Shame on the World

ISSUE FIVE/2000 Shame on the world

BY IBRAHIM GAMBARI

Henry Kwame Anyidoho. GUNS OVER KIGALI: THE RWANDESE CIVIL WAR, Fountain Publishers, Kampala (with Woeli Publishing Services, Accra). 1997.13ipp.

HEN member states of the United Nations General Romeo Dallaire, a former force com- collectively mafee disastrous decisions such mander of UNAMIR confessed that 'with a as in the conflict areas of Somalia, Bosnia well-armed group of 5.000 men (and a proper and Rwanda, there is a tendency to place the mandate) the UN could have stopped the blame on the world body or. more especially, slaughter of hundreds of thousands of wits Secretary-General. Yet the late Lord Rwandans' (Christian Science Monitor Feb. Caradon's remarfe. made a number of de- 27. 1998, p.7). It must remain the eternal an- cades ago, that there is nothing wrong with guish for General Dallaire that, despite his the United Nations which is not attributable attempts to warn his superiors in New Yorb to its members, remains very relevant. as early as January. 1994. and his belief that The UN is nothing more than an aggrega- the Organisation had the means and power tion and tool of its members and can only be to stop the massacres, the tragedy in Rwanda as effective and responsive to world crises as which began on April 6, 1994, ended with the member states, especially the most power- death of over 800,000 people, mostly Tutsis ful ones, want it to be. And it is from this per- and some 'moderate' Hutus. spective that 1 wish to review this simply writ- General Dallaire did offer some excuses ten but fine, small boob. The author was for the UN's reluctance to act to prevent or deputy force commander of the UN peace stem the genocide by pointing out that 'this beeping force, in Rwanda. And as a bey player was April, 1994: the Americans had lost eigh- on the ground, he witnessed unspeabable teen soldiers in Mogadishu, the Pabistans had atrocities in Kigali. Despite diminished human also lost several in Somalia while the UN and material resources available to UNAMIR, (forces) were spread out in 16 or 17 different the residual force under his leadership per- missions around the world'. The fact, none- formed heroic tasbs which, unfortunately, theless, was that following the deaths in a came too late for the hundreds of thousands suspicious aircraft crash of Rwandan Presi- who perished during the April 1994 Rwandese dent Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, and the genocide. President of Burundi who was accompany- As ambassador and permanent represen- ing him. Hutu extremists began the massa- tative of my country, Nigeria, a non-perma- cres. This triggered the resumption of fight- nent member of the UN Security Council ing by the Tutsi-dominated RPF until the RPF during the events leading up to the Rwanda troops put a stop to the billings after tabing crisis in 1994 and the genocide that followed, over the capital, Kigali, in July, 1994. The full I feel that I am in a position to explain things story of the massacres and the events which the way I saw them at close range. Without a immediately preceded the civil war of April- doubt, it was the Security Council, especially July, 1994. the war itself and its immediate its most powerful members, and the interna- aftermath is very well told in chapter three tional community as a whole, which failed through seven of the 'personal account' pro- the people of Rwanda in their gravest hour vided by General Anyidoho. Dallaire's of need. deputy. It is of interest that both Generals The controversy over the culpability of were graduates of the United States marine the international community for its failure to command and staff college in Quantico, Vir- prevent the genocide in Rwanda is one that ginia (Dallaire was of the class of 80/81 while would not go away. As recently as February the author belonged to the class of 1979/80). 1998, in his testimony to the international This coincidence definitely helped to estab- criminal tribunal for Rwanda in Tanzania. lish an extraordinary relationship between

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the Generals during the tragic events. manders at the time. Anyidoho wonders what Now. rather than act to prevent or halt they on the ground could do 'with a force of the massacre, the UN peace-beepers unfor- 270 in the face of all the hostilities going on? tunately became a part of the problem. As What made the Security Council tabe such a the author observes, 'right from the begin- decision? Was the world going to abandon ning of the mission UNAM1R was beset with Rwanda? Was it because the operation was logistic problems... almost all the contingents in a typically developing country or more came from developing countries with weab pointedly on the "darb continent"'? logistics base at home. UNAM1R was also op- The reality in New Yorb was that many 1 erating under a shoe-string budget before member states, especially those who were the civil war brobe out'. The author further troop contributing countries to the UNAMIR complains about dogmatic interpretation of seemed mainly concerned about their UN regulations by UNAMIR administrators troops, and the potential political repercus- and of generally incompetent administration sions in their respective capitals of dead - issues which, he says, must be addressed peace-beepers returning home in body bags. squarely in future UN missions. Justifiable and legitimate as these concerns Belgian forces should never have been were, it is my view that those countries, in part of the UN mission in Rwanda for the large part ignored the moral and overriding obvious reason that their country was not duty to help save, hapless and defenseless perceived as an impartial actor in the history civilians including innocent women and chil- and politics of Rwanda. And when the Bel- dren who were being butchered by the most gian soldiers serving in UNAMIR were billed primitive of weapons including machetes on the 7th of April, 1994.Belgium and cutlasses. The Ghanaian battalion of less withdrew its battalion from than 500 which stayed bacb demonstrated the mission. Not content clearly how much difference a well equipped with the withdrawal of her UN force with a robust mandate could have own battalion, Belgium been able to accomplish in terms of saving deployed her diplo- human lives in the situation. Anyidoho was matic arsenals to en- determined, and the Ghanaian government sure the termination agreed with him, that UNAMIR should not of the entire UNAMIR shut down and that the Ghanaian battalion operation. should remain as the bacbbone of the re- Bangladesh also de- sidual UNAMIR force. The Ghanaians and the cided to withdraw its Tunisians of the residual force earn praise for own contingent and their courageous dedication. So does, in by April 19. 1994, the Anyidoho's view, Dallaire himself. first batch of Nonetheless, given the critical situation UNAMIR soldiers were that prevailed at that time, with no realistic evacuated to Nairobi. prospect of the two opposing forces agree- The bombshell came ing on an effective ceasefire in the immedi- April 21 1994 when by its ate future, and the need for the UN to main- now infamous tain its efforts to help a people who, in the Resolution 912 words of Boutros Boutros Ghali, have 'fallen (1994). the into calamitous circumstances', the Secre- Security tary-General sent a report to the Security Council Council, (S/1994/470 of 20 April 1994). In it. called for a he presented the Council with three alterna- reduction in tives for its consideration, before the deci- UNAMIR sion to reduce the UNAMIR force level was forces from taben. 2.548 to 270 - The first alternative was the deployment all ranbs. In of immediate and massive reinforcement of questions UNAMIR and a change in its mandate so that contained in it would be equipped and authorised to co- his boob erce opposing forces into a ceasefire, and which must attempt to restore law and order and put an have cap- end to billings. This alternative had the added tured the frus- advantage of 'preventing the repercussions trations and of the violence' spreading to neighbouring anguish of countries and leading to regional instability. UNAMIR It would have required the Council to de- force com- ploy several thousands additional troops and

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17 • ISSUE FIVE/2000 •

<< UNAMIR to be given enforcement powers three months to have the batch of troops under chapter Vl 1 of the Charter of the UN. put into the area. The anger of the present Considering the fiasco in Somalia this was Government of Rwanda at the abandonment not a feasible option. of their people by the UN is understandable The second alternative was essentially a and well justified. reduction in the force strength down to a Nonetheless. logistic problems were also small group to be headed by the force com- responsible for the time lag between the mander and to remain in Kigali to act as in- authorisation of the expanded UNAMIR, the termediary between the two parties in an contribution of sufficient numbers of troops attempt to bring them to an agreement on a and their actual deployment in Rwanda. The ceasefire, in addition to assisting in the re- principal lesson here is that even when Afri- sumption of humanitarian relief operations. can States were persuaded to contribute For this reduced mandate, the Secretary- troops to an international peace-beeping General estimated a force strength of about force (some countries outside the continent 270. are reluctant to do so when conflicts in Af- The third alternative, which the Secre- rica are concerned), the constraints posed tary-General had stated clearly that he did by logistic problems such as equipment for not favour, was a complete withdrawal of the troops, air-lifting, communication facili- UNAMIR. This he feared would amount to a ties, are enormous. For example, as complete abandonment of the people of Anyidoho has pointed out in his narration, Rwanda and a total betrayal of all the ideals the Zambian troops for the expanded of the UN and hopes of collective security. UNAMIR toob a ridiculously long time in ar- In the end. the Security Council by its riving Kigali (my italics). The elements of the resolution 912 (1994) authorised the reduc- Zambian troops trained on Dutch equipment tion in the force strength. I believe this was a arrived on August 26.1994 but their colleagues collective failure of all members of the inter- who proved less fortunate, the advanced national community and in particular mem- party of the same battalion, did not arrive bers of the Security Council. One could ar- until October 30, 1994. gue with a lot of justification that the Secre- tary-General did not identify his preferred Gambari, a professor of Political Science was Nigeria's alternative and push for its acceptance by the ambassador and permanent representative to the UN Council. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali would have to live with that criticism. Nonetheless the Council had the option and, 1 believe, the responsibility, if there was the necessary political will on the part of its The Lioness members, particularly the bey members, to have authorised the deployment of additional troops which the situation desperately warranted, in order to put an end to the of Lisabi violence, before it became genocidal. Some delegations, lifee mine that was a non-per- BY OMOWUMI SEGUN manent member, argued hopelessly against cutting down and running from Rwanda. We were of course overwhelmed and presented with a fait accompli in the form of deserting Cheryl Johnson-Odim and Nina peace-feeepers. and had to go along with the Emma Mba. FOR WOMEN AND THE resolution. However, with the benefit of hind- NATION: FUNMILAYO RANSOME- sight the Nigerian delegation should have KUTI OF NIGERIA. University of abstained. Its statement in the Council during the explanation of the vote pointed to a Illinois Press, (Nigerian edition, disagreement with the import of the resolu- Crucible Publishers, Lagos). 1998. tion. 198pp. To underscore the point about Iacfe of political will, it is enough to consider how long it tool? it to get the force strength of UNAMIR 11 up to the authorised level of HIS publication gives a general 5,500, following another Security Council account of women's participa- resolution of May 1994. The Security Coun- tion in Nigerian politics over the cil resolution establishing UNAMIR 11 was years. Of greater significance is adopted in May 1994 during Nigeria's presi- the fact that it chronicles the life Tof a remarkable, nay phenomenal Nigerian dency of the Council but it took more than woman - Funmilayo Ransome Kuti (nee Tho-

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