Revisiting the Effectiveness of Alcohol Controls at Football Matches

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Policing and Society Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gpas20 ‘‘On the Lash’’ –– revisiting the effectiveness of alcohol controls at football matches Geoff Pearson a & Arianna Sale b a Management School, University of Liverpool, Chatham Street, Liverpool, L69 7ZH, UK b Department of Sociology, University of Milano Bicocca, Milan, Italy Available online: 06 Feb 2011

To cite this article: Geoff Pearson & Arianna Sale (2011): ‘‘On the Lash’’ –– revisiting the effectiveness of alcohol controls at football matches, Policing and Society, 21:2, 150-166 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2010.540660

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‘On the Lash’ revisiting the effectiveness of alcohol controls at Á football matches Geoff Pearsona* and Arianna Saleb

aManagement School, University of Liverpool, Chatham Street, Liverpool L69 7ZH, UK; bDepartment of Sociology, University of Milano Bicocca, Milan, Italy (Received 20 January 2010; ﬁnal version received 19 July 2010)

It has long been assumed that the problem of ‘football hooliganism’ is linked to levels of alcohol consumption by crowds of football supporters. As a result a number of laws and policing strategies have been developed that aim to reduce the amount of alcohol consumed by fans. This article is based primarily upon a 15-year ethnography of English football supporters and the effectiveness of social control policies upon them, and supported by interviews with police officials from the UK and Italy. Its conclusion is that alcohol restrictions are ineffective at reducing the level of drunkenness amongst fans, partly as a result of police under- enforcement. Furthermore, a by-product of a number of the restrictions is that the level of risk for violence between rival groups of fans is often increased. This article concludes that we need to revisit the use by police and football authorities of alcohol controls to reduce crowd disorder and look to other methods of reducing the problem of football hooliganism. Keywords: football; hooliganism; alcohol; regulation

Introduction The focus of this article is the relationship between regulations limiting access to alcohol and crowd behaviour, specifically the kind of ‘violence’ and ‘disorder’ among football crowds that has been labelled ‘football hooliganism’ since the mid-1960s (Dunning et al. 1988, Stott and Pearson 2007). There has been considerable academic dispute about the causes of crowd disorder involving football supporters (Dunning et al. 1991, Dunning 1994, Armstrong 1998, Giulianotti, 2000, Frosdick and Marsh Downloaded by [Paulo Gajanigo] at 07:52 24 September 2011 2005, Stott and Pearson 2007) and this paper does not intend to re-cover old ground or engage in these debates. Instead it will focus on the effectiveness of the institutional responses to one specific factor that has been identified by police, politicians, local authorities, football authorities, the media and some (although certainly not all) academics as being significant in influencing football crowds to become disorderly. In the UK there has long been an established correlation between alcohol consumption and violence and disorder (Department of Health and Social Security [DHSS] 1981, Shepherd 1989, p. 1045, Lipsey 1997, p. 245). Many studies have noted the disproportionately high number of those arrested for disorder or admitted to accident and emergency departments with injuries gained from fighting who have been consuming alcohol. Marsh and Kibby (1992, p. 38) also point out that

*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

ISSN 1043-9463 print/ISSN 1477-2728 online # 2011 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/10439463.2010.540660 http://www.informaworld.com Policing & Society 151

50% of all offences of violence or disorder in the UK occurred at the traditional pub or club closing time on Friday and Saturday, and Hobbs et al. (2003, p. 41) note how instances of crime and disorder rise with the numbers of licensed premises. However, the correlation between alcohol consumption and violence does not necessarily mean that there is a direct psychopharmacological causational link between alcohol consumption and violence (Gibbs 1986, p. 133, Marsh and Kibby 1992, p. 37, Lipsey et al. 1997, p. 246) and there is still considerable dispute as to whether alcohol consumption in and of itself influences individuals to become violent. As Lipsey et al. (1997, p. 277) point out, ‘the causal issue is still cloudy and uncertain’: ‘ ... there is no broad, reliable, ‘‘main effect’’ of alcohol on violence (...) if alcohol has any causal effects on violence, they almost certainly occur only for some persons and/or some circumstances’ (p. 278). Some studies have for example shown that when alcohol is consumed, particularly by males, this increases the likelihood of them perceiving the behaviour of others as insulting or challenging, and that alcohol increases the likelihood of them responding to this perceived hostile behaviour aggressively (Pernanen 1976, Pihl 1983, Gibbs 1986), but research shows that the connection between alcohol consumption and violence is far more complex than a simple chemical outcome. Situational factors such as crowd ‘congestion’ and ‘clustering’ around alcohol outlets (Tuck 1989) may lead to competition and goal blocking, invasions to personal space and stress. These have been strongly implicated in the aetiology of anger, aggression and violence especially when the emergence of adaptive orderly behaviour, which usually aids flow in crowded areas, is affected by drunkenness (Moore et al. 2008). Moreover, learned social ‘expectations’ of what happens when involved in social drinking (Deehan 1999, p. 8, Hobbs et al. 2003) play a key role in leading to these ‘peaks’ of violence we see around alcohol consumption.

...Although there is no direct and obvious tie between violence and the use of alcohol, there is a complex but powerful link between many incidents of public violence and the social process of collective drinking. This link is built around cultural understandings of the connections between rowdy and violent group drinking, the construction and projection of an empowered masculine identity, and the symbolic rejection of respectable social values. (Tomsen 1997, p. 100) We should also not simply assume that because social drinking can result in violence on an individual basis this will necessarily be reflected in the type of major crowd

Downloaded by [Paulo Gajanigo] at 07:52 24 September 2011 disorder that has largely been associated with ‘football hooliganism’. The effect of alcohol consumption upon football crowds is therefore clearly a complex one but how (and indeed if) intoxication of fans increases the likelihood of major disorder is not the primary concern of this paper. Instead the authors intend to assess whether alcohol controls at football matches achieve their immediate aim of reducing fan alcohol consumption. It will also investigate whether some of these alcohol controls, and the manner of their enforcement by the police, have the potential to create situations where disorder is more likely irrespective of alcohol consumption. Much of the official discourse about the causes of (and solutions to) football ‘hooliganism’ has focussed on the apparent link between alcohol and violence, and alcohol consumption is seen as a significant causal factor in instances of football- crowd disorder. For example, the 1977 Report of the Working Group on Football Crowd Behaviour concluded that, ‘nearly all those who gave evidence were firmly of the view that a strong relationship exists between alcohol and violence and that a 152 G. Pearson and A. Sale

good deal of the disturbances associated with football is due to the amount of alcohol consumed before, during and after matches’ (McElhone Report 1977, p. 5).1 This connection was reiterated in the Parliamentary debates for the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc.) Act 1985, with the Home Secretary stating, ‘There is widespread agreement that alcohol is a major contributory factor in violent and disorderly behaviour in football grounds’ (HC Deb, 3 July 1985, col. 333). Furthermore, media and official responses to acts of ‘hooliganism’ involving English supporters often focus on the effect of alcohol consumption upon those involved. If we take the example of one of the largest incidents of disorder involving English fans, around England’s World Cup match in Marseilles in 1998, all parties agreed that drunkenness was a major factor. The head of the Football Association stated that, ‘there were a lot of English people and they had all had too much to drink and, you know, they were behaving in a disgusting way’ and the Minister for Sport commented that the disorder was caused by ‘brainless drunken louts’ and a ‘crowd of mindless drunks’ who were exploited by a minority of organised hooligans (both Radio 5, 15 June 1998). The media agreed, with The Telegraph blaming ‘the activities of a drunken minority of fans’ (15 June 1998) for the riot, and The Daily Mail that, ‘Drunken thugs filled England’s World Cup with shame last night’ (15 June 1998). BBC TV coverage of the violence blamed, ‘a combination of drink and large numbers of rival supporters’ and claimed that, ‘only a small number of English supporters were involved Á probably those who had drunk the most’ (both 14 June 1998). In contrast, the early closure of bars was considered ‘an important factor in how matters were dealt with in Toulouse’ at England’s relatively trouble-free second game in the tournament (UK police delegation, quoted in Stott and Pearson 2007, p. 139). The authors do not agree with the hypothesis that alcohol, in and of itself, was the major factor in why major crowd disorder occurred in Marseilles, or indeed on any recent occasion when English fans have been involved in disorder abroad. The argument that alcohol consumption is a key driver for ‘hooliganism’ fails to account for the fact that crowds of English fans who have been drinking heavily, if successfully managed, rarely become involved in disorder. It cannot explain why other international fan groups whose fan culture relies heavily on drinking (e.g. the Scottish, Norwegians and Danes) do not have an association with major incidents of crowd violence. Finally, it also fails to account for situations where fans who are not

Downloaded by [Paulo Gajanigo] at 07:52 24 September 2011 drunk become involved in disorder. The general problem with this kind of explanation is that, imputing the cause of crowd disorder to one single variable (i.e. alcohol abuse), it fails to acknowledge the complex interactions between structural, situational and individual factors leading to disorder occurring. Socio- logical theories on the conditions under which public disorder is likely to break out (or, alternatively, fails to escalate) are now generally oriented towards a multivariate approach, including different levels of analysis, from macro-sociological factors to individual variables and face-to-face micro-interactions (the most famous of those being the ‘flashpoints model’ elaborated by Waddington (2007)). Research on the socialÁpsychological dynamics of ‘hooliganism’ proposes that the football crowd disorder is made possible by a shared ‘social identity’ among participants which is radically affected by intergroup interaction (Stott and Reicher 1998, Stott et al. 2001, 2007). This is influenced largely by external factors, most notably actions of police or other fan groups which are perceived as illegitimate (e.g. indiscriminate and Policing & Society 153

aggressive policing methods), rather than being driven by single factors such as the presence of ‘hooligans’ or the availability of alcohol. The Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) of crowd behaviour has already been applied where the theory underpinned the policing of a major football tournament (Euro 2004) and data arising from this tournament demonstrates that it is possible to police large crowds of ‘drunken’ English fans in such a way that collective disorder does not occur (Stott and Pearson 2007, ch. 10Á12). Our findings also support this explanation of the causes of large-scale football ‘hooliganism’, which appears far more reflective of our data on football crowd ‘riots’ than the other major theories explaining why this type of disorder occurs (e.g. Dunning et al. 1988). Nevertheless, whilst progress has been made on improving policing methods in many European states, a key element of social control policies for football crowds in the UK and abroad remains restricting access to alcohol for supporters. Consump- tion of alcohol by fans around matches is heavily regulated by police and local and football authorities. FIFA and UEFA (football’s international and European governing bodies) restrict access to alcohol within stadiums during their tournaments, and matches with a high risk of disorder in the UK and the Netherlands are often scheduled to kick-off early in the day in order to reduce the amount of drinking time beforehand (even though television companies generally prefer later kick-offs to increase viewing figures). For matches in Italy involving English fans, local authorities often go further, banning the sale and public consumption of alcohol within the city limits for 24 hours around the match. At the 1998 World Cup in France, the authorities extended the area covered by their alcohol ban to cover a 70-mile long ‘alcohol-free corridor’ covering the route English fans would take from the channel ferry ports to the stadium. In the UK, legislation has been enacted to criminalise being drunk in a football stadium, drinking within sight of the pitch or drinking on designated transport to and from matches (Pearson 2000). This legislation is often supported by bans on the consumption of alcohol in the streets around football grounds and on trains used by the fans to travel to away matches. We will assess these alcohol control measures on two grounds. First, do they reduce the consumption of alcohol amongst football supporters? Second, do they reduce the overall potential for disorderly situations arising? The data in this paper is drawn primarily from a series of ethnographic studies of football supporters between 1995 and 2009. In-depth longitudinal studies were

Downloaded by [Paulo Gajanigo] at 07:52 24 September 2011 carried out with groups of fans travelling home and away, focussing mainly on supporters of Blackpool (then a lower league club, 1995Á1998), Manchester United (a successful Premier League club, 2001Á2010) and the England National Team (1998Á2006). This involved complete immersion within the field (for European away matches and international tournaments this could be over several days) in order to gain an inter-subjective understanding of the motivations, understandings and interpretations of regular ‘home-and-away’ match-going supporters. Over the duration of the study over 200 matches were attended in an observational capacity and in excess of 2000 hours were spent ‘in the field’. Of course, we cannot make generalised claims about the behaviour of English supporters that will be applicable to every football supporter. Our observations were focussed on those fans who travel regularly (rather than ‘occasional’ match-goers) and almost exclusively limited to three teams (in order to provide a sufficiently detailed and in-depth analysis). However, from ‘external’ observations of other clubs’ fans, combined with data 154 G. Pearson and A. Sale

gathered by researchers with other fan groups (e.g. Giulianotti 1991, Armstrong 1998, King 2003, Millward 2006, Rookwood 2009), we believe that much of the behaviour we witnessed is reflected more widely across regular British match-goers. The paper is also supported by direct observations of match-day police operations in some Premier League fixtures during the 2008/09 season and by a number of interviews with senior police officers in the UK and Italy about their views on the effectiveness of alcohol controls on football crowds. In particular the authors gained rare access to pre-match briefings in Rome ahead of the 2009 Champions League involving Manchester United, giving them the police view on the issue that could be contrasted with observations carried out concurrently with the travelling English fans. Interviews with police officers from all over Italy were collected during the authors’ participant observation of a weekly police course held at the ‘Centro per la tutela dell’Ordine Pubblico’ (Public Order Training Centre) in Nettuno (Rome). Gaining access to the police is a complex task: in Italy in particular, a long bureaucratic procedure to get the required authorisation may enhance the common resistance to the social researcher’s gaze in this field. The building of a relationship of mutual trust and the availability of several senior police officers helped the authors cope with these difficulties. We should however recognise that the police forces observed are a sample that might be biased by the open-mindedness of the officers who accepted to be observed and interviewed.

The importance of alcohol to British Football Crowds The first factor to note is the importance that alcohol holds in the fan culture of supporters from the UK (and much of Northern Europe). The creation of a football ‘carnival’ is the driving force for supporters who follow their teams home and away and, as with the traditional carnivals throughout early-modern Europe, excessive drinking forms a major part of the festivities (Burke 2002, p. 183). This example of the St. John’s Eve festival in early-modern Britain gives a flavour of these traditional celebrations, much of which bears similarities to the contemporary carnivalesque expressions of football fandom we see from British football supporters: ‘People danced, sang and lept with great pleasure, and did not spare the bagpipes ...many loads of beer were brought ...what disorder, whoring, fighting and killing and dreadful idolatry took place there!’ (Kolve, quoted in Burke 2002, p. 195). The

Downloaded by [Paulo Gajanigo] at 07:52 24 September 2011 importance of alcohol to this football carnival is noted by a number of researchers into football fandom (Brown 1993, Sugden 2002, King 2003, Millward 2006, 2009, Rookwood 2009) and Giulianotti (1991, p. 505) points out that although alcohol consumption at, or in transit to, matches in Scotland has been banned since 1980, ‘‘‘gett’n’ skittled affor the fitba’’ remains an integral part of Scottish soccer and popular culture’. Our own research with a number of different match-going fan groups found that alcohol was not only an integral part of the match experience, but was for many fans the driving force for their behaviour. For many of our research subjects, football without alcohol was unthinkable, and the beer-fuelled ‘craic’ around the match was just as important (if not more so) than what actually occurred on the pitch. For one group of Manchester United fans we observed, this mantra was set out on the flag they took to all games, which proclaimed the name of the group, the crest of the team and the words ‘On the Lash’ (i.e. ‘getting drunk’). For these fans drinking and Policing & Society 155

football ‘does tend to go hand in hand’ and alcohol was considered ‘an essential part of the match-day experience’ (Interview data: 17 October 2009). For the teams under observation, this type of fan dominated the make-up of the match-going support at away matches and games abroad, and also formed a vociferous minority of the support for the team at home. These fans were likely to reflect on trips where beer was cheap and plentiful as a good outing, meaning that fans would, when planning future excursions, see becoming ‘drunk’2 as an essential part of it. For these fans, drinking before and after a game (although not necessarily at it) was seen as a right, not a privilege, and social control policies designed to restrict this would be circumvented. On occasion, the activities of the fans in overcoming alcohol restrictions would also expose them to an increased chance of potentially violent confrontation with rival supporters. This ties in with the ESIM theory of the crowd dynamics, which found that the denial of such ‘privileges’ can lead to a shared sense of perceived illegitimacy within a crowd which in turn can damage surrounding intergroup relations with the authorities managing them (Stott et al. 2001, 2007). The fans we observed would go to extraordinary lengths to be drunk before a match kicked-off, and both legal and practical restrictions on their ability to do this would almost always be overcome. Observations over the course of a typical match-day revealed continual alcohol consumption in the hours before kick-off, often commencing early in the morning (8 or 9 am ‘starts’ were not uncommon) and a steady increase in the levels of apparent intoxication of those fans.3 For a minority of these groups, this was also combined with the use of cannabis, cocaine and/or methedrone (referred to as ‘plant food’, which was made illegal during the course of the research). However, it was noticeable that intake of these and other drugs was not as integral to the match-day experience as alcohol (most of the fan groups did not partake in drug use, and the minority who did use the drugs did not use them every match-day). Furthermore, we did not notice any significant increase in levels of disorder or aggression from the groups under observation when different drugs were taken.

Alcohol bans in stadiums There is a long history of alcohol restrictions inside football stadia in the attempt to reduce ‘hooliganism’ (Frosdick and Marsh 2005, pp. 126Á127). In England and

Downloaded by [Paulo Gajanigo] at 07:52 24 September 2011 Wales, the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol) Act 1985, makes it illegal to enter a ‘designated’ football stadium whilst ‘drunk’ (this is not defined in the legislation), consume alcohol on official transport to matches (football specials), take alcohol into a stadium and consume alcohol within sight of the football pitch. Additionally UEFA also bans the sale of alcohol from stadiums for its competitions, although executive sections remain exempt from this ban. This leads to a situation where Heineken beer sponsors the UEFA ‘Champions League’ tournament under the slogan, Heineken and the Champions League: Great Together but at which their product is not permitted to be consumed by non-executive supporters. So, do alcohol bans inside football stadia actually reduce the level of threat from alcohol-related violence? Our data suggested that its impact was minimal and in some cases we observed it exacerbating violence and disorder both inside and outside football grounds. The source of many of the problems surrounding the effectiveness of the legislation was that police and ground stewards at turnstiles rarely prevented 156 G. Pearson and A. Sale

the fans under observation entering the ground whilst heavily under the influence of alcohol. Police officers occasionally used the fact that someone acting disorderly was also drunk as an easy means to exclude them from the stadium (without an arrest), or to perform an arrest for more complex offences. However, in 15 years of observations, we witnessed less than a dozen supporters prevented from entering the ground because they were drunk, and most of these were physically unable to stand without assistance from friends. Even in some of these cases, the supporter would simply enter through another turnstile, or wait for a while to ‘sober up’ before entering (in some cases officers or stewards actually recommended to drunken fans that they try again later). Police discretion to under-enforce the law, when the broader interest of ‘public peace’ is perceived to be at risk, has long been recognised as a key feature of the police job, and a number of researchers have noted that ‘peace- keeping’ rather than ‘law enforcement’ is usually the main objective of officers managing public order situations (Banton 1964, Bittner 1967, 1974, 1990, Wilson 1968, Reiss 1971, Waddington 1994, 1999, Reiner 2000). The use of this discretion ‘to handle the situation’ (Wilson 1968, p. 31) involves ‘craftsmanship’ (Reiner 2000, p. 112), ‘practical skill’ (Bittner 1967, p. 701) and ‘experience-tested good sense’ (Bayley and Bittner 1984, p. 51). The officers at the turnstiles must make instant decisions whether or not to prevent a drunken fan from entering the ground. In doing so, they must take into account not only the drunkenness of the fan in question, but the likely response of the crowd, the crush at the turnstile and the risks of reducing police manpower in this area if an arrest becomes necessary. These ‘tactical adaptations’ (Stott et al. 2008, p. 264) by officers on the ground may well depart significantly from the stated objectives of senior officers prior to the event (Reiss 1984, Goldsmith 1990). For example, during an observation with the police at a Premier League match in 2009, the silver commander’s pre-match briefing ordered a zero tolerance approach towards drunkenness, with alcohol consumption by visiting fans highlighted as the main concern of the day. Three lines of police were placed between the away coach park and the turnstiles, in order to create a filter to check the fans’ condition. However, during a subsequent operative sub-briefing, the inspector responsible for the visiting section substituted the rigid zero-tolerance with a more indulgent and pragmatic common sense:

The silver ordered zero tolerance towards drunkenness today, and we are all aware that [the visiting] fans are heavy drinkers. I’m sure all of you are able to distinguish between Downloaded by [Paulo Gajanigo] at 07:52 24 September 2011 people who simply have had a few drinks and completely pissed fans. You have to use your common sense today to let the former in, and stop the latter. Whilst many of the visiting supporters were heavily under the influence of alcohol only four out of around 3000 were prevented from entering the ground. Other drunken fans were allowed in, but with a warning that they were under observation and must not cause trouble. Whether street-level police discretion is inevitable, desirable or dangerous has been the core of a wide debate, in which we do not intend to engage here. However, the fact that this ban on drunken fans entering stadia is so rarely enforced was common knowledge to the match-going supporters we observed. For our research subjects, the 1985 Act did not act as a deterrent to heavy drinking before kick-off in pubs and outside off-licenses near the ground. Occasionally we observed friends of fans who were so drunk they could not walk suggesting to them that they stop Policing & Society 157

drinking in order to ensure admittance. However, generally our data indicated that because the fans knew there would be no alcohol inside the ground (or that the alcohol will be expensive, of poor quality or will take considerable queuing to purchase), they were likely to to ‘binge drink’4 before arriving at the turnstiles so that they would be drunk for the match. Observations at Manchester United’s ground in the 10 minutes before kick-off revealed large numbers of fans arriving late as a result of spending as much time as possible drinking outside, many still drinking from cans and bottles as they approached the stadium forecourt. At this stadium, police set-up an alcohol cordon consisting of a line of ‘wheelie-bins’ and it was a common sight by this cordon to see fans finishing off their beers in a hurry before entering the stadium. Again, this is evidence of practical police discretion Á local by-laws actually prohibited consumption of alcohol on the streets at any time. Whilst the cordon was effective at preventing fans taking their alcohol to the turnstiles (and also reduced the missile threat from abandoned empty bottles), our interviews and observations revealed no instances where the officers at this point had stopped drunken fans gaining access to the stadium. The rush to consume as much alcohol before entering the ground meant that many fans were drunk by kick-off time, and for our research subjects, the 1985 Act’s aim of reducing the drunkenness of fans inside the ground was not achieved. According to our data, a second consequence of the alcohol ban within UK stadiums was that the fans who had been drinking the most typically arrived at the stadium immediately prior to kick-off. At away matches in particular, we found that this contributed to crushes at the turnstiles as fans who had been drinking heavily prior to the match attempted to gain entry in time for kick-off. This habit also created problems for the English supporters we observed at matches abroad in countries such as Italy, where local fans usually enter the ground at least one-hour before kick-off. The additional access procedures implemented by Italian police and stewards (personal ID check and body searches), are planned with the slower ‘flow’ of Italian fans, and frequently resulted in crushes amongst English fans trying to access stadia at the last minute. At away matches we also saw numerous instances where this crush of drunken fans arriving late then caused problems in the ground. Some supporters arriving around kick-off, seeing that the away end appeared already full, gathered by the entrances or on stairways rather than finding their seats. Stewards charged with moving these fans were often ignored or abused and we

Downloaded by [Paulo Gajanigo] at 07:52 24 September 2011 witnessed fans trying to push through the crowd to get to their seats being assaulted by fellow supporters. On one occasion, ground stewards filled the unreserved seating from back-to-front, meaning that the drunken fans arriving late were placed on the front rows of the stand. These fans then invaded the pitch when the team scored a vital goal, an act which might have been influenced by the disinhibiting effect of alcohol consumption discussed above. A third consequence of the ban on consuming alcohol within sight of the pitch is that the concourse under the stand at half-time becomes the only place where alcohol can be consumed. As a result, this area often becomes crowded, fans jostle with one another, beers are inevitably spilled and arguments break out; on a number of occasions we witnessed fans of the same team fighting each other in the concourse at half-time. When Manchester United travelled to Barnsley in 2009, disorder occurred in the concourse after a bar was closed. The shutters were broken, food was stolen and riot police were deployed to clear the area. When speaking to a police match 158 G. Pearson and A. Sale

commander about this problem, he revealed a general reluctance to deploy officers into crowded concourses:

Concourses can be quite dangerous areas, officers can be cut off with limited ability to withdraw (...) You can have officers getting trapped and some of our officers have in the past received serious injuries where they have been knocked to the ground and badly beaten. You’re down until they’ve finished kicking you basically. A high level of force could be required to assist officers to escape from these situations. (Interview, 9 November 2009). Our observations suggested that both the pressure of the crowd, combined with the often-witnessed lack of police, made confrontations and scuffles between fans more likely. Had fans been able to return to their seats with their drink, this could have reduced the crush in the concourse, made it more accessible Á and less dangerous Á for police officers and may have prevented the disorder. With regard to the issue of ‘congestion’, this finding supports previous research on the causes of alcohol-related disorder (Tuck 1989, Moore et al. 2008). Fourth, our observations suggested that the lack of drinking provision inside stadiums meant that fans were more likely to find themselves drinking alongside rival supporters inside pubs and outside off-licenses before kick-off, rather than in the segregated and highly regulated confines of a football stadium. Here, they had access to potential weaponry should disorder occur (bottles, glasses, pool cues), and were not subject to CCTV coverage and police observation to the same extent they would have been inside the stadium. Fifth and finally, a small number of fans were observed smuggling alcohol into the stadium. Cans, bottles and hip-flasks were concealed in coats, and some fans ‘spiked’ soft drinks with spirits and openly carried these past stewards. However, for most of our research subjects there was no need to risk smuggling alcohol into the stadium, as the objective of being drunk for the duration of the match had already been achieved.

Alcohol bans on journeys to and from the stadium The 1985 Act also prohibits the consumption of alcohol on any official coaches or trains organised to carry supporters to and from matches. In addition to this, certain scheduled train services are designated ‘dry’ for high risk matches. The intention here

Downloaded by [Paulo Gajanigo] at 07:52 24 September 2011 is to reduce overall levels of alcohol consumption and therefore make the travelling crowd less disorderly. However, as with alcohol restrictions in stadia, our observations suggested this policy may be ineffective in achieving its aims. Indeed, our data indicated that attempted alcohol bans on transport did not reduce levels of drunkenness and potentially increased the risk of confrontation with rival supporters. An example of how alcohol bans on transport can fail to work in practice comes from an observation of Manchester United fans travelling to Wembley in 2009. All trains from Manchester to London were designated ‘dry’ and an alcohol and drugs cordon was set-up on the platform. Utilising sniffer dogs, metal detectors, body searches and an airport-style scanner, police officers searched every fan before they boarded the train. In the build-up to the match, research subjects discussed whether there would be an alcohol ban on the train and, concluding from previous experience there would, many set off early in the morning in order to give themselves ‘drinking time’ in London. Other options discussed, had Policing & Society 159

the train not been ‘dry’, included leaving later and taking beer onto the train, and also drinking in Manchester before departure. Both options have the potential to provide a lower level of risk of confrontation with rival fans. Our observations indicated that many of the more experienced fans smuggled alcohol on to the train. This became a game in which they could demonstrate disrespect for authority, cunning and also ‘bottle’ to each other. Female members of the group smuggled miniature spirit bottles down their bras, male members purchased bottles of soft drinks and mixed them with spirits. The most confident fans simply emptied bottles of mineral water and replaced the contents with neat vodka. At the station, all of the group under observation were successful in smuggling the alcohol on to the train, which was then consumed. This meant that by the time the train arrived at London by 11 am, some fans had already consumed half a bottle of vodka Á potentially more alcohol than they would have consumed had they been allowed to take beer on to the train or purchase alcohol from the buffet car. Some groups of fans with less experience of travelling to Wembley matches arrived at the station with crates of beer, to be told that they could not take these on the train. These fans then attempted to consume their purchases before boarding the train, meaning that again they were more intoxicated at an earlier stage than they would have been had the ban not been in force. During our ethnographic study, the Wembley experience was typical of how effective these bans were. Fans travelling on official coaches to Manchester explained how they would break the ban on a weekly basis Á for many, consumption of alcohol was a badge of honour and a symbolic show of resistance against the authorities and the ‘new consumerism’ (King 2003) of modern football. On another occasion, United fans who had smuggled cans of beer onto the train home from Cardiff were dismayed to see British Transport Police (BTP) officers patrolling the carriages, meaning they could not drink their smuggled beer. However, ten minutes into the journey, the lights on the old carriages used to transport the fans failed, plunging the train into darkness. Some time later the sound of beer cans being opened could be heard, with some fans goading the BTP officers by asking if they wanted a drink.

City-wide alcohol bans For some matches abroad involving English teams, the local authorities’ fear of Downloaded by [Paulo Gajanigo] at 07:52 24 September 2011 drunken English ‘hooligans’ results in them attempting to make the entire city ‘dry’. City-wide alcohol bans are utilised mainly by Italian authorities who often declare that for 24 hours around the match, no alcohol can be sold in bars, restaurants or shops, and that public drinking will also be outlawed. However, in six separate research trips to Italian venues where alcohol bans were announced, we did not witness a single occasion where this prevented binge-drinking by English fans. The local police authorities we spoke with were also aware of the difficulties implement- ing the ban. During the police commanders’ briefing held a few hours before the 2009 Champions League final in Rome, the match commander openly admitted the failure of the ban, also questioning the usefulness of the measure:

We are fully aware that the alcohol ban hasn’t been working. The area subjected to the ban is too wide to make controls effective. And both sellers and buyers are too willing to make their deals to be able to stop them. So, we know the ban hasn’t been respected, but 160 G. Pearson and A. Sale

at the moment it’s a minor issue for us. Honestly, it’s not our main concern. (27 May 2009) The Italian press also highlighted the ineffectiveness of the ban: ‘Beer flows. There is the ban, that’s true, but who’s respecting it? This is Rome’ (La Repubblica, 28 May 2009, our translation). For many English fans travelling abroad to watch their team, consuming large quantities of alcohol is considered an essential feature of a ‘Euro away’ (Brown 1993, Sugden 2002, Millward 2006). They will therefore go to huge lengths to find alcohol even in the middle of a city-wide prohibition, although the authors’ observations suggested that this is not usually necessary as local bar and restaurant owners are often willing to assist the English fans; the risk of being fined or losing their license appeared outweighed by the profit they would make from alcohol sales. Observations showed that there were three ways in which English fans could obtain alcohol during these prohibitions. First, upmarket restaurants were often willing to sell alcohol with meals. Sometimes this was after they were put under pressure by locals who saw no reason why they should have to drink soft drinks with their meal simply because an English football team was playing that evening. Second, local youths in many cities would purchase beer the day before from supermarkets and then sell cans and bottles to English fans on the street. Finally, bars that were hidden away from the police would continue to serve beer to English fans, although their owners often insisted that noise-levels were kept to a minimum so as not to draw attention. The owners of cafe´s and kebab shops were also usually willing to serve beer. Some bar owners went to extreme lengths to be able to serve the English fans without risking their license. Prior to the 2009 European Champions League final in Rome, a group of fans under observation came to the conclusion that around a third of all bars continued to serve alcohol, mainly those away from the main squares. However even in one of the squares, we found a bar serving beer; English fans were given empty alcohol-free beer bottles to place next to their glass of alcoholic beer to mislead the police. In another incident, fans were provided with Coca-Cola bottles with their beer and told that on a warning from the bar owner that police had arrived, they were to hide the beer under the table and pretend to drink the Cola. Other bar owners locked fans into their premises so that they could drink undisturbed. This all took place within the 24-hour ‘dry’ period in central Rome. Our observations showed that city-wide alcohol bans did not reduce Downloaded by [Paulo Gajanigo] at 07:52 24 September 2011 alcohol consumption by English fans. Instead, their effect was merely to push alcohol consumption away from town squares, to bars and restaurants hidden away down side-streets and to kebab shops and stalls. Often these establishments would only serve beer directly from the bottle, meaning that groups of English would gather together out of sight of the police with potential weaponry to hand. The experience of a visit to Italy on a ‘Euro away’ was completely different to that of English fans at the 2006 World Cup in Germany. Here, the German authorities allowed all bars to remain open as long as they liked, and alcohol was also served in the stadium. The only condition was that beer could only be served in flimsy plastic glasses. On the whole, the English gathered in large groups under the watchful eye of the police and threw beer over each other harmlessly (Stott and Pearson 2007, pp. 303Á311). Giulianotti’s (1991, p. 522) research with fans of the Scottish national team at the 1990 World Cup in Italy also questions the value of alcohol bans as a tool for Policing & Society 161

controlling fans. He argued that for the Scots, the ‘social meaning’ of alcohol was not about ‘violent machismo’ but instead to fuel a ‘party spirit’ or carnival. From our research, this could also be said of the vast majority of English supporters travelling abroad, contrary to media claims that many fans of the England team in particular travel to matches abroad with the intention of becoming involved in disorder (Stott and Pearson 2007). However, the construction of a social problem is often as important as its ‘reality’, especially when the power to construct and define lies only with one side. As the symbolic interactionists Thomas and Thomas (1928, p. 572) stated: ‘if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’ and several sociological and psychological studies on police work show that police strategies and actions are often not a direct response to the actual threat posed by a situation (Della Porta and Reiter 1998, Drury et al. 2003). Police perceptions, derived from the professional culture of the police Á the so called ‘working personality’ (Skolnick 1975), or ‘cop culture’ (Reiner 2000) Á and the political pressures coming from the government or public opinion, lie in between. These perceptions are the core of what Della Porta and Reiter (1998, p. 229) call ‘police knowledge’. The evidence of our empirical work leads to the conclusion that the underlying theories of the Italian police about English fans’ violent behaviour are primarily based on the impact of alcohol. During several interviews, conducted with Italian police officers from different cities in September 2009, our questions about English fans led to these assertions (our translation):

I’m not saying English fans are bad. Actually they’re not. But the problem is they drink. And when they drink, they become violent, they don’t respect people and things any more. You know, it becomes like a barbaric invasion. Look, we’ve got this Champions League game next Tuesday. Actually, it’s not a risky game, but we’re always worried with English teams. I mean, you can never be quiet with English fans, because they always get drunk, and when they’re so pissed, they become uncontrollable. Our interviews with the Italian police suggested that this ‘knowledge’ about the threat posed by British fans in connection with alcohol consumption was an important factor in orientating the approach of the Italian police, and, from our observations, not always in the most helpful direction for reducing the risk of disorder. Moreover, our research suggested that the enforcement of these strategies Downloaded by [Paulo Gajanigo] at 07:52 24 September 2011 could result in tension between the parties, which often confirmed, as a self-fulfilling prophecy, the aggressiveness of the drunk barbaric invaders. Giulianotti (1991, pp. 511Á512) noted that for the Scots, the ban on alcohol consumption, ‘led to the strongest collective feeling against the Italian authorities’ and recommended that, ‘banning alcohol consumption on the day of the match provokes rather than pacifies team members’ (1991, p. 522). Our data revealed that bans on alcohol consumption upon English fans often exacerbated an ‘us and them’ mentality between fans who want to drink and police who wish to stop them (although it can lead to greater positive interaction between fans and bar owners who are willing to break the ban). In these situations the police were seen as ‘killjoys’ who were trying to interfere with the (perceived) legitimate objectives of fans travelling abroad. The greatest practical problem with these bans is that fans gather in large groups deliberately away from the police and if they become targets for local ‘hooligan’ groups (or indeed if they 162 G. Pearson and A. Sale

contain fans who wish to cause violence) there is little opportunity for police to control the situation.

Early kick-off times The final issue we will consider is the use by police of the ‘early kick-off’ to reduce disorder, which is a popular tactic throughout Northern Europe for high risk matches, especially local ‘derbies’.5 As with the other policies considered above, early kick-offs were introduced to reduce the amount of alcohol consumed before a match, in the belief that this will reduce potential disorder. Our observations found that early kick-off times were successful in reducing the amount of alcohol consumed by our research subjects before kick-off, particularly for weekend matches. Although some pubs would open deliberately early for these matches, and fans would typically start drinking earlier than if the game had kicked off later, the supporters under observation were typically less intoxicated by kick-off. Therefore, if we assume that there is a link between alcohol consumption and level of risk, our data suggested that early kick-offs were effective at reducing the potential for violence between rival fans at the match. This is not, however, the same for all fans, some of whom will simply make an earlier start to their drinking either on the journey to the match or by finding a pub or club that will open early. So, for high risk matches where the fans come from different locations, early kick- offs can be effective at reducing the amount of alcohol that is consumed pre-match, and assuming that the visiting supporters travel back afterwards, our findings suggested this can reduce the level of risk. However, for ‘derbies’ between teams in the same city, levels of overall risk may not be reduced by an early kick-off because rival fans remain in close proximity to each other throughout the entire day. Whilst early kick-offs may mean that disorder is reduced at the time of the match, our research found that they have the potential to increase the likelihood of problems throughout the day. Fans under observation would start drinking earlier and following the match many would then return to city centre pubs to drink throughout the afternoon and evening. Observations of a number of Manchester United vs. Manchester City early kick-offs revealed that violence and disorder was likely throughout the entire day, with incidents between rival drunken fans continuing into

Downloaded by [Paulo Gajanigo] at 07:52 24 September 2011 the early hours. Early kick-offs did not reduce the overall amount of alcohol consumed and for some fans they increased it, a view that was supported by a UK match commander responsible for a high risk same-city derby. Although the risk of violence in and around the stadium may be reduced, there is increased risk of violence that may be less easy to control in pubs and clubs later on. For example, statistics released by the Strathclyde Police in May 2009 showed that ‘serious crime on average during the last three Old Firm games was 113% higher than during any other weekend’. Reported instances of domestic violence, for example, showed a 41% increase.6 This was despite Old Firm games usually kicking off early. Counter- intuitively, it may actually be the 7.45 pm weekday kick-offs which lead to the least amount of alcohol consumption around a same-city derby, with most fans working until two hours before kick-off and pubs closing not long after the end of the match. One match commander we spoke to admitted that early kick-offs had the potential to result in significant disorder in the city throughout the remainder of the day, but Policing & Society 163

commented that keeping order in the immediate vicinity of the stadium was the most important priority of the day:

You have to have a hierarchical strategy for the way you approach [these matches]. If we say, as we do, that the primary safety focus is around the stadium, then you take the stadium out of the context later on (...) We try to protect the stadium and take it out of the alcohol-threat. (Interview, 11 September 2009). The authors would fall short of recommending that early kick-offs for same-city derbies should be reconsidered as a result of other factors unrelated to alcohol that may influence the likelihood of disorder. The most significant of these appears to be problems arising from playing high-risk matches during the hours of darkness. In September 2009, the Sheffield United vs. Sheffield Wednesday derby was, in contrast to previous seasons, played at 7.45 pm on a Friday night. The match commander admitted after the event that, ‘I wouldn’t do it again’. Although there were only five arrests, he noted that large scale disorder was only avoided due to ‘saturating’ the immediate vicinity of the ground with nearly 500 officers. The problem as far as the commander was concerned was the combination of the amount of alcohol consumed (many fans took the afternoon off work) and the fact that the match took place at night. He believed the night-time kick-off meant that ‘hooligans’ looking to confront rivals felt less deterred by the police presence, whilst normal fans felt less reassured by their presence, both due to the poorer visibility at night, even with the use of luminous jackets. Additionally, when disorder did occur, orchestrating a quick and effective police response became more difficult due to the darkness:

[In daylight] ...it’s just easier to see what’s happening. You’ve got aircraft footage that shows you [what’s happening] you’re not on infrared, it’s easier to get your cops in place to get it back under control ... But if it breaks down like this at night-time you’ve got huge problems getting it back under control (...) I would say that if we’ve got a high tension game, a night-time makes it worse (...) night-time and drink make it more difficult to police. (Interview, 9 September 2009)

Conclusion For the English fans under observation during the course of our ethnographic studies, alcohol restrictions and bans did not appear to achieve their aims, either in

Downloaded by [Paulo Gajanigo] at 07:52 24 September 2011 terms of reducing the drunkenness of fans in stadia or reducing the potential for violence and disorder that, it has been claimed, can be caused by alcohol consumption. The groups of fans we observed continued to drink heavily before matches despite laws making it an offence to be drunk in a football stadium and even in situations where the sale and consumption of alcohol was prohibited. We discovered that under-enforcement by police and match-day stewards, combined with a determination on the part of fans to drink, ensured that the supporters under observation were able to achieve their aim of watching the game whilst heavily under the influence of alcohol. Furthermore, many of the restrictions placed upon these groups may have increased both the amount of alcohol consumed and the levels of risk of rival fans confronting each other. This is not to suggest that a link between alcohol consumption and violence does not exist (although a direct pharmacological causal link has yet to be proven) and as a result of our ethnographic studies we have sympathies with the arguments that excessive alcohol consumption lowers 164 G. Pearson and A. Sale

inhibitions, makes individuals more likely to perceive the behaviour of others as insulting or challenging, and can make supporters who have had no previous record of being involved in ‘hooliganism’ become involved in spontaneous violence and disorder. However, our research indicated that alcohol bans in stadiums, on transport and over wider areas did not have the effect of reducing the overall intoxication of fans. Although our research was carried out only upon three clubs (albeit on different groups of fans within this match-going support), if this pattern is reflected upon the wider football support, then it has serious implications for social control policies for managing football crowds. The findings of other ethnographic researchers in football crowds (Giulianotti 1991, Armstrong 1998, Sugden 2002, King 2003, Millward 2006, Rookwood 2009) combined with our own casual observations of rival fan groups during matches with the teams being researched, suggest that the behaviour witnessed is likely to be reflected more generally for an important section of the match-going public. In Northern Europe in particular, heavy consumption of alcohol is so ingrained in the fan culture that there is likely to be heavy resistance to alcohol controls, significantly limiting their effectiveness in reducing consumption around matches. As a result, we believe that it is time that the whole issue of alcohol and football crowd disorder is revisited, particularly in light of experiences such as the World Cup in 2006 and the European Football Championships in Portugal in 2004. At both of these tournaments, alcohol was freely available at all times and large numbers of English supporters were permitted to achieve high levels of intoxication. However, despite numerous ‘flash points’, serious disorder did not occur in the host cities. It is clear from tournaments such as these that it is possible to successfully police large crowds of drunken English football supporters, and that access to, and consumption of, alcohol is not the key determining factor in whether a crowd will become violent.

Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers at Policing and Society for their insightful and helpful comments that have substantially improved the quality of the final paper. Downloaded by [Paulo Gajanigo] at 07:52 24 September 2011 Notes 1. See also R v Doncaster Justices ex parte Langﬁeld QBD 149 JP 26. This is in contrast to the 1984 Report of the Ofﬁcial Working Group on Football Spectator Violence (Teasdale 1984), which stated that legislation preventing the consumption of alcohol at grounds or on football ‘specials’ was unnecessary, partially because the police had reported to them that alcohol was not a major factor for football-related violence in England and Wales (Paragraph 5). 2. For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘drunk’ is used to mean a level of intoxication whereby the authors could witness a change in the behaviour of the research subjects. Typically this would result in them becoming louder, less inhibited in their physical contact with other fans, and more likely to break into song. It does not only refer to the extreme levels of intoxication where they became physically incapable of walking straight or talking without slurring their words, or become nauseous. 3. This was a purely qualitative assessment based on amount of alcohol consumed and observed behavioural changes. Policing & Society 165

4. We use the term ‘binge’ to reﬂect a situation where the research subjects drank with the intention of achieving a state of drunkenness. For different fans, this would result in different amounts being consumed and at different speeds, but it can be differentiated from fans who, for example, arrived late and drank a single pint in a couple of minutes, or a fan who consumed four pints over a period of half a day. 5. In the UK, it is the local police who will have the ﬁnal say as to whether a match can kick- off at a certain time. 6. http://www.strathclyde.police.uk/index.asp?locID1430&docID6735 [Accessed 19 October 2009].

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