Regime Crises in Africa: a Study of Armed Forces' Behaviour

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Regime Crises in Africa: a Study of Armed Forces' Behaviour Université de Montréal Regime Crises in Africa: A Study of Armed Forces’ Behaviour Par Julien Morency-Laflamme Département de science politique Faculté des arts et des sciences Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales en vue de l’obtention du grade de Ph.D. en science politique Août 2016 © Julien Morency-Laflamme, 2016 Université de Montréal Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales Cette thèse intitulée: Regime Crises in Africa: A Study of Armed Forces’ Behaviour Présentée par : Julien Morency-Laflamme a été évaluée par un jury composé des personnes suivantes : Jane Jenson, présidente-rapporteuse Diane Éthier, directrice de recherche Mamoudou Gazibo, co-directeur de recherche Theodore McLauchlin, co-directeur de recherche Michel Fortmann, membre du jury John R. Heilbrunn (Colorado School of Mines), examinateur externe Solène Lardoux, représentante du doyen Résumé Cette thèse de doctorat vise à répondre à une question qui a été largement négligée par la littérature sur les crises des régimes autoritaires : pourquoi les forces armées tolèrent- elles ou répriment-elles les mouvements d’opposition en faveur de changements du régime ? L’hypothèse principale stipule que l’attitude conciliante ou réfractaire des forces armées dépend de la nature des mesures adoptées par le régime autoritaire afin de s’assurer de leur loyauté et prévenir des coups d’État. Lorsque ces mesures de préventions des coups d’État contribuent à créer des divisons au sein de l’armée, les factions marginalisées sont enclines à tolérer les mouvements d’opposition, si ces derniers offrent une alternative crédible au régime, en raison de leur capacité à s’unir autour d’une plate-forme commune de revendications modérées, réalistes et acceptables pour les militaires. À l’inverse, lorsque les mesures de prévention des coups d’État favorisent la cohésion interne de l’armée et son attachement au régime, les militaires adoptent une attitude répressive à l’égard des forces contestataires. Ces hypothèses sont vérifiées à l’aide d’une analyse comparative des différentes mesures de prévention des coups d’État adoptées par les régimes autoritaires du Bénin et du Togo et de leurs impacts sur le succès, dans le premier cas, et l’échec, dans le second cas, des mouvements d’opposition dans les deux pays, au début des années 1990. Cette analyse est effectuée à l’aide de deux approches méthodologiques : le traçage de processus ainsi que la comparaison de deux études de cas. Mots clés : Afrique Sub-Saharienne, Bénin, Coups d’État, Crises de régimes, Forces armées, Mouvements d’opposition, Préventions de coups, Relations civilo-militaires, Résilience autoritaire, Société civile, Togo. i Abstract This Ph.D. dissertation analyzes the factors that influence armed forces’ decisions to tolerate or suppress opposition movements demanding political reforms which could lead to regime change. This dissertation helps to fill a large gap in the literature as only a few scholars have attempted to explain military behaviour during regime crisis. It does so through an analysis of how anti-coup policies and opposition forces’ characteristics lead to the formation of marginalized military cliques and their potential support for regime change. It theorizes that the head of state’s survival strategy, specifically coup-proofing measures, influences military factions’ willingness to preserve the status quo. Reliance on loyalists leads to armed forces with a powerful core loyal to the incumbent regime and willing to use repression, while the strategy of counterbalancing leads to armed forces largely unattached to the maintenance of the regime. Under these circumstances, opposition forces can foster regime defection when they offer a viable alternative to the incumbent government, if the opposition can unify around a moderate platform that provides realist demands vis-à-vis regime forces. The main argument, on the influence of divergent coup-proofing policies on military actions, is assessed through a comparison of Benin and Togo. In each state, authoritarian regimes responded to the challenge of opposition mobilization by initiating negotiation processes. Divergences in coup-prevention techniques and credible commitment capacity of the opposition explain why the opposition campaign in the beginning of the 1990s was successful in Benin but failed in Togo. This research is based on two methods: process-tracing and the comparative method. Keywords: Armed forces, Authoritarian resilience, Benin, Civil-military relations, Coup- proofing, Military coups, Opposition movements, Sub-Saharan Africa, Regime crises, Togo. ii Table of Contents Résumé .............................................................................................................................. i Abstract ........................................................................................................................... ii Table of Contents ........................................................................................................ iii List of Figures .............................................................................................................. vi List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................ vii Remerciements ............................................................................................................. ix Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: The Armed Forces’ Role in Regime Crises ................................ 13 1.1: Definition of concepts .......................................................................................... 14 1.2: The military as kingmakers, and the birth of factionalism ............................. 16 1.2.1: Military motivation, prerogatives and professionalism .................................. 18 1.2.2: Military opportunity: the weakness of civilian institutions ............................ 20 1.2.3: Factionalism as a direct result of political intervention .................................. 22 1.3: Factionalism, preferences and military actions ................................................ 23 1.4: Coup-proofing measures, intramilitary rivalries, and military preferences . 27 1.4.1: Reliance on loyalist elements ......................................................................... 30 1.4.2: Counterbalancing ............................................................................................ 32 1.4.3: The effect of survival strategies on the military’s internal workings ............. 35 1.5: Opposition forces’ characteristics and military behaviour ............................. 39 1.6: Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 43 Chapter 2: Explaining Military Behaviour during Regime Crises, Theoretical Framework and Methodology ....................................................... 45 2.1: A theory of military actions during regime crisis ............................................. 46 2.1.1: Incumbent regimes and coup-proofing measures ........................................... 46 2.1.2: Opposition forces and credible commitment .................................................. 50 2.1.3 Summary of hypotheses and implications ....................................................... 52 2.2: Research design .................................................................................................... 54 2.2.1: Comparative method ....................................................................................... 54 iii 2.2.2: Process-tracing ................................................................................................ 61 2.3: Data collection ...................................................................................................... 68 2.3.1: Fieldwork ........................................................................................................ 68 2.3.2: Document analysis .......................................................................................... 70 2.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 71 Chapter 3: Regime Crises in Benin and Togo ................................................. 73 3.1: The pre-crisis eras ............................................................................................... 74 3.2: The factors behind the regime crises ................................................................. 79 3.2.1: Economic structures and long-term recessions ............................................... 79 3.2.2: Popular mobilization and the crises ................................................................ 83 3.3: The National Conferences and transitional governments in Benin and Togo 89 3.4: Foreign actors and the crises .............................................................................. 96 3.5: Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 100 Chapter 4: Counterbalancing the Power of President Kérékou’s Rivals in Benin’s Army ........................................................................................................ 101 4.1: The birth of military factions within Benin’s army ........................................ 102 4.2: President Kérékou and the establishment of a counterbalancing
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