EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND MIGRATION: ACHIEVING COMMON PROGRESSIVE NARRATIVES Tamás BOROS Marco FUNK Hedwig GIUSTO Oliver GRUBER Sarah KYAMBI Hervé LE BRAS Lisa PELLING Timo RINKE Thilo SCHOLLE EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND MIGRATION: ACHIEVING COMMON PROGRESSIVE NARRATIVES ACHIEVING EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND MIGRATION: Luigi TROIANI EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND MIGRATION: ACHIEVING COMMON PROGRESSIVE NARRATIVES Published by: FEPS – Foundation for European Progressive Studies Rue Montoyer 40 - 1000 Brussels, Belgium T: +32 2 234 69 00 Email: [email protected] Website: www.feps-europe.eu Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Budapest Regional Project „Flight, Migration, Integration in Europe” Fővám tér 2-3 - H-1056 Budapest, Hungary Email: [email protected] Website: www.fes.de/en/displacement-migration-integration/ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung EU Office Brussels Rue du Taciturne 38 - 1000 Brussels, Belgium Email: [email protected] Website: www.fes-europe.eu Fondazione Pietro Nenni Via Caroncini 19 - 00197 Rome, Italy T: +39 06 80 77 486 Email: [email protected] Website: www.fondazionenenni.it Fondation Jean Jaurès 12 cité Malesherbes - 75 009 Paris, France T: +33 1 40 23 24 00 Website: https://jean-jaures.org/ Copyright © 2019 by FEPS, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondazione Pietro Nenni, Fondation Jean Jaurès Edited by: Marco Funk, Hedwig Giusto, Timo Rinke, Olaf Bruns English language editor: Nicole Robinson This study was produced with the financial support of the European Parliament Cover picture : Shutterstock Book layout: Triptyque.be This study does not represent the collective views of FEPS, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondazione Pietro Nenni or Fondation Jean Jaurès, but only the opinion of the respective author. The respon- sibility of FEPS, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondazione Pietro Nenni and Fondation Jean Jaurès is limited to approving its publication as worthy of consideration for the global progressive movement. EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND MIGRATION: ACHIEVING COMMON PROGRESSIVE NARRATIVES Table of contents Introduction - Marco Funk, Hedwig Giusto and Timo Rinke ........................................... 7 Hungary: A no-go zone for migrants - Tamás Boros .......................................... 15 Swimming upstream? Attitudes towards immigration in Austria and the electoral implications for progressive politics - Oliver Gruber .................................................................................. 35 Immigration policies and electoral behaviour in Italy - Luigi Troiani ....................................................................................................... 59 Migration and public opinion: The case of Germany - Thilo Scholle ........................................................................................ 77 Attitudes in France towards migration - Hervé Le Bras .............................. 101 Sweden: Give people reasons for hope - Lisa Pelling .............................. 129 The political backlash: Scotland within the context of the United Kingdom - Sarah Kyambi ....................................... 163 Recommendations ..................................................................................................................................... 185 Contributors ........................................................................................................................................................... 191 6 EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND MIGRATION Introduction MARCO FUNK, HEDWIG GIUSTO AND TIMO RINKE Attitudes towards migrants are difficult to grasp – but they are less divided than populists would have us believe. Nevertheless, an increasing number of Europeans feel uneasy about people who escape poverty and violence in search of a decent and safe life far away from their home. This European uneasiness is expressed in fears that range from unfair competition in the labour market and reduced access to social services in the host countries to the perceived threat posed by migrants to national identities, ethnic homogeneity and security. The aim of this book is to try and shed light on the paradox that the disadvantaged and marginalised rep- resent an imminent threat to our societies. It also aims to explain the origin of a political short circuit that is affecting public opinion right across Europe and impacting on electoral results, political dynamics and immigration policies in many EU member states. This anti-migrant backlash is altering – sometimes dramatically – the balance of power between mainstream parties and so-called populist and extremist ones. It is even changing the face and soul of the European Union. Changes in people’s and governments’ attitudes towards immigra- tion, from being (more or less) open to being (more or less) closed and vice versa, are far from being infrequent. What is noteworthy is the unprecedented extent to which the topic has become cen- tral in national and European debates. At international level, this change of attitude emerged in the decision last year of five coun- tries (three of which European) not to adopt the Global Compact for Migration, promoted by the United Nations, disavowing two years of negotiations and rejecting the first attempt ever to define a common framework of reference for the international com- munity on how to approach this complex issue of migration and advance the establishment of a real and effective global govern- ance of the phenomenon. At European level, we have observed a ACHIEVING COMMON PROGRESSIVE NARRATIVES 7 growing inability – that indeed is tantamount to a stalemate – by the member states to make decisive steps in the urgent reform of the Dublin regulation, as well as in other migration and asylum policies, except those aimed at border controls and the reduction of irregular arrivals. European progressive parties have been the ones hardest hit by these developments. They are torn between their desire to stand for their values of solidarity and respect for human rights and digni- ty regardless of nationality, skin colour or religion, and their mission to stand for the rights and grievances of workers (often the social class that feels particularly threatened by migration). The decline of European progressive parties cannot of course be ascribed entire- ly to the migration issue. Indeed, their crisis started much earlier and is connected to the broader loss of popular support for tradi- tional parties and organisations. Yet there can be no doubt that for the last couple of years the question of migration has dominated headlines and debates all over Europe, has contributed to increas- ing polarisation in European politics and societies, has weakened pro-European stances across the continent and has tempted many progressive parties into adopting an increasingly restrictive attitude towards migration in order to prevent the further alienation of their voters and re-gain electoral support. Against this backdrop the Foundation for European Progressive Studies, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the Fondazione Pietro Nenni and the Fondation Jean Jaurès have promoted the analysis of this change of public opinion in seven EU member states: Hungary, Austria, Italy, Germany, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These case studies have been selected because they offer a rep- resentation of a wide range of histories and experiences in the field of immigration, are characterised by different national political contexts and have been impacted in different ways and to differ- ent extents by higher levels of immigration in recent years. The order in which the studies are presented roughly reflects the cur- rent approach of the respective governments towards migration, 8 EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND MIGRATION from the most repressive extreme to more positive attitudes. Starting from the analysis of how public opinion towards migration has changed in these countries in the last five years, the aim of this book is to provide recommendations for national progressive parties that are struggling to find ways to deal with such a delicate issue without betraying their basic principles and values. A fur- ther step was the identification of commonalities among the case studies in order to define a possible joint strategy for European progressive parties. In the spectrum of the European countries under analysis, Hungary certainly represents the one with the most extreme and restrictive positions on migration; positions that have their roots in the fact that the country and its population have so far experienced very lit- tle immigration and that Fidesz, the ruling party, has exploited and strengthened the deep-rooted sentiments of “caution, antipathy and occasionally outright xenophobia” of the Hungarian popula- tion by means of a relentless anti-migration propaganda campaign (facilitated by the tight control on media exerted by the govern- ment), in fact aimed at domestic political gains. In his analysis on developments within Hungarian public opinion, author Tamás Boros underlines the small role played by left-wing parties that have not developed a genuine counter narrative but have limited their actions to highlighting the security aspects of the phenome- non and the role of the EU, while condemning the “government’s hate-mongering”. Boros recognises that in the present circum- stances, sustaining a position diametrically opposed to that of the government and of the large majority of the population would not produce positive effects, and he therefore underlines the fact that offering global and European solutions to a