ALEXANDER WWW.CIANHOGAN.COM CLASSICS CIAN HOGAN ! @cianhogan2 ioedublin www.cianhogan.com student [email protected] Contents The Battle of the River Granicus 3 Mistakes by Persians before the battle: 3 The Battle 4 Tactical Errors Made by Persians During the Battle: 4 The Battle of Issus November 333 5 Before the Battle 6 Philotas’ plot on Alexander 8 Orientalism 10 Siwah 13 Darius 15 The Battle of Gaugamela 17 The Battle of the River Granicus Mistakes by Persians before the battle: In 334 BCE, the Persian forces were commanded by Arsames, Rheomithres, Petines, and Niphates who were helped by Spithridates the Satrap of Lydia and Ionia. Arisites governor of northern Phrygia was also present, as was the Greek Mercenary, General Memnon of Rhodes. Their intelligence reports had confirmed that Alexander had indeed crossed the Hellespont into Asia. Memnon of Rhodes, who had a good strategic understanding of the situation, advised against any military engagement of the Macedonian forces. Instead, he suggested a scorched earth policy. His reasons for doing so were as follows: a) Alexander was present in person where Darius was not b) The Macedonian lines of supply were at best shaky, and as they were relatively isolated in a foreign country, it would have been easy to starve Alexander back across the Hellespont. Aresites the Phrygian governor rejected this proposal, insisting that not one house belonging to his subjects should be destroyed. The other commanders concurred and were no doubt mistrustful of Memnon’s Greek nationality. 3 The Battle As Alexander advanced in battle order upon the river Granicus he was advised by Parmenio not to force an engagement at this point. Characteristically, Alexander ignored his cautious general’s advice, claiming that he would have been ashamed if a trickle of water the seize of the Granicus should stop him. (The Granicus was not a trickle of water.) Alexander placed Parmenio in over all command of the left wing of the army. On Alexander’s right were Philotas, Parmenio’s son, the Companion Cavalry, the Archers and the Agrianians. Attached to Philotas’ divisions were those of Amyntas, who commanded the Paeonians, the Lancers and Socrates‘ squadron. On the left of these divisions were; the Guards battalions, commanded by Parmenio’s son Nicanor, the infantry battalions of Perdiccas and the infantry. The advance position of the left wing was held by the Theslian Cavalry under Calais’ son Harpalus, these were supported by the allied cavalry. Immediately on their right, the infantry battalions extended to the centre of the army as a whole. Tactical Errors Made by Persians During the Battle: The banks of the river Granicus were extremely steep, and the Persians decided to take advantage of this by placing their cavalry along a very broad front with the infantry in the rear. This was a serious tactical blunder, because the cavalry were prevented from being able to charge. Furthermore, the Persian infantry units, who according to Arrian numbered 20,000, were prevented from gaining access to the battle by the mounted troops. In the first onslaught, the Macedonians suffered severely owing to their difficulty in securing a foothold on the other side of the river. Alexander led the attack on the right, but such was the slow pace of advance that Arrian describes the battle as being a cavalry engagement with infantry tactics. The tide slowly turned in favour of the Macedonians, their discipline combined with the sheer weight of their attack, and the advantage of the long cornel-wood spear over the light lances of the Persians, began to tell. During the engagement , Alexander caught sight of Darius’ son-in-law Mithridates. He struck him in the face with one of his spears and 4 hurled the Persian to the ground. Another Persian, Rhoesaces then charged at Alexander and struck him on his head with his scimitar, slicing off part of his helmet. While Alexander was dealing with Rhoesaces, Spithridates came up behind Alexander and was just about to kill him when Cleitus severed Spithridates arm at the shoulder. Meanwhile, the Macedonian units were streaming across the river. The lightly armed Macedonian troops had managed to force their way in-between the Persian cavalry and were inflicting heavy losses on the Persians. As a result, the Persian centre collapsed, both wings of the Persian cavalry were the routed with about 1,000 men killed. Alexander checked his pursuit of the fleeing Persians in order to turn his attention to the remaining units of foreign mercenaries. Numbed and shocked by the rapidity of the Persian collapse, these Mercenaries had failed to react, and as a result, had maintained their position and not taken part in the battle. Alexander had them surrounded by horse and infantry and ordered that they be butchered. According to Arrian, the Macedonian losses numbered a mere 25 of the Companion cavalry. ★ Alexander now had a foothold in Persia. ★ He had secured his lines of supply. ★ Huge boost in morale for his men. The Battle of Issus November 333 5 Before the Battle Originally Darius had no intention of moving from Assyria where the ground is flat and open. He was advised by Amyntas, son of Antichus, not to yield such favourable ground. Indeed, had Darius listened to this advice, the Persian army’s vast superiority in numbers and equipment could haven been brought into play. When Alexander (who had been held up at Tarsus by illness and then at Solia by religious ceremonies) failed to show, Darius grew in confidence. He began to listen to the sycophantic courtiers who persuaded him that Alexander had no stomach for a fight. As a result, Darius moved his entire army through the Amanian Gates across Mount Ameaus in the direction of Issus. Once in position at Issus, he butchered the Macedonians who had been left behind and moved his troops in the direction of the river Pinarus. Although Darius had albeit unwittingly outflanked Alexander, his army was now hemmed in-between the Gulf of Issus and the mountains. In effect Darius had seeded any numerical advantage his army may have had. Alexander’s intelligence confirmed that Darius was indeed behind him and ready to join battle. He immediately sent for his infantry and cavalry commanders and all the officers in charge of the allied troops, appealing for 6 confidence and courage in the fight to come. He remained them that the Midas and the Persians were a soft race who had led soft lives, and in typical fashion, Alexander pointed out of the two men in supreme command the Greeks had Alexander while the Persians had Darius. Alexander’s battle disposition indicated his over all intention. In a general sense his plan was to lure Darius into attacking the Macedonian left while he concentrated the main thrust of his own attack on the Persian ranks closest to the mountains. Three battalions of the Guard under Parmenio’s son Nicanor together with Coenus and Perdiccas men formed the Macedonian line from the right wing to the centre. On the extreme left from Amyntas troops, Ptolmey’s battalion and that of Meleager, Parmenio himself held supreme command of the Macedonian left. His orders were to prevent the Persians at all costs from outflanking the Macedonians. Although heavily outnumbered, Parmenio was given the task of bearing the brunt of the Persian charge and thereby preventing any gap opening up between the Macedonian lines and the sea. 7 Darius aware now that Alexander intended to join battle with ordered 30,000 mounted troops and 20,000 light infantry across the river Pinarus. The purpose of this was to secure the main body of the army while it underwent deployment. His dispositions were as follows; in the van of his infantry were 30,000 Greek Mercenaries, these were joined by 60,000 Persian heavy infantry of Kardakes. On his left, facing Alexander’s right was another division about 20,000 strong that in fact were placed on the mountains in such a way as to outflank Alexander’s right. In the rear of the Greek Mercenaries and Persians was the remainder of Darius’ army. These were organised according to nationality and would prove completely ineffective in the coming fight. The sheer weight of their numbers and the narrow nature of the battlefield placed most of them at such a distance from the main body of the action as to render them useless. Darius himself stood in the centre with nearly all his cavalry force facing Parmenio’s left. To secure Parmenio’s vulnerable left flank Alexander sent his Thessalian cavalry in secret in their direction. Once within range of Persian missiles Alexander ordered the assault. His cavalry units smashed into the Persian left, which collapses the moment he was on them. In sharp contrast to Alexander’s early success, his centre was much slower off the mark. The lack of even ground in the riverbed had caused gaps or cracks to appear in the Macedonian line. Darius’ Greeks fought bravely and struggled to push the Macedonians back into the river. Alexander’s rapidly advancing right wing noticed that things were not going well in the centre and headed in that direction, with the result that the Greek mercenaries under Darius were now outflanked. Meanwhile the Persian cavalry facing Alexander’s Theslians charged across the stream in a furious onslaught. They only broke when they heard of the destruction of the Greek Mercenaries and the flight of Darius. Indeed, it was Darius’ descion to flee the battlefield that provoked what Arrian terms and ‘open and unconcealed route’. In the route the Persians suffered horrendous casualties, at one point it is said that the pursuing Macedonians army crossed a ravine on the bodies of the dad Persians.