Sniðmát Meistaraverkefnis HÍ

MA Thesis in International Affairs

Europeanization of LGBT Rights in Montenegro

Stefan Jovic

February 2020

Europeanization of LGBT Rights in Montenegro

Stefan Jovic

Final thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of a MA degree in International Affairs

Instructor: Baldur Þórhallsson

Faculty of Political Science School of Social Sciences, University of Iceland February 2020

Europeanization of LGBT Rights in Montenegro

This final thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of a MA degree in International Affairs. The thesis may not be copied in any form without the author’s permission.

Reykjavik, Iceland, 2020

Abstract

The goal of this thesis is to shed light on the process of top-down Europeanization imposed on EU candidate states. As the current candidate state for EU membership, Montenegro has most of its negotiation chapters opened, and is generally praised by the EU for the efforts taken in order to satisfy the accession criteria. However, adoption of certain policies, such as pro-LGBT policies seems to be entirely done in order to meet the criteria for EU membership, as the experiences of local activists, opinion of local politicians and the homophobic views of the local population do not match the progressive views of the policies introduced. By analysing the implementation of those changes, we see pure Europeanization at work. This way of implementing changes can have a positive effect on the LGBT community in Montenegro, as it provides a shelter for a part of the population that would not have the same rights without the Europeanization of such laws. However, adopting policies that significantly shape the society solely due to EU membership may reveal trust issues between the public and the government, and reveal that EU values are more important than the Montenegrin ones.

Útdráttur

Markmið rannsóknar þessarar er að varpa ljósi á innleiðingu Evrópulöggjafar löndum sem óskað hafa eftir aðild að Evrópusambandinu. Eitt núverandi umsóknarlanda, Svartfjallaland, hefur þegar opnað nær alla kafla samningaviðræðnanna og að jafnaði hlotið lof fyrir innleiðingarferlið. Þrátt fyrir það, hefur innleiðing tiltekinna reglugerða og viðmiða í Svartfjallalandi, s.s. réttindamál hinsegin fólks, eingöngu vera unnin með það fyrir augum að mæta kröfum Evrópusambandsins. Færa má rök fyrir því að reynsla aðgerðasinna, skoðanir stjórnmálamanna og viðhorf almennings gagnvart hinsegin samfélagi falli ekki að öllu leyti að framsækinni sýn Evrópusambandsins. Greining innleiðingarferlisins dregur því fram einhliða innleiðingu regluverks í þágu Evrópusambandsaðildar. Aðlögunin getur haft jákvæð áhrif á hinsegin samfélagið í Svartfjallalandi, þ.e. þau sem því tilheyra njóta réttinda sem þau hefðu ekki öðlast án Evrópuvæðingarinnar. Á hinn bóginn getur aðlögun sem eingöngu er unnin með það fyrir augum að taka upp regluverk Evrópusambandsins afhjúpað veikleika í samskiptum almennings og yfirvalda og gefið til kynna að gildi Evrópusambandsins hafi meira vægi en svartfellsk.

Preface

I have always been interested in the ways the European Union works and how it shapes its member states. After completing my Bachelor´s degree in European Studies, I attended the post-graduate program in Small State Studies: Small States in Europe, and further developed my knowledge on how states, in this case small states, function in the EU. Later, while attending the MA degree in International Affairs, I was exposed to broader topics in international relations, which was beneficial for my growth as an academic, but it reassured me that the work of the EU should be my primary focus.

After choosing a topic for my MA thesis that is based on the EU, my home country of Montenegro, and the issue of LGBT rights that is close to my heart, I was exposed to a number of academics who have contributed on the literature of sexual citizenship in Europe. Researching their work was extremely inspiring, and it motivated me to learn more on the topic, and eventually write this thesis, that is hopefully a starting step in my future focus in this field, as it sparked more interest in me than any other topic I was introduced to during my education.

This thesis accounts for 30 ECTS towards a Masters of Arts in International Affairs at the University of Iceland. I would like to thank my supervisor Baldur Þórhallsson for being so supportive of my ideas, his valuable comments throughout the writing process, but most importantly, for being a great role model.

Table of contents

Abstract ...... 5 Útdráttur…………………………………………………… …………………………..6 Preface ...... 7 1 Introduction ...... 10 1.1 Background of EU – Montenegrin accession negotiations ...... 10 1.2 Significance of Focusing on Europeanization of LGBT Policies in Montenegro 11 1.3 Research Question and Hypothesis ...... 13 1.4. Structure of the Thesis……………………………………………………… 13

2 Theoretical Framework and Methodology...... 16 2.1 Europeanization ...... 16 2.1.1. Top-Down Europeanization in EU Candidate States ………………… 17 2.1.2. Top-Down Europeanization of LGBT Policies...... 18 2.2. Shelter Theory: Societal Shelter ...... 19 2.3. Interplay of Theories: Europeanization as a Shelter for the LGBT Community in Montenegro………………………………………………………………… 20 2.4. Research Purpose, Method and Design…………………………………… 21

3 Why Are LGBT Rights Important for the EU?...... 23 3.1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………… 23 3.2. Older EU Member States are Leaders in LGBT rights ...... 23 3.3. The Beginning of Common LGBT Policies in the EU ...... 25 3.4. Summary ...... 27

4 The Impact of the 2004 EU Enlargement on LGBT Policies in the EU ...... 28 4.1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………… 28 4.2. Why post-Communist States Lack LGBT Activism ...... 29 4.3. Heavy Europeanization of LGBT Policies Found in post-Communist EU States 32 4.4. Summary...... ….. 33

5 How the Region Shaped the Montenegrin Approach to LGBT Rights ?...... 34 . 5.1. Introduction ……………………………………………………………… 34 5.2. Developments in Croatia and Serbia Most Important ………. ………………..35 5.3. Serbian vs. Croatian Case with LGBT Rights: What Can Montenegro Learn? . 36 5.4. Croatian Commitment to the EU: The Main Similarity to Montengro ...... 38

5.5. Montenegro and Serbia: Separate States, Shared Values………………………… 42 5.6. Summary…………………………………………………………………………… 46

6 Montenegro and LGBT Rights: The Purest Example of Top Down Europeanization?

6.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………… 47 6.2. First Montenegrin LGBT Activist Pressured to Seek Asylum…………………47 6.3. Introduction of Pro-LGBT Policies Parallel with EU Negotiations……………49 6.4. Same-Sex Partnership Law Proposal to the Montenegrin Parliament………….51 6.5. Vote of the Parliament on the same sex partenrship law ………………………53 6.6.Summary…………………………………………………………………………55

7 Conclusions ………………..57 7.1. Benefits of Top-down Europeanization of LGBT Policies in Montenegro: Shelter for the LGBT Community…………………………………………………………………… 59 7.2. Flaws of the Top-Down Europeanization of LGBT Policies in Montenegro: Mistrust of the Government and the Public…………………………………………………………60

Bibliography ...... 61

Introduction

1.1. Background of the EU – Montenegrin Accession Negotiations

Montenegro started negotiating its accession to the EU in 2012, however, the conversation about entering the EU started earlier than that. The original efforts in implementing reforms and aligning certain standards with the EU ones began jointly with Serbia in 2005, since the two countries were still united until 2006. Ever since starting the accession process as an independent country, Montenegro proved to be up to task by quickly leading the pack of Western Balkan states which are all currently in various stages of joining the EU. Seven years after officially starting its negotiations, Montenegro has almost all of its chapters opened (32 out of 33), and even though only 3 chapters have been closed, all of the opened chapters are assessed as moderately or well prepared. The amount of chapters opened and the reputation Montenegro made as a candidate state led it to being often perceived as the most likely one to complete its accession process and become the next EU member state. In the latest EU Commission enlargement strategy, EU´s Commissioner for Enlargement, Johannes Hahn, emphasized the need for incorporating the Western Balkan states, and for the first time ever declared an expected date – 2025, when both Montenegro and Serbia are estimated to be ready to join. Similarly, in the 2017´s ´state of the union´ speech, the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker praised the reforms that are bringing these candidate states closer to becoming full members and reflected on 2025 being a possible year of accession for Montenegro. (Speech, State of the Union Address, European Commission, 2017) The predictions of Montenegrin politicians seem to be even more optimistic, as both the Montenegrin Chief negotiator with the EU and Serbian Prime Minister believe that their countries will close all negotiation chapters even earlier than that. (Confirmed in their interviews with European Western Balkans Portal and Euractiv)

Ever since starting its monitoring process with Montenegro, the EU distinguished seven key areas that will be the focus of the negotiations. The EU Commission´s opinion on Montenegro´s application for membership recognized the overall readiness of the country to comply with the standards of the EU, but the areas related to corruption, strengthening the rule of law and fighting organized crime were emphasized as requiring particular focus. (Gagro,

Vukas, 2012). These are the issues that have been present in Montenegro ever since the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the fight against them was ongoing before the accession process started; the monitoring of the EU only picked up from where the previous efforts of the local political and NGO groups started years ago. Because of this, the local population generally sees the EU as a helping hand in combating often questionable behavior of the government, with over 65.9% of the population having favorable opinion on EU membership in 2018. (Statistics by the EU Delegation in Montenegro and DeFacto Agency). It is expected for these issues to be solved in the process of joining the EU, as the Europeanization of Montenegrin laws will align them with the EU ones. However, the Montenegrin public does not agree with all of the reforms requested by the EU, particularly those concerning social issues. The political and economic reforms are introduced as a result of the negotiation process, and the Montenegrin government is able to ‘validate them’ as part of the country´s Europeanization process. Validating them is not an issue as the Montenegrin public believes the EU accession will greatly improve the country. However, what happens in cases where both the public and politicians do not agree with reforms, but they are still introduced as part of the Europeanization of Montenegro? The political and economic reforms receive positive feedback, but reforms targeting the social structure are seen as ´anti Montenegrin’ and at times threatening. An example of that is the country´s overwhelmingly negative view on pro-LGBT reforms that started taking place in 2010 after the country was granted the candidate status. The new laws regarding protection of LGBT people in Montenegro were demanded by the EU during the initial stages of the negotiation process and this essay will argue that all pro-LGBT policies adopted in Montenegro are a product of top-down Europeanization, and would not have been possible without the EU demands.

1.2. Significance of Focusing on Europeanization of the LGBT Policies in Montenegro

The thesis will focus on the issue of Montenegro introducing pro-LGBT reforms as a part of its accession negotiations for EU membership. Examining this part of the negotiation process is particularly interesting for a number of reasons: Firstly, it is an issue that Montenegro has very little experience with, yet needs to take care of due to EU´s demands. What separates this obstacle from the others is also a generally

11 very negative attitude of the local population when it comes to visibility and equal legal treatment of LGBT people. It is an inevitable part of the accession process that is requiring legal changes that the local population does not support. In 2009, just a year before the Montenegrin government submitted its application for EU membership, a local company for public opinion analysis Ipsos Strategic Marketing surveyed the general population and discovered that over 70% of the surveyed population believes that homosexuality is a disease. (Ipsos Strategic Marketing Survey on General Opinion on Homosexuality in Montenegro from 2009) This belief affected other answers, such as the view that homosexuality is dangerous for the country, and the view that the church is right when it comes to condemning homosexuality. This general negative outlook on LGBT people was a challenging starting point to say the least. Secondly, the fight for LGBT rights can be seen as an entirely EU product. There is no history of protecting this minority in Montenegro up until the negotiation process. Most of the newer EU member states had turbulent negotiations regarding LGBT rights, but the conversations about it were happening prior to EU accession, which we will discover in Chapter 4. In the case of Montenegro, that conversation started with the accession, therefore, the progress that has been made in providing equal rights to this community is entirely done in order to satisfy the EU and progress further with the negotiations. This is where the europeanization of the issue is most noticeable. It could be perceived that aligning Montenegrin laws regarding LGBT people to be on pair with the EU ones is the purest example of Europeanization found in candidate states. Thirdly, the obvious need for help of the Montenegrin LGBT population is giving us insight into the EU acting as a shelter for certain oppressed groups that would not enjoy the protection they do if it was not for the process of europeanization. If it was not for the EU´s focus on human rights and combating local discriminative policies, it would be much harder to create any positive change relying on efforts of the local politicians. This is where we see the link between the concepts of Europeanization and shelter, and emphasizing that link gives more relevance to EU membership, as minorities such as the LGBT community are given a whole new set of rights. The thesis reveals the level of Europeanization that is happening in a candidate state, and how downloading policies enormously benefits a part of the local population. By researching the development of LGBT rights in Montenegro, we will get a good insight on how a socially oppressed group such as LGBT community in candidate states finds shelter in the EU, since their protection is not guaranteed by the national government . The rights and well-

12 being of this marginalized group depend on the process of Europeanization, since adopting EU policies significantly changes the circumstances created by the domestic policies.

1.3. Research Question and Hypothesis

This thesis will seek to answer the research question: Are LGBT rights in Montenegro entirely a result of the state´s EU accession negotiations? We will explore the general significance of LGBT rights in the EU by examining the progress of their development from the founding member states with a longer history of LGBT inclusion, to the newer members with less LGBT tolerant societies. We will see how the recent enlargements to central and eastern European member states influenced the negotiation process and resulted in stricter requirements for current candidate states such as Montenegro. By placing stricter standards on the current candidate states, the EU managed to transform even the most controversial policies such as pro- LGBT policies in countries with an overwhelmingly homophobic population. By researching the Montenegrin efforts in improving LGBT rights, we will see the level of Europeanization at work, as well as the need for societal shelter of the LGBT community in this state, and test the hypothesis that Montenegro has undertaken radical changes in their policies and laws regarding LGBT people solely due to their accession process with the EU.

1.4. Structure of the Thesis

We will start by discovering the term Europeanization in Chapter 2 and how top-down Europeanization can significantly impact the policies and laws in both EU member and candidate states. This chapter also introduces the shelter theory, particularly the societal shelter smaller states seek from bigger states or unions. The purpose of this chapter is to understand that top-down Europeanization has the potential to heavily transform EU candidate states, as the process has become stronger and more demanding over the years. We then discover a link between Europeanization and the Shelter Theory, as the changes brought upon by Europeanization can serve as a main source of shelter for oppressed communities in EU

13 candidate states, such as the LGBT community in Montenegro. We will go over the research methods used for discovering this link.

Chapter 3 focuses on the significance of LGBT rights in the EU, and places an emphasis on the development of LGBT rights in the older EU member states that have started the trend of implementing pro-LGBT policies in their legislative systems. The purpose of this chapter is to understand the roots of LGBT activism in Europe and successful implementation of progressive policies among the original member states, because that sparked the beginning of common EU policies regarding LGBT equality.

Chapter 4 focuses on the impact that the 2004 EU enlargement wave had on the LGBT policies in EU member states, as this enlargement saw nine post-communist states join, all with a limited experience in LGBT activism and inclusion. We will see how this enlargement introduced a more intense Europeanization of LGBT related policies in candidate and member states, which will be helpful in understanding the process that Montenegro is currently going through.

Chapter 5 explains the impact that Croatia and Serbia have on Montenegro, and the shelter Montenegro received from its bigger ex-Yugoslav republics. The purpose of the chapter is to recognize many similarities in these countries´ approach towards LGBT inclusion, as they all used to be part of a union – Yugoslavia, and shared common history and values. Montenegro, as the smallest Yugoslav republic used them for societal shelter, and still continues to be affected by the social developments in Croatia and Serbia, including the development of LGBT issues.

Chapter 6 focuses on the uniqueness of the Montenegrin case when it comes to the lack of LGBT activism and a generally non-existent LGBT ‘scene’. This separates it from other EU member and candidate states which, even though heavily Europeanized, had experience with LGBT activism prior to EU accession talks. The chapter begins with the case of the first openly gay Montenegrin man who became an activist and was pressured into seeking asylum in Canada, which reveals the hostile atmosphere in the country when it comes to LGBT people. The chapter is concluded with the analysis of the same-sex partnership law discussion in the Montenegrin parliament which shows the reasons behind local politicians´ decisions to vote in 14 favor of pro-LGBT reforms. The purpose of the chapter is to show that the introduction of LGBT inclusive policies is parallel with the EU accession talks, and that even though local activists cannot do their work due to a homophobic environment, the country is still discussing implementation of pro-EU laws which reveals how intense the Europeanization around this issue is.

Chapter 7 includes the concluding remarks as well as a reflection on benefits and flaws of top- down Europeanization in candidate EU states.

2 Theoretical Framework and Methodology

2.1. Europeanization

Europeanization generally refers to interactions between the EU and its member states or third countries, but since this process became more prominent in European politics, it has gone through many definitions. (Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2016) Perhaps it is the common usage of the phrase that made some authors question the concept and wonder if it is just a fashionable term, or actually a useful one, but most scholars would agree that Europeanization represents the process of institutionalization at the European level and governance with common institutions making, implementing and enforcing EU-wide binding policies. (Olsen, 2002).

The most common distinctions of definitions regarding interactions between EU institutions and local governments are generally found in two variations: top-down and bottom-up approaches. With the top-down approach, European institutions influence policies and laws in its member states, or candidate states, meaning that the change starts with the EU institutions and ends with implementations of those changes on the local level of a member or candidate state. On the other end, there is the bottom-up approach seen in member states influencing EU institutions and manipulating EU-wide policies, laws and practices starting with their governments. (Olsen, 2002). The areas of life that Europeanization affects are extremely diverse since there are so many EU policies affecting the everyday life of an EU citizen. For example, Cini and Borragan (2016) reflect on Germany´s success in turning their air pollution regulations into a directive adopted by the entire EU in 1988, resulting in Germany already having their industry up to these new standards, while the UK on the other hand had to overhaul its entire industrial system and purchase new technologies, majority of them from Germany. Europe is still fairly diverse in terms of political, social and economic structures, so not all member states will react the same towards same policy changes. As Knill suggests: “the same European policy might cause fundamental reforms in one country while having no impact at all in others”. (Knill, 2001: 12) Similarly, EU-wide policies may be beneficial for one member state, and problematic for another one, but once they are part of the EU acquis, they impact the entire union and every member state must comply with them.

2.1.1. Top-down Europeanization in EU Candidate States

It is particularly interesting to observe top-down Europeanization between the EU and its candidate states for a number of reasons. First, it seems that in this scenario between the EU institutions and candidate states, top-down approach is the only approach possible, as candidate states need to align their laws and policies with the EU ones if they are trying to become full members of the union and therefore earn their participation in decision-making processes of the European Commission, Parliament and other most important EU decision-making bodies. Olivera Komar and Slaven Živkovic (2016) reflect on the way political decisions are made in a Montenegro and emphasize the role of the negotiations with the EU: “The main driving force of all the changes is based on a top–down process since the majority of legislation is introduced in order to “meet European Union standards,” or to “fulfill the criteria set by the EU in the negotiation process.” This is how the current EU accession process, though it facilitates the formal transformation of the democratic framework, reinforces the top–down approach to decision making, additionally sending a message to the citizens that they are not in control and that the decisions are being made somewhere else.” (Komar, Živkovic, 2016: 786)

While going through the accession process, candidate states are only in a position to ´download´ policies, which is a part of their accession process, and they simply cannot reach the level of influence to ‘upload’ any policies themselves. This can lead to a perception that candidate states are powerless against EU institutions and in an inferior position right from the beginning of their membership. Moreover, during the process of proving their ability to comply with the European standards in politics and economy, these new member states often find themselves “proving” they belong in Europe, which is usually seen through a Europeanization of the social standards. “Europeanization, further, entails a determination by ‘core’ European states as to which states on the ‘periphery’ deserve membership in the European society based on how much they live up to European rules or values that Europe holds dear.” (Jones and Subotic, 2011: 545)

Secondly, with the increased number of member states, the negotiations have become more demanding. For the majority of the chapters included in the accession process, candidate states must meet certain criteria that is required by the European institutions, and this system does not 17 really involve any ´negotiating´ - the accession process, the speed and the intensity of it entirely depends on the ability of the candidate state to prove it meets the criteria set out in the given chapter. The length of the accession process has been steadily rising since 2004 when the largest expansion wave occurred and the trend continued with the 2007 and 2013 enlargements when Bulgaria´s, Croatia´s and Romania´s accessions were repeatedly halted due to intensified monitoring processes. This can be attributed to the lessons learned from the 2004 expansion as all of the newer member states come from central or eastern Europe; regions with a different social, political and economic background that requires more time to adapt to EU standards.

2.1.2. Top-Down Europeanization of LGBT Policies

This is certainly true for the laws and policies regarding LGBT issues, as there is a clear divide in the views of the western and eastern parts of Europe. Fejos and Balogh (2013) point out the emergence of terms like ‘European values’ when reviewing documents regarding lobbying for improving LGBT rights, intentionally presenting equal protection of sexual minorities as ´European´ regardless of in which region it´s taking place. This notion of Europeanizing the issue is found in virtually all newer member states and in the case of Montenegro it has been so intense that LGBT rights and inclusion have already reached a level similar to the one found in the majority of the post-2004 member states, as we will notice when exploring those member states´ road to LGBT equality. This contrast could be explained through an intensified process of Europeanization of the LGBT policies during the negotiation process, not after the state has already reached membership status.

Finally, one of the costs of this kind of Europeanization is found in the fact that candidate states do not have the luxury of choosing what kind of policies are changed on the domestic level in order for them to be aligned with the EU ones. It is all part of the accession process, and each of the 33 chapters leads towards adopting the acquis that represents common rights and obligations of all member states. In the case of Montenegrin adoption of LGBT inclusion policies, they are mostly a part of the Chapter 23 focusing on judiciary and fundamental rights. The EU Commission’s view of this chapter emphasizes that “member States must ensure respect for fundamental rights and EU citizens’ rights, as guaranteed by the acquis and by the Fundamental Rights Charter.” (European Commission´s Fundamental Rights Charter) In order to enable fundamental rights to all of its citizens, anti-discriminatory laws must be introduced 18 for all the citizens, including the ones protecting citizens identifying as LGBT. This is why examining the Europeanization of LGBT rights in Montenegro gives us insight into how intense the process of reaching that point is. Introducing anti-discriminatory laws, increasing the visibility of the LGBT population with regular pride marches and starting discussion on same sex partnerships in a country where no prior efforts have been taken over such issues has been a big challenge for both the EU and Montenegro, and it continues to play a major role in the country´s road towards full accession. Similar scenarios could be found in some other central or eastern EU countries (V4 states and Baltic states), and certainly in the regional member and candidate states (Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia), but what separates Montenegro from these other examples is the dependency of the LGBT issues on EU institutions, since no local LGBT groups have been formed before the negotiations in 2012 started. Therefore, all of the results related to improving LGBT rights could be seen as the product of the EU, which is where the heavy Europeanization of this issue is recognized. By examining this process in detail, we can see Europeanization at work.

2.2. Shelter Theory and Societal Shelter

Shelter theory is seen as the need for small states to rely on bigger states or international organizations when it comes to economic, military and social issues. By not having enough resources to maneuver these matters, small states are often found seeking shelter within international organizations or by forming bilateral and multilateral agreements with other states. Because of these disadvantages, small states often have to join alliances and form special unions in order to handle certain issues, and this phenomenon can be found in many cases throughout history. (Thorhallsson, 2019) In the case of Montenegro, one of the smallest European countries with only around 600,000 people, as well as one of the youngest states with its independence reached in 2006, it heavily relies on bigger entities for support in many ways. As an EU candidate state, Montenegro is actively seeking economic shelter by becoming a part of the bigger free market and it already uses the euro as its currency; political shelter by consistently aligning its strategic goals with the EU, and it became a member of NATO in 2017 which secures the military shelter. Traditional international relations and small states literature often neglect the importance of societal relations, but societal shelter is important because it contains the diffusion of foreign people and ideas in order to avoid social stagnation and to make up for the lack of indigenous 19 knowledge. (Thorhallsson, Steinsson, 2019) Perhaps the shelter Montenegro lacks the most is the societal shelter, as its small population combined with the lack of diversity could result in social stagnation and a delay of accepting new ideas, which is certainly seen in ignoring LGBT issues until its EU accession negotiations. It should be kept in mind that before 2006, Montenegro has always been a part of a bigger union (Serbia and Montenegro, SFR Yugoslavia, Kingdom of Slovenes, and Serbs and Croats, going back to a more recent history), and even prior to that, it was found in the hands of whichever regional superpower held the most influence over the surrounding territory (mainly the Venetian Republic, Ottoman Republic and Austria- Hungary). In all of these eras, Montenegro was the smallest entity, relying heavily on others´ support - or shelter. Small states are dependent on the free flow of ideas coming from beyond their borders and even though not all ideas are good, the beneficial ones will prevail if they are an improvement from past ideas. (Thorhallsson, Sveinsson, 2019)

In a small state like Montenegro, LGBT people are found in very small numbers, but the lack of their visibility is not just due to small numbers; it is because the majority of this community chooses to stay quiet as their sexual or gender identity is not approved by the overwhelmingly homophobic society. This lack of visibility may influence the stagnation of progressive changes in laws and policies protecting them, as their problems do not appear to be a priority if the community itself is next to invisible. Therefore, accepting modern ideas, values and attitudes from bigger societies is extremely beneficial and can immensely help the LGBT community in a small society such as the Montenegrin one, where shelter takes on a completely different level.

2.3. Interplay of Theories: Europeanization of LGBT Policies as Shelter for the Montenegrin LGBT Community

20 from bigger societies is extremely beneficial and can immensely help the LGBT community in a small society such as the Montenegrin one.

In the case of Montenegro, the past attitudes towards LGBT population are overwhelmingly negative, so even though the more positive attitudes come from outside, they are still beneficial for the local LGBT community, and those new ideas are why the local LGBT population finds both shelter and a home in the EU, as without the EU institutions, there would be no progress at all. Because the reforms regarding the improvement of the LGBT community started simultaneously with the EU negotiations, we can argue that there would be no reforms at all if it was not for the accession process. That is why this minority relies so much on the EU; if it was not for the top-down Europeanization securing legal protection and promoting equal treatment, these reforms would most likely never be implemented. This is why the process of Europeanization is more significant for oppressed and marginalized groups in EU candidate states; it is much more than a to-do list, it is the main driving force behind the positive changes in their circumstances – it is where they find their shelter.

2.4. Research Method, Purpose and Design

The research is based on a qualitative method, which is suitable for the topic that includes multiple cases and a need for analysis of the behavior of governments of candidate states aiming to join the EU. According to Uwe Flick, qualitative data combines overviews, condensations and summaries with approaches of detailed analysis with the aim to generalize statements by comparing various materials or several cases. (Flick, 2013). Each of the chapters focuses on particular cases of the LGBT rights movement, from the earliest cases in Europe, to the formation of common EU laws and how that is affecting the Montenegrin case. With process tracking, we will discover the roots of the Europeanization of LGBT rights in the EU and Montenegro, and then understand how that process is approached in Montenegro with discourse analysis. Jack S. Levy emphasizes the role of qualitative methodology in recent years when it comes to research in political science, and how utilizing qualitative methods in case studies helps with development, refinement and testing of theories. (Levy, 2007). Essentially we are seeing the development of LGBT rights by observing various cases from the old EU member states and analyzing the impact of those cases on the newer member states that are expected to adopt the same norms. Process tracking and discourse analysis are utilized here, as tracking 21 these changes and the dialogue around them can give us a clearer image on how developed the requirements for LGBT reforms are when it comes to current negotiating states. When it comes to the analysis of the LGBT reforms in EU member states, books, journals and academic articles will be used, as much has been written on the topic, while the lack of published academic material on the Montenegrin case required analysis from other sources, such as media outlets and direct statements from politicians discussing the topic. Discourse analysis generates data to be analyzed from a particular understanding, seen from a certain theoretical frame, and can be interview transcripts, newspaper articles, observations or documents. (Cheek, 1146). The basic aim of the qualitative research is to explain a phenomenon, and the thesis aims to explain the role of Europeanization in adopting LGBT rights in Montenegro. It does so by process tracking of the developments made in the states that have already become members, and discourse analysis of that same issue in the case of Montenegro.

3. Why Are LGBT Rights Important for the EU?

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter we will go over the roots of the LGBT rights movement in Europe and understand how LGBT rights became an important focus for the EU. Understanding certain milestones in achieving equality for this community will help us see how difficult and time consuming that process is, which directly influences the pressure on new member and candidate states to maintain the optimal circumstances for LGBT Europeans. Additionally, the timeline of certain highlights in the fight for LGBT rights across Europe will give us insight into how certain EU member states have a longer history in LGBT inclusion, while other states had to catch up with their policies and public attitudes towards homosexuality and gender identity. Additionally, we will observe how those same member states have been members of the EU since either its inception, or since the early waves of enlargement. We will therefore better notice the differences between the older and newer EU member states in terms of both their policies regarding LGBT equality and public attitudes that often dictate those policies; as well as notice the time frame in which LGBT activism switched its focus from national to EU-wide. The aim of this chapter is to understand the dynamics of LGBT activism leading to progressive policies across the EU so that we can better understand the position in which both the EU and Montenegro are currently placed when it comes to negotiating Montenegro´s accession and discussing LGBT issues, as the two are on very different timelines, yet Montenegro is supposed to adhere to many of the policies that have been implemented in the EU a while ago.

3.2. Older EU Member States Are Global Leaders in LGBT Rights

The first important milestone in protecting LGBT people from being treated differently could be seen in implementing anti-discriminatory laws. However, we could also perceive this as the bare minimum that a country can offer, as not being discriminated against due to one’s sexual orientation or gender identity is considered as part of fundamental citizen’s rights in today´s EU. In 1981, the Council of Europe adopted a report on decriminalizing homosexuality and suppressing discrimination, introducing the same age of consent as for heterosexual relations, and equality in employment rights (Ayoub, Patternote, 2014) A few years later, as emphasized by Waaldijk and Clapham (1993) on March 13th, 1984, the European Parliament too observed

23 that discrimination against homosexuals is unacceptable, and criticizes all kinds of discrimination based on sexual orientation; however, these efforts by the EU Parliament did not inspire complete dismissal of discriminatory policies across the union.

As we can observe from the reports issued by these main EU institutions, in the early stages of the European project, there was still a lot of discrimination and mistreatment towards gay and lesbian EU citizens; nevertheless at the same time, this time frame of late 1980s and early 1990s traces introduction of some of the pioneering progressive LGBT policies in EU member states. When the European Parliament discouraged discrimination based on sexual orientation, there were no national constitutions in Europe that specifically prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation, nonetheless at the start of the 1980s, nine EU member states did have general equality clauses in their constitutions, and by 1991, France, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands had specific prohibitions on discrimination based on sexual orientation. (Clapham, Waaldijk, 1993: 77-79). These two authors also researched the social status of gays and lesbians in the European Community, assessing their status in 10 different areas: public affection, partnership, parenting, employment, education, health care, housing, religion, association and access to information. Even though the results were introduced with a disclaimer that the situation of LGBT people in these spheres greatly varies between member states, what was common in the entire EC is that LGBT people were still very discriminated against in all of these areas, rarely experiencing the same kind of treatment as people identifying as heterosexual. (Clapham, Waaldijk, 1993) The first efforts in combating homophobia and providing more equal opportunities for the LGBT community were seen in anti-discrimination policies based on sexual orientation, but we should note how that is the least a state can do in order to provide safety and livable conditions for its citizens. What most authors consider to be a real milestone in fight for equality is the legalization of same sex marriage, as legalizing the relationship between people of the same sex validates them before the state, and often automatically ´fixes´ the mistreatment in several spheres of life, such as finance, housing, healthcare and other basics of family life. By analyzing the legal and social discrimination of LGBT citizens in the then twelve EC member states, Waaldijk (1993) points out that ´one may safely conclude that for the foreseeable future no member state will allow same-sex couples to marry.´ (Waaldiijk, 1993: 93) This prediction is very important to note, since no member state in the EU had legalized same-sex marriage until 2001, when the Netherlands became the first European nation to allow same sex couples

24 to marry. But the inability for same sex couples to marry not only affected the inability of gays and lesbians to enjoy same legal rights as heterosexuals, but as Tarik Abou- Chadi and Ryan Finnigan (2018) discover, introduction of same-sex marriage leads to more tolerant attitudes towards homosexuality, and in contrast, banning same-sex constitutionally leads to a more negative view and attitude towards homosexuality. Therefore, the introduction of same sex marriage not only solves a lot of legal issues that LGBT people tend to experience, it also improves the general attitude towards them. Therefore, in the early stages of the EU, we could argue that the lack of legal equality (such as the inability to marry among same sex relationships) affected the attitude towards LGBT people, and once the trend of legalizing them began in the older EU member states, there was an understandable fear that enlarging the union to states with a poor protection of LGBTQ people could negatively affect the attitudes towards the community. The prediction by Waaldijk regarding no chances for same-sex marriage equality stayed valid for only a certain amount of time, and as Fernandez and Lutter (2013) point out, the rapid policy changes in many affluent democracies in Europe resulted in one of the most dramatic policy convergences in recent history; in 1980s no European country offered legal recognition to same sex couples, but only 25 years later, 16 European democracies introduced laws that recognize same sex marriages or registered partnerships to same sex couples. (Fernandez, Lutter, 2013)

3.3. The Beginning of Common LGBT Policies in the EU

By taking a closer look at the legal, social and economic status of LGBT people in EU member states prior to 2000s, we can observe how a certain level of EU-wide effort for protection of LGBT citizens exists (such as in the reports from the EU Parliament and the EU directive on human rights), but the actual policies affecting LGBT citizens still varied greatly between member states, and were not significantly influenced by the EU institutions. It was only in 1997, four decades after the founding of the European Community that protection of fundamental rights was introduced in the treaties, which reflected the concern over the EU being enlarged to the more fragile democracies of the post-communist countries. (Ayoub, Paternotte, 2014) This makes it easier to understand why the EU institutions today place a certain focus on LGBT

25 rights; it took a long time and hard work to reach the status this community enjoys today, and enlarging the union to new member states that do not share the same level of equality for LGBT rights might be seen as a threat for the progress that has already been made.

In the next chapter we will notice how newer member states that joined in 2004 had some catching up to do regarding LGBT policies. However, judging from this, we could assume that the optimal circumstances of LGBT people in the EU before the biggest expansion in 2004 were not due to the efforts of the EU institutions; the status of LGBT people just happened to be better than in the post 2004 member states because the national policies of those older member states protected the rights of LGBT citizens. In other words, solving the issues of LGBT citizens did not have to take on a very Europeanzied form as in other EU member states; these older member states were able to take care of at least the fundamental problems that preoccupied LGBT citizens on their own without the same kind of help coming from EU institutions.

The newer member states from the central and eastern parts of Europe went through very difficult political and economic circumstances during the 1980s and 1990s when most of the pro-LGBT policies were implemented in western (EC and EU) member states. In order for them to adapt to the system already established by the older member states, the accession process of the newer member states was based on conditionality orchestrated by the EU institutions, and these conditions are essential to reassure existing member states that new members will look like familiar, western European states. (Grabbe, 2012) In order to make sure that the policies regarding LGBT people in the new member states look ´familiar´ to the ones from the West, the protection of LGBT laws was ensured in the form of conditions for membership. Therefore, by changing the policies for the sake of aligning the acquis with the EU, the circumstances of LGBT people in those newer member states improved. The Europeanized approach of these newer member states also goes in line with the world society theory analyzed by Lutter and Fernandez who suggest that domestic political debates and reforms are often influenced by supranational cultural and discursive order seen in numerous social conventions and policy scripts that are politically influential, but often taken for granted. The states that are better connected to the international arena of discourse have a higher likelihood of adjusting their national policies based on those international norms (Lutter, Fernandez, 2013: 105-106). This scenario can be recognized in the way newer EU member states got introduced to the legacy of

LGBT inclusion that started decades before they were even considered to be members of the EU. By having a path to use an example, LGBT activists can rely on the work and examples of progressive policies of older EU member states´ activists when trying to change policies in their own states. In the next chapter we will see how newer member states changed their LGBT related policies during the EU accession process, how they adapted to them, and how their experiences influence the accession process of current candidate states such as Montenegro.

3.4. Summary

What we can learn from the viewpoints of the leading academics concerned with the rights of LGBT people during the 1980s and 1990s, is that progress made towards more equality for the LGBT community across Europe did not come on its own, but was a result of a long struggle leading to slow adjustments and finally full equality in some states. After the older member states began to enjoy more protection and inclusivity for LGBT people, EU institutions made efforts in adopting EU policies that would be mandatory for all future member states, seen in the system of conditionality placed upon candidate states. That way, the newer member states are able to inherit what has already become the standard in the older EU member states. In the next chapter we will explore the notion of conditionality and the lack of LGBT activism in newer member states (that happen to be mostly post-communist states with circumstances similar to the ones in Montenegro) and that had to catch up with the progress that older EU member states already made regarding LGBT policies.

4. The Impact of the 2004 EU Enlargement on LGBT Policies in the EU

4.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter we have seen how protection of LGBT rights varied from state to state in the early stages of the EU, and how the adoption of pro-LGBT policies in the older member states influenced the system of conditionality and pressure for adoption of such policies across the entire union. As Katja Kahlina (2015) points out, provisions against discrimination based on sexuality became explicit requirements for joining the EU in 2004 and 2007 enlargements, as in 2000s the status of sexual minorities became one of the main issues regarding social equality, mostly due to a number of eastern European countries joining at the same time. In order to understand the Europeanization of LGBT rights in Montenegro, it is important to take a close look at how the roots of Europeanizing LGBT legislature took place since the 2004 enlargement. In this chapter we will see how the biggest EU expansion in 2004 shaped the further focus of the EU on LGBT rights, particularly through the process of conditionality. This process is what mostly influenced the current dynamics of negotiating accession with candidate states such as Montenegro.

In 2004, the EU had it biggest expansion to date with ten countries becoming member states of the union. Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta were the countries joining in this enlargement wave. Out of these countries, only Cyprus and Malta have no communist history, while the other eight countries shared the burden of having communist ideology shape their attitudes and policies regarding the LGBT community. As Conor O´ Dwyer emphasizes: ‘Íf any region would seem unreceptive to LGBT activism, it would be post-communist Europe. Under communism, the authorities repressed homosexuality as a social disorder’ (O´Dwyer, 2018: 892). Even though we will discover that each of these eight states established a particular approach towards LGBT equality, sharing the communist ideology´s perception of LGBT people led to a number of parallels to be drawn. Recognizing those paralells is also important for a better understanding of the Montenegrin case, as Montenegro is a post-communist state too.

4.2. Why post-Communist States Lack LGBT Activism

The reasons for the lack of domestic LGBT activism in this region are explored by many authors, and below we will analyze those. Some argue that the internalized homophobia brought upon institutional homophobic policies resulted in a lack of in-group identification which suppresses the collective action of LGBT individuals (Gorska, Bilewicz, Winiewski, 2017); other authors emphasize the role of modernization of a country in a nation´s attitude towards liberalization of LGBT rights (Hildenbrandt, Trudinger, Wyss, 2018), while authors such as Ayoub (2015) focus on the dependency of newer EU member states on transnational actors and international channels when faced with issues regarding LGBT equality. Below we will explore these findings. Granted, all of the above mentioned findings will reflect the circumstances of some newer EU member states more than the others, but they are all significant in understanding the reasons why post-communist states lack the legacy of LGBT activism, and more importantly for this thesis’ research question - why they depend on the EU and the process of Europeanization when attempting activism on their own.

Non-normative sexualities in Central and Eastern European states (CEE) have been virtually invisible up until the fall of the Iron Curtain, as already discussed, and even though since then, public display of LGBT people in media and politics did occur, followed by empowering legislative changes and the monitoring of violations of equal opportunities preceding or accompanying the process of EU-enlargement, in post-socialist Europe, LGBT people still experience discrimination and violence. (Fejes, Balogh, 2013). The ongoing discrimination and resistance to providing equal opportunities for LGBT people in post-communist EU member states is confirmed, as we have seen, in the latest Rainbow Index that measures the quality of life and the progressiveness of LGBT policies in Europe; with Latvia, Poland, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Slovakia being placed at the bottom of the list. Just for comparison, Malta, a member state that also joined the EU in 2004, was at the very top of the chart, allowing us to presume that being a new member state does not automatically mean worse conditions for LGBT people, but communist history does. Even though seeing such results by the rest of the newer (post-communist) states may be devastating, it should not come as a surprise, as taking

29 a look at the region´s history with LGBT activism, or the lack of it during the reign of communism, should give us insight in why these member states continually perform the worst when assessing LGBT equality across the EU, and why Europeanization of LGBT legislation serves as a light at the end of a tunnel for this community.

In their paper ‘Invisible to the State: Institutional sexual stigma and collective action of LGB individuals in five East European countries’ Gorska, Biliwicz and Winiewski (2017) explore the effects of institutional sexual stigma and its effects on collective action of LGB communities in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Croatia. ‘Using the data collected in five East European countries, we found that sexual stigma engrained in the legal system (a macrolevel phenomenon) suppressed collective action among LGB individuals (a microlevel phenomenon).’ (Gorska, Biliwicz, Winiewski, 2017: 376) With these findings they emphasize the importance of institutional homophobia and the effect of internalized homophobia on the lack of in-group identification. Perhaps this would be the simplest explanation of why the LGBT activism did not reach the impact comparable to the one in old member states, because we are seeing the lack of initiating change from the micro perspective; the attitudes of LGBT people facing discrimination, and their reluctance to recognize the targeted discrimination by the state. This phenomenon of institutional homophobia of post-communist countries lasted quite a long time, bypassing them in comparison to western European countries which, as we have previously discovered, had a stronger activist movement that managed to fight for more rights and recognition of the LGBT community on their own.

By researching and comparing the activism of LGBT organizations in the Czech Republic and Poland, O’Dwyer (2018) emphasizes a similar point, the lack of will for LGBT community to see themselves as an oppressed group that is targeted specifically: ‘Unorganized activism reflected homosexuality’s exclusion from the public sphere: even if homosexual practices were not criminalized in most postcommunist countries, they were understood as something to be kept out of public view.’ (O´Dwyer, 2018: 893) We find that to be true in another post- communist state, Estonia, as Tildenberg and Allaste (2018) notice a pattern while interviewing LGBT Estonians who identify themselves as non-heterosexual, but at the same time avoid sharing a collective LGBT identity. This recurring attitude affected the lack of LGBT activism since ’’an individual’s participation in collective action may stem from their personal and social identity as LGBT. Further, it may lead to a formation of a social or collective identity as LGBT, 30 as activist or as LGBT activist.’’ (Tildenberg, Allaste, 2018: 5) The conclusions from these authors make it easier to understand how the views of the LGBT constrained communities in affected the delay of LGBT protection.

Institutional homophobia and discrimination fueling internalized homophobia that led to the lack of activism are not the only disadvantages leaving the post-communist states behind the older member states when it comes to improving LGBT rights. The topics that were relevant in the Western part of Europe only managed to come up as a topic in countries behind the ‘iron curtain’ after the collapse of the Soviet Union. (Tildenberg, Allaste 2018) The era of communism kept these states in a ‘bubble’ when it comes to modernization and keeping up with new ideas, and that resistance to modernization is what directly affected the resistance to liberalization of LGBT rights too. (Hildenbrandt, Trudinger, Wyss, 2018). When exploring the role of modernization in improving LGBT rights, it is important to emphasize that modernity is not only important in terms of new ideas, but also in technological modernity and establishing a modern welfare state. The authors researching the role of modernity reflected on the works of researchers who made a correlation between a country´s GDP or Human Development Index, and the likelihood of introducing anti-discriminatory policies. If we take a look Eurostat´s 2018 GDP statistics in the EU, it is not difficult to spot the differences between the older and newer EU member states. All of the post-communist member states joining in 2004 or after have a lower average GDP per capita when compared with the older member states, and considering that the financial and status struggles of a society have been described as influential in determining a society´s level of acceptance of sexual liberalization, we could argue that worse economic conditions were partially responsible for worse LGBT policies. With economic growth come the benefits of the welfare state, which can reduce existential anxiety as well as improve the educational sector, which gives societies access to information and a chance to improve their cognitive skills, and it all combined leads to escaping narrow societal roles, and exploring new social interactions. (Hildenbrandt, Trudinger, Wyss, 2018) This chain of events could be understood as the opposite scenario to what post-communist states experienced during the Cold War, which is isolation, lack of modernization and strong emphasis on existing societal roles promoted by the government, as seen in the examples of Slovakia and Lithuania in the next chapter. So aside from the current significant GDP difference between the older and newer member states, newer member states with a communist history must carry the baggage of delayed modernization, which is another reason for their lack of support for LGBT equality

4.3. Heavy Europeanization of LGBT Policies Found in post-Communist EU States

We have discovered the circumstances of LGBT people in post-communist states in the previous chapter, and even thouhg their hardships were plenty, all of the post-communist states did have certain activist groups attempting to bring change with their fight for visibility, but due to such strong anti-LGBT sentiments from the government, their work only produced noticeable results after the countries started their EU talks. The biggest country of the region, Poland, experienced the biggest organizational growth of LGBT activism after it joined the EU. O’Dwyer (2018) explains this through the concept of ‘benefitting from backlash’ – which is seen in Poland´s case. After the country joined the EU, the LGBT norms were in direct conflict with the overly homophobic attitudes of the country, and the backlash from introducing such norms introduced other actors to the conversation, such as pro-EU political parties who supported LGBT rights just because they mean being part of the EU.

Katja Kahlina (2015) emphasizes similar scenarios happening in Croatia, where some politicians´ desires to distance from the rest of the Balkan states emphasized their devotion to European norms and values, which include being tolerant and inclusive of LGBT people. This kind of support coming from the governments of post-communist states is such a contrast from what they have promoted before, because as previously noted, LGBT identities were condemned and often made invisible, instead placing focus on desirable identities based on ‘traditional values’.

In the case of Slovakia, another post-communist state that suffered from experiencing four decades of communist views on LGBT community, a productive citizen was considered to be devoted to the state party, married, heterosexual and monogamous, and all other non-normative behaviors were rendered invisible. (Fejes, Balogh, 2013). Similar cases can be found in another post-communist state, Lithuania, where the desired identity of a poster-Lithuanian was based on a young, married, heterosexual person in a nuclear family. (Kulpa, Mizilienska, 2011) But as we have seen in the examples of the countries above, the national rhetoric changed due to

32 the need to legitimize these countries´ belonging to Europe and having European values, which enabled local LGBT activist groups to finally receive some mainstream support.

4.4. Summary

Since the region was under the Soviet sphere of influence for such a long time, Soviet views on homosexuality left traces on the societies of these countries too, mostly seen in the efforts to erase the notion of homosexuality existing in their societies. Balogh and Fejes (2013) reflect on the work of scholars who noted total invisibility of homosexuality in post-communist countries´ popular and academic discourse, not only prosecuting the community, but completely erasing it. The lack of visibility and conversation about the LGBT community led to ignorance and later legal discrimination of this community. It additionally affected the behavior of the LGBT community that had more issues in identifying as a minority due to hostile views. So, what we can draw from this is that LGBT activism in newer post-communist member states was heavily suppressed in the communist era, and only received support from the government after EU accession talks started, allowing the LGBT community to become a part of the national discourse. With the support of the EU, LGBT legislation reached reforms and secured equality which was unimaginable before. In the next chapter, we will see how post-communist societies in the Balkans were even more prone to hostile views on their LGBT communities due to the devastating events of the 1990s.

5. How the Region Shaped the Montenegrin Approach to LGBT Rights

5.1. Introduction

Much of the previous examples from Central and Eastern European states can be applied to the history of LGBT community in Montenegro, but certain cultural and historical differences influenced the Montenegrin society to develop in a unique way, particularly when discussing LGBT issues. Dwelling deep into Montenegrin history and its somewhat complicated national identity is not the central topic of this essay, however reflecting on it briefly should help understand how the Montenegrin societal developments largely depended on external timelines, particularly those of closest regional states. This essentially includes other ex-Yugoslav states, as other European states did not make such a great impact on the Montenegrin society until recently, when the EU accession process inspired comparison to other EU member states.

In the past, Montenegro has always been part of a bigger union, unsurprisingly, for such a small population located on a small strip of Adriatic and surrounded by bigger states. However, the independence reached in 1878 at the Berlin Congress was the first time in more recent times that there was a sense of sovereignty and a distinguished national identity separate from the other South Slavic nations. What followed after was the inclusion in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes which would turn into Yugoslavia for a longer period of time, and that era brought back the feeling of a ‘small cousin’ that simply depends on its bigger siblings controlling the political, economic and social strings of the region. Therefore, when talking about Montenegrin history with LGBT issues, we must briefly cover the history of the bigger regional countries because what happened there had a direct impact on the Montenegrin case. Additionally, by understanding how the struggle for LGBT equality looked in the countries deemed to be the most similar to Montenegro, we will better realize how exactly unique Montenegrin circumstances are, and why Europeanization of LGBT issues in that state is so drastic.

5.2. Developments in Serbia and Croatia the Most Important

Even though Yugoslavia included three other states (Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Slovenia), due to linguistic and historic similarities, and a dominant political and cultural discourse coming from Serbia and Croatia, these two states are the only states whose developments with LGBT issues really mattered to Montenegro. Drawing back on the shelter theory that suggests smaller states get influenced by bigger states, the status of Montenegro as the smallest Yugoslav state certainly reflects that; the societal shelter in particular was found in bigger neighboring states. Even though both neighboring countries are considerably bigger than Montenegro with populations 5 (Croatia) or 10 times (Serbia) bigger than that of Montenegro, these are still small states with a very miniscule LGBT ‘scene’.

The size of the LGBT community, paired with the already mentioned burden of communist views is actually worsened by several other circumstances when compared to the other post- communist states of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region. Due to sharing communist ideology with other CEE states, we could learn a lot from the Europeanization processes of CEE states, however the ex-Yugoslav states carry an even bigger baggage seen in the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia which heavily impacted these societies. The Balkan region has been a hotspot of violence and wars for the majority of modern history, with the most recent Yugoslav civil war of the 1990s shaping the region´s shift into a more traditional society, and reintroducing older values that have promoted clear gender roles, a focus on machismo and a very sharp distinction of behavior for both men and women. (Swimelar, 2018)

If we compare the timelines of CEE states and Yugoslav states, we can see that the 1990s marked a beginning of EU integration for the CEE states while the Yugoslav states were in the middle of a war, far too busy surviving, much less working on being integrated into the EU. In short, as if the communist ideology was not enough to shun LGBT depiction, these turbulent times have additionally made it difficult for LGBT rights to become a topic of discussion, as they were even more so erased in social structures. These are some of the circumstances that are unique for the modern Europe and are certainly more severe than virtually found elsewhere in the EU, and should be kept in mind when researching any social developments in the Balkans, particularly the development of LGBT rights.

For the purpose of this thesis, it is helpful to take a closer look on what has been researched about the Serbian and Croatian cases, as there has been more written about these two states´ road towards LGBT equality and a lot of the findings from these states apply to Montenegro. Furthermore, in many aspects, Montenegro´s case could be understood as a mix of experiences of these two states, which does not come as a surprise. Being so deep into the accession process, and having an overwhelmingly pro-EU government and population brings the Montenegrin case closer to Croatia, while the socio-political past of the country resembles the Serbian case. This influences LGBT issues just as much. Most importantly, there is one common line tying all three cases together – the intense Europeanization of LGBT rights and the constant merging of LGBT rights with EU accession of these states. Even though these states are no longer sharing the same central Yugoslav government, it appears that their independent governments and populations understood and still regard LGBT rights as a step towards EU accession which otherwise would not receive the same attention, let alone commitment. As Katja Kahlina (2018) points out: ‘Since the beginning of the 2000s the values of inclusive plurality and tolerance have become part of the new changing national identities in post-Yugoslav space. The implementation of those allegedly European liberal democratic values served as a ‘proof’ of ‘Europeanness’ and a desired ‘European future’. (Kahlina, 2018: 76)

5.3. Serbian vs. Croatian Case with LGBT Rights: What Can Montenegro Learn?

Safia Swimelar (2018) compares the Serbian and Croatian cases with LGBT progress, focusing on how this issue has been approached by the two governments. She discovers that Croatian approach was heavily influenced by the desire to prove the country´s belonging in Europe and following of European norms and values, while simultaneously drifting further away from the undesirable ‘Balkan’ identity. ‘States in the Western Balkans (or Southeast Europe) such as Croatia and Serbia have been at the forefront of the intersection of the processes of Europeanization, LGBT rights change, and nationalism, occurring within a dynamic socio- cultural and political post-Yugoslav space’. (Swimelar, 2018: 2) The desire to fully immerse in the European set of values found in the Croatian case is quite similar to what Montenegro is currently experiencing while deep in the accession process; the country is regarded as the ‘leader in the region’ when it comes to Euro-Atlantic integration. Considering that the state has opened all negotiation chapters for EU accession, local politicians often like to emphasize how Montenegro has obviously chosen a path that distances themselves from the past Balkan 36 rhetoric and is committed to fully embracing their new European identity. In 2016, Milo Djukanovic, then prime minister of Montenegro addressed the European Parliament´s Committee on foreign affairs by focusing on the intense reforms Montenegro has taken upon since starting their accession process and emphasized the country´s role as a regional leader in EU affairs: ‘Montenegro will continue to responsibly promote European interests in the Western Balkans, committing itself to secure the European context in which interests of our country will be valued and its perseverance and commitment to the European course will result in consistent social framework and the confidence of citizens in the European project and social progress that it brings.’ (Milo Djukanovic´s speech, 2016, European Parliament)

Reflecting back on Swimelar´s point of the Western Balkans being on the intersection of LGBT issues, Europeanization and other substantial social reforms all happening within a post- Yugoslav socio-political space, it is important to note how it is extremely difficult to commit to such intense changes, and LGBT reform is a great example of that. This is due to the contrast of how this issue is seen in the EU and on the Balkans; the Balkan identity of these states is prone to completely erasing the existence of LGBT people, while their newly adopted EU identity is supposed to support and give complete legal and social freedom to LGBT people, which is why these societies in transition from one era to another find themselves being so torn. Katja Kahlina is another academic comparing the Serbian and Croatian cases with LGBT progress linked to EU accession and emphasizes how the EU firmly positioned themselves as promoters of LGBT tolerance in 2000s when the talks of EU accession started: ‘In addition, gay pride marches taking place in the region came under special attention of EU enlargement officials and representatives of (mostly north-western) European governments.’ (Kahlina, 2018: 75) This shows us that the progress made with LGBT issues in the region had influence from the EU from early on.

In the first chapter of this essay we have seen the steady progress found in western states who had less issues adopting EU wide policies, then later discovered how that process required heavier Europeanization in CEE states joining in 2004, but the same process becomes considerably more complex in South East European countries, or the Western Balkans. Before we examine how these states have handled LGBT issues politically, it is important to understand the social stance that predetermined such political moves. The unique circumstances of the Balkan nations make it hard to draw a clear parallel with both older and newer EU

37 member states. Certain attitudes of nations towards LGBT are common as Swimelar emphasizes: ’the relationship between nationality and sexuality has historically been constructed in ways that have supported patriarchal relations, traditional gender divisions and roles, and heterosexual relations. In short, the nation has often been constructed and framed as masculine, heterosexual, and the symbolic embodiment of what is “natural,” while same-sex relations are often constructed as “unnatural” and threatening to the traditional idea of the nation. (Swimelar, 2018: 7)

While this narrative can be found in many states around Europe (such as the previously highlighted examples of governments of Lithuania and Slovakia investing time and money in promoting a ‘healthy and desirable family’ portrayed by heterosexual couples with children) the level of which this patriarchal understanding of values influences politics is different in the Balkan states. (Swimelar, 2018) points out how the influence of military and war and their perception as defenders of the nation, fueled by a masculine picture are crucial in understanding the ways Europeanization and nationalism played out in the Balkans, and the recent wars of the 1990s still influence the political discourse and overall reality of these states. This is why the Croatian and Serbian relationship with nationalism and sexuality is more complex compared to other post-communist states that have not recently experienced war.

However, it is worth mentioning that Montenegro was excluded from the war atrocities committed during the 1990s era as the war did not happen on its territory, but that does not mean that many of the values and social changes from the neighborhood did not influence Montenegro just as much. With a considerable part of the population still declaring themselves as Serbian, these developments had a profound impact on the behavior in Montenegrin society too.

5.4. Croatian Commitment to the EU: the main Similarity to Montenegro

What we can learn about the Montenegrin LGBT case from the Croatian one is the justification of reforms through the adoption of the ‘European identity’. The previously mentioned statistical majority of Montenegrins (over 70%) supporting EU accession is even more seen in the efforts of the government to present their country as integrated into EU values as possible, and constructing the new identity of the country based on the identity of EU. This identity is 38 composed on many norms and values, out of which LGBT inclusion probably represents one of the most challenging ones to adopt, but following the norms and values around this issue is what allows the full adoption of that identity validated through full EU membership. When analysing the discourse of Montenegrin politicians on LGBT topics in later chapters, we will notice that whenever Montenegrin politicians mention improving LGBT issues, they refer to adopting European values. We can find the same narrative in Croatia, as emphasized by Swimelar: ‘By configuring Europe as Croatia’s political and cultural home, it lends support to LGBT rights as tied to Europe and to the LGBT movement that consistently seeks to tie their goals to European values of tolerance, diversity, and human rights (as they often do during Pride Parades) (Swimelar, 2018: 11)

As seen in the Montenegrin Prime Minister´s speech emphasizing Montenegro´s efforts in adopting EU values and firmly sticking to European sphere of influence, Montenegro also sees the EU as its future home, and being a part of that home requires following certain rules, of which the Montenegrin government is aware of. It joined NATO in 2018, which was another proof that Euro-Atlantic integration is the main political goal. In many ways, what Montenegro is going through currently has already happened in Croatia approximately a decade ago when the country made some substantial changes regarding LGBT rights, due to their EU accession process. The reforms in LGBT laws were often seen as necessary if the society is to really show their rightful belonging to the rest of Europe. ‘The discourses that have emerged in the struggles for sexual human rights in Croatia often evoke European identity, European values and human rights as powerful instruments for lobbying.’(Balogh, Fejes, 2013: 24)

This attitude affected the LGBT reforms in several ways, and all of them are currently repeating themselves in Montenegro where a very similar process is taking place during their accession process. The dismissal of LGBT issues by the Montenegrin politicians up until the EU negotiations can be interpreted as a sign that the reforms introduced do not reflect their views, but are used as a tool to prove their country´s place in the EU. ‘The idea that the passing of these legislative measures or sexual rights could be used to ´endear´ international institutions only makes sense in a context in which these rights are viewed as progressive and indicators of developments.’ (Balogh, Fejes, 2013: 31)

What we have seen from the 2004 expansion is that new member states feel obliged to accept EU norms that have been created decades ago, and are seen as lacking progress, so adopting EU norms becomes a sign of progress. This is definitely seen in the Croatian and Montenegrin cases with LGBT reforms due to EU accession, as both states have overwhelmingly homophobic societies, yet progressive changes are promoted from the government that is aware of the changes it needs to implement if it desires EU accession, or its ‘rightful place’ in Europe. Since both Croatia and Montenegro are late comers to the EU scene, with Croatia being the youngest member of the union, and Montenegro often regarded as the next in line to join, they are both faced with entering a union of states that have since long ago gone through the process of adapting LGBT legislation considered the minimum in terms of protecting human rights. By not delivering on this issue, they are in danger of being labelled as a ‘threat’ to the wellbeing of the union as they are showing their lack of potential in ensuring European values are really respected in their societies. In order to avoid this, politicians of these two states have used certain strategies to deal with this issue. One of them is using LGBT progress to their advantage by presenting themselves as protectors of European values and norms, and utilizing LGBT issues as a clear example of how dedicated they are to advancing their country´s alignment with EU standards. In the long run, this is still optimal for LGBT populations in Croatia and Montenegro, but this approach is problematic as ‘fake allies’ only want to support progressive reforms up to the point of reaching their political party goals, and are not genuine in their concerns.

We should also note that what differentiates Croatia´s case with the Montenegrin one is their history being centered around the Roman, Habsburg and Austro-Hungarian empire which generally all adopted the Western European identity, and that ‘allows’ the independent Croatia to prove their historic rightful belonging to the European set of values and norms by emphasizing tolerant LGBT views that are a measurement of that. ‘Despite the ever present religious and ethnic nationalism, Croatia has used its proximity to Western Europe and its Hapsburg historical legacy to proclaim consistently that it belongs to Europe, in contrast to its Balkan neighbors, as illustrated by the “return to Europe” frame’. (Swimelar, 2018: 10) It appears that separating themselves from the Balkan mindset helps Croatia elevate their image. By being closer to Western Europe, they prove their identity and drift away from the undesirable image. ‘Like orientalism, homonationalism presents the West as culturally, morally, and political advanced, with LGBT rights as one manifestation of this superiority. In short, an

40 example of homonationalism applied to this particular research is where we see European countries on the periphery, such as Croatia, use its progress on LGBT rights as a way to claim superiority over other “backward” cultures or states (Swimelar, 2018: 9) In this particular scenario, ‘other backwards’ states would be other Balkan states that have not undergone sufficient LGBT reforms (most of them are not EU candidates, and the local politicians do not see the need for major progressive changes). Montenegro has continued the same approach as Croatia and the occasional encouraging messages from Brussels have helped in maintaining the title as the leading state when it comes to EU enlargement and further integration. In 2018, the European Parliament issued a report focused on Montenegro, emphasizing how: ‘With most negotiation chapters open and a likely candidate to meet the 2025 accession date suggested by the European Commission's new 2018 enlargement strategy, Montenegro is in a leading position on its path towards EU accession, compared to the other five aspirants from the Western Balkans’ (European Parliament, 2018). This image of the frontrunner and ‘teacher´s favorite’ has been embraced by the pro-EU Montenegrin leading party, often putting themselves on a pedestal designed for EU leaders. That title has been utilized in order to present themselves closer to Europe, more in line with the European values, just like in the Croatian case.

Even though these two countries seem to put their European values on display, certain values cannot be changed easily, such as fully embracing the LGBT community. This was proven by severely aggressive pride parades in Split, the biggest Croatian coastal town, and Budva, the biggest town on the Montenegrin coast. Both cities benefit greatly from tourism and presenting themselves as desirable places for visiting. However, a gathering celebrating LGBT inclusion resulted in something completely opposite, suggesting that certain people are not welcome there, as visitors or locals, no matter how much the governments of these countries worked on inviting them. Pride Parade in Split and Pride parade in Budva, were both very violent despite all these efforts by the governments. Swimelar described the violent Split parade: ‘There were numerous foreign dignitaries attending the event, as well as Croatian citizens from across the country. There was a thousands-strong opposition prior to the event, and during the Pride, there was a large number of violent and angry anti-gay protesters, some yelling “kill the gays”. Croatia was heartily criticized by the European Union and foreign diplomats and was reminded that this behavior was not acceptable for European democracies and did not show support for European values. Croatian president Josipović condemned the attack and said, “It is sad what

41 happened in Split in which part of the population showed its non-European face’ (Swimelar, 2018: 12) A very similar scenario happened in Montenegro, in Budva, where local opponents to the pride aggressively treated the parade participants and displayed their very hostile attitudes towards the LGBT community. ‘There were around 200 participants in the procession, protected by 1900 police officers, while groups of hooligans clashed with the police in several locations and made about 20,000 euros worth of damage. Tens of hooligans were arrested, although the prosecution did not charge a single person.’ (Kalezic, Brkovic, 2010: 169) The realistic image of the local attitudes wash shown during pride, with news outlets like Reuters later spreading the news across Europe and letting the rest of the continent know that the first pride parade in Montenegro had a ‘kill the gays’ chant in its background. (Vasiljevic, Reuters, 2013)

5.5. Montenegro and Serbia: Separate States, Shared Values

Describing the long and complex relationship between Montenegro and Serbia is not the topic of this essay, but certain connections between these two states must be explained when talking about LGBT issues as the dissolution of their union occurred fairly recently in 2006. The most important finding for the purpose of understanding the Montenegrin Europeanization of LGBT rights comes from the socio-political similarities of these two countries, as well as the ‘inherited’ progress with LGBT rights, or lack thereof. Just like the above mentioned similarities with Croatia, the parallels drawn with Serbia could help us understand why exactly Montenegro is in the stage it currently is.

Montenegro has a big Serbian community and considering that it has been the last state to separate from the Serbian government (with a referendum held in 2006), the political and social ties to Serbia have traditionally been very strong. Whatever political climate was present in Serbia would inevitably influence the situation in Montenegro too. For the purpose of this essay, it is only important to focus on the dynamics between Serbia and the EU, and how that relationship affected Montenegro, particularly the Serbian approach towards Europeanization of LGBT rights. Just like in Croatia and Montenegro, local homophobic views were not in synch with the EU´s orders of creating a more friendly society for LGBT people. The directives from the EU were the same as the ones sent to Croatia or Montenegro, however they were not

42 accepted in the same way in Serbia, mostly due to the lack of desire for the country to identify with some of the core European values.

We have seen the Croatian and Montenegrin progress with LGBT rights closely linked with their desire to adopt a new European identity and prove how EU values are a part of their new identity. Jelena Subotic (2010) reflects on the Serbian approach towards identifying with Europe during the start of their accession process and discovers how the state appeared to be more reluctant to adopt their new identity. ‘As the empirical study of Serbia will show, Serbia did not immediately identify with Europe. Joining the EU was—and still is—a national priority, but the European identity never took the “taken-for-granted” attribute that makes it fully internalized. In contrast, Serbian post-Yugoslav identity has developed in profound isolation from Europe because of Serbia’s reputation as the architect of the Yugoslav breakup and the biggest perpetrator of wartime atrocities. (Subotic, 2010: 597) Additionally, since Serbia is the biggest state out of these three, as well as out of entire former Yugoslavia, we could perceive it as a factor in the state not feeling like they need help from the EU, as they are relying on their history as the biggest and most impactful state in the previous union - Yugoslavia.

As previously mentioned, Montenegro was spared the wartime atrocities, but due to its union with Serbia and a large percentage of the population identifying as Serbian, these events and their consequences played a big role in adopting EU values, and they have to be mentioned. Additionally, we have seen that a part of Croatian reasoning behind adopting EU values comes from the historical background and longstanding ties with Western European empires, which is something that Serbia and Montenegro have only partially experienced, having been under the Ottoman empire for much longer. This historical detachment from what ‘being European‘ means could be understood as something Montenegro and Serbia have in common, and why both of these states have an issue in understanding that LGBT people have always been a part of their communities, just never had the luxury of being represented; therefore their opportunity to publicly show themselves during pride parades supported by the EU does not mean that they are an EU import, it just means that it is the first time this community found support from someone. This makes it very easy for the homophobic society to detach themselves from the issue and declare it as a ‘European’ agenda that does not have anything to do with their cultures and societies. Milos Mikus (2011) reflects on the pride parade held in Belgrade, Serbia in 2010 and how it did not feel very organic, due to so much foreign influence overshadowing the

43 presence of the local participants, or the lack of it: ‘In their rather predictable and formal speeches in English, the foreign guests repeatedly referred to the EU, whose flag could be seen in the crowd, along with rainbow flags, a purple Union Jack, but no Serbian flag. Surrounded by the globalized iconography of the LGBT movement and cheesy western pop, I could not help feeling that almost the only local thing about the Parade were the militarized, violent conditions under which it was happening.’ (Mikus, 2011: 836)

The lack of identification with EU values directly influences the lack of understanding for the oppressed LGBT community, and that lack of compassion for their struggles in reaching legal and social recognition is further worsened by the ‘value creators’ such as the biggest national church, Serbian Orthodox Church. Church and traditional aspects of society often play a role in the way a country approaches certain issues, such as sexuality and gender roles, and this is where Montenegro is probably closer to Serbia. Both countries follow orthodox Christianity, which has never shown support for LGBT people, and the ‘unnatural’ perception of LGBT people is deeply connected to religion. The heads of the church have had numerous homophobic remarks that are welcomed and do not cause much concern over general population. Safia Swimelar reflects on the work of Phillip Ayoub regarding nationalism and LGBT rights, pointing out how the resistance to progressive gay policies is greater in states where ‘norm creators’ such as the church framing the LGBT community as a ‘threat for the nation’. (Swimelar, 2018)

In the Serbian example, representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church have often expressed their concerns with the LGBT minority and the way their inclusion into the mainstream society negatively affects the society in general. Milos Jovanovic (2013) explores the influence Serbian Orthodox Church has on modern Serbia on issues such as LGBT inclusion and emphasizes how the church has referred to homosexuality in particular as forceful westernization of Eastern Orthodox societies. “The Orthodox official theology unambiguously interprets homosexuality as a sin, illness, disorder, a form of zeal and addiction (similar to drug abuse), as well as something unnatural, sacrilegious and destructive.“ (Jovanovic, 2013: 87) When such negative interpretations of homosexuality come from one of the most influential norm creators, the church, they are easily translated into the general interpretation of the society who see their homophobic views being validated. It is particularly interesting to note the church´s reoccurring linking of LGBT community with the ‘west’, which goes in line with both the politicians´ and

44 general population´s understanding of LGBT people being a western import and therefore not a domestic problem that needs fixing. Understanding the stance of the Serbian Orthodox Church is important for the Montenegrin case too, as that is one of the most attended churches in Montenegro and their attitudes on the LGBT community have a direct impact on Montenegrin society too.

Having seen some of the reasons why the Serbian and Montenegrin LGBT community is often detached from the society, it is interesting to see that both countries had examples of putting LGBT figures in the spotlight for the international stage, while obviously not embracing them at home. Jones and Subotic (2011) explore the cultural Europeanization states go through, and what states on the periphery of Europe imagine ‘being European’ is like. They reflect on the Serbian decision to choose Marija Serifovic, a Roma lesbian as a representative in the Eurovision Song Contest in 2007, and how does that decision does not go in line with their widespread homophobia as well as mistreatment of the Roma community. ‘The choice of Serifovic was Serbia’s attempt to present its liberal, tolerant and modern face to Europe at the time when the country’s EU application was in jeopardy.’ (Jones, Subotic, 2011: 550) By sending a representative that collides with what the state identifies with, Serbia shows that they are willing to show a side of their society that is different, but only in order to ‘fit in’ with what is considered as ‘European’, such as LGBT inclusion and tolerance for minorities. Similarly to the Serbian choice, Montenegro sent a flamboyant performer (who does not publicly declare his sexuality, but his performances heavily reference female pop stars and are very camp), Slavko Kalezic, as their representative in the 2017 Eurovision song contest, which can be interpreted in the same way. Kalezic has had a long career in the Montenegrin entertainment industry, but has suffered ridicule and general dislike from the local homophobic audience, yet he was the one chosen to represent the country in front of Europe. These choices should make us question if states like Montenegro and Serbia choose token minority figures in order to be perceived as more tolerant, while continuing the same repressive behavior at home. Jones and Subotic reflect on his issue: ‘However, as in the Serbian case, this performance was meant exclusively for the international audience. Domestically, attitudes and behaviors toward sexual minorities remain unchanged and deeply regressive. As in the case of Serbia, gay (or ‘gay’) performers were presented abroad as instrumental Europeans, but not as full citizens back at home.’ (Jones, Subotic, 2011: 551) Interestingly enough, these same two performers chosen in order to present their countries´ tolerance have actually dated each other in the early stages of

45 their careers, possibly to cover up their sexualities and appear more in line with what their audiences wish to see.

5.6. Summary

As the smallest ex-Yugoslav republic, Montenegro has been heavily influenced by bigger ex- Yugoslav republics, namely Croatia and Serbia. These two states differ in their experience with LGBT inclusion and relationship with the EU, but Montenegro shares the experience with both. Croatia´s eager desire to use its European identity meant adopting all sorts of new values, among them LGBT inclusion, and Montenegro is going through a similar process during the negotiation phases. However, the socio-historic similarity with Serbia also influences the Montenegrin relationship with both the EU and the LGBT community, and that brings the Montenegrin case closer to Serbia. What we have seen from the above examples is the lack of identification of Serbia to the EU and its values, whether it is the historical distance, religious difference or the mainstream understanding of what is acceptable and what is not. This lack of connection between the two makes the Europeanization of LGBT laws in particular more difficult, as such drastic changes are not met with favorable reactions from the local population. ‘In short, the Serbian case illustrates that national identity has been a constraint on LGBT rights based both on its identity divergence from Europe, which is twinned with LGBT rights, and the way that national identity and religion have combined in ways that perceive homosexuality as an external threat to the nation (in addition to the family)’. (Swimelar, 2018: 20) As we further focus on the perception of the Montenegrin politicians and general public, we will see that Montenegro shares this sentiment too, but the Europeanization of LGBT laws is stronger than this perception.

6. Montenegro and LGBT Rights: The Purest Example of top-down Europeanization?

6.1. Introduction

Having seen all the similarities and reoccurring approaches towards LGBT progress in the post- Yugoslav region, we can see that many things happening in Montenegro are not exclusive to it, they are common in states with similar circumstances. However, certain details about the Montenegrin LGBT community are too unique and only apply there, which make the Europeanization of that issue more interesting. The unique circumstances mainly have to do with the size of the country and complete erasure of the LGBT community that is on a whole different level even when compared to its closest neighbors. In this chapter we will go over the main reasons on what makes the LGBT scene in Montenegro special: lack of LGBT activism prior to EU negotiations, an LGBT activist being granted asylum in Canada at a time when EU inspired LGBT policies were already implemented, as well as a general lack of visible LGBT population which can be attributed to the small size of the country paired with a homophobic environment. Additionally, we will see that even with these circumstances, Montenegro is still adopting new pro-LGBT laws, such as the same-sex partnership law. Analyzing the discussion around that law will further point out the level of top-Europeanization at work when it comes to LGBT rights in Montenegro.

6.2. First Montenegrin LGBT Activist Pressured to Seek Asylum

A good way of understanding how Montenegro dealt with the LGBT´s desire for social inclusion is analyzing the case of the first openly gay Montenegrin man, Zdravko Cimbaljevic who used his ‘title’ as the first openly gay man to create a career as an activist and founder of the LGBT group Progres. The treatment of the only gay activist can be a good starting point in understanding how extreme conditions can be for local LGBT activism. His experience as an openly gay man was extremely difficult, and the details of the harassment he endured received international coverage. Huffington Post released a viral article in 2013 titled Zdravko Cimbaljevic, Montenegro´s First Openly Gay Man, Stared Down His Own Obituary. The peculiar headline was hinting at the situation Zdravko was faced with when just a day before the first Montenegrin Pride event, opponents of the parade already prepared obituaries to be 47 plastered around the country, announcing his death. This incident gained attention due to the bizarre details around it, but Zdravko actually had a long list of violent attacks he endured over the years, with some being more serious, but they were not taken seriously by Montenegrin authorities.

After the harassment became unbearable, Zdravko decided to seek asylum in Canada, and his application was approved in September of 2013. Ever since then, Zdravko was more vocal when it comes to sharing his experience, and in 2016 he participated in the writing of the document titled ‘Security and Basic Rights: Dimensions and Perspectives in Security of LGBT People’, released by the Montenegrin government. Montenegrin Ministry of Human and Minority Rights and the Ministry of Internal Affairs placed special focus on the document, as it was one of the most comprehensive materials in educating authorities on how to approach the issue of LGBT inclusion in Montengro. Zdravko Cimbaljevic used the project to share his experience and emphasized that even though he notices progress being made over the last 3 years he spent abroad, he was still concerned with the possibility of people enduring the same traumatic events he went through. His concluding statement was rather depressing, as he pointed out that LGBT people in Montenegro are not able to live an enjoyable life due to the country´s attitudes.

He also pointed out that most incidents against LGBT people are not reported, or if they are, they are not properly processed, which calls for transformation of the government´s behavior and appropriate changes. His call for government´s change of behavior would likely mean strong institutional reforms that would enable LGBT people to feel safe in their own country, and be free to enjoy the same rights and protection as the heterosexual population. The effects of institutional stigma only amplify homophobic sentiments in a country, as they give validation to homosexuality being disregarded. (Bilewicz, Gorska, Winiewski, 2017). That form of institutional stigma is what Cimbaljevic finds as the biggest problem in combating homophobia and transphobia in Montenegro, as the government needs to make the first steps in combating such discriminative attitudes. A huge institutional change would be the introduction of same sex partnerships, which would enable same sex couples to have their relationships validated in front of the state, and in the next chapter we will see how that issue has been handled by the Montenegrin government, and how it further helps us understand the dynamics of top-down Europeanization of LGBT laws.

6.3. Introduction of LGBT Rights in Montenegro Parallel with EU Negotiations

The first Montenegrin LGBT activist applied for asylum in Canada in 2013, when Montenegro was already adopting pro-LGBT policies as a part of the EU negotiations. The development of those policies went hand in hand with EU negotiations as Montenegro did not have a history of local activism that could have fought for those rights on its own. As limiting as they are, the LGBT ‘scenes’ in Serbia and Croatia, the closest neighboring states, have existed and managed to form a circle of people ready to initiate change in times predating the EU talks, by being vocal about their discrimination, unfavorable social status and overall need for acceptance. In Serbia, the formation of the organization Arkadia in 1990 marks the beginning of a visible LGBT movement. (Rhodes-Kubiak, 2015) In Croatia, NGO (LIGMA) Lesbian and Gay Men Action –was founded in Zagreb in August of 1992. Even though it did not receive any support from the government and barely managed to survive financially, it was a milestone to have a space formed and led by LGBT people eager to improve their circumstances. (Sagasta, 2001)

Unlike the experiences of urban communities of Belgrade and Zagreb, Montenegro does not have an LGBT scene that could trigger any kind of community work towards positive change, certainly not in the 1990s and is still struggling with this issue today. There has been an attempt at creating an organization focused on improving the lives of the LGBT community in 2003, which was largely financed with foreign aid, but the organization collapsed just two years into its operation. (Brkovic, Kalezic, 2016) As if the lack of local population identifying as LGBT was not enough, the ones who do identify as such do not see a need for joining forces, as we have mentioned already in cases of Poland and Czech Republic where Conor O’Dwyer (2018) researched the phenomenon of LGBT people not seeing themselves as a discriminated group and do not recognize the need for collective identity or action. The lack of in-group identification is a big contributor for there being so little done in order to tackle this issue earlier, and still today.

Local Montenegrin LGBT activists Danilo Kalezic and Carna Brkovic explore the issue of LGBT people in Montenegro refusing to recognize their non-straight identity and how that affects the lack of activism in the country. By interviewing several young men who engage in same-sex relationships or sexual activities, they find a common thread seen in their reluctance to voice dissatisfaction over their circumstances in Montenegro. ‘Broadly speaking, many

LGBT people in Montenegro who are not activists expressed a similar sense of separation from LGBT activism and the Pride Processions of the last few years. They frequently reacted to LGBT activism and the Pride event with reluctant acceptance at best or outright criticism at worst. One way—with which we do not agree—to understand this sense of separation of LGBT people from LGBT activism would be to assume that these people do not know what is good for them. We could assume that they are frightened and auto-homophobic to the point that it makes them incapable of understanding what would make their own lives better and easier.’ (Brkovic, Kalezic, 2016: 158)

The sense of LGBT community in Montenegro does not exist even today. There is not a single gay bar, club or café in the country. Brkovic and Kalezic (2016) describe the state of the local LGBT scene, or the lack of it: ‘Taking into account the fact that Podgorica has approximately 180,000 residents and that heteronormativity is pervasive, it should not come as a surprise that there are no LGBT clubs, cafes, cinemas, or town quarters. The “gay scene” in Montenegrin towns usually revolves around and within online spaces, a few public parks, one well- known public beach, and infrequent LGBT parties organized by the local NGOs.’ (Brkovic, Kalezic, 2016: 156) Aside from this, there are no public figures (outside of a handful LGBT activists) who publicly declare themselves as part of the LGBT community; no celebrities, artists, politicians, athletes or anyone from the public sphere who could use their platform to expose the issues of the LGBT community to the general population.

After years of no organizations dealing with issues of LGBT people, in 2011 (the year marking start of EU accession talks) a new NGO was formed, called Forum Progress. The founder of this LGBT organization just happened to be the only openly gay man in the country, who, due to severe mental and physical abuse, was made to seek asylum in Canada in 2013 where he has been living since.This extreme treatment of the only openly gay person in the country happening at the time of the state opening its EU accession talks should give us insight into how closed the society is towards this minority. When we understand these circumstances, it is safe to assume that no progressive action would take place with this issue if it was not for the EU initiating it.

The timeline of milestones related to LGBT progress is basically parallel to the negotiations with the EU. Brkovic and Kalezic (2016) emphasize how the first draft proposal on fighting

50 homophobia did not receive support from the government officials and how their refusal to deal with the matter resulted in months of lobbying from NGO organizations and the international community (mostly the EU), and how adopting the action plan happened at the same time as the country was receiving its evaluation report from the European Commission. The connection between the progressive LGBT policies and EU accession talks is extremely close, and paired with the lack of will of the local population to fight for these progressive changes, it allows us to presume that these progressive policies are a pure product of top-down Europeanization.

6.4. Same-Sex Partnership Law Proposal to the Montenegrin Parliament

In this section we will take a look at the process behind Montenegro´s attempts at adopting the same sex partnership law. It is safe to say that even just having the discussion around the law is already a huge milestone for a country that had its only LGBT activist seeking asylum within few years of being active. Even though the country has such a short history of LGBT inclusion, the conversation about the same sex partnership law was set up in the parliament, and the discussion on the law could be seen as one of the clearest indicators on how inclusive the society really is. Additionally, analyzing the discussion around the same-sex partnership law is a good way of finding out what Montenegrin politicians really think about the status of the LGBT community, and how they approach the issue behind the closed doors. Unsurprisingly, what the process behind formatting the law reveals is that this discussion is also heavily influenced by the EU. This includes the efforts taken in designing the right proposal for the law, and the eventual voting on the law.

This chapter is completely based on the thorough analysis of the report submitted on the 11th of March, 2019, by Committee for Human Rights and Freedoms to the Parliament of Montenegro, regarding the same sex partnership law. The report included a detailed breakdown of reasons why the law should be discussed in the parliament. The committee emphasized that during 2015 and 2016, they received assistance from the experts in the European Council in analyzing same sex partnership and marriage laws in certain EU states (Austria, Germany, United Kingdom and the Netherlands), as well as in the regional EU states (Croatia and Slovenia). Additionally, they analyzed the Montenegrin laws regarding family, inheritance, healthcare, pensions, social assistance and childcare. This was done in order to find the best model that could work for

Montenegro. Here we can see that even before the proposal of the law, the very construction of the proposal included researching EU´s take on the issue.

Aside from this, the Committee pointed out that the previous big milestone, the introduction of the non-discrimination law, was subject to change in 2017, due to demands from the European Commission, and after the said changes were done, that law was completely up to the EU standards. The law prohibited any discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, which, according to the Committee makes it paradoxical that LGBT people are discriminated against when it comes to legal partnerships. This was one of the main reasons why the Committee urged the Parliament to consider voting on the law. Besides this case, the Committee brought up the EU several more times, pointing out how the design of the law is the most widely accepted set of benefits same sex couples enjoy in EU states with marriage equality already adopted. The report included a section naming all of the EU states where marriage equality or same sex partnerships exist, and emphasized how adopting such laws has not negatively influenced the democracy or economic prosperity of said states.

They also pointed out that adoption of the same sex partnership law is an internationally lawful obligation, if we focus on the European Court of Human Rights proclaiming that regulation of this issue is the responsibility of the state; and the proposition of the law is, in accordance to that, made with international standards in mind, mainly ones promoted in the European convention on human rights and basic freedoms.

On the other hand, the Committee emphasized that the Montenegrin society is not ready for a law that includes adoption of kids by same sex couples, which is why the right to adoption for these couples will not be included in the proposal. Additionally, it was pointed out that the law is considered to be of extreme importance for the society, therefore a reaction from the public will be valued, and there should be at least a year between adopting and implementing the law due to this reason. The Committee also pointed out how the discussions between them and the non-governmental organizations hinted at the Montenegrin society not being ready for this law at all, and that the implementation of it could be problematic. One of the potential issues was expected to mirror the situation in Croatia, where there have been cases of the state being sued for not allowing adoption to same sex couples. Nevertheless, the non-governmental organizations that participated in the initial stages of the law formation additionally pointed out

52 how the law would solve issues of the LGBT community that already lives in couples, but without a lawful option and that there has been an increase in society´s approval, going from 18% support in 2016, to 55% support in January of 2019. (Statistics provided in the report, by the Committee, source unknown)

As we can see, the report includes mention of the EU from the very beginning, even when formulating the law, as well as when pointing out why the law should be adopted. There is mention over the Montenegrin perception of the law, and even though the report says that the society might not be ready for the law, the EU accession seems to overrule that sentiment. What we can notice from the report is that the EU mentions are pretty much used as the validation for the law implementation, as it is clear that the society itself is not up for this law being introduced.

6.5. The Parliament´s Vote on the Same-Sex Partnership Law

In July of 2019, the Montenegrin Parliament voted on the adoption of the same-sex partnership law. Reflecting on the result of the vote, as well as the remarks made by the MPs during the vote is another way of understanding how this issue is seen in the Montenegrin politics. There are several interesting moments from the voting process that are worth mentioning, as the behind-the-scenes commentary might tell us more than the actual result of the vote. This chapter is completely based on the analysis of plenary sessions of the Montenegrin parliament regarding the adoption of the same sex partnership law, in April and July of 2019.

The voting on 31st of July 2019 was paused before it even began, with one MP feeling the need to address the lack of MPs present on that day. His point was that a law of this magnitude cannot be voted on with that many voters absent from the Parliament. He emphasized: ‘This law, the European law, is about Montenegro closing chapters 23 and 24, and entering the EU. We cannot vote on it without everyone present, and need to postpone the vote.’ That remark was followed up by MP Representative of the leading Democratic Social Party (DPS), who said that he agrees that the decision of some MPs to miss the vote is unacceptable, however, after several delays 53 of the vote that were made in order to explain to other MPs how important this law is for Montenegrin EU path, it is finally time to vote, as this law is way too important for the Montenegrin progress towards the EU and the obligations it owes to the EU.

The urges to vote that day were not without reason, as the vote on the law was postponed several times due to certain MPs not feeling like this law should be discussed, as the Montenegrin society has bigger issues to be concerned with. Just a few months prior to the date of the voting, on April 4th, MP Jovan Jole Vucurovic of the MP Group Democratic Front, gave his opinion on the law. He said: ‘I do not understand why the leading party (Democratic Party of Socialists) is pressuring us to vote on this law, other than for the orders from Brussels. The hands of some MPs are being twisted in the dark corners of Brussels in order for us to approve this law. So, to you, it is more important what the Brussel´s gay lobby wants, than what the people of Montenegro do. I simply do not understand why the Democratic Party of Socialists and the leading majority is so eager to adopt this law, unless they themselves are part of the gay lobby. I believe the people need to vote on a referendum when it comes to laws like this, laws that dig deep into the spiritual and national essence of the society. No one in Montenegro has ever degraded this country so much as the politicians in favor of this law. This country has survived for centuries on some other values, certainly not on grounds related to theft, criminal behavior, mafia or same sex marriages. That is the essence of this new law that has nothing to do with Montenegro, and is only promoted by the members of Democratic Party of Socialists so that they would be praised by Brussels and tapped on their backs. The truth is, that 90% of the society is against this law.’ (Statistic provided by the MP Vucurovic, source unknown)

The mention of DPS party urging the vote was actually confirmed that day, as the previously mentioned representative of that party was the one to address the President of the Parliament once again and suggest voting immediately. The President of the Parliament then proceeded to announce the vote, which resulted in 42 MPs voting, 38 in favor of the law, 4 against.

The overwhelming support for the law might seem optimistic, but we need to take several factors into consideration. The parties opposing the law did not show up for the voting which resulted in DPS party being the only one showing up in its full capacity. The remarks made by the MPs belonging to the DPS party and their urging for voting on that day is likely because they are the strongest supporters of the country´s EU path, which is constantly reaffirmed in

54 their speeches, such as the one in the beginning of the voting session by their representative. The only other MPs present were a few members of the Social Democrats of Montenegro and the Liberal Party of Montenegro, who were expected to vote in favor of the law due to their liberal views).

However, the 4 votes in opposition to the law belong to the 4 MPs coming from the minority party, and they decided to hail the adoption of the law, as these MPs stated they cannot accept a law that is in contrast with their traditional beliefs. These MPs were: Ervin Ibrahimovic, Nedzad Dresevic, Adrijan Vuksanovic and Genci Nimanbegu, all belonging to the MP group formed out of the Bosniak Party, coalition “The Albanians Decisively” and the Croatian Civic Initiative (HGI). The absolute support of all MPs was necessary for the law to be adopted that day, and the 4 votes against disabled that.

6.6. Summary

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the unique circumstances of the LGBT community in Montenegro. The lack of openly out people, not even celebrities, as well as no LGBT spaces such as clubs or bars make it difficult for this community to be represented in everyday life. The example of the only openly gay man, turned activist, whose experiences with violent homophobia reached a level where he needed to seek asylum abroad additionally make it clear how difficult it is to live as an LGBT person in Montenegro. Such lack of representation is unique for this day and age in Europe.

However, even with such limited representation, pro-LGBT laws are still being implemented, including the same-sex partnership law that was discussed in the parliament in 2019. However, the proposal and the vote on the same sex partnership law in was based on a lot of talk mentioning the EU and validating the law via EU membership. The law on the vote revealed that all votes in favor come from pro-EU parties. So, even though the majority of the MPs voted in favor of the law, we have to take into consideration that almost all of these votes come from the Democratic Socialist Party who has openly stated that their vote is based on the Montenegrin

55 accession into the EU and closure of chapters 23 and 24. Their urging of the vote comes from their desire to speed up Montenegro´s accession process, not from their actual support for the LGBT community. It is this accepting of norms and policies due to the EU accession process that begs the questions if those changes are really desired by the authorities and the public. Exploring the process behind adopting EU policies in EU candidate states gives us insight into how effective those changes are, and if their implementation really works for the candidate states. ‘Adopting and implementing EU rules is one thing; changing deeply shared social norms is quite another’ (Subotic, 2010: 596)

7. Conclusions

LGBT rights have been a part of the EU for a long time, although the first EU member states to adopt pro-LGBT policies have done so as a result of their national activism. This essentially means that there was no need for a top down-Europeanized approach when discussing LGBT laws, quite the contrary, we saw a bottom-up approach where pro-LGBT changes in original EU member states led to EU-wide pro-LGBT policies. The introduction of non-discrimination policies and same sex partnerships in EU member states in early 2000s accounts for the reputation of Europe as the most LGBT friendly space in the world. However, the expansion of the EU on to the post-communist states of the Central and Eastern Europe pointed out certain differences between the older and newer member states, particularly when it comes to economic and social differences. One of the social differences would be the lack of LGBT activism of the post-communist states that resulted in a lack of guaranteed legal protection for LGBT persons coming from those states. This led to the EU placing a special focus on LGBT protection and making sure that the new member states comply with the standard that has already been set by the older states that had already adopted progressive laws.

A way of ensuring that is through EU accession conditionality, a set of requirements a country needs to fulfill in order to become an official member state. The first time we see an intense focus on LGBT rights as a part of the conditionality is during the 2004 EU enlargement that saw eight post-communist states with a limited LGBT inclusion enter the EU. The process of adopting new policies and laws from the EU is called Europeanization, and even though it is necessary, it can be problematic for states that adopt such policies purely because of their desire for membership. However, we have seen examples from the 2004 EU expansion that saw post- communist states embrace LGBT rights as a part of their new European identity, and adopting pro-LGBT policies in order to advance on their EU path. This approach is problematic; even though the policies mean progress, the sped up process of adopting them in order to meet EU criteria means that the country is not following its own rhythm, but adopting policies that may be outside of their scope.

One of the purest examples of such top-down Europeanization could be seen in the adoption of pro-LGBT laws in the case of Montenegro. By the time current candidate states, such as Montenegro started negotiating their entry, the conditionality on LGBT rights was well

57 established and the EU learned a lot from the previous enlargements. This meant that newer candidate states with a similar lack of LGBT inclusion would have to work harder in order to prove their ability to keep up with the EU standards.

In the case of Montenegro, an overwhelmingly homophobic country, non-discriminative LGBT policies have only been introduced after the country received candidate status, letting us presume that the efforts in ensuring LGBT equality were done purely due to EU accession, and confirming the hypothesis that LGBT rights in Montenegro are a product of radical changes that the government has taken in order to satisfy the EU accession criteria. Even though the local activism did not manage to change much from within, and was condemned, pro-LGBT policies kept being introduced. They were praised from the local politicians aware of what that means for speeding up the EU accession process, but condemned by the general public that does not find the pro-LGBT policies belong in the country. An example of that is the debate on same sex partnerships being discussed in the country, which is something the local population is not ready for, but the local politicians are in favor of, as they understand it is a part of EU conditionality. The blind adoption of LGBT laws as a part of the accession process makes up for one of the purest examples of top-down Europeanization.

Even though we should recognize the issues of adopting laws and policies as a part of a to-do list, we need to realize that it is the only way for the local LGBT community to acquire rights, which makes EU act as a shelter. Perhaps we can distinguish two main outcomes of Europeanization in this case; the benefits of the Europeanization of LGBT rights in Montenegro, as well as the flaws of top-down Europeanization of such significant change in short time.

7.1. Benefits of Europeanization: A Shelter for the LGBT Community

Having seen the impact of pro-LGBT laws that have been introduced due to EU accession requirements, we can see that positive changes have acted as a shelter for the LGBT community. The example of the first openly gay man and later LGBT activist Zdravko Cimbaljevic applying for asylum in Canada was a clear sign that LGBT people are not able to live their lives freely and publicly in Montenegro, but not every LGBT person from Montenegro is expected to seek shelter in asylums. However, we could perceive the Europeanization of LGBT laws as a best way of ensuring shelter for the local LGBT community.

Phillip Ayoub and David Patternote (2014) discuss the role of Europeanization in social changes, which are often seen as marginal compared to political and administrative processes that present the primary role of Europeanization. However, they emphasize the role of Europeanization in social movements too, and describe LGBT cases as very illustrative of that trend. ‘Transnational and local LGBT movements use Europe and its institutions (European Union, Council of Europe) as a strategic channel to claim and gain rights.’ (Ayoub, Patternote, 2014). From introducing non-discrimination laws, to managing to debate same sex partnerships and have a majority of MPs back up the law due to EU demands, the EU accession process has enabled LGBT people in Montenegro to acquire rights that would otherwise only be available to them abroad. The eager desire of the DPS party to introduce the same sex partnership law would have enabled Montenegrin people to be entitled to same rights as EU citizens in terms of legal partnerships, but that decision would not have been made for the purpose of citizens gaining more rights; it was only promoted due to the party´s pro-EU views. The case of the DPS party´s enthusiasm reminds us of Olivera Komar´s findings on that party´s approach to implementing changes: ‘The main driving force of all the changes is based on a top–down process since the majority of legislation is introduced in order to “meet European Union standards,” or to “fulfill the criteria set by the EU in the negotiation process.” This is how the current EU accession process, though it facilitates the formal transformation of the democratic framework, reinforces the top–down approach to decision making, additionally sending a message to the citizens that they are not in control and that the decisions are being made somewhere else.’(Komar, 2016: 786)

Aside from the economic and political policy changes that Montenegro has implemented due to the EU, the societal changes are recognized in the case of LGBT laws. As we have seen in the previous chapters, newer EU member states have struggled with very similar scenarios as Montenegro, but when it comes to their LGBT communities, there has been some work done in their societies in order to create a space in (urban areas) where this community can create a safe space and integrate. In the case of Montenegro however, there is no LGBT scene, no LGBT spaces, public persons, and much hope for change from within, and all support comes from outside sources, mainly the EU. This intense societal change is so heavily inspired by Europeanization, but is that the real solution? We have seen the ways in which adoption of EU laws serves as a shelter for the LGBT community, but below we can detect some flaws of top- down Europeanization when it comes to social changes.

7.2. Is Europeanization of LGBT Laws a Real Solution?

In researching the process of top-down Europeanization in Central and Eastern European (CEE) states joining the EU in its biggest enlargement wave, Heather Grabbe (2002) discovers that the institutional models adopted in those states during their negotiation processes are not necessarily ones that would have been adopted by the CEE policymakers if they were not conditioned to adopt them. Her emphasis on EU conditionality on the CEE states is what we should look for in the current negotiations going on with Montenegro, as we are finding a common thread of laws being adopted simply due to EU conditionality. This can harm the trust between citizens and their governments, as changes are rapidly introduced without prior consultation and done in order to receive praise from Brussels. Additionally, when analyzing the atmosphere in the Montenegrin parliament during the vote on same sex-partnerships, we could see that some local politicians opposing the law were very aware of such a trend, which creates division between politicians too. When both the politicians and the general public clearly see that their society is changing due to demands from the EU, it is to be expected that EU accession is also criticized. Therefore, even though we have seen that Montenegro has an overwhelmingly pro-EU population, these kinds of acts of top-down Europeanization need to be carefully approached, as they can shift the support of the public. EU conditionality and the

60 constant focus on top-down Europeanization seems to completely steer the direction of the country when it comes to any policy, even the most controversial ones such as pro-LGBT policies in an overwhelmingly homophobic society, which creates a mistrust between the citizens and politicians, and that clear sign that EU candidate states cannot make decisions for themselves even before becoming member states of the EU can be considered as a flaw of top- down Europeanization. We can recognize the shelter that such policies create for LGBT community, but also the doubt those policies plant in the part of society that is strongly opposing them.

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