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FMFRP 12-1 Surprise FMFRP 12-1 Surprise U.S. Marine Corps DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited PCN 140 120100 00 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C.20380-0001 12 October 1988 FOREWORD 1. PURPOSE Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-1, Surprise, ispublished to ensure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine or to be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRP's in the 12 Series are a special category of publications: reprints of historical works which were published commercially and are no longer in print. 2. SCOPE This reference publication complements existing training manuals on deception and provides new perspectives on well known examples of deception operations and surprises. General Waldemar Erfurth, a World War II German army general, wrote Surpriseasa discussion of the theory of surprise. The book was translated by Dr. Stefan T. Possony and Daniel Vilfroy in 1943. 3. CERTIFICATION Reviewed and approved this date. BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS M. P. SULLIVAN Major General, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commander for Warfighting Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia DISTRIBUTION: 11 CONTENTS Page Translators'Comment • Author's Introduction 31 Surprise; Means for Victor'yinRecent Wars 39 StrategicSurprises; Early Phasesof War 45 Surprise;War of Movement 63 Deployment for Battle 67 Battle 93 Pursuit, Retreat, Diversion, Counter-attack 127 Surprise; War of Position, Attack 161 Surprise; War of Position, Defense 181 Surprise; Value, New Wcnpons and Combat Techniques 19L Results and Conclusions 195 MAPS "Kessels" 4 Vistula Campaign, South Poland, 1914 84 Battle of Tannenberg 94 Battle of I-Iermannstadt 98 Battle of the Arges 102 Battle of the Masurian Lakes 110 Battle of the Marne 134 EastPrussia,1914 138 Lodz Offensive,1914 146 Battle of Warsaw, 1920 12 Translator's Comment GENERALErfurth's book on "Surprise in 'War"isthe firsttreatise on the importance of surprise in modern military literature.Surprise was considered as an essential element of victory by almost all ancient military writers.Frontinus and Polyaenus,for instance, had written a whole collection of ways and means of surprise—almost text books for victory.These books,especiallyFrontinus', were knownto every military commander in the later period of antiquity and throughout the Middle Ages.Machiavelli, the founder of modern military science, heavily drew on Frontinus. During the eighteenth century, the problem of surprise again attracted the attention of military writers.The Chevalier de Cessac wrote an entire book on surprise.Frederick the Great never tired in advising his generals on the importance of surprise and declared that in war one should alternately don the skin of the lion and of the fox. Yet the military school which began with Guibert and ended with the generals of World War Idid not fully understand the role which surprise may play in war. For them, as Napoleon pointed out in a famous dictum, only one thing counted: mass. To be sure, almost every one of these military writers did men- tion surprise.Clausewitz himself,as can be seen from the quotations which General Erfurth faithfully collected, insisted on the importance of surprise.Occasionally surprise methods were applied on the battlefield. Yet surprise was not consideredas the basis of military planningnorastheconditiosinequanonofvictory. Rather,itwas consideredasa welcome by-product which sometimes completed and facilitated victory.Surprise was luck, 2 SURPRISE butnot the resultof strategy. The generals of the nineteenth andearlytweqieth century weremore concerned withthe problem of the inner and outer lines, with the principle of concentration whichhadbeenfirstformulated by Carnot,at atime when the role of surprise was almost completely for- gotten.Later on, the attention of military thinkers centered on the importance of the flank. To assess the real value of General Erfurth's book, one must realize not only thatit was written before the outbreak of World War 11,but also thatit amounts to a more or less complete break with traditional military thinking. To be sure, General Erfurth trieshardto prove that his ideas completeiy tally with the doctrines of Clausewitz, Moltke and Schlieffen. Yet, whatever his cluotations may say, itis easy to realize that the doctrine of surprise and the doctrine of the flank attack, as propounded by Schlieffen, do not go together.Either surprise is 'the key to victory" or the attack against the enemy's flank is.This does not mean that surprise and flank attacks cannot sometimes be combined. Yet itis obvious that surprise cannot, principle, always and exclusively be achieved on the enemy's flank.If itis known a priori that whatever else one does, one attempts to launch a flank attack, obviously surprise can never be accomplished.After all, the enemy knows where his flanks are. Where To Ajiack ihe Enemy Jf we assume that the enemy can only be defeated by sur- prise operations,itisclearthat he should not know where these operations are going to take place. A strategy which is based upon the principle of surprise can therefore not be bound by Schlieffen'sdoctrine.Instead,the general who relies on surprise must have a completely open mind as to whether he should attack on the flank or at the center or somewhere else. The strategy of surprise replaces the traditional principle: 'At- tack on the flank" by the broader and more general principle: "Attack wherever the enemy is off guard." Besides, General Erfurth makes arather loose use of the term 'flank." The flank of a Roman legion or of Napoleon's army can hardly be compared to the flank of a modern army which usually rests upon the frontier of a neutral country or upon impenetrable terrain.Itis hardly an exaggeration to say that, sURPRIsE 3 under modern condition of continental warfare, flanks in the traditional sense do not exist or do not offer any prospect for envelopment maneuvers.In modern war flanks are available only at bulgesand wedges, butthe sides of a wedge are not necessarily more vulnerable than its peak or other sectors of the front. As amatter offact,modern strategy,including German strategy,hasliberateditselffrom the dogma oftheflank. GeneralWetzeil,Ludendorif'sChief-of.operations,writes: "The enemy is not necessarily weakest on his flanks, nor will he make most of his mistakes on the wings.His weakness and his errors may occur at other places.The main condition of success is to discover weaknesses and errors wherever they re" and to attack the enemy wherever he is weak and whenever he has committed an error. "Itis remarkable," Wetzell continues,"that Field Mar3hal Count von Schlieffen in his war games of iSo4and1905soon discontinued .his flanking attack through Belgium in orde- to exploitmistakes which had been committed bythe enemy. Alier discoveringthe cnelnys mistakes,heimmediatelyre- groLmpedhisentire forces and tried to dccide the war by patial victories west and east of tIme Moselle, and renounced seeking thedecisioninBelgium and northernFrance.Therei3a tendencytooverratetheirriportanceofenvelopmentand flanking attacks.Instead, one should do what Schlieffen him- self did: exploit the mistakes of the enemy." In other words, there isa difference between Schliefferi the theoretician and Schlicffen the soldier.The soldier Schlieffcn was a pupil of Moltke and the Gerhians, on the whole, are going back to Moltke's concept: "Strategy isa system of ex- pedients and makeshifts." Rommel, saysFuller,"has never worked on what may be called a fixed plan."We are thus coming back to Napoleon's: "Onf'engage el uis on you," Wetzellsummarizes this new, or old, strategical thought as fol. lows: "The greatest surprise for the enemy isalostbattle, wherever this battle takes place.Victory can be achieved by many different methods and sometimes by mere luck.But the surest way to win is to exploit the enemy's weaknesses and errors by the immediate forming of a center of gravity at the enemy's vulnerable points." Even a casual glance at the history of the two World Wars ENEMY LINES ARMORED TROOPS ARMORQ FORCES FORCES IN TRAP MOT TROOPS MOT TROOR WEDGE AXD TRAP The knl und @ref (wcdgc and trap) tactics us& by the Germans in Russia stem directly from the classical German strategy of destroying the cncmy by cncirclcmcnt rcsuldng from outflanking action. Kd rrnd krsrd is the process of tzking huge bites out of the hostile position, detro)ing th: cncmy forccs in a given sector, and thcn repeating the prcxxss in another sector. The krif or wcdgc, Figure I, is driven by strong ~rmorcdforccs, supported by motorized and foot troops, which push deep into the enemy rcar. Usually two such wdgcs arc drivcn, at a considerable disrancc from each other. The operation thcn develops into a double pincers movement. The mobilc force spearheading the original wedges turn to meet at same point deep in the hostile rcar. Figure 2: The slower foot troops turn inside the mobilc forccs, forming an inner set of pincers. This cncirclclncnt forms the krsrd or trap. SURPRISE 5 shows that many offensives had been directed against joints, hinges or pivotal points. The big German offensive of March, 1918, was launched against the joint of the British and French armies.The German attack against the Allies in May, 1940, wasdirected against Sedan, thatisto say, against the point around which the offensive wing of theAllies turned and which separated the defensive army group and the Maginot Line from the offensive, left wing. Other attacks were directed against points upon which the entire front of the defender depended and whose fall necessitated a general retreat.Other operations again were break-throughs. Ifin modern war the flank had maintained its traditional vulnerability, break-through operations were hardly possible,letalone the formation of "kessels." General Erfurth's reliance upon the flank should therefore not be taken as a reflection of modern German strategy.In- stead, wherever he says "flank," one should read "vulnerable point." The character of the vulnerablepoint may change.
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