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The Question of a Right to Life in Animal Ethics ]örg Luy Institut für Tie~chutz und Tierverhalten, Fachbereich Veterinärmedizin I Freie Universität Berlin, BerIin, Germany

Summary Zusammenfassung: Das tierschutzethische Problem eines Rechts In animal ethics a Right to Life has been postulated repeatedly, aufLeben but no valid argument has been produced yet. Thus the question Ein moralisches Recht auf Leben ist auch (einigen) Tieren wieder- of a Right to Life in anima I ethics remains unanswered. It is re- holt zugesprochen worden. Allerdings gibt es bis heute keine markable that no philosopher has yet found a valid argument gänzlich überzeugende Argumentation zur Begründung. Die against Epicurus ("there is nothing fearful in the absence of Tötungsfrage in der Tierschutzethik kann daher weiterhin als offen life"). On the other hand, there is - again based upon Epicurus' betrachtet werden. Der springende Punkt besteht darin, ein stich- argument - a basic moral duty with respect to painless killing haltiges Argument gegen Epikurs Feststellung zu finden, dass der (i.e. 170 fear, no distress, no suffering). Zustand des Nicht-mehr-lebens nichts Beängstigendes enthält. Auf Grundlage der Argumentation Epikurs lässt sich aber auch zeigen, dass ein moralisches Recht der Tiereauf eine angst- und schmerz- lose Durchführung der 10tung außer Frage steht.

Keywords: anima I welfare, animal rights, animal killing, ethics, bioethics

The Problem ter to Menoeceus). If Ais correct, and good out (System der philosophischen Ethik und and bad consist of pleasurable and painful Pädagogik, 1932). Most of today's debates on animal ethics sensory experience, then there is a basic focus on the protection of sentient beings. moral duty with respect to painless killing However, the moral status of a sentient be- (no fear, no distress, no suffering), and the A - Prevention of negative ing is not clearly defined. Do animal ethics moral duty not to kill humans must be a du- experiences (A) aim to prevent negative experiences in ty derived from a social contract. So Her- beings that are capable of such experiences marchos, the follower of Epicurus, argued: Within the group of animal-friendly (sentient beings)? Or do anirnal ethics (B) "If [... ] it was possible to make a certain philosophers Jeremy Bentham (1780), Wil- aim to protect the interests of beings that compact with other anirnals in the same helm Dietler (1787), Immanuel Kant are capable of having interests (sentient be- manner as with men, that we should not kill (1797), Arthur Schopenhauer (1840) and ings)? The background assumption of Ais them, nor they us, and that they should not Eduard von Hartrnann (1886) were typical that all good and bad consists of sense-ex- be indiscIiminately destroyed by us, it representatives of assumption A. Jeremy perience (Epicurus, 341-271 BC). The would be well to extend justice as far as to Bentham (1748-1832) put forth the famous background assumption of B is that to be- this." (Hermarchos, - 325-259 Be; in E. argument: "If the being eaten were all, have morally means to respect the interests Wynne-Tyson (ed.), Porphyry: On Absti- there is very good reason why we should be of all those who are affected (Leonard Nel- nence from Animal Food). suffered [allowed] to eat such of them as son, GöttingeniGermany, 1882-1927). If B is correct, we must follow Leonard we like to eat: we are the better for it, and If A is correct, we must follow Epicurus Nelson who wrote: My deliberations can they are never the worse. [... ] The death on the issue of death: "Get used to believ- be applied to every interest an animal has. they suffer in OUf hands commonly is, and ing that death is nothing to us. For all good These deliberations can also be used to de- always may be, a speedier, and by that and bad consists in sense-experience, and cide the question of whether the painless means a less painful one, than that which death is the privation of sense-experience. killing of animals is morally perrnissible. would await them in the inevitable course [There] is nothing fearful in life for one The answer is simple if we ask ourselves of nature. If the being killed were all, there who has grasped that there is nothing fear- whether we would agree to OUf own killing is very good reason why we should be suf- ful in the absence of life. [... ] So death [... ] on the condition that it is painless. We fered [allowed] to kill such as molest us is nothing to us; since when we exist, death would not agree, because it would violate [... ]. But is there any reason why we is not yet present, and when death is pre- our interest in life, regardless of how should be suffered [allowed] to torment sent, then we do not exist." (Epicurus, Let- painlessly or cruelly the killing is carried them? Not any that I can see." (An Intro- duction to the Principles of Morals and Received 13. 7. 2006; received in final form and accepted for publication 9. 10. 2006 Legislation, 1780).A sirnilar argument was

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put forward by the German philosopher quick and painless. Though there are some Nauheim: ASKU-Presse. Wilhelm Dietler in l787: It is morally per- fates worse than death, an untimely death Epicurus (1994). Letter to Menoeceus. In rnissible to kill animals for food or safety - is not in the interests of its victims, B. Inwood and L. P. Gerson (eds.), The but it is never perrnissible to torture ani- whether human or animal, independently Epicurus Reader. Selected Writings. In- mals. The animals must be killed in the of whether they understand their own mor- dianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publish- quiekest way possible and with the least tality, and thus independently of whether ing Company. amount of suffering (Gerechtigkeit gegen they themselves have adesire to continue Hartmann, E. v. (1886). Modeme Prob- Thiere, 1'87). Immanuel Kant (1724- to live." (The Case for Animal Rights, leme. Leipzig: Friedrich. 1804) wrote: A quick and painless killing 1984). In Germany, Ursula Wolf (*1951) Hermarchos (1965). In E. Wynne-Tyson of animals is morally permissible (Die put forward a sirnilar logical argument: (ed.), Porphyry: On Abstinence from Metaphysik der Sitten, 1797). And Arthur Animals that consciously try to attain a Animal Food. London & Fontwell: Cen- Schopenhauer (1788-1860) simply added good life have an interest in being alive, taur Press. the idea of stunning: Compassion with an- for this is a necessary precondition of a Kant, I. (1914). Die Metaphysik der Sitten, imals does not mean to abstain from killing good life (Haben wir moralische Ver- 11, 1, § 17 (1797). Hg. von der Königlich animals for food. Without meat human be- pflichtungen gegen Tiere?, 1988). A con- Preußischen Akademie der Wis- ings would suffer more than an animal that sequence of this would be a Right to Life senschaften. Berlin: Reimer. is killed quickly and without fear. But ani- for all conscious animals (Das Tier in der Nelson, L. (1970). System der philosophi- mals should generally be stunned before Moral, 1990). And Swiss philosopher schen Ethik und Pädagogik (1932). slaughter (e.g. with chloroform). (Über die Jean-Claude Wolf (*1953) explained: A Hamburg: Meiner. Grundlage der Moral, 1840). In 1886 being "with a will to go on" is forcefully Regan, T. (1984). The Case Jor Animal Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906) argued interrupted in its striving when killed or Rights. London: Routledge. as Bentham had done a hundred years ear- irreversibly stunned. In this respect, killing Schopenhauer, A. (1986). Über die Grund- lier: Every animal must die one day. If a harms every sentient being (unless it is suf- lage der Moral (1840). In 3. Bd. der man kills an animal in a way which is faster fering dreadfully and hopelessly). This is Suhrkamp Werkausgabe. FrankfurtlM. and less painful than the death it would ex- the central argument for a general ban on Singer, P. (1980). Anirnals and the Value of perience in nature, then this should not be a killing sentient beings (Töten von Tieren? Life. In T. Regan (ed.), Matters oJ Life moral problem (Modeme Probleme, 1886). Eine angemessene Begründung des Tö- and Death (218-259). New York: Ran- tungsverbotes aus moralphilosophischer dom House. Perspektive, 1993). Singer, P. (1979). Killing Humans and B - Protection of interests Killing Anirnals. Inquiry 22, 145-156. Wolf, I-Cl. (1993). Töten von Tieren? Eine Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Ursula Wolf and Conclusion angemessene Begründung des Tö- Jean-Claude Wolf are typical representa- tungsverbotes aus moralphilosophischer tives of assumption B. It was Singer It is remarkable that none of the represen- Perspektive. In Tagungsband der DVG- (*1946) who introduced Nelson's idea in- tatives of assumption B (protection of in- Tagung .Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben" am to utilitarianism: "Unlike classical utilitar- terests) have yet found a valid argument 27.11.1993 in Stuttgart, 70-82. ianism, preference utilitarianism makes against Epicurus ("there is nothing fearful Wolf, U. (1988). Haben wir moralische killing a direct wrong done to the person in the absence of Iife"), while still accept- Verpflichtungen gegen Tiere? ZPhF 42, killed, because it is an act contrary to his or ing the proposition that the consequences 222-246. her preferences." (Animals and the Value of an act determine whether this act is eth- Wolf, U. (1990). Das Tier in der Moral. of Life, 1980). But Singer respects only ically problematic for the individual (e.g. if FrankfurtlM.: Klostermann. those interests which are consciously pre- children should be taken to the dentist, or Wynne-Tyson, E. (ed.) (1965). Porphyry: ferred by the individual, otherwise he fol- dogs to the vet), So the Right to Life is still On Abstinence from Animal Food. Lon- lows assumption A: "Given that an animal a hypothesis in anirnal ethics. On the other don & Fontwell: Centaur Press. belongs to a species incapable of self-con- hand, there is without doubt a basic moral sciousness [i.e. incapable of a preference- duty with respect to painless killing (i.e. no Correspondence to interest in remaining alive], it follows that fear, no distress, no suffering). Prof. Dr. Jörg Luy it is not wrong to rear and kill it for food, Juniorprofessur für Tierschutz provided that it lives a pleasant life [... ]." und Ethik am (Killing Humans and Killing Animals, References Institut für Tierschutz und Tierverhalten 1979). Nelson's idea can also be found in Bentham, J. (1970). An Intraduction to the Fachbereich Veterinärmedizin I Tom Regan's (*1938) book The Case for Principles of Morals and Legislation, 17, Freie Universität Berlin Animal Rights: "Death is [... ] the irre- N, Footnote b (1789). Edited by I H. Oertzenweg 19 b versible harm because death is [00'] the ir- Bums and H. L. A. Hart. University of 14163 Berlin reversible loss, foreclosing every opportu- London: The Athlone Press. Germany nity to find any satisfaction. This is true Dietler, W. (1997). Gerechtigkeit gegen e-mail: [email protected] whether death is slow and agonizing or Thiere (1787). Neudruck von 1997. Bad

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