Abstract Although Prior Research Demonstrates That Strong Partisans
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Abstract Although prior research demonstrates that strong partisans are less likely to cast a split-ticket, recent scholarly work hints that partisan-ideological sorting—the matching of an individual’s partisan and ideological identities—may play a comparatively stronger role in shaping this voting behavior. Simply, if a high degree of congruence between identities underscores psychological orientations that prevent association with an out-group, then highly-sorted voters should be less likely to cross-party lines within the voting booth. Using 1972-2012 ANES Time-Series and 2010 CCES surveys, we provide evidence that demonstrates that a high degree of partisan-ideological sorting produces the strongest negative effect on split-ticket voting across national and subnational ticket pairings. We then supplement these analyses with 1992-1996 ANES Panel data to demonstrate how changes in sorting over time affect this type of voting behavior. Our results indicate that although an increase in partisan strength alone is insufficient to reduce an individual’s propensity to cast a split-ticket, an increase in identity sorting over time has a strong negative and significant effect on split-ticket voting. We conclude with a brief discussion about the consequences of identity convergence; namely, that sorting fosters a unique form of “electoral polarization.” Abstract word count: 192 Manuscript word count (excluding references, tables, figures): 6,099 Key words: sorting, ticket-splitting, electoral polarization Sorting and the Split-Ticket Although the study of split-ticket voting has received generous scholarly attention (Campbell and Miller, 1957; Beck, Baum, Clausen, Smith, 1992; Burden and Kimball, 2004; Davis, 2014), relatively little research has considered how the effects of mass sorting have contributed to the prevalence of split-tickets.1 However, recent work on partisan-ideological sorting—the process whereby an individual’s partisan and ideological identities converge—has clear implications for how scholars traditionally consider “motivated” explanations of ticket-splitting behavior. Simply, if a high degree of integration between congruent identities underscores significant psychological orientations that prevent association with an out-group (Roccas and Brewer, 2002; Brewer and Pierce, 2005), then highly-sorted voters should be less likely to cross party lines within the voting booth. As a result of these increasingly tribal attachments (Mason, 2015), we argue that split-ticket voting should be extraordinarily rare for individuals with strong, overlapping ideological and partisan identities. Using the 1972-2012 ANES Time-Series and 2010 CCES surveys, we provide firm evidence that partisan-ideological sorting routinely produces the strongest negative effect among a battery of alternative explanations for split-ticket voting at both the national and subnational level. We then supplement these analyses with 1992-1996 ANES Panel data, which cover a period of time in which Americans’ political identities were in flux and partisan-ideological sorting rapidly accelerated (Mason, 2015), to demonstrate the causal effects of changes in sorting on vote choice. Interestingly, these results indicate that although an increase in partisan strength alone is insufficient to motivate a reduction in an individual’s propensity to cast a split-ticket, an increase in sorting over time has a strong negative and significant effect on this voting behavior. We conclude with a brief discussion about why previous work 1 Levendusky (2009) includes one analysis of how a form of policy sorting affects split- ticket voting in the narrow window of 1992 to 1996, but this form of sorting is appreciably different from our operationalization of partisan-ideological sorting, which we expound on below. 1 Sorting and the Split-Ticket that concentrates solely on the strength of partisan attachments undersells the role that multiple, consistent political identities play in creating a unique form of electoral “polarization.” Preferences, identity, and split-ticket voting Although institutional conditions play a role in structuring the frequency of ticket- splitting (Burden, 2002), the earliest scholarly work on split-ticket voting clearly emphasizes the primary role that individuals’ partisan preference orientations play in producing straight or split-tickets (Campbell and Miller, 1957).2 Indeed, if electoral choice reflects the degree to which preference orientations are integrated into an individual’s partisan consciousness, then clear partisan preferences should result in straight-ticket voting (Lavine, Johnson, and Steenbergen, 2012). Conversely, for individuals with weakly-rooted or conflicted preference orientations, conflict between these preferences should introduce instability into electoral decision-making (Campbell and Miller, 1957),3 while indifference—the utter lack of any meaningful partisan preferences—should generate the highest likelihood of casting a split-ticket because partisan attachments are only nominally integrated into the indifferent individual’s partisan self-image (Davis, 2014). 2 Two institutional conditions also worth considering are candidate incumbency and availability. First, incumbency increases the likelihood of split-tickets because the name recognition enjoyed by incumbent candidates is often significant enough to attract out- party voters (Beck et al. 1992; Burden 2002). Second, the actual availability of in-party candidates is related to ticket splitting insofar as candidates running unopposed may attract voters who would not, under other circumstances, cast a vote for that candidate (Burden and Kimball 2004) 3 The cross-pressured voter—who is “attracted to each party by one set of opinions and repelled by another” (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954, 200)—is likely to cast a split-ticket as a function of this ambivalence (Mulligan 2011). 2 Sorting and the Split-Ticket However, although these preference orientations underscore the importance of singular, conflicted, or absent partisan motivations, it is the underlying partisan self- image—or political identity—that fundamentally shapes voting behavior generally (Green, Palmquist, and Shickler, 2002; Greene, 2004) and ticket-splitting behavior specifically (Beck, Baum, Clausen and Smith, 1992). At its core, this is a social identity conceptualization of partisanship that suggests that electoral decision-making should primarily be a function of the strength of the affective connections that an individual shares with a particular party (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960; Greene, 1999, 2002, 2004; Iyengar et al., 2012; Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe, 2015). Thus, if “partisanship is the most prominent political identity because parties are the groups that directly compete for power in the political realm, and competition between groups increases the salience of competing group identities” (Mason, 2015, 130), then individuals who strongly identify with a particular party should engage in behaviors that are consistent with or on behalf of those parties (Huddy, 2001; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Throughout the literature on split-ticket voting, the connection between the strength of partisan identity and an individual’s propensity to cast a split-ticket is consistently noted in both presidential and subpresidential elections (Campbell and Miller, 1957; Beck et al., 1992; Burden and Kimball, 2004; Mulligan, 2011; Davis, 2014). However, recent research on partisan sorting—or the convergence of an individual’s partisan and ideological identities—suggests that accounting solely for an individual’s partisan identity may under-estimate the effect that strong and, importantly, consistent political attachments have on split-ticket voting. Indeed, we suspect that for those individuals with strong and congruent partisan and ideological identities (i.e. the highly-sorted), the likelihood of casting a split-ticket should be particularly low. 3 Sorting and the Split-Ticket The role of sorting Recent research has shown that partisan-ideological sorting is driving increasing levels of social polarization, which includes partisan prejudice, political activism, and anger (Mason, 2015). This is a distinct type of polarization, affecting judgment, action, and emotion, as opposed to the rational assessments of policy outcomes that characterize issue polarization. We believe this distinction is particularly useful because separating social polarization from issue polarization allows scholars to more precisely examine the nature of polarization generally, and the outcomes of sorting specifically. In particular, it runs contrary to claims that partisan-ideological sorting and polarization are one and the same (Fiorina, Abrams, Pope, 2005, 2008; Fiorina and Levendusky, 2006), while also addressing ongoing debates in political science literature over the very nature of polarization itself (e.g. see Abramowitz, 2010 versus Fiorina, Abrams and Pope, 2005, 2008). We argue here that the social elements of this polarization are capable of motivating voters to purify their voting choices, leading to a form of “electoral polarization” in which increasingly sorted voters are decreasingly capable of bringing themselves to vote for a member of the opposing party, no matter how familiar they may be.4 It should be made clear, here, that this view of partisan-ideological sorting also relies on a conceptualization of ideological identities as social identities, distinct from a purely rational set of policy positions.