One of the key tenets of this design is beginning of the game, the rebel Washington were fairly invulnerable the vulnerability of the respective capital is flanked by a small, but to capture, as it is in most other capitals and the high payoff achieved strategically-placed Union force at strategic Civil War designs, the if a capital is captured. This dynamic Fort Monroe and multiple north- player can use the Army of the tension ensures that both players will south routes that need to be de- Potomac in fairly unrealistic man- keep strong forces in the Eastern fended. Although both capitals begin ners. McClellen's Peninsula cam- theater to both protect their own the game fortified, this is an insuffi- paign was a high risk operation in capital while threatening their cient defense. game terms. Lincoln insisted that a opponents. strong covering force remain behind During the Civil War, the effect of to prevent a Confederate thrust at When I learned that FOR THE forts were wide ranging. The unify- DC. It was this force, and the PEOPLE would be reprinted by GMT, ing historical thread is that a fort was Confederacy's desire not to trade I set out to pour more history into the as strong as the men and leaders who capitals, which prevented Lee from design. One of the things that I had manned them. Each turn of FOR THE moving North until the threat to noticed since the original publication PEOPLE represents around four Richmond was neutralized. Lincoln's of the game was the lack of play on months. If the fort is manned with decision to withhold McDowell's the Peninsula and more obviously in sufficient forces and adequate die roll corps from McClellen will occur in the Shenandoah valley. My analysis modifiers (DRMs), then the fort will the game, because to do otherwise is of the situation revealed that the key hold. If the attacker is superior in to court disaster. In game terms, the problems were 1) the weakness of these dimensions, then it is assumed Peninsula campaign finds the Army forts in preventing river crossings that over the course of four months of the Potomac (AoP) in the and 2) how the map captured the they will prevail. Upon examining Williamsburg space and the Army of various historical routes of advance. the lengthy siege of Petersburg, you Northern Virginia (AoNV) in Rich- My alterations to the map and rules find that it is the growing weakness mond while McDowell sits in were minor, but their impact on play of the Confederate forces coupled Manassas with four strength points has been profound. This article will with the threat to their last remaining (SPs). The best move for the Confed- discuss the new operational thinking lines of communication that results in erates in this situation is to attack the that is required for solid play in the the loss of the fort. On the other end AoP, which results in the Seven Days GMT edition of the game. of the spectrum, Forts Henry and battle. Donaldson were captured in about a A View from the President's Desk week. Battles on the Flanks Loss of the capital for either side is However, not all in the first edition not a game-ending event, but a very One of the design's other intents is to was as it should be. In the AH painful one. The Union stands to lose use the simulation dynamics to give version, it was too easy for players to thirty percent of its initial Strategic the player good reasons to take attack directly from Manassas to Will (SW) if Washington DC is historically-motivated decisions. If Washington. The game didn't have captured. Just as Lincoln did the proper historical rationale historically, your attention is for forcing the Confederates to focused on this potential maneuver to the west as they problem. If, despite your best did historically. During the efforts, you still lose Washing- Antietam campaign the Confed- ton to the rebels, then your eracy crossed from Manassas to situation is more difficult, but Frederick. During the not impossible. Assuming you Gettysburg campaign they relocate the capital to some- came through the Shenandoah where in the West out of harms valley. What I didn't adequately way, it is very unlikely for the factor into the original design Union to lose their capital twice was the impact forts had on in a game. river crossing operations. It was too easy for forces to cross The corollary is that the loss of rivers and directly assault forts. Richmond drives Confederate A small, but significant, rule SW down 27 points while the change now prevents direct Union gains 12 points for a net attacks on forts across rivers. change of 39 points. At the You either need to Amphibious assault them, giving the Union the Fredericksburg, which is where the expend one of these two opportuni- proper incentive to invest in armies usually resided when they ties by attacking at his first opportu- ironclads, or you need to maneuver weren't conducting offensive opera- nity. Since the Union usually goes around them. tions. It is a standoff situation where first, the AoP should be activated on the side that first moves off the line the first card play. The result will be a This rule, in conjunction with a minor loses, because this army is out of 6 SP loss for the Union and a 3 or 4 map change to the Potomac river position to stop a thrust at its capital. SP loss for the Confederacy with the denies the Confederate player the If the Union plays a cautious game Union army back in Manassas. ability to go straight after Washing- and avoids attacking in the East, as Because the Army of Northern ton, but still leaves it vulnerable to a they did historically, trouble can Virginia rolls a ten, there is a fifty flanking maneuver. This subtle ensue elsewhere on the map. If the percent chance that one of the key change enables a Peninsula cam- Union plays ahistorically during 1862 commanders will be killed. paign, because the Union has a bit or 1863, Lee moves and attacks the more time to react to a Confederate AoP driving it into Washington. Assuming that the Confederate thrust. For example, assuming the Because Lee is less than 2 to 1 response is to try and threaten Union holds Manassas with a force stronger than the Union, his move is Washington, the AoNV attacks and which is more than half the size of finished. The Union moves reinforce- wins another large battle. Due to the the AoNV, the AoP can leave Wash- ments into DC and then Lee activates fort in Manassas and the increased ington using the special McClellan again, marches through Frederick, Union defensive DRM capabilities, army move to Monroe. If Lee attacks and takes Washington. The Union the Confederate losses are probably 4 north in response, the AoP could capital is displaced, plus Lee has won or possibly 5 SPs reducing Lee down either take Richmond or maneuver two Large battles with a net effect on to 3 or 4 SPs. Now Lee is in Manassas back to Washington by sea. The one the Union of at least minus 40 and should have lost at least one key extra space of maneuver required to Strategic Will points. general. For all intents and purposes, take the Union capital doesn't The question at hand is the danger is past. If the Southern significantly reduce its vulnerability, how is a different result player overplays his hand, Richmond but to a well prepared Union force, achieved by the Union. becomes vulnerable to a counterat- enables some of the more extraordi- There are two key concepts tack since the AoNV will have nary historical maneuvers. in the Eastern Theater. insufficient strength to defend it. If First, Washington always has top Lee attacks, the Union should be able In the same vein the new optional priority on resources until it is to win a defensive battle in either Shenandoah Valley rule (which I secure. Second, never ignore the first Frederick, MD or in the Washington encourage everyone to use) causes concept. space where McClellan, plus the fort, the South to gain the proper histori- another Union general and any force cal perspective regarding this region. To secure Washington, the Union advantage gives the Union a +6 or If the Confederate player ignores the player must do several things. First, better total DRM. This large a DRM is valley it is possible for the Union to the AoP must start every Strategy usually sufficient for the Union to capture the state of Virginia by Phase at 15 SPs. Second, Washington hold his capital. conquering the northern half of the must contain at least 8 and probably state, without capturing Richmond. 10 SPs. Third, never let the AoNV This formula has a few key uncertain- This motivates the Confederate start the Strategy Phase in Manassas. ties. What if the Union player doesn't player to detach a small force to keep Fourth, maintain a fort in Manassas get any 3 operations cards? What if Union flanking forces at bay. Because whenever possible. Fifth, maintain the Confederate player goes first with it is important to not lose these small the capability to launch forces into a campaign card? Well the answer is and medium battles, I have found it the Shenandoah Valley (via Harper's that then it gets very exciting. If the best to use a high DRM leader who is Ferry into Winchester, Strasburg and Confederate player is a carpe diem easy to move. For my money, the best Staunton). \. kind of guy, Lincoln could get an candidate that fits this bill is none earlier than historical trip back to other than Stonewall Jackson. During The Army of the Potomac is going to Illinois when the capital is re-located my playtests of the second edition I get the raw end of the historical stick during the Political Phase. found it gratifying to see Jackson during 1862 and early 1863. This detached from the AoNV to keep the means that with few exceptions the One thing that both players need to valley situation under control. AoP will lose 5 or 6 SPs per battle if have in their FOR THE PEOPLE kit is they are facing the historical Army of the ability to create a credible Practical Advice Northern Virginia command combi- diversion. This is where the Valley nation (e.g., Lee, Jackson, Longstreet Moving from the philosophical to the campaign comes into its own. If the and Stuart). The good news is the practical, here is how the situation Union can move through the Army of Northern Virginia will be broadly works. With the capitals Shenandoah Valley astride Lee's line taking from 3 to 4 SP losses per vulnerable, the armies in spatial of communication (LOC), the Confed- battle. A twelve-point army can opposition to the enemy are moved at erate will be out of supply during sustain two large battles per turn. some risk. Along the line between attacks, giving the Union a +2 DRM, This simulates the basic historical Washington to Richmond, the three potentially causing the defeat of Lee limits that were achieved in this spaces are Manasass, Fredericksburg in a battle. Another variant of this theater (e.g., Chancellorsville and and Hanover. These three spaces tactic is to have positioned 3 or 4 SPs Gettysburg, or Second Manassas and define the main Eastern Theater axis. in Fort Monroe. Even though Butler Antietam). Therefore, the Union goal A typical situation sees the AoP in is an incompetent, he can still move is to force the Confederate player to Manasass and the AoNV in into enemy territory to cut Lee's LOC, if not threaten Richmond itself.

through Amelia Courthouse to Manassas and cuts the Union LOC. The Union will most likely only have a +2 or as high as +4 DRM (with a 3-1 force advantage) while the South should have a +9 (Johnston, fort, Union out of supply and two addi- tional generals) guaranteeing victory (asterisk results are cancelled in capitals/resource spaces which both apply to Richmond). Failure either to build the AoNV or to cut the Union LOC is a recipe for early disaster. Accomplishing one of these tasks makes Richmond very secure in spite of the Union advantage.

Another Confederate tactic to preempt a Union advance building up the East at the expense of the West during turn 2 (Summer 1861), and launching an offensive through the Shenandoah Valley into Maryland. This maneuver will threaten to outflank the AoP and directly attack Washington. The Union should react to this forcing the use of a key card when they are in the shortest supply. As the old saying goes, the best defense is a good offense.

How aggressive the Union may Conclusion This illustrates how the best laid become in the East depends on how One of the key changes to FOR THE plans can still go wrong. The key is to many 3 Ops cards he gets. not panic, and to find ways to get the PEOPLE has been the subtle, but Confederate player to use up his significant changes to the Eastern The player sitting at Davis' theater of operations. The alterations cards doing other things while you desk shouldn't despair. attempt to recover the situation. bring more of the historical concerns First, the AoNV should be and options into the game. The built with J. Johnston in increased opportunities to play on How to keep the Yankees command. Second, he the flanks of the theater is due to out of the Old Dominion should interrupt the Union LOC via these changes. I believe the end result maneuver. Due to LOC constraints, Early in the war, Richmond is is a better historical simulation the first Union advance will get him vulnerable to capture. If the South without significant rule additions as far as Hanover. One of the critical has sent too many of its reinforce- that slow down play. I hope you like map changes in the GMT edition of ments west or left them on coastal the improvements. the game now works its wonders. defense, it could find itself during the The South should dispatch a corps Fall 1861 turn on the short end of the from Richmond which maneuvers capital sweepstakes. During late 1861, the big Union advantage is its huge forces. Historically, the only thing keeping the Union out of Richmond was McClellan. This is simulated in the game by the fact that most decent Union generals have strategy ratings of 3. Whereas McClellan is the best army com- mander for defending Washington, he is about the worst for threatening Richmond. What I find most intrigu- ing about this situation is that the real history of the war may have been the least likely outcome, when it comes to the Eastern theater of operations. If McDowell had been a bit luckier at Manassas or if Sherman had been placed in a higher com- mand position earlier in the war, who knows what might have happened!