JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Middle East: The View from Israel By Ze’ev Schiff The Isaac and Mildred Brochstein Fellow in Peace and Security James A. Baker III, Institute for Public Policy Rice University in Honor of Yitzak Rabin MARCH 2003 JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Middle East: The View from Israel By Ze’ev Schiff The Isaac and Mildred Brochstein Fellow in Peace and Security James A. Baker III, Institute for Public Policy Rice University in Honor of Yitzak Rabin MARCH 2003 © 2003 by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University. This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy. Biography Ze’ev Schiff Ze’ev Schiff is the Isaac and Mildred Brochstein Fellow in Peace and Security at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University. The defense editor of the leading Israeli daily, Ha’aretz, Mr. Schiff is the author of several books and numerous articles on strategic and military subjects. His books include A History of the Israeli Defense Forces, Earthquake in October, Israel’s Lebanon War, and The Intifida (with Ehud Ya’ari). His articles have been published in magazines and newspapers such as Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The National Interest, The New York Times, The International Herald Tribune, and The Los Angeles Times. Mr. Schiff has received a number of Israeli awards for journalism, including the prestigious Sokolov Prize. He is also the recipient of the President Haim Herzog Prize, awarded for special contribution to the State of Israel. Mr. Schiff has been a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment and fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He also has served on the council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Mr. Schiff is married with two children and resides in Tel Aviv, Israel. INTRODUCTION threat. If Saddam Hussein successfully devel- ops nuclear weapons, he and his regime would The most important objective of the confronta- threaten and imperil Israel’s very existence. tion with Iraq is the elimination of weapons of Because of Israel’s small geographic dimen- mass destruction (WMD). It is a strategic objec- sions and the concentration of its population tive that takes precedence over everything else in a narrow strip, that danger is greatly magni- and that, in certain circumstances, would con- fied. The threat to Israel will become many stitute a casus belli. All other goals of the con- times more intense if other countries in the frontation with Iraq are either secondary or a area, such as Iran, are armed with nuclear function of the chief objective. The demand to weapons. overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime is based We need to bear in mind that of the coun- primarily on the assumption that as long as it is tries invading Israel during the 1948 war for in power, it would not be possible to eliminate independence, Iraq was the only one that did the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq be- not sign the armistice agreements with the cause Saddam Hussein would either prevent it newly established state. Iraqi leaders have de- or resume developing such weapons once the clared over and over again that they were at weapons inspectors accomplish their mission war with Israel. Saddam has called for the de- and leave Iraq. The planned overthrow of the struction of the Jewish State. In addition to the regime is also based on the assumption that 1948 war, Iraqi forces took part in the 1967 Six with weapons of mass destruction in his posses- Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur (October) sion, Saddam Hussein would ultimately use War. During the 1991 Gulf War, Israel was the them against his neighbors. Saddam Hussein target of Saddam Hussein’s missiles, some 40 already has used these weapons twice. In the of which, launched from western Iraq, were Iraq–Iran war, he ordered the use of chemical aimed at its population. For fear that Saddam weapons against the Iranians. His brutality Hussein might use chemical weapons against reached its peak when, doubting their loyalty, Israel, gas masks were issued to the entire he used chemical weapons again against Kurds population. Iraq has also extended consider- in the Halabja region—his own citizens. able support to a number of terrorist organiza- The danger posed by weapons of mass tions operating against Israel. Saddam Hussein destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein is makes a special point of donating large sums not restricted to the Middle East. Such weap- of money to families of Palestinian suicide ons could well reach radical terrorist organiza- bombers. tions that have absolutely no political or moral It is only natural that the Israeli intelli- restraints. They are liable to use WMD any- gence services should attach special impor- where in the world, against American, British, tance to all information concerning Iraqi Israeli or other targets—anyone, in fact, stand- efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. ing in their way. Clearly, the finger of Saddam However, Iraq is not the only intelligence tar- Hussein on the nuclear trigger could pose a get. Every other country in the region seeking serious threat to regional as well as interna- to make or obtain weapons of mass destruction tional stability. awakens Israel’s curiosity. Israel also keeps That can be said to be Israel’s official posi- track of other countries, often geographically tion, and its position on this issue is unequivo- remote, that are potential suppliers of weapons cal. Being on the front line facing Iraq, Israel of mass destruction. The basic assumption is considers the present situation to be a strategic that the production of WMD must be stopped; otherwise the region, and especially Israel, Should the war fail to eliminate the men- would be in a most precarious situation. ace of WMD from Iraq, other Middle East The Iraqi issue must not be treated as an iso- countries are likely to develop or try to obtain lated, self-contained problem. The fate of Iraq them. It is also possible that a number of Arab will profoundly affect the strategic picture of countries would one day form a coalition the whole Middle East and far beyond. In the aimed at obtaining nuclear weapons. Members region, a swift and smashing victory in Iraq of such a coalition might imagine that they would create many opportunities. A slow, lame, could resist international pressure and the and inconclusive victory that leaves WMD in threat of sanctions more effectively together the hands of Iraq could undermine regional rather than alone. If Saddam Hussein has suc- stability. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, ceeded in obtaining nuclear weapons, why not Bahrain, Qatar and Oman, and Jordan would do likewise? Some would call it a defensive face growing threats. Much of Israel’s deter- necessity. rence capacity would be blunted, and the The possibility that in addition to Iraq, temptation to attack Israel by various means, other Middle Eastern countries (like Iran or including WMD, would grow. Consideration of Libya) would become armed with nuclear benefits and risks of a war against Iraq, there- weapons could induce a change in Israel’s fore, requires the broadest possible strategic nuclear policy. So far, Israel has been firm in context. upholding its image as an undeclared nuclear Defeat of Saddam Hussein and the re- country. It neither confirms nor denies posses- moval of WMD from Iraq could, for example, sion of nuclear weapons. This obviously in- offer an excellent opportunity to address the volves avoiding any nuclear tests. If the Middle conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. East slips into multipolar nuclear arming, Is- Failure to exploit this opportunity would only rael could conceivably change its attitude and invite the Israeli Right and settlers to stick to its policy. Such a change might result from their settlement project in the territories. It security concerns, the hawkish political posi- would imply a continued Israeli occupation—a tions of an elected Israeli government, or the sure recipe for ongoing terrorism. It could end pressure of public opinion and the desire to in a military confrontation with Hezbollah and pacify such pressures. Israel could, for in- Syria, which backs it. To miss another such stance, decide on a nuclear test. It could give opportunity would cause endless trouble. An up its nuclear ambiguity and declare that it is a opportunity presented itself in 1991 when the nuclear country. It could decide to produce Bush Administration and Secretary James A. tactical nuclear weapons and reject the idea Baker, III set up the Madrid peace conference. that nuclear weapons are intended solely for Direct negotiations between Israel and some the case of a genuine threat to survival. With Arab delegations took place for the first time, Iran moving to achieve nuclear weapons, more resulting in the mutual recognition of Israel and more Israelis claim the need to build ca- and the PLO. Peace was signed between Israel pacity for a second strike, despite the vast in- and Jordan, and direct talks began between vestment this would require. Israel and Syria. Because of mistakes made by However, successful liquidation of WMD in both parties, some of these opportunities were Iraq would be a warning to whoever may be not properly utilized. Defeat of Saddam might planning to follow Saddam’s example in devel- offer the opportunity to resume the peace pro- oping such weapons.