2 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
wrong, there is a general consensus to give the government a smooth ride,.2 Yet there is consensus in the international scholarly community' that Rwanda is run by a dictatorship with little respect for human rights, little attention to the fate of the vast majority of its population made up of ever poorer peasants, and little awareness of the structural violence its ambitious engineering project engenders. The regime seeks full control over people and space: Rwanda is an army with a state, rather than a state with an army, Although a report by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative expressed major concern and concluded that the state of governance and human rights did not satisfy Commonwealth standards," Rwanda was admitted to the club without much debate in November 2009. President Kagame, against whom there is overwhelming evidence of responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanitv," is given red carpet treatment on his frequent international visits, the Rwandan leadership's vision is lauded in many quarters," and Rwanda is often presented as a 'model'." How does Kigali get away with it? This article tries to answer this ques tion by looking not at the substantive aspects of governance in Rwanda, but at the regime's practices (I am of course aware that substance and
2. International Crisis Group, '''Consensual democracy" in post-genocide Rwanda: evalu ating the March 2001 district elections' (Report, Nairobi and Brussels, 9 October 2001), p.20. 3. The only noticeable exceptions are Phil Clark (University of Oxford) and William Schabas (National University of Ireland). 4. Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 'Rwanda's application for membership of the Commonwealth: report and recommendations of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative' (August 2009). 5. These crimes took place mainly in Rwanda in 1994, in ZalreIDRC in 1996-7, and again in Rwanda in 1997-8, as detailed in numerous reports by several IN bodies, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. For an early survey of crimes against humanity committed by the RPFIRPA, see Serge Desouter and Filip Reyntiens, 'Rwanda: les violation des droits de l'bommc par Ie FPR/APR - plaidoyer pour une cnquete approfondie' (Working Paper, Centre d'etude de la region des grands lacs d'Afrique, Antwerp, June 1995). For a view on RPF abuse from within, see Abdul 1. Ruzibiza, Rwanda: L'histoire secreu (Editions du Panama, Paris, 2005)..More recently, a major UN report has confirmed and complemented the data on RPA abuse in the DRC: IN High Commission for Human Rights, 'Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993--2003: report of the mapping exercise doc umenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003' (Geneva, August 2010). 6. Kagame set up a Presidential Advisory Council (PAC) which includes CEQs of foreign companies, academics, and even the founder of Saddleback Church, Pastor Rick Warren. Tony Blair acts as an 'unpaid adviser' to the President. Kagame travels from one award cer emony to the next. 7. \Vhen Kegame received a Global Citizen Award in 2009, the statement of the Clinton Foundation read as follows: 'From crisis, President Kagame has forged a strong, unified and growing nation with the potential to become a model for the rest of Africa and the world'. Clinton Foundation, 'Former President Clinton announces winners of the Third Annual Clinton Global Citizen Awards' (23 September 2009),
Dealing with external meddlers Since the RPF came to power in July 1994, keeping or getting outside observers out has been a constant concern. By the end of 1995, 38 international NGOs had been expelled and the activities of 18 others suspended, their assets frozen, and their equipment impounded. In June 1997 the government, through a large-scale diplomatic offensive, succeeded in having the mandate of UN Special Rapporteur Rene Degni-Segui terminated, as his reports had become a nuisance. He was replaced by a Special Representative whose mandate and interest in criti cizing the regime over its human rights record was much more limited. The United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (UNHRFOR) was next in line. On 7 December 1997, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, previously con sidered a friend of the 'New Rwanda' (she visited the country on a couple of occasions when she was President of Ireland), issued a communique condemning the absence of a reconciliation policy and the practice of serious human rights violations. The spokesman for the Rwandan presidency immediately responded by vehemently and categ orically denying Robinson's observations, accusing her of being influ enced 'by informants whose aims are to mislead international opinion on the situation of Rwanda'S The following year the government refused UNHRFOR permission to continue monitoring the human rights situation, and sought to limit its activities to mere technical assist ance. Robinson decided that such a truncated mandate was unaccepta ble, and closed the operation at the end of july 1998. In April 2001, a round of efficient lobbying ensured the support of the African group in the UN Commission for Human Rights for striking Rwanda off the agenda, thus putting an end to formal international concerns with
8. Statement by presidential spokesman, Kigali, 7 December 1997. 4 AFRICA.""l' AFFAIRS human rights in Rwanda, Canada strongly objected, and got the routine treatment in return: the Rwandan delegate accused Canada of 'harbour ing many genocidaires'.9 Other external meddlers were from the press or academia, In 1997 alone, two journalists and one researcher were declared persona non grata. French scholar Gerard Prunier was violently taken to task after the publication of a critical but on the whole appropriate analysis.'? The director of the official information office lashed out against Prunier 'who claims to be an aca demic', who presents '3 pseudo analysis ofRwandan society', and who is no less than 'indirectly responsible for the 1994 genocide',l1 On 9 February, Reuters correspondent Christian Jennings was expelled, apparently for having wrinen two days earlier that, during a press conference, (then Vice-President) Kagame had asserted that 'Rwanda has the right to divert a part of international aid to contribute to the internal war against Hutu extre mists'.'? On 28 November, Stephen Smith of the French daily Liberation was in turn declared undesirable. The charge d'affaires at the Rwandan embassy in Paris explained that 'Smith only has himself to blame, given the horrors he has written about the country'. 13 More recently, in August 2008, the Rwandan Minister of Information accused the BBC and the VOA of 'destroy[ing] the unity of Rwandans' and announced that the government had 'the capacity and the right' to suspend their broadcasts 'if the situation doesn't change"!" On 25 April 2009, the government banned the Kinyarwanda service of the BBe. After listening to a preview of a forthcom ing programme of'Imvo n'Imvano' ('Analysis of the Source ofa Problem') the Minister claimed that it contained 'most outrageous statements'. Criticism routinely met with strongly worded rebuttals, A few examples must suffice. After reports were almost simultaneously released by Amnesty International (AI)15 and Human Rights Watch (HRW),16 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that this was part of a 'political strat egy' of opponents acting 'under the cover of international human rights
9. Agence France-Presse (AFP) (Geneva, 20 April 2001). 10. Gerard Prunier, 'Rwanda: the social, political and economic situation in June 1997' (Report, Writenet (UK), July 1997). 11. Wilson Rutayisire, 'Gerald [sic] Prunier: a eulogy for genocide' (Ministry of Information, Kigali, 24 October 1997). 12. Reuters (Kigali, 7 February 1997). 13. Reporters sans Fronrieres (RFS) and Internatonal Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) (Communique, Toronto, 2 December 1997). In 'Rwanda: enquete sur la terreur tutsie', published in Liberation on 27 February 1996, Smith had documented crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the RPF. 14. 'La BBe et la VOA accusees par Kigali de "detruire l'unite des Rwandais" (AFP, Kigali, 19 August 2008). 15. Amnesty International, 'The troubled course of justice' (London, 26 April 2000). 16. Human Rights Watch, 'Rwanda: the search for security and human rights abuses' (New York, April 2000). 3l14S
GOVER.'l'ANCE IN POST -GENOCIDE RWANDA 5
organizations'. The HRW report was described as 'very mean-spirited, grossly prejudiced and shallowly researched', and the organization was accused of 'consciously waging a war of lies and defamation against the Rwandan government of national unity'; the report was a 'patent and sha meless attempt to interfere in the internal politics of Rwanda and an immoral attempt to enhance the political agendas of certain opponents'. 17 Barely a month later, a report by HRW accusing the Rwandan army of massacring civilians and practising rape on a large scale in the DReIS was said to be 'malicious, baseless and biased' by the government spokesman Joseph Bideri: 'These are not human rights reports, but just political documents.... These documents are authored by one Dr Alison Des Forges who wants to slander the Rwandan government in the face of the donor cornmuniry.'!" Almost a decade later Des Forges, Human Rights Watch's senior adviser for Africa, was declared persona non grata.20 HRW's May 2001 report' Uprooting the rural poor in Rwanda' was said to be 'baseless and full of lies', and HRW stood accused of disseminating 'a propaganda that undermines human rights by promoting ethnic division among Rwandans'. A month later, a report by AI on the human toll of the Rwandan occupation of eastern DRC21 was characterized as 'outright bias, lack of objectivity and outright lies'. Amnesty's observations were 'clearly unsubstantiated' and 'a reflection of the longstanding antipathy that AI has demonstrated towards Rwanda'. Using its 'genocide credit' (see below) to exploit the suffering of the victims for political ends, the government claimed that AI's accusations were 'an insupportable insult to the memory of the more than a million victims of the 1994 genocide'. 22 Accusations of intimidation and fraud related to the 2003 elections gave rise to new angry statements. In a Foreign Ministry communique of II May 2003 a HRW report" was said to attempt to 'sabotage the
17. Pan-African News Agency (PA.."'JA) (Kigali, 29 April 2000). 18. Human Rights Watch, 'Eastern Congo ravaged: killing civilians and silencing protest' (New York, May 2000). 19. The Monitor (Kampala), 13 May 2000. Interestingly, during a visit to Kigali the UK Minister for Overseas Development Cooperation, Clare Short, made exactly the same accu sations on Rwandan television. 20. After having been refused access at a land border crossing with Burundi in early September 2008, Des Forges landed at Kigali airport on 3 December to attend an inter national conference on judicial assistance, but was prevented from leaving the plane and forced to return to Brussels. General Prosecutor Ngoga later justified the measure by stating that 'HRW's interference only benefited the genocidaires'. 'HRW chief meets government officials', Sunday Times (Kigali), 221V1.arch 2009. 21. Amnesty International, 'Democratic Republic of Congo. Rwandese-ccntrolled East: devastating human toll' (London, 19 June 2001). 22. Government of Rwanda (GOR), 'Response to the Amnesty International Report, "Democratic Republic of Congo. Rwandeae-controlled East: devastating human toll'" (Kigali, n.d. [20011). 23. Human Rights Watch, 'Preparing for elections: tightening control in the name of unity' (New York, May 2003). 6 AFRICAN AFFAIRS process of political normalization (and) to counter the sending of aid'. On 13 May, the Rwandan (governmental) National Commission for Human Rights was 'surprised by the lightness of the information (that) only aims at stirring up confusion in the minds of the Rwandans'. Reacting to a report by Amnesty International.f" the government won dered 'whether AI's sources are not those who still harbour the philos ophy of genocidaires' and failed to 'understand the motive behind the baseless and malicious allegations contained in (the) report', adding that 'AI, since 1994, has been relentless in rubbishing the efforts of the Rwandan government'r'? Reports by official multilateral bodies fared no better. In July 2000, an International Panel of Eminent Persons (IPEP) entrusted by the OAU to investigate the genocide published its report.f" which contained a section highly critical of the RPF, accusing it of having committed large-scale mas sacres before, during, and after the genocide. In a press statement, President Kagame accused IPEP of bias and lack of independence, and claimed it had relied too much on the 'revisionist literature' of Gerard Prunier and myself'" Interestingly, Kagame stated that 'Where the investi gation has remained within the mandate and terms of reference given by the OAU, the report has been relevant, informative and shows originality in its investigation', but he criticized the report where, in his view, it went 'outside the mandate and terms of refcrence'F" - in other words, where it mentioned RPF abuse. After an EU observer mission criticized aspects of the August 2003 presidential election, the chairman of the National Election Commission claimed that the mission was 'inspired by a spirit of bias, lacks the slightest objectivity, and simply wants to defend the interest of (opposition) candidate Faustin Twagiramungu'i'" \X1hen the report on Rwanda from the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) congratulated the country on a number of issues, but was also critical on themes ofpoliti cal governance, Kagame lashed out at the experts: 'People who made the peer review report were experts who studied in the best universities in the world. We gave them access to all the information they wanted, but I was
24. Amnesty International, 'Rwanda: run-up to presidential elections marred by threats and harassment' (London, 22 August 2003). 25. GOR, 'Response to Amnesty International's report on Rwanda's forthcoming elec tions' (Kigali, n.d.). 26. International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 'The Preventable Genocide' (Addis Ababa, 7 July 2000). 27. 'W'e were pan of the editorial committee for the report; the Rwandan government unsuccessfully attempted to have us excluded. 28. 'Rwandan government protests against new report on the genocide' (News report. Africa Online, 24 August 2000). 29. 'Presidenticlle: Ie Rwanda mecontent des critiques europeennee sur le scrutin' (AFP. Kigali, 28 August 2003). GOVERNANCE IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 7 so surprised when they came up with allegations that Rwanda has no politi cal space', adding that 'Probably they don't understand the meaning of political space. Because if they knew, Rwanda would be an example.'?" The 2005 US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices met with an acerbic rebuttal. The report was said to be 'riddled with inaccuracies and inconsistencies', and most of its observations were simply denied. Thus, 'There are no political detainees in Rwanda'; the accusation that political freedoms were limited was 'a subjective opinion unsupported by evidence'; and 'Government considers the charge that Tutsis, particularly English speaking Tutsis, are favoured contemptible and unworthy to be dignified with a reply'. 31 The UN was treated in much the same vein. When a report discussed in the Security Council documented Rwanda's continuing support for the DRC rebel group CNDP,32 the government responded in its usual style, denouncing 'the dangerous inaccuracies and outright lies' contained in the report, whose objectives were 'malicious' and which was replete with accusations 'result ing from hearsay, perceptions and stereotypes'. As always, it was the others' fault: the UN and the international community 'have failed to neutralize the persistent threat' posed by the FDLR, and they should 'boldly acknowledge and confront their own failures and weaknesses'. 33 Once again exploiting the 'genocide credit', the Minister of Information claimed that the report was 'a continuous ploy by powerful countries to disregard the truth when it comes to Rwanda (and) to hide their guilt after they abandoned Rwandans during the genocide'. 34 The reaction to the DRC Mapping Exercise of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights" was similarly robust. Even before the report was released, Foreign Minister Mushikiwabo wrote to the UN Secretary-General that 'attempts to take action on this report - either through its release or leaks to the media - will force us to withdraw Rwanda's various commitments to the United Nations, especially in the area of peacekeeping'. 36
30. 'Enough political space - Kagame', The New Times (Kigali), 27 January 2006. 31. 'Rwanda Response to the 2005 State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor on March 8, 2006' (Kigali, 2006). 32. United Nations, Security Council, 'Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo' (S/2008i773, 12 December 2008). 33. 'Statement by the Government of Rwanda on the report of the ~ Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo' (Kigali, 15 December 2008). 34. '"L'N report "part of west conspiracy against Rwanda'" (Rwanda News Agency, 15 December 2008). 35. lJN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003. Report of the Mapping Exercise' (UNHCHR, August 2010). 36. Letter dated 5 August 20 I0 from Louise Mushikiwabo to Ban ki-Moon. This was not a hollow threat as Rwanda contributes several thousand troops to the UNA.WD mission in Darfur. 8 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Eliminating domestic dissent After the RPF seized power in July 1994 and established a 'Government of National Unity' purportedly in line with the 1993 Arusha peace accord, initially a number of politicians, civil servants, judges, and mili tary in place under the old regime either remained in the country or returned from abroad, and indicated their willingness to cooperate with the RPF. The illusion of inclusiveness was soon shattered, however, by the departure into exile first of Hutu, later of Tutsi genocide survivors, and even, eventually, of RPF old hands. From early 1995, Hutu elites became the victims of harassment, imprisonment, and even physical elim ination. Provincial governors (prefers), local mayors, head teachers, clerics, and judges were killed in increasing numbers. During the following years, the same fate befell Tutsi politicians, officers, journalists, and leaders of civil society whose loyalty to the regime was in doubt. In many cases, the responsibility of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA, which had become the national army) was well documented.V During the first months of 2000, the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of Parliament were forced to resign, and the latter two went into exile, showing how little space there was for views that were dissenting or seen as such. There are not many other countries where, in the absence of regime change, so many ministers, MPs, high-ranking army officers, civil servants, judges, diplomats, and civil society leaders have been jailed, killed, 'disappeared' or driven into exile abroad. The destruction of the MDR (Mouvement Democratique Republicain), the last party that attempted to maintain some autonomy towards the RPF, started in earnest in 1998. During a meeting in May of a 'Forum for national orientations', the l\IDR proposed a document in which it defended a number of positions on the past and the present that were quite opposed to those of the RPF. 38 The MDR was summoned to rewrite its homework in no uncertain terms, which it did in less than a week: the new document toed the RPF line and every word critical of the regime had disappeared. The party was nonetheless banned altogether in 2003 (see below). While it was dealing with the MDR, the regime made sure that no other opposition parties emerged. On 30 May 2001, former President and RPF leader Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, announced the creation of a new parry, the PDR tPorti democratique pour le
37. For early examples, see the following reports by Human Rights Watch: 'Rwanda: a new catastrophe?' (December 1994); 'Rwanda: the crisis continues' (April 1995); 'Local Rwandan leaders assassinated' (August 1995); 'HRW and FIDH condemn new killings in Rwanda' (july 1996). See also Ruzfbiza, Rwanda. 38. MDR, 'Contribution du Mouvement Democratiquc Republicain dans la recherche de solutions aux problemes que rencontre Ie Rwanda' (Partydocument, 23 May 1998). 3'141
GOVERNANCE IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 9 renouveau)-Ubuyanja. Bizimungu and former Minister Charles Ntakirutinka were immediately placed under house arrest, while other initiators of the party were threatened to the extent that three of them left the party two weeks after its aborted creation. Interestingly, this campaign mainly targeted Tutsi members, which then made it possible to present the PDR as an 'ethnist' Hutu party. Another PDR leader, Gratien Munyarubuga, was assassinated; yet another, Major Frank Bizimungu (a Tutsi officer without blood ties to Pasteur Bizimungu), 'disappeared'. On 7 April 2002, Kagame gave clear notice to his predecessor in a speech during the annual genocide commemoration: 'The day will come when I will have to take decisive action against these people. When this day has come, even their (Western) sponsors with whom they spend time drinking tea will be powerless. ,39 Two weeks later Bizimungu and Ntakirutinka were arrested and jailed; during the following weeks, dozens of others sus pected of supporting the PDR joined them in prison. With elections in view later that year, the MDR was dealt the final blow in the Spring of 2003. Despite its full control of all instruments of local, provincial, and national management, and the reinforcement offered by its constitutional engineering, the RPF was not confident about the outcome of the polls."? It therefore closed off the last potential spaces of political contestation. President Kagame gave notice in a speech on 31 March, when he addressed his opponents in a veiled way that was however very easily understood by Rwandans: 'If they come with the objective of hinder ing our programmes, they will be injured.... Our clemency decreases. '" To whoever prides himself of having harvested sorghum or maize, we will say that we have mills to crush them.' The outcome of the political process was without doubt: 'I can tell you that the result of the elections is known. '" I can tell you for 100 percent that the elected will be those who follow the policy of reconstructing the country.... Those who want to bring divi sionism ... have no place in this country. ,41 Kagame's threats were immediately followed by deeds. On 15 April, Parliament recommended the banning of the MDR. During the debate, the meaning of 'divisionism' became quite clear: indeed the report of the
39. 'Rwanda leader Kagamc warns opponents on genocide anniversary' (AFP, Kigali, 7 April 2002). 40. The RPF's limited belief in elections was made clear in an internal document pro duced before the genocide: 'The strong foundations put in place during the transitional period must allow the Front to organize the timely departure of Habyarimana [uvenal with or without elections (these need to be organized at the moment of the RPF's choosing, in the light of the situation in the country).' RPF) 'Obiectifs du Front', translated from French. This text LS not dated, but it was probably written in February 1994. \'(.'hile it is not signed, the style suggests that the author may well be Tiro Rutaremara, a leading RPF ideologue belonging to the (small) progressive wing of the party. 41. Speech by President Kagamc on International Water Day, Rcbero, Bwisigc District, Bvumba, 31 March 2003, 10 AFRICAN AFFAIRS parliamentary commission stated that the MDR had said in November 1994 'that it is an opposition parry (which means) that it has the intention to divide the Rwandans again'. The government did not play hard to get: on 16 May, 'the Council of Ministers, having studied the conclusions of Parliament on the case of the MDR, approves these con clusions and confirms the banning of the MDR because of its division ism, and requests the competent authorities to give effect to this decision in accordance with the law' .42 This decision was accompanied by a crackdown on those considered close to the MDR. Former Defence Minister General Emmanuel Habyarimana and Colonel Balthazar Ndengeyinka, both quoted in the parliamentary report, were lucky to escape to Uganda, and from there to Europe. Others were less fortunate: on 1 April, Major Felicicn Ngirabatware was arrested and detained incommunicado; on 3 April, the former secretary of General Habyarimana 'disappeared', followed on 7 April by MDR MP Leonard Hitimana. When on 23 April the same fate befell former Supreme Court judge Colonel Augustin Cyiza, a mise en scene was devised to suggest that he had fled to Uganda.t' In addition, two parties that attempted to fill the void left by the MDR were refused recog nition: on 11 August, just before the elections, the government rejected the applications of ADEP-Mizero (Alliance pour la democratie, Fequite et le progres) and of the PSP (Parti pour la solidarite et le progres). In the eyes of the regime, the elimination of the political opposition was legitimate. As a matter offact, it claimed there was no genuine opposition. During an interview with a Belgian journalist, President Kagame claimed that his opponents were 'ignorant', 'misguided' or 'disgruntled'. Anyway, they were just a minority: 'The majority of people in Rwanda are engaged in these processes (of building the counrry) and are happy.'44 The idea that those who do not adhere to the RPF view have no place in the political dis pensation is quite old. Already in 1996, the government weekly La Nouvelle Releue expressed the hope that the road followed would be 'the result of a popular consensus between the leaders and the enlightened part of the people,;45 this obviously leaves little space for the unenlightened part. In the same vein, the leG noted that 'When the regime's viewpoint is not respected, accepted or understood, it is simply imposed. In this context, the
42. Government communique, 'Le gouvemernent approuve 1a dissolution du patti l\1DR' (Agence Rwandaise d'Information, Kigali, 19 May 2003). At the time of this decision, the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior were members of the MDR. 43. On this episode, sec Thierry Cruvellier et al., Augusrin Cyiea: Un homme libre au Rwanda (Karthala, Paris, 2004). 44. '
46. International Crisis Group, 'Rwanda at the end of the transition' (leG, Africa Report No. 53, 13 November 2002), p. 2. 47. USAID, 'Rwanda democracy and governance assessment' (November 2002), p. 46. 48. LDOL, 'Dynamiques de paix et logiqucs de guerre. Rapport annuel sur 1a situation des droits de I'homme dans la region des grands lacs. Annee 2002' (May 2003). 49. International Crisis Group, "'Consensual democracy'", p. 12. 50. Ibid. p. 23. 51. Mission d'observation electorale de l'Union Europeenne, 'Rwanda. Election presidentielle 25 aout 2003. Elections legislatives 29 et 30 septembre, 2 octobre 2003' (Final Report); European Union Election Observer Mission, 'Republic of Rwanda, Legislative Elections to the Chamber of Deputies 15-18 September 2008, Final Report'. 52. Mission d'observarion electorale de l'Union Buropcenne, 'Rwanda. Election presidenrielle', p. 4. 53. This calculation by members of the EU observation team was based on a very robust sample size of 24.96 percent of the total vote (which gave a standard error for the smallest sample of under 1 percent). 54. While the observer mission noted a great number of irregularities in its report, the mis sion's chairman, British MEP Michael Cashman, refused to make this particularly damning information public. 12 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
is therefore a de facto single-party situation, where the RPF is 'the sole legal political operative in the country'. 55 While the political opposition seemed to have been eliminated in 2003, it resurfaced in 2009~ lOin the perspective of the 2010 presidential elections. Until then, none of the existing parties considered themselves to be in the opposition and they were pan of a canel dominated by the RPF. Indeed during a meeting of the Liberal Party in 2008, one of its leaders stated that 'we are not here to oppose President Kagame, but to build the nation. Rwanda does not need a European-type opposition.Y" One opposition party, PS-Imberakuri, was registered in mid-2009, while two other would-be contenders, the Democratic Green Party and Forces Dernocratiques Unifiees (FDU)-Inkingi, were prevented from seeking rec ognition through systematic sabotage. Yet these initiatives challenged the RPF's political monopoly and intrcduced, inside the country.l" a debate that contested the ruling party's discourse. Although the RPF contrclled all layers of government) from the local to the national, these challenges were seen as a major threat, the more so since they occurred at a time when the regime experienced instability within5 8 Parry leaders were threatened, splits in the parties were engineered, administrative obstacles prevented them from functioning. Opposition leaders were jailed, even assassinated, as were independent journalists. 59 The three candidates that were allowed to face the incumbent during the presidential poll on 9 August 2010 were put forward by parties belonging to the RPF's canel. In what was in effect a one party contest, Kagame obtained 93 percent of the vote, while the turnout was a whopping 98 percent. Rwandans know well what is expected ofthem. Civil society too was eliminated as an autonomous force. Since the second half of the 1990s, human rights defenders, advocates of rural development, and NGOs generally have been threatened by arrests, 'dis appearances', and intimidation.P'' In 1998, two leaders of the human rights associations Cladho and Liprodhor went into exile. In the same year Andre Sibomana, chair of the Rwandan Association for Human Rights and Public Freedoms (ADL), died of an illness that might have
55. International Crisis Group, 'rConsensual democracy"', p. 23. 56. 'Rwanda. Elections en trompe-l'cei!', Le Vif-L'Bxpress (Brussels), 4 August 2008. 57, A number of opposition movements have been active abroad during the last fifteen years. 58. Several high-ranking officers were arrested or fled the country, and there were recurrent rumours of a coup d'euu. 59. For an overview, see Filip Reynriens, 'Chronique polirique du Rwanda, 2009-2010' in Stefaan Marysse, Filip Reyntiens, and Stef Vandeginste (eds), L 'Afrique des grands lacs. Annuaire 2009-2010 (L'Harmanan, Paris, 2010), pp. 273-98. 60. A survey of these practices can be found in Front Line Rwanda, 'Disappearances, arrests, threats, intimidation of human rights defenders 200 1-2004' (Dublin, 2005). In addition to human rights defenders, the report highlights the persecution of rural defenders, independent journalists, and ~GOs. GOVERNANCE IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 13
been cured had he been allowed to leave the country to seek treatment abroad. In addition to direct persecution, the secret services infiltrated civil society groups; 'such tactics have largely succeeded in breaking up the Rwandan local NGO network'. 61 The Tutsi survivors' organization Ibuka, which had become increasingly critical of the government, was neutralized in 2000. Its vice-president Josue Kayijaho went into exile and Kayijaho's brother Assiel Kabera was assassinated. Ibuka's leadership was replaced by RPF faithfuls such as Antoine Mugesera, a member of the party's political bureau, and Ibuka ceased criticizing the regime. A law promulgated in April 2001 gave the authorities wide-ranging powers to control the management, finances, and projects of national and inter national NGOs. LDGL observed that 'Rwanda surprises particularly by the weird collusion between the government and important sections of civil society. Spaces of free expression are almost all invaded or reduced to a minimum in order to prevent contestation. ,62 In clear terms, 'civil society' was infiltrated and manipulated by the regime. The practice of controlling and coopting also extended to international NGOs: 'LandNet Rwanda, for example, an umbrella network of local and international NGOs, now has a Ministry of Lands official as an ex officio member. ,63 The final assault on civil society came in 2004, a year after the elimin ation of the political opposition, and it was conducted in exactly the same vein, In a move reminiscent of the 2003 report on the MDR, at the end of June 2004 a 'Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on Genocidal Ideology' recommended the banning of a number of associations 'preach ing the ideology of genocide and ethnic hatred', Among them was the last remaining independent human rights organization, Liprodhor, as well as half a dozen other groups, including some involved in the promotion of peasant interests, In addition, several international NGOs, as well as France and the Netherlands, stood accused. International human rights groups protested, to no avail.64 Contrary to the lv1DR precedent a year earlier, it proved unnecessary to ban Liprodhor formally. After Parliament sent a list of a dozen Liprodhor cadres to the government with the request
61. International Crisis Group, '''Consensual dernocracy'", p. 20. This tactic of infiltration was widely used. The leG noted that from July 1994 RPF cadres 'applied to work in UN agencies, local and foreign NGOs and key businesses to monitor attitudes towards the gov ernment and general activities', ibid.. p. 7. 62. LDGL, 'La problematique de 1a libertc d'expression au Rwanda' (Report, Kigali, December 2001), 63. Johan Pottier, 'Land reform for peace? Rwanda's 2005 land law in context', Journal of Agrarian Change 6,4 (2006), pp. 509-37, p. 510. See also Paul Gready, "You're either with us or against us": civil society and policy making in post-genocide Rwanda', African Affairs 109,437 (2010), pp. 637-57, 64. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, 'Rwanda: parliament seeks to abolish rights group' (New York, 2 July 2004); Amnesty International, 'Rwanda: deeper into the abyss waging war on civil society' (London, 5 July 2004). --_.._------
14 AFRICAN AFFAIRS • that they be arrested and prosecuted, in early July most of its leadership fled to Uganda and Burundi, This was the end of Liprodhor as an auton omous organization, something the government openly welcomed: in a declaration of 18 September, it noted 'that Liprodhor has separated itself from those among its members corroded by the ideology of genocide (and that) the General Assembly of Liprodhor, during its meeting of II September 2004, has asked to be forgiven by the people and govern ment of Rwanda for the bad behaviour of some of its representatives and membersY' This contentment was understandable, as most new members of the board of Liprodhor were RPF faithfuls. Rather than banning it, the RPF took over and thus neutralized Liptodhor. The media underwent the same fate as civil sociery.'" Under the title 'An atrophied and muzzled press', the LGG noted that 'Since 1998, each stage in the concentration of power seems to have been accompanied by additional restrictions on the subjects the press could cover.''7 In November 2001, Reporters sans Frontiercs called President Kagame a 'predator of press freedom' and noted that only one weekly, Umuseso, was 'relatively independent'. The report concluded that 'Journalists continue to suffer threats and pressures'. 68 Around the same period, a report by the LDGL found that 'the press is again targeted by the regime' and that 'while fewer journalists are arrested or killed lately, this is not due to a larger openness of the authorities, but rather to the fatigue andlor the res ignation of a profession that prefers to adopt a low profile instead of seeking confrontation with an authoritarian regime.... The degree of press freedom is inversely proportional to the omnipotence of the internal (DMI) and external (ESO) intelligence services.t''" The 'relatively inde pendent' Umuseso was under continuous threat. Its editor-in-chief Ismail Mbonigaba was twice arrested in 2002 and 2003, and three journalists were detained in mid-2002. Harassment came in several ways: pressures on announcers, intimidation, demonization, seizure of entire issues, but the strongest threat came in the wake of the campaign against the MDR (see above). Among the 'promoters of division', the parliamentary commit tee included 'the journalists of Umuseso', Again in August 20061
65. 'Declaration du conseii des ministres al'issue de sa reunion au Village Urugwiro, le 17 septem bre 2004, reiatioe au rapport de fa Chambres des Deputes sur Ies sueries de Gikongoro et de l'ideologie genocidaire au Rwanda' (Kigali, 18 September 2004). 66. For an excellent survey of the fate of the media under RPF rule, see Lars Waldorf, 'Censorship and propaganda in post-genocide Rwanda' in Allan Thompson (ed.), The Media and tne Rwanda Genocide (Pluto Press and Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 2007), pp.404-16. 67. International Crisis Group, 'Rwanda or the end of the transition', p. 14. 68. Reporters sans Frontieres, 'Rwanda. Discreet and targeted pressure: President Kagame is a predator ofpressfreedom' (Paris, 7 November 2001). 69. LDGL, 'La problemaaque de fa hberte d'exoression', 3435
GOVERNA.'l"CE IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 15
Reporters sans Frontieres expressed concern about the 'increasingly hostile climate' for independent papers, after several journalists were threatened, arrested, or roughed up. In April 2010, Umuseso and Umuuugizi, another paper with independent tendencies, were suspended for a period of six months, thus banning them from covering the electoral campaign and the presidential poll (see above). The editor of Umuvugizi fled to Kampala, while its co-editor was killed in Kigali the day after he published a story on the regime's hit squads on the paper's website (which was blocked inside Rwanda). Even foreign media were targeted. In January 2006, two Rwandan journalists working for the VOA and the BBC were accused of 'treason': according to the police spokesman, they were no 'patriots' and 'the ideology of these journalists needs revision' .70 The BBC was banned from FM relay in Rwanda during two months in 2009, and threatened with the same sanction in mid-2009, this time along with the VOA. 7 1 The way in which the political opposition, civil society, and the press were treated epitomized a more general attempt at controlling people and space. This showed in the maintenance of a large and efficient army, able to operate inside and far beyond national borders; in the establishment of 're-education', 'solidarity', and 'regroupment' camps; in the villagization policy (imidugudu); in the tense relations of distrust with non-state and foreign actors; and in the emergence of a powerful intelligence capacity, with the DMI operating inside the country and the ESO abroad. Despite its civilian appearance, Rwanda is an army with a state rather than a state with an army, and it is effectively run by a military regime. The central place taken by the military and intelligence services allowed one analyst to call Rwanda a 'securocracy'.72 Indeed military skills permeate the way in which Rwandans must be 'educated'. A 'Manual for the solidarity camps and other training' issued by the Civic Education Service of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) contains a section on 'self-defence'. Among other things, students are taught how to 'perform military drills', 'stripping and assembling of AK-47 rifle', and 'use combat tactics in a section and a platoon'. 73 Control is not just military. Law, too, became a potent instrument in the RPF's hands. Laws on 'divisionism' (2001) and on 'genocide
70. Reporters sans Froniieree, 'Rwanda: le chef de letat inaugure une salve d'auaques uerbales des autorites COnlre les jownatistes: (31 January 2006). 71. 'Pressure on VOA radio mounts from government' (R..~A, Kigali, 19 June 2009); 'BBe risks indefinite ban from Rwanda' (RNA, Kigali, 26 June 2009). 72. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, 'Democratisation and milirarisation in Rwanda: eight years after the genocide', African Security Review II, 3 (2002), pp. 77~87. 73, Republique du Rwanda, Commission narionale pour I'unite et la reconciliation, 'Manuel pour les camps de solidarite et autrcs formations' (Manual, Kigali, October 2006), p. 120. 16 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
ideology' (2008) allowed the elimination of dissident voices and the impo sition of the RPF's reading of history and truth. Ill-defined charges under these broadly phrased laws were frequently used to serve political or per sonal interests. 74 As of August 2009, there were reportedly 912 persons in prison on genocide ideology accusations.P The 1995 'Fundamental Law' was a piece of subtle and smart constitutional engineering that allowed concealment of the monolithic nature of the exercise of power. Under the labels of 'power sharing' and 'national unity', it institutionalized RPF dominance, while avoiding the creation of an image of unfettered control.76 The 2003 constitution proceeded from the same logic. Among other mechanisms, this was achieved by the role assigned to the Senate and the Consultative Forum for Political Organizations, both dominated by the RPF, to 'discipline' political parties. 77 Despite the appearance of political pluralism, e.g. through a 'coalition government', the RPF managed to monopolize real, though sometimes less visible, decision making. The rCG found that, from July 1994, RPF cadres were posted at all levels of the administration, both in Kigali and the provinces, to control the actions of civil servants, ministers and politicians.I" Still according to the leG, 'The administrative chain of authority - from the office of the President, to the hills - is under control of an omnipresent security apparatus, which shadows the official system. ,79 In 2002, while ministers were drawn from several parties, the vast majority of permanent secretaries were RPF members. Twelve out of 16 ministries had an RPF permanent secretary, and at the remaining four ministries, the ministers were from the RPF. Exiled opponents who were once ministers said that this practice amounted to giving them a post but no authority, while the RPF secretary-generals wielded the real power.P'' This hidden exercise of control was nearly complete in 2010, when 17 out of 18 permanent secretaries were from the RPF (in addition, 15 were Tursi). Exactly the same phenomenon can be seen in local government,
74. Human Rights Watch, 'Law and reality: progress in judicial reform in Rwanda' (24 July 2008), p. 40. 75. Amnesty International, 'Report 2010: the state of the world's human n'ghts', London, p.273. 76. For details, see Filip Reyntiens, 'Constitution-making in situations of extreme crisis: the case of Rwanda and Burundi', Journal ojAfrican Law 40, 2 (1996)] pp. 236-9. 77. According to a USAID document, the Forum 'has served as a means of limiting the range of allowable ideas among politicians', and a source of the report compared it to the central committee of a single party. USAID, 'Rwanda democracy', p. 50. According (0 the experience of the former Speaker of Parliament Joseph Sebarenzi, '[clreating the Forum of Political Panics was a way for Kagame CO remove members of Parliament who stood in his way" and he offers many examples of how this worked. Joseph Sebarenzi, God Sleeps in Rwanda: a journey ojtransformation (Atria Books, New York] ::-..~, 2009), pp. 146-51. 78. International Crisis Group, "Consensual democracy"', p. 7. 79. Ibid. p. 22. 80. International Crisis Group, 'Rwanda a: the end of the transition', p. II. GOVER.1\IANCEIN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 17 where the executive secretaries, the most powerful persons at sector level, are generally RPF Tutsi unknown to the area, appointed and paid by the central government, while elected positions are often occupied by Hutu originating from the area, unpaid and with no real power.i" Another way of hiding control by the RPF is the use of youth and women's organizations. In 1998 an RPF congress put Aloysia Inyumba, the Minister for Women and Social Services, in charge ofbuilding up a national network of women's groups, using aid funds for women's empowerment allocated to her ministry. By the first quarter of 1999, Catholic youth leaders were recruited to mobilize the young. Women and youth leaders were prom ised positions within the future district councils or even seats in Parliament if they supported the RPF. In parallel, the 'solidarity camps' organized by the NURC became the training grounds for RPF political sensitization and education, and for the selection of electoral candidates.V Although interna tionally hailed as a model of women's empowerment, the 24 MPs represent ing women, elected in an indirect and opaque way, are all 'RPF-approved', and they serve to hide the RPF's domination ofParliament. likewise, despite official adherence to the principle of separation of powers, the RPF has taken control of the judiciary. Although the law prohi bits judges from belonging to political parties, many of them are RPF members. A Human Rights Watch report noted in 2008 that a judge said that loyalty to the RPF was important in getting appointed and that he had been recruited after several meetings with a representative of the RPF who had no link to the judicial system, According to another lawyer, of the two candidates presented to the Senate for appointment to the Supreme Court, one dearly was meant to be chosen while the second was there only for show. The second candidate is known in the profession as 'the bridesmaid'.83 The desire to control people and space is not just inspired by the need to fend off challenges to its power or to avert the return of Hutu extre mism, but also by the way in which the RPF views the Rwandan popu lation, which it treats with distrust and paternalism. Aloysia Inyumba expressed this very well when she stated that 'the ordinary citizens are like babies. They will need to be completely educated if we want to move towards democracy.r'" In other words, democracy will come after re-education, but for the time being, 'a strong, "enlightened" leadership
81. Bert Ingelaere, 'Peasants, power and ethnicity: a bottom-up perspective on Rwanda's political transition', African Affairs 109, 435 (2010), pp. 287-91. 82. International Crisis Group, '''Consensual democracy", p. 7. This information was based on interviews with a former RPF official, a youth district candidate and a ~C official. 83. Human Rights Watch, 'Law and reality', p. 46. The report also contains many examples of executive interference in the judicial process, pp. 46-69. 84. [eroen Corduwener, 'Wcderopbouw in Rwanda, met ijzeren hand' ('Reconstruction in Rwanda, with an iron fist'), NRC-Handelsblad, 27 March 2002. 3~32
18 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
is required'. 85 This is a longstanding belief. An internal text quoted earlier read as follows:
The majority of the Rwandans have neither democratic culture nor the will to change. Let us not be fooled, many of them have not detached themselves from Habyarimana because they see him as "their chief'. Many have adhered to the MDR because they thought, rightly so, that it is the Parmehutu. Therefore, very few of them are really progressive, whence the need for the From to approach this conservative population and to bring to it a message of change."
Dealing wilh the world and the region Rwanda is a small, landlocked, and extremely dependent country without much of a real economy. Over the post-1994 period, it has relied on inter national aid for about 25 percent of its GDP and over 50 percent of its budget. And yet, since 1994 it has tackled the rest of the world as if it were a global superpower. Its assertiveness has been based on two pillars: the genocide credit and a strong army. The major conflict with the international community expressed itself through constant wrangling with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Rwanda, which in 1994 happened to be a non permanent member of the UN Security Council, voted against the resol ution establishing the ICTR because its Statute did not provide for the death penalty and because its seat was not located in Kigali. However, the real cause for the troubled relations with the ICTR lay in the Rwandan attempts to impose victors' justice on the institution. On 3 November 1999, the ICTR Appeals Chamber rejected the indictment of[ean-Bosco Barayagwiza on procedural grounds and ordered his immediate release. The reaction of Kigali was furious. The Cabinet 'vehemently contested the decision' and argued that 'The Rwandan people cannot tolerate this decision, which was the result of complete incompetence by the prosecu tion.' If the Appeals Chamber did not reconsider its decision, the govern ment 'would take other measures'. 87 Rwanda suspended its cooperation with the ICTR and increased the pressure by refusing a visa to Prosecutor Del Ponte and preventing witnesses from testifying in Arusha. ~8 When she argued the case for review, Del Ponte acknowledged the role
85. International Crisis Group, 'Rwanda at the end of the transition', p. 5. The same report quotes constitutional commission member Jacques Kabale as pointing out that 'the commission has the merit of asking the opinions of an uneducated population', p. 7. 86. RPF, 'Obiecrifs du Front'. 87. 'Rwanda slams decisions to free Iean-Bosco Barayagwiza' (Hirondelle News Agency, Arusha, 6 November 1999). 88. 'ICTR Prosecutor [Q ask for review of Appeal Court decision, as Rwanda refuses her a visa' (Hirondellc News Agency, Arusha, 22 November 1999). 3~31
GOVER.'JANCE IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 19 played by political pressure: 'Justice as dispensed by this Tribunal was paralysed.... Due account has to be taken of the fact that, whether we like it or not, our ability to continue proceedings and investigations depends on the goodwill of the government of Rwanda.,89 \Vhile the 'new facts' needed to ground its decision were flimsy, the Appeals Chamber duly revised its earlier ruling on 31 March 2000. The stage was set for generally successful - attempts by Kigali to interfere in the international judicial process, and Del Ponte herself was to be the main victim. The relations between the Rwandan government and the ICTR got worse when Del Ponte announced on 4 April 2002 that she hoped to issue the first indictments against RPF suspects before the end of the year. She complained about the lack of cooperation on the part of Rwanda, and added that President Kagame did not honour his promises; as a result) the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) was forced to conduct its investigations into massacres by the RPF outside of Rwanda."o A few days later, ten pro secution witnesses refused to travel to Arusha, thus forcing the Prosecutor to strike them off the witness list. While the reason given for this refusal to cooperate was the treaonent of witnesses, the Prosecutor stated that 'the true reason is to be found elsewhere.... We have good reasons to believe that powerful elements within Rwanda strongly oppose the investigation ... of crimes allegedly committed by members of the RPF in 1994.'9' In her report of 24 July 2002 to the UN Security Council, Del Ponte denounced the lack of cooperation by the Rwandan authorities. On the same day, Rwandan Prosecutor General Gerald Gahima questioned the usefulness of the ICTR and rejected any idea of prosecuting RPF sus pects: the RPA saved the nation and any attempt to indict one of its offi cers would be tantamount to an attack against the nation's unity.92 By the end of 2002, the Rwandan government had decided that Del Ponte had to go, and it increased the pressure. In late November, it announced that Del Ponte 'has lost the moral authority to prosecute cases linked to the genocide'Y' and on 12 December asked that she be removed. Del Ponte later recalled that during a conversation with Kagame at the end of 2002, he told her, 'as if he was giving an order', to limit herself to the genocide and to leave it to his government to deal with the soldiers: 'Your work creates political problems for me and will destabilise the
89. 'UN Prosecutor says Appeal Court decision on Barayagwiza violated victims' rights' (Hirondclle ~e'WS Agency, Arusha, 22 February 2000). 90. Chris McGreal, 'Genocide Tribunal ready to indict first Tutsis: Rwanda is blocking investigations offormer rebels despite pledges, Prosecutor says', The Guardian, 5 April 2002. 91. 'UN Prosecutor rallies UK support' (Hirondelle News Agency, Arusha, 3 December 2002). 92. 'Rwanda questions usefulness of UN genocide court' (Report from the ~, Reuters, 24 July 2002. 93. Gouvernement du Rwanda, 'Communique de presse' (Kigali, 21 November 2002). 3<#30
20 AFRlCA.;'I AFFAIRS
country.'?" As the press relayed information that the OTP signed a US-brokered agreement with the Rwandan government renouncing further investigation of RPF abuse, Del Ponte's spokesperson stated on 1 July 2003 that the investigations continued and that 'the Prosecutor cannot conclude any agreement with any government whatsoever, in con tradiction to its mandate'i'" A few weeks later, the OTP claimed that Rwanda was exercising discreet pressures on the UN Security Council not to renew Del Ponte's mandate, which was due to expire in September, Her spokesperson stated that 'the objective is to prevent the Prosecutor from investigating crimes possibly committed by members of the RPA.,96 On 29 July the UN Secretary-General, with the support ofKigali's allies in the US and the UK, proposed to appoint another Prosecutor for the ICTR. The Security Council endorsed the proposal, and Rwanda finally got rid of Del Ponte."? Her successor, Gambian judge Hassan Bubacar [allow, abandoned the investigations against RPFiRPA suspects. The regime also engaged in open warfare with other international players, sometimes even with its own backers. Particularly from 2002 on, Kagame became increasingly irritated by criticism, while feeling limited in his response by Rwanda's dependency on aid. In August 2002, he insisted that 'Rwandans must stop being dependent' on the international community, whose attitude 'that compounds our problems emerge[s] from indifference, ignorance and malice'. This came just after the USA, unhappy with the RPA's involvement in the DRC, blocked a disburse ment in the context of Rwanda's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility with the IMF. Without specifically mentioning Washington, Kagame stated that 'there may be abuse by some board members of these insti rutions (IMF, World Bank)' and he complained about the 'injustices per petuated by some of the big powers'i'" A month later, Belgium was lecrured in less diplomatic terms after Foreign Minister Louis Michel told a newspaper that 'the exceptional situation (of Rwanda) as a result of the 1994 genocide should not be eternally translated in lack of democracy'.99
94. Quoted in 'I was sacked as Rwanda genocide prosecutor for challenging President, says Del Ponte', The Guardian, 13 September 2003. 95. 'Le TPIR n'a pas renonce a poursuivre Ics membres de I'APR, selon un porte-parole' (Hirondelle News Agency, Arusha, 1 July 2003). 96. 'Lc Rwanda veur ecarter Mme Del Ponte de son peste de procureur (porte-parole)' (AFP, The Hague, 24 July 2003). 97. This shameful saga is detailed in Carla Del Ponte, La Caccia. 10 c I criminali di guerre (Feltrinelli Bdirore, Milan, 2008), pp. 236-53 and Florence Hartmann, Paix et chdtiment: les guerres secretes de la politique et de la justice iruemasionales (Flammarion, Paris. 2007), pp.262-77. 98. Speech at the opening of the Rwanda National Security Workshop with Civil Society, Kigali, 8 August 2002. 99. 'Le minisrre belge des Affaires etrangeres explique sa methode" Le Soir (Brussels), 31 August 2002. GOVER.."'JANCE IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA • 21
Rwandan government spokesman Joseph Bideri reacted: 'Rwanda has nothing to learn about democracy from Louis Michel or Belgium.... Democracy is proceeding in Rwanda, fortunately without the contribution of Belgium.... If Mr Michel is in search of colonies, Rwanda should be the last of his centres of interest. ,100 Donors' suggestions that Rwanda should engage in negotiations with the (armed) opposition met with robust reactions. In early 1998, the Japanese ambassador encouraged the government to 'forget hatred, dis trust and pride', so that 'the fighting may cease and negotiations may begin'. The response was immediate. On 29 January, Minister of Foreign Affairs Anastase Gasana stated that he was 'surprised to hear the ambassa dor of a country friendly towards Rwanda ... request negotiations with criminal groups, which should be brought before the courts', adding that 'given the historical heritage of Japan, it is regrettable that Mr Shinsuke proposes negotiations with the forces of genocide'. 101 Four days after this diatribe, the Japanese government announced that 'it did not speak out in favour of a negotiation between Rwanda and the rebels'; it had been a 'misunderstanding'. 102 When in April 2008 Belgian Foreign Minister Karel de Gucht advocated a dialogue with the FDLR, the reaction was equally furious. Foreign Minister Museminali stated that 'this declaration by a Belgian official is scandalous ... and of a nature that could feed another diplomatic scandal', 103 probably a reference to the severing of relations with France in late 2006 (see below). Analyses by international donor agencies that did not fit the govern ment discourse were aggressively suppressed. An expensive multi-country study launched by the World Bank in 2005 sought to collect data on determinants of movement out of poverty; it included observations of par ticipatory decision making at local and national levels. Six months into the study, the Rwandan security forces seized at least half of the data because 'genocide ideology' was present in the study's design and content, and Rwandan and foreign researchers were questioned by the police. The World Bank was forced to destroy all data and to abandon the research project altogether. 104 In August 2007 the UNDP published a National Human Development Report on Rwanda' o, that contained a
100. AFP, Kigali, II September 2002. 101. AFP, Kigali, 29 January t998. 102. AFP. Kigali, 4 February 1998. 103. 'Rwanda: Kigali critique la proposition belge de mediation avec les FDLR' (Panapress, Kigali, 30 April 2008). 104. For more details, see Bert Ingelaere, 'Do we understand life after genocide? Center and periphery in the construction of knowledge in postgenocide Rwanda', African Studies Reoieu 53,1 (20l0), pp. 49-50. 105. UNDP, 'Turning Vision 2020 into reality: from recovery to sustainable human devel opment' (UNDP, 2007). 22 AFRICAN" AFFAIRS number of observations critical of government policy. The report was rejected by the Cabinet, which asked the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, James Musoni, to refute it officially. Musoni, however, had been chairman of the steering committee that oversaw the drafting, and had signed the foreword to the report. He claimed that he only saw a draft and blamed 'the inaccuracies ... on additional interpret ations by the author'. Regarding the Swedish main author and a Rwandan university lecturer involved in the process, Musoni added: 'We have blacklisted them and won't associate them in any business.dOG The VNDP was forced to issue a five-page 'Addendum-Corrigendum', which contained 28 points in which 'inaccuracies' were put right. When, in May 2006, the World Food Programme stated that almost 300,000 Rwandans needed urgent humanitarian assistance in response to famine, the government strongly dismissed the assessment, describing it as 'mere fabrication, opportunistic and serving selfish interests.... \VFP's claims are just politics intended to achieve nothing but to destroy the country. ... They are just looking for assistance on our behalf to keep them oper ating in the country."07 A few days later, the world march against hunger, organized worldwide by the WFP, was cancelled in Kigali 'for unclear reasons".':" The most intense conflict was with France, an ally of the former regime and accused by the RPF of active involvement in the genocide. Accusations remained vague and the dispute was diffuse until on 10 March 2004 Le Monde published elements from a French judicial inquiry into the downing of President Habyarimana's plane, an attack that triggered the genocide, As the investigation pointed an accusing finger toward the RPF and even Kagame in person, the reaction was swift. Minister of Foreign Affairs Charles Murigande issued a 'categorical denial' and announced the line of defence Rwanda was to adopt systema tically: 'These allegations must be placed in a certain context: everyone knows well the role France has played in the Rwandan genocide.... It is France which has trained the genocidal army and the militias that have committed genocide.tl'" In an interview with Radio France International on 16 March, Kagame damaged relations further by stating that France
106. '1 never read UN report before launch - Musoni', The New Times (Kigab), 24 August 2007. 107. 'Hunger: government refutes WFP claims', The New Times (Kigah), 14 May 2006. Interestingly, during the same period, the Burundian government recognized the problem in a region that straddles both countries, and requested international assistance for famine victims. 'Nkurunziza urges Burundians to assist famine victims' (PA."""JA, Bujumbura, 20 February 2006). 108. 'Report d'une manifestation du PAM a Kigali contre la faim' (PANA, Kigali, 22 May 2006). 109. AFP (Brussels, 10 March 2004). GOVERNANCE IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 23 • had offered weapons and training to those guilty of genocide.J!'' During the tenth commemoration ceremony in Kigali on 7 April, he denounced the 'shameful attitude' of the international community and lashed out again at France: '[The French] have knowingly trained and armed the sol diers and militiamen who were about to commit genocide, and they knew that they were going to commit genocide.' Directly addressing the French Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs who was present at the ceremony, Kagame said that the French 'have the audacity to stay here without 1 apologizing'. I I When, in November 2006, French judge Bruguiere issued arrest war rants against nine Rwandan officers suspected of having been involved in the attack against the presidential plane, Kigali immediately broke off dip lomatic relations with France and opened two backfires in the form of so-called 'independent' commissions of inquiry. The report of the first, known as the 'Mucyo Comrmssion'v'J? which was made public on 5 August 2008, 'found' that France had been actively engaged in the gen ocide, both before and while it took place. As the name of the commis sion 'entrusted with the task of collecting evidence of the implication of the French state' showed, it had a clear mission which it did not however accomplish in a convincing fashion, as the report was replete with unlike lihoods, doubtful testimonies, and at least one forged document. The second report, made by the 'Mutsinzi Committee', was published on II January 2010. 113 It attempted to show that the presidential plane was not taken down by the RPF but by Hutu military, and it was even less convincing than the previous one. 114 In the meantime, the regime played hardball with regard to the French judicial inquiry. Rose Kabuye, the chief of protocol at the President's office, was one of the officers against whom an arrest warrant was issued. Knowing that she would be arrested, she was sent on a mission to Germany, where she was duly apprehended on 9 November 2008 1 15 and transferred to Paris. After she was indicted,
110. Reuters (Kigali, 16 March 2004). 111. 'France blamed as Rwanda marks genocide date', The Guardian, 8 April 2004. 112. Republique du Rwanda, Commission narionale independante chargee de rassembler les preuves montrant l'implication de l'Etat francais dans le genocide perpetre au Rwanda en 1994, 'Rapponfinal' (Kigali, 15 November 2007). 113. Republic of Rwanda, Independent Commirrce of experts charged with investigation into me crash on 6 April 1994 of the Falcon 50 Aeroplane, registration number 9XR-NN, 'Report of the investigation into the causes and circumstances of and responsibility for the attack of 06/04/1994 against the Falcon 50 Rwandan Presidential Aeroplane, Registration number 9XR-NN' (Kigali, 20 April 2009). 114. See Filip Reyntiens, 'A fake inquiry on a major event: analysis of the Mutsinzi report on the 6th April 1994 attack on the Rwandan President's aeroplane' (lOB Working Paper 2010-7, Institute of Development Policy and Management, Antwerp, 2010). 115. The Rwandan government immediately retaliated by expelling the German ambassa dor in Kigali and by recalling [he Rwandan ambassador in Berlin. However Germany had not done anything but act upon a European arrest warrant. 24 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
she (and Rwandan intelligence) gained access to the Bruguiere file, which came in handy at the time the Mutsinzi report was being drafted. The paradoxical outcome of this saga was that France and Rwanda restored diplomatic relations. Besides the ICTR and France, Spain too was attacked over a delicate judicial file. After Spanish judge Andreu Merelles issued arrest warrants on 6 February 2008 against 40 officers of the RDF over both the killing of Spanish nationals and crimes against humanity committed in Rwanda and the DRC, the reaction was swift and furious. In a communique dated 9 February, the Foreign Ministry stated that Andreu Merelles based his decision on information provided by 'well-known detractors of Rwanda', without specifying who these were. '[H]is so-called judicial file is full of hate and racist language, genocide denial and absolute falsehoods [and] an unacceptable attempt to rewrite and confuse history for political expe diency',l16 On the same day, Justice Minister Karugarama stated that this 'racist and negationist document ... should be treated with the contempt it deserves' and that it was 'the result of coordinated efforts between nega tive forces and genocide suspects still at large, bent on destabilizing the country', 117 again without offering any specification. Parliament followed suit: accusing Andreu Merelles of 'judicial terrorism', it urged the govern ment to prosecute him for 'negationism', 118 Kagame too did not mince his words. Denouncing the 'arrogance' of the Spanish judge, he said that 'If I met him, I would tell him to go to hell.'Il9 While it tackled the international community aggressively, Rwanda developed into a regional powerhouse. It twice invaded ZalreIDRC, where it supported proxy rebel movements and committed massive war crimes and crimes against humanity, and it came close to waging a full war with its fanner ally Uganda.F" Despite being a small and poor country, Rwanda developed an extraordinary degree of military, political, and econ omic control over its huge (but weak) western neighbour, and it shame lessly lied about its involvement. In January 1997, when Belgium stated publicly what everyone knew, namely that thousands of Rwandan soldiers were deployed in Zaire, presidential adviser Claude Dusaidi reacted: 'I believe that Belgium has gone senile .... It looks like they don't know
116. Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 'Rwanda govern ment reaction to the Spanish judge indictments' (Kigali, 9 February 2008). 117. 'Karugarama accuses judge of snubbing international law', The Neo Times (Kigali), 9 February 2008. 118. 'Sue Spanish judge, parties urge government', The New Times (KigaJl), 25 February 2008. 119. 'Rwanda's Kagame blasts Spanish genocide indictments' (Reuters, Kigali, 1 April 2008). 120. See Filip Reynticns, The GreasAfrican War: Congo and regionalgeopolitics, ]996--2006 (Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2009). GOVERNANCE IN POST-GENOCIDE RWA..~DA 25 where the borders are, nor do they distinguish between Zairians and Rwandans.' 121 Many more denials were to follow, but they sounded very hollow since Kagame himself unveiled the public secret in an interview with the Washington Post. Claiming regional leadership, he said that 'the Rwandan government planned and directed the rebellion', that 'Rwandan forces participated in the capture of at least four cities' and that 'Rwanda provided training and arms for the (rebel) forces even before the campaign to overthrow Marshal Mobutu began last October'. Kagame added that it would have been 'more suitable if Congolese rebels had done most of the fighting" but they were not 'fully prepared to carry it out alone'. 122 Rwanda's regional ambitions were made explicit early on. During a mid-1997 meeting in Brussels, RPF general secretary Denis Polisi stated that Rwanda had become a 'master piece' and that 'henceforth nothing can be done (in the region) without passing by Rwanda', adding that 'Rwanda has just solved the problem of Zaire and is getting ready to solve other problems in the region,.]23 One of the RPF's ideologues, Privat Rutazibwa, referring to the nickname 'Soldiers without borders' given to the RPA by the Congolese, wrote that 'the freedom fighters should have no borders, as long as there are still retrograde ideologies and oppressive regimes on this continent', and he underlined 'the stabilizing role of the new Rwanda throughout the region,.'2. He published these lines just weeks after Rwanda invaded the DRC a second time, while Kigali again denied its presence there. What were seen as hegemonic ambitions inspired fear in neighbouring countries. On 28 August 2001, Ugandan President Museveni wrote a letter to the UK Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short explaining why he needed to increase defence spending: 'We have no doubts that Rwanda is planning aggression against us either using proxies or, even, directly.' Referring to the size of the Rwandan army, he added that 'It is possible this level of manpower gives them the arrogance to think that they can interfere in the internal affairs of Uganda. ,125 The arrogance that so infuriated Museveni explains the condescending and scornful way in which RPA Chief of Staff James Kabarebe described Congolese President Joseph Kabila:
121. AFP (Nairobi, 29 January 1997). 122. John Pomfret) 'Defence Minister says arms, troops supplied for anti-Moburu drive', Wash£ngton Post, 9 July 1997. 123. Meeting with the Rwandan community, Brussels, 15 June 1997 (based on notes taken by 1\\'0 persons present). 124. Privat Rutazibwa, 'Crises des Grands Lacs: la solution viendra du Rwanda' (ARl/ &"IA, ~o. 104, Kigali, 20-26 August 1998). 125. Bernard Leloup, 'Les rebellions congolaises ct leurs parrains dans l'ordre politique regional' in Filip Rcyntjens and Stefaan Marysse (eds), L'Afrique des grands lacs. Annuaire 2001-2002 (L'Harmattan, Paris, 2002), pp. 83--4. 26 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Joseph has always found it very difficult to adapt himself to the life of a soldier. This was clear during the exchange of fire. He didn't know what to do. I have taught him every thing .... (Laurent) Kabila insisted [that Kabarebe became Chief of Staff of the Congolese army], arguing that his son Joseph did not have a sufficient background.... While Laurent-Desire Kabila was a cheater, his son is timid. He is incapable of looking people in their face. I have never seen in him the slightest ability to command. 126
Managing information, imposing the truth With regard to the massacres by the RPA of refugees in Zaire in 1996-7, Nik Gowing has shown the importance of information management by the Rwandan regime. Without false modesty, Kagame stated that 'We used communication and information warfare better than anyone. We have found a new way of doing things.'127 One technique, first used in Rwanda and later in Zaire, was the 'closure of the conflict scene': Kagame confirmed that 'the aim was to let them [the NGOs and the press] continue their work, but deny them what would be dangerous to US,.128 Intimidation was another tool: 'Kagame does not like ~GOs, so he paralyzed them completely and terrorized them. If he did not like what they did with information, he kicked them out."29 likewise, jour nalists 'knew the Rwandan government could make life unpleasant'. 130 Fear was reinforced by a practice of encouraging leaks and monitoring communications. Thus 'one particular NGO partial to the Rwandan government' would fax sit-reps directly to Kagame's office.l"A huma nitarian agent indicated that 'if the Save the Children person in Bukavu radioed that he had refugees ... then those refugees would be under threat because networks were bugged'.132 Not content with remaining silent about RPF crimes, some reporters became 'RPF groupies', ready to excuse what they did wrong: one of them recognized that 'journalists and NGOs were in bed with the RPF'133 At any rate, the choice was simple: 'The RPA's line was that you are either with the RPA or against them' .134 Pottier notes that the Kagame's information strategy was 'built
126. Jeune Afrique/L'Imelligenl, No. 2155-6, 29 April-12 May 2002, quoted by Bernard Leloup, 'Les rebellions congoJaises', pp. 95--6. 127. Nik Gowing, 'New challenges and problems for information management in complex emergencies: ominous lessons from the Great Lakes and eastern zaire in late 1996 and early 1997' (Paper presented at conference on Dispatches from Disaster Zones, Oxford, 28 May 1998), p. 4. 128. tu«, p. 15. 129. Ibid., p. 22. 130. Ibid., p. 36. 131. Ibid., p. 47. 132. Ibid., p. 50. 133. Ibid., p. 41. 134. tsu., p. 62. GOVERNANCE IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 27 around denial';135 it actually amounted to shameless lying. The RPF's routine was 'simple but effective: ban outsiders from the battle zone; delay and frustrate their movements; deny any "rumour" of military excesses; withhold information; apply moral argument by shaming the international community'.136 This kind of manipulation was facilitated by the genocide credit the regime astutely maintained and exploited to escape condemnation. It was used as an ideological weapon allowing the RPF to acquire and maintain victim status and to enjoy impunity for its own crimes. Pottier observed that 'Those who represent the victims of genocide are not to be chal lenged."37 A diplomat interviewed by Le Mamie in New York acknowl edged that 'any action undertaken against the regime in Kigali is always perceived as offering moral support to those guilty of genocide; it is true that the Rwandan regime is benefiting from this ambivalence, and we know it', 138 The regime too knew: Minister Patrick Mazimhaka stated that 'we were (diplomatically) stronger because nobody could argue against us', while a US diplomat admitted that 'the Americans were terri bly manipulated by this government and now we are almost held hostage by it'.139 In 2001, Claudine Vidal analysed the use made of the annual genocide commemorations for propaganda purposes: 'The ceremonies organized by the regime reveal an inevitable relation of power, first because they capture the silent words of the victims giving them a meaning determined by current goals, and second because they take over the private mourning of the survivors and transform it into a collective mourning in the name of considerations that are not theirs.,140 She concluded that 'at every commemoration, those in power have instrumentalized the representation of the genocide in the context of the political conflicts at the time'. 141 [ohan Pottier translated this observation into the arena of the regime's dealing with the international community. The RPF, 'as Rwanda's post genocide spiritual guardian, displays exceptional skill at converting inter national feelings of guilt and ineptitude into admissions that the Front deserves to have the monopoly on knowledge construction'.142 The regime 'convinced the world that they - and they alone - had the right to
135. Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, survival and disinformation in the late fwemierh century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002), p. 55. 136. tu«, p. 58. 137. Ibid., p. 176. 138. LeMonde, 26 October 1996. 139. Washington RJsl, 14 July 1998. 140. Claudine Vidal, 'Les commemorations du genocide au Rwanda', Les Temps Modernes 56,613 (2001), p. 44. 141. lbid., p. 45. 142. [chan Portier, Re-Irnagining Rwanda, p. 203. 28 AFRICA."'1 AFFAIRS know and determine what was going on in those parts of the Great Lakes region they now controlled', and they achieved this through a strategy based on the 'concept of morality, guilt and punishment', 143 Besides its moral high ground, the regime also succeeded in having its flawless narrative swallowed by the donor community because of its decent technocratic governance, with competent and even channing elites articulating an intelligent discourse, exactly the one the international communiry wished to hear. And yet, behind this facade is a regime that has ruthlessly killed tens if not hundreds of thousands of its own citizens and that has practised political murder on a large scale. Those considered a threat, Hutu and Tutsi alike, were physically eliminated. Jon Swain listed eight persons assassinated by the intelligence services only because of their knowledge of the RPF's role in the downing of former President Habyarimana's plane; 144 scores of others were killed because 'they knew too much' ,145 Assassinations did not spare RPA officers, as soon as their loyalry was in doubt. Ruzibiza described the physical elimination of over twenty military, in addition to several foreigners working in Rwanda who were suspected of having leaked information on RPF abuse.t'" A former Speaker of Parliament and a former government minister who were forced into exile offer chilling and unique behind-the-curtain views of the regime's practices that read like Nero's Rome: parallel hierarchies and channels of decision making; monitoring of telephone and email com munications; deceit, lies, threats, and intimidation; setting of traps; cor ruption and nepotism; denunciation, spreading of rumours, and false accusations; manipulation and concealment.l V After his departure into exile in early 20 I 0, former Army Chief of Staff General Kayumba Nyamwasa used similar terms to characterize the regime's faults: 'intri gue, treachery, manipulation, and betrayal'. 148 The monopoly of truth the regime successfully gained extended not just to Rwanda's visions and analyses of current affairs - for instance its democratic credentials, its human rights record, or its involvement in the DRC ~ but to history generally. In summary, this official history claims that pre-colonial Rwanda had been for centuries a unified, harmonious, and peaceful society and that, inspired by the so-called 'Hamitic
143. tu«, p. 151. 144. Jon Swain, 'The riddle of the Rwandan assassin's trail'. The Sunday Times, 4 April 2004. 145. This is the title of a documentary film directed by Julien Elie on the murder in Nairobi of Seth Sendashonga, a former RPF leader: Celui qui sauait (Alter-Cine, Montreal, 2001). 146. Ruzlbiza, Ruanda, pp. 420-41. 147. Sebarenzi, God Sleeps in Rwanda; Patrick Habamenshi, Rwanda, Where Souls Turn to Dust: My journey from exile tv legacy (il.Iniverse, New York, :-""Y, 2009). 148. 'Gen. Nyamwasa responds to Kagame', Sunday Monuar (Kampala), 30 May 2010. GOVERNANCE IN POST-GENOCIDE RWA."1\l"DA 29 hypothesis',149 ethnicity was introduced by the Belgian administration and the Catholic Church in the context of a divide and rule policy. The RPF put an end to the genocide that resulted from divisive politics, and restored peace and harmony, 150 However, the leading historian of Rwanda, Jan Vansina, finds 'a whole set of false propositions and asser tions,I51 in this narrative:
The linguistic and cultural unity of the country today did not exist in the seventeenth century and Rwanda is not a 'natural' nation. . Rwanda really became a nation in the twentieth century.." Formerly, neither abundance nor order flourished in the country and it is false to think that everyone was happy with their station in life and all lived in peace under the shepherd's staff of wise kings.... The reasons for the elaboration of such erroneous propositions are evident .... [T]here is the projection of a nostalgic utopia into the past, a past that contrasts with a painful present. L52
If history did not suit the regime, a new history needed to be con structed. During a scholarly debate in Kigali in 2004 about the nature of the genocide, one foreign academic mentioned the value of different 'truths'. A high-ranking official in the audience immediately demanded the floor to insist: 'There is only one truth and we know it, ,153 The stated aim of an 'international conference' held in Kigali in July 2008 was 'on the one hand, to observe the failure of the human and social sciences that have led to genocide, on the other, the resourcing of the human and social sciences thanks to the efforts of the Rwandans'. The meeting called for 'a new methodology, a new literature, a new history',154 The regime even succeeded in penetrating international academic publishing to settle scores with critical scholars. A book published in 2008 contains a six-page preface in which President Kagame was not only allowed to put forward his regime's view on Rwanda's past, present, and future, but also to propose a strongly worded rebuttal of a chapter written by Lemarchand in that very book. Lemarchand was said to be 'mistaken', 'simplistic', and 'wrong'; 'The revisionists must receive justice for their crimes against his torical truth and the affront of their fraudulent narratives.' '"
149. Edith R. Sanders, 'The Hamitic hypothesis: its origin and function in time perspec tive', Journal 0/African History 10, 4 (1969), pp. 521-32. 150. This presentation can be found in many statements and documents. See, for example, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, 'The Rwandan confiia: origin, development, exit strategies' (Study commissioned by the NURC, Kigali, 2004). 151. Jan Vansina, Antecedents to Modem Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI, 2004), pp. 197-8. 152. Ibid., pp. 198-9. 153. Human Rights Watch, 'Law and reality', p. 36. 154. 'Rwanda: Apprendre de l'cxperience du genocide rwandais' (ARl, Kigali, 23 July 2008), italics added. 155. President P. Kagame, 'Preface', in Phil Clark and Zachary D. Kaufman (eds), After Genocide: Transitional justice, pon-conftia reconstruction and reconciliation in Rwanda and beyond (Hurst, London, 2008), pp. xxi-xxvi. 30 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
One particular aspect of imposing the truth served a very concrete project. The RPF vigorously denied the reality of ethniciry, a denial that was an essential element of the hegemonic strategies of a small Tutsi elite. The claim that 'there are no Hutu and Tutsi, but only Banyarwanda' allowed the concealment of domination by Tursi. \X7hen, in the past, Hutu were a majority in public institutions, this was called 'ethnic domination'; however, now that Tursi were a majority, this became 'meritocracy'. Though obviously denying this, the regime operated in ethnic terms, as evidenced by some telling facts. A calculation made in 2000 showed that about 70 percent of the 169 most important office holders in the country were Tutsi,156 who make up about 10 percent ofthe population. A member of an INGO targeted by the government observed the contradiction in the accusa tions against his organization: 'On one hand you can't talk about ethnic groups, everyone is Rwandan, but then an organization can be raked over the coals for not hiring Tutsi. 1157 A parliamentary report noted that Liprodhor 'never gives an employment contract to a Tursi' and found that the Mayor ofKanama District 'refused to hire Tursi'. ISS Former Agriculture Minister Habamenshi recalled that he was summoned by Kagame 'to explain to him how Hutu think'.159 In 1998, Kagame told US Ambassador Gribbin that Rwanda 'felt honor bound to support [the Banyamulenge mutiny in the DRC] on grounds of ethnic solidarity'i'P" After the RPF's victory, the exiled former speaker of Parliament Joseph Sebarenzi, a Tursi genocide survivor himself, realized that 'the tables were turned and Hutu felt the same lack of security we Tutsi had felt for so many years'."?' So the ethnic amnesia162 preached by the regime only served to veil the fact that rule by a minority of the majority ethnic group was replaced by rule by a minority ofthe minority ethnic group. Foreigners may be fooled,163 but Rwandans know the link between power and truth very well: Ingelaere's respondents said that the origins
156. Filip Reynriens, 'Rwanda, ten years on: from genocide to dictatorship', African Affairs t03, 411 (2004), pp. 177-210, 188-9. 157, Front Line Rwanda, 'Disappearances', p. 90, 158. Republique du Rwanda, Chambre des deputes, 'Rapport de la Commission perle mentaire ad hoc creee en date du 20 janvier 2004 chargee d'exarniner les rueries perpetrees dans la province de Gikongoro, l'ideologie genocidaire et ceux qui la propagent partour au Rwanda'. adopted by the Chamber on 30 June 2004 (unofficial translation from Kinyanvanda), 159. Habamenshi, Rwanda, p. 75. 160. Robert E Gribbin, In the Aftemuub of Genocide: The US role iu Ruanda (iUniverse, New York, NY, 2005), p. 280. 161. Sebarenzi, God Sleeps in Rwanda, p. 82. 162. Term coined by Rene Lemarchand, 'Burundi: The politics of ethnic amnesia' in Helen Fein (ed.), Genocide Watch (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1992), pp.70--86. 163. A former police officer asked to assess the effectiveness of reforms in the justice system told Human Rights Watch: 'You can't understand. You sec what's on paper but you GOVER..;'lANCE IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 31 and context of the genocide 'are already known and that the current gov ernment is taking care of the general "Truth" (with capital T) about the past'. 164 Apart from the legal means mentioned earlier, one way of impos ing the truth domestically is through the ingando or solidarity camps, which van Hoyweghen sees as just one way of socially engineering the entire country. University students were urged in an ingando opening session 'to choose their side and work with or against the govemmcnt'i'P" That the Rwandans are not fooled shows in Susan Thomson's experience of're-education'. Her conclusion:
The graduates of these inganda camps that I met do not believe in the national unity of the re-imagined past or in the reconciliation of a rc-engineered future. Rather, they sec the camps and their ideological discourse as efforts to exercise social control over adult Hutu men. Instead of being re-educated, these graduates merely learned new forms of 'ritualized dissimulation' and strategic compliance.J''" Rwanda is by no means the only place and historical circumstance where the construction of truth is the privilege of those in power, nor where the power to say what counts as true is an issue of contemporary politics. However, in today's Rwanda the use of the instruments of knowledge construction have an extraordinary impact on the relations of those in power with both their own citizens and the outside world. Towards the latter, this allowed the regime to have its own narrative accepted and to silence the challenges to that narrative. Domestically, one truth was imposed, at least in its public expression. Yet James Scott has shown that, beside the public transcript of the powerful, the power less - in this case most Hutu and many Tutsi - develop a hidden tran script. 107 This insurgent reading of history is invisible, yet very present in people's minds and private exchanges.
Conclusion Rather than summarizing the themes developed in this article, I conclude by highlighting a number of transversal trends that have emerged clearly don't know the truth.... You foreigners are easily tricked.' Human Rights Watch, 'Law and reality', p. 44. 164. Bert Ingelaere, 'Does the truth pass across the tire without burning? Transitional justice and its discontents in Rwanda's gacaca courts' (lOB Discussion Paper, Antwerp, 2007), p. 29. 165. Saskia van Hoyweghen, 'The urgency of land and agrarian reform in Rwanda', African Affairs 98,392 (1999), pp. 353-72, p. 366. 166. Susan Thomson, 'Getting re-educated in Rwanda's solidarity camps' in Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf (eds), Reconstructing Rwanda: State building and human rights after mass vi0 Ience ~'isconsin University Press, Madison, WI, forthcoming). 167. James C. Scott, Domination and the Am of Resistance: Hidden transcripts (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1992). 32 AFRICAN AFFAIRS over the past fifteen years. Prominent among these is the incremental way in which the RPF has monopolized power and eliminated countervailing voices. This piecemeal approach has allowed the regime to avoid condem nation by the international community, which was faced by steps con sidered) each on its own, to be too small to warrant a robust response. The RPF explored the limits of tolerance, and it realized there were none; so it crossed one Rubicon after the other. Referring to opponents, Kagame once said that a barrel can be emptied with a coffee spoon, and this also holds true for his dealings with the international community. Having eliminated individual domestic and external troublemakers one at a time, he had neutralized the political opposition by 2003, and civil society by 2004; between 200 I and 20 I0, the manipulation of elections allowed him to confer a layer of democratic legitimacy on what was in reality the gradual closing off of political space; the introduction of legal instruments allowed his regime to tighten its grip. This piecemeal approach, coupled with the regime's moral high ground, kept the inter national community in a constant waiting mood. It hoped things would improve, but they kept worsening to a point of no return, as its hesitant and confusing responses only emboldened the RPF. Front Line summar ized the effects of international tolerance as follows:
The donor community gave Rwanda about $7 million to hold superficially democratic elections [in 2003], but then turned a blind eye to the widespread fraud, intimidation, and human rights violations committed by the RPF to ensure its election victory - even though those problems were thoroughly documented and reported by the European Union's own election observer mission. If donors were unwilling to cry foul over flawed elections that they helped finance, the Rwandan Government clearly calculated that it did not have much to fear from donors when it came time to suppress human rights defenders. 1b8
A second trend is the extraordinary sense of entitlement displayed by the RPF. The combination of its having defeated the forces of genocide, its efficient and cynical exploitation of international feelings of guilt and ineptitude, and its regional military might allowed it to tackle unsympa thetic voices aggressively and with arrogance. Strongly worded, indeed intimidating statements reduced to silence many of those who might otherwise have spoken out. This assertive and proactive behaviour has allowed the regime to escape judicial scrutiny both by the ICTR and the justice systems of third countries. Though coming from a small and very poor and aid-dependent country, it has also served to avoid condemna tion of the regime's human rights record, its poor democratic credentials, its dangerously flawed political governance, and its aggressive behaviour in the region. The major instrument for achieving this tolerance has been
168. Front line Rwanda, 'Disappearances', pp. 98-9. GOVERNANCE IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 33 the skilful and cynical use of the genocide credit, which allowed the regime both to capitalize on the guilt feelings of the international commu nity and to present itself as the victim of genocide. As a matter of fact, the RPF did not have much of a choice. While Straus and Waldorf point to a number of reasons why the regime chose the path it did,169 the most important one is that the RPF would simply lose power if it accepted a competitive political system. Strong information management is the third thread. The regime's per formance in this field may well be traceable to the intelligence back ground and experience of some of the RPF's military leaders, including Kagame himself, who was the head of military intelligence in Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) until 1990. Monitoring and disseminat ing information is part of a strategy for both external and internal con sumption. Externally, the RPF has successfully cordoned off the arenas of massive human rights abuse in Rwanda and the DRC and imposed a monopoly on the reading of history. In combination with the moral high ground achieved through the genocide credit, this has made the regime nearly unchallengeable for the international community. Domestically, the RPF has decreed one single truth and devised instruments (legis lation, intimidation, 're-education', silencing alternative voices) to avoid its being challenged, at least publicly. By doing so, it has privileged the public transcript of the powerful, but failed to eliminate the hidden tran script of the oppressed. In all likelihood, in the privacy of their homes, in discreet conversations, and in the body language that accompanies their silence, the powerless construct their truth, which may well be more radical than the RPF believes. In Rwanda as in some other places, history is a highly political stake of the present and the future rather than a way of analysing and understanding the past. Its manipulation contributes to the structural violence so prevalent, yet apparently so invisible to outsiders. The so-called international community bears overwhelming responsibil ity in allowing the RPF to deploy its skills successfully. It has been a willing hostage to Kigali's spin, whether it be on political governance and human rights, on massive violations of international humanitarian law, on the aggression and plunder of the DRC, on its dangerous social and economic engineering exercise, or on the way it has injected structural violence across the country and the region. This tolerance was visible
169, They identify five critical factors: institutional legacy (the ancient roots of Rwandan political culture and institutions include strong state-centred social control); the regime's pathway to power (its military and ideological background); the terms of settlement of the conflict (the RPF came to power with a relatively free hand); the base of political support (which is narrow and still narrowing); and the international environment (the permissive international community). Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf, 'Introduction: seeing like a post conflict state' in Straus and Waldorl (eds), Reconstructing Rwanda. 34 AFRICAN AFFAIRS from the early days after the RPF seized power. At a donors' roundtable in Geneva in January 1995, almost US$600 million of aid money was pledged. The failure to tie the pledges to improvements in a rapidly dete riorating human rights situation may well have persuaded the regime that it could act without restraint, and that impunity was assured. This feeling could only be reinforced when reactions were muted, to say the least, after the RPA massacred thousands of rDPs in Kibeho camp in April 1995, after the Prime Minister and two other ministers left the gov ernment 'of national unity' in disgust in August 1995, after scores of Hutu officials were killed or went into exile throughout 1995, or after Rwanda invaded Zaire for the first time in the fall of 1996 and committed massive atrocities there. Under these circumstances, the moment soon came when dialogue was futile, and the Rwandan showcase reached a point of no return. Peter Uvin's judgement is severe: 'In the case of post genocide Rwanda, those who provide significant budgetary support claim to do so as part of a deliberate and respectful strategy in which both sides dialogue to produce a long-term political and economic vision for the future.... In practice, the Rwandan side gains greater power, partly because no one in annual monitoring exercises wants to rock the boat and undermine the nice setup.' 170
170, Peter Uvin, Human Rights and Development (Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, CT, 2004), pp.II6-17. NO.ICTR-2001-7~ The Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi, Case IS Public
Annex 2
Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, Beschluss vom 06.11.2008, Aktenzeichen 2 Ausl175/07
14 March 2011 JuraForum.de - Entscheidungen OLG-FRANKFURT - Beschluss vom 0611.2008, Az: 2 Ausl A 175/07
OLG-FRANKFURT Beschluss vom 06.11.2008, Aktenzeichen: 2 Ausl A 175107
Grunde:
Der Senat hat mit Beschlufl vom 25.Marz 2008 gegen den Verlolgten die forrnliche Auslieferungshaft angeordnet. Auf die Grunds dieses Beschlusses wird Bezug genommen. Die ruandischen Beh6rden ersuchen danach um Auslieferung des Verlolgten nach Ruanda zum Zwecke der Strafverfolgung. Gegen den Verlolgten besteht Internationaler Haftbefehl der Generalstaatsanwaltschaft der Republik Ruanda in 01 vorn 19. August 2007 (Az.: RPGR: 715/GenIMJD/RE). Dern Verlolgten werden V6lkermord, Teilnahrne arn V6lkerrnord, Verschw6rung zur Begehung von V6lkermord, Mord, Ausrottung sowie Bildung, Mitgliedschaft und Radelsfuhrerschaft in Bezug auf eine kriminelle Bande zur Last gelegt. Der Verlolgte war von 1988 bis 1994 Burgermeister der Gemeinde 02 in der Pratektur 03 und ehemaliger Parteiqanqer der herrschenden ...-Partei in Ruanda. Er soli sich u.a. am 4. Oktober 1990 in 02 aktiv an der systematischen Verhaftung von Tutsis beteiligt haben, von denen mehrere infolge der von ihm angeordneten Folter gestorben sind. Am 11. April 1994 soli er zusammen mit anderen beschlossen haben, Tutsi-Fluchtlinqe in der Kirchengemeinde 04 zu ubertallen, In AusfUhrung dieses Beschlusses sollen mehr als 2.000 Tutsis ermordet worden sein. Der Verfolgte soli die Oberlalle pers6nlich angefUhrt und befehligt haben und den Milizen Gewehre, Transportmittel und Geld zur Verlugung gestellt haben.
In einem Verfahren, das nicht den Verfolgten betrifft, hatte die Strafkammer III des Internationalen Gerichtshofs fUr Ruanda in einer Entscheidung vom 28.Mai 2008 die Verweisung eines Strafverfahrens an Ruanda mit der Begrundung abgelehnt, die Strafstruktur der Republik Ruanda entsprache nicht dem international anerkannten Standard und ein faires Verfahren sei in Ruanda nicht qewahrleistet. Nunmehr hat auch die Berufungskammer des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs in jenem Verlahren unter dem 08.0ktober 2008 die Verweisung eines Strafverfahrens an Ruanda abgelehnt. Sie sieht ein faires Verfahren vor einem ruandischen Gericht wegen fehlender Waffengleichheit nicht garantiert.
Da die Berufungskammer des Internationalen Gerichtshofs damit eine qrundsatzliche Aussage und nicht eine Einzelfallentscheidung getroffen hat, kann eine Auslieferung des Verfolgten an die Republik Ruanda derzeit nicht in Betracht kommen.
Das Auswartiqe Amt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat uber das Bundesamt der Justiz unter dem 29.Juli 2008 lediglich mitgeteilt, es halte eine Bewilligung der Auslieferung nicht tur vornherein ausgeschlossen, und hat gebeten, "die lanqere Bearbeitungszeit wegen der Befassung der Leitungsebene zu entschuldigen." Eine weitere Stellungnahme liegt bislang nicht vor.
Die Auslieferung war deshalb fUr unzulassiq zu srklaren und der Haftbefehl aufzuheben, obwohl der Verlolgte nach Auffassung des Senats auf Grund der von der Republik Ruanda vorgelegten Unterlagen der in dem o. a. Haftbefehl der Generalstaatsanwaltschaft der Republik Ruanda dargestellten Straftaten weiterhin hinreichend verdachtiq erscheint.
Seite 1 von 1 NO.ICTR-2001-75-R~' The Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi, Case 3 Public
Annex 3
Decision ofthe Ministry ofJustice on the request for the extradition ofRwandan national Francois Bazaramba. Given at Helsinki on 20 February 2009
14 March 2011 Dec i s ion of theMinistry of JU$'\ice on the requestfor tho oxtIadition of Rwlll1dan national Francois Bazaramba. Given at Hel sinki on 20 February2009.
R.equest for extradition The Foreign Ministry of theRepublic ofR.wanda submittedon 27 February Z()()8to the Ministry of Justice a request for the extradition to Rwanda of Rwandannatiorial Francois Bazararnba dated29January 2008. The request is based on a warrant of arrestissuedon 20Febraury 2008by the Rwan dan ProsecutorGeneral. A.ccording to the warrant Mr. Bazarambais suspectedof sevenoffences consisting of genocide, complicity t!:lerein and conspiracyto cortnnit genocide, of murder andextermination as a crime againsthumanity as well as offer mationof. membership, leadership of andparticipation in an association of a criminal gang whosepurposeis to do harm to peopleand theirproperty.'The allegedoffences were committed between 6 April and4 July 1994in Rwanda. The District Courtof Porvoo placed Mr. Bazaramba in pre-trial detentionin April 2007 on accountof the alleged offences. He is still in custody
The National Bureauof Investigation carriedout a pre-trial investigationinto the al legedoffences. The investigation is nowcomplete andthe case has been referred to the prosecutionat\thorities. On J6 April 2008 theMinistry of Justicerequested the Rwandan authorities to sup plement their requestwithrespect tothe evidence supporting the allegations. The Rwandanauthorities nevercomplied withthe request.
Decision The Ministryof Justice has decided to reject the requestfor the ""tradition ofFrancois Bazarambaon the basis of Section 14paragraph 2 of the Act on Extradition (456/1970). Accordingto the provision a request shall be turneddownforthwith ifthe documents indicate that the law would not allow therequestto be granted or if the Ministryof Justice otherwisedeems thatthe request maynot be granted.
GroundS 'The Internationll1 Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda(ICTR) was established in 1994 by a United Nationsresolution to prosecute persons responsible fOT genocideand otherse rious violations of international humanitarian law committedin Rwandabetween 1 Januaryand 31 December 1994. ~/1
In September 2007 the ICTR prosecutors submitted to the court in accordance with the court's completion strategy three pending cases for referral to Rwanda for adjudi- cation before Rwandan couns. .
Three different Trial Chambers rejected the requests in May-June 2008. For various reasons the Trial Chambers were not satisfied that the defendants would receive a fair trial in Rwanda.
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTR upheld two of the Trial Chambers' decisions that had been appealed against to deny referral. As grounds were cited the Appeals Cham bers' misgivings about a fair trial in Rwanda as to the defendant's possibility to obtain the attendance of, and to examine, witnesses under the same conditions as the prose cution. The Appeals Chamber estimated that a defendant might face difficulties inob raining witnesses residing within Rwanda because they would be sfraid to testify, and that he would not be able to call witnesses residing outside Rwanda. to the extent and in a manner, that would ensure a free trial. .
On account of the above the Ministry of Justice notes that it neither has any reason to question the conclusions of the ICTR, nor has it any grounds to eseess the prevailing circumstances in Rwanda any differently than the lCTR.
A fair trial is a fundamental right of an accused person. By acceding to the European Convention on the Protection cf Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Finland has, for its parI. committed itself to guaranteeing this right to persons within its juris diction. Consequently, the Finnish authorities can nOI contribute through their own ac dons to foreign conn proceedings where a justifiable doubt has been raised pertaining to the possibility of a fair trial.
Minister of Justice TuiJa Brax
Legal Adviser Juhani Korhonen
Distribution: Francois Bazaramba/Attorney Ville Hoikkala . ' National Bureau of Investigation Office of the Prosecutor General The Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi, Case No.1CTR~2001-75-Rllbis 3410
Annex 4
Arret DonnantA vis sur la Demande d'Extradition du Nomme: Isaac KAMALI, du 10 decembre 2008, N° 2007/03825, Cour d'Appel de Paris, Premiere Chambre de l'Instruction
/4 March 201/ COUR D'APPEL DE PARIS Du 10 decembre 2008 PREMIERE CHAMBRE DE VINSTRUCTlON N° 2007/03825
ARRET (N° 1- 14 pages) prononce en audience publique Ie dix decembre deux mil huit ARRET DONNANT AVIS SUR LA dormant son avis sur la demande d'extradition forrnee contre DEMANDE KAMALlIsaac D'EXTRADITION ne Ie 28 mai 1949 it NYABIKENKE CITARAMA (Rwanda) de UGIRASHEBUlA Denis KAMALl et de NYlRABA!JINZI Genereuse DUNOMME: Demeurant 4 Impasse de la Sariette 34500 BEZIERS Isaac KAMALl de nationalite franyaise acquise le 6 juin2002
place sous ecrou extraditionnelle 22 juin 2007 ala Maison d'Arret de Paris La Sante remis en liberte par arret de cette chambre le 14 aout 2007 Assiste de Me BlJU-DUVAL, avocat au Barreau de Paris,
COMPOSITION DE LA COUR lors des debats, du ctelibere et du prononce de l'arret
M.GURT]\,'ER, President,
M. LAGEZE, Conseiller,
Recu copie de Mme BOUVENOT-JACQUOT, Conseillere, I'arret et pris tous trois designes conformementa l'article 191 du code de procedure penale connaissance Ie nce 10 Decembre 2008 GREFFIER: Mme BINART, aux debats et au prono de l'arret
MINISTERE PUBLIC represente aux debats et au prononce de l'arret par M. LECOMPTE, avocat general *** /
PAGE 1 N°2007/03825 ------DltBATS:
A l' audience publique du 12 novembre 2008 ont ete entendus :
_ Isaac KAMALI, en son interrogatoire conform6nent aux articles 696-13 et 696-15 du code de procedure penale dont Ie proces-verbal a ete dresse,
_ MGURTNER, President, en son rapport,
_M. LECOMPTE, avocat general, en ses requisitions
_Me BlJU-DUVAL, avocat du comparant et celui-ci lui-meme, qui a eu la parole Ie dernier, en leurs observations
Le comparant s'est exprime sans I'assistance d'un interprete ayant declare parler et comprendre la langue francaise.
L'affaire a ete mise en delibere pour l'avis de la Cour etre prononce it l'audience du 10 decembre 2008 it 14 heures.
RAPPEL DE LA PROCEDURE :
Le 2 juillet 2007, le Gouvernement du Rwanda a forme contre le nornme M. Isaac KAMALI une demande d'extradition adressee par la voie diplomatique, parvenue au Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres le 19 Juillet 2007 et precedee d'une demande d'arrestation provisoire diffusee le 22 juin 2007 ;
Le 22 juin 2007, celui-ci a ete apprehende al'aeroport de Roissy Charles de Gaulle, situe dans le ressort de la cour d'appel de Paris,
Le 22 juin 2007, Ie Procureur de la Republique deBobigny a precede it l'interrogatoire d'identite del'interesse dont il a ete dresse proces-verbal et l'a place sous ecrou extraditionnel ;
Le 13 aout 2007,M. le Procureur General a procede it I'interrogatoire de l'interesse dent il a ete dresse proces-verbal ;
Aux audiences publiques de la chambre de I'instruction des 14 aout, 19 septembre,12 decernbre 2007, 21 mai, 8 octobre et 12 novembre 2008, notification a ere faite ou renouvelee du titre en vertu duquelI'arrestation a eu lieu, des pieces produites Ii l'appui de la demande d'extradition ainsi que des documents transmis dans le cadre du complement d'information.
Me BlJU-DUVAL, avocat de M. Isaac KAlVL-\LI , a depose le 19 mai 2008 Ii 14h20 et Ie 03 novembre 2008 Ii 1IhSO, au greffe de la chambre de I'instruction, des memoires successifs vises par Ie greffier, communiques au Ministere Public et classes au dossier.
PAGE 2 N'2007/03825 * * * '* *
DECISION
prise apresen avoir delibereconformement it I'article 200 du code de procedure penale
EN LA FORME
Considerant qu'il a ete satisfait aux formes et aux delais prescrits par les articles 696-8 et suivants du code de procedure penale relatifs it l'extradition des etrangers ; que la procedure est done reguliere en la forme.
AU FOND
Par note verbale n" 258/0911 du 11 juillet 2007 de son ambassade it Bruxellesendate du 11 juillet20071egouvernement de laRepublique duRwanda a sollicite l'extradition deKAMALI Isaac pour l'execution d'un mandai d'arret n° 112/513/REIRU delivre Ie 27 octobre 2004 par Ie Procureur General Adjoint de Kigali au titre de poursuites penales fondees sur les crimes de genocide et de crimes contre I'humanite perpetres contre la populationtutsie.
Devant Iachambrede l'instruction, KAMAL! Isaac a reconnuque letitre en vertu duquel la demande d'extradition est presentee s'appliquait bien it sa personne et il n'a pas renonce au benefice des regles regissantl' extradition et n'a pas consenti it etre remis aux autorites requerantes.
II convient de rappeler que Ie gouvernement rwandais a adresse une demande d'extradition it I'encontre de Isaac KAMALI des chefs de genocide, cornplicite de genocide, association de malfaiteurs pour commettre le genocide, assassinat et extermination, creation, direction et appartenance it une association de malfaiteurs dont I'objet etait de porter atteinte aux personnes et it leurs proprietes, incitation, aide ou encouragement it I'entrave it l'ordre public.
Le 11 septembre 2007, est parvenue au Greffe de la Cour, par une note verbale du 17 aout 2007, n? 330/09.01/CABIMIN/07 adressee it l' Ambassade de Belgique, une serie de documents, soit _ la copie certifiee conforme d'un mandat d'arret international du 27 octobre 2004 nOO I12/REIRUemispar M. NGOGA Martin,Procureur Generalde la Republique du Rwanda non traduit, it I'encontre de Isaac KAMAL! des chefs de genocide, crimes contre l'humanite et crimes de guerre, -Ia loi 21/77 du 18.81977 instituant un code penal au Rwanda, -Ia loiW33 bis/2003 du 6.9.03 reprirnant ces actes,
PAGE 3 ./f'f} N'2007/0382S el/ , _ la loi organique N° I612004 du 19 juin 2004 portant organisation et cornpetences desjuridictions de GACACA chargees des pour suites et dujugement des infractions constitutives du crime de genocide et autres crimes centre l'humanite cornmis entre le I er octobre 1990 et le 31 Decembre.l994, -Ialoi organique 10/2007 du 1.3.07 modifiant laloi l6de2004 N°1612004, -Ia loi N'31!2007 du 25 juillet 2007 portant abolition de la peine de mort, -Ie decret- Loi 8/75 du 12 fevrier 1975 ratifiant la Convention des Nations Unies de 1948, _ Loi du 30 aout 1996 (art.lo) erigeant l'assassinat en tant que crime contre l'Humanite, routes pieces traduites en francais et notifiees le 19 septembre 2007 par la Cour de ceans it Isaac KAMAL!.
Il est specifie par la demande que la nouvelle legislation du Rwanda a rendu nulles et non avenues les decisions anterieures prises it son encontre, selon l'article 204 de la loi n013/2004 du J7 mai 2004 et que la peine de mort a ere abolie au Rwanda par la loi organique I 1/2007 du 16 fevrier 2007 pour tous les cas de dessaisissement du TPIR ou emanant d'autres pays vers le Rwanda
S'agissantde l'implication d'Isaac KAMAL!, il est recherche aux fins de poursuites penales en tant qu'instigateur et planificateur du genocide de 1994 au Rwanda. Un jugement aurait ete prononce Ie 20 mars 2003 qui l'a reconnu coupable de planification, commission, instigation, conduite et participation au genocide de 1994 et l'a condamne it la peine capitale.
LESFAITS REPROCHES PAR LA DEMANDE D' EXTRADITION soNT LES SUNANTS:
Courant 1994, dans la commune de Nyabikenke dans l'ex-prefecture de Gitararna, Isaac KAMALI aurait ete "actif" dans les actes de tuerie, pillage, destruction de biens de tutsis, Il aurait supervise les massacres perpetres par les miliciens Interahamwe.
Aux environs du 10 avril 1994, Isaac KAMAL! accompagne du ministre NZABONIMANA et du chef des miliciens, Vincent NGARAMBE, est aile chez le bourgmestre. de la ville Nyabikenke, ou ont ete tenues des reunions privees et publiques, et notamment Ie 14 avril 1994 aux fins de preparer, organiser les massacres perpetres les 14 et 15 avril de cette annee-la
Isaac KAMAL! aurait dirige Iegroupe des miliciens qui tua les innocents tutsi, refugies dans le bureau de la ville, il aurait ordonne et supervise le lancement des grenades sur les refugies, I'utilisation de machettes et gourdins pour les achever. Isaac KAMAL! aurait appartenu it l'equipe qui a tue MUNAMA et sa famille. Il aurait tue personnellement, assiste des autres miliciens, la femme et les enfants d'un nornme Celestin GASHUGI.
PAGE 4 N'2007/03825 3Jlo5 Entre Ie 6 avril et Ie 17 juillet 1994, Isaac KAMAL! aurait appartenu a une association de malfaiteurs, composee des personnes precitees et de Joseph SERUTENCE, association ayant vocation acommettre Ie genocide et les crimes contre l'humanite, en visant les tutsis en tant que groupe ethnique.
Au vude cesfaits, la responsabilite penaleindividuelle de Isaac KAMAL! releverait de la Ioi organique n° 16/2004 du 19juin 2004 portant organisation et fonctionnementdesjuridictions de GACACApour le genocide et Iescrimescontre l'humanite , cornrnis au Rwanda entre octobre 1990 et Ie 31decernbre 1994.
II est repute penalement responsable aux termes des articles 51§1 et 72 de cette 10i.
L'Etat requerant a indique avoir approuve et ratifie par un decret-loi du 12 fevrier 1975 la convention relative it la prevention et la repression du crime de genocide adoptee par la resolution n0260 du 9 decernbre 1948 de l'Assemblee Generale des Nations Unies.
.Sont ainsi reunis, centre Isaac KAMALI , 8 chefs d'accusation :
1. Le genocide
Chef d'accusation n? 1 : Genocide
Au titre de ce crime puni par l'article 51 de la lei organique et par la convention precitee, Isaac KAMAL! est accuse d'avoir, entre Ie 7 avril et Ie 4 juillet 1994, dans I'ancienne prefecture de Gitamara (Rwanda), avec l'intentionde detruire en tout ou partie les tutsis, planifie, initie, ordonne, commis et soutenu ou encourage d'une facon ou d'une autre laplanification, la preparation ou l'execution des massacres ayant entraine Ia mort ou les dommages physiques et moraux aux tutsis.
Chef d'accusation n02 : la complicite de genocide
.Au titre de ce crime puni par l'article 51 de Ia loi organique et de la convention sur Ie genocide precitee, Isaac KAMAL! est accuse d' avoir, entre Ie 7 avril et le 4 juillet 1994 dans l'ancienneprefecture de Gitarama (Rwanda), avec I'intention de detruire en tout ou partie les tutsis et sachant que son assistance contribuera al'accomplissement du crime de genocide, planifie, initie, ordonne, commis, ordonne et soutenu ou encourage d'une facon ou d'une autre la planification, Iapreparation ou l'execution des massacres ayantentraine Iamort ou Ies dornmages physiques et moraux aux tutsis.
Chef d'accusation nO 3 : la complicite de genocide
Au titre de ce crime puni par l'article 51 de la lei organique et de la convention sur le genocide precitee Isaac KAMALI est accuse d'avoir, entre Ie 7 avril et Ie4 juillet, dans la prefecture de Gitarama (Rwanda), avec l'intentionde
PAGE 5 N'2007/03825 detruire en tout ou partie les personnes d'ethnie tutsie, complete et de s' etre mis d'accord avec d'autres personnes telles que les membres de l'adrninistration locale, les bourgmestres des communes voisines, les officiers militaires et differents conseiJlers des secteurs, les chefs des Interahamwe, les cadres du MRND it l'echelon local et national, les membres du gouvernement interirnaire du 8 avril 1994 du Premier Ministre KAMBANDA Jean pour tuer ou causer de graves blessures physiques et mentales aux personnes aux personnes d'ethnie tutsie selon les details ci apres.
En qualite de militant du mouvement MRND, Isaac KAMAli aurait rencontre les membres de ce parti et les rniliciens du Interaharnwe entre Ie 7 avril et Ie 4 juillet 1994 II aurait "complete" avec ceux-ci et autres lors des reunions publiques incitant aux tueries. II aurait distribue des armes et machettes pendant •cette periode apres avoir recrute des civils, et aurait organise des entrainements ·rnilitaires.
·II. Les crimes contre I'humanite
Chefd'accusation n? 4 .l'assassinat en tant que crime contre l'humanite
Tel que prevu par la convention du 26 novembre 1948 et par la loi organique du 30 aout 1996 et puru par l'article 14 de la rneme loi.
Au titre de ce crime contre l'hurnanite reprime par l'article 311 du Code penal et l'article 51 (3) de la Ioi organique, Isaac KAMAL! est accuse d'avoir, .. entre Ie 7 avril 1994 et le 4 juillet 1994, dans la prefecture de Gitarama, . particulierernent dans la commune de Nyabikenke (Rwanda), avec l'intention de ·detruire en tout ou partie les personnes d'ethnie tutsie, planifie, initie, ordonne, commis etsoutenu ou encourage d'une facon ou d'une autre la planification, la preparation ou l'execution de massacres ethniques et politiques des populations civiles tels que ci apres detaillees •
Sont en particulier vises les assassinats des families MUNANA et MUKARUSHEMA, l'assassinat de SEBISHAKO Noel, MBUGUJE Stanislas, . SABAZUNGU Jean et NYEMANA.
Chef d'accusation n? 5 L'extermination en tant que crime contre I'humanite
Au titre de ce crime contre l'humanite, infraction punie par la loi organique, specialement en son article 51 (I), (3), IsaacKAMALI est accuse d'avoir, entre Ie 7 avril et Ie4 juillet 1994 it Nyabikenke, Remera, Rukaragata, Kavumu et autour de la colline de Nyabugombe dans l'ancienne prefecture de Gitarama (Rwanda,), avec I'intention de participer it l'elirnination d'un grand nombre d'individus et sachant pertinemment que son action faisait partie d'autres entreprises criminelles, planifie, instigue, ordonne, comrnis, soutenu ou encourage d'une facon ou d'une autre la planification, la preparation, I'execution de l'exterrnination ou Iemassacre
PAGE 6 N'2007/03825 de la population civile dans le cadre des attaques systematiques et agrande echelie dirigees contre les populations civiles sur la base ethnique et politique
En substance, il est reproche aIsaac KAMAL! d'avoir, de concert avec Ie ministre NZABONIMANA Calixte, participe aux massacres it grande echelle qui eurent lieu en avri11994 dans la commune de Nyabikenke, et d'avoirfourni une aide logistique en arrnes, machettes et vehicules de transport aux tueurs qui ont elimine les tutsis qui avaient trouve refuge it plusieurs endroits dans 1a commune de Nyabikenke
III. Les crimes ordinaires tels que prevus par Ie code penal rwandais
Chefd'accusation nO 7 : Association de malfaiteurs:
Poursuivi pour avoir forme, adhere, participe et dirige une enteprise criminelle conjointe dont l'objet est de porter atteinte aux personnes et aux proprietes, crime prevu par l'article 281 et reprime par les articles 282 et 283 du code penal rwandais, il est reproche itIsaac KAMAL! d'avoir, entre Ie7 avril et Ie 4 juillet 1994 a Nyabikenke, Remera, Rukaragata, Kavumu et autour de la colline de Nyabugombe dans l'ancienne prefecture de Gitarama au Rwanda, avec l'intenticn de porter atteinte aux personnes ainsi qu' aleurs biens, forme, dirige, participe et devenu membre d'une entreprise criminel conjointe connue en tant qu'Interahamwe S'agissant des milices Interahamwe, elles representaient la jeunesse du parti au pouvoir MRND ayant recu un entralnement militaire pour exterminer les tutsis pendant le genocide
Entre avril et juillet 1994, KAMAL! Isaac agissant de concert avec Ie ministre NZABONIMANA Calixte, le bourgmestre Anatole KARUGAN'UA, le comrnercant Vincent NGARAMBE, Mathias BISHOKANINKINDI, president du MRND itNyabikenke, Joseph SERUTENGE et plusieurs autres membres de i'autorite administrative aussi bien des civils que des militaires, aurait nornme les chefs des Interahamwe, leur aurait fourni les armes, les aurait entraines et les aurait equipes malgre la conscience qu'il avait des consequences previsibles de ses actes.
KAMAL! Isaac et les autres cites precedemment auraient deliberement participe dans la creation de la dite association de malfaiteurs II aurait par ailleurs continue it diriger et it conseiller les miliciens Interahamwe, tout en sachant pertinnement que cette rnilice portait atteinte aux person nes ainsi qu'itleurs biens
Chefd'accusation n? 8 : Incitation et encouragement au desordre public
Au titre de ce crime defini par l'article 166 du code penal du Rwanda, il est reproche it KAMAL! Isaac, d'avoir immediatement apres son arrive it Nyabikenke en provenance de Kigali, fait erige une barriere au carrefour se trouvant en contrebas du bureau communal pour y verifier les cartes d'identite tutsies.
PAGE 7 N°2007/03825 ------Entre le 12 et Ie 13 avril, KAMALI Isaac en compagnie du ministre NZABONIMAj~A Calixte se serait rendu au siege de la commune Nyabikenke, serait entre au bureau, aurait cherche a rencontrer Ie bourgmestre Anatole KARUGA.NDA avec qui il se serait entretenu longuement, puis, des sa sortie en compagnie du bourgmestre et en presence des refugies tutsis, il auraitdemande s'il "y avait encore Ia des tutsis alors que Ies autres lieux avaient ere nettoyes" voulant dire par la "tues''. Les deuxhommesauraientquitte les lieuxet se seraient diriges vers la collineNyabugombe ou les miliciens Interahamwe etaient en train d'etre entrainespar les militaires (FAR). "
Le 14 avril 1994, en compagnie de NZABONIMANA Calixte et des autorites localesdu secteurKavumu, avec l'intention d'inciter au trouble a I'ordre public, KAIVIALI Isaac aurait tenu une reunion au centre commercial de Gasagara au cours de laquelle ils auraientdit en seance qu'il fallait combattreleur ennemi commun, Ie tutsi, qu'il soit enfant, femme ou personne agee, si bien que, ce jour-la, beaucoup de tutsis furent tues
Le meme jour, l' extradable avec Ie rneme ministre auraittenu auCentre de Negoce de Remera une reunion avec les chefs de la milice Interahamwe. Durant la nuit du 14 avril, les tutsis qui avaient trouve refuge au bureau communal furent attaques par les miliciens Interahamwe et la population localed'origine hutue tua et blessa beaucoup de personnes.
Selon l'Etat requerant, la demande d'extradition ne comporte pas dinfractions a caractere politique, mais elle ne concerne que des acres criminels reprimespar le droit national rwandais et international. IIest rappeleque l' article VII de la convention sur Iegenocideconsidere que "le genocide et d'autres actes enumeres sous I'article III ne pourront etre consideres comme crimes politiques en cas d'extradition". . *
IIest rappelequefaisant suiteauxrequisitions du procureurgeneral et au mernoire depose par Ie conseil de l' extradable, la Cour de ce siege a par un arret en date du 20 fevrier 2008 ordonne un compIement'd'information aux fins d'obtenir : 1°/ des autorites francaises : _ quelles fassent preciser par I'OFPRA ou tout autre organisme, si consecutivement a sa naturalisation, Isaac KAMALI a perdu Iestatut de refugie; 2°/ de l'Etat requerant : _ qu'il precise que! est la piece de justice, decision de condamnation ou mandat d'arret, qui est le fondement de la demande d'extradition; • et par consequent il precise les qualifications juridiques des faits retenus a l'encontre de Isaac KAl\'IALI, et la ou les dates de commission des faits; _qu'il preciser quellejuridictionde droit commun ou GACACAsera ameneea le Juger
PAGE 8 ? N'2007/03825 - qu'il indiquecdans la seconde hypothese, sera-t-il assiste d'un avocat, beneficiera-t-il d'un droit d'appel devant une juridiction composee de magistrats de I' ordre judiciaire? - qu'il dise , quelles que soient les dispositions legales applicables, si M Isaac KAMALI n' encourt, en aucune hypothese, la peine de mort - qu'il produise : - Ie jugement de la condamnation du 20 mars 2003 traduit en francais, - Ie mandat d' arret du 27 octobre 2004 traduit en francais, - la lei du 16 fevrier 2007, - Ie texte de loi permettant de poursuivre de maniere retroactive des faits commis en 1994. • Par courrier en date du 10 avril 2008, l'OFPRA a informe la Cour que Isaac KAMAL! a acquis la nationalite francaise le 6 juin 2002 et qu'il a par consequente perdu Ie benefice du statut de refugie qui lui vait ete accorde Ie 7 septernbre 1999. * Par l'interrnediaire de I'ambassade de Belgique, la Republique du RWANDA a fait parvenir Ie 10 septembre 2008, transmise it la cour le 6 octobre 2008 : - Ie mandat d'arret international du procureur general de la republique du Rwanda en date du 27 octobre 2004 (annexe I), - l'acte daccusation du procureur general NGOGA en date du 21 aout 2008 (annexe 2), -Ies statuts de la Haute Cour de la republique.juridiction cornpetente pour juger cette affaire ( annexe 3), - la loi n013/2004 du 17 mai 2004 portant code de procedure penale (annexe 4), -Ia loi organique n031/2007 du 25 juillet 2007 portant abolition de la peine de mort (annexe 5), - la loi relative it l'imprescriptibilite du genocide et des crimes contre l'humanite (annexe 6), - copie du jugement de premiere instance de Gitarama en date du 20 mars 2003 statuant sur les crimes de genocide et les crimes contre l'hurnanite commis entre le I" octobre 1990 et le 31 decernbre 1994 et imputes it KAMAL! Isaac, NZIRIHA Laurent et NGARAMBE Vincent, et condamnant notamment it mort Isaac KAMALI.
*
Dans ses requisitions en date du 20 octobre 2008, le procureur general indique que I' execution du complement d'information ne repond que partiellement aux interrogations constantes que souleve cette procedure, qu'il subsistent des imprecisions quant aux circonstances de la commission des faits imputes it Isaac KAMAL!, qu'enfin, les garanties dont l' extradable est susceptible de beneficier de la part de l'Etat requerant sent insuffisantes. II requiert done I' emission d'un avis defavorable. II ;1/ji~ PAGE 9 ! N'2007/03825 ! Par son memoire depose le 19mai 2008, le conseil de KAMAL! Isaac fait valoir que la perte de la qualite de refugie consecutive a l' acquisition de la nationalite franr;aise n' a pas fait dispara1tre pour l'interesse le risque de subir des traitements inhumains et degradants et detre prive d'un proces regi par les principes generaux du droit issus de la convention de Geneve et de la convention europeenne des droits de l'hornme. IIsouligne que les enquetes, les rapports divers sur les conditions dans lesquelles fonctionne la justice rwandaise confirme l' absence de garanties fondamentales auxquelles doit pouvoir pretendre l' extradable en cas de remise al'Etat requerant.
Dans son memoire recapitulatif qui fait suite notamment au depot du complement d'information, le conseil de I'extradable articule un certain nombre de griefs al'encontre de 1areponse transmise par les auto rites rwandaises et des pieces de justice qui I'accompagnent dans le cadre de l' execution du complement d'information. En premier lieu, it fait observer que le mandat d' arret international qui fonde la demande d' extradition ne renferme aucune indication sur la nature et la date des faits poursuivis comme l'exige l'article 696-8 du code de procedure penale et qu'il existe des divergences entre les faits enonces dans la demande d'extradition et ceux vises dans le mandat d'arret du 27 octobre 2004.
En deuxieme lieu, il allegue que si la naturalisation de KAMAL! lui a fait perdre son statut de refugie, ilne saurait etre prive d' aucun des droits qui resultent de ce statut dont il beneficiait anterieurement asa naturalisation comme l' a juge la commission des recours des refugies dans sa decision du 18 juillet 2006 et que, d'une maniere generate, l'OFPRAfait etat de ses preoccupations quant aux risques encourus par l'interesse
En iroisieme lieu, il invoque la precarite de I'etat de sante de KAMALI Isaac qui souffre d' affections graves necessitant une prise en charge medicale appropriee. En quatrieme lieu, it soutient que les faits poursuivis sent en contradiction avec le principe de la legalite des delits et des peines et font obstacle au respect du principe de non-retroactivite de la loi penale en ce sens qu'il est fait application de la loi n033 bis/2003 du 6 septembre 2003 pour sanctionner des faits cornmis en 1994, et que certains crimes enonces dans la demande d'extradition entrant dans une qualification de droit commun sont couverts par la prescription.
En cinquieme lieu, il pretend que les poursuites penales ant ete rnises en oeuvre pour reprirner toute opposition politique cornrne Ie revelerait la demande d'extradition qui fait reference aI'engagement politique de I'extradable.
En sixierne lieu, il est releve que si la peine de mort a ete effectivement aboli, r extradable encourt cependant une peine de reclusion criminelleJrPetuite !~( PAGE 10 N°2007/03825 ------_.. 33~f assortie d'une mise en isolement, lexclusion du benefice de la liberation conditionnelle, lanon-application possible de circonstancesattenuantes, ensemble de dispositions contraires it l'article 3 de la convention europeenne des droits de J'homme et condamnees par IeTPIR.
En septieme lieu, il denonce les insuffisances du droit applicable et I' absence de regles suffisantes sur I'exercice des droits de la defense devant les juridictions rwandaises, s' agissant notamment de la protection accordee aux temoins de la defense. ..* CEO ETANT EXPOSE:
Considerant qu'en I'absence de relations diplomatiques et de convention d'entraide judiciaire penale entre la France et Ie Rwanda, la presente demande d'extradition a ete formee par l'intermediaire du Royaume de Belgique et sur Ie fondementdes dispositions legales regissant en droit francais I'extradition de droit cornmun et en conforrnite avec les regles constitutionnelles relatives au principe de reciprocite,
Que la saisine de la France est intervcnue par une note verbale du gouvernement du Rwanda (Ministere des affaires etrangeres et de la cooperation) visant en particulier Ie crime de genocide et Ie convention des Nations Unies sur la prevention et la punition du crimede genocide;
Considerantque, dans lesformes requises parI'article696-8 du codede procedure penale comme mentionnees ci-avant, les autorites rwandaises ont satisfait aux exigences de ce texte en enoncant les chefs d'accusation fondant la poursuite accornpagnees des dispositions legales applicables, la designation de la personne recherchee, la chronologie des faits susceptibles d'etre retenus it son encontre, les garanties de procedure auxquelles iJ peut pretendre ainsi qu'un exposesornrnaire des faits qui lui sont directernent reproches, '
Qu'!1 en resulte que sur ce point, le grief invcque par la defense de KAMAL! Isaac ne saurait prosperer ;
Considerant que, comme l'a releve Ieconseil de j'extradable dans son memoire, la demande dextradition reiteree a l'occasion de la transmission des pieces relatives au complement d'information ordonne par la cour de ceans comporte l'absence de reference ala loiorganique nOl5/2006du 24 mars 2006 modifiant et cornpletant la loi organique precedents datee du 20 mars 2004 ainsi qu'un changernent de qualification juridiquedu chefd'accusation n03 initialernent retenu sous la denomination de "cornplot de genocide" et devenu "association de malfaiteurs pour commettre Ie genocide",
Qu'outre ces differences releveesdansles deux demandesforrnees respectivement Ie Iljuillet 2007 et le 21 aout 2008, force est de constater que subsistent
PAGE 11 N°2007/03825
0/r 33tt8 egalement des divergences plus prononcees entre ces demandes d'extradition et le mandat d' arret international en date du 27 octobre 2004 visant exclusivement les crimes de genocide et de crimes centre l'humanite sans autre precision;
Considerant que par son memoire, Isaac KAMALI entend soutenir que ces incertitudes affectant la demande d' extradition se trouvent aggravees par des manquernents aux conditions determinees par l' article 696-3 ducode de procedure penale,
Que ces manquements dont l' appreciation s'inscrit dans l'application au cas d' espece du principe de double incrimination concernent des principes quireievent de l' ordre public national francais ;
Considerant qu'il est soutenu avec pertinence qu'independamment des imprecisions relatives aux circonstances des faits et au degre d'implication de l'extradable dans leur commission les atteintes portees aux principes de la legalite des delits et des peines ainsi qua celui de la non retroactivite des lois,
Qu'il resulte en effet de la legislation applicable au Rwanda, s'agissant plus specifiquement de la loi n033bis12003 du 6 septembre 2003, que Ia repression des actes qualifies de genocide ou de crimes contre l'humanite etait jusque Iiiabsente de l' appareil penal de ce pays,
Que I'application de ce texte aux faits de la cause qui sechelonnent entre le 7 avril et Ie 4 juillet 1994 est contraire aux principes precites et, de toute evidence, inconciliable avec l' ordre public francais en raison de son mcompatibilite avec le principe intangible de la non retroactivite des lois penales plus severes ;
Considerant que dans le prolongement du contr6le de double incrimination, il convient d'observer que les crimes ordinaires correspondant aux chefs d'accusation n07 (association de malfaiteurs) et 8 (incitation et encouragement au desordre public) a supposer qu'ils soient punissables en droit. francais et susceptibles de revetir Ie cas echeant la qualification de crimes, sent reputes prescrits au regard des dispositions de l'article 7 du code de procedure penale qui fixent a 10 annees revolues la duree de la prescription de l'action publique de droit commun,
Quen l'espece, il est en effet avere qu'il s'est ecoule plus de dix ans entre les derniers faits incrimines et la date de delivrance du mandat d'arret international qui sert de support juridique it la demande d' extradition,
Conslderant qu' outre ces obstacles it l'extradition qui relevent de I'application des dispositions des articles 696-3 et 696-4 du code de procedure penale, ily a lieu de declarer fondees les moyens invoques a l'appui des interets de l'extradable concernant les modalites d'application de la peine en cas de prononce d'une peine de reclusion crirninelle a perpetuite et les limites notoirement denoncees qui prejudicient it l'exercice des droits de la defense,
PAGE 12 N'20Q7/03825 Qu'en effet, les garanties d'un proces equitable devant la Haute Cour de la Republique comme s'y engage l'Etat requerant ne resiste pas aux critiques convergentes d' organisations internationales des droits de l'hornme et du tribunal penal international pour Ie Rwanda qui reievent que les pratiques judiciaires rwandaises n' ont pas evince les violations des droits de la defense et le recours il des traitements inhumains et degradants en contradiction avec les valeurs communement adrnises et issues des principes fondamentaux du droit tels que definis par la declaration universelle des droits de l'hornme de 1948, par la convention europeenne de sauvegarde des droits de I'homme et des libertes fondamentales, par les dispositions constitutionnelles francaises et par I'article preliminaire du code de procedure penale francais ;
Considerant, enfin, que Isaac KAMALI qui ne peut dans la presente affaire se prevaloir de l' acquisition de la nationalite francaise parait en revanche fonde il revendiquer la protection que l'Etat francais lui avait accorde au moment ou lui etait attribue Ie statut de refugie,
Que Jesrisques encourus derneurent en effet suffisamment pregnants compte tenu des carences observees en matiere des garanties procedurales au point que les effets de cette protection dont I'extradable beneficiait en qualite de refugie politique lui soient maintenus ;
Considerant que la demande d'cxtradition formee par la Republique du Rwanda se heurte aux obstacles de fond qui se degagent de cette analyse,
Qu'en consequence, et sur la base de cette appreciation, la Cour de ceans ne peut qu'emettre un avis defavorable .
*************
PAGE 13 N'2007/03825 PAR CES MOTIFS
LACOUR Vu les articles 696-1 et suivants du code de procedure penale ;
Est d'avis qu'il y a lieu d'emettre un avis dHavorable a la demande d'extradition faite par le Gouvernement de la Republique du Rwanda contre le llOmme :
KAMAL! Isaac ne le 28 mai 1949 II NYABIKENKE CITARAMA (Rwanda) de UGIRASHEBUIA Denis KAMAL! et de NYIRABAHINZI Genereuse, de nationalite fran~aise . Libre-
Demeurant 4 Impasse de la Sariette 34500 BEZIERS
Dit qu'a la diligence de M. le Procureur General te dossier sera envoye a M. Ie Garde des Sceaux, ministre de la Justice, avec une expedition authentique du present arret. SIDENT LEGREFFIER
PAGE 14 NQ2007/03825 The Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi, Case No.1CTR-2001-75~RJ Ibis Public 33'S
Annex 5
Arret N° 395 du 15 Septembre 2010, Cour d'Appel de Versailles, Chambre de l'Instruction, Itleme chambre-section C
/4 March 20/ / twr ARRETW ?>S5 COUR D'APPEL DE VERSAILLES du 15 septernbre 2010 CHAMBRE DE L'INSTRUCTION 10eme chambre-section C *** ARRET PRONONCE EN AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE LEQUINZE SEPTEMBRE DEUX MIL DIX DECISION: avisdefavorabte et remiseen liberte COMPOSITION DE LA COUR - lors des debats, du delibere Monsieur POIROTTE, President Madame DUBOIS, conseiller AFFAIRE; Madame ORSINI, conseiller RWAMUCYO Euglme tous trois desiqnes en application des dispositions de I'article 191 du Code de procedure penale - lors des debats Monsieur CAZALS, avocat general, Madame FOUGERAT, Greffier, Lors du prononce de l'arret il a ete donne lecture de l'arret par Notifie par L.R le : Monsieur POIROTTE, President en presence du Minlstere public et de Monsieur BEAUFILS, Greffier, PARTIES EN CAUSE: PERSONNE DONT L'EXTRADITION EST DEMANDEE RWAMUCYO Eugene ne Ie 06/06/1959 a GATONDE (Rwanda)de nationalite Rwandaise Actuellement detenu ala maison d'arret : BOIS D'ARCY Mandat d'arret du 06 aoOt 2007 execute Ie 26 mai 2010 Pour des faits de: crimes de genocide, crimes contre l'humanlte, crimes ordinaires (creation, direction, appartenance aune association de malfaiteurs dont I'objet etait de porter atteinte aux personnes ainsi qu'a leurs proprietes) Ayant pour avocats Maltre MEILHAC, 60 rue Pierre Charron - 75008 PARIS - Maltre BOULlN, 33 rue Gallile - 75116 PARIS - Maltre FLAMME, F ROOSEVELTLAAN 112 - B- 9 000 gent -1- RAPPEL DE LA PROCEDURE Le 20 aout 2007 Ie ministre des affaires etrangeres et de la cooperation de la Republique du RWANDA, via I'ambassade de BELGIQUE a forme contre RWAMUCYO Eugene detenu ala rnaison d'arret des Yvelines, une demande d'extradition ; Le 27 mai 2010 Monsieur Ie procureur general a procede a I'interrogatoire de I'interesse dont iI a ett'! dresse proces-verbal. Le Monsieur Ieprocureur general a precede a I'inlerrogatoire de I'interesse dont iI a ete dresse proces-verbal. Conformement aux dispositions des articles 194 et 197 du Code de procedure penale, Monsieur Ie Procureur General: _a notifiB la date a laquelle I'affaire sera appelee aI'audience a: RWAMUCYO Eugene par les soins du chef de l'etablissement penilentiaire Ie 09 septembre 2010 et a son avocat par leUre recommandee Ie 09 septembre 2010 ; • a depose Ie dossier au greffe de la chambre de !'instruction et ses requisitions ecrites datees du 31 aout 2010 pour etre tenus a la disposition de I'avocat de RWAMUCYO Eugene; Maitre MEILHAC a depose un mernoire Ie 07 septembre 2010 a 13:00 lequel a ete vise par Ie greffier et communique ala Cour. DEROULEMENT DES DEBATS A I'audience publique du 08 septembre 2010 ont ele enlendus: Notification a ete faile aI'etranger comparant, du titre en vertu duquell'extradition est dsmandee ainsi que des pieces produites a I'appui de la demande. L'etranger comparant susnomme a ete entendu en son interrogatoire conformement a I'article 696-13 du Code de procedure penale dont Ie proces verbal a ate dresse ; Monsieur POIROTTE, President, en son rapport, Monsieur CAZALS, avocat gEmaral, en ses requisitions; Maltres MEIHLAC, BOULlN, FLAMME avocats de RWAMUCYO Eugene, en leurs observations; RWAMUCYO Eugene en ses explications, lequel a eu la parole Ie dernier. -2- DECISION Rendue Ie QUINZE SEPTEMBRE DEUX MIL DIX par arret prononce en audience publique En presence de RWAMUCYO Eugene apres en avoir delibere dans les conditions prevues par i'article 200 du code de procedure penale ; AU FOND Le 20 aoOt 2007, Ie mmistere des affaires etranqeres et de la cooperation de la Republique du Rwanda a transrnis au gouvernement francais, par l'interrnedialre des autorites belges, une demande d'extradition concernant Eugene RWAMUCYO, ressortissant rwandais ne en 1959 a Gatonde (Rwanda). Cette demande est parvenue au ministere francais des affaires etranqeres Ie 3 septembre 2007. Y etaient joints : - Un acte d'accusation dresse a I'encontre d'Euqene RWAMUCYO par Ie procureur general de la Republique du Rwanda Ie 8 aout 2007 pour des crimes de genocide (genocide, complicite de genocide, complot de genocide), des crimes contre l'humanite (assassinat, extermination) et des crimes ordinaires (creation, direction et appartenance a une association de malfaiteurs dont I'objet etait de porter atteinte aux personnes ainsl qu'a leurs proprietes, incitation, aide ou encouragement a I'entrave a I'ordre public), faits commis aButare au Rwanda entre Ie 6 avril ou Ie 7 avril, suivant les infractions, et Ie 4 juiilet 1994 ; - Un mandat d'arret international delivre a I'encontre d'Euqene RWAMUCYO par Ie procureur gElneral de la Republique du Rwanda Ie 6 aout 2007 pour les memes infractions. Ces deux documents comportent un expose des faits reproches a Eugene RWAMUCYO. L'acte d'accusation comporte egalement I'engagement pris par ies autorites du Rwanda, qui rappellent avoir aboli la peine de mort, de faire beneficier Eugene RWAMUCYO de conditions de detention convenables et d'un proces equitable. Ayant fait I'objet d'un controle d'identite, Eugene RWAMUCYO a ete place sous Ie regime de la retention judiciaire pour execution du mandat d'arret internationai Ie 26 mai 2010 puis, Ie 27 mai 2010, a ete conduit devant Ie procureur general qui, Ie merne jour, a precede aux formalites edictees par I'article 696-10 du Code de procedure penale, a oroonne son piacement sous ecrou extraditionnel et a saisi la chambre de I'instruction de requisitions tendant ace qu'elle ordonne un complement d'information. Eugene RWAMUCYO, qui a comparu devant la chambre de I'instruction Ie 2 juin 2010, s'est oppose a son extradition et a fait deposer un memo ire tendant ace que soit rendu un avis defavorable acette mesure. -3- Par arret du 9 juin 2010, la chambre de !'instruction a notamment: - En la forme, declare reguliere la procedure d'extradition; - Avant dire droit, ordonne un complement d'information et invite les autorltes de la Repubiique du Rwanda atransmettre avant Ie 20 aoOt 2010 les documents ou renseignements suivants : - Original ou copie certiflee conforme du mandat d'arret international delivre contre Eugene RWAMUCYO ; - Copie des texles de loi incriminant et repnrnant les infractions reprochees a Eugene RWAMUCYO, y cornpris ceux qui prevoient les conditions et la repression de la cornpltcite ; - Copie des textes applicables en matiere de prescription de I'action pubtique et, si necessaire, justification de I'accomplissement, dans les delais requis, d'actes lnterruptifs de prescription; - Copie de la loi 31/07 du 25/'uillet 2007 et indication des conditions d'execution de la peine de rec usion perpetuelle qui a ete substituee a la peine de mort ; - Explications sur les raisons qui ont conduit a I'arrestation de Peter Erlinder, avocat arnericain ; - Copie des dispositions du Code de procedure penale prevoyant les «principes fondamentaux» enonces dans la demande d'exlradition - Conclusions de l'equlpe d'experts internationaux du tribunal penal international pour Ie Rwanda relatives aux conditions de detention dans l'Etat requsrant ; Renvoye I'affaire a I'audience du 8 septembre 2010. En execution de cette decision, les autorites rwandaises ont transmis au gouvernement francais, par voie diplomatique, divers documents qui sont parvenus a la cour d'appelles 13 et 31 aoOt 2010. Le 31 aoOt 2010, Ie procureur general a saisi la chambre de I'instruction de nouvelles requisitions tendant a ce que Ie prononce de I'avis sur la demande d'extradition soit differe et que l'Etat requerant soit invite ajustifier du caractere non prescrit des «crimes ordinaires» d'association de malfaiteurs et d'entrave a I'ordre public ainsi qu'a produire la traduction en langue francaise des documents fournis en langue anglaise. Eugene RWAMUCYO a fait deposer un rnernolre dans lequel il demande ala cour de prononcer la nullite de la procedure d'extradition et surabondamment, de rendre un avis defavorable. Dans tous les cas, Usollicite sa remise en liberte. * Considerant que, contrairement a ce que la cour a indique par erreur dans son arret du 9 juin 2010, I'original du mandat d'arret international delivre contre Eugene RWAMUCYO Ie 6 aout 2007 par le procureur general de la Republique du Rwanda etait bien joint a la demande d'extradition adressee par les autorites rwandaises au -4- 33Cfo gouvernement francais ainsi que Ie prevoit l'article 696-8 du Code de procedure penale, cette piece figurant au dossier de la procedure; Considerant qu'aux termes des dispositions de I'article 696-4 du Code de procedure penale, I'extradition n'est pas accordee : - lorsque Ie fait a raison duquel I'extradition a ete demandee est puni par la legislation de l'Etat requerant d'une peine ou d'une mesure de surete contraire a I'ordre public francais ; - lorsque, d'apres la loi de I'Etat requerant ou la loi francalse, la prescription de I'action s'est trouvee acquise anterieurernent a la demande d'extradition ; - ou lorsque la personne reclarnee seraitjuqee dans I'Etat requerant par un tribunal n'assurant pas les garanties fondamentales de procedure et de protection des droits de la defense; Considerant, sur Ie premier point, que les principes d'ordre public de legalite des delits et des peines et de non retroactivite de la loi penale, notamment enonces en droit interne par les article 8 de la Declaration des droits de I'homme et du citoyen, 111-3 et 112-1 du Code penal et, en droit conventionnel, par les articles 15-1 du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques et 7.1 de la Convention europeenne des droits de I'homme et des hbertes fondamentales s'opposent a ce que soit infligee a I'auteur d'une infraction une peine qui n'etait pas prevue ala date des taits ; Or, considerant qu'i1 resulte des pieces produites par I'Etat requerant que si les faits reproches aEugene RWAMUCYO sous les qualifications de crimes de genocide (genocide, compllcne de genocide, complot de genocide) et de crimes contre l'hurnanite (assassinat, extermination) etaient bien incrtmines au Rwanda au cours de l'annee 1994, epoque alaquelle ils auraient ete commis, ils n'etaient alors assortis d'aucune sanction; que les penalites encourues par les auteurs de ces infractions ont ete edlctees par la loi organique 33bis 2003 du 6 septembre 2003 reprimant Ie crime de genocide, les crimes contre I'humanlte et les crimes de guerre qui rappelle, atitre liminaire, que Ie Rwanda avait ratifie les conventions internationales prevoyant ces infractions mais n'avait cependant pas prevu de sanctions qui leur soient applicables ; Considerant, sur Ie deuxieme point, que pour les infractions quallfiees de «crimes ordinaires» dont I'action publique se prescrit au Rwanda par l'ecoulernent d'un delai de dix annees selon les documents transmis par l'Etatrequerant, les autorites rwandaises n'ont apporte aucune precision quant a i'existence eventuelle d'actes interruptifs de prescription entre Ie 4 juillet 1994, date des faits. et Ie 6 aoOt2007, date de delivrance du mandat d'arret international et ce en depit de la demande qui leur a ete adressee ; qu'il y a lieu, des lors, de considerer que I'actlon publique est eteinte pour ces infractions; Considerant, sur Ie troisierne point, qu'au nombre des garanties fondamentales figurent celles pour la personne poursuivie de choisir librement son avocat et son systerne de defense; que, dans I'exercice de son actlvite professionnelle et sauf abus manifeste de sa part, I'avocat doit jouir d'une totale liberte de parole; Or, considerant qu'il ressort des pieces produites par la defense -5- - que I'avocat americain Peter ERLINDER, defenseur d'une citoyenne rwandaise elle-meme poursuivie pour negation du genocide, a recemment ete arrete et incarcere au Rwanda pour avoir nie et minimise Ie genocide dans divers ecrits et discours et propaqe des rumeurs susceptibles de perturber la securite des rwandais ; qu'il resulte du jugement rendu par Ie tribunal de grande instance de Gasabo Ie 7 juin 2010 ayant place Peter ERLINDER en detention provisoire que Ie rninistere public lui reprochait notamment Ii cet avocat d'avoir «nie et minimise Ie genocide dans I'affaire des Militaires 1, dans laquelle iI eta it conseil de la defense au TPIR» ; que I'accusation dont Peter ERLINDER a ainsi fait I'objet fait craindre qu'Euqene RWAMUCYO, s'i1 etait extrade dans son pays d'origine, ne puisse beneficier des garanties fondamentales de procedure et de protection des droits de la defense; conslderant en consequence que, par application de I'article 696-4 du Code de procedure panale. un avis defavorable doit etre donne a I'extradition d'Euqene RWAMUCYO ; PAR CES MOTIFS, LACOUR, Donne un avis defavorable Ii I'extradition d'Eugene RWAMUCYO; Ordonne la mise en liberte d'Eugene RWAMUCYO, s'il n'est detenu pour autre cause; Dit qu'a la diligence de Monsieur Ie procureur general Ie dossier sera envoye a Madame la ministre d'Etat, garde des Sceaux, ministre de la Justice et des Libertes avec une expedition du present arret; Laisse a la diligence du mmistere public, I'execution du present arret. LE PRESIDENTr--, LEGRE~=-~ A'~~ ?~~ Monsieur POIROTTE -6- The Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-200J -75-RJ Ibis 338&PubUc Annex 6 Email Correspondence between the Defence and the Federal Office for Justice, Demande d'acces ala Note Diplomatique de ['OFJ dans Paffaire Gaspard Ruhumuriza,3 December 2010 14 March 2011 .iman - AW: Uemanae cacces a ra rsote rnpromauquc ae I'UtJ oa ... nllpS:llmaJl.google .com. malll!U1=L6lIK=OO)~ iueoceocvreweptceq.. G~ iI Bettina Spilker AW: Demande d'acces a la Note Diplomatique de I'OFJ dans I'affaire Gaspard Ruhumuriza [email protected] Onere Madame. Je ne peux pas vous transmettre une copie de la note diplomatique qui est destinee uniquement aux autorites ruandaises. Par centre, je peux vous envoyer Ie lien de notre communique qui resume les elements essentiels de la note: http://www.bj.admin.ch/contenVbl/fr/home/dokumentation/medieninformationen/2009/2009 06-30.html Entretemps. les autontes ruandaises ont confirme leur intention d'adresser a la Suisse une demande de delegation de la poursuite penale rnentionnee dans notre communique. En automne 2009, elles ont envoys a notre office des documents que nous avons transmis a l'Office de I'auditeur en chef. II incombe en premier a cet office d'examiner ces documents et de decider de la suite. Avec mes meilleures salutations Folco Galli Informationschef Eidgenossisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement EJPD Bundesamt fur Justiz BJ Bundesrain 20, 3003 Bern Tel. +41 31 3227788 Fax +41 31 32277 87 [email protected] www.bj.admin.ch -----UrsprOngliche Nachricht----- Von: [email protected] (mailto:[email protected]] Gesendet: Samstag, 27. November 201015:48 An: Galli Folco BJ Betreff: Demande d'acces a la Note Diplomatique de I'OFJ dans I'affaire Gaspard Ruhumuriza contactmailintro You've received a new form based mail from IcontenVbj/fr/misc/conform/jcr:contenVpar/0001 Values: backpagepath : Icontentlbj/fr/home/dokumentation/medieninformationen/2009/2009-06-30 body: Cher Monsieur Folco, je m'adresse a vous dans Ie cadre de mon travail en tant qu'assistante juridique pour une equipe de defense au Tribunal Penal International pour Ie Rwanda. Je recherche des decisions nationales refusant I'extradition d'individus vers Ie Rwanda. Dans I'affaire von 2 3/11/11 8:47 PlY nnpS:llmall.gOOgle.comlmalIIIUl=""'IK=3.3i~=PI",q .. jmau _tv«: uemanoe oacces a ra rxote UlplOmauque OC l'Ut'J aa ... RUHUMURIZA, cette decision a ete prise, a ma connaissance, par I'OFJ. Vous serait-il possible de m'en faire parvenir une copie? Je vous serais tres reconnaissante si vous pouviez m'aider. Veuillez aqreer, Monsieur, I'expression de mes sentiments distingues. Bettina Spilker elem0005 : Envoyer from: [email protected] name: Bettina Spilker subject: Demande d'acces a la Note Diplomatique de I'OFJ dans I'affaire Gaspard Ruhumuriza telefon : 3111111 8:47 PIV ~ von 2 ------_.. ~ 75-R1 The Prosecutor v. Jean Uwlnkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001- Ibis Public Annex 7 Supreme Court Decision on the Requestfor Extradition to the republic ofRwanda ofSylvere Ahorugeze, Case No. 61082-09,26 May 2009 (Swedish Original, as well as official English translation) 14 March 2011 Page lof21 , THE SUPREME COURT'S Case no. (-t.: DECISION '. v () 1082-09 "11 '-' issuedin Stockholm on 26 May 2009 Request for extradition to the Republic of Rwanda of the Pernl!l heldin custody. Sylvere Ahorugeze, born I May 1956, a citizenof Rwanda, of no flxed abodein Sweden. Counsel andPublic Defender: Advokat Hans Bredberg Advokatfmnan Hans Bredberg AB Box 7261 103 S9Stockholm In a requestdated 4 August200S theNational Prosecution Authority in the Republic of Rwanda has requested that the Rwandan citizen. Sylvere Ahorugeze, be extradited to the Republic of Rwanda to stand trial. An arrestwart8l1t dated 17July2008, issuedby the Chief Stale Prosecutor, MartinNgoga, has been presented in supportof the request. From the warrantandthe file of charges appended to the requestit is evidentthat Sylvere Ahorugeze issuspected of Doc ID 36700 Office houri 11iE SUPREME COURT PoslIloddreso T,lopIIona 0'·561 66600 8:45am - l2noon RiddlrllUsIllrId I Box 2066 FIX 8-561 66686 10312S_1m E·llllil: hopta.domstolcn@ I. genocide(items 1-3 of the indictment) 2. crimes againsthumanitythrough murderand extennination (items 4 and 5 of the indictment) 3. formation, membership, leadership of, and participation in, criminal gangs, the activitiesofwhichwere based on causing ipiury to persons or damage to their property(item6 ofthe indictment). The offenceswere allegedly committed in Rwanda duringthe period 6 April- 4 July 1994. After the matterwas referred to the ChiefState Prosecutor pursuantto the Criminal Offences (Extradition) Act (1957:668) and an investigation was carried out, the ChiefState Prosecutorreferred the matter to the Supreme Court, togetherwitha separateopinion,pursuantto section 17of the same Act. Sylvere Ahorugeze has opposed extradition. Sylvere Ahorugeze has been deprived of liberty,as a person arrestedand remanded in custody, since 16July 2008. The SupremeCourt, which helda hearing in the matter on 6 May 2009, decides as follows. • THE SUPREME COURT !'ago 3 • OPINION SyFvere Alwnigeu'.position SyMre AhorogezebaSderilCll allolfenccs towhich the request relates. He has arguedthat therurciUnpediJnenls to extnIditionpunuantto sections 6-9 ofthe ExtraditilllfAct !IIId Article 6ofthe European Conventionfor the Protection ofHuinall Rights and Fundamental Freedoms(the "European'ConventiOn"); He has based his position on, infer alia. the follOwmgasserlions. The witness statements 00 ""hicb the requestfor extnIditionis based are incorrectand basedon a conspiracy against him. The allegation of his participation in the murder of28 persons on 7 April 1994has been investigated by the police !IIId prosecutor in Denmark wbo,on 6 September2007, decidild~clollci tho'prciliminary Utvestigation sincea prosecutioncould Dotbo expectcdtolead to a conviction, There is no probable cause that hecommilled theallegedoffences (section 9, second paragraph ofthe,Extradition'Act). '!n,his opinion;thetlleged offences ate to be'regatded as political crimes ,(section 6 ofthe Exlradition Act). Asa Hutllhe ri,~ ifextradited,being exposed to sucb persecution ofaseverenatorO urof'CiTed to in section7 ofthe Extradition AcUn thisconteXt, bebuernpb8slsed thathe hold refugee status in Denmark; Sylvere Ahorogaze hUalso referredto his poor health,particularly the fact that be bas undergone a bypass operation 'and withina numberofyears will'bein need ofa new operation, which . there is no possibilitytoeatryout inRW!IIIda. Extradition is thusclearly incompatiblewith humanitarian requirements (section8 ofthe ExtraditionAct). 3381 nmSUPREME COURT o IOB2-09 Page 4 He has further argued thatthedeficiencies in thejudicialsystem in Rwanda, particularly withrespect 10 the possibilities to obtain the attendance and CllUIlIliJuItion ofwitnesses on hisbehalf underthe S8IIIe conditions as witnesses agaillst him, but also with respectto thecourts' in4ePl'!l~m:e ~ impl!litiality, .. are still so greatthat, ifextradited, heruns ..therisli; ofbein8fl,1l8I"'Il~IYdenied.fairtriaJinRwanda. Thus, thereisIII impediment to extradil;ion pursUlllt to Article c6 ofthe European Conrontlon•.1iI. thisCQn~.hebas pointed out that the International Criminal Tribunal forRwanlla(JCTR.), inaltcases wherethe issue ofs transferfor trial inll.~ hasbeen addressed, has found thatthereto be an impediment thereto. Nor is there Illy individual Statewhich has extradiled ~o Rwanda·any porson.lICCUSedofgenocide or similar crimes. 1M ChlifState.PrOfeC1l/pr's.posltion The.ChiefStstePt\lSeCUtorhas,Jn bisopinlon,stated that in hisview the~elcistsproballle~ that Sylvete Ahorugezehascommitted the offences towhich theC)dIlIditionrequest .relates and that, with the exception of item 6ofthe.indietmont,.these offences correspond to criminal offencesfor which, under Swedish law,such a punishment is .~bed thatextradition maytakeplace.Ilem 6'of the indictment, vvhjc/l~latestothe formation· and.membership ofacrimlnal ~i5lltiQn,.doesllet correspond lo.anyQffence under Swedish lawand thll,l,as~ganIs 1IIat. offence, there isanimpedimentto extradition pursuantto section 4. first paregrsph of the·Exlfaditioo Act With te~ to otheroffences 10 which.the request relates,in the view of the ChiefStsteProseclltor.thesecorrespond,. inSwedish law,to Jnstigstion,anaggravated offence, andinclternenttohatted against an ethnicgroup, an aggravated offence, an~vated~JlB offence and murder, as well as complicity insuchoffences. The punishment stipulated fortheseoffences is such thattheymaybe subsumed in the offenceof genocide pursuant to the Genocide (PenaJties) Act (l964: t69). Imprisonment fQr a term net exceeding four yearsis stipulated for PageS "!'HE SUPREME COURT aggravatc In theChiefState Prosecutor's opinion, theevidtnce which hascome to lightin the- matter is'notsufficient tobasean assUmption that SyMre Ahorugeze nms-the risk ofsuchcpersecution astefen'cd to in section 7of the Extradition Actand the extradition ofSylvere Ahorngeze to Rwanda cannotbe-deemed manifestly incompatible With· humanitarian requirements. and thus section'S ofthe'Extradition Act alsodoes not constitute anyimpedimeDtto extradition. With respect to thequestion whether the European Convention constitutes animpedimentto'extradition, theChiefState Prosecutor has asserted thattheassessment may give riseto doubt, buthasfound thatthe evidence inthecasemust.be--deemedto provide support forthe view that conditions inRwanda are.not ofsuch a serious natUre that an impediment toextradition'cxists pursuantto Articles 3 and6 of the European Convention. _$copeolthe SupremeCourt'J. arsiSsment The Extradition Actcontains provisions regardinlf~xtradition to counlriesoth~ than theNordiccounlries and Member States of the cEuropean Union, tostandtrla1for criminal offences/Section I provides that it is always theOovemmentwhich decides onextradition and that unless otherwise provided-jn-a treaty with another State,thereisno obligation to grantextraditiolJ' 011 theotherham), theAct contains a number of provisiolJSWhichl'revent extradition. Withrespeetto theprocedure, section IS provides- thattheGovernment can always immediately dismiss anapplication ifit is c1_thatitshould not be granted. In other cases, anopinion should be issued bythe 1 .\ . nmSUPREME COURT 01082-1)9 Page 6 ChIefSlateProsecutorand,Jn Accordi11g to thoWQrding ofthoAct, thoassessmont whichit is incumbentonthe.. SlIpremeCourt.toconduct·islhus limitedto the bJtpodimonls to extradition as slstod in1heExtradition Act Sevoral of these impedimenlsstofonnulatodinrelativoly generallyterms. Thisis perhapsparticUlarly thecasewith. respect to the provisinns in sCGlion 7 regardingimpediment on the ground of riskof persecution of a severe nature and in section Sregardins impediment on the groundof manifest incompatibility with.humanitarianrequlromonts..It Is not unusual th.sl tho porsonto whoma reqllOsl for extradition relatesopposesextradition 'citilJgthesesoctiQDS411dtheronpon presents infQrmation regarding genoralconditlQos.inthe.Stalewhlch has madethe request.It Is afsQ clear that suchinformationniaybo.ofimpc>rtallcefor tho assessment as to ,whetherany of the slstod grounds constltulc an impodimcntlo oxtradition in·an·individualcase.ADotherlssuo.is whetherlheprovisions of tho Extradition Actsto inlcndcd toboappliod suchthai infonnstlon regardinggonoral conditions in sState constitutes the basisforan assessmentthal thoro existsan impediment to extradition, wholly independently of thecircumstances in thoindividual case, TIlE SUPREME COURT Page 1 Incase NIA"1993, p.242;' tlte:$llpremc-CoUrfstaml1batthe allegations macfe by the personto whom tho request related, regarding general 'conditions within thelidntiriistration ofjllstico and prisons inthe requesting State, could riofllefaken Intoaccount within thescopeof the assessment whichwasto bemade jlursuant to sections 1 and8 of the l!xtnlditlon Act It maylle'lIssuinecfthattile statliinent was intended to dlll\ote'that it may-he regardeclessentially as a dutyof thoGovernment to llS$ll$sthe'extent towfriclilbegeneraI conditiOns in a Statewere suchthat these constitUted a motegenerafr08son fornotgranting extradition (in ,whichCOnteXt ooojliniOll mm1'the Supreme COllrt is requiJocl), aswell as the extentto which infonitatlOn regaroing tho general conditions in the requesting State should be accorded particullIr weight in addition to an sssessinent6fmOrllindivlduaURd gri:lurids. The issue of tho'a1loclitionofjurisdiction hlltweoh the Government and the Supremo Courtwith reSpect to decisions on extradition mattoncan, to a certainextent, besaidto have been made more complicated when the European Convention entered inio force asSwedish Jaw on I lanumy, 1995.111 its case Jaw (theleadirig'decision beingthojudgment of 7 luly 1989in thocase 800'mg v. IneUlilied Kingdom, StrlesA. no. 161),the Buropesn C6urt'ofHWrtan IUglitsheld thlIt ilmay COnstitute a breach of the Conventionto,Oxti'aCIlte'Si:lJlieonc to anotbdr Staici. This is particularly so in caseswhere anexttaditloil entalls a riskthatthopenon involved will be exposed to treatment in violation of Article 3 oftheConvention. Itis not, however, lliledoltt thai'an extradition maybe deemed to be in ,violation of otherprovisions Of"tlloConveDtion, forexample the provisions in Article 6 regarding therightto a'fa'ir1rlal, to which the ,court hasdrawriatteritiononnumerousi:lCClISions. As a consequence of thefact thattheEuropean Convention is now applicable as SWedishlaw,therom lawful im~imonts to extradition in addition to thosesetforth intheExtradition Act. There maybedifferent 1, lO.~2-09 Page ~ • THE SUPREME COURT o Opinions regardittgthel,ll8llllerin which tbetelationship between the Convelltion provi,jonundtbepl9visions..ofthe Extradition AGt should ':.-,' .'.~ .' . beunderstood, notJeast .. l'OgII{d~:.SIlCtions7and 8 which are intended to provi~ a simil,!, »Jle.ofJXmeCtionas ittthe Gonvention. h is,however, clear thl\i when UlIessil1gwll~ther tIIereis an impediment to extradition p!lJ'5U4llt to thePJ'llYi~iOlllof the EIIJ'OPCll!II(;;onyention, information regarding;the ~ISOl'ditlons)Vitbin tIIeadmillistl'alion ofjustice and prisons of a Statl!Il1IY.""of ~IYClllClatsj~iflcance; thisisin contl'a$lto lYhattb~~"premeCourt. h!u assUJll¢witb respect tothe appli~n oftlleprllyis!olls.ofthellxtrad.ition Act.Theissue was ad4res~ -,,-,'.,,',' ,.-, '," in..caseNIAc2lJ92"p.624,ittwh«:hthe,Supremo.' .",.<"'. .' .' Court, .n~~ingt,bllt,:\IIe~on.Actjll'Qvi.no instJUctions thereon, in an opinillllto tII~~entad4resse Vi" etCII'. den.' .' Iyto.' .' ote,i1tlitte with case.NJA 1993,p.242,thatitmust . .'.' .... .'- .. ' " .. , -,," '. . eSSClltiaity be~¢fIJIIi a dIltY'Of theOQVernment to assess the~t tQwIliFb.the:~~,CQJtCij~iD.aState were$UChas to constitute a mClJ'l' gett!'llIll'llllSf1I1·fqrDQt.grantjpg~ition. ' In the NJA2007 N36aiso.takes.' .'tbe SC!JIle line. ease, Supreme Case", ' -,.'.- , .,.- -." -.' :. -', .-' - tIIat CQUl1 al!mittcdJy~.,tbeissueofwhetherl\llextraditiQJI was CQIllP8lihlewith Articles 3and6 oftile European Convention, 00 tile basis of evid~9~ted intbematter regarding.general conditions in the requesting State, butfllllnd that theevidence, albeit tIIat itgave rise to doubt, didnotprovide a su1f'lCient basis foc theiSSO$smenttllat there . \V~~!lf81 intpedimel!~tQextradltiPn. However,~ingtQ the :. 33% .". .. . THE SuPREME COURT olO8W9" Page9 SlIJ:'N'IlIe Courtit WIllI assiioiedthat .the issue woul4 be taken ill!Q account further illthecolltinued prepai'8li0ll of tho 1lIaIter'(within the C4billet Office). The Supreme COUrtretiJmedfotheseissues incase NJA2007, p. 574. the SuPteme COUlfihel'e Ii6Id1hatbOth Article J of thoEuropean Convention'andsection 8 ofthe' EXtraditIon Act \VOte alllled at satisfyillg humanitarian requirements. AcCOrdillgtOthe CoUrt, an issuewhich .thtitbUpon arose wU wmthu thcfaSseumeDtll$to whether anextradition wasiJlcompatiblewith Article :rofthe European'ConvOIItion should bike place as part ofthoassessment as to whether extradition violated Article 8 oftheEx1i'adition Act, orwhethetit should takeindepcndOlltly ofthe assessment pursuant to the ExtraditiOll Act TheSupreme Court pointed out that, pursuant tosectio!i'g oftheExtradltiOll Act,the assessment isto take place baseden thepet$o'Jial'citcuinstlillces oftbe person involved andthat thosectiOll thuS pi'OvIdOd 110 basisfor an usessment whicb related togcocralconditiollswitbin, for exJImple;the prison system inthe requesting State, a1tasse$smentwhicb might needto be made pursuant to Article Jofthe EuropeiiD COIIVentiOll.lnadditiOll, according to the COurt the balluicing agaihSftheil\terCSt8 BllSedon thisillteJplC,tatloil,theSuprcmeCourthcldthat there was no illlpeClimentto eXttaditionpurstUint to sectiOll'8' ofthe ExtraditiOll Act, aI!d'tItereafter proceeded to an Issessmenl punuanfto Article 3 of the European Coovention, mc'OtItr8st't(ftltl:positlOna taken in casesNJA 2002,p. 624 and NJA 2007 N36, theSupreme Court was of theview that the evidence in thit caseproviding a sufficient basis for the assessment 33tS THE 'SUPREME COURT e 108Z.,G9 Page 10 ~~_wasan,iJjt~ilJ!entto,~tion.~ to Article 3 oftbe Ilunl~AmYen!i!lll,' It is evident from tbedescribed decisions that, notwithstanding the wording ofsec!i!llll~ 9ftheE,~tionAct, in..e1ttradition cases it is deemeclincumbentOll,/"he ~e Court to QC)nsider the issue whctber the eyiden<:elnthe matter;proyldes a basis for8lI JlSlICSSIlIent that ~is alawfutiJnJll!llim~'tj:I~itlonJlllJ'S~ to thCl provisions of the Eun!~Co~lion,in~itiQll to an asseSS!11Cll!tof whether there is 8lIyimpedimentP9J;SU!!Ilt,to the.prQvisiQlls ofthe..Bxtradition Act. The Sl1)m'Qle Colllt' Theoffences to which theextradition request relates arenot political .crimes(cfin thisres~tMlcleYllj)ftheCOflyention 00 tbe Prevention lllldPunishmentofthe Crjpleorqenocide SO1957:6'\ and cue NJAU 1.964,.p.,210witha TIlE SUPREME COURT 61082.:09 Page II • As a groundfor an impediment to extradition: pursuant to sectlon? of the Extradition Act, SylvCro Ahol1lgezo hascited the fact that he is a Hutu. He hasalso unconlrovertibly stated that be has been declared a refugee in Denmark. In conjunction withtheenactment of the Extradition Act, it was intended that theprotection forpolitical refugees set forth in the legislation regarding aliens, which is basedon the Geneva Convention, should correspond to theprohibition on extradition in section 7 of the ExtraditIon Act (caseNIAn 1958, p. 22 el seq.). However, the definition ofRlfugeo has subsequently beenexpanded in manycountries. Neither the deciSion on SylvCro Ahorugeze's refugee status which was granted in Denmark nor the invostigalion on whichthat decision was based has been adduced in the extradition matter. In anyevent,it is clearthat that decision was issued several years ago,whilethe extradition matternow involves considering wbatber there is such a riskof persecution as referred to in section 7 ofthe Extradition Act.In lightofthe evidence regarding conditions inRwanda, themerefactthat Sylvcl'lI Ahorugeze is a Hutucannotbe deemed sufficient in orderthat he mightbe considered to risk suchpersecution of a severenatureas referred to inthe relevant provision. Nor doesthe evidence otherwise providesupportforthe assessmentthat thereexists anysuchrisk. SyivereAhorugeze hascited health I'lI8SOns, primarily his needfor a . renewedbypassoperation, as a ground for an impediment to extradition pUfSlUlJit to section80ftheExtrIditionAct. Based on whatthe Supreme Court has pI'lIViously heldregarding thofocusof theassesament which is . . to takoplece pursuant to tho section, andtakingintoaccount Rwanda's interestin beingableto bring criminal proceedings, therecannotbe deemedto exist any impedimo~t to extradition based on this ground. ------Page 12 ~ SUPREME COURT o IOS2-09 To summarise, the s~e Court finds, inits assessment in aceordanco withthe provlslons oftheExtndltlon Act, thatthere is animpediment to ·cxttadltion asre8lJ'ds item 6 oftheindictmcnt.and that thereare no impediments punuant toscctlonsl·10 of the Exlraditlon Act with respect to otheroffences. It is, however, cl_that in the eventthatextradition is granted, a ~ation should'" made pursuant to section 12,lint puagraph, Slibseetion I ofthe Extradition Act. Impediments plll'SlIQnt to 1M European Convention Asalreal1Y mentioned, there maybeJawtill impediments to extradition in accnrdancewith theproVisions ofthe European Qmvention,which apply asSWedish law,aswen asinaceordance with the provisions ofthe Extradition Act. Sylvere Ahoru$CZChas argued in the matterthatthe deficiencies inthejudicial system in Rwanda arc so greatthat,if he is extradited. he runsth.e riskofbeina flagrantly denieda fair1Iia1in R.~da andthatthere isthus.an impediment to ~ition pursuant to Article6 of the European Convention. He hasspecifically pointed to defillicncies withrespoIlt to thepossibilities to obtainthe attendance arid examination of witnesses onhisbehalfunder the same IlODditions as witnesses against bim, bUt alsowith respect to the independence and impartiality !Ifthejudiciar)'. Inaddition, inthe matterthe issue has arisen whetherextradition WOuld violate ArtIcle 3 of the Eurnpcan Convention. It is evident from thecase law of theEuropean Courtof Human Rights (see,e.g., the previ(lUsly,mootioned ~ Saadl v. Italy, para. 12S with . .. - ,.:-,.-,--,' ,-,,' . furtherreferences) tbatan extraditjon violates Article3 of the Convention if s¥bstantial grounds 1lavc been.shown for beHavins that thepenon affected, jf cxtradited, faces a real. risk of beingsubjected to treatment contrary to Article 3. The~yldcncein the matter provides no basis for making any sucbassessment. ------.33112 Pap 13 • TIlE SUPREME COURT· • However, u previousiy stated,-ODD~oceuionIth, £uropcan CourtofHuman Rights basemll&uised t!Iat III oxtraditloa might also violato tho proviJious at Ardel' 6 rogudlnglb' rigllt 10 • fairtrial. It is, however, cleartliatth' oondJtion. forthii beittg deemed to betho case &II <:oJIsideredlobe signiflc:antly marC rcstr~!ban withrespect10 AJ'IicIe 3.InthtpteViOlI$ty..mentioned cue, Soerl", v. tM United Kingdom,lb, Court declaied in para. 113 thatit was DOt roled outthat• question ofcompatJ'lnlity ~th Articl' 6 mightariSe ill oxceptlonal cases through an extradition docislt)ll ill ciJi:umstmtces wherethe pe1SOII iIIvolved sufferod orrisks suMg• t1agnnt~ilIl ofa fairtrial ill tho requeatlng State.It isevldeut liom thewording that a requested Statebas no obligation tosatls1Y Jlsett'tIlat tho person to beoxtradited will ill all respeclI beguaranteed • fair trial incompliallce with thoConvention's rules, butrather !bat it Isoniyinlbecase offlasrBntbreiclI ofSucb roles that an cxtradItIon may entaii .broacli ottho CoDvention byIbe extraditing State (cf.in thiirespectDanellus, ~iJiga rattfgheter.1 Europelskpraxts [Hurium Righfllln European Cue Law]3rdedition, 2007,p. 137et U ~ inaterlaJ which tOrm. tllebUls for theassCsamCnt mayalsobeof significance fortho ~iof wbetl10r lIIexttadition might violate therighttoafair trial P1ll'SU&Dt to Article 6. The isSUe bas been addressed in tho EW'Ope&n Court of Human Rights' doclsiauo( 16October 2001 in the cue, Ebthom 11. ~. no. 7J5551OJ. paragmph8 JJ and J~. The 33=11 Page 14 THESUPREME COURT 01082-09 Coult stated therein ~ as regards extradition, in principle it is incumbent on thep$'lYmakinS ~ alleption thaianextl'lldltion violates Article 6 to prove that!h!ll!' isarisk thathe will "flagrantly" bedenied a t"aittrialJet·bi this respect lite previously-mentioned decision, Saadiv. lim;. ;'-"129: see,h~, alsO)!UL 133 8nlthejudsmentof 4 FeInuary 200Sinthe ~~ andAsktrov v. TUI'Irey (Ge] nos. 46827199 and 469$1199.f,a,a.90.ECHR 200s-!reganling a factor which was known. or shoU/dhave ~eolatow1l,to thed~iding State). The e:ndentiary requirement herll istheaame as regards Article 3 (substantial .'.- .. ',', .... ,'-...... ,. grounds tor:believing). With respect to the ~.condltions withintheJudicial system in R~inthe matter 8 report has been citedfromthe F The official documents, which include expressions ,ofopinion against an ,P, __ '" :',:." ...... " .. '...:; .. ",' --;, --c.',' .extraditill\1, areconcise and fonnulated in such .. manner thatthey cannot beused asan imm~ basis fora decision; nor can it be assumed they , _. . ,," .' ·,··..t· ,were intendedto be soused. TheFinnish Ministry ofJustice's decision isdated 20 February 2009. The decision entails therejection ofa request from Rwanda forextradition in orderto stand trialfor, iniU alia, genocide. The decision hasbeen taken 33-10 '" •. THE SUPREME COURT Page IS , piusuant toaprOVision otdleFimJiSMxtiildition legislatioo,according to which a requllStshliJl berejeCted irnrhediately ilit is evident ftom the documents .thal die request caiinofbo granted according to lawor ifthe MiniStry OtherwiiMlbolieveslh8t tbtreareJlo reasons to granl therequest (cf. section IS of the SWedisliExlrliaition Act). In its reasoning, the Ministry ofJustice mers toa number of decisions from the ICTR regatdillg proposiilsfor~tI1IIltli&fer t<> theRWiiridim national judicial sysUim of Cases pelIding inthe court. iii the· decisiOns, the IerR rejected the prOfiOsaIs onthegrouI\d"liiinarily, ofthediftleultiesforanaccused inRw8Ildii to liavetliiown~ heariftbOl\illnislIy ofJusticedid notcollSldot·ifuu itli8d~ fuCaJI ii!tii cjuestiOiithe lerR's conelusiollSor toassess theconditions in R:ivand4differently thanthe rCTRhad done. OnthegroWia thatFinland,throligh theEuropean Convention, has un4ertakCln to siWahtee Ii fairIlial to persons within its jurisdiction, theMlj,istiy cifJUstiCe wils of theviewthat Finnish autliOrrties IlOUldDOt, thl'oUgh1b~ir own actionli;ean'tribute to a trial in a foreign' Stale whicltr81sed W8liiuIted gi-ooods as to whether thetrial would becarried outfairly. Thedecisions from theIerR that are referredto intheFinnish decision havebeen available also inthis matter. The issue involves a decision pursUllDtto Article II obis ofllleTiibunaJ's Rules af Procedure and Evidenee. AcCordingto-thoscrRules, the Tribim4hriay, upon therequest bY tbo Tribunal'sproSOcutor, tl"iIMfor a casependirig before theTribunal forprosecution ina State: Tliisi~liowever, conditional on the Tribunal satis!ying itSelfthafthO acC1ISOd;~II·rCceive IIfait trial inthecourts of theState coriccrned.The a.'lSe$SnieririvlJiclttl1o Icrtfhas conducted is thusc:le8rIy more rigOrous thSJt ariassefsinent whiclt relates totheextent lowhieh anextraditionmig!itviolateAiticle6 ottheEuropean converitiOn. II ~au alScibonlrtOctthBtthenature oflbC problem as regards the evidenoo ofwitn-.onwhich the IerR based ilsdecisions, isof a type whigb is notunknown even inSlates inwhicb themaintenance of the right to a fair THESUPREME COURT Page16 trial C8IIJ!otbe.~,~ ilUoqllestron.EvCD if on0llCCOPtS thodescription of thocon~itiol)sApRwan Tbec!op!sion fropttJ,l! JIlgh,eowt oP~~is~ 8 April2009. In tho .docision"tho CouJ1hold thatthote _ anjm~ to the extradi~on 'to~da offour~~S~ of~ido.Tbe decision is of .~ m~ filrtJ10 ,~on ()f,whothor,)n$wedon, thereisa la.,.rullmpe(I'Il!~tlo.lh!oxtra!!ition of !!YIvVo Ahorogoze, bearing ....,.. ,- -:. -,/.,., .,.: -.. ; """'" .":" .•.. ",.,- ";',' , m mlndthattboffi81I,Co\ll1,m~~ont,m c. .. ,' _,',_"'--',,, " _":", •.. ,...• ,' ". ,', -c". _:'. " -_,', "' pnn.',._ iple proceeded ontho ))asls"',_., oflho.,', '" '; fQrmuIationusod,",', ,;.,',-' '.c_?,. :'''':."'" by:".,.",.'the BuropoanCoU!t", ..'. .., of Human Rights wh~C.ltil18t,!1.0 The ffigb Cclurt'.~()1IlVIIS1Skon.following8tlllppoai ofa lower court d~~lon in.whichlt _~eldth~,lIIOJ:Cl-,1lO im~iment to . . oxtl'adition. 'Tho ady~prgcedU(e 0$J!ded over a longperiod of '.~ " ..•.. '"" . ' ...., .. \ ...... ,. " ..., ..." -',,' , .... .-: .: '.., ,,",', ': ,,',' .. " time(it commenee,d,lIS llU'l)' lII.thea~ of2006; seeparagraph 17of tho~ision) 8tlde~'VO"'"!ton ,.;. ' _. :.e·'" ';, __',.,..-:."',:.,".__ '.,. , 1Il1dora!ovide\lco. :. , "" '" " Will adducod. in tho m~ (!hehOlll'jJl$.,q(t~tjJJt"ny alone m tho fu'stlnstanco tookoighteen days);l'bo ~~~!()p,Ol!~ Pvor70 ~ly'oVritten pages. " '. " ,.'., . Sillli1arly tolh~I<:p~,.th~Highc;;oW bases jts.d~ision primarily on doticiO!1cies III ~~,thoJl9SSibili~stoacldlll;o own evidence in ,t- THE SUPREME COURT OH032-09 . Page 17 Rw*nd8, buttheCourt a1Sli gNiis ~ impression that the~ ere doubts lIlI.. regards the indqieodCncc lndinlp8l'tiality ofthejudiciary. ThoHighCourt's decision pir3' contliins anextellilve description and analysis oftheevideaceadduQed'inthe matter. Thereis, however, reason to belir ill miDd th8t tIIo evillOrl.cewu evilIuat'ilddlffereritly inthe first instance ind inthe Higb Court. It isnotentilelysimpleto decideto what extentthe evaluatiDJiofthoaddllcccfevldence; or theassessment of the levelwhich SrIoi1lci be re Fromthecitedreports from theForeign Minlslly and Sweden's Embassy, the Section Officc inKfgamitis evident, u alsoemphasised by boththe ICTRandt!io High Ccllltt;tI1at the eonditlotiSWlthin'the judicial system in Rwanda hiive imlleijonecllllr'iJII)ltOVcmentsin recent years butthat die~' an, StIll inajor defiClencies;Tho ForelgilNlinistry'sreport regarding conditions iD 2007 stateS; fnlt'rdHa,that thmlsaqllestionmark regBidingthe acfullfinde]leridenco oftbejlldlciary;The laterreportis morediteCily focused ontIlejudiCial System, and on Rwanda's endeavours to have persons suspecte\f of gi\rtocide eXtradited to Rwanda. The report staleS, amongothertliinp; tholthe-R;windanjudicial system in 2008has coniinued to develop andw'beOftintpnlvedin different areas; thol there is still a lack of a suffiCient iliin\1'Jet ofdefencecouoilel, judges andother persons required to maintain an efIlclent judicial system without long t " ' THE SlJPREME COURT 01082-09 Page 18 »,aiting~; ls"'~9n a~.lack that !\lore.' .'.' - ,', ,': " ,- '. ','.'reprding.' .j': "., .' ofpolitical i~C!C'i.that.tlawhas ~.•~which.~en impossible tho punishment comprising Iifo.limo isolation criticised bytheICIR; and I~.a docis!9*,hss ~taken~g a nowwitl!ess protectlon prggJ'8llW1oun~er dItla,~i~ Qf thoC9lJl1a. It is further stated that ···R~da.no\V ~~Iftohavo covered alllfoficiencioa pointed out bythoICI'R.~.~ i~hudisp~ wjIllngpos.sl!J comply with ICTR, " " -,. .' ',' ·a1beit~il.I.dQ!l~.J1l).I.~~'I\Iith thoc!oserjption of tho problem. 'TholeP9rt.9l!~ !flat,inc;onv~~tatives ofHuman ·.. Righ~ ~ateI!{~.~ Lti,; andRea/IJy-l'J'pgress ill Judicial ·Re.fonltPr'lbf~~~(l()g~ted an lm~t basisfor theHigb .·Court~s cloQis!on)~lajnOJt!fJatdltlY didnot~ thoS\OPS taken thus CarlO imProvotho wi~~lion $jtualionin Rwanda tobesufficient ·It isapparentfi'ollllhecovidonee In.t!le m~ that thoro have boon serious probloms with thejudicial $Ystem InRwanda but thatregular improvements have taken place inrecent yean. There are, however, stilI anumberofpro!lloms.~m0stsoriolls, which IlIIlYbe crucial forthe jssueOfOltll'adI~lI,is Ih'~.to .which tho ri~preacribod inArticle .: 6.3 ofthoEuropc8I\ ~O!1vention foraporsonaec~ of a crime to obtain thoa~.andOl'''Wination!>fwitnessos!>n .. .,:,.,.' .'.'.' ':.- ;.,.' ,-" .'"- .-'.'.' -; _,' .'.' -, ~ .•_.. ,',,' .'.,.' c-,·, his, behalfunder thesame conditjQns~wi.~.JIJajp'lt.ltim.can~ Satisf:ied. Besed onthe dofie~iO$m.this~th.lCTllbas .. .' .' -_ .' :: .:. ,'- '_',r. __,_' "';',',_ ._' :,,,,.;, ...... • :... notC!>DSidorod.." ...':'.•..:,,,.... that it could ttansforprosecllti9!l$l!J~~ J1D~~o,flj;~jO$ ~ .this respect also constituto 'Tho provisions reprding a right toa fairtrial setforth in Article 6 ofthe EUl'OpOIII Conventioo do not mOllll, with rIlSpOCt to extradition, that an Ol'traditioS Stale must satisfy itsolfthat a trial ina requesting State will ~:SUPREME COURT 01082-09 Page 19 " meet aU ofthe~CIIlSapplicablopursuant to Articlo 6. It is only . f1agtaM breaCheaofthojirinc:iplesthat c:onstituto impediments to eXtradition. Thatthis'entailn relativolyhigh threshold is evidentfrom the t'ac:f thatthe European£ourtofHwnan Right& has asswnedthat an impedimelltbasedon,thlsground existsonly ineJ«:eptlonaJ c:ases. There may. of'course; bediffmnt opinions as to what constitutes a .,f1lIgrant violation' of thoprinciples in Article6. Tbo-c:onditlons under , which the European CourtofHwnan Rightsfindsthat an extraditing Statohlls c:oInmitteda bread!'olthe'Conventionis one thing. It is another matter when a Statedec:ides;ona request for extnIdition in a specific case. In silc:h caso!here·is probablygtneraJJyreason to proceedon the basisof more stringCntrequiremeirtsteganling the legalproceedings. The situationmay besuchthat thoquestion is difficult to assessand that tho risk cannotberuled outthat the European CourtofHwnan Rightswould find an eXtradition to beinviolation of the Convention. In thosecases where the Stato itsclfcandecide wbk:b requimnent sbouldbe imposed in order for extradition totakeplace, theremaybe reasonto refuse extraditionon thoground of tho,interest in a fair tria!; quite independently ofthe risk ofa flagrant breach of theprinciples. Ac:eordingw1be ExtraditiQIIAct, theSupmne CourtshaUexpress its opinion as to whethortho extradition maylawfully be granted. It is thereupon for'tho,Court to:considerthe issuebasedon the restrictive , approachexpressed in thocaselawof the European Courtof Human Rights as regards the assessment wbether an impediment exists pursuant to Article 6 oflbe European Convention, albeit that sound reasonsmight be deemedto militato infavour of theview thatthe Government should, in practice,givegreater consideration to the interest protected in the ConventionIhan thatwhicb follows from such a pointof departure. 33~ - " , THE SUPREME COURT 01082.-09 Page 20 • The SupmneCourttindUhat theevidenl;e in thelllatter provides reason loeRIertalndoubtsrepnlinaSylv6reAho",gIlZe'.possibililies, after an .""tradiIionlo Rwanda,torecoiv!t,alrial whic;hsat!~ties the requirements foraJairlriai asestablished in Article.(i ofthe.European Convention. The doubt applies, primarily;;rothequestionofhis p9ssibililies 10 obtain the attendanceandexamination ofwitnesses on his behalfunderthe same 'cOnditions as witnesses:agalnsjdl lm,Ho_,.the evidence adduced in theSupretDeCourt_ net provide asuftlclenl:basis 10 makethe assessmenl.tltat, forthis-reason; thereisa generallawflllimpedimenllo clXIradition 10 Rwanda,rorgenocide,and similar.crimes. Thus,withthe -assessment thatdJeSupreme.Cowtmustmakethere is DC impedimonllo the extradition of Sy/vjreAborugeze..based.onthe Eurcpean Convention. IImay belISSUI!led thatintlte continued preparation ofdJe matter cOllBideralion will be $iVeillo dJe·need forJiuthl'r information as a basis .fora tinal decision. DECISIONON·OlHEIMSSUES; 'SyIvereAhorugeteshall remainincuslody in the'matter. In respect ofrepresentalionofSyIvereAhorugozeinthe extradition matter, Hans Bredbergci. awarded compensation..from publicfunds in ;,the amountofseventylbousandtwo hundredandeishl fivekronor(SEK .70,2S5),'ofwhich SEK.4J)iS4SrelaleHo work,SEK 10,150 10 time wasted, SEK 5,230 toout- THE SUPREME COURT o I082-1l9 added tax. Tho costwiDllo borne bytheState. ISignoturel ISignafll1'el I SignotureI I Signature I I SignalUrlll I Signt1lllrlll Participants in thedecision: Justices Joban Munck, DagVictor (rapport/llll'J, Ann-ehristine Lindeblad, Kemin CaJissendorffandPer Virdesten. Presenting Judge Referee: Tyri Ohman [Stamp] ft 10 '-byalllnntd tIIa1l1M Photllcopy COli ",,0".10 lila OI1gfnal: I SIK'l11IJln f I,Revv8f1 Ben-Oor, do hereby atrltmthat fhls ~ a flUeand cecuofe 1ransIoffon from theSWedlshOf1gina1. Translegal Sweden AS rLe.-.,fkb www·transIegal.c:om Reuv8f1 Ben-Oor. MIl (Contobl, AulholUed Translator SIocJctiolm, 13 July 2009 33.3 Sida I (20) HOGSTA DOMSTOLENS BESLUT MaIm meddelat i Stockholm den 26 maj 2009 o 1082-09 Frarnstallning om utlamning till Republiken Rwanda av SA Ombud och offentlig forsvarare: Advokat HE Nationella aklagermyndigheten i Republiken Rwanda har i en framstallning den 4 augusti 2008 begart art rwandiske medborgaren SA skall utlamnas till Republiken Rwanda for Iagforing, Till stod for framstallningen har aberopats ett haktningsbeslut utfardat av riksaklagare MN den 17 juli 2008. Av beslutet och den till frarnstallningen fogade anklagelseakten frarngar art SA ar misstankt for 1. folkmord (atalspunktema 1-3) 2. brort mot manskligheten genom mord och utrotning (atalspunktcrna 4 och 5) Dok.ld 36700 HOGSTA DOMSTOLEN Postadress Telefon 08-561 66600 Expeditionstid Riddarhustorget 8 Box 2066 Telefax 08-56166686 08:45-12:00 103 12 Stockholm E-post: [email protected] 13:15-15:00 www.hogstadomstolen.se HOGSTA DOMSTOLEN 01082-09 Sid 2 3. bildande av, medlemskap i, ledarskap for och deltagande i samman slutning for brottsliga ligor, vilkas verksamhet gatt ut pa att skada manniskor eller deras egendom (atalspunkten 6). Bratten skall ha bcgatts under tiden 6 april - 4 juli 1994 i Rwanda. Sedan arendet enligt lagen (1957:668) om utlarnning for bratt overlamnats till riksaklagaren och utredning verkstallts, har riksaklagaren enligt 17 § samma lag overlamnat arendet till Hogsta domstolen tillsammans med eget yttrande. SA har motsatt sig utlamning, SA har sasom anhallen och haktad varit berovad friheten sedan den 16 juli 2008. Hogsta dornstolen, som har hallit forhandling i arendet den 6 maj 2009, beslutar foljande YTTRANDE SAs installning SA har fornekat samtliga gamingar som framstallningen avser. Han har gjort gallande att det foreligger hinder mot utlamning enligt 6-9 §§ utlarnnings lagen och artikel 6 i den Europeiska konventionen om skydd for de manskliga rattighetema och de grundlaggande frihetema HOGSTA DOMSTOLEN 01082-09 Sid 3 (Europakonventionen). Som grund for sin installning har han anfort bl.a. foljande. De villnesuppgifter som ligger till grund for utlarnningsframstallningen ar oriktiga och grundar sig pa en komploll mot honom. Pastaendet om hans delaktighet i mord pa 28 personer den 7 april 1994 har utrells av polis och aklagare i Danmark som den 6 september 2007 beslot all nedlagga forunder sokningen eftersom ell atal inte kunde forvantas leda till en fallande dom. Det foreligger inte sannolika skal for all han begatt de pastadda gamingama (9 § andra stycket utlamningslagen). De pastadda brotten ar enligt hans uppfallning all bedoma som politiska broll (6 § utlamningslagen). Som hutu riskerar han om han utlamnas all utsattas for sadan forfoljelse av svar beskaffenhet som avses i 7 § utlam ningslagen. Han har i sammanhanget framhallit all han har stallning som flykting i Danmark. SA har vidare hanvisat till sill daliga halsotillstand och da sarskilt den omstandigheten all han genomgatt en bypassoperation och inom ell antal ar ar i behov av en fomyad sadan som det saknas mojlighet all utfora i Rwanda. En utlarnning skulle darfor vara uppenbart oforenlig med humanitetens krav (8 § utlamningslagen). Han har vidare gjort gallande all bristema i rattsvasendet i Rwanda, sarskilt nar det galler mojlighetema for honom all sjalv fa vittnen inkallade och forhorda under samma forhallanden som vittnen aberopade mot honom men ocksa i fraga om domstolamas oavhangighet och opartiskhet, alltjamt ar sa stora all han om han utlamnades skulle riskera all pa ell flagrant satt forvagras en rattvis rattegang i Rwanda. Hinder mot utlamning foreligger darfor enligt artikel 6 i Europakonventionen. Han har i sammanhanget pekat HOGSTA DOMSTOLEN 01082-09 Sid 4 pa att Intemationella brottmalstribunalen for Rwanda (ICTR) i samtliga fall da fragan om att overlamna fall for behandling i Rwanda tagits upp har funnit att det forclegat hinder for detta. Det finns inte heller nagon enskild stat som utlarnnat nagon person till Rwanda som anklagats for folkmord eller liknande brott. Riksaklagarens installning Riksaklagarcn har i sitt yttrande anfort att det enligt hans uppfattning fore ligger sannolika skal for att SA har gjort sig skyldig till de gamingar som utlamningsframstallningcn avser och att des sa, med undantag for atalspunkten 6, motsvarar brott for vilka enligt svensk lag ar foreskrivet sadant straffatt utlamning kan ske. Atalspunkten 6, som avser bildande av och medlemskap i en kriminell organisation, motsvarar inte nagot brott enligt svensk ratt och hinder mot utlamning foreligger darfor enligt 4 § forsta stycket utlamningslagen betraffande denna gaming. Vad galler ovriga garningar som framstallningcn omfattar motsvaras dessa enligt riksaklagaren i svensk ratt av uppvigling, grovt brott, och hets mot folkgrupp, grovt brott, grovt vapenbrott och mord samt medverkan till sadana brott. For dessa brott ar sadant straff stadgat att de kan inga i brottet folkmord enligt lagen (1964: 169) om straff for folkmord. For grovt vapen brott ar stadgat fangelse i hogst fyra ar. Ayen detta brott kan inga som bestandsdel i brottet folkmord. Vad som framkommit i arendet utgor enligt riksaklagaren inte tillracklig grund for att anta att SA loper risk for sadan forfoljelse som avses i 7 § HOGSTA DOMSTOLEN 01082-09 Sid 5 utlamningslagen och det kan inte anses uppenbart oforenligt med humanitetens krav at! utlamna SA till Rwanda varfor inte heller 8 § utlamningslagen utgor nagot hinder mot utlamning, Nar det galler fragan om Europakonventionen utgor hinder mot utlamning har riksaklagaren anfort at! bedomningen kan ge anledning till tvekan men funnit at! utredningen i malet maste anses ge stod for at! forhallandena i Rwanda inte ar av sa allvarligt slag at! det foreligger hinder mot utlamning enligt artiklarna 3 och 6 i Europakonventionen. Omfattningen av Hogsta domstolens provning I utlamningslagen finns bestiimmelser om utlamning for lagforing av brott till andra stater an de nordiska och medlemsstater i den Europeiska unionen. Av I § framgar at! det alltid ar regeringen som fattar beslut om utlamning och at! det, om inte annat foljer av en overenskommelse med annan stat, inte foreligger nagon skyldighet att bevilja utlamning, I lagen finns daremot en rad bestiimmelser om hinder mot utlamning, Nar det galler forfarandet framgar av 15 § at! regeringen alltid kan avsla en ansokan omedelbart, om det ar uppenbart at! den inte bor bifallas. I annat fall skall yttrande avges av riksaklagaren och arendet skall dessutom provas av Hogsta domstolen, om den som avses med framstallningen inte samtyckt till at! han utlamnas, Vad Hogsta domstolen skall prova ar enligt 18 § om "utlamning lagligen kan beviljas enligt vad i 1-10 §§ sags". Av 20 § framgar at! regeringen inte far bifalla en utlamningsframstallning om Hogsta domstolen vid sin provning funnit att det foreligger sadant hinder mot utlamning som sags i 18 §. Daremot kan regeringen alltid avsla en HOGSTA DOMSTOLEN o 1082-09 Sid 6 framstallning aven om Hogsta domstolen gjort den bedomningen att det enligt de aktuella bestammelsema inte finns nagot lagligt hinder mot ett bifall. Den provning som enligt lagtexten ankommer pa Hogsta domstolen ar alltsa begransad till de hinder mot utlamning som finns i utlamningslagen, Flera av dessa ar forhallandevis allmant utformade. Detta galler kanske sarskilt bestammelserna i 7 § om hinder pa grund av risk for forfoljelse av svar beskaffenhet och i 8 § om hinder pa grund av uppenbar oforenlighet med humanitetens krav. Det ar inte ovanligt att den som en utlamningsframstall ning ror rnotsatter sig utlamning med hanvisning till dessa paragrafer och darvid aberopar uppgifter om de allmanna forhallandena i den stat som gjort framstallningen. Det ar ocksa uppenbart att sadana uppgifter kan vara av betydelse for bedomningen av om det pa nagon av de angivna grundema foreligger hinder mot utlamning i ett enskilt fall. En annan fraga ar om bestlimmelsema i utlamningslagen ar avsedda att tillampas sa att uppgifter om allmanna forhallandena i en stat Iaggs till grund en bedomning att det foreliggcr hinder mot utlamning helt oberoende av omstandigheterna i det enskilda falle!. I NJA 1993 s. 242 uttalade Hogsta domstolen att vad den som begaran avsag anfort om de allmanna forhallandena inom rartsskipningen och fangelsema i den ansokande staten inte kunde beaktas inom ramen for den provning som skulle goras enligt 7 och 8 §§ utlamningslagen, Det far antas att avsikten med uttalandet var att markera att det narrnast fick anses vara en uppgift for regeringen att bedoma i vad man de allmanna forhallandena i en stat var sadana att dessa utgjorde ett mer generellt skal for att inte bevilja utlamning (varvid nagot yttrande fran Hogsta domstolen inte ar erforderligt) liksom i HOGSTA DOMSTOLEN 01082-09 Sid 7 vilken utstrackning upplysningar om de allmanna forhallandena i den ansokande staten borde tillaggas sarskild vikt vid sidan av en bedomning pa mer individualiserad grund. Fragan om kompetensfordelningen mellan regeringen oeh Hogsta domstolen nar det galler beslut i utlamningsfragor kan i viss man sagas ha komplieerats i oeh med att Europakonventionen borjade galla som svensk lag fran den I januari 1995. I sin praxis (det ledande avgorandet ar dom den 7 juli 1989 i malet Soering mot Forenade kungariket, Serie A, nr 161) har Europa domstolen fastslagit att det kan utgora konventionsbrott att utlamna nagon till en annan stat. Detta galler sarskilt i fall da en utvisning innebar risk for att den berorde personen skall utsattas for behandling i strid med artikel 3 i konventionen. Det ar dock inte uteslutet att en utlamning kan anses sta i strid med andra bestamrnelser i konventionen som exempelvis, vilket domstolen erinrat om vid atskilliga tillfallen, bestammelserna om ratt till en rattvis rattegang i artikel 6. Att Europakonventionen numera galler som svensk lag innebar att det ocksa vid sidan av utlamningslagen firms lagliga hinder mot utlamning, Hur for hallandet mellan dessa oeh bestammelserna i utlamningslagen, som inte minst nar det galler 7 oeh 8 §§ syftar till att bereda skydd av liknande slag som konventionen, bor uppfattas kan var forernal for olika bedornningar. Klart ar emellertid att vid bedornningen av om det foreligger hinder mot utlamning enligt Europakonventionens bestammelser kan, i motsats till vad Hogsta domstolen antagit nar det galler tillampningen av utlamningslagens bestamrnelser, uppgifter om de allmanna forhallandena inom rattsskipningen oeh fangelserna i en stat vara av helt avgorande betydelse. Fragestallningen berordes i NJA 2002 s. 624 dar Hogsta dornstolen, trots att utlarnningslagen HOOSTA DOMSTOLEN 01082-09 Sid 8 inte ger nagon anvisning darorn, i ett yttrande till regeringen, med hanvisning till i arendet lamnade uppgifter am allrnanna forhallanden i den ansokande staten, berorde fragan i vad man en utlamning skulle sta i strid med artikel 3 i Europakonventionen. Hogsta domstolen tog emellertid inte klar stallning till i vad man artikel 3 utgjorde hinder mot utlamning utan uttalade endast att utredningen inte gay underlag for en bedomning att sadant hinder fore lag. Avsikten harmed var uppenbarligen att, i overens stamrnelse med NJA 1993 s. 242, markera att det narmast tick anses vara en uppgift for regeringen att bedorna i vad man de allmanna forhallandena i en stat var sadana att de utgjorde ett mer generellt skal for att inte bevilja utlamning. I linje harmed ligger ocksa NJA 2007 N 36 dar Hogsta domstolen, med han visning till i arendet Iamnade uppgifter om allmanna forhallanden i den ansokande staten, visserligen behandlade fragan am en utlamning var foren Jig med artiklama 3 och 6 i Europakonventionen men fann att utredningen, aven am den gay anledning till tvekan, inte gay tillrackligt underlag for bedornningen att det forelag generella hinder mot utlamning, Enligt Hogsta domstolen tick det emellertid forutsattas att fragan beaktades ytterligare vid arendets fortsatta beredning (inom Regeringskansliet). Hogsta domstolen aterkom till fragestallningarna i NJA 2007 s. 574. Hogsta domstolen konstaterade dar att saval artikel 3 i Europakonventionen sam 8 § i utlamningslagcn syftar till att tillgodose humanitetens krav. En fraga sam enligt domstolen da uppkom var am bedomningen av om en utlamning var oforenlig med artikel 3 i Europakonventionen skulle ske sam ett led i prov ningen av am utlamningen skulle strida mot 8 § utlamningslagen eller om den skulle ske fristaende fran provningen enligt utlamningslagen. Hogsta H6GSTA DOMSTOLEN 61082-09 Sid 9 domstolen pekade pa att det ar den berordes personliga forhallanden som enligt 8 § utlamningslagen ar utgangspunkten for provningen och att den paragrafen darfor inte gay underlag for en provning som avsag allmanna forhallanden inom exempelvis fangelsevasendet i den anmodande staten, en provning som kunde behova goras enligt artikel 3 i Europakonventionen. Till detta kom enligt domstolen att den avvagning mot den frammande statens intresse som paragrafen forutsatter var frammande vid en provning enligt artikel 3 (jfr hartill exempelvis Europadomstolens dom den 28 februari 2008 i malet Saadi mot Italien, no 37201106, § 127). Hogsta domstolen fann mot den bakgrunden att bedomningen enligt artikel 3 i Europakonventionen borde goras vid sidan av provningen enligt utlamnings lagen. Med denna tolkning fann Hogsta domstolen att det inte forelag nagot hinder mot utlamning enligt 8 § utlamningslagen och overgick darefter till en provning enligt artikel 3 i Europakonventionen. I motsats till de stallnings taganden som gjordes i rattsfallen NJA 2002 s. 624 och NJA 2007 N 36 ansag Hogsta domstolen att utredningen i detta fall gay tillrackligt stod for bedornningen at! det forelag hinder mot utlarnning enligt artikel 3 i Europa konventionen. Av de redovisade avgorandena framgar at! det, trots formuleringen i 18 § utlamningslagen, ansetts ankomma pa Hogsta domstolen at! i utlamnings arenden, vid sidan av am det foreligger hinder enligt bestarnmelserna i ut lamningslagen, aven prova fragan om den i arendet foreliggande utredningen ger underlag for bedomningcn att del finns lagliga hinder mot utlamning enligt bestammelserna i Europakonvenlionen. HOGSTA DOMSTOLEN 01082-09 Sid 10 Hinder enligt utlamningslagen Hogsta domstolen gor inte nagon annan bedomning an den som riksaklagar ren redovisat nar det galler fragan am det foreligger sannolika skal for att SA har gjort sig skyldig till de garningar som utlamnings- framstallningen avser (9 § andra stycket utlamningslagen) liksom fragan i vilken utstrack ning dessa gamingar motsvarar brott enligt svensk lag (4 § utlamnngslagen). Atalspunkten 6, som avser bildande av och medlemskap i en kriminell organisation, motsvarar saledes inte nagot brott enligt svensl ratt och hinder mot utlamning foreliggcr darfor betraffande denna gaming (jfr exem pelvis NJA 2000 s. 158). I ovrigt fiireligger inte nagot hinder mot utlamning enligt 4 § utlamningslagen. De gamingar som utlamningsframstallningen avser ar inte politiska brott (jfr hartill artikel VII i Konventionen om forebyggande och bestraffning av brottet folkmord (genocide) SO 1952:64 och NJA II 1964 s. 210 med vidare hanvisningar), Nagot hinder mot utlamning foreligger darfor inte enligt 6 §. Som grund for att hinder mot utlamning skulle foreligga enligt 7 § utlam ningslagen har SA aberopat att han ar hutu. Han har vidare obestritt uppgett att han i Danmark forklarats vara flykting. Vid tillkomsten av utlarnningslagen avsags att astadkomma overensstam melse mellan utlanningslagstiftningcns pa Geneve-konventionen grundade skydd for politiska flyktingar och forbudet mot utlamning i 7 § utlarnnings lagen (NJA II 1958 s. 22 ff.). Darefter har emellertid flyktingdefinitionen i manga Hinder vidgats. Varken det beslut am SAs flyktingstatus som med delats i Danmark eller den utredning som legat till grund for detta beslut HOGSTA DOMSTOLEN 01082-09 Sid 11 har forebragts i utlamningsarendet. Under alia omstandigheter star det klart att detta beslut meddelats for flera ar sedan medan det i utlamningsarendet galler att prova om det nu finns en sadan risk for forfoljelse som avses i 7 § utlamningslagen, Enbart den ornstandigheten att SA ar hutu kan darvid mot bakgrund av den utredning som foreligger angaende forhallandena i Rwanda inte anses vara tillracklig for att han skall kunna anses riskera sadan for foijelse av svar beskaffenhet som avses i den aktuella bestammelsen. Inte heller i ovrigt ger utredningen stod for bedornningcn att det foreligger nagon sadan risk. Som grund for att hinder mot utlamning skulle foreligga enligt 8 § utlam ningslagen har SA aberopat halsoskal och darvid i forsta hand sitt behov av en fomyad bypassoperation. Med utgangspunkt i vad Hogsta domstolen tidigare funnit angaende inriktningen av den provning som skall ske enligt paragrafen och med beaktande av Rwandas intresse av att lagforing kan aga rum kan det inte anses foreligga nagot hinder mot ut- lamning pa denna grund. Sammanfattningsvis finner Hogsta domstolen vid sin provning enligt be stammelserna i utlarnningslagen att hinder mot utlamning foreligger savitt avser atalspunkten 6 samt att hinder inte meter enligt 1-10 §§ utlamnings lagen i fraga om ovriga gamingar, Del star dock klart att, i den handelse utlamning beviljas, forbehall bor goras enligt 12 § forsta stycket I utlam ningslagen. 335~ HOGSTA DOMSTOLEN 01082-09 Sid 12 ffinderenhgtEuropakonventionen Som redan berorts kan lagligt hinder mot utlamning, forutorn enligt bestam melsema i utlamningslagcn, foreligga enligt bestamrnelsema i Europakon ventionen vilka galler som svensk lag. I arendet har fran SAs sida gjorts gallande att bristema i rattsvasendet i Rwanda ar sa stora att han, om han utlamnas, skulle riskera att pa ett flagrant satt forvagras en rattvis rattegang i Rwanda och att det darfor foreliggcr hinder mot utlarnning enligt artikel6 i Europakonventionen. Han har sarskilt pekat pa brister nar det galler mojlighetema att sjalv fa vittnen inkallade och forhorda under samma forhallanden som vittnen aberopade mot honom men ocksa betraffande domstolamas oavhangighet och opartiskhet. I arendet har dessutom fragan om en utlamning skulle sill i strid med artikel 3 i Europakonventionen aktualiserats. Av Europadomstolens praxis (se t.ex. det tidigare namnda fallet Saadi mot Italien, § /25 med vidare hanvisningar) framgar att en utlamning star i strid med artikel 3 i konventionen om det har pavisats patagliga grunder for att anta att (substantial grounds have been shown for believing that) den beror de, om han utvisas, loper en allvarlig risk for att utsattas for behandling i strid med artikel 3 (faces a real risk ofbeing subjected to treatment contrary to article 3). Utredningen i arendet ger inte underlag for att gora nagon sadan bedornning. Som tidigare sagts har emellertid Europadomstolen vid atskilliga tillfallen framhallit att en utlarnning ocksa kan sta i strid med bestammelserna i artikel 6 om ratten till en rattvis rattegang. Uppenbart ar dock att forutsattningama for att detta skulle anses vara fallet ansetts vara vasentligt mer begransade an 3351 H(')GST A DOMSTOLEN o 1082-09 Sid 13 nar det galler artikel 3. I det tidigare namnda fallet Soering mot Forenade kungariket, forklarade domstolen i § 113 att den inte uteslot att en fraga om forenligheten med artikel 6 i undantagsfall kunde uppkomma genom utlam ningsbeslut under forhallanden dar den berorde pa ett flagrant satt har forvagrats eller riskerar att forvagras en rattvis rartegang i den anmodande staten (suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting state). Av fonnuleringen framgar att en anmodad stat inte har skyldighet att forvissa sig om att den som utlamnas i alia hanseenden skall vara garanterad en rattvis rattegang i overensstamrnelse med konventionens regler utan at! det endast ar vid risk for flagranta brott mot dessa som en utlarnning kan innebara konventionsbrott fran den utlamnande staten (jfr hartill Danelius, Manskliga rattigheter i Europeisk praxis, 3 uppl. 2007, s. 137 f.). Den i fallet Soering anvanda fonnuleringen har darefter, med vissa smarre variationer, vid atskilliga tillfallen upprepats (se Lex. domstolens beslut den 21 oktober 2008 i malet MH mot Sverige, no 10641108, § 45), dock utan att domstolen vid nagot tillfalle konstaterat nagon overtradelse. Av betydelse for provningen av om en utlamning kan komma att sta i strid med ratten till en rattvis rattegang enligt artikel 6 ar ocksa vilket material som ligger till grund for provningen. Fragan har berorts av Eurapadomstolen i avgorandet den 16 oktober 2001 i malet Einhorn mot Frankrike, no 71555/01, § 33 och 34. Domstolen anfor dar att betraffande utlamning an kommer det i princip pa den som gor gallande att en sadan skulle sta i strid med artikel 6 att visa at! det firms en risk for att han pa ett "flagrant satt" kommer att forvagras en rattvis rattegang (jfr hartill det tidigare namnda avgorandet Saadi mot Italien § 129; se dock aven § 133 och dom den 4 februari 2005 i rnalet Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC}, nos, 46827/99 and 46951/99, § 90, ECHR 2005-1 angacnde fakta som var HOOSTA DOMSTOLEN 01082-09 Sid 14 kanda eller borde ha varit kanda for beslutstaten). Beviskravet ar har det samma som betraffande artikel 3 (substatial grounds for believing). Nar det galler de allmanna forhallandena inom rattsvasendet i Rwanda har i arendet aberopats en rapport fran Utrikesdepartementet om de manskliga rattighetema i Rwanda 2007 samt en rapport fran Sveriges ambassad, Sektionskontoret i Kigali den 5 mars 2009 med rubriken Femton ar efter folkmordet i Rwanda - utvecklingen inom rattssektorn for att fa folkmord rnisstankta utomlands att overlamnas till Rwanda. I arendet ar dessutom tillgangliga skrivelser fran Amnesty International och Organization For Peace Justice & Development in Rwanda samt beslut angaende utlamning eller overlamnande till Rwanda av Justitieministeriet i Finland, ICTR samt The High Court ofJustice i London. Skrivelserna, som innefattar opinionsyttringar mot en utlamning, ar kort fattade och har en utformning som gor att de inte kan, och inte heller kan antas ha varit avsedda for att, anvandas som omedelbart beslutsunderlag. Det finska Justitieministeriets beslut ar fran den 20 februari 2009. Beslutet innebar avslag pa en utlamningsframstallning fran Rwanda avseende lag foring for bl.a. folkmord. Beslutet har fattats med stod av en bestammelse i den finska utlarnningslagstiftningen enligt vilken en begaran skall avslas omedelbart om det frarngar av handlingarna att begaran enligt lag inte kan bifallas eller om ministeriet annars anser att det inte firms skal att bifalla begaran (jfr 15 § i den svenska utlamningslagen), I motiveringen hanvisar justitieministeriet till ett antal avgoranden fran ICTR angaende forslag till overforing av i den domstolen anhangiga mal till Rwandas nationella HOGSTA DOMSTOLEN 01082-09 Sid 15 dornstolsvasende. I avgorandena avslog ICTR forslagen med hanvisning till framst svarighetcrna for en tilltalad att i Rwanda hora egna vittnen. Justitieministeriet ansag sig inte ha anledning att ifragasatta ICTRs slutsatser eller att bedorna forhallandena i Rwanda pa nagot annat satt an ICTR. Med hanvisning till att Finland genom Europakonventionen forbundit sig att garantera personer inom sin jurisdiktion en rattvis rattegang ansag justitieministeriet att finska myndigheter inte genom egna atgarder kunde medverka till en rattegang i en frammande stat som vacker grundat tvivel pa att rattegangen gcnornfors rattvist, De avgoranden fran ICTR som refereras till i det finska beslutet har varit tillgangliga ocksa i detta arende. Fraga ar om beslut enligt artikel IIbis i tribunalens Rules ofProcedure and Evidence. Enligt des sa kan tribunalen pa framstallning av tribunalens aklagare overfora ett i tribunalen anhangigt mal for behandling i en stat. En forutsattning for detta ar dock att tribunalen forvissar sig om att den rnisstankte kommer att fa en rattvis rattegang (shall satisfy itself that the accused will receive a fair trial in the courts ofthe State concerned). Den provning som ICTR har gjort ar saledes uppenbarligen mer rigoros an en som galler i vad man en utlamning skulle sta i strid med artikel 6 i Europakonventionen. Det kan ocksa konstateras att den form av problem med vittnesbevisningen som ICTR lagt till grund for sina stallningstaganden ar av ett slag som inte ar okanda aven i stater i vilka uppratthallandet av ratten till en rattvis rattegang inte kan ifragasattas, Aven om man godtar den beskrivning av forhallandena i Rwanda som ICTR Iamnar tillater avgoran dena inte den slutsatsen att en utlamning av SA skulle inne- bara en over- HOOSTA DOMSTOLEN 01082-09 Sid 16 tradelse av artikel 6 i Europakonventionen om ratten till en rattvis rattegang, Avgorandet fran the High Court ofJustice ar fran den 8 april 2009. I av gorandet fann domstolen att det forelag hinder mot utlamning till Rwanda av fyra for folkmord misstankta personer. Avgorandet ar av sarskilt intresse for fragan om det i Sverige foreligger lagligt hinder mot en utlamning av SA med hansyn till att High Court i sin bedomning i princip utgatt fran den formulering som Europadomstolen anvant nar den angett under vilka om stiindigheter en utlamning skulle kunna sta i strid med artikel 6 i Europakonventionen. Vad som anges som avgorande for bedomningen (se § 240ch 121 i avgorandet) ar saledes att det ansetts foreligga en allvarlig risk for att de berorda pa ett flagrant satt skulle forvagras rattvisa om de ut lamnades (ifthese appellants were returned there would be a real risk that they would suffer a flagrant denial ofjustice). High Courts avgorande fattades efter overklagande av ett avgorande i lagre domstol enligt vilket det inte forelag nagot hinder mot utlamning. Det kontradiktoriska forfarandet strackte sig over lang tid (det inleddes redan pa hosten 2006; se § 17 i avgorandet) och i arendet aberopades omfattande bade skriftlig och muntlig bevisning (enbart den muntliga bevisupptagningen i forsta instans omfattade arton dagar). Sjalva avgorandet omfattar over 70 tattskrivna sidor. I likhet med ICTR grundar High Court sitt avgorande i forsta hand pa brister betraffande mojligheterna att forebringa egen bevis ning i Rwanda men domstolen ger ocksa uttryck for att det firms tveksam samheter nar det galler domstolarnas oavhangighet och opartiskhet. I High Courts avgorande finns i och for sig en fyllig redovisning och analys av den i det arendet forebringade bevisningen. Det finns emellertid skal att HOGSTA DOMSTOLEN 01082-09 Sid 17 erinra om att bevisningen varderats olika i forsta instans och i High Court. Det ar inte helt enkelt att avgora i vilken utstrackning varderingen av den forebringade bevisningen eller bedornningen av vilken niva som bor kravas for att det skall anses foreligga en allvarlig risk for" a flagrant denial of justice" har varit utslagsgivande vid provningen, High Courts avgorande ger utan tvekan anledning till att hysa tvivel om en utlamning av SA till Rwanda ar forenlig med bestammelsema i artikel 6 om ratten till en rattvis rattegang, Avgorandet kan emellertid inte som sadant laggas till grund for en bedorn ning att en utlamning star i strid med artikel 6 i Europakonventionen. Av de i arendet aberopade rapporterna fran Utrikesdepartementet och Sveriges ambassad, Sektionskontoret i Kigali framgar, som ocksa frarnhalls av saval ICTR som High Court, att forhallandena inom rattsvasendet i Rwanda genorngatt klara forbattringar under senare ar men att det fortfaran de finns stora brister. I rapporten fran utrikesdepartementet om forhallande na under ar 2007 sags bl.a. att det finns fragetecken angaendc domstolarnas faktiska sjalvstandighet. Den senare rapporten ar mer direkt inriktad pa ratts vasendet och pa Rwandas anstrangningar att fa personer som ar misstankta for folkmord utlamnade till Rwanda. I rapporten sags bl.a. aft det rwandiska rattsvasendet under 2008 har fortsatt att utvecklas och forbattras pa olika omraden, aft det fortfarande saknas tillrackligt antal forsvarare, domare och annat som kravs for att uppratta ett effektivt rattsvasende utan langa vante tider, aft det finns uppgifter om bristande politiskt oberoende, aft en lag antagits som omojliggor det av ICTR kritiserade straffet livstids isolering samt aft beslut fattats om ett nytt vittnesskyddssystem som ligger under domstolama. Det sags vidare att Rwanda nu anser sig ha tackt in alia brister som ICTR pekat pa och att man visat sig villig att gora det som ICTR kraver aven om man ibland inte hillier med om problembeskrivningen. I rapporten HOOSTA DOMSTOLEN 01082-09 Sid 18 redovisas vidare att foretradare for Human Rights Watch (vars rapport Law and Reality - Progress in Judicial Reform in Rwanda fran 2008 utgjort ett viktigt underlag for avgorandet i High Court) vid samtal forklarat att man inte anser att stegen for att forbattra vittnesskyddssituationen i Rwanda ar tillrackliga hittills. Av utredningen i arendet framgar att det forelegat allvarliga problem med rattsvasendet i Rwanda men att fortlopande forbattringar skett under senare ar. Fortfarande finns dock en rad problem. Det allvarligaste, och for fragan om utlamning kan ske avgorande, ar i vilken utstrackning den i Europakon ventionen artikel 6.3.d foreskrivna ratten for den som ar anklagad for brott att sjalv fa vittnen inkallade och forhorda under samma forhallanden som vittnen mot honom kan tillgodoses. ICTR har med hanvisning till brister i detta hanseende inte ansett sig kunna overfora atal till Rwanda och brister i detta hanseende utgor ocksa den framsta grunden for att High Court ansett att det foreligger hinder mot utlamning, Enligt en i arendet aberopad rapport har dock efter ICTRs avgoranden beslut fattats om ett nytt vittnesskydds system i syfte att undanroja de brister som ICTR funnit. Bestammelserna om ratt till en rattvis rattegang i artikel 6 Europakonven tionen innebar nar det galler utlarnning inte att en utlamnande stat maste forvissa sig om att en rattegang i anmodande staten kommer att uppfylla alla de krav som galler enligt artikel 6. Det ar endast flagranta brott mot prin cipema som utgor hinder mot utlamning, Att detta innebar en relativt hog troskel framgar av att Europadomstolen utgatt fran att hinder endast undan tagsvis foreligger pa denna grund. HoaSTA DOMSTOLEN 01082-09 Sid 19 Vad som utgor ett flagrant brott mot principerna i artikel 6 kan naturligtvis vara foremal for olika bedomningar. En sak ar under vilka forutsattningar som Europadomstolen skulle finna att en utlamnande stat gjort sig skyldig till ett konventionsbrott. En annan sak ar nar en stat tar stallning till en utlamningsframstallning i ett enskilt fall. Det torde i det fallet regelmassigt finnas anledning att utga fran strangare krav pa det rattsliga forfarandet. Situationen kan vara den att fragan ar svarbedomd och att risken for att Europadomstolen skulle finna en utlamning konventionsstridig inte kan uteslutas. I de fall da staten sjalv kan avgora vilka krav som bor stallas for att utlamning skall ske kan det finnas anledning att vagra utlamning med hansyn till intresset av en rattvis rattegang hell oberoende av risken for ett flagrant brott mot principerna. Vad Hogsta domstolen enligt utlamningslagen skall uttala sig om ar om utlamningen lagligen kan beviljas. Det ligger da nara till hands for domstolen att prova fragan med utgangspunkt i den restriktivitet som kommit till uttryck i Europadomstolens praxis nar det galler bedomningen av om det forcliggcr hinder enligt artikel 6 i Europakonventionen, aven om goda skal kan anses tala for att regeringen i sin praxis bor ta storre hansyn till det i konventionen skyddade intresset an vad som foljer av en sadan utgangspunkt, Hogsta domstolen finner att den utredning som forcligger i arendet ger anledning att hysa tvivel om SAs mojligheter att efter en utlamning till Rwanda erhalla en rattegang som uppfyller de i artikel 6 i Europakonven tionen uppstallda kraven pa en rattvis rattegang. Tvivlen galler i forsta hand fragan om hans mojligheter att sjalv fa vittnen inkallade och forhorda under samma forhallanden som vittnen mot honom. Den i Hogsta domstolen . HOGSTA DOMSTOLEN 01082-09 Sid 20 forcbringade utredningen ger emellertid inte tillrackligt stod for att gora bedomningen att det pa denna grund foreligger ett generellt lagligt hinder mot utlarnning till Rwanda for folkmord och liknande brott. Vid den bedornning som Hogsta domstolen har att gora finns det saledes inte hinder mot utlarnning av SA pa grund av Europakonventionen. Det far forutsattas att fragan om behovet av ytterligare underlag for ett slutligt stallningstagande i fragan beaktas i den fort satta beredningen av arendet. BESLUT I OVRIGA FRAGOR SA skall alltjamt vara haktad i arendet, For bitrade at SA i utlamningsarendet tillerkanns HB ersattning av allmanna medel med sjuttiotusentvahundraattiofern (70 285) kr, varav 40 848 kr for arbete, 10 150 kr for tidsspillan, 5 230 kr for utlagg och 14057 kr for mervardesskatt. Kostnaden skall stanna pa staten. I avgorandet har deltagit: justitieraden Johan Munck, Dag Victor (referent), Ann-Christine Lindeblad, Kerstin Calissendorffoch Per Virdesten Foredragande revisionssekreterare: Tyri Ohman 4' The Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi, Case No. lCTR-2001-75-Rllbis Public 334l, Annex 8 Affidavits ofPotential Defence Witnesses (redacted version). /4 March 2011 Liste des temoins potentiels en defense pour lesquels les affidavits sont annexes. No Pseudonyme Nom et prenoms Pays de residence 1 /U057 Malawi 2 /U77 Malawi 3 /U056 Malawi 4 /U061 Malawi 5 /U062 Malawi 6 /U063 Malawi 7 /U060 Malawi 8 IU050 Malawi 9 IU059 Zambia 10 IU064 U2anda 11 /U013 U2anda 12 IU065 Uaanda 13 /U066 U2anda 14 /U067 Uganda 15 /U058 Zambia 16 /U82 U2anda 17 /U068 Uganda 18 /U069 U2anda 19 /U070 Mozambique 20 /U071 Mozambique 21 juozz Mozambique 22 jU073 U2anda 23 jU75 Malawi 24 jU074 Conao Brazzaville 25 jU038 Congo Brazzaville 26 jU039 Congo Brazzaville 27 /U040 Congo Brazzaville 28 /U041 Congo Brazzaville 29 /U042 Congo Brazzaville 30 /U043 Conzo Brazzaville 31 /U049 Burundi 32 /U045 Burundi 33 jU046 Burundi 34 jU048 Burundi 35 jU61 Tanzania 36 jU075 Kenya 37 jU076 Kenya 38 IU077 Swaziland 39 IU078 Swaziland 40 jU98 Rwanda 41 /U079 Rwanda 42 /U080 Rwanda 43 /U036 Rwanda 44 /U46 Rwanda 3341 45 IU36 Rwanda 46 IU020 Rwanda 47 IU62 Rwanda 48 IU079 Cameroun 49 IU080 Cameroun }U057 3337 AFFIDAVIT I a Rwandan refugee living in Malawi declare the following before , the Commissioner of oath and the Investigator for defense in the case "Prosecutor vs Uwinkindi Jean". ." I met the defense Investigator, Mr Athanase Dushimilimana, in Uwinkindi Jean's defense. He asked me the questions concerning the massacres occurred in Kanzenze Commune in April-July 1994. He asked me if! am willing to be the defense witness of Uwinkindi Jean. He informed me that the Prosecutor has already filed a motion concerning the referral ofthis case to Rwandan courts. I am willing to give testimony in Uwinkindi Jean's defense ifthe proceedings takes place in Arusha before the UNICTR chamber. I shall not be a witness before Rwandan courts either seating in Rwanda, either seating outside the country ifUwinkindi case is transferred. In Rwanda after genocide; my parents were jailed for more than ten years without lawsuit. I fear to be threatened, jailed, killed or to disappear. To appear before Rwandan courts lead my relatives living in Rwanda to jail, killing or disappearance as a reprehension ofmy testimony. In addition, I have the statu's ofrefugee in Malawi and this statu.§ was granted because the UNHCR and Malawian authorities considered the serious reasons that lead me to leave my country, up to now these reasons remain. The political, vague and subjective law on negationism and ideology of genocide .terrifies me since anybody can be put in jail because ofhis testimony in court or elsewhere about what he saw or hear during the genocide. The affidavit is tran?lated for.me and I agree with its content. Done in Lilongwe, on November 16th, 20I0 The Witness: }U77 }U056 AFFIDAVIT I, a Rwandan refugee living in Malawi declare the following before the Commissioner of oath and the Investigator for defense in the case "Prosecutor vs Uwinkindi Jean". I met the defense Investigator, Mr Athanase Dushimilimana, in Uwinkindi Jean's defense. He asked me the questions concerning the massacres occurred in Kanzenze Commune in April-July 1994. He asked me ifI am willing to be the defense witness of Uwinkindi Jean. He informed me that the Prosecutor has already filed a motion concerning the referral of this case to Rwandan courts. I am willing, to give testimony in Uwinkindi Jean's defense ifthe proceedings takes place in Arusha before the UNICTR chamber. I don't want to be a witness before Rwandan courts either seating in Rwanda, either seating outside the country ifUwinkindi case is transferred. In Rwanda after genocide, my sister was jailed for more many years without lawsuit. I was menaced by Rwandan soldiers before leaving the country. I fear to be threatened, jailed, killed or to disappear. To appear before Rwandan courts lead my relatives living in Rwanda to jail, killing or disappearance as a reprehension ofmy testimony. In addition, I have the statUli ofrefugee in Malawi and this status. was granted because the UNHCR and Malawian authorities considered the serious reasons that lead ine to leave my country, up to now these reasons remain. The political, vague and subjective law on negationism and ideoldgy ofgenocide terrifies me since anybody can be put injail because ofhis testimony in court or elsewhere about what he saw or hear during the genocide. The affidavit is translated for me and I agree with its content. Done in Lilongwe, on November 16th, 2010 The Witness: The Commissioner ofoath: '. ,~-)-;R1S-r«~; ,J - l'l }U061 jUO<;1 AFFIDAVIT Today on 17th February 2011, I talked with the defence Investigator Mr Athanase Dushimilimana as the case "Prosecutor vs Uwinkindi Jean" is concerned. I have no objection-. to be a defense witness in Uwinkindi Jean case. -. The Investigator informs me that the case ofUwinkindi Jean can be transferred to Rwanda to be heard by the national court as the Prosecutor requested in his motion. Should that be the case, for the security reasons, I do request that my identity should not be disclosed to any Rwandan authority, either administrative authority, either police authority, either judiciary authority. Ifthe case ofUwinkindi Jean is transferred to Rwandan courts, I will not testify as defence witness for safety reasons for myself, my family and my relatives particularly those living in Rwanda. The political law on ideology ofgenocide and negationism is an instrument that can be used to prosecute any targeted person whose view differs from the one ofKigali dictatorial power as genocide is concerned. The Govt ofKagame never tolerate anyone who dares to mention that RPF killed the Hutu in Rwanda and in Congo. A lawsuit can be established to prosecute me. In regard with this law, a defense witness, a defence lawyer or a politician opposed to Kagames regime can be arrested like Madame Ingabire Umuhoza Victoire and her lawyer Peter Erlinder. In Rwanda and in the view ofRwandan authorities, it is a sacrilege to say that RPF led by Paul Kagame committed massacres against the Hutu, it is intolerable. Subsequently, to appear before Rwandan courts can lead me to be arrested or killed. My family that is living in Rwanda can be threatened, arrested or can disappear. Therefore, ifthe case of Uwinkindi Jean is transferred to Rwanda I am requesting that my name be dropped from the list of his witnesses. The witness: ( The Investigator : DUSHIM~IMANA ATHANASE 1 3332 }U062 AFFIDAVIT I know Pastor Uwinkindi Jean, he was a Pastor at Kayenzi Pentecostal Parish. I know many things concerning the massacres occurred in Kanzenze Commune in April-July 1994. I am willing to be the defense witness ofUwinkindi Jean. The Investigator informed me that the Prosecutor has already filed a motion concerning the referral ofthis case to Rwandan courts. I am willing to give testimony in Uwinkindi Jean's defense ifthe case takes place in Arusha before the UNICTR chamber. I shall not be a witness before Rwandan courts either seating in Rwanda, either seating outside the country ifUwinkindi case is transferred. I fear to be threatened, jailed, killed or to disappear. To appear before Rwandan courts can cost my relatives living in Rwanda to be jailed, killed or disappear as a reprehension ofmy testimony. In addition, I have the statuj; ofrefugee in Malawi and this statug was granted because the UNHCR and Malawian authorities considered the serious reasons that lead me to leave my country, up to now these reasons remain. The political, vague and subjective law on negationism and ideology of genocide terrifies me since anybody can be put injail because ofhis testimony in court or elsewhere about what he saw or hear during the genocide. The affidavit is translated for me and I agree with its content. I certify that the content ofthis affidavit is true and correct to the best ofmy knowledge. Done in Lilongwe, November 16th, 2010 The Witness: The Commissioner ofoaths: MAlAWI JU063 AFFIDAVIT a Rwandan refugee living in Malawi declare the following before the Commissioner ofoath and the Investigator for defense in the case "Prosecutor vs Uwinkindi Jean". ,. I met the defense Investigator, Mr Athanase Dushimilimana, in Uwinkindi Jean's defense. He asked me the questions concerning the massacres occ~rred in Kanzenze Commune in April-July 1994. He asked me if! am willing to be the defense witness of Uwinkindi Jean. He informed me that the Prosecutor has already filed a motion concerning the referral ofthis case to Rwandan courts. I am willing to give testimony in Uwinkindi Jean's defense ifthe proceedings takes place in Arusha before the UNICTR chamber. I don't want to be a witness before Rwandan courts either seating in Rwanda, either seating outside the country ifUwinkindi case is transferred. In Rwanda after genocide. I was ~d my relatives were menaced by Rwandan soldiers because of the career I held. I fear to be threatened, jailed, killed or to disappear because ofmy views and diffusions I made. To appear before Rwandan courts lead my relatives living in Rwanda to jail, killing or disappearance as a reprehension ofmy testimony. In addition, I have the statuS ofrefugee in Malawi and this statu~ was granted because the UNHCR and Malawian authorities considered the serious reasons that lead me to leave my country, up to now these reasons remain. The political, vague and subjective law on negationisrn and ideology of genocide terrifies me since anybody can be put injail because ofhis testimony in court or elsewhere about what he saw or hear during the genocide. The affidavit is translated for me and I agree with its content. Done in Lilongwe, on November 16th, 2010 The Witness': iii The Commissioner ofoath :