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North Korean Tactics North Korean Tactics James M. Minnich Major, U.S. Army Northeast Asia Foreign Area Officer CGSC 2001-2002, Section 12C [email protected] Originally published while attending the Republic of Korea Army College United States Embassy, Defense Attaché Office Seoul, Republic of Korea May 2001 Revised during attendance of the United States Army Command and Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas September 2001 North Korean Tactics TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND............................................................................................ 4 2. NORTH KOREAN NATIONAL STRATEGY AND MILITARY POLICY FOUNDATION ........ 4 3. MILITARY IDEOLOGY....................................................................................................................... 5 3.1. KOREAN WAR – LESSONS LEARNED ................................................................................................... 5 3.2. CUBAN CRISIS – LESSONS LEARNED.................................................................................................... 5 3.3. VIETNAM WAR & MIDDLE EAST WAR – LESSONS LEARNED.............................................................. 6 3.4. RUSSIA/AFGHANISTAN WAR – LESSONS LEARNED ............................................................................. 6 3.5. GULF WAR – LESSONS LEARNED ........................................................................................................ 6 3.6. KOSOVO WAR – LESSONS LEARNED ................................................................................................... 6 4. NATIONAL OBJECTIVE...................................................................................................................... 7 5. MILITARY POLICY .............................................................................................................................. 7 5.1. POINT 1, MILITARIZATION OF THE POPULACE ..................................................................................... 7 5.2. POINT 2, STRONGHOLD-BASED FORTIFIED COUNTRY .......................................................................... 8 5.3. POINT 3, CADRE-BASED MILITARY...................................................................................................... 8 5.4. POINT 4, MODERNIZATION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT......................................................................... 8 6. MILITARY STRATEGY....................................................................................................................... 8 6.1. SURPRISE ATTACK STRATEGY ............................................................................................................. 9 6.2. QUICK DECISIVE WAR ......................................................................................................................... 9 6.3. MIXED TACTICS STRATEGY ................................................................................................................. 9 7. PRINCIPLE FUNDAMENTALS OF WAR......................................................................................... 9 7.1. MASS AND DISPERSION...................................................................................................................... 10 7.2. SURPRISE ATTACK............................................................................................................................. 10 7.3. INCREASE MANEUVERABILITY .......................................................................................................... 10 7.4. CUNNING AND PERSONIFIED TACTICS ............................................................................................... 10 7.5. SECURE SECRETS............................................................................................................................... 11 8. TACTICAL DOCTRINE...................................................................................................................... 11 8.1. OFFENSIVE TACTICS .......................................................................................................................... 11 8.1.1. Penetration................................................................................................................................. 11 8.1.2. Thrust......................................................................................................................................... 12 8.1.3. Holding Maneuver ..................................................................................................................... 13 8.1.4. Turning Maneuver ..................................................................................................................... 13 8.1.5. Infiltration Maneuver................................................................................................................. 14 8.1.6. Besetment Maneuver.................................................................................................................. 14 8.1.7. Encirclement Maneuver ............................................................................................................. 15 8.2. DEFENSIVE TACTICS .......................................................................................................................... 16 8.2.1. Mobile Defense .......................................................................................................................... 16 8.2.2. Area Defense.............................................................................................................................. 16 8.2.2.1. Security Zone .......................................................................................................................................17 8.2.2.1.1. Combat Security Area...................................................................................................................18 8.2.2.1.2. General Security Area...................................................................................................................18 8.2.2.2. 1st Defensive Zone................................................................................................................................18 8.2.2.3. 2nd and 3rd Defensive Zone and Buffer Zones ......................................................................................19 8.2.2.4. Anti-Tank Defense System...................................................................................................................19 8.2.2.4.1. Anti-Armor Obstacle Plan ............................................................................................................20 8.2.2.4.2. Anti-Armor Fire Plan....................................................................................................................20 8.2.2.4.2.1. Phase 1 Area Fires (Anti-Armor Fire Plan) ...........................................................................20 Major James M. Minnich Page 2 North Korean Tactics 8.2.2.4.2.2. Phase 2 Rolling Fires (Anti-Armor Fire Plan).......................................................................20 8.2.2.4.2.3. Phase 3 Anti-Armor Rectangular Target Fires (Anti-Armor Fire Plan).................................20 8.2.2.4.2.4. Phase 4 Direct-fire Fight (Anti-Armor Fire Plan)..................................................................20 8.2.2.4.3. Anti-Tank (AT) Defensive Position..............................................................................................21 8.2.2.4.4. Anti-Tank Engagement Area ........................................................................................................22 8.2.2.4.5. Anti-Tank “Mobile” Reserve ........................................................................................................22 8.2.2.5. Counterattack Force .............................................................................................................................23 9. ARTILLERY GROUPING TACTICS ................................................................................................ 24 9.1. REGIMENTAL ARTILLERY GROUPS (RAG) ........................................................................................ 24 9.2. DIVISION ARTILLERY GROUP (DAG) ................................................................................................ 24 9.3. CORPS ARTILLERY GROUP (CAG)..................................................................................................... 24 10. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................... 24 BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................................................... 31 TABLES, FIGURES, AND CHARTS FIGURE 1. NORTH KOREAN NATIONAL STRATEGY AND MILITARY POLICY FOUNDATION ........................... 5 TABLE 1. NORTH KOREAN STANDARD ATTACK FRONTAGE/DEPTH.......................................................... 11 FIGURE 2. FORMS OF MANEUVER ............................................................................................................... 12 TABLE 2. PENETRATION WIDTH REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................................... 12 FIGURE 3. THRUST MANEUVER .................................................................................................................. 13 TABLE 3. NORTH KOREAN STANDARD DEFENSE FRONTAGE .................................................................... 13 TABLE 4. TURNING MANEUVER UNIT EMPLOYMENT SIZE/MISSION
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