average on reported attacks • Sinai inNorth andDevelopments Trends ing thestate. orrepresent simply forcifically targeted declared, either because they were spe month every since the war on terror was ty personnel died have in a terror attack an attack on security forces, and securi of site the been not has province Sea Red ities been have security forces. fatal of percent 56 and forces, security ed target have time this during Egypt across years. five a been mainstay of violence in the past • to the Islamic State in November 2014. in November theIslamic State to other the from attacks on time targets) Israeli of in its 2011 emergence to its of declaration allegiance several as well (as Egypt in elsewhere attacks 15 and inside attacks 23 claimed which ABM, by majority compared to 10 in the year Only prior. five percent of theseattacks were claimedby any group, the At Jan-10 July July 2013 through 2014: The targeting of security forces has tacks Apr-10 Jul-10 Oct-10 Reported Sixty-six percent of percent all attacks Sixty-six Jan-11 Apr-11 Jul-11 Oct-11 T argeting Attacks increased Attacks significantly inNorth Sinai during this time, with19 Jan-12 Apr-12 Egypt Security Watch Egypt 1 Jul-12 Only the Oct-12 S ecurity Forces Jan-13 Apr-13 - - - - - Jul-13 Oct-13 Popu Mo Liwaa al-Thawra Present Claimed2010to Attacks Re Pu Jan-14 vo 6 ni ve sh lar lu me ti Apr-14 me nt Re on Five Years of Egypt’s War onTerror War of Egypt’s Years Five nt ary Jul-14 si stan Oct-14 ce Jan-15 Apr-15 Ot Jul-15 her Oct-15 Jan-16 Aj nad Apr-16 Mi Jul-16 sr Oct-16 An Jan-17 sa r Apr-17 Bayt Jul-17 a l-Maqdis Oct-17 Wilayat Sinai Wilayat Hass Is Jan-18 in la E , Apr-18 gy mi m pt c Stat e EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 10 40 90 60 10 20 80 50 30 70 40 60 10 20 50 30 0 0 0 Dec-14 Sinai Wilayat Claimedby Attacks thegroup. notclaimedby duringthisperiodwere intheprovince reported ofattacks percent 40 about Sinai, Wilayat of prominence the Despite justice. of systems own its and provision service of its in building, capacity the state it project to with mainland, also propaganda photo where attempts in contained been has violence its of percent Ninety-nine Salopek. Tomislav Croatian as such others, as well as spies deemed it those beheading violence, spectacle State-style Islamic the embracing tics, Sinai has claimed 995 attacks killing over 588 security personnel and 329 civilians. It shifted its tac Sinai carrying began and out more more frequent, mediatized deadlier, attacks. • “SinaiProvince.” Sinai—theIslamicState’s al-Baghdadi andbecameWilayat the al-Qaeda as network his counterparts remaining in North Sinai pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr special forces officer were breaking their Ramadan fast. These attacks signified a split within ABM, as former Egyptian a Desert, killing Oasis major 22 in attack soldiers the on at Western a the checkpoint Farafra as they as out carried militants of group Sinai-based a summer, the in Earlier personnel.
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