Sweden's Near-Involvement in the Crimean War As A
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Scandinavica Vol 58 No 2 2019 Scandinavica Vol 58 No 2 2019 Riste, O. (2005). Norway’s Foreign Relations. A History. Oslo: National Revanchism at a Universitetsforlaget. Sandvik, P.T. (2018). Nasjonens velstand. Norges økonomiske Critical Juncture: historie 1800–1940. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. Salmon, P. (1993). Foreign Policy and National Identity. The Sweden’s Near-Involvement in the Norwegian Integrity Treaty 1907-24. Oslo: Institutt for forsvarsstudier. Sasley, B. (2013). ‘Emotions in International Relations’, Crimean War as a Study in Swedish in E-International Relations June 12 2013, http://www.e-ir. Nationalism info/2013/06/10/to-be-or-not-to-be-nude-the-predictable-feminist- outrage/ (Last accessed: 22 March 2018). Scheer, M. (2012). ‘Are emotions a kind of practice (and is that what Mart Kuldkepp makes them have a history)? A Bordieuian approach to understanding emotion’, in History and Theory, 51 (May), pp.193–220. Department of Scandinavian Studies, UCL Stearn, P. (2016). ‘Emotions and Change: Where History Comes in’, in Ariffin, Y., Coicaud, J.-M. and Popovski, V. (eds.), Emotions in Abstract International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. This article argues that the persistent revanchist feelings in Sweden 48–64. vis-à-vis Russia over the loss of Finland in 1809 constitute a broad Sørensen, Ø. (2001). Kampen om Norges sjel, vol. 3 in Norsk undercurrent in Sweden’s otherwise peaceful modern history. The idéhistorie, Oslo: Aschehoug. Franco-British attempts to draw Sweden into the Crimean War (1853– The Duke of Cambridge (2018). ‘Duke of Cambridge gives speech at 1856) against Russia are studied as an example of one such ‘critical black-tie dinner at Royal Palace in Oslo [1.2.2018]’, http://royalcentral. juncture’ that brought Sweden very close to joining a war with the co.uk/uk/cambridges/duke-of-cambridge-gives-speech-at-black-tie- expectation of reconquering Finland. Facilitated by the development of dinner-at-royal-palace-in-oslo-95596 (Last accessed: 27 August 2018). the modern public sphere in Sweden, the war enthusiasm in the Swedish Thorkildsen, D. et al. (1996). Grundtvigianisme og nasjonalisme i liberal press reflected a deeply-felt national humiliation over the defeat Norge i det 19. århundre, KULTs skriftserie nr. 70, Oslo: Universitetet in 1809, but also linked to anxieties over the development of Finnish i Oslo. (Fennoman) nationalism and the possibilities of realising the goals of Worm-Müller, J.S. (1902). Boergeneralen Christian de Wet: en Skildring af Helten og hans Kampe. Kristiania: Tvedt. the Scandinavianist movement. Åselius, G. (1994). The ‘Russian menace’ to Sweden: The belief system of a small power security élite in the age of imperialism. Keywords Stockholm: Stockholms universitet. Sweden, Finland, Scandinavism (Scandinavianism), Crimean War 114 115 Scandinavica Vol 58 No 2 2019 Scandinavica Vol 58 No 2 2019 Scandinavian countries today enjoy a global reputation for their Carl XIV Johan (1763–1844) turned the brunt of Swedish foreign policy promotion of peaceful conflict resolution, with Scandinavian away from the east, and towards the west. politicians often taking on the role of mediators in international peace 1814 has long been taken as the starting point of a congratulatory negotiations (see e.g. Ingebritsen 2002: 17–18). Perhaps even more narrative about Sweden’s exceptional peacefulness in the modern than its neighbours, Sweden has been able to claim legitimacy as a era. In an article published in Foreign Affairs in 1959, the famous peace-builder, its pacific reputation bolstered by the fact that it has Swedish political scientist and public intellectual Herbert Tingsten managed to stay out of any and all wars since 1814, making its 200- argued that Swedish foreign policy and, indeed, ‘Sweden’s attitude plus year tenure in peacefulness the most impressive in the entire towards the world at large’ had been essentially determined by two world. factors: its long period of peace and neutrality from 1814 onwards, Yet for all its peacefulness today, the country has an exceedingly and its exceptionally calm internal development. Even though Tingsten warlike past. In the seventeenth century, known in Swedish admitted that ‘on a few occasions’ Sweden had shown some willingness historiography as the Great Power Era (Stormaktstiden), Sweden was to take part in a war (during the Crimean War, in 1864, in 1905 and in one of the most successful military powers in Europe, conquering over the First World War), changes in the political or military situation or the the course of more than century vast territories from its neighbouring strength of the pacifist public opinion had in all cases rendered such Denmark in the south, but also on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea plans inconsequential (Tingsten 1959: 474). and in Northern Germany. This territorial overextension was not to The opinion that such incidents were no more than blips on the last, however. Sweden was conclusively defeated by a coalition of radar is a common one. For example, in his article ‘Acquisition and states in the Great Northern War (1700–1721), and by the terms of its Transmission of Pacifist Mentalities in Sweden’, seeking to explain how 1721 Nystad Peace Treaty with Russia, it was forced to give up all its the famed Swedish peacefulness came about, Ernst L. Moerk argues eastern possessions except for Finland and Karelia. that after Carl XIV Johan ‘laid the foundations for Sweden’s neutrality Sweden’s eighteenth-century attempts at revanche against Russia and definitely turned her aspirations away from her age-old military ended either in loss of still more territory (in 1741–1743) or the competition with Russia to socioeconomic and cultural goals’, the reaffirmation of status quo ante bellum (in 1788–1790). In the end, the bellicose episode of Sweden’s near-involvement in the Crimean war old national humiliation of 1721 was overshadowed by an even worse ‘suggests that Sweden had not yet entered a state of stable and secure one in 1809, brought about by Sweden’s disastrous involvement in peace at this time and that the old antagonism against Russia still had the Napoleonic Wars. Through a series of political and military moves, a hold on the mentality of the leaders’ (Moerk 1995: 294–295). The Russia managed in 1808–1809 to conquer, and, by the terms of the implication is again that the overall direction of Sweden’s history from Peace Treaty of Fredrikshamn, permanently sever from Sweden the 1814 onwards was away from war, any atavistic opportunism on part whole of Finland, which had been Swedish since the twelfth century. of its leaders notwithstanding. Five years later, Sweden was able to compensate for this loss by During the recent 2014 celebrations of the 200 years of Swedish wrangling Norway out of Danish hands with the 1814 Peace Treaty peace, the near-war situations of the long nineteenth century were with of Kiel, even though the Swedish-Norwegian union would never quite very few exceptions (see Iko 2014) left almost totally unmentioned. replace what had been the eastern third of the Swedish state. Still, by In a festive speech given on the occasion by Ove Bring, Professor of declaring Sweden a satisfied power and concluding an alliance with International Law at the Swedish Defence University, Oscar I was even Russia against possible French aggression (the so-called policy of praised for ‘engaging Sweden in one of the first-ever peacekeeping 1812; see Munch-Pedersen 1996 for details), the new Swedish king operations’ as the speaker styled his limited military intervention into 116 117 Scandinavica Vol 58 No 2 2019 Scandinavica Vol 58 No 2 2019 Scandinavian countries today enjoy a global reputation for their Carl XIV Johan (1763–1844) turned the brunt of Swedish foreign policy promotion of peaceful conflict resolution, with Scandinavian away from the east, and towards the west. politicians often taking on the role of mediators in international peace 1814 has long been taken as the starting point of a congratulatory negotiations (see e.g. Ingebritsen 2002: 17–18). Perhaps even more narrative about Sweden’s exceptional peacefulness in the modern than its neighbours, Sweden has been able to claim legitimacy as a era. In an article published in Foreign Affairs in 1959, the famous peace-builder, its pacific reputation bolstered by the fact that it has Swedish political scientist and public intellectual Herbert Tingsten managed to stay out of any and all wars since 1814, making its 200- argued that Swedish foreign policy and, indeed, ‘Sweden’s attitude plus year tenure in peacefulness the most impressive in the entire towards the world at large’ had been essentially determined by two world. factors: its long period of peace and neutrality from 1814 onwards, Yet for all its peacefulness today, the country has an exceedingly and its exceptionally calm internal development. Even though Tingsten warlike past. In the seventeenth century, known in Swedish admitted that ‘on a few occasions’ Sweden had shown some willingness historiography as the Great Power Era (Stormaktstiden), Sweden was to take part in a war (during the Crimean War, in 1864, in 1905 and in one of the most successful military powers in Europe, conquering over the First World War), changes in the political or military situation or the the course of more than century vast territories from its neighbouring strength of the pacifist public opinion had in all cases rendered such Denmark in the south, but also on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea plans inconsequential (Tingsten 1959: 474). and in Northern Germany. This territorial overextension was not to The opinion that such incidents were no more than blips on the last, however. Sweden was conclusively defeated by a coalition of radar is a common one. For example, in his article ‘Acquisition and states in the Great Northern War (1700–1721), and by the terms of its Transmission of Pacifist Mentalities in Sweden’, seeking to explain how 1721 Nystad Peace Treaty with Russia, it was forced to give up all its the famed Swedish peacefulness came about, Ernst L.