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Internet in China: Big Mama Is Watching You

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Internet in China: Big Mama Is Watching You Internet in China: Big Mama is Watching You Internet Control and the Chinese Government MA Thesis Supervisor: Dr. S.R. Landsberger Chinese Languages & Cultures University of Leiden July 2001 Lokman Tsui 9639454 Marshallsingel 30 1187 LG Amstelveen 020-4560283 [email protected] [email protected] Internet in China: Big Mama is Watching You Acknowledgements This thesis would not have been possible without the patience and support of Waiyu and my parents. I am also grateful to my supervisor Dr. Landsberger, Drs. Keijser, Dr. Schneider and my friend Raymond van Erkel for reading and helping me to revise this thesis. 2 Internet in China: Big Mama is Watching You Abstract Initially, the internet was an open medium with certain characteristics that made it hard to control. According to Western journalists and politicians, the efforts of the Chinese government to control the internet are doomed to fail. This study attempts to counter this view and discusses to what degree the Chinese government can control the internet in China and, more than that, to what degree the internet can be used as a means for control. Methodologically, the four modalities of control (the law, architecture, social norms and the market), set forth by Lessig will be used. As a result, this study will offer a legal, technical, social and economical perspective in discussing the degree of internet control in China. Lessig further argues that the architecture of the internet is undergoing changes that continue to enable control. A prime example of using architecture as a means of control is the concept of the Panopticon prison, invented by Bentham and mediated by Foucault. The concept of the Panopticon will be used to show how the internet can be used as a means for control. The conclusions are that the Chinese government are quite capable of controlling the internet in China and that China has the perfect ingredients for deploying a digital Panopticon. This digital Panopticon will continue to improve and develop, driven by the market. These conclusions show that the internet, to contrary belief, can be controlled and even be used as a means for control. Problem To what degree can the Chinese government control the internet in China and to what degree can the internet be used as a means for control? Keywords internet regulation, internet control, social control, political control, censorship, privacy, surveillance, panopticon, Lessig, internet in China, Chinese Internet, media. 3 Internet in China: Big Mama is Watching You Index of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 6 1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW: INTERNET IN CHINA.......................................................... 7 1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW: CONTROL OF INTERNET IN CHINA..................................... 8 1.3 CHOICE OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK............................................................... 8 1.4 SET-UP ................................................................................................................. 9 2. CONTROL OF THE INTERNET....................................................................... 10 2.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERNET ................................................................. 10 The Technology of the Medium ........................................................................... 10 The Geographical Distribution of Internet Users............................................... 11 The Nature of Content......................................................................................... 12 2.2 THE FOUR MODALITIES OF CONTROL ................................................................ 12 2.3 PANOPTICON ...................................................................................................... 13 3. THE INTERNET IN CHINA............................................................................... 15 3.1 HOW THE INTERNET CAN BENEFIT CHINA .......................................................... 15 3.2 THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN CHINA ................................................. 17 3.3 THE REGULATORY REGIME WITH REGARD TO THE INTERNET ............................ 19 3.4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNET IN CHINA................................................ 20 4. CONTROL OF THE INTERNET IN CHINA............................................... 26 4.1 THE LAW............................................................................................................ 26 4.1.1 Chinese Characteristics of the Law ........................................................... 28 4.1.2 Conclusion: Law makes the Panopticon Legal.......................................... 30 4.2 ARCHITECTURE .................................................................................................. 31 4.2.1 Control of the Network Infrastructure ....................................................... 31 4.2.2 Countermeasures........................................................................................ 32 4.2.3 Conclusion: The Internet Is Not Impossible to Control ............................. 35 4.3 SOCIAL NORMS .................................................................................................. 36 4.3.1 How the Chinese view Foreign Technology............................................... 36 4.3.2 How the Chinese view Privacy and the Internet ........................................ 37 4.3.3 Offline Social Norms .................................................................................. 39 4.3.4 Online Social Norms .................................................................................. 39 4.3.5 Nationalism ................................................................................................ 41 4.3.6 Conclusion: Wary of Foreign Technology, Not Wary of Privacy............. 41 4.4 THE MARKET ..................................................................................................... 42 4.4.1 The Digital Panopticon .............................................................................. 43 5. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................... 44 5.1 FURTHER RESEARCH .......................................................................................... 45 5.1.1 Topic Limitations ....................................................................................... 45 5.1.2 Used Methodology...................................................................................... 45 5.1.3 Comparative Studies .................................................................................. 45 5.1.4 Limitations of the Sources.......................................................................... 45 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................... 46 4 Internet in China: Big Mama is Watching You APPENDIX 1 - GLOSSARY OF TERMS .............................................................. 54 APPENDIX 2 – KEY GOVERNMENT BODIES.................................................. 58 APPENDIX 3 – KEY REGULATIONS.................................................................. 60 APPENDIX 4 - THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MII................................... 61 APPENDIX 5 - SPECIFIC INTERNET CRIMES ................................................ 62 APPENDIX 6 – CENSORSHIP: AN EXAMPLE .................................................. 63 5 Internet in China: Big Mama is Watching You 1. Introduction “In the new century, liberty will spread by cell phone and cable modem … We know how much the internet has changed America, and we are already an open society. Imagine how much it could change China. Now, there’s no question China has been trying to crack down on the internet --- good luck. That’s sort of like trying to nail Jello to the wall.”1 (former President of the United States Bill Clinton, 8 March 2000) This quote from Clinton shows what appears to be the general consensus in the West and in particular the United States: the development of the internet will bring immense changes to authoritarian regimes such as China. These regimes are trying to stop an irresistible force in their efforts to control the internet.2 One cannot but agree with Clinton when one keeps hearing from journalists and politicians that the internet is the harbinger of freedom without boundaries. Information previously unavailable to the ordinary Chinese citizen is now accessible on the World Wide Web (WWW). Although the Chinese government attempts to block websites deemed undesirable, the information can still travel in China due to the “inherent characteristics” of the internet by re-routing the information around the filters. “The state is [just] too big, too slow, too geographically and technically limited to regulate a global citizenry’s fleeting interactions over a mercurial medium.”3 Or is it? Why is the Chinese government promoting the use of internet if by doing so, they will shoot in their own feet? What are the inherent characteristics of the internet that make it impossible to control? What means does the Chinese government currently employ to control All online articles were last visited on 4 June 2001. 1 Bill Clinton in a speech at Paul H. Nitze School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University on 8 March 2000, quoted after Shanthi Kalathil, William J. Drake, Taylor C. Boas, “Dictatorships in the Digital Age: Some Considerations on the Internet in China and Cuba,” Information
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