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Home , Alexander (satrap), Aretes, Battle of Gaugamela, Battle of Issus, Coenus (general), Companion cavalry

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@cianhogan2 ioedublin www.cianhogan.com student [email protected] Contents

The Battle of the River Granicus 3

Mistakes by before the battle: 3

The Battle 4

Tactical Errors Made by Persians During the Battle: 4

The Battle of November 333 5

Before the Battle 6

Philotas’ plot on Alexander 8

Orientalism 10

Siwah 13

Darius 15

The 17 The Battle of the River Granicus

Mistakes by Persians before the battle:

In 334 BCE, the Persian forces were commanded by , Rheomithres, Petines, and Niphates who were helped by the of and . Arisites governor of northern was also present, as was the Greek , General Memnon of . Their intelligence reports had confirmed that Alexander had indeed crossed the Hellespont into Asia. Memnon of Rhodes, who had a good strategic understanding of the situation, advised against any military engagement of the Macedonian forces. Instead, he suggested a policy. His reasons for doing so were as follows:

a) Alexander was present in person where Darius was not b) The Macedonian lines of supply were at best shaky, and as they were relatively isolated in a foreign country, it would have been easy to starve Alexander back across the Hellespont.

Aresites the Phrygian governor rejected this proposal, insisting that not one house belonging to his subjects should be destroyed. The other commanders concurred and were no doubt mistrustful of Memnon’s Greek nationality.

3 The Battle

As Alexander advanced in battle order upon the river Granicus he was advised by Parmenio not to force an engagement at this point. Characteristically, Alexander ignored his cautious general’s advice, claiming that he would have been ashamed if a trickle of water the seize of the Granicus should stop him. (The Granicus was not a trickle of water.) Alexander placed Parmenio in over all command of the left wing of the army. On Alexander’s right were , Parmenio’s son, the Companion , the Archers and the Agrianians. Attached to Philotas’ divisions were those of Amyntas, who commanded the Paeonians, the Lancers and ‘ squadron. On the left of these divisions were; the Guards battalions, commanded by Parmenio’s son , the battalions of and the infantry. The advance position of the left wing was held by the Theslian Cavalry under Calais’ son , these were supported by the allied cavalry. Immediately on their right, the infantry battalions extended to the centre of the army as a whole.

Tactical Errors Made by Persians During the Battle:

The banks of the river Granicus were extremely steep, and the Persians decided to take advantage of this by placing their cavalry along a very broad front with the infantry in the rear. This was a serious tactical blunder, because the cavalry were prevented from being able to . Furthermore, the Persian infantry units, who according to numbered 20,000, were prevented from gaining access to the battle by the mounted troops. In the first onslaught, the Macedonians suffered severely owing to their difficulty in securing a foothold on the other of the river. Alexander led the attack on the right, but such was the slow pace of advance that Arrian describes the battle as being a cavalry engagement with infantry tactics.

The tide slowly turned in favour of the Macedonians, their discipline combined with the sheer weight of their attack, and the advantage of the long cornel-wood spear over the light lances of the Persians, began to tell. During the engagement , Alexander caught sight of Darius’ son-in-law Mithridates. He struck him in the face with one of his spears and

4 hurled the Persian to the ground. Another Persian, Rhoesaces then charged at Alexander and struck him on his head with his scimitar, slicing off part of his helmet. While Alexander was dealing with Rhoesaces, Spithridates came up behind Alexander and was just about to kill him when Cleitus severed Spithridates arm at the shoulder. Meanwhile, the Macedonian units were streaming across the river. The lightly armed Macedonian troops had managed to force their way in-between the Persian cavalry and were inflicting heavy losses on the Persians. As a result, the Persian centre collapsed, both wings of the Persian cavalry were the routed with about 1,000 men killed.

Alexander checked his pursuit of the fleeing Persians in order to turn his attention to the remaining units of foreign . Numbed and shocked by the rapidity of the Persian collapse, these Mercenaries had failed to react, and as a result, had maintained their position and not taken part in the battle. Alexander had them surrounded by horse and infantry and ordered that they be butchered. According to Arrian, the Macedonian losses numbered a mere 25 of the .

★ Alexander now had a foothold in Persia. ★ He had secured his lines of supply. ★ Huge boost in morale for his men.

The November 333

5 Before the Battle

Originally Darius had no intention of moving from Assyria where the ground is flat and open. He was advised by Amyntas, son of Antichus, not to yield such favourable ground. Indeed, had Darius listened to this advice, the Persian army’s vast superiority in numbers and equipment could haven been brought into play. When Alexander (who had been held up at by illness and then at Solia by religious ceremonies) failed to show, Darius grew in confidence. He began to listen to the sycophantic courtiers who persuaded him that Alexander had no stomach for a fight. As a result, Darius moved his entire army through the Amanian Gates across Mount Ameaus in the direction of Issus. Once in position at Issus, he butchered the Macedonians who had been left behind and moved his troops in the direction of the river Pinarus.

Although Darius had albeit unwittingly outflanked Alexander, his army was now hemmed in-between the Gulf of Issus and the mountains. In effect Darius had seeded any numerical advantage his army may have had. Alexander’s intelligence confirmed that Darius was indeed behind him and ready to join battle. He immediately sent for his infantry and cavalry commanders and all the officers in charge of the allied troops, appealing for

6 confidence and courage in the fight to come. He remained them that the Midas and the Persians were a soft race who had led soft lives, and in typical fashion, Alexander pointed out of the two men in supreme command the had Alexander while the Persians had Darius.

Alexander’s battle disposition indicated his over all intention. In a general sense his plan was to lure Darius into attacking the Macedonian left while he concentrated the main thrust of his own attack on the Persian ranks closest to the mountains. Three battalions of the Guard under Parmenio’s son Nicanor together with and Perdiccas men formed

the Macedonian line from the right wing to the centre. On the extreme left from Amyntas troops, Ptolmey’s battalion and that of , Parmenio himself held supreme command of the Macedonian left. His orders were to prevent the Persians at all costs from outflanking the Macedonians. Although heavily outnumbered, Parmenio was given the task of bearing the brunt of the Persian charge and thereby preventing any gap opening up between the Macedonian lines and the sea.

7 Darius aware now that Alexander intended to join battle with ordered 30,000 mounted troops and 20,000 across the river Pinarus. The purpose of this was to secure the main body of the army while it underwent deployment. His dispositions were as follows; in the van of his infantry were 30,000 Greek Mercenaries, these were joined by 60,000 Persian of Kardakes. On his left, facing Alexander’s right was another division about 20,000 strong that in fact were placed on the mountains in such a way as to outflank Alexander’s right. In the rear of the Greek Mercenaries and Persians was the remainder of Darius’ army. These were organised according to nationality and would prove completely ineffective in the coming fight. The sheer weight of their numbers and the narrow nature of the placed most of them at such a distance from the main body of the action as to render them useless. Darius himself stood in the centre with nearly all his cavalry force facing Parmenio’s left. To secure Parmenio’s vulnerable left flank Alexander sent his Thessalian cavalry in secret in their direction.

Once within range of Persian missiles Alexander ordered the assault. His cavalry units smashed into the Persian left, which collapses the moment he was on them. In sharp contrast to Alexander’s early success, his centre was much slower off the mark. The lack of even ground in the riverbed had caused gaps or cracks to appear in the Macedonian line. Darius’ Greeks fought bravely and struggled to push the Macedonians back into the river. Alexander’s rapidly advancing right wing noticed that things were not going well in the centre and headed in that direction, with the result that the Greek mercenaries under Darius were now outflanked. Meanwhile the Persian cavalry facing Alexander’s Theslians charged across the stream in a furious onslaught. They only broke when they heard of the destruction of the Greek Mercenaries and the flight of Darius. Indeed, it was Darius’ descion to flee the battlefield that provoked what Arrian terms and ‘open and unconcealed route’. In the route the Persians suffered horrendous casualties, at one point it is said that the pursuing Macedonians army crossed a ravine on the bodies of the dad Persians. Darius himself rode throughout the night in order to affect his escape. The political, military and social map of Asia was about to change forever.

Philotas’ plot on Alexander

8 According to few Macedonians “enjoyed a more prominent position” than Philotas, son of Parmenio. He was considered brave, courageous and generous by all his friends. However, Plutarch also goes on to point out that Philotas was ostentatious of his wealth and displayed a certain degree of arrogance, which set him apart from other Macedonians. So much so that, his father had warned him against making so much of himself in front of others. Following the capture of Darius’ treasure of Damascus a Greek girl named Antigone was presented to Philotas as a prize. Plutarch tell us that, Philotas was often boastful in her presence and disparaging of Alexander’s achievements, he even went so far as to describe Alexander as a boy who owed his successes to others. Craterous came to hear of these remarks and immediately brought the girl before Alexander. Who at this time, according to Arrian, was conducting operations in the area of Zarangia.

Alexander ordered the girl to continue seeing Philotas and to report everything she ad heard him say. Philotas had no suspicion that a trap was being set for him and continued to speak slightly of the King. Meanwhile, according to Plutarch, a Macedonian from Chalaestra, named Dimnos organised a conspiracy against Alexander. He attempted to involve his lover Nicomachas in the plot, but he refused and told his brother Cebalinus of the attempt. Cebalinus in turn brought the information to Philotas. Arrian suggest that Alexander was aware as early as the Egyptian Campaigns of Philotas potential treachery. In any case, on two separate occasions Philotas failed to bring the information to Alexander’s attention. News of the plot eventually reached Alexander’s ears and Dimnos was killed while trying to resist arrest. According to Plutarch this enraged Alexander, as he felt that Dimnos’ testimony was necessary if the truth about Philotas was to be uncovered.

Alexander became increasingly suspicious of Philotas and willingly believed the unlikely hood that a Chalaestrian like Dimnos could have acted on his own. Philotas’ enemies exploited Alexander’s suspicions and in Plutarch’s words brought “innumerable accusations against him”. Philotas was arrested and tortured. All the while during his interrogation Alexander listened on concealed behind a curtain. According to Arrian, Philotas was shot or stoned to death by the Macedonians. Meanwhile, Alexander sent one of his Companions, Polydomas, with a letter for Cleandar, Sitalaces and Menidas. These three generals were posted in Parmenio’s army in . The letter ordered them to have Parmenio put to death, this they did without question. Alexander probably feared Parmenio’s reaction to news of his sons death. At the same time Amyntas, Polemom, 9 and Simnian were all arrested and put on trial and acquitted. In view of these events Alexander split the Companions into two separate divisions headed up by and Cleitus.

The trial and murder of Philotas and Parmenio ignited a change in Alexander’s relationship with his men. There is a stark contrast between the man who once took a suspected poisoned cup from his doctor and unflinchingly drank it and the nervous despotic ruler that Alexander was quick becoming. While Alexander certainly still commanded the respect of his men, there is no doubt that they also feared him.

Orientalism

Describe ’s orientalism, what comments do Arrian and Plutarch make about alexander’s Orientalism.

In many respects Alexander’s peculiar family life provided him with a working model for how integration between different races could be achieved. Philip had secured Macedonian borders through a series of clever alliances, aggressive posturing and marriage to a foreign bride. In this sense Alexander was no different, Alexander’s orientalism at its most basic level was born of a desire to rule Persia successfully.

On the face of it Alexander was granted hegemony of the Corinthian League in order to pursue a war of revenge against Persia and to liberate the Greek towns on the Agion seaboard. No sooner as Alexander had crossed the Hellespont he defeated the of Darius at the battle of Granicus and added all of Ionia, Aonia and the two Phragias to his fledgling empire. Even as early as this stage in the war it is possible to discern something of Alexander’s future orientalism. Following the Persian disaster at Granicus Alexander reappointed Ada as governess of . The point here is that Alexander may have been granted the authority by the to destroy Persia but he wished to incite a fusion between and Persia.

10 As the campaign progressed and Alexander’s successes increased so do did the territory he was controlling. Slowly Alexander began to adopt Persian customs. The invasion of was accomplished in part because the Persians were deeply resented by the local population. In any case Alexander granted the Egyptians religious freedom and on November 14th 332BC Alexander was enthroned as at Memphis. In the winter of that year he journeyed to Siwah to worship at the temple of Amon-Ra. Here again we can see a fledgling orientalism.

Following the capture of and during the troubled campaigns against the Scithians Alexander began to adopt Persian dress. Furthermore, heavy drinking bouts were now common place. Arrian tells us that during this period Alexander tended to “Barbaric excess”. He became increasingly susceptible to sycophantic flattery. Not all Macedonians were pleased with this. Indeed the fight with Cleitus that resulted in his brutal murder was in large part due to the latter’s resentment of Alexander’s behaviour. Around this time Alexander attempted to introduce proskynesis as a court practise. This act of prostration common in Persia was anathema to Greece. Perhaps, Alexander introduced this practise in order to place Macedonians and Persians on an equal footing. However, whatever the desire, it did produce great resentment in the Macedonian ranks.

Opposition to this act of proskynesis is perhaps best exemplified by response to Alexander’s request that the Macedonian prostrate themselves. In the Greek worldview prostration was something one performed in front of a god, to a philosopher like Callisthenes this was not something that could be easily tolerated. One night Arrian tells us, Alexander sent around a golden loving cup. Passing it first to those with whom the agreement about the act of prostration had been made. Plutarch cites the royal chamberlain Chares in telling us that those who performed the act of obeisance received a kiss from Alexander then returned to their couch. The cup then came to Callisthenes, as the philosopher approached the King, shouted out that Callisthenes had not prostrated himself. Alexander refused to kiss him, Callisthenes for his part proclaimed in a loud voice that he would have to go away the poorer for a kiss. Callisthenes was later put to death by Alexander as the alleged ringleader of the page boy plot.

11 The fullest expression of Alexander’s intent to adopt oriental practises can be seen at the mass marriage at . The marriage ceremonies, according to Arrian, were held in the Persian fashion. Chairs were set out for the bridegrooms in the order of precedence and the brides entered and sat down by their husbands who took them by the hand and kissed them. The rank and file men of the army began to resent Alexander’s growing orientalism. The military training of half cast children who wee to be raised as Alexander’s Epigoni and the overt orientalism of the governor of Persia added to their hostility. Furthermore, the men despised the inclusion of foreign mounted troops into the campaigns. Bactrians, Sogdians, Arachotians, Zarangians, Arrians, Parothians and Euacae were all introduced in to the elite Macedonian regiments. In addition to this Persian officers were appointed and a new 5th mounted regiment was formed. The Macedonians according to Arrian could not help but feel that Alexander had forgotten his roots. All of this came to a head at Opius.

At an assembly of the Macedonian troops Alexander announced the discharge of all men unfit for service. However, the rank and file of the army did not take this to be a jester of a good will. They goaded Alexander suggesting that he should discharge the entire army. They even went so far as to joke sarcastically that Alexander should take his father (the god Amon) with him on his next campaign. Alexander’s reply was resolute and vicious. He leapt from the platform with his officers and had 13 of the ringleaders arrested and executed. He then gave a long speech outlining all he had done for the army. The next day he appointed Persian officers and divided amongst them command of the various units of the army. Only those he had designated as kinsman were now permitted to give him the customary kiss. Following, this his men kept a vigil outside Alexander’s tent until Alexander permitted them to speak. Callines, a companion officer put forth their case. Explaining the army’s resentment of Alexander’s perceived favouritism for Persians and a Persian way of life. “Every man of you” Alexander replied “I regard as my kinsman” and at that point Callines kissed Alexander. Following this sacrifice to the gods was offered. In an act of unity the magi and the Greek seers dipped their wine from the same bowl and poured the same libations. The purpose of the offerings, Arrian tells us, was to insure that the Macedonians and Persians might rule together in harmony as an imperial power.

While Alexander’s death cut short any real hope of a Graico-Persian empire, it can not be disputed that he intended to rule Persia rather than subjugate it. His orientalism opened up east to western thought and philosophies in the same fashion Persia was no 12 longer seen as a land of despotic and barbaric excess. While unpopular with the troops there are signs that gradual acceptance would have been forth coming had Alexander lived. In any case following his death the map of the world had forever been altered.

Siwah

Alexander as Zeus Amon

1997 a) Give an account of Alexander’s visit to the shrine of Zeus Ammon at Siwah based on your readings of Arrian and Plutarch. b) What is Arrian’s attitude to the claim that Alexander was the son of Zeus.

In 332 following the fall of Gaza, Alexander moved on Egypt. The country fell without a shot being fired and the Persian governor offered no opposition to Alexander’s occupation. Following the foundation of , Alexander decided to make for the temple of Zeus-Amon at Siwah. No doubt Alexander realised the propaganda value of such a visit. The fact that the Persians had, in the past, denied the Egyptians religious freedom, may have partially informed Alexander’s desire to be seen to worship local deities. Furthermore, Persian refusal to permit freedom of worship isolated them from the people they governed and Alexander was eager to exploit this.

13 Siwah is located in Libya and contains the shrine of Amon. The site itself is situated some 400 miles from Egyptian and had been known to the Greeks for over a century. The Greeks equated Amon with their Zeus. Given some of the myths that Alexander was willing to propagate about his own divinity it is no wonder that he should size the opportunity to visit the shrine of the god supposedly responsible for his conception. The of Siwah had a reputation of infallibility, furthermore, Hercules and Perseus, two great Greek heroes were supposed to have consulted the oracle in the past. Perseus was reported to have sought the advice before slaying the Gorgan and Hercules went in search of Antaeus and Basiris. Furthermore, given that these two great heroes were descendants of Zeus Alexander felt that he to should consult the oracle.

The journey to Siwah began by marching some 200 miles along the coast to Paraetonium. According to Plutarch it was a long and arduous journey owing to the lack of water and frequent sandstorms. Plutarch goes on to state that during the journey Alexander received assistance from the gods. Firstly, heavy showers removed the need for water stops and made the sand easier for marching on. In addition to this, whenever the party became lost ravens would appear to guide them on their march. According to Callisthenes birds would appear at night to croak and caw over any soldiers who had become lost. Arrian tells us that, having reached Paraetonium Alexander moved south into the interior through uninhabited country. Arrian also suggests the help of some divinity in guiding Alexander on his way. However, rather than birds Arrian suggests the presence of snakes.

Arriving at the shrine Alexander was welcomed by the high priest of Amon. Plutarch suggests that the high priest wished to address Alexander in Greek as ‘O Pai Dion’ (Oh my son) but owing to poor pronunciation he came out with the phrase ‘O Pai Dios’ (Oh Son of God). Alexander was delighted with this slip of pronunciation and allowed it to be propagated that he had been addressed by god as the sun of Zeus. Following, this Alexander returned to Memphis. b) Arrian readily excepts that Alexander had divine assistance all his life. On more than one occasion Arrian states that nothing could have been more likely than Alexander having been helped by some divine agent. However, on the subject of Alexander’s divinity Arrian is less vocal. He states that Alexander undertook this journey to Siwah with the 14 deliberate intention of obtaining more precise information on the subject of his divinity. Arrian goes on to state that “ at any rate Alexander [intended] to say that he had obtained” such information. This hardly amounts to a ringing endorsement of Alexander’s divinity. Arrian also recites in book 7 the story of Dandamis, an Indian philosopher who refused to have anything to do with Alexander. He told Alexander that if the Macedonian King were the son of god well them so was he and in that case he needed nothing from Alexander. It is unlikely that Arrian would have believed in Alexander’s divinity and included such a story. Finally, Arrian states in the closing pages of the book that he does not think that Alexander’s “claim to be of divine origin was a very serious fault”. Arrian views the claim “a mere device to magnify his consequence in the eyes of his subjects”.

Darius

Based on the evidence in the prescribed texts briefly asess Darius as an a) individua and b) leader of the Persians. a) According to Arrian Darius appears to have been moderate and descent in his conduct. Although Arrian does say that the brevity of his rule may have in a sense prevented him from imitating the despotic excesses of his predecessors. Faced with the relentless onslaught of Alexander’s advance he not only seeded territory but his mother, wife and children. In a modern context his decision to attempt a negotiation in the from of two letters to Alexander is laudable. However, with in the context of his time Darius would have been better employed facing Alexander directly. In any case one is forced to agree with Arrian that his life was “ an unbroken chain of disasters”. According to Plutarch when Darius lay fatally wounded he told Polystrasus, the Macedonian who had chanced upon him, that Alexander had his blessing. This nobility of character in the face of such overwhelming misfortune certainly endears us to Darius.

b)

15 In the spring of 334BC with an army of between 30-40,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, resources of between 70-200 talents Alexander crossed the Hellespont. Apposing him was Darius III, emperor of all Asia and in control of vast resources both military and financial. Darius’ decision not to appose Alexander in person was one of the biggest blunders of his military career. In allowing Alexander to gain a foothold on Persian soil and in refusing to face Alexander in person Darius yielded two valuable advantages to his opponent. Following the battle of Granicus, Alexander had crushed the local satraps and added Ionia, Aetolia, the two and Lydia to his possession. However, at this early stage in the war Persian navel supremacy was such that Darius could have brought the war to Greece. Alexander’s hegemony and control over the League of Corinth was not as the debacle of Thebes had proved on based on loyalty rather on fear. Had Darius exploited Greek disunity by bringing the war to Greece it is unlikely that would have had sufficient resources to maintain control. This would have left Alexander’s flank dangerously exposed and could easily have interrupted his lines of supply and communication. Indeed Darius’ most competent general, Memnon of Rhodes, had such a plan in mind. However, the refusal of local satraps to implement a scorched earth policy and Darius’ tardiness in giving him overall command had fatal consequences on any hopes of early Persian successes. The fall of was an unmitigated disaster for Darius. It reduced the reach of the Persian navy and allowed Alexander to assume a coastal policy by land. Not long afterwards Caria and Hellicarnasus fell into Alexander’s hands. By the time Darius had decided to put to the field in person, Alexander was in a far more comfortable position than he should have been. Darius’ decision to face Alexander on the plain around Socchi two days march east of the jungle pass was a sound one, which would have allowed him to maximise his massive numerical superiority. When Alexander failed to show Darius foolishly listened to flatterers who advised him to move in search of Alexander in the direction of Issus. Discounting the Greek traitor Amyantas’ advice Darius did just that and so in November 333 Darius marched an army of some 6000.000 men through the Amanos mountains to the bay of Issus. In the process Darius handed Alexander an easy victory. While Darius’ deployments were solid his choice of location hampered any real possibility for manoeuvre. Ultimately Darius could not effectively cope with the efficiency of the Macedonian cavalry charge. The route of the Persian army was almost complete. While Darius chose his ground a little more carefully for their second encounter, Alexander’s tactics were flawless. The battle of Gaugamela saw the complete disillusion of Darius’ rule over Persia. In a sense it nearly confirmed what most at this stage had felt. The lose of Egypt and Cyrene coupled with the fall of Palestine and had shattered Persian 16 prestige and confidence. While modern historians feel that Arrian’s assessment of Darius is a little to harsh, one can not but agree that in certain military areas he was indeed the “feeblest of men”. Its certainly remarkable that a man who controlled the known world should in the words of Arrian end his days as a “homeless fugitive” in the land he ruled.

The Battle of Gaugamela

Following his return from Egypt Alexander received news that Darius was making plans for a decisive battle. Alexander was happy to allow Darius chose the timing and the location of this battle. According to Arrian, this demonstrated “the dynamic strength of Alexander’s personality and will,” Arrian goes on to say that Darius’ entire army consisted of 40,000 Cavalry, 1 Million infantry, 200 scythe , and about 15 elephants. Darius was encamped at Gaugamela near the river Boumodus, about 75 miles from the city of Arbela. Great care was taken by the Persians, to even out the ground, so as to make it suitable for cavalry and chariots. Darius made his first tactical blunder on the night before the battle when, according to Plutarch, he “kept his troops under arms and held a review of them by torch light.” However, Plutarch stresses that Alexander “allowed his Macedonians to sleep”, refusing to “steal [his] victory” like a thief. So, on the day of the battle, 20th September 331BC, Darius’ army was tired from having been kept up most of the night. Alexander led his army out at the second watch with the clear intention of engaging Darius at dawn. When Darius was told that Alexander was approaching, he drew his army up for battle, while Alexander continued all the while to advance in battle formation. It was not until Alexander was within 4 miles of Darius army, that he finally caught sight of him, and ordered the to halt. He called together the Companions, Generals, Cavalry Commanders and Senior officers of his allies and mercenaries. Alexander accepted Parmenio’s advice that it was best to reconnoitre the entire battle field in case it posed any hidden danger. Before the battle Alexander encouraged the men and urged them on to, what he promised, would be certain victory. Arrian describes the Persian deployments in the following terms :

At the centre, where King Darius was to be found, the relatives of the king were arranged, along with the Persian Applebearers, the Indians, the "Carian deportees" and the Mardian archers; behind them, in a hollow, were the Babylonians [under the leadership of

17 ], the Red Sea contingents and the Sittacenians. Out in front on the left wing, opposite Alexander's right wing, stood the Sacaean horsemen [commanded by Bessus], around 1,000 Bactrians, and 100 scythed chariots. The elephants and 50 scythed chariots stood close to Darius' own royal squadron. At the front of the right wing stood the Armenian and Cappadocian horsemen, with another 50 scythed chariots. The Greek mercenaries were placed on either side of Darius and his Persian followers, directly opposite the , since only they could possibly be a match for the phalanx.

According to Plutarch “as the action developed, the left wing under Parmenio was driven back and found itself hard pressed.” Later in the battle, further pressure was placed upon Parmenio when Mazaeus sent a detachment of cavalry, to outflank the Macedonian left and attack their baggage trains. Meanwhile, Alexander was leading his men at an angle to the right in the direction of Darius. The Persians reacted to this by sending the Scythian cavalry to outflank Alexander’s men. Such was the speed of Alexander’s advance, that Darius feared that the Macedonians would reach the part of the battle field that had not been prepared and was uneven. Darius was worried that this would render his chariots useless. He immediately ordered his troops, who were riding ahead of the left wing, to wheel round the to the right, in order to prevent Alexander from extending his line any further. When this happened, Alexander ordered his mercenary cavalry Manias to charge the Scythian cavalry. However, such was the Persian advantage in numbers that this attack proved ineffective. In order to support the mercenaries Alexander was forced to bring Ariston’s squadron and the Paeonians to their aid.

This was enough to break the Scythian cavalry and according to Arian “the enemy gave way.” The Macedonians suffered heavy losses in this part of the battle field. At this point in the encounter Darius ordered his Scythe chariots to charge in the direction of Alexander himself in a clear attempt to disrupt the phalanx. However this manoeuvre proved to be a complete failure. The phalanx was too disciplined and was protected by the Agrianians and javelin throwers. Darius now launched his entire phalanx while Alexander ordered to attack the enemy cavalry who were attempting to encircle his right wing. A gap began to appear in the Persian phalanx. Together with units of his own phalanx and his elite squadron of cavalry companions Alexander formed a wedge in order to 18 exploit the gap in the Persian ranks and to attack Darius himself. The struggle at this point was bitter and characterised by hand to hand fighting. According to Arrian, Darius “who had all along been nervous saw nothing but danger, he himself was the first to turn and flee.” Meanwhile, the Persians on the right wing did not yet know of Darius’ flight and had continued to flank Parmenio. For his part, Parmenio sent an urgent message to Alexander seeking his immediate help. On receiving the message Alexander broke off his pursuit of Darius and charged in the direction of the right wing of the enemy cavalry. However, when he began to reach Parmenio’s position it became clear that the enemy was already in flight and Parmenio was not in as great peril as previously believed. Alexander engaged the fleeing enemy cavalry and according to Arrian it was here that the companion cavalry suffered their greatest losses. At this point, Alexander continued his pursuit of Darius and it was left to Parmenio’s to capture the enemy’s baggage trains and camp.

Following the Persian defeat at Gaugamela, Alexander began to target the great and wealthy cities of the Persian Empire (, Susa, and ). The contest for the Hegemony of Persia was now all but over and Darius would never again mount an effective military challenge to Alexander’s rule. The battle demonstrated Alexander’s ingenuity, ruthlessness and determination. However, the events at the battle played a significant role in the souring of Alexander’s relationship with Parmenio. On more than one occasion Alexander cited Parmenio’s decision to call him back as a reason for mistrusting him.

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