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The modernization of professional football in England and the United States: A comparative analysis

Dawson, Steven Charles, Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1994

UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106

THE MODERNIZATION OF PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL IN

ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of Ohio State University

By

Steven Charles Dawson, B.Ed., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1994

Dissertation Committee: Approved by

M. Adelman

S. Kleinman

B. Nelson

Adviser

Department of Physical Education Copyright by Steven Charles Dawson 1994 To my Wife and children ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to sincerely thank Dr. Melvin Adelman for his patience, guidance, and insightful comments during the course of this study. I also appreciate the efforts and suggestions from the other members of my advisory committee, Drs. Barbara Nelson and Sy

Kleinman. Gratitude is expressed to Gene Harvey for his assistance and efforts in the computing center. To my Wife, Debra, and my children, Jessica, Brenton and Jennifer, I am extremely grateful for their support, their faith in my ability, and their understanding during my absence.

Ill VITA

July 7, 1954 ...... Bom, London England

1978 ...... B.Ed. Loughborough University, Loughborough, England

1978-1979 Teacher, Cardinal Hinsley High School, London, England

1979-1981 M.A. Sport Sociolo^, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio.

1981-1982 ...... Teacher, Watchung Hills High School, Warren, New Jersey.

1982-Presen t ...... Assistant Professor of Physical Education, Wittenberg University, Springfield, Ohio.

PUBLICATIONS

Dawson, S.C., M. Malmisur and J.Lewis. A Comparative Analysis of Professional Soccer in the United States and England. Journal of Snort Behavior. 7, 3, 1984.

FIELD OF STUDY

Major Field; Health, Physical Education and Recreation.

IV TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... iii

VITA ...... iv

LIST OF TABLES ...... ix

CHAPTER PAGE

I INTRODUCTION ...... 1

General Statement...... 1 Thesis Statement...... 1 Goal of Study ...... 1 Why Such a Study...... 2 Relevance and Importance of diis Study ...... 3 Problems and Issues to S o lv e...... 3 Modernization...... 4 Review of Literature...... 4 Modernization Theory ...... 4 Cross Cultural Analysis ...... 10 Internal Versus E xternal...... 13 Development of Thesis...... 15 Methodology and Other Needed P o in ts...... 16 Fram ework...... 18 Rationalization...... 18 Organization...... 21 Commercialization ...... 23 M e d ia ...... 25 Employee R o le...... 26 n THE G A M E ...... 28

ENGLAND...... 28 Competitions...... 32 World Cup ...... 32 The F.A. Cup ...... 33 The Football League Cup ...... 34 The Football League Championship...... 34 International T eam s...... 35 CHAPTER PAGE

Apprentices...... 36 Amateur Football ...... 37 Managers and Coaches...... 38 Substitutions...... 38 Length of Season ...... 39 Crowds ...... 39 USA ...... 41 The Roots of Professional Football...... 43 The Pennsylvania Period ...... 45 The Ohio Period...... 46 Transition and Development ...... 48 Post World Warn ...... 51 The Contemporary Game ...... 53

m RATIONALIZATION...... 57

ENGLAND...... 58 Introduction...... 58 Nineteenth C entury...... 58 Twentieth Century - Training and Practice...... 68 City F a c to r...... 69 Professionalism, Conunercialism, and the Working-Class ...... 70 Post World War I ...... 72 Managers and Certified Coaches ...... 75 Europe and the World ...... 80 The 1960s o n...... 84 USA ...... 88 Introduction...... 88 Nineteenth C entury...... 89 Twentieth Century...... 92 League Structure...... 97 Post World War H ...... 99 A Unique G am e...... 103

IV ORGANIZATION ...... 112

ENGLAND...... 113 Introduction...... 113 Nineteenth C entury...... 114 Profit Seeking Organizations or N o t?...... 118 Separation of Amateur and Professional ...... 123 League S occer...... 125 Goals of the FA and F L ...... 128 A Time for C hange...... 133 USA ...... 137 Introduction...... 137 Nineteenth C entury...... 138 Early Twentieth Century...... 139

vi CHAPTER PAGE

From APFA to N F L...... 140 Expansion and R ivalry ...... 144 TheAFL ...... 149 The 1970s o n ...... 153

V COMMERCIALIZATION ...... 156

ENGLAND...... 157 Introduction...... 157 Nineteenth C entury...... 158 Expansion and Domination ...... 161 Promotion and P ro fit...... 165 Inter-War Y ears...... 168 Consumer Capitalism...... 171 Selling Pro Soccer...... 174 The New Order and Thatcherism ...... 177 USA ...... 182 Introduction...... 182 Nineteenth C entury...... 183 Pro Football in die Midwest...... 187 Financial Uncertainty...... 190 Pro Football and the Big C ity...... 192 Fiscal Growth ...... 195 Revenue Sharing and P arity ...... 199 NFL T oday...... 203

VI M E D IA ...... 207

ENGLAND...... 208 Introduction...... 208 Print Media - Early Days ...... 208 Broadcast M edia ...... 210 Celebrity Status ...... 211 Age of Publicity...... 213 Managers and M ed ia ...... 215 TV and Fan Violence...... 216 Thatcherism, Impression-Managers, and Satellite T V ...... 217 USA ...... 230 Introduction...... 230 Early Struggle...... 230 Recognition by the Press...... 231 Pro Football and its "Marriage" to T V...... 232 Pro Football - A Game Made for T V...... 240

Vn EMPLOYEE ROLE ...... 249

ENGLAND...... 250

vii CHAPTER PAGE

Introduction...... 250 Early Professionals...... 250 Unions and Working-Class Id entity ...... 255 Prosperity and Freedom? ...... 261 Aspirations and Opportunities...... 264 M anagers...... 266 E quality...... 269 USA ...... 272 Introduction...... 272 The Early Professional...... 272 Stardom and Pro Football...... 275 Post World War n ...... 277 1960s - Stardom, Coaches and Defense...... 280 Individualism, Agents and U nions ...... 283 E quality...... 287

Vm ANALYSIS...... 292

Rationalization...... 292 Organizations...... 308 Commercialization ...... 322 Media ...... 341 Employee R o le...... 352 S um m ary...... 362 Conclusion...... 371

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 373

V lll LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE

1 Occupations of Club Directors 1888-1914 ...... 160

2 Attendance and Profit for First Division League Teams, 1913-1914...... 165

3 NFL Financial Summary: 1970-1980* (in thousands of do llars)...... 198

4 Free Agency Salaries 1992, 1993...... 287

IX CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

General Statement

Professional football (American football in the USA, and soccer in England) has grown

in popularity in both the USA and England over the past century. Both sports saw their inception

in the nineteenth century yet were not accepted at the pro level by the public and press, as a

serious, worthwhile enterprise, until the twentieth century. However, once recognition occurred

the professional game evolved into a commercialized, spectator sport.

Besides the obvious differences between American football and soccer, cultural disparities

are a factor in producing dichotomies between each sport, however, similarities do exist.

Therefore, this study will examines both similarities and differences in terms of structure, the

way the game has been played, organized and developed, and the meaning it brings to sport and

the culture.

Thesis Statement

Goal of Studv

In this study I use a cross-cultural analysis to examine the development of professional

football in England and the USA. I employ a concept of modernization to establish the

framework to analyze the nature of and reasons for the significant changes that occurred. It is

my intent to demonstrate that the basic structure and philosophy of modem football evolved

during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. References to the pre-professional era are discussed only as it directly impinged on developments of the game as we know it today,

1 2

This study is about the way professional football has developed in each culture. The

main theme is concerned with the process and rate by which professional football modernized and

its relationship to the culture in which it developed. Football in England and the USA has taken

on certain characteristics (for example, bureaucratic structure, commercial ideology, rational

approach) reflective of a modem society, and these characteristics will form the framework by

which the level of modernization will be assessed.

Why Such a Studv?

There are many reasons for a study of this nature of which four are listed below. First,

if social scientists are to explain sport as it exists today they have to understand how it evolved

and, perhaps more importantly, why. Too many studies describing the meaning of sport are

ahistorical and consequently do not provide us the insights necessary for an overall, critical

conceptual understanding. Second, I believe cross-cultural, comparative research is a scholarly

exercise most valuable to the future of sport sociology. To understand sport in a particular

culture and explain how it reflects social trends — which has been a most popular topic among

sport sociologists of late — it would be beneficial and appropriate to compare that particular sport

to one played in a different culture. This is of particular interest to me because I have spent a significant part of my life living in two different societies, and find it interesting and enlightening to compare different sports and sport systems in general. Third, I contend that the concept of modernization, placed within a framework to be used as a heuristic device, is a valuable addition to the analysis of sport. It provides scholars with critical frame of reference for explaining what sport is, where it came from and how it evolved. And fourth, I know of no other study that has compared pro football in America and pro soccer in England in the way this study has. While a difficult and ambitious enterprise, I believe it to be a fascinating task that adds much to the literature in the sport social science area. 3

Relevance and Importance of this Studv

This study demonstrates that while certain characteristics of contemporary sport are taken

on more readily by one culture than another, sport in different cultures can develop at a similar

rate. It also recognizes that sport does not act independently of other institutions, and does take

on facets of the culture in which it exists (external influences). This latter example will

demonstrate that sport in England and the USA will modernize at a different rate depending on

social change, but the difference may not be that significant, indicating a merging of the two

cultures, or the universal capacity of sport (overcoming cultural boundaries), or both.

The value of cross-cultural analysis, i.e., the significance of this type of work, may be two-fold in this case. First, it helps us understand football and its modernization in both cultures, and the external and internal forces that move sport in a particular direction. Second, it addresses the controversy of the universalistic versus particularistic aspects of sport, and raises questions about the autonomy of sport. Sport can be seen as both separate and tied to the "real world."

What this study will do is analyze the tension within this relationship of independence and dependence. Such an analysis will examine the following question; can the quest for records overcome cultural imposition?

Problems and Issues to Solve

There are three main issues this study is attempting to resolve. First, to understand why one sport, rather than another, takes on and exhibits particular characteristics of modernization at certain periods of time; is it in response to the culture or is more related to the nature of the sport itself? Utilizing a framework for measuring modernization within a comparative analysis, this study will be able to address these questions and demonstrate how to apply such a framework. Second, it is important to understand historical social developments in examining sport in different cultures. This study will examine the structure, development and organization of sport in relation to social change. For example, it will examine the following questions: what are the differences and similarities between the organizational structure of pro soccer and pro 4

football?; and, what were the external and internal forces that were instrumental in the emergence

of these two different sport systems? Third, this study will address the question of whether sport

is more universalistic or particularistic in the way it has evolved. Therefore, the question of

autonomy or dependence will be attended to. For example, is football different from soccer

because it evolved in the USA or because of internal mechanisms facilitating this? Or, are both

sports very similar because sport crosses all social and cultural boundaries? Or, are both sports

becoming similar because American values are having a profound influence on English culture?

These issues will be examined in this study.

Modernization

It is appropriate here to state the definition of the concept of modernization as it will be

used throughout this thesis. Modernization as referred to in this study entails movement from

a traditional "ideal" type of society to the modem "ideal" type of society which conceptually rests

on patterns of thought, behavior, and organization (Brown, 1976). Similar to the modernization

of society the modernization of sport entails the movement from the premodem to the modem

pattem (Adelman, 1986).

Review of Literature

Modemization Theorv

The concq)t of modernity became very evident in the nineteenth century and reflected characteristics of contemporary western development. At this time becoming modem was associated with progress, while today the two terms, "modem" and "progress," are recognized to have taken on different meanings. Brown (1976) says progress is an open ended term closely linked to improvement, but the term modem has acquired static characteristics. Therefore to state that becoming modem was largely synonymous with progress leads to many unsubstantiated value judgments. 5

Brown (1976) regrets this occurrence when he notes: "The lingering overlap between

"progress" and "modemization" is especially evident in the work of social scientists. They

haven’t really achieved a detached cultural relativism, their writings impute superiority to the

dynamic, "progressive," modem and westem societies over the traditional non-westem culture"

(p.5).

Gmneau (1986) sees modemization as a process that encompasses a broad range of human bdiavior, rather than a single event. Consequently, there is no attempt on his part to fix

an exact date for the inception of modem sport.

Gmneau (1986) also notes that sport should not be seen simply as a reflection of the society in which it exists. Modem sport has been widely viewed as a cultural bi-product of the technological and social changes associated with the development of an urban and industrial society. These changes are said to have undermined the basis for older pre-industrial forms of sporting practice while creating the conditions necessary for the emergence of modem sport

(Gmneau, 1986).

Yet beyond reference to technological pressures Gmneau (1986) states that few writers have been either specific or detailed enough about the precise ways in which industrialization and urbanization have transformed sporting practice in westem societies. Adelman (1986) states, that the concepts of industrialization and urbanization are often used merely as abstractions whose apparent influences on sport are treated as self-evident. The accumulation of these little bits of causation related to the impact of industrialization and urbanization on sport is not sufficient to tell us the whole story (Gruneau, 1986).

Influential in the development of this kind of thought were those scholars who, in their desire to explain modem life, constmcted various typologies based on a dichotomous conception of traditional and modem society. These scholars — Henry Maine’s (1822-1888) status and contract, Emile Durkheim’s (1858-1917) mechanical and organic solidarity, and Ferdinand

Tonnies’s (1855-1936) Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft — argued that traditional society was stable, with limited differentiation, an agrarian economy based on a mechanical division of labor and 6

ruled by an ascriptive elite. Modem society, on the other hand, was described as having a high

division of labor consistent with industrial change; it was a functional social structure that

adjusted to changing political and economic patterns. Life was dynamic, oriented to change,

innovation, and rationality. Premodem life was static, homogeneous and tradition-bound.

Adelman (1992) notes that Max Weber (1864-1920) argued that typological constmcts

(what he called "ideal types") were not perfect reflections of any existing society, but a heuristic

device designed to help analysis. Weber was especially critical of scholars who adapted a linear

vision of social change. Weber noted that Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft were in reality not

mutually exclusive types, but that both continued to coexist within modem society.

Recent historical and sociological literature has been sensitive to the need for a broader

theoretical analysis of sport and social development (Dunning, 1973; Dunning and Sheard, 1979;

Guttmann, 1978; Adelman, 1986; Gmneau, 1986). These writers all emphasize how the

understanding of sport as a simple reflection of technological innovation, or of seemingly related

changes in social organization, has proven extremely limiting. They offer more complex analyses

of sport in the context of the transformation of pre-industrial to industrial societies (Gmneau,

1986).

Many writers of social development of industrial societies have made the mistake of

largely "borrowing" ideas and theoretical arguments from the mainstream of westem social

thought. Gmneau (1986) has argued that these ideas and arguments are an expression of a

general theory of industrial society many of whose assumptions have become almost taken-for-granted in contemporary sociology and historiography. What is needed is a more

critical frame of reference.

Gmneau (1986) feels some writers whose work can be linked to the theory of industrial society often advance at least one (but not necessarily all) of the following notions: 1) while modem sport has its problems, these imperfections tend to be counterbalanced by the positive and progressive features in industrial societies. Modem sports opened up a great number of possibilities unavailable in pre-industrial times (Guttmann, 1978), and athletes today are more 7

skilled than ever before; 2) democratization of sports has continued to occur along with the

breakdown of ascriptive privilege in the society as a whole, and the expansion of individual

opportunities in sport for the poor, women and minority racial and ethnic groups; 3) modem

sport is seen as a rational adaptation to meet the needs of developing urban, secular and industrial

society, and the new dominant values embodied in a growing middle-class which has a concern

for utility and respectability in addition to achievement; 4) major social conflicts in sport were

simply a transitory feature in the change from traditional to modem sporting forms and practices.

The dominant structures and meanings of modem sport have now become fully legitimated and

reflects a broader consensus, and functions in society in a way which helps to reinforce the

apparent rational ordering of modem life; and, 5) the fundamental characteristics of sport are

basically similar throughout modem industrial societies. The dominant structures and meanings

of sports in technologically advanced societies will inevitably provide the model for sports in

supposedly underdeveloped societies (Gruneau’s discussion here adapts some of the ideas

postulated in Giddens, 1982).

The problem with this broad perspective lies in the underlying assumptions and

explanatory categories of the theory itself. If one accepts Gmneau’s critique, the assumptions

need to be modified and are highly problematic. This becomes a very functionalist approach

where life in the west is described as voluntary and consensual in nature while promoting social

progress and equality.

During the first half of the twentieth century, American sociologists - Charles Cooley

(1864-1929), Louis Wirth (1897-1952), Talcott Parsons (1902-1979), and Robert Redfield (1897-

1958) — spoke of social change in which a community style of life was being replaced by more functional, associational, modem styles. However, "it was the works of Parsons and other stmctural-functional writers that profoundly influenced how modemization theorists framed their examinations and explanations of the process of social change" (Adelman, 1992, p.348).

These modemization theorists saw modernity as an expression of rationality, progress and liberal democracy. They adapted an holistic approach to analyzing the process of social change. 8

which tied them closely with structural-functionalism and emphasized the ideal type construction

of traditional and modem societies as mutually exclusive. The holistic approach was centered

on the idea that characteristics and institutional structures of modem society facilitated adaptations

to societal change and problems. Modemization theorists also argued that there was a merging

of various institutional areas. Consequently, the modemization of one area (institutions)

influenced the modemization of another and produced similar structural patterns (Adelman,

1992).

Guttmann (1991) has been critical of those writers who have assumed modem to exclude

traditional yet includes progressive and moral behavior.

Whether one conceptualizes in terms of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, the traditional and the modem, the particularistic and the universalistic, or some other admittedly simplified dichotomy, everyone with a historically informed sociological imagination recognizes that there has been a social transformation in the last two centuries and that this transformation has produced a more secular and more rationalized world, if not a more rational one. It is admittedly regrettable that some ethnocentric simplifateurs have assumed that this transformation is a) a sign of moral as well as technological progress and, therefore, b) proof of the moral as well as the technologic^ superiority of the modernizers over the traditionalists. But these mistaken assumptions should not be allowed to discredit the insights of Toennies, Weber and their like (jp.188).

This approach, alluded to by Guttmann (1991), also places too much emphasis on

descriptive "mapping" of changes rather than their explanation. How did these changes occur?

It is important when defining sports as either traditional or modem that we do not overlook the

important differences between the characteristics of sports at varying moments in the history of

specific societies. When comparing sport in different societies the theory of industrial society

leads us to explain variations in degrees of traditionalism and modernity which is inadequate because it fails to identify die fundamental differences in the political and economic histories of

each country (Gmneau, 1986). If people are to understand the differences in the evolution of sport from one society to another it is necessary that they first acquire knowledge of the history and culture of each society. 9

Finally industrial society theory too readily conveys the impr^sicn that the development

of sporting practices in modem life is an essentially completed phenomenon. The transition from

traditional to modem is not a beginning to end kind of analysis. A point Adelman is most

sensitive of in his work on modemization.

Process should be conceptualized as both continuity and change. "Too much is left out

of the account if we merely conceive of the recent history of sport as a general transformation from traditional elite and popular recreations to the institutionalized practices of modem mass sports." (Gmneau, 1986, p.23) Modem industrial societies still contain important residual sporting practices, styles and traditions. "By the very term "residual" I mean sporting practices, styles and beliefe effectively formed in the past but which remain highly significant today"

(Williams, 1977, p.65).

For example, the basic idea of competition has remained the same, i.e., domination of your opponent, distinguish the winner from the loser. The winner received the adulation of the crowd in Ancient Greece and Rome and does today. More specifically, they still do not play a tie-break in the final set at Wimbledon. The F.A. Cup Final in England is always played on a

Saturday at 3 p.m. with Royalty presenting the trophy in front of the fans. The winning team then performs a lap of honor. In college football a tie is a tie, no overtime. Concerning the fans, their participation and accommodation may have changed but their role has essentially remained the same.

Some of these traditional practices, styles and beliefs have become incorporated into more typically modem ways of playing, and to say that they lie outside the consensus formed around modem sports and social needs (i.e., they are deviant or dysftinctional) confuses the needs and interests of specific groups of people with the needs and interests of the whole society (cf.,

Gmneau, 1976; Hargreaves, 1982). For example, certain traditional aspects of pro soccer that soccer people want to retain have continued to exist — standing while spectating, maintaining four divisions and so forth. One of the important questions this study attempts to answer is : "How 10

have some sporting forms and ways of playing been able to achieve dominance in the face of

contending or alternative forms and ways of playing?" (Gruneau, 1986, p.25).

Cross Cultural Analvsis

Potentialities of the field of sport sociology as well as some of its important results can

be found in the cross-cultural analysis of sport and games, which for the comparative study of

socio-cultural systems in sociology and cultural anthropology can provide us with crucial

insights. Such analysis will also lead to new and better insights in regard to the theory of sport

itself (Luschen, 1970).

Adelman (1992) also sees the value in this type of analysis. "Given the global dimension

of modemization and the assumption that it possessed universal characteristics, it is not surprising

that historians engaged in cross-cultural research foimd this approach attractive" ^.349).

Cyril Black’s (1966) work the Dynamics of Modemization was influential in promoting

this orientation for historical study. In 1975, collaborating with scholars from a variety of

disciplines. Black wrote The Modemization of Japan and Russia. According to George

Fredrickson (1980) this thoroughly comparative study was the most successful example of

comparative history and it demonstrated that interdisciplinary work was the goal of the fiiture.

A theoretical frame of reference for the comparative study of sport and games is provided

by structural functional theory. Luschen (1970) has argued that regardless of the body of theory

and the conceptual frame of reference, the methodological procedures as already outlined by

anthropologists like Radcliffe-Brown (1952) stand out as a must in the comparative analysis of sport and games. Not only should a structural analysis be provided in order to determine the make-up of the system of sport itself and the interrelationship of sport to the socio-cultural system at large and its subsystems, but the question of the functional significance of sport should be answered as well. "If one does not want to raise this problem in terms of structural functional theory, it will necessarily appear again in the methodology of comparative research as that of equivalence." (Luschen, 1970, p.7) 11

Continuing on from this point Luschen (1970) felt that it is impossible to overlook the

fact that sport and games in one culture have completely different meaning, or function for that

matter, than in another. Baseball in Lybia is only materially the same as baseball in the USA (cf.

Gini, 1939). Personally I would dispute this point. Guttmann (1978) would disagree as he feels

sport contains certain universalistic elements that cut across cultural boundaries. Central to

Guttmann's thesis was the belief that the quest for records, the essential characteristic of modem

sport, which has its roots in the victory of Enlightenment science, has produced a sport system

which is more universalistic than particularistic.

This controversy is central to the purpose of this study. That is, to examine whether the

"road" that pro soccer took during the last one hundred years or so is similar to the one taken

by pro football over the same period, or, the evolution of each sport been predominantly a

response to cultural imposition. The latter position is difRcult to prove when cultural values

converge.

Allardt (1970) feels that all sociology is comparative, since all studies involve

comparisons of groups or analyses of the variation of some social phenomena in relation to other

social phenomena. He insists that "comparative sociology designates comparisons of societies

defined either by nationhood or a distinct cultural heritage. Because of the many different

connotations the word "comparative" has had in the history of social science it would perhaps be

recommendable to speak directly of cross-national and cross-cultural instead of comparative

research" (p. 14).

Dawson, Malmisur and Lewis (1984) utilized a paradigm Talcott Parsons (1961)

developed to demonstrate how structural conditions of professional soccer in the USA and

England are related to each fiinctional imperative of his theory. The purpose of that study was to show differences and similarities between two sport systems guided by Parsons’ paradigm.

Using this method, in searching for intra-relationships within countries, these scholars uncovered differences and similarities between professional soccer in the USA and England. They 12

concluded that there are significant differences between the structures and processes of

professional soccer in the USA and England.

Not only did Parsons’ view of basic functions organize the comparisons between soccer

in each society, discussion led to a consensus that governing bodies; rules; profit and promotion;

and fan behavior were worthy, if not prime, examples of mechanisms accounting for each

function. Regarding pattern maintenance, it was found governing bodies in the USA were more

diverse than in England where the Football Association (FA) dominates professional soccer.

Competition in the USA was, therefore, more autonomous; in England more compliant. This

flexible pattern in the USA persisted in rules and regulations: the integrative structure. American

professional soccer was characterized by flexibility, while English soccer was steeped in

tradition. Sharp differences between the two systems were found comparing goal attainment

mechanisms. American professional soccer stressed profit; England emphasized promotion of

the game. Adaptation in the USA as measured by fan behavior revealed more

convenience-oriented structures than in England. Fan behavior in England has at times been

maladaptive (Dawson et al, 1984).

Finally, this analysis depicted the value and need for comparative sport sociological

study. An understanding of unique dimensions of the social system of professional soccer

emerged as culture and sport was mirrored by the other. In this way, contrasting cultural

relativity of social mechanisms teased out similarities and differences of systems: a basic step

toward meaning. The authors concluded that more investigations of this type, empirically and

theoretically guided, are needed.

A cross cultural approach analyzing the evolution of sport, allows us to compare one

society with another, and should encourage scholars to be more sensitive to the social history of

different societies and the impact of urbanization and industrialization, and at the stages they occurred. "Any fully developed analysis of the social development of sport in western societies must be more broadly theorized" (Gruneau, 1986, p.2) 13

Sport sociologists have constantly attempted to demonstrate societal pressures affecting

and directing behavior in sport. By comparing one sport milieu with another (different societies)

and/or examining sport over time, scholars would be more able to argue in favor of sport as a

reflection of society or a unique phenomenon in and of itself.

Internal Versus External

In A Sporting Time (1986), Adelman applied a modernization framework to a particular time and place (mid-nineteenth-century New York City), and utilized internal and external approaches to analyze developments in sport. This perspective Adelman (1992) said, "facilitated an examination of sport on two distinct but interrelated and interacting levels: the relationship between sport and the modernization of society and the evolution of modem sport structures and ideology" ^.352).

Adelman’s work demonstrated that societal change was not the only factor influencing the emergence of modem sport structures. Rather, this development in sport was also the result of various internal events, such as the rate at which it grew, the extent to which it became a competitive activity, and the degree to which it evolved as a commercial enterprise.

By the 1980s other scholars, such as Harris (1981), realized the need to move beyond the social control (social imposition) debate and focus on reconstmcting the options faced by those in institutions. This strategy moved historians to give greater expression to an internal analysis.

According to Adelman (1992) the combination of intemal and extemal perspectives produced scholarly work from historians about the nature and operation of modem institutions and the imposition of society at large, and educated us as to the limitations of modemization theory. "These historians still viewed institutional stmctures as possessing some degree of

"autonomy," but they rejected the systemic approach and its machine-like imagery. Rather they envisioned stmctures as embedded in cultural constmcts" (p.3S2).

Hardy (1986) alluded to the importance of utilizing an intemal form of inquiry. He suggested that instead of utilizing sport from the outside in, scholars should consider 14

developments from the inside out. He notes: "The starting point will not be the broad processes

that concern social historians — developments in social class, urban life, or racism. Rather the

initial focus will be on central issues as the sport organizations defined them" 16). Therefore,

the main questions for researchers become less concerned with changing issues in society as a

whole, and more around standard, ongoing developments within the sport industry.

While the application of the outside-in approach enabled scholars to frame sport in its

societal context — something which is absent in many popular sport histories — it also resulted

in historians interpreting the evolution of modem sport as a by-product of alterations in society.

"Their analysis lacked an intemal perspective that would examine how the institutional and

stmctural characteristics of athletics were implicated in influencing the tone and direction of

sport" (Adelman, 1992, p.352).

We can see forces on two levels, the extemal and the intemal. Extemal influences can

be seen as socio-cultural imposition, and intemal influences can be seen as independent yet

interrelated forces. An example of the latter could be a league having an institutional stmcture

of its own.

This study will examine changes in pro football and pro soccer in relation to the dynamics of intemal and extemal developments. For example, those that govem sport sometimes impose policies, laws and so forth to accommodate change in society at large or the general sport subculture. On the other hand, they may initiate change specifically for the benefit of their particular sport without much regard for other sports or what is "fashionable" at the time. There are obvious connections here between the intemal and extemal position and the universalistic and particularistic controversy which this study will attend to. 15

Development of Thesis

This study is a cross-cultural analysis of the development of professional football utilizing

a framework for modemization. The following are some of the questions that this study attempts

to answer:

1) How has professional football developed in England and the USA during the twentieth century?

2) What characteristics of modemization has each sport taken on, and are these universal or specific to each culture?

3) What are the residual components of sport that have been able to survive despite emerging alternative forms?

4) Is football more modem in one culture than the other?

By addressing these questions it is possible to demonstrate the significance of this study

and analyze the relationship between sport and society.

Sociologists and modemization theorists have been guilty of making a number of

assumptions about occurrences and behavior in sport without taking into consideration how these

occurrences and behavioral patterns came about, or by substituting functionalist teleology for

historical process, static and reified ideal types for complex social realities, and temporal labels

for social categories (Wilentz, 1984). They have tended to by-pass factors preceding these

occurrences; factors very influential to the actions of present time. Therefore much of their work has been ahistorical.

Adelman (1992) concedes that as a theoretical construct modemization is historical.

When considering its sociological origins tills is neitiier surprising nor could it have been otherwise. However, Smelser (1960) a proponent of modemization theory, realized there were important differences between the model (of modemization) and actual historical experiences.

In fact, Adelman argues that the theory was not designed to match reality or explain the unfolding of a series of events as historians conceptualize this process. Nonetheless, when modemization 16

is accepted as a concept created to help frame coherent patterns, it is, as Raymond Grew (1977)

noted, certainly historical.

While Grew (1977) asserted that modemization was not a theory, and had no predictive

powers,

he maintained that the concept defines categories that describe the organization of society and its constituent parts, and that it very broadly defines the direction of change that may occur within diese categories. The framework also relates how changes in one category are connected to changes in another, indicates how social groups respond to such alterations, and identifies shifting patterns of organization and bdiavior (Adelman, 1992, p.354).

Also, Grew believed the concept facilitated comparisons between social groups, countries,

and time periods.

This study recognizes the importance of previous happenings on present-day behavior and

structure, as well as the need for comparative analysis. By analyzing and comparing different

cultures and examining their history scholars can better demonstrate sport’s ability to be universal

across cultures or whether it is specific to each country. Cross-cultural analysis is important to the nature of the subject area; an avenue to which sport sociology should be directed.

Mefiiodologv and Other Needed Points

By examining the historical development of football in England and the USA this study will analyze the modemization process of these sports. This study will draw upon secondary sources, and will be limited to information from books, articles, newspapers and so forth, on the relevant subject area.

This kind of scholarly enterprise demands an analysis of the changing meanings and uses of popular traditions by difrering social groups in the history of modem industrial societies.

When utilizing this approach researchers will be less likely to commit the error of viewing the history of sport as a series of rational or functionally necessary adaptations to change, as the result of a consensus rooted in the changing normative structure of society, or even as the 17

determined outgrowth of the continuing forces of rationalization. According to Gruneau (1986)

what we are really looking at in the history of modem sport is a history of cultural struggle. He

says sports caimot be reduced to determinants which are seen to lie in an otherwise constituted

social order. They are better understood as shifting social and cultural practices which help to

constitute particular ways of life.

Although I am not totally convinced of Brohm’s (1976) idea that sport always plays an

integrating and never an oppositional role, I do believe that nearly all categories of capitalist

production reappear in sport practices, directly or indirectly — certainly in pro sport. As

Adelman (1986) noted: "By training and adjusting urban men to the view of the new social

system, sport as a promoter of rational order became a servant of its creator, the modem

productive system" (p.9).

Central to this study is the idea that material and cultural influences have constitutive

roles in the development of meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt. The

important question is how do they interconnect?

While a number of theorists including Gmneau have argued that "there is a very real

sense in which sport’s form actually is set apart in space and time by its constituting stmctures,"

(p.39) this study contends that this is not always the case. The mles that govem sport may differ

from other institutions — economy, education, government. However, there is a common bond

between the competition stmcture in sport and the market place that has developed as a result of

the modemization process and the imposition of rational order.

The goal of this study is to offer an explanation of the social development of sport. The

concepts of capital accumulation, unequal class relationships and powers, commodification, and

hegemony, need to be fully considered in any adequate analysis of the social development of

modem sport. Alüiough rather ambitious die attempt will be made to develop an analysis which

will add credence to this type of work. For as Brown (1976) noted: "An interpretive framework that promises to integrate a wide range of historical phenomena deserves scmtiny. An idea that 18

helps to explain the connections among events in economic, political, social and inteilectual

history can be vitally important for our understanding" 19).

Framework

Utilizing the works of Adelman (1986,1992), Brown (1976), Gruneau (1986), Guttmann

(1978), this study seeks to establish modemization as an analytic framework for comprehending

changes in the structures, attitudes toward, and functions of sport in the twentieth century. The

framework is comprised of five characteristics of modemization — rationalization, organization,

commercialization, media, employee role. The characteristics utilized and applied will be

sufficient, though not totally encompassing, in illustrating and examining stmctural and cultural

influences on a particular sport over time. While Chapter n is not part of this framework it is

included in the study because it familiarizes the reader with pro soccer and pro football.

Rationalization

The first characteristic to be examined is rationalization. This is chosen first and

analyzed at greater length because it is perceived as more influential in initiating stmctural and

cultural change than any other characteristic.

Brown (1976) distinguishes between two ideal societal types - traditional and modem — although he concedes that neither type has ever existed in its ideal form. These societal types posses polar characteristics. Traditional society reflects stability, localism, an ascriptive paternalistic hierarchy, little specialization, and a dependence on manual labor. Time moves in endless cycles as the past, present and future are the same. Also, the goal is to maintain society as it exists (acceptance and resignation of life) rather than incorporating new ways of thinking or doing things.

By contrast. Brown (1976) sees modem society as dynamic, cosmopolitan, technological, and indicative of a functional social stmcture that conforms to changing ideologies and evolving 19

political and economic systems; most of all it is rational. "The desire for change and the belief

that it can be achieved through the application of rational analysis is central to modem

society For Brown, modernization entails movement in the direction of this ideal type, which

conceptually rests on patterns of thought, behavior, and organization and which may be applied

to any sphere of social life" (Adelman, 1986, p.5).

Primitive sports were controlled and regulated by taboos and traditions. Prescribed rules

of competition characterize modem sport. However, the difference between the rules of the

former and the latter is that modem sports are rationalized rather than prescribed by tradition.

The important point here is that there is a connection between means and ends. The rules of the

game are perceived as a means to an end. New rules replace old ones. "The mles are cultural

artifacts and not divine instmctions" (Guttmann, 1978, p.40).

For example, in the National Football League (NFL), as a result of the players becoming

bigger, stronger, and more highly trained, the game became faster so a fourth official was added

in 1929, a fifth in the backfield in 1947, and a sixth official in 1965, the line judge, to

accommodate this change. In 1985 the length of a team time-out during the last two minutes was reduced from 90 to 60 seconds. The reason for this change may be because the game was becoming too long and people were losing interest, or perhaps too many stoppages in such a short period of time dismpted the TV schedule.

This connection between means and ends is also illustrated in modem sport by deferred gratification which could be defined as training. "Training implies a rationalization of the whole enterprise, a willingness to experiment, a constant testing of results achieved" (Guttmann, 1978, p.43). Also, information about certain contests and how to perform certain skills are written, rationalized, and stmctured with an organizational basis. An example of this for both the NFL and professional soccer in England concerns the time commitment of athletes to perform at this level. NFL players are not only involved with their sport seven days of the week during the season, but have an extensive pre-season and strength program in the off-season. Professional soccer players in England receive at most a two month break from competition. Those on the 20

international team are lucky to get any release time at all. However, unlike the NFL, most

games are played on Saturdays and weekdays so Sunday is generally a day off. Nonetheless,

these athletes are part of an organizational structure that constantly imposes itself on them from

the time they enter it to the time they retire.

We can see analogous phenomena in the rationalization of productivity. As operations research indicated how men and machines could be made more productive when their movements could be preplanned so as to fulfil tightly integrated patterns, workers became subject to new disciplines, new forms of control. These new controls were made more acceptable insofar as they were made to appear both rational and impersonal, in other words as if people were subject, in the end, not to individuals (for example, to managers of foremen) but to the requirements of productivity and efficient organization (Whitson, 1984). Athletes, on the surface, are subject to the coaches, but in reality to the organization that controls their contract and pays their wages.

As sporting performance has become subjected to systematic detailed analysis, it can be argued that biomechanics, psychology, exercise physiology, and game strategy have all contributed to dramatic increases in performance standards. But, to reach these levels performers have had to become increasingly disciplined and standardized in their approach to competition and training. In the NFL athletes have to maintain a certain weight and can be fined for failing to do so. Many of these athletes are on special diets and constantly monitored. Regimented practice schedules are a part of professional soccer in England and an integral part of the NFL.

Concerning psychology, it is not unusual for NFL teams to have their own sport psychologist, or "sport guru" as they are often called. The organizations are structured so that no one "thing" is left to chance.

Elias (1978) has argued that the habit of discipline (i.e., a structure of feeling approximating to a self-discipline which is never relaxed) is an essential characteristic of civilizing (meaning productive and creative) societies. In a similar argument Guttmann (1978) says in sport as in other spheres of life, we cannot enjoy the fruits of a scientific and rationalizing culture (i.e., the achievements it makes possible), without also submitting to its characteristic 21

discipline. Through this total commitment to the discipline one might ask the question; does

sport become more like work than sport? Under such a system can we separate the two?

The characteristic of rationalization encompasses and allows us to analyze change in

professional sport as it reflects the rise of the industrial society. Contemporary society as made

up of organizations that are formally structured and institutionalized at a local, regional and

national level. These organizations and institutions, have increasingly been governed on a

permanent basis with standardized rules which have been rationally constructed. I believe the

growth of this institutional process has had an important effect on the development of professional

sport. There is obviously a tie here to the bureaucratic structure of sport.

This produced a new kind of attitude oriented toward rationalization, which emerged in

sport through the rise of three factors: the growth of sport itself, therefore, the need for rational

order and standardization (procedures, rules and regulations of the game), the rise of competition

(at national and international level), and commercialization (how to promote and sell professional

sport to die public).

Organization

The central thesis here is to demonstrate how pro football in England and the USA have

come to reflect the bureaucratic nature of modem sport and society, and if the differences in the

development of organizational structure of each respective League (FL and NFL) and clubs in

general, is indicative of cultural imposition. Premodem societies are not characterized by

bureaucratic organizations of any kind, let alone a sports bureaucracy (Guttmann, 1978).

However, professional team sport in modem society could be referred to as the epitome of a

bureaucratic organization.

There appears to be a process of structural development for modem organizations that

is unique to pro sport and that may be common to all sports. Loy and Ingham (1973), and

Gruneau (1986) have all offered important suggestions about the transformation of g set of rules to &e set of rules. Gruneau (1986) extended his model to include stages of bourgeois, corporate. 22

and state control. Guttmann (1978), Ingham (1979), and Adelman (1986) had earlier presented

important insights into the organizational differences between premodem sports and their modem,

rationalized, counterparts.

However, Hardy (1986) says that while these authors capture much of the larger

framework of development, there is a need for much closer morphology. He suggests that the

following questions are cmcial to understanding the development of the organizational structure

of modem sport, and therefore are critical to a study of this nature.

Has each sport experienced a transition in which players have lost control of both the process and die product of their labor? Has this transition come before, after, or simultaneous to the moment of commercialization? Has every sport had a "shake out" and subsequent stratification of firms and markets into sets of similar power and capacity? Have these sets regrouped into even more compatible networks of markets, and have they then fashioned central ofRces to regulate their activities? (Hardy, 1986, p.32).

After the Industrial Revolution old traditions, customs and rituals were replaced with such

radically different social inventions as standardization, centralization, division of labor,

impersonal authority and rational planning. Bureaucracy and formal organization were proving

to be effective ways to organize the emerging social order (Curry and Jiobu, 1984). The Football

Association (FA) and the NFL effectively divorced the athlete from the decision making process;

a main goal of bureaucratic organizations.

The first national sports organizations were created in the middle of the nineteenth

century, in England. By the end of the century, international organizations proliferated, and the

International Olympic Committee had been established in 1894. In the twentieth century, almost every modem nation has created a governmental sports bureaucracy to aid, abet, and regulate the voluntary associations of the nineteenth century (Guttmann, 1978).

Sport franchises today are special purpose groups that seek to make profits while providing entertainment, although the intensity of these goals differ somewhat in England compared to the USA. These franchises are part of a league, a formal organization often referred to as a bureaucracy. Like other bureaucratic structures, the league possesses the following characteristics; 1) a division of labor that specifies the job description of each playing position 23

and produces a chain of command among the hierarchy of positions; 2) a rationalization of the

operations (structured as other organizations are in other institutions in society) and impersonal

relations among positions (just there to do a job) that enables the objectives of the organization

to be implemented; 3) an impersonal application of the rules without regard for person or

circumstance, as rules are made for the good of the game not so much the good of the individual;

and 4) routinization of tasks (creativity is not overly encouraged) that makes specific individuals

replaceable (Leonard, 1984).

Guttmann (1978) says the two most important functions of the bureaucracy is to see that

the rules and regulations are universal and to facilitate a network of competitions firom local to

national and even international level. Each position in the organization is specialized in that a

set of rulK and regulations specifies what each member is and is not required to do. The

structure is impersonal in that the decisions made, for example, hiring, trading, releasing,

strategy, are made, supposedly, for the good of the organization (Guttmann, 1978).

Consequently we have a situation where professional athletes are part of a team one "minute" and

gone the next, i.e., the loyalty of team to player, and player to team is not as evident as in recent

time, twenty to thirty years ago. Unfortunately players become, and can be seen as, products

rather than integral parts of the organization. However, some may argue that this has always been the case.

Commercialization

Sport has become big business, enormous amounts of money are invested in the creation of the sports product and related economic spin-offs. Top class athletes earn huge incomes from off-field as well as on-field activities, and millions of consumers pay to watch them play and even more are secondhand spectators through the print and broadcast media (Vamplew, 1988).

However, this did not occur overnight. As Vamplew (1988) has correctly noted, sport became an industry perh^s a century ago and sports professionalism goes back even further. 24

This characteristic will basically deal with the growing commodification of professional

sport and how economic factors have controlled behavior within and development of pro football

in England and the USA. The sport industry consists of sport firms (clubs or teams) which sell

a product to consumers. When revenues fall below cost, sport firms lose money and may eventually go out of business. The history of professional sport demonstrates that failures have been common (Curry and Jiobu, 1984).

Hardy (1986) said the sport product unfolds as a three-part commodity, and the sport industry divides into segments that generate one or two more of the parts. These are as follows; the activity or game form, the service, and the goods.

It is necessary to define commodity here since it must be understood historically. Marx

(1887) stated that a commodity is "in the first place, an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another...... To become a commodity a product must be transferred to another whom it will serve as a use-value, by means of exchange" (in

Bottomore, et al., 1983, p.86). Sport then becomes a commodity when its producers transfer it, via exchange, to a separate group of consumers. Hardy (1986) noted that it is the responsibility of historians to uncover the process by which the sport product evolved and by which the parts -

- game form, service, goods - moved closer to pure commodities. An insight into this process is central and critical to understanding the commercialization of pro football in England and the

USA.

No single event can be thought responsible for the commercialization of professional sport; both economic and political factors have contributed to its development. According to

Hoch (1972), "The character and scale of sports today is the child of monopoly capitalism"

(p.39). Hoch would presumably agree that the conunodification of sport has undermined the multifarious forms of human activity in the desire to satisfy the principles of the market. The professional foul, extrinsic motivation, product rather than process - these phenomena are indicative of professional sport today. 25

In the market place has professional sport become devoid of intrinsic meaning or value while being reduced to commodity relations? Has Ais corporate nature of sport become identified by the commercial interests of owners and sponsors and by the subordination of the player’s participation for intrinsic reasons to extrinsically motivated goals such as satisfying owners, sponsors, pressure groups and fans? Certainly the new sport entrepreneur is one with less concern for the aesthetic aspects of sports and more for sound business practices and the maximization of profits. How have these bureaucrats transformed the character of sports?

Media

Sports and the media have become interconnected parts of our lives. Sports programming has become an important aspect of media content, and many sports have become dependent on the media for promotion and income (Coakley, 1994). In light of these interconnections, this chapter on media illustrates how this relationship has affected the development of pro football in

England and the USA.

One aspect of the growing commercialization of sport is its relationship with the mass media. Although the press and radio have been important influences on its growth, the medium of television (TV) has radically altered and became an integral part of professional sport. A symbiotic relationship exists between television and sport that is beneficial to both segments.

Although this relationship may not be equal in nature, both television and sport serve their own interests by protecting and promoting each other. Professional sport has clearly become a branch of the entertainment industry and the link between the two is stronger now than ever before. No sport attracts a higher TV rating than the NFL in the USA and professional soccer in England.

The strength of this relationship is more recent in England than the USA, a point that will be discussed in this study. 26

Employee Role

How has the role of the athlete changed since the inception of professionalism? They are

certainly paid more and enjoy a greater visibility with the public than their predecessors, but they

are still subordinate to the owners and coaches. However, they are more aware of their rights

and have a voice, the players’ union. These unions have played significant roles in the NFL and

Football League (FL) in recent time.

Players have come to realize they are a conunodity, expendable at anytime. Agents,

unions, player reps, arbitrators, journalists and former players have all educated the modem day

athlete of their rights, worth and predicament. This has helped create free agency, numerous

trades, transfers, and player hold-outs. In other words players and owners are still on opposite

sides of the fence as they were a century ago.

The changing role of managers and coaches will be analyzed here. Do coaches have

more power than they used to? Is their role more specific? Are they under more pressure

today? How has the press affected their behavior? How has rationalization and technocracy

changed their job description? These are some of the questions that are appropriate to this

section.

Although there are numerous inequalities in modem sport, the principle is one of

equality. Premodem sport tended to be ascriptive and limited to males, aristocrats and the leisure

class. Guttmann (1978) notes, that modem sport emphasizes the equity principle, with an

increasing proportion of involvement by women and minority groups.

Two aspects of equality will be examined in this study: equality of the conditions of

competition — which will be examined in chapter IV — and equal access to the contest, which is

what we are mainly concemed with here.

Equal access to the contest has tended to lag behind the institutionalized tenet of equal

conditions of competition. However, while accepting the existence of racial discrimination in professional sport, I believe the institution of sport has provided greater access to success for the black athlete than any other institution in society. Nonetheless, we have to ask why? Is it 27 because the dominant white culture perceives this avenue for success (sport) as nonthreatening?

Or, is it because sport is "ahead of its time?" Or, is it a combination of these two plus other variables? These questions are dealt with and analyzed in this section, along with the comparison between the rise of the professional black football/soccer player in the USA and England, and why they emerged at a different time.

Other characteristics of modemization will be included within the framework above, for example, standardization, quantification and records, rules and regulations, and specialization.

The characteristics included in the framework will be seen, not in isolation of each other, but rather integrated and influencing each other in the whole process of change.

Each country will be analyzed separately but comparisons will be made when appropriate. The beginning date will depend on the inception of professional football in the respective countries. However, this study will consider the lead up to professional football in each country, i.e., what factors brought about its occurrence, as well as proceedings since that time. CHAPTER n

THE GAME

This chapter is a descriptive examination of the "game" itself, with no attempt to analyze

the nature of football and soccer within the context of the modemization framework. It also

provides an overview of the history of football in the USA and soccer in England, and the

emergence of the professional game. Attention is given to describing the contemporary game as

it exists today, for example, rules and regulations, competition structure, crowd behavior and so

on. Exploring these aspects will allow the reader an insight into the game which is necessary for

understanding what is to follow. The term, soccer, will be used in describing football in England

so as to avoid confusion with the American game of football. However, from a practical

standpoint, it will be necessary to use both terms, especially when describing early developments

of the game. Incidently, football (the game played predominantly with the feet) is only called

soccer in the USA and Canada.

ENGLAND

The origins of soccer are unclear, although the Chinese played a sport similar to modem soccer some 2500 years ago (Coombs, 1977). The ancient game was played in many variations.

One involved the ball being kicked over a net, while another form of play called for a group of players to keep the ball in the air with their feet as long as possible, and it is this form of play that has been best preserved from Burma in the west, to Japan in the north and the Marshall and

Gilbert Islands in the east. A third, and probably the earliest form, called for digging holes in the ground with the purpose of the game to kick the ball into the holes (Simri, 1972).

2 8 29

In early Christian times Greeks and Romans played a kicking game called Paganica using

an inflated cow bladder for a ball. Roman fighting legions took the game with them as a means

of relaxing between battles. Thus it is believed the Romans introduced soccer to England as early

as the third century A.D. (Coombs, 1977).

Dunning (1980) suggests that modem British football has passed through four stages. In

the first stage football was a wild and unruly folk game played according to unwritten, customary

rules. The second stage lasted from 1750 to 1840 when the game was included as part of the public school life. The third stage lasted from about 1840 to around 1860 when football was subjected to more formal organization by public schools and when rules of behavior were codified and enforced. In the fourth stage the game spread to the broader society. Roadburg (1980) added a fifth stage which began in 1855 when, after a great deal of debate and controversy, professionalism was made legal.

Dunning (1975) cites extracts from folk games which he notes as forming "the matrix out of which modem rugby and soccer have developed" (p.111). He examined the transformation of soccer from a "folk game" into a "modem sport," and suggests that this took place in the public schools between 1830 and 1860. Dunning (1975) sees the changes not as an evolutionary, automatic process, but as a transition that was determined mainly by the dynamics of the social context in which the game was played. These societal changes were seen as instrumental to the incipient modemization of the game, and consequently the game was not "bom" into the world but had to be developed, as part of a long-term process, out of earlier more simple forms. "It was the changing structure that led incipient modemization to occur not the endogenous dynamics of the game" (p.112).

Dunning (1975) discusses the manner in which football (which was a form of rugby and soccer at this time 1840-1860) was integrated into the social structure of public schools. He demonstrates how in the more orderly social climate of the public schools, football was reformed and developed into a more complex and elaborate game. Baker (1979) notes, that football became stylized according to each school’s facilities and traditions, and by 1850 many different 30

versions of the game fell Into two distinct types: the handling and tackling game played by the

newer public schools, and the kicking game played by the older establishments. "The two games

were simply Irreconcilable, and the breach was formally recognized by the formation of the FA

In 1863 and the Rugby Football Union In 1871," (Baker, 1979, p.245).

After the formation of the F A. In 1863 as the national authority, professional soccer

began on an organized basis with the establishment of the Football League (FL) in 1888 (Taylor,

1980). The FL remains the governing body of the sport and currently consists of the four

full-time professional divisions: the Premier League and Divisions I,n, and IQ. These were

known as Divisions I, U, IQ, and IV until the 1992-93 season, which saw a change In title but

not in structure. Each division was simply given a new title — different number, or name - but

Is basically In the same position as before. The FA Is the governing body of the National team,

professional and amateur, plus any domestic cup competition, except the Football League Cup

(more recently called the Coca Cola Cup), and also has authority concerning all professional,

semi-professional and amateur leagues.

By the mld-1880s soccer was universally accepted as "the people’s game." It thrived.

In terms of attendance and participation as no other game had done previously. Soccer had

become the game of the busy classes and consequently of the people. This was no more

Illustrated than In the Industrial towns of the North and the Midlands where soccer found Its

strongest support (Walvln, 1986). Teams from the Industrial areas arose, aided by the Factory

Acts, which outlawed Saturday afternoon working. With the new leisure time available, workers

went from the factory gate to the soccer ground.

Soccer had a hold on the imagination of the country long before 1863, when Cambridge

University drew up a set of rules, and the English F.A. was formed at a meeting In the

Freemason’s Tavern In London’s Great Queen Street (Glanvllle, 1979). In 1872 England saw the advent of the F.A. Cup, a development of huge Importance, accelerating the growth of professionalism, a change In the class structure of sport, and the development of tactics.

However, the F.A. Cup was not sufficient enough to sustain professionalism, even If the 31

professionals, in one way or another, were allowed to take part in it. In 1888 W. McGregor,

a Scot who was connected with the celebrated Aston Villa club, devised the idea of a Football

League (Glanville, 1979). This came about because of a need to establish an organized

competitive structure with teams of similar ability which was attractive to spectators. This could

not be guaranteed in the F.A. Cup where many lopsided results occurred.

The FL, at first, consisted of 12 clubs, who played each odier once at home and once

away, gaining two points for a win, one for a draw. This system survived until the present

(except that the winner now receives three points), which says much for its simple ingenuity.

However, today the League consists of 92 clubs split into Four Divisions. The Premier League

and Division m contain 22 clubs, while Divisions I and H each contain 24 clubs. The top

semi-professional club, (the winner of the General Motors Vauxhall League - the feeder League

for the four major divisions), is promoted into the Third Division, whereas the bottom club in

that Division is relegated to semi-professional status (Davies, 1994). The top four clubs in the

Third, and top three clubs in the First and Second Divisions are promoted into the immediate

division above, while the bottom three clubs in the Premier League and First Division, and the

bottom four from the Second Division are relegated to the immediate division below at the end

of each season. A play-off system was instituted in 1988 for Divisions I, II, and HI. Under this

system the top two clubs in Divisions I and II and the top three clubs in Division m are

automatically promoted, while the four clubs behind them must then contest lucrative but

"nervecrunching play-offs, to earn die fourth spot in the next flight up (Davies, 1994). There

are two semi-final games (one home, one away) with the final being played at Wembley Stadium

(London). All three finals are played on the same weekend. The wiimers of the Premier League

become the FL Champions, and are rewarded by receiving a place in the top European club

competition, the European Cup.

By the outbreak of World War I, soccer was not only established as immeasurably the

most popular spectator sport in England — drawing crowds of well over 100,(XX) to the F.A. Cup

Final and sustaining a Football League tournament which since 1892 had two divisions, and 32

would before long acquire a third, then a fourth — but it had spread across the globe. "Such was

the force of the expansion, such the growing popularity of the game, that the Olympic tournament

would not be sufficient to contain it. A world game it was, and a World Cup it would have,"

(Glanville, 1979, p. 19).

Since soccer is a world wide sport, there is a need for a central governing body. In

1904, the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) was established to coordinate

soccer activities internationally. Not just FIFA, but virtually all other associations and

suborganizations, amateur and professional, abide by a set of rules that were established by the

London Football Association more than 100 years ago (Coombs, 1977).

Competitions

World Cup

The World Cup, or to give it its proper name, the Jules Rimet Trophy, was first played

in Montevideo in 1930, but the principle of it was agreed by FIFA at their Antwerp Congress

of 1920. No man did more to farther the idea than Jules Rimet, President of the French Football

Federation, who was elected FIFA president in Antwerp, and it was thus that the attractive gold

cup came to be given his name.

The World Cup finals are held every four years. The qualifying rounds start two years before the finals, when 24 teams gather in one country for the final stages of the competition.

The 24 teams (teams representing a country, i.e., the national team) are split up into six divisions of four teams, with the top 16 teams going through into a single elimination play-off situation.

England won this tournament in 1966 when the finals (always played over a three to four week period) were played in England. The closest the USA came to winning the World Cup, was in

1930, when they reached the semi-finals, with a team made up largely of ex-British professionals

(Glanville, 1979). 33

The World Cup is probably the single most important sporting event throughout the

world, barring the Olympic games, although the former captures a bigger television audience than

the latter, suggesting the pervasiveness of soccer world wide and reaffirming the belief that it is

the "world game."

The F.A, Cup

The F.A. Cup is the great progenitor of all soccer competition. The allure of it made,

with amazing speed, a national sport of soccer in England in the 1880s, and brought about the

birth of professionalism. "The F.A. Cup is the natural father of the World Cup, the European

Cup, and all those other, lesser, cups we know today" (Glanville, 1979, p.261).

The F.A. Cup has maintained an astonishing vitality. It is still the most attractive and

passionately followed competition in England, still famous for its feats of "giant killing." It still

builds up to a spectacular crescendo when the Final is played at Wembley Stadium each May,

watched by 100,000 fortunate enough to get a ticket, and by millions more on television, not only

in England but throughout the world.

It was on July 20, 1871, that C. W. Alcock, secretary of the eight year old F.A., proposed at a meeting in London, "that it is desirable that a Challenge Cup should be established in connection with the Association, for which all clubs belonging to the Association should be invited to compete," (Glanville, 1979, p.261). Note this last proviso: all clubs. There is the glory and the glamour of it. Where in most other countries the national cup is a limited affair, confined to teams in the Football League, in England the humblest, most obscure little amateur club is entitled to take part, entering at the stage of the Preliminary Round in September, near the very start of the season. Four rounds of the qualifying competition proper begins in late

November.

It is only with the Third Round proper, traditionally played in early January, that the competition gets "right off the ground," only then that the major First and Second Division clubs of the FL enter die lists. At this stage, there will be 64 clubs remaining in the tournament. After 34

the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth rounds there will be only four, contesting the semi-finals, which are

both played in neutral stadia. These take place now in April, with the Cup Final in May.

The draw for the F.A. Cup is made by random procedures out of a "hat," so you can

have two top teams playing each other, or a "small" team playing a top team, at any time during

the competition after the Third Round proper. The competition is a simple knock-out one. It

is usually every soccer player’s dream in England to play in an F.A. Cup Final. The

atmosphere, tradition, excitement and "build-up" of the Final make it unique.

The Football LeagueC up

The FL devised the Football League Cup as a competition similar in structure and

organization to that of the F.A. Cup. The only difference being that the 92 League clubs, from

the Premier League and Divisions I, H, and HI, are the only teams involved. Also that the First

Round and the Semi-Final Round are decided over a "2-leg affair," i.e., both teams playing two

games against each other, one at home and one away, with the aggregate score deciding the

winner. The final is also played at Wembley. The FL has tried to make this, its own Knock-out

cup, more attractive by giving the winners an automatic place in the Union of European Football

Association (U.E.F.A.) Cup, one of the European competitions for clubs.

The Football League Championship

Cup competitions are what one might call the "icing on the cake" for soccer players.

However, the League Championship, whether the Premier League or Divisions I, U, and HI, is what soccer really evolves around in England. Clubs and players cannot survive on the "glory" of cup competitions alone, although some clubs are seen as better "cup" sides than "league" sides. The real "road to success" involves doing well in whatever division you are in, especially for the clubs in die First, Second, Third Divisions, who are all trying to gain promotion into die

Premier League (where the big money is made), whether it be in the immediate or distant future. 35

Each club plays every other club twice throughout the season, once at home, and once

away. Therefore, each club in the Premier League and Division m play 42 League games, while

each club, in Divisions II, and m , play 46 League games throughout the season.

International Teams

England has competed at the international level in soccer since 1879 when it played

against Wales, and the National soccer team has probably been, in this century, the most

important and celebrated sporting team in England. It is still considered a privilege and an honor

to be chosen to play for the English Team, meaning at that moment in time that you are

considered one of the best 11 players, in a country where soccer’s participant and spectator

popularity is not rivaled by any other sport (Butler, 1981).

The greatest moment for soccer, in England, came in 1966, when the National Team won

the most coveted prize in world soccer, the World Cup. Having beaten arch rivals West

Germany 4-2 in the final, one sensed a feeling of nationalism arising within the country, similar

to that when the USA beat Russia at hockey in the Winter Olympics of 1980.

The National Team, which competes in the World Cup, Eturopean Nations Cup and a number of "firiendly" (exhibition) international matches each year, is chosen from the best players from England. The team is selected by the England Team Manager, who is elected into this position by the F.A. Committee.

Although the England professional soccer team is always the team people relate to when considering international soccer, it is not the only national soccer team operating in England today. In order of seniority and standard the list is as follows:

1. The (full international) England Team (already mentioned);

2. The England B-Team. Comprising of those players who are on the fringe of making the first team;

3. The England Under-23 Team. Comprising of the "best" players in the country who are under the age 23 years, who are not chosen for the above two teams; 36

4. The England Youth Team. Comprising of the "best" professional players at the age of 18 or under;

5. The England Amateur Team. Comprising of the "best" schoolboy players in the country. There are usually two teams here, one including boys from die ages of 14 to 16 years, and one from the ages of 16 to 18 years. These players are attending high school at the time of playing.

Apprentices

Most professional clubs in England (nearly all First and Second Division clubs) not only

carry a First team but also a Second one (made up of reserves, still considered full-time professionals, who play in a separate reserve League), and a Youth team. The Youth team is usually made up of full-time and part-time apprentices. The part-time apprentices are still at high school but train and play for the Youth team. They usually train twice a week and play either once or twice a week. The full-time apprentices have left school and train regularly (three or four times a week) and play at least once if not twice a week. The full-time apprentices are not paid very well, and usually have menial jobs to carry out (such as, cleaning the professional players’ boots, and sweeping the changing rooms and ground) but are waiting for the opportunity to secure a position in the First team. Of course, a lot of them do not "make it" or end up playing for the Second team most of the time. The age of the apprentices varies from 15 to 18 years, the fiill-time apprentices from 16-18 years, as you have to be 16 years old before you can leave high school in England. Hillman (1980) notes that, "The football apprentice can be seen as the poor relation to his industrial counterpart. He has only two years in which to prove his ability and at no stage does he have the security of a job to look forward to" ^.28).

Many young players prefer to remain part-time apprentices, so they can have the security, if failing to become a professional soccer player, of attaining a good education by remaining at school. However, some young players become regular first team players before their apprenticeship time "runs out," and acquire lucrative contracts for themselves.

Nevertheless, as mentioned before, not every young player experiences the success. In many respects, soccer is unlike other industries. It puts enormous pressure on young players to adapt quickly to a new environment and to develop new skills in a highly professional industry. 37

As Hillman (1980) argues, "once the apprentice joins his club from school, he is making the most

difficult and apprdiensive change in his life to date. Most clubs are more than adequately

equipped to develop the ball skills and knowledge of the game but what about character and

attitude" (p.28).

The concqit of development training is not new. Development courses for young

apprentices do exist. The Brathey Hall Trust (Windermere, by the English Lake District), for

example, has established a separate sports development unit set up specifically to help young

sportsmen and women to develop the non-skills of their sport. All exercises used are aimed at

developing awareness and potential in attitude, application, self-discipline, quality, standards,

self-motivation, character and so on (Hillman, 1980).

Amateur Football

Besides, professional, semi-professional, college and high school soccer in England, there

exists thousands of other clubs playing in hundreds of leagues throughout the country on Saturday

afternoon. There are 37,000 clubs, many of them carrying four or five teams, registered with

the F. A. in England, and countless others not registered (Croker, 1979). It is difficult for anyone

living in England not to become immersed in the phenomena of soccer on a Saturday afternoon,

especially "sports minded" people.

However, Saturday afternoon is not the only time millions of women become "soccer widows," as Sunday Morning Leagues are also a big part of the soccer culture in England. Many people who are spectators on Saturday afternoon become participants on Sunday morning, and try to emulate their "heroes," (Sunday afternoon Leagues also exist but not to the same extent as morning Leagues). Also, many people play two games at the weekend, and it is not uncommon for school boys to play, Saturday morning (for their school), Saturday afiemoon (for their club), and Sunday morning (for another club). However, it was not until 1960 that the F. A. recognized "Sunday soccer." Actually, there now exists the F.A. Sunday Cup, which includes 38

top teams from local areas who want to play in this national Sunday cup competition (Butler,

1980).

Managers and Coaches

"The tantalizing thing about soccer’s coaches and managers is that nobody is ever quite

sure what they do" (Glanville, 1979, p. 152). The manager in England today has kind of a dual

role, selecting and coaching the team. Of course, professional teams have a manager and a coach

(sometimes seen as an assistant manager), but the manager has the final say in coaching

procedures and selecting players. Many assistant managers ("coaches") look after the second

team and often help with youth teams who also tend to have their own coach. The terms coach

and manager in England can often mean the same thing, as people in these positions often

perform dual roles.

Although the Board of Directors (shareholders) own soccer clubs in England, the manager

has the choice of how to run his team, who to select and who to buy or sell, providing the ftmds

are there. However, failure can mean die loss of a job; professional sport in England can be just

as ruthless as anywhere else in the world.

There are four periods of time which are crucial to the manager or coach: during

training; final minutes before the game; half-time; and, just after the game. During the game he

can shout from a sitting position behind the sidelines (not allowed to stand close to the sidelines

and coach, or move up and down the field coaching), but he is not allowed to stop the game

when things are going wrong. Unlike the coach in American football or basketball, the soccer manager in England is not allowed to call "time-outs," or make numerous substitutions, therefore his control, once the game has started, is somewhat limited. This brings me to my next point, substitutions. 39

Substitutions

Before 1965 no substitutions were allowed in English soccer matches (it was unheard of).

However, in 1965, the FL, by 39 votes to 10, agreed one substitute be allowed for an injured player at any time during a League match (Butler, 1980). Today, at all levels, two substitutes are allowed. This was brought about by pressure to conform to FIFA rules. Players are not allowed to return after being substituted, unlike most American team sports, which puts a totally different complexion on the game as far as the coaching strategy is concerned.

Length of Season

It is not uncommon for top professional clubs, such as Liverpool, Manchester United, or Tottenham (to name a few), to play 50 to 60 games a season, not including scrimmages and international matches for the better players within these teams. With at least 42 League games, domestic and European cup games, as well as friendly and invitational games, the professional soccer players’ season can be very hectic and arduous. The soccer season in England is probably the most lengthy and demanding in the world. Starting at the end of August and ending in May, and for some, even into June or July.

There is a fiill League program every Saturday afternoon at 3 p.m. (except when cup or international competitions prevail), and midweek games usually start at 7:30 PM. Professional soccer was never played on Sunday until 1981 when the FL organized games for some Second and Third Division clubs. Today, there is always at least one Premier League game on Sunday which is televised live, following on from the American system. Those running the pro game saw the opportunity of a TV audience and large crowds when not competing against a full League program. Pro soccer on Sunday is similar then to pro football on Monday night - a national audience. 40

Crowds

It is only appropriate when analyzing the game of soccer in England that some attention

must be given to crowd behavior. So much has been written or spoken about soccer crowds in

England (Dawson, et al., 1984, Dunning 1980, Roadburg, 1980, Taylor, 1987, Walvin, 1986),

that a thorough description of the "game" would be lacking without some mention of spectators.

On a Saturday afternoon, the crowd size can range from around 1,000 people at some

Third Division games to 50,000 at a top Premier League game. On February 5, 1994, the total

attendance for League games was 482,054, of which 249,475 attended Premier League games,

over half the figure for all four Divisions flPailv Mail. 1994). This may not seem a lot of people

when you consider that 92 clubs are involved, however, one must remember that the season is

nine months long, with at least 42 games being played by each club. People can pick and choose

which games to see when there are so many. To see every game would work out to be very

expensive (^proximately $12 standing and $18 sitting per game), especially for the spectator who

takes his family to each game.

However, since 1949 (when for the year soccer crowds reached a peak of 49 million),

with the exception of the year following the English World Cup victory in 1966, crowds have

steadily declined to an approximate 24 million. Taylor (1987) alleged that there are many

reasons for the fall in popularity, but above all there is the change in social conditions outside

of soccer’s control. He listed these as being a great range of alternative entertainments which

offer greater comfort and facilities for the customer. The motor car offers greater mobility and

television provides entertainment in the home as well as bringing the best of the top games to the

armchair fan. The improved status of women has led to wives having a greater say in the choice

of family entertainment.

Though such social changes have occurred, Taylor (1987) continued, professional soccer has not been prepared to adapt to them. "Fans faced with increased admission charges to old established grounds, where, having struggled to park the car, queued up for a weak cup of tea, jostled to use inadequate toilet facilities, they often have to stand in the pouring rain," (Taylor, 41

1980, p. 19). Since Taylor wrote this many soccer grounds in England have been renovated

(luxury boxes, some are all-seated, covered but not domed), but still do not provide the luxury

that most stadia in the USA do.

Although Taylor (1980) listed a number of reasons for the decline in crowd size,

professional soccer is not about to disappear. He alluded to this some years later as he wrote:

Soccer remains about five times more popular as a spectator sport than either rugby or cricket, and only golf comes close to soccer as a sport in which men actively participate. Popidar interest in other sports and leisure time diversions (for example, snooker, darts, hiking, and climbing) is on the increase, but not necessarily to the exclusion of individuals’ interest in soccer. It needs to be said, loudly and clearly, that there is no cultural equivalent to a good game of first- class soccer played before packed terraces, with the tensions and excitement bom of local partisan commitment (Taylor, 1987, p. 187).

Although crowds seemed to have declined somewhat over the years, children are often

given a ball to kick before they can walk, and these children have chosen a professional team to

follow at a very young age. As Hopcraft (1988) states:

The point about football in Britain is that it is not just a sport people take to, like cricket or tennis or running long distances. It is inherent in the people. It is built into the urban psyche, as much a common experience to our children as are uncles and school. It is not a phenomenon; it is an every day matter. There is more eccentricity in deliberately disregarding it than in devoting a life to it. It has more significance in the national character than theater has. Its sudden withdrawal from the people would bring deeper disconsolation dian to deprive them of television. The way we play the game, organize it and reward it reflects the kind of community we are (p.9).

It has often been said, when Liverpool wins, the biggest factory in that area, Hailwoods, has a

marked increase in production. I have not seen any hard evidence of this, but in certain cities,

such as, Liverpool, Manchester, Nottingham, the most important corporation, for the people, are the professional soccer clubs. Much of the activities in local areas surrounding professional

soccer clubs seem geared towards 3 p.m. every Saturday afternoon, during the soccer season.

Perhaps a quote from the famous ex-Liverpool manager Bill Shankly, sums up the feeling and meaning soccer has for many people in England. "Some people say soccer’s a matter of life and death, but its much more important than that,” (in Glanville, 1979, p. 164) 42 USA

Professional football has been the subject of many journalist writings as well as those of

other interested observers. However, scholarly analysis of the sport and its relation to American

society has been limited (Govemali, 1951, Maltby, 1987, Rader, 1990, Riesman and Denny,

1954).

Professional football has become a multi-million dollar enterprise spread throughout the

major cities of the USA, and attracting millions of fans. NFL teams averaged more than 60,000

a game in 1990, and the same year signed a $3.6 billion, four year deal with American

Broadcasting Company (ABC), Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), National Broadcasting

Company (NBC), Entertainment Sports Programming Network (ESPN) and Turner Network

Television (TNT) (NFL, 1991). It receives extensive print and electronic media coverage each

day during the football season (Maltby, 1987).

Similar to many businesses, the NFL grew from something smaller, less prestigious, and

more unstable. The American Professional Football Association (APFA), first formed in 1920,

was a loosely structured league of 14 teams. The APFA, renamed the NFL in 1922, did not

achieve stability until after World War II. Professional football did not realize true prosperity

until the 1960s when the NFL established firm ties to network television (Maltby, 1987).

However, professional football existed in an even more unorganized fashion than the

APFA prior to 1920. Football’s origins lie in the game of soccer played as far back as Roman

times. The kicking games of primitive tribes, harpaston in the Greek city-state of Sparta, calcio

in ancient Rome, and the varieties of soccer that have been played for perhaps 2,000 years, can

be considered ancestors of football (NFL, 1990).

American football comes from English soccer and rugby, and is the "cousin" of these games. They all involve in one way or another, the kicking of some object up and down a field.

Soccer was the only "foot" game for hundreds of years until it was first modified in the early

1800’s (Ross, 1986). 43

Two important steps in the evolution of football occurred in England. First Rugby was

invented; a new game that would influence American football greatly because you could advance

the ball by carrying it as well as kicking it (NFL, 1990). The second thing that happened was

the formation of the London Football Association in 1862. It was organized by the proponents

of the kicking game. They drew up rules forbidding the carrying of the ball. From then on their

game was called association football or soccer. But that was not their largest contribution to

American football. More importantly, they wrote rules that Americans would overhaul and rewrite. And by having a rules convention the British established a rite of the sport, a tradition as much a part of it as bringing the uniforms out of storage for the first practice each year and blowing up the footballs (NFL, 1990).

In the USA, the soccer and rugby versions of the "foot" game with a ball had been played by townspeople since Colonial times. However, in 1862, events occurred in Boston that gave birth to the American game of football; a hybrid of soccer and rugby.

The Boston Oneida Football Club was organized by prep school boys of the city’s schools. Tiring of both, they decided to improvise tiieir own game. The feature of goal kicking in soccer, and running widi the ball from a "scrum," in rugby, were combinai to produce American football. The rugby "scrum" developed into "scrimmage," or to line up in a formation of various shapes according to the times played in. This style of football was called the "Boston Game" and prevailed through the 1860’s in New England. In 1862, the Oneidas developed and practiced their new game among themselves. Then, on November 7, 1863, the first game of American-style football was arranged and played between the now re^y Oneidas and a pick-up team of non-club members from Boston, the "All-Stars" ^oss, 1986, p.3).

The "Boston Game" Ailed to catch on and the Oneidas remained the only club regularly playing this style of game until 1869. By then, some Oneida players were college men in Ivy

League schools and they introduced the game in the famous first college football contest of

November 6, 1869, at New Brunswick, N.J., playing under soccer scoring rules, but using a modified style of game that permitted running with the ball. Rutgers University defeated

Princeton 6-4. Ivy League schools continued to modify this combined game in the 1870’s and

1880’s until by 1890 they had the regularly known game of American football with 11 players. 44

fîrst downs, goal posts, and so on. Only one thing was missing, the forward pass. This was

added in 1906 (Ross, 1986).

The Roots of Professional Football

Pro football had its roots in Athletic clubs, the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) and the

Allegheny Athletic Association (AAA) of Pittsburgh. After the Civil War one of the most

important aspects of the sports movement was the advent of the athletic club. The first was the

New York Athletic club in 1868. Virtually every other city acquired one after that. "These clubs

sponsored teams in a great variety of sports. They gave tremendous impetus to competition in

all of them. And they probably started pro football" (NFL, 1990, p.9).

Club football was very popular by 1890, and it is doubtful that all these clubs and players

in them operated by strict amateur codes. One of their number, William (Pudge) Heffelfinger

of the AAA of Pittsburgh, received what history records as the first payment to play football in

1892. But he was the most famous player of his day; others more obscure than Heffelfinger may

have received payments earlier than he did (NFL, 1990).

Ironically the AAU inadvertently helped bring about the rise of professional football. In

1889, six athletic clubs in the East decided to copy the parent AAU and form their own union,

or league. They were the Baltimore Athletic Club, the Boston Athletic Association, the New

York Athletic Club, the New York Crescents Athletic Club, the New York Manhattans, and the

Orange (New Jersey) Athletic Club. There was now a league of amateur teams. The next step

was to begin talking about going professional (NFL, 1990).

In New Jersey, the Orange Athletic Club awarded trophies or watches to its best players

at the end of each season. Accusations were made against Orange but apparently this was the practice of several clubs in the New York City area. The AAU ruled that clubs could no longer

award trophies; they had to limit their gifts to banners costing 25 cents apiece. But the big athletic clubs continued to find ways to get around the rules. One way was to hand out travel expenses equal to double the amount of the fare. There obviously were professional players on 45

athletic clubs in other cities before Heffelfinger was paid $500 by a club in Pittsburgh and started

the recorded history of professional football (NFL, 1990).

Alluding to this controversy Maltby (1987) states; "Technically professionalism in football

existed a good many years before the early 1890s. Yet customarily professional football’s

beginnings have been traced back only to 1892, when the rivalry among athletic club teams in

Pittsburgh led to the hiring of players....A major difficulty for researchers concerns just what

makes a man a professional. Money for services obviously is the major criterion" (p. 101).

The Pennsvlvania Period

The game of football emerged as a professional game westward from colleges such as

Yale, Princeton, Rutgers, and Harvard, across Pennsylvania to Pittsburgh. Professional football then moved directly westward into Ohio, into towns such as Akron, Canton, and Massillon. And they and others formed what eventually became the NFL (Maltby, 1987).

Pittsburgh’s first athletic clubs were the AAA and the Pittsburgh Athletic Club (PAC).

Such clubs emerged after the Civil War, according to researcher Thomas Jable, as an antidote to Victorianism. Through competitive aüüetics at ftieir clubs, American men could "countermand the Victorian principles of delicacy and refinement. " Football, aggressive and sometimes violent, served this need especially well; it "represented a significant triumph of robust manliness over tender and fragile femininity." Membership in an athletic club also meant prestige and an opportunity to identify vicariously with the big names in college football (NFL, 1990).

Ringers hired by the AAA in 1892 were the first professional players. In Jable’s words.

As competition increased in intensity and winning became important, the athletic club turned to the established athlete from the outside...hi hiring the gifted player or professional, the athletic club shattered the amateur ideal upon which it was founded, i.e., participation for the sheer love of the game. Victory meant fame, glory, and increased income for the athletic club. Professionalism crept into footbsdl as the AAA and the PAC vied for notoriety, prestige, and profits (in NFL, 1990, p.9)

PAC challenged AAA to a game. It was scheduled for Columbus Day, October 12,

1892, at the PAC field in Pittsburgh’s East Liberty section. More than 3,000 spectators flocked 46

to the grounds, and the teams divided $1,200 in gate receipts, and as a result of the great interest

in the game each club processed about 100 new members during the weeks that followed (NFL,

1990).

1893 was the first regularly established year of professional football. Both the AAA and

PAC in their race to compete against each other threw fear of the AAU to the wind and had

regularly signed and hired players on their teams for the complete season, though they did not

: advertise the fact; no professional team doing that until 1902 (Ross, 1986).

However, Treat (1970) states that the first professional football team, and consequently

first professional game, to be recognized as such played in the township of Latrobe, PA. Latrobe

made its debut on August 31, 1895, when it beat Jeannette, a township 10 miles away, 12-0, For

the next 10 years, Latrobe fielded a powerful team which played wherever and whenever it

could. Dr. John Braillier, who was to become a dentist in Latrobe, is awarded the distinction

of having become the first football player to openly turn professional, accepting $10 and expenses

to play for Latrobe against Jeannette (Treat, 1970).

During the next few years other professional teams began to appear. Open football

professionalism spread to the clubs of the small towns in the surrounding coal region, and

professional football speared in other states. Upper New York State followed Pennsylvania soon

after the turn of the century. Teams existed in Buffalo, Syracuse, Watertown, Auburn, Corinth,

Clayton, Oswego, Alexandria Bay and Ogdensburg. A "World Series" was played indoors at

Madison Square Garden in both 1902 and 1903, giving rise to the same event in the game of

professional baseball (Treat, 1970).

The Ohio Period

During the first two decades of the twentieth century the center of pro football shifted

from western Pennsylvania to Ohio. "Athletic clubs and their ringers ushered in pro football.

It "came out of the closet" in Pennsylvania when teams openly declared themselves pros. And

it grew into a league in Ohio," (NFL, 1990, p. 11). 47

The game grew up in somewhat prosperous, medium size industrial cities; the population

of Akron was 69,067 in 1910 and Canton’s was 50,217. In Ais setting, professional football

arrived. Predictably, it had its roots in athletic club teams. According to Ross (1986), there

were clubs in Dayton in 1889, Cleveland in 1890, Cincinnati in 1891. Other club teams appeared

in Alliance, Byesville, Columbus, Lorain, Marion, Newark, Sandusky, Salem, Shelby, and

Toledo. There was a state champion proclaimed every year after 1896 (Ross, 1986).

The Shelby team, known as the Blues, was one of the first Ohio teams to turn

professional. As early as 1902, the squad was composed entirely of ex-college players who were

purely professional. Included was the first black professional player, Charles Follis (NFL, 1990).

"But in 1903 a new team appeared on the horizon named the Massillon Tigers" (Ross,

1986, p.36). Within one year, the state had at least eight professional teams. Massillon was state

champion in 1904, 1905, and 1906. A.A. (Buzz) Wesbacker played for the Massillon Tigers

during this time. "The pro games were always on Sunday," he recalled, "and each team would

get together Sunday morning with the coach, who would map out the plays and signals. We

would practice for an hour, and that was it. If the coach liked the way you played in the actual

game, you were signed up for the following week" (NFL, 1990, p. 11).

Professional football players came from varied backgrounds. The players for the

Columbus Panhandles were, in their regular jobs, mechanics for the Panhandle Division of the

Pennsylvania Railroad. "They had free transportation and so they were an inexpensive team to

play," Harry March (1934) wrote. "The boys worked in the shop until four o’clock Saturday

afternoon, got their suppers at home, grabbed the rattlers (trains) to any point within 12 hours’

ride of Columbus, played the Sunday game, took another train to Columbus, and punched the

time clock at seven Monday morning" (in NFL, 1990, p. 11).

Starting in 1904, and lasting until 1920 when the American Professional Football

Association (APFA) was formed, Ohio was the battleground, and the nursery, for major league football. Canton, Massillon, Akron, Columbus and Dayton produced many players for the professional league. It was at Canton that Jim Thorpe first appeared to play for many years until 48

he finished his career with the N.Y. Giants in 1925 (Treat, 1970). No other Ohio team made

as much history or contributed as much to professional football before 1920 as the Canton

Bulldogs. They turned professional in 1905 (NFL, 1990).

In 1906 the forward pass was legalized. The first authenticated pass completion in a

professional game came on October 27, when George Parratt of Massillon threw a completion

to Dan Riley in a victory over a combined Benwood-Moundsville team. Archrivals Canton and

Massillon, the two best teams in America, played twice, with Canton winning the first game but

Massillon won the second and the Ohio League Championship. A betting scandal and the

financial disaster wrought upon the two clubs by paying huge salaries caused a temporary decline

in interest in professional football in the two cities and somewhat through Ohio (NFL, 1991).

Immediately subsequent to World War I was a bleak time for professional football. It

was difficult to get people through the turnstiles with the reasons being illegal padding of

uniforms, gambling on games, fixed games and libel suits. The game was financed only by

shoestring promoters. The organization and stability that would result in systematic and

profitable scheduling was non-existent. Salaries were irregular and fluctuated with patronage.

Playing conditions were terrible. Although individual towns backed their teams vociferously and

enthusiastically, public relations in general were deplorable. People tended to view the game

warily and with suspicion (Govemali, 1951).

Transition and Development

The following section discusses the period of pro football between 1920 and 1945, the

emergence of the APFA and the American Football League (AFL), and the impact of Harold

Grange on the pro game.

Although shortly after World War I the future of professional football did not look particularly good, a number of financial backers were aware of the potential of the game. These backers formed the APFA in 1920 (Govemali, 1951). Through the twenties and early 1930s, weaker teams, and those in smaller cities began to fall by the wayside for, as March (1934) points 49

out, "Professional football... is too expensive to be supported by smaller communities for more

than two or three years. Green Bay is again the exception to the rule. " However Green Bay did

play some of its home games in Milwaukee. Some 30 teams dropped out of the picture between

1921 and 1945 (Govemali, 1951).

In looking back at NFL history, its easy to realize that the thirties was its turning point. Until then the NFL had been a hodgepodge. In its maiden season, 1921, teams represented six cities that currently have franchises (Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Detroit, and Buffalo) as well as several smaller citi%. Most games were played on dirt fields with small, rickety wooden grandstands. A few thousand people, sometimes a few hundred, attended (Anderson, 1985, p.28).

In its early years the NFL not only was without many spectators, but it was also without

a balanced schedule or a championship game. In 1926, for example, the NFL had 22 teams, with the Frankford (Pennsylvania) Yellowjackets having a 14-1-1 record for first place while the

Hammond (Indiana) Professionals and the Louisville (Kentucky) Colonels shared last place, each with a 0-4 record. Year by year after that, the NFL slowly dwindled to only eight teams in

1932. But for the 1933 season the NFL was split into Eastern and Western divisions, each with five teams. When the winners of the two divisions met in the first NFL Championship Game, the Bears defeated the New York Giants, 23-21 (Anderson, 1985).

Competitively that frrst NFL Championship was the equivalent of today’s Superbowl, but financially the players’ share reflected the Depression that had so many Americans out of work. The bonus check for each member of the Bears was $210.23. Harold ("Red") Grange received one of those checks. He earned $100,000 his first year, an amazing sum at that time

(1925). He had become professional football’s first national attraction. Grange was paid well, but he and his Bear teammates earned every cent. Beginning wiüi the frrst sellout crowd ever for a professional football game, 36,000 at Wrigley Field on Thanksgiving Day, 1925, through

January 31, 1926, Grange and the Bears played 19 games before a total of nearly 400,000 fans in cities across the country. Seeking their own stage. Grange and C.C. Pyle (a promoter) formed the American Football League (AFL) for the 1926 season. Grange was the co-owner and 50

halfback of the NY Yankees in this new League. When the AFL folded after one season, the

Yankees joined the NFL for the 1927 season (Anderson, 1985).

Govemali (1951) said that the greatest lift professional football received was Grange’s

entrance into the game. His presence enticed 73,651 on a December afternoon in 1925. March

(1934) writes: "The Polo Grounds was sold out completely...Pyle, Grange, and the Bears drew

over $56,000 for one afternoons exhibition" (in Govemali, 1951, p. 18). The Chicago Tribune

stated that Grange collected $30,000 as his share of the gate that day (Govemali, 1951).

The signing of Grange to pro football and the subsequent Grange/Pyle "touring show"

was significant in that it led the way for other pro athletes and agents to make money from the game, and it was a challenge to college football.

The rapid evolution of the game can be followed through the growth of the NFL.

Franchises originally valued at $50 increased in value to $50,000 by 1940. The maximum player limit increased steadily from 18 to 33 per squad by 1945. This increase in roster size was due to the increase in the tempo of the game, which the professional League, ever conscious of popular demand, pioneered through constant appraisal and re-evaluation of the roles. Their efforts to interest the paying public resulted in rules and regulations that favored offensive football and touchdown production (1934 the NFL changed the shape of the ball slightly, longer and narrower, which made passing easier). Touchdown production accomplished for football what the home run produced in baseball; namely, bigger crowds. Team rosters increased steadily, for tired performers could not compete on a high level for any great length of time

(Govemali, 1951).

Rader (1990) notes, the NFL somehow survived many handicaps as well as the ravages of the Great Depression and World War H. Creating a more offensive sport than the collegians may have been part of the reason. The pro mle-makers moved the hashmarks ten yards inside the sidelines and permitted forward passes from any spot behind the line of scrimmage (1933), and allowed free substitutions (1943). The adoption of two divisions in 1933 with a championship game at the end of the season also enhanced interest in the sport. The creation of 51

the College AA-Star Game in 1934, which pitted the NFL champion of the previous season

against recently graduated college seniors, added to the respectability of the pro game, attracted

large gates, and gained the attention of the nation’s press. In 1936, the NFL adopted a draft,

which allowed teams the exclusive right to contract for the services of college players in reverse

order of their league standing in the previous season. Ostensibly, the draft would equalize

competition between clubs, but also strengthened the owner’s bargaining position with potential players (Rader, 1990).

Post World War n

While pro football had enjoyed some prosperity and popularity before World War U it was after 1945 that the game experienced its most dramatic growth. This section is concerned with this development.

During and shortly after World War n the NFL merged some of its teams in order to maintain some standard of play. The League looked forward to the cessation of hostilities and resumption of high caliber play which would produce tremendous profits for owners. The war boom was responsible for padded bankrolls and it was predicted that crowds would continue to support the game. "The opulent owner fancied these rosy-hued dreams of the future" (Govemali,

1951, p.40).

However, Rader (1990) states that prior to the mid-1950s, NFL teams struggled to survive.

During its ftrst 35 years, over 40 franchises joined the league, stmggled, and then expired. The Great Depression of the 1930s wiped out all the franchises in smaller cities save Green Bay, Wisconsin. Major college games invariably outdrew the pro games. To many Americans, pay-for-play carried a stigma. The league failed to attract many of the top college players. Even though the NFL signed college heroes such as Red Grange and Emie Nevers in the 1920s, most college graduates could make more money elsewhere or simply bypassed the game because of its negative associations. In the early days, the newspapers all but ignored the NFL (p.261). 52

Govemali (1951) writes that in 1949 only six out of 17 teams were making money, with

both Leagues (the NFL and All-America Conference, with its first year in 1946) losing millions.

The conflict raised expenses from $75,000 to $250,000. A settlement was needed after four

years an $800,000 loss for both Leagues. Therefore on December 9, 1949, there was a merger

which was recognized as a triumph for the NFL, as all its members remained intact while four

of seven teams in the All-America Conference (AAC) were dissolved, only the financially

successful (apart from the Colts) being absorbed into the older organization.

Rader (1990) states that after World War n the fortunes of pro football improved. "By

1950 average game attendance had doubled, though the NFL confronted an expensive war with

a rival, the AAC between 1946 and 1949. The NFL also signed more college stars to contracts.

And on the horizon was television, which promised not only lucrative revenues but the creation

of new fans for the sport," (Rader, 1990, p.262).

Few would have predicted in 1950 that pro football would shortly rival baseball for the

affection of the American people. By 1960 the NFL had come of age and no other team sport

"even approximated professional football’s popularity on television," (Rader, 1990, p.262). But its success had inspired the creation of a new rival, the American Football League (AFL) in

1960, which eventually made the NFL "bigger and better," (Anderson, 1985).

Following the Green Bay Packers’ NFL championship in 1965, the NFL agreed to an eventual total merger with the AFL. In the process. Superbowl I was created; the first meeting of the NFL and AFL champions. What followed demonstrated the evolution of the NFL as a truly national organization, with teams emerging in major cities all across the country. The AFL had begun play as a rival league in 1960 in eight cities - New York, Boston, Buffalo, Dallas,

Houston, Denver, Oakland, and Los Angeles - but within three years, two teams had been transplanted: the Chargers went from Los Angeles to San Diego; the Dallas Texans moved to

Kansas City and were renamed the Chiefs. Then in 1966, the Miami Dolphins were organized; in 1968 the Cincinnati Bengals would be added. The AFL teams also were competing with the

NFL teams for the best college talent. As the salaries and bonuses soared higher and higher. 53

club owners in both Leagues agreed to merge the teams into one NFL, which would begin with

the 1970 season (Anderson, 1985). Owners realized that this structure was beneficial to all and

solidified the strength of the NFL with few competitors. However, while the emergence of the

rival league (AFL) facilitated the growth of the NFL and the pro game in general, it was ironic that this type of competition became a catalyst for change.

Rader (1990) feels that superior management accounted for part of the NFL’s success.

The football owners had much in common. Unlike the savagely independent barons of baseball, they were far more willing to delegate authority to the commissioner’s office. And unlike the bas^all owners, they chose as commissioners men who had experience in the game’s business side. In the post-World War H era, both DeBenneville "Bert" Bell and Alvin "Pete" Rozelle provided the NFL with astute leadership. The commissioners welded the NFL owners into a single economic cartel, one far more united than in any other professional team sport ^.262).

In the 1950s Bell laid the foundations for the NFL’s successful marriage to television.

By the mid-1950s televised pro football was attracting millions of new viewers. Watching the games filled a g ^ in the lives of many Americans. "The central requirement of the game-that the offense must move the ball ten yards in four plays or give it up to the opposing team-set up recurring crises, keeping the viewer’s attention riveted on the little silver screen. The pause between plays permitted the viewer to savor the drama" (Rader, 1990, p.263). Technological breakthroughs contributed to pro football’s growing popularity. The perfection in the 1960s of instant replays and slow motion shots allowed fans to experience the game in an entirely different way from that of the spectator in the stands (Rader, 1990).

The Contemnorarv Game

The following section describes the merger between the NFL and AFL and the emerging structure of one league as a result. Attention is given to the way the competition structure is organized, that is, realignment into two different conferences, and the play-off and wild card system leading to the Superbowl. 54

For professional sport in the USA, the growth and success of pro football Aom the 1960s

to the present time has been unparalleled. "Any dummy can make money operating a pro

football club, " declared A1 Davis, managing partner of the Oakland Raiders in 1978 (Kennedy

and Williamson, 1978). By the 1970s, each pro stadium regularly exceeded 90 percent of its

capacity in attendance, even for preseason exhibition games. The average audience for televised

games leaped from 11 million in 1967 to nearly 20 million by 1977. Two league policies insured

teams against financial failure. By giving visiting teams 40 percent of the gate receipts the NFL

avoided the gross disparities in revenues among franchises characteristic of major league baseball

and pro basketball. More importantly, the NFL split television revenues equally among the

franchises. As Art Modell, the Cleveland Browns owner, once quipped: "We’re 28 Republicans

who vote socialist" (Rader, 1990, p.266).

In 1966 a series of secret meetings regarding a possible AFL-NFL merger were held between Lamar Hunt of Kansas City and Tex Schramm of Dallas. Rozelle announced the merger, June 8. Under the agreement, the two Leagues would combine to form an expanded league of 24 teams, to be increased to 26 in 1968 and to 28 by 1970 or soon thereafter. All existing franchises would be retained, and no franchises would be transferred outside their metropolitan areas. While maintaining separate schedules through 1969, the leagues agreed to play an annual AFL-NFL World Championship Game beginning in 1967. Preseason games would be held between teams of each League starting in 1967. Official regular-season play would start in 1970 when the two Leagues would officially merge to form one league with two conferences. Rozelle was named Commissioner of the expanded league set up (NFL, 1991).

The merged 26-team League was realigned into two thirteen-team conferences, the

National Football Conference (NFC) and the American Football Conference (AFC), each with three divisions (Anderson, 1985). In 1974, Tampa and Seattle were awarded an NFL franchise which were to begin in 1976. In 1977, a 16-game regular season, four game preseason was adopted to begin in 1978 (NFL, 1991). 55

The significance of this merger is that basic economic strategy was the most influential

factor in decision making by owners. A cartel structure where the League established profit

sharing and a monopoly over the market was an indication of the way contemporary sport leagues were now to operate.

Today, the NFL’s 28 teams (which is changing as we speak) split into two conferences of three divisions decide their champion in a similar way as other professional sports do. Each division champion is an automatic qualifier for the play-offs along with three wild card teams

(those with the best records in each conference who were not a division champion) from each conference. In the first round the division champion with the worst record plays the wild card team with the worst record, and the other two wild card teams play against each other, in each respective conference. After the AFC and NFC wild card games we have the AFC and NFC semifinals, which lead to the AFC and NFC championship. The champions from each conference then meet in the Superbowl.

Rader (1990) argued, that by expanding the number of teams eligible for the playoffs and establishing "position" scheduling reduced the likelihood of dynasties, and therefore, kept and interest of the fans.

Beginning in the 1970s, eight teams rather than four participated in the playoffs for the championship. The wild card berth in the playoffs added excitement. In 1977 the NFL introduced the controversial position or "parity" scheduling, which had the effect of pitting more of the weaker teams (according to their records in the previous season) against each other and consequently more of the stronger teams against each other for regular season play. The new system virtu^ly assured that three-fourths of the teams would have a crack at the playoffs up to the final few weeks of the season (Rader, 1990, p.269-270).

In 1983 the United States Football League (USFL) began with a Spring schedule. For the second time in less than 10 years, a new pro league was hoping to challenge the NFL; the

World Football League (WFL) had tried in 1974 and folded two years later. The birth of the

USFL, as well as the WFL, had been inspired by the NFL’s success, particularly by the growth of the Superbowl game into one of America’s biggest sport spectacles. The USFL lasted a little 56 longer than the WFL, but also folded without mounting much of a challenge to the NFL

(Anderson, 1985).

Today, the World League of American Football (WLAF), the most recent pro football

League, operates somewhat as a farm system for the NFL rather than as a rival. Its season begins in the Spring, and is made up of teams from the United States and Europe. The WLAF, which began in 1991, allows those players who are presently not good enough to play in the

NFL, the opportunity to play some form of professional football.

Pro football has expanded to many comers of the globe - millions of people from all over the world tune in to die Superbowl — however, it is not a "world game" in the sense that soccer is. Nonetheless, within the USA the NFL is by far the most successful pro sports league, with litde indication that its strength and the game’s popularity is eroding. CHAPTER m

RATIONALIZATION

This characteristic of modernization is considered first because it can be utilized to

describe and explain facets of societal change. In other words, rationalization is more pervasive than other characteristics of modernization when used as a tool to define behavior. For example, rational thought, which will be defined shortly, is the main determinant of what society is today,

and how and why it developed the way it did. The same can be said for sport and consequently football. Therefore, rational thought and ideas have been the most important influence in creating football as we know it in its most contemporary form in England and the USA.

Rational thought can be defined as a pre-condition for establishing rules and procedures that have been "thought-out," pre-planned and rationalized as a means to an end. This state of mind is responsible for developing a society that is made up of organizations (the means) with specific goals (the end). The goals and the way society reaches them are dictated by the economically powerful. This group tries to convince the majority that these methods are for the common good

In professional sport, the goals (winning and financial solvency) and the means of reaching them (organizational structure, rules and regulations, training, innovations, technology and so forth) are central to die rationalization thesis as proported by Guttmann (1978), Adelman

(1986), Dunning (1975), and other "modernization" theorists.

In this context then, this chapter will contain and focus on the following areas in analyzing the rationalization of football: 1) technology (which includes training methods, styles of play and strategies); 2) rules and regulations; 3) competition structure; and 4) commercialization.

57 58

ENGLAND

Introduction

Soccer evolved from the plebeian, amateur (schoolboy) game to the pro stage through a

process that conformed to changing ideologies and evolving political and economic systems.

Basically these changes involved the attempt to establish a formal body of soccer knowledge, linking this to the qualifications, and associated efforts to rationalize practice at the League clubs in terms of tactical prqtaration, elimination of error, and so on. "The old League footballer’s ethos of native skill and masculine toughness had to be reconciled with a new orthodoxy based on formal knowledge and strategy," (Wagg, 1984, p. 125). This was one of the steps away from working-class culture that soccer had taken since World War H. Also, entrepreneurs soon realized the profits to be gained and had no qualms about paying players or building new stadia.

Nineteenth Centurv

A variety of games of soccer had existed long before Victorian and Edwardian periods.

Before the coming of railways, communications in Britain were far from good. As far as soccer was concerned this isolation produced an immeasurable number of forms (Dunning, 1975).

The main matches were played on holidays and festivals. For the towns and villages of the still large rural society, such games had more important functions than just the enjoyment of a traditional outdoor activity. They were instrumental in producing a community solidarity (i.e., village versus village) and a social identity for players and spectators alike. The standardized game fiilfilled similar functions after 1860 (Mason, 1980).

Industrial expansion and the growth of towns helped diminish old customs even among an urban population who came mainly from a rural setting. Moral values were encouraged within activities and it came to be assumed that if recreation was acceptable at all, it must be "rational" and it must prepare the mind and body for work, instead of being an end in itself. It is ironic that this attitude to games was to be internalized by the middle classes in the public schools. 59

transferred into the working classes by the missionaries of muscular Christianity and distorted,

through professionalization, into the mass spectator sports of the late Victorian and Edwardian

periods (Mason, 1980).

Hargreaves (1992) argues that these developments were initiated in the early period of

Britain’s industrialization up to the 1840s, where changes in popular sports and recreations were mainly instigated by dominant groups under the aegis of the rational recreation movement.

The movement embraced a variety of organizations that proliferated as the century wore on, from the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animus, Sunday Schools and temperance groups, to working men’s institutes, youth organizations, and slum settlements. The movement attempted to persuade, or if necessary coerce, working-class people into accepting a bourgeois model of disciplined, "improving," respectable sporting and recreational activity as an alternative to the tradition plebeian forms which were seen as dissolute and disruptive of social order (Hargreaves, 1992, p. 146).

Hargreaves (1992) notes that individual working-class leaders and socialists were aware that an important area of popular culture was being corralled, by nonsocialist forces and that it might work to their disadvantage. The Fabian News pointed out that "capturing the social life of the workers is one of the most potent weapons of the servile state the fellowship of the cricket and football field will bear precious fruit in sterner fields of industrial warfare," (in

Mason, 1980, p.237). Some local union and socialist groups tried to organize sporting and recreational activity free of commercial influences and bourgeois controls but their efforts were overtaken and submerged by the stronger appeal and organizational superiority of the alternatives

(Yeo, 1976).

Ultimately, Hargreaves (1992) says, dominant groups achieved hegemony over this area of social life through their ct^acity to win support for state intervention at the local level and their command over commercialized leisure and the network of voluntary provision for the sport and recreation.

Above all, their leadership of the rational recreation movement ensured their success, although by no means monolithic, dominant groups in pursuit of their own interests worked to the same effect. They were able to exploit structural and cultural divisions within the working-class and to form cross-class alliances with key sections that muted the expression of the conflict ^.148). 60

The version of football which peasants, artisans, and cottage workers played in

preindustrial England corresponded to the natural rhythm of work and play activities in which

relatively few restrictions or regulations existed. As the process of industrialization overwhelmed

plebeian society, football as it had been played was no longer feasible. Peasant-artisan football

declined drastically as a result of circumstances unrelated to the recreational preferences of its

former participants.

Football in the early nineteenth century involved little dribbling or passing, and sheer

brawn and pure speed a foot were more highly valued attributes than the agility, teamwork, and

coordination required of contemporary soccer players. This was football in a society deeply

marked by custom and less regulated by precise time demands than contemporary society

(Tischler, 1981).

In describing the decline of pre-industrial football, Strutt (1969) notes that it had been,

"formerly much in vogue among common people of England." Pre-industrial work regimes

permitted numerous opportunities for football. Football was often played as part of such

celebrations (holidays), and it was also popular after the crop had been harvested, when there was

generally more time for leisure. Also, the irregular working day, as Thompson (1974) has noted,

provided the flexibility that allowed recreations during the pre-industrial period.

Deviations from a strict work schedule had been acceptable on a modest scale in

pre-industrial society. However, the Industrial Revolution generated demands of time and

discipline for the working-class that were qualitatively more rigorous and enforceable than those

that had existed earlier (Strutt, 1969).

However, there were continuities as well as breaks with older patterns and there were

initiatives and innovation from subordinate as well as dominant groups (Hargreaves, 1992).

Social historians have documented the long and complex process of conflict and accommodation

between and within social classes through which older, popular sports and pastimes were repressed or reformed and modem forms emerged (Bailey, 1978; Cunningham, 1980; Gray,

1981; Joyce, 1980; Yeo, 1976). 61

Football players in the country as well as in the cities had less time, space, and energy

for their game. Much working-class recreation occurred in the pub. While many traditional

recreations, including football, were no longer enjoyed, it is hard to imagine that the rowdy

plebeian game would prove useful to and experience a renaissance at England’s prestigious public

schools. Yet it was in this environment that football was next accepted, although in a

considerably modified way. Changes in the social profile of the participants and the radically

different demands upon them affected the way in which new players in the early nineteenth

century molded "football," (Dunning, 1975, Tischler, 1981).

In spite of football’s low reputation (especially among educators), the excitement of the

game continued to appeal to young university men. By the 1830s and 1840s football was

becoming a pastime of the elite and was transformed in their image, as the game no longer

resembled peasant artisan brawls (Tischler, 1981).

This change produced a more structured, organized game of football. The pre-industrial

game had little rules, boundaries or organized competition. Tournaments and competition had

little importance, and players had no need to publish rules. The peasant-artisan games were

extensions of village or town traditions, and football was only part of a larger celebration.

However, during the second half of the nineteenth century organized tournaments between forms

and houses within a school replaced more spontaneous play patterns, and reports of school

matches appeared in middle-class journals of London. "By regulating behavior on the playing field, the schools distanced their new version of football from the plebeian variety. Educators recognized the need for discipline and rationality suggested by the growing complexity of the period," (Tischler, 1981, p.21). Therefore, another form of football evolved in an environment which stood in sharp contrast to the peasant-artisan community. The game experienced a renaissance in these public schools when the need for an efficient, well-trained bureaucracy prompted the creation of a codified, organized version of football (Tischler, 1981).

With the reform of the public schools went the reform of rough football. Between 1845 and 1862 pupils and staff between them had written down the rules of the football games played 6 2

at the seven leading public schools. It was at Cambridge University, first in 1848 and in the

1860s, that formal and informal experiments finally produced a body of the rules that appeared

to have a fairly wide acceptance. It was not until 1882 that all football players in Britain outside

the public schools accepted what came to be known as association (soccer) or rugby rules,

although a spectacular expansion in the numbers playing both games had occurred some time

before (Mason, 1980).

The movement for a single football code which could be enjoyed by graduates of all

public schools gained momentum. Letters and articles followed, and finally, in 1863, graduates

of several schools met for the purpose of properly administering die game, and on November 25,

the FA was founded (Glanville, 1979).

The Association was created to administer a game enjoyed almost exclusively by men and

boys whose social profile fit the public-school mold. The increasingly frequent mention of

Association football in journals and newspapers at this time also suggests that the popularity of

the standardized game was growing.

In 1871, the FA began its sponsorship of the Challenge Cup (FA Cup) competition, a

tournament to decide the team championship of organized soccer. Attendance at matches rose

significandy with the start of these cup games, and the games received greater newspaper

coverage. However, at this time it was still an amateur game graduates from the public schools

dominated.

The FA would not have to worry about distinctions between amateurism and

professionalism for nearly twenty years. However, as Tischler (1981) notes, "shifts in the

relative strengths and positions of classes in English society made the issue of professionalism

the overwhelming concern of the FA between 1880 and 1885. The outcome of the controversy

over professionalism would again radically alter the nature of football" (p.25).

While the game was being transformed in the public schools, several factors took shape

in society at large that eventually produced a popular soccer culture. The emergence of the relationship between the game and the working-class has been the most documented area of study 63

by researchers. Any analysis of soccer over the last 120 years has to capture how this game

became associated with the working man more than any other class, and its consequence on the

development of the sport. The relevance of this relationship to the rationalization of pro soccer

has rarely been documented yet it is important.

Walvin (1986) argues that the notion of "athleticism" promoted in the public schools

affected or infiltrated the ranks of the working-class, and institutions such as, unions, factories

and churches.

Modem professional clubs developed through the support and backing from the local communities; a church, a factory, or a specific group of workers. But as new stadiums were built and accommodated, the professional teams were associated with a much broader community of support and commitment. Often the process was more complex and reflected not merely geography but that confusion of social forces which created a mosaic of urban loyalties and commitments throughout mainland Britain (p.6S).

Dunning (1975) demonstrates the role played by industrialization in the modernization

of soccer. He focuses on how the game started to move to a modem form as a result of

industrialization which led to a change in the balance of power between classes, more specifically

to an increase in the power of the bourgeoisie - the industrial middle classes — relative to that

of the aristocracy and gentry.

However, the attitudes toward soccer for the middle-class were different from those of

the working-class. The middle-class philosophy was encapsulated in the notion of "playing the game" (Mason, 1980). Sportsmanship and playing for the team and not thyself was very evident by the second half of the Victorian era; not that you won or lost but how you played the game.

So soccer at this time was seen, from a middle-class viewpoint, to improve character and help develop muscle and good circulation. The middle classes saw the game as helping to keep workers off the streets also bringing classes together. By the 1880s, as far as the middle-class attitudes were concerned, sport was seen as something that all classes could share. Football was good for the physique, it helped to build character, it perhaps led to a diminution in drinking, and it brought the classes together. Working-class attitudes to sport are much more difficult to uncover (Mason, 1980). 64

The new working-class preference for an organized, codified form of soccer is both

problematic, in that little can be proven conclusively in an analysis of this trend, and significant

as workers now embraced an organized and disciplined version of soccer. Tischler

(1981) maintains that while no single causative factor can be isolated, "the introduction to the

working-class of a codified form of soccer bears a striking similarity to the process which Foster

(1974) associated with the changes that occurred in education, temperance activities, and

elsewhere in working-class life," ^.33). A more sophisticated and complex society required an

organized structure, written rules and regulations and so on, to maintain order, and as far as

soccer officials were concerned, to advance the sport.

Baker (1979) documents a number of factors contributing to a working-class soccer

culture. The growth of cities was very influential. In 1800 there was not a single city other than

London with a population of 100,000 or more; nearly a century later no less than 72 per cent

lived in cities, and the number of urban centers surpassing 100,000 had leaped to 23. This

overcrowding brought on a great demand for new housing, sanitation facilities, and new

diversions. Parks and fields were at a premium in the working-class sections of town, producing

a demand for cheap transportation. Baker (1979) notes, that this transport system played a big part in the opportunity for the working-class to play and watch the game. "As Britain’s

fast-growing railway systems made inter-city soccer competition possible, a boom in intra-city transport vdiicles such as passenger cabs, omnibuses, coaches, and trams linked the most remote working-class areas to fields of play," (p.242).

Baker (1979) also alludes to the mid-century Factory Acts allowing working men more leisure time, and the Education Act of 1870, putting a school within the reach of every child, as instrumental in the growth of working-class soccer. Laboring classes won their half-day

Saturdays, and were able to play informally or watch their local clubs. Schoolboys learned their three R’s as well as how to play organized games. This in turn created a mass reading audience for the sports press which could only promote the affection and interest of the working-class toward soccer. 65

Sport Historians (Baker, 1979; Dunning, 1975; Mason, 1980; Tischler, 1981; Vamplew,

1988; Walvin, 1986) have well documented the growth of soccer clubs from the beginning, the

rise of professionalism, the eventual demise of upper-class domination on the soccer field, and

the failure of the dominant classes to instill the "fair play" notion as part of a gentleman’s game.

Let us now consider the emergence of the professional game and its affect on the way the game

was to be played — demise of "fair play" - and consequently the inception of certain rules and

regulations.

Until the close of the 1870s both the FA and leading clubs in and around London were

dominated by either leisured gentlemen or by professionally or commercially employed products

of public and grammar schools. Play was not confused with work, it was done for fun and

because it was good for you. However, this changed by the end of the century. "From

1883-1914, northern working-class teams won every FA Cup except one," (Baker, 1979, p.244).

Whoever the first professional was is not clear, but rumors of professionalism were

widespread in the early 1880s. The first stage of the problem of professionalism in soccer

manifested itself in the crisis surrounding importation. Importation was the playing of men

brought into the town, district or team from outside. Many soccer officials considered this

activity to be outside the spirit of the game — this was not unlike the system in the USA where

players offered their services to different teams in different towns and where "ringers" were

brought in for big games. The gentlemen founders of the game thought it was degrading and not

in the spirit of the game for men to play for money. Many players were paid under the table,

and the new entrepreneurs saw professional soccer as a lucrative investment, and the profits they

made from the game helped build new stadiums, buy equipment and uniforms, and provide

salaries (Baker, 1979). In 1883 the Athletic News indicated the soccer, which was played and enjoyed almost free of expense, "has developed into a vast business institution," (Mason, 1980, p.71).

The opponents of professionalism replied with two major arguments. First, a voluntary leisure activity would become a business. It would develop business attitudes of win at all costs. 66

Second, old structure of the game (local rivalries), would be damaged as clubs paying the most

money (wealthy clubs) would secure the best players.

Professionalism was finally legalized after a special general meeting of the FA on July

twentieth, 1885. Professionals would not be allowed to play for more than one club in any one

season without the special permission of the FA Committee. This amateur-professional issue was punctuated by accusations of class prejudice. The first professional to play in the major fixture,

England versus Scotland, did so in 1886 and was made to wear a different shirt from the rest of the eleven (Mason, 1980).

In the 1870s most players were attackers and both sides had a goalie, two backs, one half-back and seven forwards. Backs were there for long kicking and strength. Heavy shoulder charging was very prominent. It was a robust game. By the middle of the 1880s the passing game had taken over — somewhat earlier than the passing game became prominent in the USA, where it was a physical running game for many years in the NFL - a response to a more sophisticated and professional attitude. As Wagg notes:

As early as the 1890s professionalism existed in terms of exploiting the rules, e.g., the "off-side trap" which reflected the collectivist traditions of Ae working class life: passing served the team — death-or-glory dribbling was an unacceptable self-indulgence more applicable to die amateur style of play. Besides which for professionals money and job tenure were at state and local followers, intense in their identification and demands for victory had to be appeased (p.35).

This professional attitude to the game (playing for money, therefore, playing to win becoming the main motivating factor) made the outcome seem more important than ever before, and consequently people in the game began to realize there were many ways to score or to stop people from scoring. Hence people started to view soccer from a strategic point of view. Rules, strategies and formations were developed with a specific purpose in mind, overcoming your opponent to win the game. People began to think about the game in a rational sense. As Mason

(1980) notes:

The goalkeqier could use his hands to play the ball anywhere on the field. There was more heading in the game. With die emergence of combination, a new playing formation was bom, wididrawing two forwards to half-back position. 67

The arrival of the third back was the last important change in the structure of the team until the 1930s when the center-half was withdrawn to play between the two full-backs so becoming literally a "third back." The growth in competitive play, both cup and league, made the referee as objective arbiter, divorced from direct connection with the competing clubs, essential. By the mid-1880s then, association football had more or less reachai its 20th century form ^.209).

It was evident through rule changes, that soccer people began to demonstrate a rational

approach to the game - thinking about rules and regulations that were important to controlling

the action and how the game should be played.

Mason (1980) says analysis of a game in 1902 might be as follows; The umpires were

now linesmen concentrating on offside and indicating when the ball was out of play and which

side should get the throw-in. The referee had been giving free kicks for foul play without appeal

in 1889-90. Perhaps the most significant change after the emergence of the referee as the man

in charge on the field was the institution of the penalty kick. It was awarded for deliberate foul

play committed by opponents in their own penalty area. Penalty area lines took their present

form in season 1902-3. Goalkeepers now received some protection from physical attack, and their privilege of using their hands was restricted to the penalty area in 1912.

As early as the 1890s, after 10 years or so of professionalism in soccer, critics of the game felt that some of their fears had been justified. In particular they doubted whether the sportsmanship ethic really thrived among the largely working-class crowd.

If working class crowds were reluctant to appreciate both sides, so the profession^ football players themselves also failed to reach the standards of sportsmanship expect^ by ex-public school men. It is possible that had been an increase in intentional foul play since the mid-1880s, especially by defenders close to their own goal. Hence the penalty kick was introduced in 1891. For many ex-public schoolboys and much of the middle class this rule was inappropriate as gentlemen did not deliberately commit fouls (Mason, 1980, p.231).

To put it crudely, could this be a result of changing attitudes within the working-class toward a game that was now becoming a profession, with serious consequences for the winners and losers? The first professional teams developed in those towns in Lancashire and the midlands which were industrial and urban where the "survival of the fittest" attitude was most evident

(Mason, 1980). The working-class in these areas were becoming a part of the competitive world 68

reflective of industrialization — rationalizing their involvement in soccer, play for pay, and

therefore play not to lose at any cost. These values had an affect on the way the game was to

be played for over a century.

However, the middle-class were not totally grieved about the way the game was played

or more particularly how intently the working man associated himself with the town team.

Although these towns were industrial and urban they were relatively settled; community spirit and

solidarity still existed, which is uncharacteristic of urban towns today. By the 1860s and 1870s

their most rapid period of industrial and population growth was over. These clusters of towns

had risen together during the Industrial Revolution and achieved political status together. They

were used to doing things together and this may well have facilitated the spread of the game. As

Mason (1980) notes: "In such circumstances it would not be surprising to find a growing

identification with a place emerging among both middle and working classes. Football can be

seen both to contribute to this and to benefit from it. Working people could be helped to feel that

they belonged to a community by the activities of the local football team and their attachment to

that team" (jp.260).

Twentieth Century - Training and Practice

By 1902 professionals had taken on the attitude that preparation was important if they

were to improve and become successful. They had become especially good at heading and passing, and had significantly improved standards of the game through continued practice and tactical understanding. This was another area of ideological confrontation, and a changing approach, in early soccer, i.e., coaching and tactical preparation. Attitudes were defined by broader class ideologies; aristocrats, and those aspiring to comparable status, preferred to believe in the "naturalness" of their social position, rather than to consider it to be the result of striving.

By the 1890s the need for training was began to be accepted in the form of the promotion of physical fitness, and trainers being hired. However, these training sessions were usually just long country walks with collar and ties still on. By the 1890s big clubs had players removed to 69

a hotel the night before a big match. Although professional players were still not coached, tactical planning was taking place, but by contemporary standards it was individualistic and spontaneous. The same could be said for pro football in the USA, but the nature of the game

(complex, and need for organization) made innovative, spontaneous type play somewhat unacceptable soon after the inception of professionalism.

Citv Factor

After 1888, the big city clubs emerged increasingly dominant. Winning the FL title was a different matter to the FA Cup. It required consistent form and ability over a whole season of at first 22 matches and later 26, 30,34, from 1905,38 and 42 today (Glanville, 1979). Winning this trophy demanded a different approach to the game than that demonstrated by public schoolboys and amateurs. It demanded planning, organization and a long-term outlook. With this competition structure in place the game required a more rational approach than previously.

There is no doubt that the public schools and the ancient universities were turning out some good players, certainly throughout the 1880s and 1890s. This was illustrated by the success of the Corinthians, an amateur team from the 1880s into the 1890s. However, the professional trained harder and the game as a result, grew faster, if not necessarily more skillful. By 1907 serious competition between amateurs and full-timers was over. The list of top teams from 1900 to 1915 not only emphasized the urban character of the professional game but the strength of the big city clubs. These clubs were generally had wealthier owners and the availability of people willing to pay to see a game. The census of 1911 listed 97 urban districts with populations exceeding 50,000 and these included the homes of all the clubs in the two divisions of the FL except for two (Mason, 1980). A similar pattern was to occur in the NFL, which originally started in medium sized cities, but soon established franchises in the big cities. 70

Professionalism. Commercialism, and the Workinp-Class

This section discusses the origins of pro clubs, the emergence of professionalism and

commercialism, and the rise of the working-class game, where winning became all important.

Korr (1978) in his analysis of West Ham United Football Club, said the majority of

soccer clubs that became professional had their roots in industrial clubs, church or settlement house sponsored groups or neighborhood clubs. Taylor (1971) asserts that the present day clubs grew out of the concern of working-class men to develop their primary group relationships in what leisure time they had. "Most of these clubs grew directly out of autonomous occupational groups. West Ham United was one such club, which was started by a group of workers at the

Thames Iron Works," (Taylor, 1971, p.213).

Korr (1978) illustrated how the local working-class culture, along with the industrial and labor structure of the East End of London was instrumental in West Ham’s development. He describes the operation of the club as it moved into professional status. This description included the roles played by shareholders, directors in running a business, capital investment, the social ramifications of moving the club, and the involvement of local politicians attempting to solidify community ties. Korr (1978) concluded, that the directors realized they were selling a product.

Winning became in ^ rtan t so top players were brought down from the north and from Scotland.

These professionals were paid a wage they could live on, so the soccer playing role became a fiill-time job. This attitude of operating clubs like a business and recruiting players from all over the country was a sign of things to come and central to the process of how the contemporary game would eventually evolve.

These findings of Korr’s case study seem to be reflective of the direction pro soccer was moving at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. As Baker (1979) wrote: "In the ascendancy of those northern clubs lay the origins of professional football"

(p.244).

Newspaper rq)orts of soccer crowds in the early 1880s frequently described their size, enthusiasm, and insatiable demand for soccer. At the same time, the levy of admission fees at 71

matches revolutionized numerous aspects of soccer. The sport became less a gentleman’s pastime

and more a commercial enterprise when played at its highest levels. Relationships among teams

increasingly came to resemble the relationships among ordinary competitive business firms. As

Tischler (1981) argues, "the debate over professionalism was a by-product of the

commercialization of football, which to entrepreneurs entailed the competition for players in an

open labor market, and was the central pillar on which the football business stood” (p. 140).

Adelman (1986) alludes to this connection between rationalization, professionalism, and

commercialism in sport as he writes;

Commercialization served as a catalyst for the expansion of competition and professionalism by providing a more rational and productive method of financing these developments. In addition, the increase in the number of commercial units nationally required that the various sports entrepreneurs coordinate and rationalize their business practices to maximize their profits. Critical to this process was equality of competition, uniform rules, systematic scheduling and increased organization ^.10).

The population distribution of Lancashire and the development of transportation facilities

that linked several mill towns heightened commercial competition among teams. In addition to

an expanded railway network, trams and cabs provided transportation to matches. Also, it was

noted that fans would often walk several miles to see a good match. The message to club owners

was clear: to be financially successful and collect large gates, it was necessary to display good

players. Crowds could go to see other teams if hometown matches were not up to par.

Gate revenues correlated to the performance of the teams as early as the 1880s (Tischler,

1981). Therefore, there was competition for the best players even at this early stage of

professional soccer. The ex-public schoolboys who comprised soccer’s governing body were

upset by these developments, and this was accentuated by the success of the working-class teams

from Lancashire and the Midlands over the old-boy teams. The development of this working-

class soccer culture and the projection of some that soccer could be a commercial enterprise was

the determining factor in producing the professional game. "The legalization of professionalism was brought about by the growth of commercialism in football. "Professional" came to be

accepted as a euphemism for "working class,"" (Tischler, 1981, p.44). 72

The best players came from mining or manufacturing districts in England or Scotland

(Mason, 1980). These players could not be expected to sacrifice a day’s work for a match a long

distance away. One problem was that very few were able to be released to train for matches, and

if they did it might be only a couple of days before a game. A revised body of regulations was

needed, which would allow the owners to pay players openly and sufficiently to enable them to

play and train unhindered. Hence the legalization of professionalism in 1885 as noted above.

Many Scottish players were imported even though this upset many local supporters who

felt the "local lads" should be given more opportunity. While the public were not ready at this

time to accept this change (a desire to demonstrate superiority) owners were. This attitude by

owners toward the game provided a mechanism for rational change. As Adelman (1986) notes:

A desire to demonstrate superiority — which is the essence of competition, particularly among individuals who do not know each other on a personal basis — required the formalization of behavioral patterns and contributed to the professionalization of sport, with a concomitant emphasis on training and specialized roles The commercialization of sport contributed to the modernization of sport in two ways: by facilitating the growth of competitive, athletics beyond local boundaries and by aiding the rise of professional sports. In neither case was commercialization the cause of these developments, since both flowed from the search for superiority; in fact, the presence of competitive and professional elements with a particular sport always preceded commercialization ^.9).

However, these imported players attracted large crowds and enthusiasm for the game.

Aston Villa, Blackburn Rovers, and Preston North End averaged crowds of 4000-6000 per game

during the years when the issue of professionalism was debated. Other teams attracted crowds

of 15,000 paying spectators for certain matches, as in the case of Darwen (18th March, 1882),

Bolton (2nd February, 1885), Nottingham (1st March, 1884), and Derby (28th February 1885).

These numbers compare poorly to those of the decade prior to World War I, yet they illustrate the popularity and potential of soccer among paying spectators (Tischler, 1981).

Post World War I

This section deals with the emerging ideology within the game that accepted and promoted an attitude demonstrated in other businesses. Pro soccer was no longer an amateur 73

sport; it was "serious stuff where a "working boy" could make a living for his family. This

attitude was taken on by spectators as well as players and owners.

By 1915 soccer on all its various levels, was a sizeable minority interest compared to

other businesses emerging at this time. The competitive element seems to have been important:

it was not playing for the game’s sake which stimulated the plethora of cups and leagues which

dominated the structure of the game. Perhaps betting was more important too. The working-

class spectator identified with a team and through that team a place (Mason, 1980). Through this

commitment to affiliation spectators expected and demanded results. Also, pride was "on the

line." These spectators were beginning to rationalize their, as well as the players, involvement

in soccer, in that playing for fun and playing well would not suffice. This instrumental approach to sport reflected what Brown (1976) called the modem personality type which exhibits a significant drive for individual autonomy, initiative, and achievement.

However, there were those in the middle classes who felt that sport should still be seen as games not interfering with work, which was the serious part of our lives. Yet a serious approach to the game was inevitable and even the middle-class eventually accepted it as part of the rationalization of sport.

It seems as far as soccer was concerned, working people had rejected much of what the southern-oriented professional and administrative middle classes would have prescribed. There was no monolithic middle-class, so there was no monolithic middle-class attitude to soccer.

There were even those in the middle-class who believed in professionalization of the game and that there was nothing wrong in playing to win (Mason, 1980).

Among the working-class the sportsmanship ethic, that was very evident of the earlier middle-class dominated amateur game, was disappearing. Winning became more important than playing the game well, even if it meant bending the rules, and that is what the crowd came to see. "The widespread experience which working men had of playing and watching association football probably aided the formation of a more general consciousness of class," (Mason, 1980, p.256). It was their game, it reflected their values and in some respects set them apart from 74

other classes and accentuated the need to be successful at something where opportunity prevailed.

This attitude was probably conducive to the development of professionalism and consequently the

importance of winning. This attitude changed the game from that time to present as we shall now

see.

Playing soccer was a better way of making a living than sweating in somebody’s coal

mine or dark, satanic mill. In essence the same argument explains why clever-headed young men

turn professional today rather than go to university. There were no hungry players among those

Old Etonians, Old Harrovians and Old Carthusians.

Money became a vital influence on developments in soccer as soon as families realized

that the sport could pay regular working wages. This was the point at which the game took on

its widest significance. "The growth of football is not a footnote to the social history of the 20th

century but a plain thread in it," (Hopcraft, 1968, p.22). While not considered a profession of

"higher culture," it was a profession nonetheless, as pro soccer was an occupation that demanded

a time commitment, planning and organization just like any other career or business.

By the 1920s soccer was an established employer in a community where jobs were

scarce. The clubs had grown up out of pride in athleticism, in local importance, and in corporate

endeavor. The stadiums were situated where the supporters lived, in among the industrial mazes

of factories and overcrowded streets of worker’s houses. The Saturday match became more than

mere diversion from the daily grind, because there was often no work to be relieved. To go to

the match was to escape from miserable despondency into the excitement of combat. Here, by

association with the home team, positive identity could be claimed by athleticism and goals. To

win was personal success, to lose another blow from life. "Football was not so much an opiate

of the people as a flag run up against the gaffer bolting his gates and the landlord armed with his

bailiffs," (Hopcraft, 1968, p.23).

The attention the state paid to the soccer world appears to have been stepped up after the

war. In 1923 the Empire Stadium (Wembley) was opened. From this time on the FA Cup Final would annually be held there. In the 1930s soccer seemed to be taking on a more central social 75

priority — more of a break with the Puritan revolution than anything else. The working-class

game was now being regarded, by sections of the elite, as well as the general public, as a more

serious matter, one of national concern.

However, developments of the national team were slow and hampered by the myopic

conservatism of FA officials. International soccer was well established by the 1920s, but the FA

was disdainful of FIFA and between the world wars was only a member for four years (1924-28).

The FA did not even send a team to the first World Cup (1930), although it realized that the

country’s premier mass sport was now a matter of international importance. In 1932 when

England played Austria it was obvious the latter had a coach, and if England were to dominate

in future it would have to take the game more seriously. There was a desire to change, to

establish rational order, as Voigt (1971) notes: "The appearance of formal sport reflects man’s

rational attempt at channeling fun, and the rise of many formal sports in industrial society testifies

to this faith in rationalism — a faith which values the formalization of most patterns of behavior"

(p.24).

This somewhat amateur approach to international soccer - football at home was okay so

why worry about international success - was instigated through professional league soccer. After

World War I, Divisions I and II enlarged to 22 teams each and Division HI was created. Huge

numbers of people went to see the games which led to complacency as tiie League saw no need

to change. There were few advocates for coaching among players and managers. The working-

class were suspicious of book learners, and those using blackboard to explain the game.

Managers and Certified Coaches

This section discusses the establishment of coaching courses, why they came about, and the effect this had on the way managers approached the game, i.e., the consideration of tactics.

Also, there is examination of other factors that changed the role of managers after World War

I. 76

Soccer was not "just a game" anymore, the goal was to win matches and if it took

coaches, as it did on the continent, then so be it. The trouble lay in the plan to promote coaching

by Stanley Rous (President of the FA, later to become President of FIFA), who began to establish

a new regime at the FA after 1934. Part of this change was the FA Coaching course, the first

one held in London in 1936, (Wagg, 1984). This course was held annually and those passing received a certificate, which gave players extra dignity and status with a professional qualification, as well extra money for coaching schoolboys. However, method was one thing and certificates were another; anyone could sign up for a course, which somewhat lowered its status and in many instances its standards.

The inter-war period was a time of development for soccer managers. In the 1930s signs existed that suggested managers were responsible for performance on the field and the idea that they actually planned strategies, although this was not universally accepted. Some clubs did not even appoint a manager until after the World War H, as they saw no need for one. The chairman or directors often chose the line-up. Also managers were often seen as "secretaries-managers"

(clerical figure) and mainly trainers rather than coaches — get the sprints in for the lads, put the team sheet up on the wall. Liverpool did not have one until mid-1930s. West Bromwich Albion until 1948, and Aston Villa until 1958 (Wagg, 1984).

However, managers had existed even before 1914, as directors wanted them to be accountable to the local soccer public. They were expendable as high turnover rate in the 1920s and 1930s indicates, and this was even more evident with the escalating desire to win among directors. These changes illustrate how it was increasingly difficult for sport to exist on its previous informal and spontaneous basis (Adelman, 1986).

Many managers saw little of their players, as they were often in the charge of a trainer during the week who had them running and doing exercises without a ball, with the assumption being the players will be hungry come Saturday afternoon. Most of the manager’s time was spent behind a desk, watching many matches and recruiting players. Even as players at this time wanted tactical instruction, soccer managers of the 1920s and 1930s identified upwards with club 77

proprietors, rather than downwards with the players on the "shop floor," (Wagg, 1984). Not

unlike managers in factories and other professions who acted as the go-between for owners and

workers, but in reality were an extension of elite decision making.

The following is an excerpt from Hopcraft (1968) which typifies the managers role

between the two world wars:

Stan Cullis had wanted to be a journalist but had left school at IS and was working in a grocery shop, taking further lessons at night school. He remembers being t^ken to see Wolves’ manager, the legendary martinet Major Buckley, at his home. Buckley, he says, "looked like a retired, well-to-do farmer, because he always wore plus-fours. He looked like a man of the soil. No one ever thought of calling him anything else but "Major." It was his rank in the First World War." The interview was short and staccato. Cullis says: "He looked me up and down as I imagine a blood-stock owner would look at a racehorse. He said, "Stand up." He tapped me on the chest and said, "What have you got there?" I didn’t know what he meant. I thought he must mean somefiiing about my clothes. He said "Are you frightened?" I said, "What of?" He said, "Of getting hurt." I said, "No." That was all he said to me. He had some words with my father which I couldn’t hear, and I was a professional footballer. " The next conversation Cullis had with his manager was equally terse: "He gave me a very strict instruction about what I had to do if I wanted to make a success of the job. This first homily was, "You listen to me because I am going to be the most important man in your life from now on""(p.24-25).

However, the manager’s role and outlook started to change between the two world wars for a number of reasons. Managers saw they were accountable for the team’s performance and in the "public’s eye." Also, they realized the ideology surrounding professional soccer had changed as those involved wanted to bury the amateur ethos for good. Major Frank Buckley of

Wolves and Herbert Chapman of the Arsenal in the 1920s and 1930s saw soccer as a business and how a club’s success related to the town or city’s success. Chapman stated: "Football is not a hobby anymore," (Wagg, 1984, p.57). In the USA George Halas and Curly Lambeau saw pro football in the same light — a business made up of teams closely affiliated with the local public and the city where they play.

Inevitably some managers began working closer with their players, and resentment toward directors grew. As players of a higher quality were developed through professionalism, they wanted managers with expertise and knowledge of soccer, the game demanded it. Directors were 78

seen as businessmen w iù no understanding of the game. The players wanted ex-pros in charge

of them. In other words they wanted a "player manager" type (Buckley and Chapman), which

they did not always get.

Many managers appealed to an almost mystical concern for hardness in the working-class

male, which was their bridge to the players. Buckley, the manager at Blacl^ool, from 1923-27,

reflected this attitude; die first "track suit" manager who trained the team himself. This was a

departure from the suit and hat manager and a response to the tactical demands of the game.

There was now a greater pressure to win. The directors were aware of the fans needs for

success, and consequendy needed expert managers who required a greater commitment from their

players. These managers became firm disciplinarians, and even today this style still exists at

certain clubs, for example, Brian Clough at Nottingham Forest (Wagg, 1984).

This growing national phenomenon of soccer managers was due in large part to the

media, especially the newspapers. By the 1920s many newspapers portrayed good managers as

the key to success in soccer. As a result the manager in professional soccer became more

marketable, and by the 1930s, their relationship with reporters became more institutionalized;

sometimes in the pub.

These changes were not across the board; still some lockerrooms lacked tactical

guidance. However, as Wagg (1984) notes: "Between the wars a transition occurred of the manager from a sacrificial clerk to a tactician-horsetrader by the late 1930s many managers

seemed to be more actively involved in the business of running professional teams-signing players, selecting the side, giving tactical instruction and getting this into the newspapers.

However, the football manager was not yet a technocrat," (p.48).

As far as the players were concerned, attitudes to playing the game and secondly to wages related to management and society in general. There have always been perceptible cultural differences between soccer players: "the canny inside forward, the clever dribbler, the hard men who ’tookno prisoners’...and these corresponded to different strands and strata in working-class life. Off the field managers imposed themselves, becoming unwitting agents for middle-class 79

morality," (Wagg, 1984, p.56). It was bad enough for players being told how to play the game

let alone how to live as well.

The technocrat coach was not well accepted even in the 1930s. Players had learned the

game on the streets and a technocrat threatened the traditional wisdom. Therefore, a lot of

managers were ex-intemationals as players trusted their knowledge. Some worked out tactics

with the players, in fact the famous "stopper center-half plan (two man central defense) was

devised not by Chapman but at an Arsenal team meeting (Hopcraft, 1968).

After World War I league soccer became less spontaneous and more defensive - playing

not to lose rather than attacking soccer. The most important goal for directors, managers and

players was not to lose, with playing good, attractive soccer relegated in terms of importance.

Therefore, the FA legislated an amendment to the offside law in 1925 so only two not three

players between the attacker and the goal was needed. This was intended to counter the offside

trap and return the game to the carefree attacking play of the pre-war days. Of course this problem has never gone away and even the pros of the 1920s and 1930s thought too much individually skilled play was against the main goal of the game, i.e., team work. Also, toughness and physical commitment was a big part of the game which managers emphasized in games and practice. However, it never reached the feneticism of the 1970s when players were unable to turn and were constantly tackled from behind. Nonetheless, the ideology of the 1930s was one of a tough game where players would lose their masculinity if they were not prepared to play hard. Also, "gamesmanship was considered wrong — hard physical game and tackling which was more a part of gender, masculine honesty and straightforwardness than part of their job, " (Wagg,

1984, p.60).

Professional soccer is now effectively a technocracy, though not equalling medicine or law. Theodore Roszak (1973) said technocracy is what "the ideal men usually have in mind when they speak of modernizing, updating, rationalizing and planning," (in Wagg, 1984, p.73).

Wagg (1984) said a technocracy is not a profession in the widely accepted sense but its members do style themselves as "professionals." The soccer world became a technocracy because of 8 0

developments and changes that had been brewing at the FA since the 1930s, in the League

somewhat earlier and in the changing face of British capitalism.

Britain because of its aristocratic tradition had developed more ambiguously as a capitalist

society than America. In the 1940s the great majority of people among the higher social classes

in Britain held to gentlemanly bourgeois values while their counterpart in the USA discovered

new ones. The transition from an old economy centered on production for a new one aimed at

mass marketing and promotion. A number of changes were inevitable in soccer as it was

incompatible with this emergent cluster of new dominant values. "The British Empire being

dismantled after World War n and Western Europe becoming a bulwark — political, economic

and strategic - against the communist bioc. The implications were clear for football," (Wagg,

1984, p.70).

Europe and the World

This section considers the effect European and international competitions had on the way soccer people viewed the pro game in England. Factors that brought about changes in technocracy and a more rationalized approach of FA officials and managers are discussed here.

For the first time English soccer clubs entered into the European soccer tournaments, it became important for the National team to perform well against communist countries, and it was felt that soccer should be spread to the Third World. Changes in society began to alter the functions of sport, or ra&er how people perceived the game in terms of the way it should be played as well as the role it had off the field, and TV was major part of this.

Commercial TV (TTV) brought racing and soccer into peoples homes. Famous players became household names, and were expected to project the right image, being skillful, athletic and working-class. Officials accepted that publicity and advertizing were inevitable, especially with declining attendances. "Impression management" (advertizing, the mass media, public relations) became a tactic of the elite which redefined the game. The business world and the 81

media were changing the face of the game. An area we shall turn to in a later chapter. These

kinds of changes had already begun to change pro football in the USA.

In 1945 Moscow Dynamo Football Club toured Britain. They beat Arsenal 4-3 and won

most of their matches by a wider margin. The importance of this was; 1) it helped to impress upon the FA and other soccer officials the need to modernize the English game. This could only strengthen the hand of Stanley Rous and the move towards licensing coaches; 2) the popularity of individuality and masculinity would obviously produce a difficulty for Rous and his supporters in establishing coaching at the League clubs; 3) inter-club competitions between Europeans would bring a greater prestige and revenue to top clubs. Strong support of Rous for the European Cup and the UEFA Cup both began in 1955 (Wagg, 1984).

The central figure in promotion of coaching was Walter Winterbottom who was made the

FA Director of Coaching and manager of England — its first — in 1946. Rous picked him as the man to modernize English soccer. The coaching campaign began on two fronts: the England team and the FA courses many League players attended. Winterbottom faced some opposition, as the popular press of the time was hostile to coaching. This was still evident among the clubs as many management jobs in the League still went to ex-intemational players.

Although Herbert Chapman and Frank Buckley pioneered a style of managing geared toward tactical efficiency in the 1920s and 1930s, it was not until the 1940s and 1950s that other managers began to go about things in the same way. Gradually more clubs appointed coaches

(ex-players with a qualification from the FA, i.e., FA Badge) and many of these became managers, and by the end of the 1960s the ethos and practice of coaching were well entrenched at the League clubs. This increasing rationalization of the game could be attributed to a number of things: the realization by the FA of the need to improve the English game after being exposed to top European teams; the imposition on the pro game by the elite, utilizing "impression management" tactics, that emphasized attitudes in sport similar to other professional organizations, i.e., efficiency, preparation and, above all, survival through success; and, changes 82

within the game itself that were necessary if standards were to improve and the game was to

move forward.

One of the implications of this was a shift in the ideological place of soccer and sport in

general in England. Professional soccer now acquired respectability, adopting a rhetoric of

efficiency, professionalism and science, it was becoming part of "real" life. The old practice of

not working with soccer balls in the week had to go. Bill Nicholson, FA Coach and Tottenham

manager, was seen as a tactical mastermind when the Spurs (Tottenham Hotspur) won both the

FA Cup and the Football League (ftrst team to do the double in the twentieth century) in 1961

(Wagg, 1984).

Pro soccer was now mostly operated by qualified people who, like their counterparts in

other professions and organizations, approached the game in a professional, serious manner.

Planning, preparation, training and so forth, reflected a changing attitude toward pro soccer

indicative of a move toward rationalization.

Another implication of soccer technocracy was that it sought to widen the cognitive gulf

between those "in the game" and those not. In other words, outsiders were not well accepted.

However, these boundaries between amateurs and professionals can be difficult to sustain, for

example, FA courses were open to anyone, amateurs, PE teachers, journalists and so forth. Yet

today the highest coaching award, the FA Full Badge, is generally reserved for a select few, i.e.,

pros or ex-pros.

In the 1950s the attitude of not wanting to experiment with or ftirther develop the game

was tied in with an ever presence of parochialism. The media showed little interest in the 1950

World Cup in Brazil. There was no radio commentary at all. This parochialism reflected

attitudes within League clubs, to which writers looked for their stories. It was also a reflection

of broader British values, which still exist today. The British have always felt secure in their

own system and have been adverse to change. Perhaps this carried over from a time when they

were one of the most dominant cultures, and the idea that they invented the game in its contemporary form. 83

However, a 3-6 home defeat to Hungary in 1953 had a dramatic effect on English soccer

and demonstrated the need for change. It was a symbolic moment when people realized that

English soccer would have to go back to "school" and learn to play the modem, scientific way.

Then losing 1-7 in Budapest six months later was attributed to a lack on their part of necessary

coaching and overall tactical preparation (Glanville, 1979).

British soccer was a metaphor for the greatness of Britain. However, they were both in doubt. The Empire had fallen sometime earlier, and as soccer began to corrode this was voiced by the public through the newspapers. The England team had for many years been the symbol of superior play and were showing vulnerability. The British public wanted to know why. Was it because other countries were beginning to approach the game in a more serious way, utilizing sophisticated, more advanced tactics, as Hungary had in 1953? How should England respond?

The FA had been trying to modernize its practices since the beginning of the

Winterbottom era and especially in the wake of defeat by the USA in the 1950 World Cup, when a Technical Sub-Committee had been set up. This had some important innovations and an overall commitment to long term planning. In 1954,200 young professionals of 18 or under were asked to attend for trials at six League grounds in various parts of the country. The same year an

England Under-23 team was established to give professionals an early experience at international soccer (Wagg, 1984).

Winterbottom and his team sensed that reporting of their affairs was increasingly of an investigative nature (similar to today — checking their every move and decision). There was an angry response to England’s failure to win the 1958 World Cup in Sweden. The press and consequently the public wanted to know why England were not as good as Brazil (the winners).

Much of this failure was attributed to poor preparation and unlike Brazil, England did not have a training camp. The press scrutinized and measured England’s performance abroad as well as home. The next World Cup in 1962 brought similar results for England and once again the press was very critical. Rous longed for the 1930s when the tours were "free and easy affairs" and the press was less critical and informed (Glanville, 1979). 84

As a new rationalized soccer had emerged and was here to stay, England was perceived

as well down the field of world soccer standards. Efficiency and the desire not to lose changed

the way the game was played, for example, in the 1962 World Cup only 1.17 goals per game

were yielded compared to 3.60 in 1958 and 5.34 in 1954. Also, violent and "professional"

tackling became the norm at the international and then club level.

The feelings about these changes were mixed in the soccer culture in England. People

realized the English game lacked preparation and good coaching, and understood the need for

correction if England was ever to rule the soccer world again. However, the movement away

from the working-class artistry to a robot type play associated with the FA Badge was seen in a

negative light (Glanville, 1979, Wagg, 1984).

Alf Ramsey took over from Winterbottom in 1963 and was well accepted because he was

seen as a tactician, a technocrat as well as a competent ex-pro player himself. Many players saw

him as more ruthless than Winterbottom, who was from an upper middle-class background and

conveyed the amateur/gentleman attitude in his approach to the game. Bobby Charlton, one of

England’s most celebrated and influential players, described the difference between the two men:

Ramsey was a "mud-on-his-boots" type manager (willing to be on the field and confident of his

ability in practical coaching situations), while Winterbottom was a "chalk-on-his-fingers" type

manager (did most of his work behind a desk and in the lockerroom). The emergence of the type

of manager Ramsey was represented an ideological shift in the soccer world (Hopcraft, 1968).

The 1960s on

This final section discusses factors that facilitated the commercialization of the game since the 1960s and how this promoted a "win at all costs” attitude within the pro soccer milieu.

There were clearly other reasons besides the scrutiny of the press as to why a sense of professional exclusivity hardened in the clubs. Surely, factors such as the lifting of the maximum wage ceiling (players could sell themselves to the highest bidder, accentuating the fact that wealthy teams could attract the best players), the breakdown of working-class community 85

solidarity, and the pressure to win all contributed to this process. In 1961 the FL agreed to lift

the player’s maximum wage ceiling which contributed to a complete transformation of the soccer

culture. Wage bills got bigger in the 1960s and attendance declined. Along with this was the

breakdown of working-class neighborhoods, and a move to a more symmetrical nature of family

life, a growing affluence, more people driving cars, and more leisure time options.

The above had a tremendous affect on how people approached, played and viewed the

game. Now there was an extreme pressure on the manager to produce success, as it was seen

as a prerequisite to bringing the crowds back. Some managers were now taken because of their

management skills rather than their soccer knowledge. "So market factors lay behind the

emergence in the 1960s of a defensive "professional " ideology among League soccer people.

Managers had to stress the non-rational, or charismatic, aspects of their work in order to

legitimate it," (Wagg, 1984, p. 121).

By the late 1960s, soccer had moved a great distance, ideologically, since the days when

spontaneity and lack of preparation marked out the players of the highest social status. One of

the main reasons for this was that the importance attached to the pursuit of victory became more

accepted. Directors began to keep out of the playing side, the press concentrated on "selling"

the game, and supporters began to accept the game and the PR that goes with it.

The 1970s did not provide a great deal to be proud of as far as the soccer purist was

concerned. During this time the game was representative of the "winning at all cost" attitude,

even more so than the 1960s. The youth culture was losing respect for traditional values, their

elders, and authority figures, such as, the police, teachers and the government. Although we had

"Flower-Power" in the 1960s, the 1970s was a more critical time in the sense of questioning and re-evaluating established norms, certainly in England. The music of this time was more aggressive than the peace message of the 1960s (Taylor, 1989). The passivists were losing ground and the hard core radicals were emerging in the political arena, the entertainment business and the education system. It is not surprising therefore, that soccer-hooliganism was more rampant now than ever before. 8 6

The game was dominated by Leeds United and Arsenal, both very efficient soccer

"machines." The game bad become very complex and sophisticated, but at the same time very

"dirty. " If a player was through (beyond the defense, in a scoring or dangerous position), "bring

him down," was the motto. The game was full of anti-heroes, famous for their hard tackling,

and no-mercy image. Referees even began to accept this style of play, and became somewhat

immune to it. Certain fouls that would had led to a player being sent from the field ten years earlier, were often dealt with without a response, a warning or a "slap on the wrist." The athletic, physical player, rather than the smooth, skilled, innovative player was the norm of the day (George Best, being the exception of course).

Jimmy Hill, Chairman of Coventry, and TV analyst, laid blame to many problems in soccer to the rise of technocracy. Soccer, the argument runs, has alienated the "public," what is called for is more entertainment - goals and goalmouth incident — and stiff penalties for what tends to be called the "cynical" rather than the "professional" foul, especially when it prevents a goal from being scoral.

Accepting this principle led to important changes in the League for the 1982-83 season, notably the award of three points for a win, and empowering the referee to send-off players for cynical fouls if preventing die possibility of a goal. What was dramatic about this was that it allowed teams to stay in the tide race even though they were many points behind, and consequently maintained fan interest throughout the season, unlike baseball. However, this change alone is unlikely to increase attendance, for example, improving the incentive to win does not necessarily alter the incentive not to lose. Also, there is no evidence that people will turn out in large numbers to watch a team that entertains but loses. This is a consequence of the trend in dominant attitudes toward winning in general, and winning at sport in particular, as desirable in itself. Those managing and playing the contemporary game define their involvement and success in terms of win/loss record. This refers back to an earlier point where it was acknowledged that the desire to demonstrate superiority is critical to the establishment of rational order. 87

This drive for more entertainment on the one hand, and continued expectation of winning

on the other will undoubtedly shorten still further the tenure of team managers. This pressure

was mainly responsible for the high turnover rate evidenced in the 1980s, and surely to be

continued in the 1990s, of soccer managers.

Similar to NFL teams in the USA, Wagg (1984) sees the avenues clubs have to take to

remain successful businesses in the 1990s is not necessarily in soccer per se. They have to follow

similar strategies to other businesses in this modem world. These avenues to take in search for

capital have been realistically sketched out. They include diversification (developing leisure complexes, like Coventry City’s "Sky Blue Connexion" at nearby Ryton, shopping precincts, supermarkets and so on), development funds, lotteries, a levy on pools profits, the use of stadia for other sports (for example, Rugby League at Fulham) and sponsorship. Sponsorship will be especially important, as evidenced by renaming of the League Cup the Coca Cola Cup, the

Premier League of the FL the Endsleigh Premier League (sponsored by Coca Cola and Endsleigh

Insurance respectively), and all professional teams wearing the name of their sponsor in big letters across the front of their uniforms. Soccer’s future, Wagg (1984) says, lies in the generating of extraneous income and, most especially, with more and better impression management.

The game of soccer has changed over the last 100 years in a way that is reflective of a rationalized attitude to life. Today, the professional game carries with it all the characteristics of a modem sport, and more generally a modem stmcture. Yet, there still exists certain residual facets of professional soccer that demonstrates that rationalization in sport, specifically professional soccer in England, does not have to parallel changes in society in general. For example, professional players still only practice half-days, many of them spending the afternoon in the pub, apprentices still clean out the dressing rooms and the star players’ boots, and very few stadia are all-seated. Also, while rationalization in sport has reduced chance, the FA Cup remains as popular as ever, allowing the "little" clubs (even amateurs) the opportunity for glory, in this single elimination competition. These residual facets will be alluded to in later chapters. However, while the modem game still carries with it a legacy of days gone by, the whole

appearance and manner of professional soccer has been transformed, though, not to everybody’s

liking. The youthfulness of a team, as a positive policy rather than as an enforced result of a high incidence of injury, is now a commonplace; even Second and Third Division clubs adopt

it. The game is played at sprinter’s pace; it is more explosive than it was; players are cunning veterans by their mid-twenties; referees are frequently treated with undisguised contempt; managers grow more tense and anxious by the month; the conflict between the younger and older generations, which is one of the major contemporary tensions in society generally, is given emphatic expression in soccer. Even board of directors are beginning to get younger.

USA

Introduction

This second half of the chapter examines the way pro football came to reflect the rationalization of contemporary society. Discussion focuses on the way the game became organized, the way it was played, changes in rules and regulations, and the emerging commercialization of pro football. Twenty to thirty years after the NFL was established in 1922 pro football came to embody the values of a system replete with the constraints characteristic of capitalistic market operations: professionalism, specialization, standardization, bureaucratic decision-making, reliance on technology, and the constant drive for efficiency and maximum production.

Guttmann (1978) writes that football is "a truly modem game with all the characteristics of modem sport. The emotional function of the game may be primitive and even atavistic, but the stmcture of the game is clearly modem, isomorphic with basketball, baseball, and soccer.

To understand the degree of the sport’s modemity, we need to consider its historical origins and development" (p. 125). 89 Nineteenth Century

This section describes the beginning of organized pro football (uniformity of standards,

conferences and leagues, or lack oQ how it was structured and where it first took hold.

Professional football existed in the 1890s essentially as an outlaw sport; played by athletes

who were afraid to admit their professionalism. By the 1900s, a variety of semi-professional

teams were established, and by 1910 enough strong teams formed, staffed with former collegiate

players, to bring about a loosely structured APFA (Maltby, 1987).

In the early 1890s the dividing line between amateurism and professionalism was

indiscernible. It was then the custom for recognized athletic clubs to play against college teams.

Indeed, numerous college players also competed in professional football but maintained their amateur standing by expending their energies only for expenses and a trophy. The players would sell their trophies to a pawnbroker and give their claim tickets to the promoters of the game who would then reclaim the trophies. This cycle would be repeated to protect the players from the

"taint" of professionalism. In England and the USA there was a stigma attached to pro football in its infancy - in England amateur soccer was revered while in the USA college football enjoyed that status.

If salaries did not lure the players into the professional game, neither did the playing conditions. None of the present-day facilities of professional ball parks and coliseums was available in the cradle years. Also, there was no uniformity of standards. As March (1934) writes about one incident where a team practiced with a lightweight ball all week and used it in the ensuing game to defeat its opponents because they could not handle the below standard football. Uniformity of standards is one element indicative of rationalization, and pro football would have to demonstrate that if it was to reach it most contemporary form. As Adelman

(1986) writes: "To facilitate the athletic experience within a growing sports universe required the development of uniform rules and the creation of governing agencies to administer the sport and provide a mechanism for rational change" (p.9). 90

The story, although one of growth, was primarily one of failure up to, and for sometime

after, the formation of the League in the 1920s. Seldom did teams make a profit and most

existed in the east and midwest, but most folded after a short time. Scheduling problems were

insurmountable; players switched teams with alarming regularity; and, most important, the public

did not respond to professional football as it did baseball and collegiate football (Maltby, 1987).

While football was evolving in American colleges, another avenue for the sport’s growth

developed. Athletic clubs, originally amateur in their orientation, were prevalent throughout the

cities and towns of the country. These clubs arose in urban areas for a variety of reasons. The

city provided the people, communication, transportation, and general financial support necessary

for the clubs to function. They provided a sense of community for various ethnic groups, and

reinforced social status for the upper-class.

Athletic clubs developed along similar lines in most urban areas of the country. Engaging

in track and field they soon recruited boxing, wrestling, basketball, and football. In 1878 the

Crescent Athletic Club of Brooklyn took up football, and shortly thereafter others in the east

followed suit, playing college teams as well as other athletic associations. The athletic clubs

loomed large in the popularization of football as a spectator sport in America.

The potential of professionalism in these heretofore amateur athletic clubs created much

controversy in 1892. In the following year though, both the Allegheny Athletic Association

(AAA) and the Pittsburgh Athletic Club (PAC) hired players rather frequently. Thus

professionalism in Pittsburgh became more entrenched and soon spread to other athletic clubs in

that area and beyond.

The use of ringers continued in 1894. The AAA brought in Steve Stevenson of the

Chicago Athletic Association to aid its 30-4 season final victory over the PAC, which had also used its own outsiders. The game, played at Allegheny’s Exposition Park in late November, drew an estimated 10,000 fans, an incredibly large crowd for an athletic club contest (Maltby,

1987). 91

Professional football had modest origins. In the 1890s the tough mine and mill towns of

western Pennsylvania and Ohio were the cradle for the infant sport. There, local clubs, often

formed by the players themselves, began to pay some men a few dollars to risk life and limb to

play on Sunday afternoons (Rader, 1990).

Latrobe, PA, which developed its own team following the success of the AAA and the

PAC, was also typical of the pre-1920 era. Latrobe was sponsored by the local YMCA. The

team began as an amateur club staffed with local players, many of whom worked in the town’s

steel mills. They practiced at a vacant lot of the Pennsylvania Railroad, many times at night

under the light afforded by street lamps (Maltby, 1987). At this time (pre-1920) there was no

central structure for professional football, no leagues existed and each team scheduled its own

matches. These part-time pro athletes had much in common with pro soccer players at this time.

Both were not taken too seriously by the general public, and could not rely on a regular income from their sport to support Aemselves.

Professionalism in a supposedly amateur game gave rise to resentment toward renumerating players, and presented an obstacle to the emergence of professional football. Teams that were openly professional in the 1890s and early 1900s had to resort to secret recruitment of star athletes, who usually played under pseudonyms to protect their reputations and eligibility.

With covert professionalism fairly well established at the colleges, it was only another small step to the organization of open, full-fledged professional teams.

With many false and shaky starts, professional football more or less established itself in the western Pennsylvania cities and towns of Pittsburgh, Allegheny, Latrobe, and Greensburg.

In its first stages only the occasional outstanding ringer was paid to give a team a decided advantage over a rival.

Entirely professional teams emerged in 1896, briefly with the AAA, and in 1897 with

Latrobe and Greensburg. The AAA attempted to pay each player $100 per game, but found after only two games that this amount was highly unrealistic and the club folded. By the early

1900s teams such as these generally paid their players at the end of the season, dividing whatever 92

profits they may have accumulated. For example, the undefeated Latrobe team of 1904 made

$500 after all expenses were paid. This amount was divided among 16 players. Unfortunately

for the players, this came to an average of only $3.50 per player for each of the nine games

played. Thus, professional football was generally not lucrative and was by no means a viable

way to earn a living. And the players had no illusions of thinking they could become

self-sufficient playing the game (Maltby, 1987).

Twentieth Centurv

Discussion here focuses on changes taking place in society that facilitated the growth of

pro sports, changes in rules that separated the pro game from college football and made it more

attractive and therefore more lucrative, and a more scientific approach to playing. Also there is

an examination of the emerging bureaucratic structure of pro football and how the growing

urbanization of America affected this development.

Bender (1978) has argued that the loss of local autonomy and the increase in population

made life in the late nineteenth century more complex. This situation created a need for

something that would encourage the sense of community, "the bonds of sentiment and mutuality, "

that Americans now lacked, or at least had to redefine.

As America became urbanized, people had to cope with the new complexities of modem

life. One of the ways American’s combatted urban alienation was to engage in the general trend

of organization, for example, different clubs. An integrating factor prevalent in the USA was

organized sports, an outlet that provided "common interests, common loyalties, common

enthusiasms," (Cozens and Stumpf, 1953).

Because of the interest they aroused, sports were seen as a good "drawing card."

Obviously, rules are instituted for a number of reasons, but in 1910, the Collegiate Rules

Committee met in New York City and made several significant changes, that were to add to the

attraction of football. Most passing restrictions were removed to make the game more open.

Two years later the field was shortened from 110 to 100 yards and added 10 yard end zones to 93

promote passing for touchdowns. Four downs rather than three could be used to meet the 10

yard requirement. The scoring system at last reached its final form, with touchdowns now worth

six points (Maltby, 1987).

The rules had essentially stabilized after the 1912 reforms. But the forward pass was not

employed with any regularity until 1913. Notre Dame beat heavy favorite Army 35-13 in 1913

scoring all five touchdowns through the air. Many believe this game was the catalyst for

producing the new open game over the old, battering-ram play (Maltby, 1987). Also, this style

of play was more conducive to attracting large crowds. Owners realized this was linked to the

potential of football as a commercial spectacle.

The development of the college football rules and concurrent controversy over the sport

affected the slowly emerging game. The pros played under the collegiate rules until well after

the formation of the NFL. The continual debate over the game centered on two aspects; brutality

and professionalism. However, the game grew in popularity and the public willingly paid to see

it played (Govemali, 1951). With these financial possibilities apparent, professional football was

perceived by many involved in the game, as a viable proposition.

The period between 1900 and 1920 witnessed the economic and social transformation of

the USA into a powerful industrial nation. Theodore Roosevelt was the symbol of American

ambitions and cocky self-confidence. The period from 1900 to 1920 witnessed the rise of

American imperialism and military might as the nation acquired new territories and possessions,

expanding its empire beyond the continent. Along with imperialist advances went business and

investment interests. If America was going to claim her place in the world and protect her

far-flung holdings, she must be ready to defend her interests and anticipate the possibility of war.

This meant that the physical health and conditioning of young men would assume paramount

importance, for military training could only build on the strength, reflexes, stamina, and physical

training that were already being developed. Manly sports that involved tests of strength, stamina,

coordination, and reflexes were to be valued for their indirect contributions both physically and mentally. The restraint and propriety of the Victorian period were cast aside in favor of a new 94

activism and manly directness. America had finally discovered its true identity as a nation that

works, sweats, plays hard, and leads (Noverr and Ziewacz, 1983).

An emerging urban and industrial society needed vigorous, athletic workers whose bodies

were toned and strengthened by work and by sports. If properly controlled and directed, sports

could provide the needed antidote to hours worked in factories or lives lived in tenements.

Along with scientific management and its emphasis on efficiency and productivity, came

precision manufacturing. People had to learn to work in repetitive and efficient ways in order

to meet the demands of the newly created assembly line. Mass production brought dramatic

changes in the lives of workers as they struggled to find their place and role in the new industrial

system. Work became more regimented, more segmented from the total process of production,

more redundant, and more carefiilly scrutinized and analyzed (Noverr and Ziewacz, 1983).

While the growth of sporting activity could be seen as a reaction to the increasing

dominance of machinery and routinized labor in American life, sport, especially professional,

began to reflect the emerging scientific management philosophy. Sport was no longer considered

trivial or wasteful; it was becoming a central part of the American creed. As Guttmann (1978)

notes: "By World War 1, football was a thoroughly specialized, rationalized, bureaucratically

organized example of modem sports" ^.129).

In the 1920s professional football struggled to find a formula for success, fan acceptance,

and organizational stability. However, those controlling the game did find the right formula for

success (emulated baseball’s model), by producing a highly organized institution, with each part

and role within it rationalized, planned and structured in a bureaucratic fashion. In this respect

professional football became reflective of other institutions and organizations where financial

success was paramount for survival.

As a result those in command had to develop the game as a business venture, where Xs

and Os had to be incorporated into the scientific management of a financially solvent organization. This not only affected the actual management of the League, a club, or the coaching and training strategies involved, but also how to sell the game to the public. 95

The professional League’s efforts to interest the paying public resulted in rules and

regulations that favored offensive football and touchdown production. Touchdown production

accomplished for football what the home run produced in baseball; namely, bigger crowds.

Team rosters increased steadily, for tired performers could not compete on a high level for any

great length of time. This idea of changing rules to encourage scoring and a more open game

was also taken on by the FA in England in 1925, i.e., amendment to the offside law. Officials

for both sports were motivated by a need to make their sport more attractive so they could sell

it. Indicative of the emerging rationalization process.

"The turning point for professional football was in 1925 when Red Grange was signed to play for the Chicago Bears," (Noverr and Ziewacz, 1983, p.84). After Grange left college to play football for monetary gain, the National League adopted a rule in 1926 which made all players ineligible until their college class had graduated. This was an obvious attempt on the part of the "pay for play" league to establish rapport with the colleges and to create good feeling with their market for competitors. By that one subtle stroke, the League turned what might have been a ruinous realm of publicity into a masterful triumph of public relations (Govemeli, 1951).

However, while inevitable, not everyone accepted this new formula or the development of a more professional game with the top clubs establishing themselves in the large cities to serve the growing urbanization of America in the 1920s — as was the case for the big soccer clubs in

England. This evolution of professional football reflects this pattern of progressivism, which

Robert Wiebe outlined in The Search for Order. 1877-1920.

Wiebe (1967) contends that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century’s, American

"island communities" began to disintegrate. The cohesion provided by these small, more-or-less independent communities disappeared as America became modernized, and large, industrial, and impersonal urban areas became prominent throughout many areas of the country. As the nation’s island communities broke down, people sought ways to confront the emergence of a new

American system, one which was larger in scope and reflective of urban-industrial life. 96

Americans essentially, then, engaged in a "search for order" in the midst of the loss of

local autonomy and what they perceived to be growing chaos. This quest was conducted on all

levels. Big business sought to end disruptive and destructive competition by organizing

corporations, trusts, and other forms of combinations. Middle-class professionals created

associations to organize their particular fields and establish standards. Small communities tried

valiantly to preserve the society that had given their lives meaning (Wiebe, 1967).

At the local level, supporting professional football teams was one way in which towns

tried to retain their r^idly fading identity as communities. Small towns (such as Latrobe,

Shelby, or Pine Village) provided their communities with a great deal of civic pride, especially

if successfiil. In this manner professional football helped the island communities combat the trend

of business and impersonality. Professional football in these towns, where the loss of a sense of

community was keenly felt, actually was able to survive (if not profit greatly) for a relatively long

period (Maltby, 1987). Of course, in England the smaller clubs of the FL have passed the test

of time, and continue to provide the service noted above for the local community.

In the large impersonal cities, professional football did not fare as well. The largest cities

of the country in 1920 had been unable to generate interest in professional football for a variety

of reasons. Southern and western cities really had no chance to support professional football

because the sport itself had not yet achieved widespread popularity there. In New England,

prejudice against the pro game was perhaps stronger than it was elsewhere. In other regions,

sometimes the presence of large and successful college teams presented too much competition for

any aspiring professional club (Maltby, 1987).

In the east and midwest, many cities may actually have been too big to attract a cohesive

following for a relatively new sport. The game itself, at the pro level, needed to win widespread

support (as baseball had) before it could succeed in a big city. The inhabitants of small towns,

on the other hand, could overlook any suspicions of professional football because for them the maintenance of the community’s identity was more important than the debate over the evils of 97

professionalism. Generally, the only teams which actually survived in the big cities were the

ones that functioned at least initially on a neighborhood level.

League Structure

The following discusses the development of a formal league and the cartel structure of

the NFL as a response to growing complexities in contemporary society — external influence —

and the desire of owners and NFL officials to create order and uniformity of standards — internal

influence.

The development of professional football demonstrates Wiebe’s (1967) thesis. Once

professional football was established in the 1890s, the various people involved in the sport

engaged in their own "search for order," even though it may have been conducted in a haphazard

fashion much of the time. As early as 1902, professional football promoters sought to make their

sporting endeavors more rational by calling for the creation of a unifying league. Such an

association allegedly would bring the stability necessary to make professional football viable.

Though largely unsuccessful in their efforts, professional football managers at least created the

weak American Professional Football Association (APFA) in 1920. With the formation of the

APFA, the general chaos which had characterized professional football up to that point began to

diminish (Maltby, 1987), Similarly in England, the formation of the FL was indicative of the

rational process utilized by ofGcials. However, this uniformity was stabilized sooner in England.

Perhaps the size of the country and having an established governing body (FA) already in place,

was instrumental to the speed with which order was achieved.

The APFA, for all intents and purposes, existed in name only after the September 1920

meeting. All members played a variety of games against non-League opponents. In 1922 the

managers adopted a new name; the NFL. Under Joe Carr of the Columbus Panhandles, the

League’s new President, the NFL eventually supplanted the small industrial town teams with representatives from larger cities. By the time of Carr’s death in 1939, only the Green Bay

Packers, playing in a town of 43,000 sustained memories of the League’s humble origins. 98

At a special meeting in Cleveland, April 23, 1927, Carr decided to secure the NFL’s

future by eliminating the financially weaker teams and consolidating the quality players onto a

limited number of more successful teams — a trend established earlier by baseball and crucial to

the rationalization of pro sports leagues. A development that is yet to take place in England

although a Super League (10-15 teams) may emerge in the near future. The new-look NFL dropped to twelve teams, the center of gravity of the League left the Midwest (apart from

Chicago and Green Bay), where the NFL had started, and began to emerge in the large cities of the East (NFL, 1991).

In 1933, the NFL, which long had followed the rules of college football, made a number of significant changes from the college game for the first time and began to independently develop rules serving its needs and the style of play it preferred. The innovations from the 1932 championship game — inbounds line or hashmarks and goal posts on the goal lines - were adopted. Also the forward pass was legalized firom anywhere behind the line of scrimmage.

NFL owners George Preston Marshall and George Halas pushed through the proposal that divided the NFL into two divisions, with the winners to meet in an annual championship game.

By 1935 owners in the NFL rationalized the move towards parity among teams as a prerequisite to developing and maintaining fan interest. The NFL adopted Bert Bell’s proposal to hold an annual draft of college players, to begin the following year, with teams selecting in an inverse order of finish (NFL, 1991).

This rule was primarily intended to strengthen the weaker teams in the League - although some may argue that it was also to save money. Selection and attraction of ball players, therefore, did not bear any relationship to the wealth of the individual club, for under the draft laws, the college player selected had no alternative but to play with the team that drafted him

(Govemali, 1951).

The draft was a sign of the emerging cartel structure of the NFL. This development

(NFL operating as a cartel) was supplemented by further changes in 1936, for example, no franchise transactions for the first year since the formation of the NFL, and the first year in 99

which all member teams played the same number of games; an indication of uniformity, and

rational change.

This uniformity was enhanced when Elmer Layden was named the first Commissioner

of the NFL in 1941. His office was instrumental in affecting the competition structure, rules and regulations and the documentation of official records. In 1941 the League by-laws were revised to provide for play-offs in case there were ties in division races, and sudden-death overtimes in case a play-off game was tied after four quarters. An official NFL Record Manual was published for the first time. In 1943 the League made the wearing of helmets mandatory and approved a 10-game schedule for all teams, and in 1944 coaching from the bench was legalized. And, in

1946, the NFL took on a truly national appearance for the first time when Dan Reeves (owner of the Cleveland Rams) was granted permission by the League to move his NFL champion Rams to Los Angeles (NFL, 1991).

Post World War H

This section analyzes the "Golden Era" of pro football, the emergence of knowledgeable coaches who produced dramatic changes in the way the game was played - specialization, scientific approach — and the appearance of pro football as a most contemporary sport.

By 1950 professional football began to operate in a manner familiar to the spectator of the 1990s, it was truly a modem game. Unlimited free substitution was restored, opening the way for the era of two platoons and specialization. The Los Angeles Rams became the first NFL team to have all of its games — both home and away — televised. The Washington Redskins followed the Rams in arranging to televise their games; other teams made deals to put selected games on television.

The growing importance of professional football and the relationship it enjoyed with society was reflected by the tremendous increase in patronage and expansion of its coverage by newspapers, TV and radio; that even rivaled baseball. Crowds from 40,(K)0 to 80,000 were no 100

longer viewed with amazement, and in 1947 attendance records for the NFL were broken when

1,732,135 fans saw a total of 55 games (Govemali, 1951).

The media devoted much time, space and effort to covering professional football for

Sunday evening and Monday morning consumption. Radio, TV, and newspaper interviews with

coaches, players and owners comprised a major portion of the sport news that was eagerly read

and heard by avid sport followers.

The game created employment for coaches, public relations men, office personnel, scouts,

groundske^ers, ticket men, hawkers and others. Some interests began to depend on professional

sports for nourishment. As an illustration, for years TV would have been practically non-existent

without professional and college football. In the 1950s it was a standard TV feature, and the

NFL received approximately $100,000 for the rights to televise some of its games. The profits

would be equally divided among the clubs, allowing around 400 players to be in a position to

earn a livelihood yearly from the game (Govemali, 1951).

The increase of leisure time had a salutary effect on the patronage of professional football. As wages remained high, revenue increased as working hours decreased. All kinds of people comprised the professional football crowd (although the majority were middle to upper- class), but one trait made them different from college crowds, tolerance. They expected, demanded and were rewarded by the acme of skilled performance from the players they had paid to see (Newcombe, 1966).

Skilled performance and a scientific approach, leaving little to chance, was fast becoming the attitude among coaches and others involved in the game. Paul Brown had molded a team that would win the NFL’s Eastern Division title every season from 1950 through 1955, as well as three NFL championships in that span. More than that. Brown popularized the organizational approach not only to professional football but also to college football. Many of the techniques that are accepted procedure now were unknown until Brown introduced them. For example, year-round coaching stafis, notebooks and classrooms, film scouting, grading players, lodging the team at a hotel the night before home games, specific pass patterns, face bars on helmets. 101

switching offensive players to defence, using messenger guards to bring in the next play from the

sideline, to name a few (Anderson, 1985).

Some of the decisive changes in the game were made by the rule-makers (Commissioner

assisted by an executive committee); others were the result of coaching experiments.

Nonetheless, these changes were reflective of other institutions and organizations inside and

outside of sport in the desire to advance and grow.

Free substitution, which became a permanent part of the pro rules in 1950, made possible

the sudden development of the specialist — the passer, runner, receiver, blocker and, later, the

defensive experts. As an example of how free substitution and the development of the specialist

has changed football, consider the end.

In 1946, when substitutions were limited to three players at a time, an end’s responsibilities were enough to leave him limp in mind and muscle. On offense he was required to catch passes, long and short; throw decisive blocks on running plays to the inside or outside; and occasionally he asked to handle the ball like a halfback on the end-around. On defense he was expected to hold down one side of a five-man line; rush the passer from the old six-two-two-one; and on goal-line stands, guard the flank in the dependable seven-diamond defense (Newcombe, 1966, p.48).

The modem receiver plays only on offense — his old defensive chores are handled by

outside linebackers and defensive tackles - and his responsibilities depend upon his physical stmcture, his speed and his pass-catching ability. However, the most telling improvements in the game have been made in the passing attack - and the defense’s methods of coping with it. "Pro football is very much a passing game and if you do not respond to the fine practice of throwing and catching a football (while eluding all the snares and traps thrown by the defense), then take up court tennis on Sunday aftemoons," (Newcombe, 1966, p.49).

An aspect of the game that has changed dramatically over the last 50-60 years has been the size, speed and strength of the competitors. Much of this is due to the following; diet, the realization of the role nutrition plays in athletic performance; year round training schedules; weight training; scientific and technological changes in player preparation (strength coach for example); a professional attitude that it is a business and one’s livelihood and not a part-time 102

leisure activity; and, unfortunately, the advent of steroids and other performance enhancing

drugs.

From one end of die weight chart to the other, the pros are much more sizable than they

were 40-50 years ago. In 1946, the six tackles who did most of the work on offense and defense

for the Detroit Lions averaged 225 pounds; in 1966 the Lions’ six top tackles averaged 260

pounds (Newcombe, 1966), and in 1991 the San Diego Chargers’ tackles averaged 289 pounds

(Simers, 1991). The physical magnitude of the players is a key difference between the game 50

years ago and now. Linemen are heavier, taller, and faster.

With all this brawn capable of eye-blinking speed, the "violence" of pro football fascinates many analysts in their efforts to account for the game’s tremendous popularity. In one man’s account I learned that when a 240-pound lineman, who runs the 100 in 11 seconds, collides with a 200-pound back, who runs the 100 in 10 seconds, the kinetic energy equals 66,000 inch pounds one inch! I was impressed but decided not to let the details get in the way of my pleasure of watching Jimmy Brown glide through the line, slip a tackle or two and then accelerate past die safety. In the mind of another deep-thinking observer, pro football is "a game played on a team basis that not only sanctions violence but requires it every play... its metaphoric relationship to war goes beyond strategic analogies and deathly symbolism to the action itself." And I was reminded diat my own taste for violence is ecstatically fulfilled down there on the field (Newcombe, 1966, p.49).

One can be attracted to professional football by way of violence, skill and aesthetic

qualities or both. Violence is often seen as the necessary expenditure of all that kinetic energy

and a way of getting the job done. But, so is the grace and skill of the quarterback maneuvering

to beat the linemen, or by the defensive tackle looping into the opponent’s attack, or by the

conerback darting over to steal the ball out of the hands of the intended receiver.

"Contemporary sociologists offer odier helpful explanations for our endurallment with the game: It has been described as Retum-Trip Pop (along with Humphrey Bogart movies), a transformation of the college game of the 1920s. "Think of pro football as improvisational theater," was Pop advice," (Newcombe, 1966, p.49). All these development in the game - size of players, violent hits, highly skilled, specialized athletes who train year-round, the emergence of performance enhancing drugs and so on - are all part of the evolution of the game that reflect 103

rational thought on the part of owners and football people, to provide a sport that the public will

"buy."

A Unique Game

The final part of this chapter examines how pro football, more than any other sport

reflected trends and values of the larger culture from the 1960s on. This section demonstrates

how pro football became more complex and rationalized, yet dramatic and defined so spectators

could identify with and be attracted to this unique game. Also, how the physical contact,

explosive plays, and synchronized team work within a formal organization appealed to Americans

and perpetuated the industrial social system as a whole.

"In a young, vibrant society gone wholly kinetic," wrote Newcombe (1966), "pro football

is the only game that makes sense" (p.49). However, for many observers there were other reasons for the popularity of professional football that were related to larger social upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s.

To President Richard Nixon, perhaps the nation’s most conspicuous football fan and a man obsessed with winning and losing, football was a miniature school of life, but without life’s everyday ambiguities and moral dilemmas. Nixon believed football furnished a healthy antidote to what was perceived in the 1960s and 1970s as excessive individual freedom and lawlessness.

Rader (1990) notes: "Nixon regularly placed long distance calls to stadium locker rooms to congratulate winning teams. Intrigued by the strategy and tactics of the game, he even gave unsolicited suggestions for pass plays, including diagrams, to the head coaches of the Miami

Dolphins and the Washington Redskins" ^.268). He used the specialized vocabulary of football to describe his proposals for ending the Vietnam War and for dealing with the nation’s economic problems. Some commentators, on the other hand, insisted that only a nation addicted to the violence of a sport like football could pursue a war as immoral and brutal as the Vietnam conflict

(Ross, 1973). 104

The 1960s and 1970s were a time when the young people vdiemently questioned the

status quo; this was reflected in music. Aims and books. We had Woodstock and Kent State, and

anti-war rallies became commonplace. However, professional football was one institution,

operating within an autocratic structure, that remained unblemished and grew in popularity, why?

William Phillips (1969), writing in Commentary, offers his interpretation of the various

appeals of different sports; "All sports serve as some kind of release but the rhythm of football

is geared particularly to the violence and the peculiar combination of order and disorder of

modem life. Baseball is too slow, too dependable, too much like a regional drawl. Baseball is

too nervous and too tight; hockey too frenzied; boxing too chaotic, too folksy. Only football

provides a genuine catharsis" (p.66).

On the other hand, Bianchi (1972), in his critique stated: "Professional football reveals

the fascist streak in our society Football’s totalitarian authority structure...reflects die

militarism prevalent in our culture" ^.31). Paul Hoch (1972) has argued that football surpassed

baseball in popularity in the late 1960s precisely because of a basic militarism in American life

which found violent expression in our games as well as on the battle fields of Vietnam.

It is too simplistic to say that football acts as a catharsis to everyday frustrations, or fulfills some societal need to see "a crazy miniature war," a playful war waged for its own sake.

Like the society in which it exists — so complex and varied, that massive, efficiency seeking bureaucracies control every move and decision made — modem football is a well designed, strategically planned form of activity, where every person, in a bureaucratic stmcture, has a specific role to play within the confines of the program.

Riesman and Denny (1954) in their account of the origins of American football, studied mgby and delineated how it was changed to football - a sport more suitable to the American culture. Specifically, they noted how the ambiguity of the English scmm or scramble for a free ball changed in American football to a well-defined line of scrimmage with the symmetry of offensive and defensive lines and with a specific point in time when the ball is put into play - when the center snaps the ball. With a line of scrimmage and centering of the ball, the American 105

adaptations resulted in the emergence of a running and passing game rather than a kicking game.

Also, to accommodate the American desire for action, the yardage rule was instituted. Thus, a

team must move the ball at least 10 yards in four downs or give up the ball to the opposing

team. The standardization of rules for football was also necessary to adapt the game to the

diversity of American collegiate competition and audiences. In short, the sport of football was

adapted to the themes of the American cultural milieu (Snyder and Spreitzer, 1978).

Unlike baseball, there is scarcely a single play that the average spectator could hope to perform adequately, and there is even a difficulty in really understanding what is going on. In baseball what happens is what meets the eye, but in football each action is the result of 11 men acting simultaneously against 11 other men, clearly this is too much for the eye to totally comprehend. Football has become a game of staggering complexity, and coaches are now wired in to several "spotters" during the games so they can And out what is happening.

Ross (1973) in his analysis of baseball and football asserts that the latter is more reflective of modem themes and values than the former. He develops the thesis that "each sport contains a fundamental myth which it elaborates for its fans": the pastoral myth of baseball, stressing harmony and style, "frontier" simplicity and easy pace, intimacy between game and fan, and providing a "green world of tranquillity" in a society of "too much action, struggle, and change"; and the contrasting heroic myth of football — "more appropriate to the new realities (and fantasies) of our time" - with its godlike heroes, "staggering complexity," its violence and elaborate met2q)hor of war, and, like life today, its "potential for sudden disaster or triumph"

(p. 107).

Ross (1973) writes:

Baseball dissolves time and urgency in a green expanse, thereby creating a luxurious and peaceful sense of leisure. As is appropriate to a heroic enterprise, football reverses this procedure and converts space into time. The game is ideally played in an oval stadium, not in a "park," and the difference is the elimination of perspective. This makes football a perfect television game, because even at first hand it offers a flat, perpetually moving foreground (wherever the ball is). The eye in baseball viewing opens up; in football it zeroes in. There is no democratic in football, and spectators are not asked to relax, but to concentrate. You are encouraged to watch the drama, not a medley 106

of ubiquitous gestures, and you are constantly reminded that this event is taking place in time. The third element in baseball is the field; in football this element is the clock. Traditionally heroes do reckon with time, and football players are no excq^tions. Time in football is wound up inexorably until it reaches the breaking point in the last minutes of a close game. More often than not it is the clock which emerges as the real enemy, and it is the sense of time running out that regularly produces a pitch of tension uncommon in baseball (p. 108).

A fiirther reason for football’s intensity is that the game is played like a war. The idea

is to win by going through, around or over the opposing team and the battle lines, quite literally,

are drawn on every play. Football like war is an arena for action, and like war football leaves

little room for personal style. One of the reasons for the underdeveloped qualities of football

personalities, and one which gets to the heart of the game’s modernity, is that football is very

much a game of modem technology. This is one of the main differences between the nature of

football and soccer.

Football’s action is largely interaction, and the game’s complexity requires that its players

mold themselves into a perfectly coordinated unit. Jerry Kramer (1969), the veteran guard and

author Instant Replav. writes how Lombardi would work to develop such integration; "He makes

us execute the same plays over and over, a hundred times, two hundred times, until we do every

little thing automatically. He works to make the kickoff-team perfect, the punt-retum team

perfect, the field-goal team perfect. He ignores nothing. Technique, technique, technique, over

and over and over, until we feel like we’re going crazy. But we win," (in Ross, 1977, p. 107).

Individual identity thus comes to be associated with the team or unit that one plays for

to a much greater extent than in baseball. Is this a reflection of contemporary USA? Ross (1973)

seems to think so as he writ%:

It is not surprising, really, that we should have a game which asserts the heroic function of a mechaniz^ group, since we have become a country where collective identity is a reality. Football as a game of groups is appealing to us as a people of groups, and for this reason football is very much an "establishment" game - since it is in the corporate business and governmental structures that group America is most developed (p. 109).

However, football is not totally tied to the mechanistic, pre-planned, bureaucratic structures so evident in modem society. To many spectators some plays are seen as human and 107

dazzling. They suggest to the audience that technology is still a tool and not a master. Fans get

living proof of this every time a long pass is completed; they see at once that it is the result of

careful planning, perfect integration and an effective "planning, " but they also see that it is human

and that what counts as well is man, his desire, his natural skill and his grace and athletic ability

under pressure.

Football metaphysically yokes heroic action and technology by violence to suggest that they are mutually supportive. It’s a doubtful proposition, but given how we live it has its attractions ^oss, 1973, p. 110).

It would be too simple to say that football has ceased to be a game for its players, and

has become an industry, or a training for industry. In the American culture as a whole, the line between work and play is often obscure, and in many respects the "more work-like an activity becomes, the more successhilly it can conceal elements of playfulness," (Denney, 1951, p.250).

Also, if we do not believe in historical inevitability, nor in the necessary homogeneity of a culture, we cannot suggest that American football developed as it did out of cultural compulsion and could not have gone off in quite different directions. It is difficult to speculate but certain facets of the game could have been retained flaying "both ways") or changes and rules adopted by one League but not another (Canadian football — wider field).

However, the running and operation of a professional football franchise involves the heavy overhead and staff personnel characteristic of high-capital, functionally rationalized industries, as the result of continuous changes in the game since its post-Civil-War diffusion from

England. All these developments can be seen as a configuration that includes, among other things, changes in coaching, in the training of players, and, from a business standpoint, the training of the mass audience.

In 1974 the following rule changes were adopted to add action and tempo to games; one sudden-death overtime period was added for preseason and regular-season games; the goal posts were moved from the goal line to the end lines; kick-offs were moved from the 40- to the 35-yard line; after missed field goals from beyond the 20, the ball was to be returned to the line of scrimmage; restrictions were placed on members of the punting team to open up return 108

possibilities; roll-blocking and cutting of wide receivers was eliminated; the extent of downfield

contact a defender could have with an eligible receiver was restricted; the penalties for offensive

holding, illegal use of the hands, and tripping were reduced from 15 to 10 yards; and, wide

receivers blocking back toward the ball within three yards of the line of scrimmage were

prevented from blocking below the waist (NFL, 1991).

In 1977 and 1978 the NFL continued a trend toward opening up the game, especially the

passing game, and to cut down on injuries. Defenders were permitted to make contact with

eligible receivers only once, and the head slap was outlawed. Offensive linemen were prohibited

from thrusting their hands to an opponents neck, face, or head. Also, changes permitted a

defender to maintain contact with a receiver within five yards of the line of scrimmage, but

restricted contact beyond that point (NFL, 1991).

Undoubtedly, there were obvious reasons for these changes - NFL officials wanted to

improve the standard of play, encourage attacking, high scoring football, reduce the onset of

injuries, especially to star players, and create a game that was attractive to spectators and would

satisfy the needs of TV producers, and be conducive to TV production.

Certain technocratic advances in the game were incorporated to facilitate efficiency and

accommodate the spectators in the stadia and at home. In 1975 referees were equipped with

wireless microphones for all preseason, regular-season, and play-off games. A year later the

NFL adopted the use of two 30-second clocks for all games, visible to both players and fans to

note the official time between the ready-for-play signal and snap of the ball. This would help to

keep the game moving. In 1988 a 45-second clock was approved to replace the 30-second

clock. For a normal sequence of plays, the interval between plays was changed to 45 seconds

from the time the ball is signaled dead until it is snapped on the succeeding play (NFL, 1991).

In 1978 a study on the use of instant replay as an officiating aid was made during seven

nationally televised preseason games. In 1986 the owners adopted limited use of instant replay

as an officiating aid. However, during that season 374 plays were closely reviewed by replay officials, leading to 38 reversals in 224 games. Nonetheless, instant replay was eliminated for 109

the 1992 season as an aid to assist referees in decision making. I believe it will be reintroduced

in the near future.

The dramatization of line against line, the recurrent starting and stopping of the game in

conjunction with the timed snapping of the ball, the formalized division of labor between

backfleld and line, and perhaps most important, the increasingly precise synchronization of

players in motion -- these developments make it seem feasible to say that the whole procedural

rationalization of the game, which has been described above, was not unwelcome to Americans,

and that it fitted in with other aspects of their industrial folkways.

The development of the open and rationalized game has led step by step not only to the

two-platoon system, but also to numerous formations, made up of specific role players, on

offense and defense. These innovations call for a very different relationship among the players

than was the case in the early days of non-specialization. Today the game is a cooperative

enterprise in which mistakes are too costly - to the head coach and his staff, the finances of the

team, even the franchise itself — to be left to individual initiative. As early as the 1950s coaches

were conscious of the need to be group-dynamic leaders rather than old-line straw bosses

(Denney, 1951).

More recent changes in the game demonstrate that the powers to be have become more

and more cognizant of the relationship between scoring and parity of teams, and the number of

people going through the turnstiles and general interest in the game. Even though the

low-scoring, power football of the 1960s and early 1970s satisfied millions of spectators, in the

1970s the moguls of the NFL experimented with rule changes to make the game more exciting.

Critics charged that the pro games had become too predictable (an almost natural consequence

of rationalization); coaches seemed determined, above all else, to avoid costly mistakes. Some of the problem stemmed from t£^id improvements being made mostly in defense radier than in offense. In 1975 alone, defensive players knocked 17 quarterbacks out of action (Rader, 1990).

To bring more offense to the game, the NFL adopted minor rule changes in 1972, 1974,

1977, and a revolutionary set of ones in 1978. In that year the rule-makers permitted pass 110 defenders to chuck, or bump, a potential receiver only once and allowed offensive linemen to

extend their arms and open their hand to protect the passer. The following season the offenses

went wild (Zimmerman, 1979). Within three years, passing yardage nearly doubled, and quarterback sacks fell to an all-time low. Gradually, however, defenses reversed the offensive barrage. Referees and umpires began to permit more physical contact with receivers, coaches invented new pass defenses, and defensive players learned how to elude would-be-pass-blockers more effectively (Rader, 1990). Nonetheless, quarterbacks are bigger, stronger, and faster today than at any other time, and pose a real threat to any defense. Offenses are finely tuned machines, possessing a complex set of numerous plays that have been developed over an enormous amount of time in meetings, watching film and tapes, and on the practice field itself.

The NFL rule changes in 1979 emphasized additional player safety. The changes prohibited players on the receiving team from blocking below the waist during kick-offs, punts, and field-goal attempts; prohibited the wearing of tom or altered equipment and exposed pads that could be hazardous; extended the zone in which there could be no crackback blocks; and instructed officials to quickly whistle play dead when a quarterback was clearly in the grasp of a tackier. Rule changes placed greater restrictions on contact in the area of the head, neck, and face. Under the heading of "personal foul," players were prohibited from directly striking, swinging, or clubbing on die head, neck, or face. Starting in 1980, a penalty could be called for such contact whether or not the initial contact was made below the neck area (NFL, 1991).

These changes were motivated not only for player safety, but also to sell the game to a growing audience. According to a Louis Harris Sports Survey in 1978, 70% of the nation’s sports fans said they followed football, compared to 54% who followed baseball. Football increased its lead as the country’s favorite, 26% compared to 16% for baseball. A CBS

Sports/New York Times survey, noted that 53% of the nation’s sports fans in 1984 said they most enjoyed watching football, compared to 18% for baseball. In that same year, the NFL paid attendance exceeded 13 million for the fifth consecutive complete regular season when

13,398,112, an average of 59,813, attended games. The figure was the second-highest in League Ill

history. Teams averaged 42.4 points per game, the second-highest total since the 1970 merger

(NFL, 1991).

This popularity and interest would probably have not occurred without competition

throughout the NFL, i.e., a move toward parity. Dynasties are fine for a while, but the cartel

structure of the NFL allows for greater equality of competition. The draft means more in football

than baseball, and teams that were bottom of their league two or three years ago can rebuild in

a short period of time, for example, Dallas in 1994 compared to 1989. "As in Baseball, the NFL

also confronted disparities in competition. Lopsided games, runaway races for the

championships, and having the same teams repeatedly in the playoffs threatened to reduce interest

in the sport," (Rader, 1990, p.269). Besides the draft, Rader (1990) writes other strategies

utilized were "expanding the number of teams eligible for the playoffs and establishing "position"

scheduling reduced the liklehood of dynasties....The new system virtually assured that

three-fourths of the teams would have a crack at the playoffs up to the final few weeks of the

season" (p.269). This reflects rationalization of structure responding to economic needs.

So, while we accept that the game, and consequently the people involved have certain unique qualities that allow for freedom of expression and behavior, ultimately the history and development of American football has been tied to the social milieu. This does not mean that professional football has been a passive recipient of social pressure — it certainly has been a catalyst for creating change in the American sports scene and perhaps society in general — but the rationalization of the game has occurred in a systematic and nonsystematic fashion relative to change in society at large and the ongoing ideology. CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATION

This chapter is to analyzes the league structure, the rules structure, and the competition

structure of professional football in England and America, and how these have developed and

changed over time.

The characteristics distinguishing organized sport from earlier forms (which were not

reflective of uniformity or standardization) include formal teams, leagues, codified rules, standard

equipment, and sponsors, as well as a bureaucratic structure through which the process occurs.

Primitive societies were not characterized by bureaucratic organizations of any kind, let alone a

sports bureaucracy. As Guttmann (1978) writes: "In the twentieth century, almost every modern nation has created a governmental sports bureaucracy to aid, abet, regulate or replace the voluntary associations of the nineteenth century"(p.46).

Hardy (1986) says: "Although there is considerable overlap between the organizations producing and controlling game forms and services, there are also important historical distinctions that await clarification" (p.24). Therefore, while both game forms and services tend now to be controlled at the regional and national level (for example, NFL, FA, FL) this has not always been true.

The sports bureaucracy decides on the rules and regulations, and administers them so they are universal for all involved. One of the main functions of the "powers to be" in the NFL and

FA is to see that these laws and codes are adhered to "across the board."

Equally important to the bureaucratic organization is the facilitation of a competition structure that has progressed from local to national contests. The NFL and FA are responsible

112 113

for developing an intricate structure that allows for competition to take place between teams

across the whole country.

These developments in sport, and society in general, are reflective of contemporary

society and demand a closer look to understand why certain organizational forms have grown to

dominate the production and distribution of games and sports to their consumers; how these organizations have merged into systems of interdependence, wherein some units clearly dominate others; and finally what rules, resources and practices have constituted the structure or logic of pro soccer and football over time (Hardy, 1986).

Such an analysis must pay close attention to social and cultural developments in society at large. Yet, Hardy (1986) states, "this will be important not only to clarify the sport industry’s submission to some wider "mentalité," but also to explore the ways in which entrepreneurs may have insulated themselves from outside forces" ^.15). One cannot easily pigeonhole the motives of owners into compartments of "social control," because they were too often consumed with a struggle to govern and understand their complex organizations (Hardy, 1986). To use Harris’

(1981) words, we will not appreciate pro football’s development until we begin to "clearly reconstruct the old alternatives" and "suggest the kinds of choices [these] institutions represented"

(p.38).

I agree with Hardy (1986) that only by reconstructing the old alternatives that decision­ makers faced can we begin to understand how and why sports have developed along the lines they have, and why the system and structure took on its particular shape and logic.

ENGLAND

Introduction

At the club (franchise) level pro soccer soon became organized along the lines of factories and other businesses, i.e., directors and managers running the clubs and producing a product — pro soccer — and controlling workers who were the players. At the league and national 114

(bureaucratie) level understanding the organizational structure is not so easy because of its

complex nature. The FL operates on its own but under the guidelines of the FA which is all

encompassing. The goals of the governing bodies toward stability rather than change and the

survival of smaller clubs indicates a somewhat traditional, rigid value system, and acts as an

opposition to the establishment of rationalized practice. However, since the 1980s these

prevailing attitudes have begun to waiver under the pressure of commercial forces and a changing

ownership and clientele.

Nineteenth Centurv

The main emphasis in this section of the chapter will be concerned with the development

of governing bodies and the soccer clubs that played/play under their rules and guidelines.

Discussion centers around the establishment of the FA and FL, why this came about, and the impact it had on pro soccer. Also, there is an examination of the origins of the soccer club itself.

A considerable proportion of soccer clubs came into existence via organizations which already existed for another purpose. The three major pre-existing institutions that produced soccer clubs were churches and chapels, public houses and places of employment (Wagg, 1984).

Prior to the development in the 1860s there were middle-class missions to society which affected the development of soccer organizations, for the remainder of the nineteenth century.

These missions along with the mid-1860s trade depression, the increase in pauperism, and movement of trade unionists pressurized parliament into giving a million working men the vote in 1867. "A healthy mind in a healthy body" was a catch phrase that emerged in the development of the new working men’s club as well as in games like soccer. It was the call sign of the muscular Christians producing an amazing expansion, of games in general, and especially soccer (Mason, 1980). This atmosphere - population encouraged to participate in games and be aware of the importance of physicality — created an environment conducive to the emergence of an organization that would govern those involved. There was a need for order and structure as many people were now playing some form of soccer all over the country. 115

The Football Association (FA) was formed in 1863 by the representatives of a small

number of mainly southern clubs at a meeting in the Freemason’s Tavern in London’s Great

Queen Street (Glanville, 1979). Basically it was an agreement between the clubs to play each

other under the same set of rules. Thirty clubs had joined by 1868 at a time when another

association of soccer clubs had emerged in Sheffield. Although agreement on one code of laws

could not be reached immediately, the new Secretary of the FA, Charles Alcock, took a team

from London to Sheffield in December of 1871 (Mason, 1980).

The idea that London could play Sheffield in 1871 indicates that the two associations were

moving toward an agreement over their different rules, and in April 1877 one set of laws was

eventually achieved. This arrangement with the Sheffield FA was instrumental in strengthening

the position of the FA in London as soccer’s leading authority. By the mid-1870s, other

associations were also established; evidence of the growing centralization of a governing body

for soccer. This centralization was further enhanced by the movement of other soccer

associations;

The Birmingham FA was set up in 1875 and Lancashire in 1878. Further football associations claiming jurisdiction in their areas were organized all over England. After this accelerated expansion the other most significant fact to notice was that all these local associations looked to the FA itself and wished to affiliate with it It was also in 1882, that the International Board, comprising the English, Irish, Scottish and Welsh Football Associations was established. From 1882, one set of rules for the playing of football was accepted nationwide (Mason, 1980, p. 15).

By the mid-1880s the FA had developed from an association of clubs to an organization of county and district associations together with a limited number of clubs in direct membership.

During this time — early 1880s — the FA was becoming more and more pervasive because of the need of a central structure. Gradually, each country and club came under its jurisdiction. The

FA functioned as the dominant authority on how soccer was structured, from amateur to professional soccer. Its values prevailed to build a consensus throughout the soccer community, and contributed to the effective functioning of the soccer system as a whole. It presided over the laws of the game, organized the FA Cup in 1872, (a development of huge importance. 116

accelerating the growth of professionalism, a change in the class structure of the sport, and the

development of tactics), and, worked with the FA’s of Ireland, Scotland and Wales, for the home

international championship (tournament involving England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales)

(Glanville, 1979). This governance was easier to accomplish than that experienced by pro

football in its infancy in the USA - size of country and competition from college football acted

as obstacles.

The Football League (FL) originally consisted of 12 clubs and operated as early as 1888

as a separate organization which recognized the FA’s overall responsibility for the game at all

levels while largely running its own internal affairs. The FL developed out of the saturation of

cup competitions during the 1880s which disrupted previously scheduled friendly games between

somewhat equally matched teams and produced, especially in the early rounds of the cup, games

between teams of unequal ability which became unattractive to spectators. The cup games took

precedence over friendly — scrimmage — matches even though it might result in a smaller crowd.

Cup opponents were selected at random, not seeded, so many games were one sided and boring

for spectators.

Mason (1980) suggests that the league idea was probably taken over from American

baseball.

Clubs would contract to play ’home and home’ matches with each other on fixed dates throughout the season. The champion was decided by a system of two points for a win and one for a draw. It was hoped that such a competition between the leading teams would maintain spectator interest and limit the financially damaging disruption of cup-ties (p. 17).

As mentioned above, the vast majority of soccer clubs that developed into professional

teams had their roots in industrial and neighborhood clubs, churches and chapels, and public

houses. It was the Victorian middle-class "amateurs" who wrote the rules of the game,

established and ran the governing body, the FA (Korr, 1978).

It is diffrcult to know when the first soccer clubs were set up by churches and chapels.

Aston Villa and Bolton Wanderers, two of the oldest professional clubs, began this way in 1874.

Everton, Barnsley, Fulham and Birmingham City are a examples of other clubs whose early days 117

were affiliated with religious groups. "Blackburn in 1876 had at least four church clubs playing

regularly and by the middle of the 1880s 19 clubs connected with Nottingham churches formed

their own competition," (Mason, 1980, p.25).

These types of clubs were not all run by the clergy, as the congregations were partially

composed of young working men who had a voice in the control of these clubs. However,

church and chapel teams, and Sunday school clubs made up approximately one quarter of all

organized, regularly operating clubs between 1863 and 1915 (Mason, 1980).

Public houses also played an important role in the origins of soccer clubs. This is not

surprising since pubs were one of the few pre-existing institutions largely organized to serve

working people. Also, pubs were traditionally associated with a number of recreation and social

activities, and often provided facilities for changing before a game and eating and drinking after

it. Public houses also helped promote the game. "Publicans certainly seem to have encouraged

the growth of the game. The landlord of the Anchor Inn at Darwen offered prizes of five pounds

and two pounds to local clubs in an Easter knock-out competition in 1882. Results were

displayed in pubs via telegrams, club secretaries and members," (Mason, 1980, p.27).

The third major institution to play an important role in affecting peoples lives from 1860

to 1900, and consequently how they participated in and perceived sport, was the work place.

Many employees were attracted to and identified with firms because the owners provided them with changing rooms and playing fields, which one may see as a significant part of modem welfare capitalism. Taylor (1971) interestingly asserts that present day clubs grew out of "the concern of working-class men to develop their primary-group relationships in what leisure time they had. Most of these clubs grew directly out of autonomous occupational groups," (in Korr,

1978, p.213). One of his examples is the West Ham United Football Club, in East London, which was started by a group of workers at the Thames Ironworks. West Ham United was originally known as Thames Ironworks and had been set up in 1895 as one of several works societies which tried to meet the leisure needs of the firm’s employees. The other most famous 1 1 8

professional club to have its origins at the work place was Arsenal from North London. Arsenal

was formed by a group of workmen at the Woolwich Arsenal in 1886 (Mason, 1980).

After the 1870s there was a rapid growth of soccer clubs, especially in the midlands and

the north of England. In 1867 the FA had only 10 clubs associated with it; within four years that

number increased to 50, to 1000 by 1888 and by 1905 this number had expanded tenfold.

However, clubs that were made up largely of working men found it very difficult to compete

against teams from outside their immediate area on a regular basis. At this moment in time gate

receipts were not enough to meet these costs, and so they required the support of "influential

people."

West Ham United and Woolwich Arsenal — which openly turned professional in 1900 and

1891 respectively — are good examples of working men achieving elite status in sport and

ultimately professionalism. By 1900 interested local business and professional men took control

because of financial obstacles. Consequently, if a club was successful, and became openly

professional after 1885, certain resources such as, time and money, were needed to run it, neither

of which working men had much access to. As a result, limited liability was the avenue to

take. "An easy way of raising money was via incorporation and limited liability. This occurred

under the Companies Act in 1880s but the rush was to come in the 1890s and beyond," (Mason,

1980, p.37).

Profit Seeking Organizations or Not?

This section examines the running of soccer clubs and the goals of directors at the turn

of the twentieth century. It is apparent that while pro clubs were profit seeking organizations this

was not as important as maintaining class relationships and status within the local community,

although this began to change by 1914.

Those holding large numbers of shares in soccer clubs were predominantly middle-class,

although there were some working-class shareholders. But it is clear that working men had little say in English boardrooms (Vamplew, 1988). Who were these shareholders? It is apparent from 119

individual club data that English soccer club shareholders were overwhelmingly drawn from the

local populace. "It can be surmised that local identification was important to the soccer

shareholder and clearly there was little or no blind investment," (Vamplew, 1988, p. 159).

The drink trade became prominent, but probably did not become involved for direct

financial gain as profits were by no means guaranteed and the FA restricted dividends to five percent. No one could profit too much on that, and so professional soccer was not seen as a purely money-making venture. Nor was it permissible to receive directors fees. As Wagg (1984) states: "Although clubs began one by one to be constituted as limited companies directors were to take no payment for their services, and a retain-and-transfer system was established to prevent footballers moving from club to club at will" ^.5).

O f course not everyone invested into professional soccer merely because they loved the game. The opportunity for making money existed for the successful League clubs. Chelsea received the highest annual receipts of any League club, 22,826 pounds in 1908. However, a number of clubs lost money as a result of the way the club was run. Eccentric management was not uncommon at this time, and many directors did not always apply the same business strategies to running the soccer club as they did to their personal commercial activities. An attitude that still exists today. "A strong whiff of Micawberism permeated football club boardrooms: indeed it has never entirely disappeared in the 20th century," (Mason, 1980, p.47).

Before 1914 professional clubs were run openly and unambiguously by a board of directors who charged themselves with the whole gamut of club administration: finance, recruitment and payment of players, selection of teams, and so on. Much of this has since become the separate role of the manager. It would seem that there was no, or little, specialization in running a professional soccer club before this time.

Professional soccer clubs were not primarily profit-making institutions, and any profits that were made were usually ploughed back. "They were, by the end of 1915 mostly limited liability companies with a largely middle-class body of shareholders and a directorate whose occupational composition would almost certainly reflect the economic structure of the town," 120

(Mason, 1980, p.49). The directors had complete control as long as they were able to build a

competitive soccer club in order to attract supporters, and operate in a manner whereby disaster

was not forthcoming in the foreseeable future. In some respects, soccer clubs at the beginning

of the twentieth century, could be seen as a family affair with both shares and directorship being

passed down to each generation.

Professional soccer clubs were becoming business enterprises, and were run along these

lines. The development of West Ham United to professional status reflects this trend. Korr

(1978) documents the club’s growth from an amateur organization to a professional business enterprise, and the social and economic ramifications for those operating business and the local community itself.

Arnold Hills, the owner of the Thames Ironworks, was the force behind the creation of the Thames Ironworks Football Club, the predecessor of West Ham United. Hills was a product of inherited money, position and ideals of Victorian upper-class education, and the club represented a blend of his two major non-business interests, sport and social welfare. The soccer club was formed within the Works in the Summer of 1895 and its origins showed little difference from other local amateur and industrial teams. The team used a nearby soccer ground for their practices and matches. The financing of the club came from members’ subscriptions and a contribution from the Works.

Hills set up a Central Council to coordinate the efforts of the club. The first season was hectic and successful, and the committee (all of whom were members of the clerical staff, foremen or supervisors of the works) set up a schedule and entered the club in cup tournaments.

More than 50 men joined the club which necessitated finding enough matches for two teams.

During the season there was a move, initiated by the players, to have the governing committee composed of non-players. As a result, a number of gentlemen were asked to fulfil this important function which proved very beneficial (Korr, 1978).

The schedule of the club resembled more closely that of a professional team, and before the season was over, the committee was ambitious enough to have the club elected to the 121

newly-formed London League. The club had increased its membership and fielded three teams.

There were 30 first team matches scheduled and six cup competitions (Korr, 1978).

By the time the club opened its third season it was fast becoming an organization that

reflected structure and planning. Korr (1978) states;

...it had a stadium which it claimed ’was good enough to hold the English FA Cup Final...smart new outfits’ and a complete schedule of matches. The committee also insured the players against loss of wages that might be the result of injuries sustained while playing football. There were also six new players for the first team, five of whom were from the Greater London area, but none of whom came to the club from within the Ironworks (p.217).

However, even though the club was the most successful one in the East End, the

Secretary was disappointed with support it received. Consequently, the governing committee

decided the way to attract more fans was to give them top quality soccer, and by the turn of the

century this meant professional soccer. Very few of the new players had any roots in the East

End. They were lured to Canning Town from professional clubs as far away as Middlesborough,

Aberystwyth and Inverness (Korr, 1978).

The committee tried to build a competitive soccer club in order to attract supporters. It

was obvious to those running the organization that the club could not prosper in the land of

semi-professionalism. It had to choose between being a recreational facility for the Works or

continue to strengthen its appeal to the local fans. The solution to the problem was to keep the

club in its existence but to severe its formal connections with the Works. The answer to Hills’

dilemma was the creation of a limited company. Hills remained with the club and became a major shareholder and he encouraged business associates and his workmen to invest in the club.

The ties with the Ironworks continued in two respects: members of its staff were directors and some other directors had business ties and served on civic committees with Hills.

An article in the Athletic News in 1895 described the changes in soccer during the previous 20 years. It demonstrated that the growth of the game and the large numbers of spectators it had attracted had simultaneously produced problems.

From humble origins, clubs...formed in the first instance for the recreation of their members have grown and almost unconsciously the power passed into the 122

hands of these regular providers of the sinews of war. So now we find the players, the servants of the clubs and the officials endeavoring to supply the exacting demands of the public. The game could no longer afford to be dragged down by the systematic management of some club officials and there was a need for strong patrons in the game (in Korr, 1978, p.222).

This analysis, Korr (1978) states, almost describes the development of West Ham

United. "Businessmen and managers would devote part of their time to running a financially

viable organization whose product was football and whose workers played a game" ^.222). This

is central to the theme of this chapter, i.e., contemporary pro sport organizations began to model themselves on other organizations where paid workers produced the product and were rewarded by the owners.

By 1914 the Board of Directors of West Ham United saw themselves as employers of soccer players in the same way as Directors employed workers in their business. Salary negotiations were handled by the Secretary, the paid administrator, and the Directors retained control over him and the finances of the club. There was also a strong strain of paternalism amongst the directors. Players were fined for missing matches and practice. Curfews were enforced on players, wages were held in trust for players who had drinking problems and doctor’s certificates were required for any failure to play or train. "In many ways, the term

"club" might t^pear to be a misnomer to describe the business of running a football team, an organization with places firmly established for the employer and the worker," (Korr, 1978, p.230).

In concluding Korr (1978) writes that West Ham United needed money and management as well as players and a love for soccer to be successfiil. The structure needed to produce a top-class professional soccer club developed out of a "combination of an ’amateur’s’ generosity and local businessmen’s sense of community pride and a desire to gain recognition," (Korr, 1978, p.230). 123

Separation of Amateur and Professional

The following analyzes how soccer clubs became organized along bureaucratic lines

which facilitated the separation of amateur and pro soccer, and the role the FA played in this

development.

As early as 1880 "big-time" soccer in England was distinctly bourgeois in organization

and structure. The sport that captivated millions of working people also incorporated and institutionalized the principles of social organization that were the bases of bourgeois hegemony.

The establishment of such arrangements seems to have been worth a meager hve percent return

(Tischler, 1981).

After the early 1880s soccer at the top-level was controlled not by the actual players, as in plebeian and schoolboy games, but by nonplaying "officials" or entrepreneurs. Further, a separation emerged between the participants and spectators which was strengthened by the bureaucratic structure and the evolution of soccer as a paying business venture (Tischler, 1981).

The decline of both the plebeian and schoolboy versions of soccer played a critical role in the emergence of the commercial-professional game. By the time commercial-professional soccer was introduced, the growth of a market economy had already circumscribed traditional recreations (Tischler, 1981). "Commercialized sports could be introduced virtually without competition from recreational activities which were no longer feasible in an industrializing society," (Tischler, 1981, p.7).

The same forces that contributed to the eclipse of plebeian soccer (although this did continue albeit informally) simultaneously elicited the need for an efficient and well-trained bureaucracy to direct a society that was growing more complex. Educational methods, the reformers argued, had to be overhauled to produce a bureaucracy and a political leadership that could understand and meet the needs of a complex, changing society. This change demanded a more structured, organized game of soccer (Wagg, 1984).

By the 1880s, well financed soccer clubs replicated and normalized contemporary commercial-societal relationships and offered controlled sporting entertainment to paying 124

spectators by the thousands. Also, from the number of clubs listed with the FA it would seem

that soccer was becoming a truly national game (a number of years before pro football reached

this status in the USA). Molyneux listed 24 clubs in Birmingham in 1876-77, and three years

later, the number of clubs reached 155 (Tischler, 1981).

As the English working-class rediscovered the game, soccer came to exist on at least two

distinct levels — amateur and commercial, professional plane, but these were never mutually exclusive. The latter drew its substance from the grassroots acceptance of the sport. While amateur players outnumbered professionals, the numerical dimension alone could be deceiving.

The emerging professional game comprised not only the development of a business structure but also its rapid growth as a spectator sport. This enthusiasm for watching the professional game eclipsed mass participation in the sport. Large crowds at sports events were nothing new but large paying crowds on a regular basis were (Vamplew, 1988).

As Tischler (1981) writes:

As money replaced tradition and birth as a medium for social intercourse, so too were recreations commercialized in the 1880s. As entrepreneurs perceived the commercial potential of leisure time, they discovered that recreation could be marketed and sold. Yet, the providing of entertainment also had its costs, and a rational, business like mentdity emerged as entertainment business (p.37).

The FA, in the time it has been functioning, has laid down the dominant values that guide and legitimate action within the soccer structure of England. These values have developed over time, but are at the stage now where professional soccer is considered the most important aspect of the structure.

There tends to be a general compliance within the soccer structure of England to the rules and regulations set down by the FA. Also, these rulings seem to have been assimilated by the fans, and consequently the "whole soccer culture" in England. The FA has been very successful in imposing these values on soccer people. A form of indoctrination has occurred where the participants have accepted the philosophy of the FA. A goal of any organization is surely to be able to "lay down" laws and rules, and have freedom to operate in a way you see fit. The FA with a few "hiccups" on the way has experienced this freedom. 125 League Soccer

The following section discusses the relationship between the FL and the FA, the role the

FL played in the legalization of professionalism and the opportunity it gave players for full-time

employment, and the competition structure that resulted through an established league.

By the outbreak of World War I in 1914, soccer was not only established as

immeasurably the most popular spectator sport in England - drawing crowds of well over

100,000 to the FA Cup Final and sustaining a Football League tournament which since 1892 had

a second division, and would before long acquire a third, then a fourth — but it had spread across

the globe (Glanville, 1979).

The establishment of the FL provided owners with a "sound business footing. " The FL

comprised the wealthiest professional teams which competed among themselves for much of the

season. In addition to League games, these teams also continued to play for the FA Cup and in

privately arranged engagements. The FA retained authority over all teams, amateur and

professional, and formulated rules for soccer which were accepted by all clubs.

Unlike many other sports in England, pro soccer has had two ruling bodies. The origins

of the League, as noted before, stemmed from an idea of William McGregor, a Scotsman

associated with Aston Villa, and were designed to improve the present unsatisfactory state of club

schedules and to render them more certain in their fulfillment and interesting in character

(Vamplew, 1988).

With professionalism good gates had become imperative to the leading clubs, but the multiplicity of local cup competitions, often with one-sided early rounds, could not guarantee this and they also interfered with more remunerative friendly fixtures against other major teams. Hence for the 1988/89 season twelve such clubs, six each from the North and the Midlands, bound themselves to play their fiill-strength teams in competitive League fixtures (Vamplew, 1988, p. 125).

The two organizations had power effectively sown up. At its inception the League had declared that any offending club or players shall be dealt with by the League in any manner that they may think fit (Vamplew, 1988). Thus any club which was unwilling to accept the League’s decisions could forfeit its place in the most financially rewarding league tournament in English 126

soccer. Clubs which were unwilling to accept the paramount authority of the FA could find it

difficult to obtain matches at all.

The power relationship between the two organizations was (and still is) complex. Initially

McGregor had advocated that the League should govern professional soccer but, over time, he

realized that when the League met, they were actuated by the interests of the League clubs. The

general good of soccer then is not their chief concern and as such McGregor came to the

conclusion that it was best for the whole government of soccer to be under the control of the FA.

Nevertheless, the desire of the League was for autonomy in its own affairs (more recently to

demand the services of players who are selected to play for the National team), especially

regarding financial arrangements, because the FA Council was dominated by men from amateur

clubs, who saw the FL as a commercialized, selfish organization (Vamplew, 1988).

Owners wanted professionalism sanctioned (and it was in 1885) as it would give

uniformity to wage allocation as illicit player wages disturbed employers. The free market

principle of competition for players would favor players’ monetary demand. This in turn pushed

wages upward; yet the fear of the high cost of good players was one factor that prompted owners

to unite in order to seek legalized professionalism. The illicit laissez-faire wages policy between

1880 and 1885 had favored "shamateurs," working-class players who were nominally amateurs

but who received wages illegally (Wagg, 1984).

The existence of the owners for both laissez-faire and restriction helps to explain much

of the history of professional soccer in England between 1880 and 1914. A bidding war for

players, which ensued during the 1880s, raised the level of wages as players jumped from team

to team, perhaps enjoying the dilemma of the entrepreneurs.

As the free market promised no ceiling on player wages, owners collectively took steps

to alter the free market. They wanted to develop in soccer the same employer-employee

relationships that were the norm outside of sports, i.e., keep players in their "place."

Legalization would mean that the players were only servants to those from whom they receive wages, rather Üian die masters themselves. Legalization would alter die status of the parties and 127

the overall business climate of soccer. However, although a player’s wages were controlled for

a whole season now as opposed to match-by-match, competition for talent still existed as they

could enter the tree market at the season’s conclusion (Tischler, 1981).

Another persistent problem for owners in their dealings with each other, prior to the

establishment of the FL, was the unreliability regarding match schedules. A club would host an

opponent, keep the gate revenue, and then decline to visit the opponent’s ground. Owners

recognized the need for more regularized and permanent agreements to insure the consistent flow

of revenue, and it became clear to them that they needed an effective authority to resolve

commercial disputes.

A great stimulus to attendance was the decision of the wealthier club owners to establish

the FL in 1888. By developing along rational business lines and reversing extant labor-capital

relationships, the FL emerged as a potent force in professional soccer. One of the main goals

here was to secure equality of playing competition. The FA exercised direct control over the size

of the competing group, with changes requiring a two-thirds majority, and they developed quality

control through the mechanism of promotion and relegation on merit (Vamplew, 1988). These

goals of equality of competition and quality control were to be replicated by the NFL at a later

date. However, this was to occur utilizing a somewhat different, and less democratic method,

i.e., draft system, and financial stability in establishing a franchise.

After only five months the Athletic News declared that the League was a financial

success. The schedules guaranteed engagements and made possible a more exact calculation of revenue. Matches were arranged on a home-and-home basis, with each League club playing host to and visiting all other League teams, providing spectators with new attractions for each home match. The competition of the League championship drew extensive press coverage, while the provision for relegating the bottom four teams sustained the interest of their supporters.

Rule 18 of the FL constitution implemented in 1890 that transfer from one team to another was possible only through the purchase of a players contract. Players could not change teams on their own initiative. As a result, players lost their free-market negotiating rights and 128

advantages. The new policy created a dilemma for members of the soccer hierarchy who tried

to adhere to principles of classical political economy. The directors were forced to recognize that

by implementing the transfer system (and, in 1900, the Maximum Wage Rule) they were

influencing forces which, according to the tenets of laissez-faire, were best left untouched.

Owners feared that if players were allowed greater freedom, wealthier clubs would buy up talent

and create an imbalance among clubs, thereby jeopardizing the stability of the entire League

(Wagg, 1984).

The debate among club directors over the Maximum Wage Rule was also conducted in

the same language as the discussion over broader economic theory and practice. Approved by the League and FA in 1900, the rule stated that a four pound weekly wage would be the highest allowed. Like the transfer system, the Maximum Wage Rule was designed to enhance a competitive balance within the League.

In practice the Maximum Wage Rule proved somewhat elastic. The Players’ Union - established in 1907, probably because of the passing of the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, which clarified and publicized the legal status of trade unions, and because of a realization the League clubs were no longer to overthrow the maximum-wage legislation — said that clubs broke the rules when it suited them (Vamplew, 1988). The Players’ Union renewed the campaign for laissez-faire when it became clear that payments beyond four pound would cease. The amnesty agreement which absolved clubs of past infringements of the rule was signed in early 1909 by all FL clubs. The Maximum Wage Rule and the transfer system, as enforced by the League, augmented the owners’ control of the game (Tischler, 1981).

Goals of the FA and FL

This section demonstrates how the goals of each governing body (the FA and FL) affects the competition structure, rules and regulations and international soccer. What is apparent here is how the organization of pro soccer facilitates the soccer community at all levels ^outh, school, amateur and pro) and reflects the way society and pro sport is organized in general. 129

Broadly speaking, the main goal for the FA at the beginning of each season, would be

to promote the game of soccer throughout the country. A number of things would enhance

this-the success of the National team, English clubs doing well in European competitions, an

increase in total attendance with the reduction in crowd violence, or an improvement in the

standard of coaching at all levels.

Parsons (1961) believed that in modem society there has been a reduction in the

importance of line authority so organizations have become more associational. An example in

English soccer concerns the development of the FL, who, though not as powerfiil as the FA, built

up four divisions (that operate for nine months of the year) and their own cup competition, the

FL Cup.

When analyzing English sport in general the goals of the governing bodies tend to be

similar to those mentioned in soccer. That is, to promote the sport at all levels, especially

professional, with the National team given preference. However, developments of the National

team were slow and hampered by the often myopic conservatism of FA officials. International

soccer was well established by the 1920s, club sides both amateur and pro, had been going of

foreign tours well before World War I and increased competition at national level had been

stimulated by the founding of FIFA in 1904. But the FA had been disdainful of FIFA from the

onset, refusing to join at first and thereafter seceding several times. Between the world wars the

FA was only a member of FIFA for four years (Wagg, 1984).

But the tide of events was flowing against the FA — International soccer was on the increase. The World Cup was inaugurated in 1930 and although the FA did not send a team to the first tournament (in Umguay) it was clear that the game’s national administrators would have to waken to the idea that soccer, the country’s premier mass sport, was now a matter of international importance.

One result from this awareness was the move by the FA to steadily modernize its practices before and after the Winterbottom régime, and especially in the wake of the defeat by the USA in the 1950 World Cup, when a Technical Subcommittee had been set up. This led to 130

some important innovations and an overall commitment to long term planning (Glanville, 1979).

In 1954 for instance, 200 young professional players of 18 or under were asked to attend for

trials at six League grounds in various parts of the country. The same year an England Under-23

team was established to give pro players earlier experience of international soccer. Often though,

as in the past, they received little co-operation from the FL, either at ground level - some club managers for example, objected to the Under-23s because they felt it drew the covetous attention of other clubs to their promising young players — or at official level. League officials remained the doggedly populist voice of small town capitalism. Indeed, Alan Hardaker (secretary of the

FL) still maintained a quarter of a century later that in a national referendum League soccer would get the popular vote over international soccer (Wagg, 1984).

As we have seen, the rules and regulations — on and off the field — in soccer today, have existed for over 100 years. It is not surprising therefore to see that people in England have become accustomed to the way soccer is structured and run. Consequently, the goals of the governing bodies concerning rules and regulations, tend to be geared more toward stability than change or improvisation, in other words, keep things the way they are.

It was noted earlier that promotion and interest for soccer, were two goals the FA tries to accomplish, and it seems they do not fall far short when you consider that they have over

37,000 registered clubs, each probably carrying a number of teams (Croker, 1979). From professional to the minor amateur standard, soccer competitions tend to be structured the same way. Teams play in a league, which may have a number of divisions, (I once played in a league that had 10 divisions), and within these leagues a number of cup competitions exist, external to the division championship, which all clubs are entitled to play in. The rule prevails throughout

England of 3 points for a win, 1 for a draw, and 0 for defeat in die championship race, with cup games organized on a knock-out basis (single elimination). Some clubs can be involved in four different competitions for the majority of the season. 131

We can see here, that those involved in soccer in England have produced a societal

community, that has a common culture which legitimates the normative order, as Parsons (1961)

put it, in the soccer system, for example, the structure of competition.

From the FL to the amateur Leagues, the factors of promotion and relegation are

common to all. At the professional level, semi-professional clubs can be promoted into Division

in, if they win the General Motors Vauxhall League (the top semi-professional League). This is rather a meritocratic system, as no club is too big that it cannot be relegated. I remember

when Manchester United, the most famous soccer club in England, was relegated to Division n

in 1975.

For a competitive structure such as the one above, you have a number of wiimers rather

than just one, therefore, more teams get the chance to experience success. For example, in the

1979-80 season, Liverpool won the Division I championship. West Ham United the FA Cup,

Wolverhampton Wanderers the FL Cup, and Nottingham Forest the European Cup, to name a

few. For other team sports, in England, this idea of clubs being involved in a number of

competitions, also prevails.

If one competition was chosen to exemplify the integrative component of soccer, I feel

it would be the FA Cup. This competition, first played in the 1871-72 season, is open to

amateur, semi-professional and, of course, professional clubs. Few of the smaller clubs last to

the "proper" rounds (Third Round) when top professional teams enter the competition, but at least

they had the opportunity. If they reach the Third Round, they could possibly draw the likes of

an Arsenal or Manchester United at home or away. Could you imagine the Dallas Cowboys

travelling to Ohio to play the Canton Bulldogs in a competition.

Every soccer fan in England wants their "own" club to do well, but, the success of the full International team is of primary concern. If one were to choose one event in the history of

English sport that had the biggest impact of bringing the country together, it would have to be

England wiiming the World Cup in 1966. 132

In other words, club teams are important to the fans, but, the National team is always the

focus of attention and interest. In society in general, national problems or events hold primary

importance, and institutions in England are organized in many ways on a national basis. For

example, nationalized steel, coal, transport system and medicine, to name a few. On the other

hand, in the USA for pro sport the main interest is at the domestic level. Apart from the

Olympics there is not a great deal of interest, comparatively, in international sport. Concerning

non sport issues much of society is more concerned with, and organized around, state and

regional issues.

Success of English clubs in European competition is also a priority for the FA. That is

why the top clubs, as a result of die competitive structure, represent England in European cup

competitions. Winning the European Cup (the top club competition in Europe that involves the

Premier League champions from the respective countries) is good for the game of soccer as it

increases interest and produces more publicity for the game.

The system in England whereby the top professional clubs are elected to play in Europe

can be seen as an example of motivation to contribute what is necessary for the functioning of

the system. This system helps to accomplish the goals of the FA and FL. For the former, there

is the elite teams representing the country and promoting publicity and interest in the game, while

for the latter, this selective process makes the Premier Division very competitive, as well as the

promotion into it, which assists in the continual production of each division.

Nonetheless, with the increasing differentiation of the governing organizations, a conflict

of goals has sometimes occurred. For example, when there is an international competition

coming up, the FA try to assemble all the best players together beforehand to practice as a team.

However, these players may be involved in some important league or cup games for their club,

therefore, the clubs are reluctant to free the players. It is only recently (the last two years) that

the FL working in conjunction with the FA have decided that there should be no Premier League

program the Saturday prior to a big international game so players can be free to train together under a different coach. 133

A Time for Change

The following examines the reasons why those organizing pro soccer were slow to change

aspects of the game which resulted in archaic practices compared to other businesses. However,

change was "inevitable" if directors, soccer officials, and players were to reach prosperity and

be responsible for advancing the game.

I contend, that while the rules that govern sport may differentiate from other institutions,

economy, education and so forth, there is a common bond between the competition structure in sport and die market place diat has developed as a result of the modernization process and the imposition of rational order. However, the way English clubs operated in 1915, as Mason (1980) described - directors did not always run the clubs on strict business lines — is not that far from the organizational approach of contemporary clubs, which is somewhat reflective of the attitude prevailing in English sport.

Maintaining Victorian and Edwardian values, coupled with adversity to change, soccer clubs in England were, and to some extent still are, indicative of cultural lag — other institutions, certainly in the business industry, have employed modem procedures as a matter of survival.

Yet, while clubs have been reluctant to change their mode of operations, they become more aware of the benefits available with new commercial interests. The end result was a peculiar amalgam, of old and new physical appearance archaic stadia, but modem money-making tactics utilized). Now, with newly renovated stadia, the only evidence of an archaic appearance at some clubs (mainly those in the Premier League) belongs to the surrounding areas outside the grounds

(for example. Old Trafford, Manchester, Anfield, Liverpool).

By the 1920s the FL - the administering body, not the clubs - was a moribund organization, every bit as reactionary and remote as the FA. In the nineteenth century it had been the vehicle for the establishment of the professional game. Proponents of the FL had not buried their heads in the sand, they had confronted social change and through the pages of the

Athletic News they had "lambasted Southern fuddy-duddies and their conservative collaborators in the North," (Wagg, 1984, p.30). However, once League soccer had been put on a sound 134

footing, the sporadic wage militancy of the Players’ Union defeated and the financial side of club

affairs regularized, it was always likely that the significance of the League as a bureaucracy

would dwindle. True, it expanded after World War I with the enlargements of Divisions I and

n to 22 clubs each and the creation of Division HI, principally out of the Southern League (semi-

pro league). But the reason for this expansion was precisely also the reason for the League’s

complacency on wider issues - namely the prosperity of League soccer (Wagg, 1984).

In the 1920s and 1930s huge numbers of people went to watch soccer matches. Many

ground attendance records were set during this period; there was simply nothing pressing the FL

to examine its practice. Furthermore its resentment of the FA, far from abating, was clearly

fuelled both by its physical remoteness (its headquarters were in Preston until 1959) and by the

failure of League Secretary Fred Howarth to get the secretaryship of the FA, vacated by

Frederick Wall in 1934. The job went instead to an FA man, top referee Stanley Rous.

According to Alan Hardaker, his successor at the League, Howarth’s bitterness showed in his

subsequent dealings with Rous (Wagg, 1984).

Britain, because of its aristocratic tradition, had developed more ambiguously as a

capitalist society than the USA. One consequence of this was that, in the 1940s, a great majority

of people among higher social classes in Britain still held fast to old gentlemanly bourgeois values

while their counterpart in the USA had discovered new ones. This shift in values had, according

to Alvin Gouldner (1972), accompanied: "The transition from an older economy centered on

production to a new one centered on mass marketing and promotion" (p.381).

For the inhabitants of this new bourgeois world, in which the rising elites of advertizing

and public relations enjoyed a special eminence, many of the conventional moral distinctions of middle-class life no longer applied. The distinction, for example between truth and falsehood in commercial practice was made redundant by advertizing: advertizers do not purport to tell the truth, they are only trying to give a convincing impression. If people bought the impression then so much the better: the mask was as real as the face. Likewise, play and sport were no longer to be seen as less important than, or different in kind from, work. From now on they would be 135 just one more area of life where you had to win. The situation in the soccer world was

increasingly incompatible with this emergent cluster of new dominant values, as a number of

people were quick to see. A number of changes were inevitable and they had been summarized by more than one writer under the headings of professionalization, commercialization and

internationalization (Wagg, 1984).

The impetus of professionalization came, ironically enough, mainly from the despised amateurs of the FA who, at Rous’s instigation, continued to feet over the international standing of English soccer. In this regard there is little doubt that the more enlightened administrators of the game could see which way the political and economic winds were blowing.

In London and Washington the war-time alliance with the USSR was rapidly being forgotten and much was being made of the Iron Curtain’ and the ’communist menace.’ At the same time, notwithstanding the right wing of the Conservative Party, the more farsighted and pragmatic politicians and business people could see diat the British Empire would soon effectively be dismantled. Many eyes therefore settled their gaze on Western Europe, seeking a bulwark — political, economic and strategy - against the communist bloc. For the football world the implications were clear enough (Wagg, 1984, p.70).

Wagg (1984) lists a number of developments in pro soccer as a result of these political and economic changes. First, a European soccer tournament, symbolizing these comparatively recent links would find favor in high places. Second, with the Empire ebbing away, it was important for the National team - soccer being the national game - to acquit itself well, especially against opposition from communist countries. Third, the game of soccer should be spread to the Third World, including former colonies, where Britain might hope to acquire, or to retain, markets.

Wages everywhere in Britain rose during the 1950s and, with the expansion of the consumer goods industries which had sprung up between the wars, workers were not short of things to spend them on. Famous soccer players would provide an ideal "image" (skillful, aüiletic, working-class, and successful) to project at such a market. However, Wagg (1984) writes:

in the Britain of the time, with its complacent rhetoric of classlessness and never having had it so good, the professional footballer’s maximum wage restriction 136

was an anomaly which was bound eventually to go. Once it had gone, the cultural transformation of the football world was assured. The dam which the burghers of the Football League had built against vulgar commercialism was sooner or later to give way, and the game’s many conservative administrators were obliged now to accept Aat what had been die problem was now the solution (p.71).

Walvin (1986) says the most consistent burden on the clubs is that of wage bills. The

early professional game was met with resistance to waged players. Even after professionalism

was established, the clubs and their supervisory organizations (FL, FA) maintained rigid

regulations and ceilings. However, in the 1960s, after union and legal action, wages escalated

throughout the four divisions.

Clubs were paying wages beyond their means, and transfer fees had "got out of hand"

by the early 1980s. The result of this poor management led to more restrictions and control on

the way clubs run their programs. Governing bodies (FA, FL, UEFA, FIFA and British

Government) intervened and enquiries were set up to analyze the game’s structure and finances.

By the early 1980s many clubs were experiencing a severe debt. Much of this arose ftom attitudes of adversity to change. As Walvin (1986) writes: "The internal financial management of football clubs is, in most cases, peculiarly archaic, old-fashioned and unsuited to the demands of them," ^.23). Professional clubs showed themselves to be deficient in their financial management.

Problems of debt and management was most evident in the smaller clubs. Major clubs were able to strike up lucrative deals with sponsors starting mainly in the late 1970s and 1980s.

The FL struck sponsorship deals — with milk, camera, and bank organizations - breaking with traditions and moving soccer into yet another commercial venture. This sponsorship system served to widen the gap between rich and poor.

The majority of income came from sponsorship and media coverage of which smaller, less "attractive" clubs, got little. But, these clubs have still survived, barely, illustrating poor economics and attitudes other than the profit motive. One wonders how long they can survive?

"Unfortunately the organization structure and the dogged-survivalism of many of the smaller and 137

troubled clubs militates against the implementation of important rationalizations," (Walvin, 1986,

p.2S). Many of them operate in the red, and knowing fully well their economic plight continue

to operate this way — maintaining reserve and youth teams and tea ladies, keeping entrance fees

low and maintaining reductions for youth and old age pensioners. Their concessions and bar

prices are very reasonable and give the appearance of the "local candy shop on the comer." All

in all these clubs still give the appearance of days-gone-by, when "personal touch" and affiliation

with the community was more important than making money.

The organization of pro soccer since its inception has demonstrated values indicative of

complacency and security as well as a willingness to experiment and change. However, the latter

is more the result of necessity rather than choice, i.e., mainly economic reality. Also, there is

a distinction between values and attitudes espoused by FA officials compared to those in the FL.

The FA is still a somewhat archaic organization run by "archaic people," which is crucial to the

modernization of the game as they are the overriding authority.

USA

Introduction

Prior to the 1920s the pro game was disorganized and in a state of flux because there was

no central governing body that had established a stable, economically viable league, with a

schedule and written rules for all clubs to follow - a rational enterprise it was not. With the

establishment of the NFL pro football secured a strong organizational base over time. The NFL

was to evolve into the epitome of the modem bureaucratic sports league — little individual

freedom for clubs or players, mles and regulations laid out in a systematic, rational fashion.

Franchises developed under the auspices of modem capitalism — hierarchical stmcture with primary goals of efficiency and profit. 138

Nineteenth Century

This section is concerned with the development of the first pro clubs and the realization

that a league with universal rules was needed for the pro game to grow; yet this was not

automatic.

It was noted in a previous chapter that professional football existed in an unorganized

fashion prior to 1920. However, there were signs that individuals desired to stabilize the sport, develop a structured league and establish a standardized operational procedure for the game.

As early as 1896 the Allegheny Athletic Association (AAA) team fielded the first completely professional team for its abbreviated two-game season. The following year the

Latrobe Athletic Association football team went entirely professional, becoming the first team to play a full season with only professionals.

Baseball’s Philadelphia Athletics, managed by Connie Mack, and the Philadelphia Phillies formed professional football teams, joining the Pittsburgh Stars in the first attempt at a pro football league, named the NFL. The first World Series of pro football, actually a five-team tournament, was played among a team made up of players from both the Athletics and the

Phillies, but simply named "New York," the New York Knickerbockers; die Syracuse Athletic

Club; the Warlow Athletic Club; and the Orange (New Jersey) Athletic Club at New York’s original Madison Square Garden. In 1903 the Franklin (PA) Athletic Club won the second and last World Series of pro football (NFL, 1991). Athletic clubs loomed large in the popularization of football as a spectator sport in America, playing a similar role as churches, pubs and places of employment did to the growth of soccer clubs in England.

By 1903 pro football was declining in the Pittsburgh area, and the emphasis on the pro game shifted west to Ohio. Ohio had at least seven pro teams, widi Massillon winning the Ohio

Independent Championship, that is the pro title. Talk surfaced about forming a state-wide league to end spiraling salaries brought about by constant bidding for players and to write universal rules for the game. However, this attempt to start the League failed. Ross (1986) noted; 139

In the year of 1904, six new pro teams in Ohio besides Massillon found professional football an expensive proposition and tried to form an association to stop cutthroat competitive bidding for Pennsylvania pros and college stars. The idea fell through as they could not originate &e idea of the reserve clause to stop player jumping, besides a^eeing on what the peak salary should be to various stars. Ohio’s state champions from 1904 to 1920 were decided as before—by popular acclaim, there being no new movements for a pro football league until the NFL was founded in 1920, in Ohio, incidently (p.42)

Actually it was called the APFA (American Professional Football Conference) before it

became the NFL.

Earlv Twentieth Centurv

The following examines the different type of pro clubs that were operating during the

early part of the twentieth century, the expansion beyond Ohio, and the gravitation toward bigger

cities.

Between 1900 and 1910 professional football was played at three basic levels.

High-priced pro teams, Canton and Massillon of 1905 and 1906, worked through the auspices

of a local athletic club. In Massillon the 1905 Tigers listed 122 subscribers who contributed a

total of $1,468 (approximately $12 each). In addition to the cumbersome salaries of the

well-publicized players, expenses for teams of this magnitude included renting a park, hiring

officials, advertising, and traveling (Ross, 1886).

At a somewhat lower plateau were teams like the Shelby Blues, the Buffalo Oakdales, or

Hinkel’s All-Stars of Cleveland. Local athletic clubs, or local businesses often sponsored these

medium-sized teams. Players for Shelby and other similarly sized squads probably received their pay-on a game-by-game basis, but the sums they commanded did not compare favorably to

Canton and Massillon wages (Maltby, 1987).

At pro football’s lowest level were small, semi-pro teams like the Rochester Jeffersons, the Buffalo Niagaras, the Louisville Brecks, and countless others scattered throughout the east and midwest. These clubs usually had no real management. They were led instead by chosen captains who handled scheduling and financial matters. Players often came from the same 140

neighborhood. The athletes were not interested in profit so much as they were in just playing

football for their own personal enjoyment.

At whatever level, football gained popularity between 1900 and 1910. Medium-sized pro

teams and small semi-pro outfits, particularly in the midwest, survived despite receiving limited

publicity - they survived but not like the lower level pro teams did in England, i.e., after

formation of the NFL they became extinct at the pro level. The longer these teams remained in

existence, the more attention they garnered. By 1910 professional football had been established

throughout the state of Ohio and also in key cities such as Buffalo, Detroit, and Chicago. It thus

stood on the threshold of major expansion (Maltby, 1987).

The first pro team west of Ohio was in Pine Village, Indiana, in 1913. It hired a bitter and disillusioned Jim Thorpe, branded as a pro in the 1912 Olympics, as its famous paid player.

Wabash, Indiana, followed suit as a pro club in 1914, as did Racine, Wisconsin. Beloit,

Wisconsin went pro in 1917 and then, after World War I was over in 1918, a big preforming spurt took place in the west in 1919, the returning athletes being restless and getting "pro fever. "

In 1919 no less than eleven pro clubs were formed through Indiana, Wisconsin, Michigan, and

Illinois. The salary bidding got so fierce for stars that the old established clubs in Ohio felt that something had to be done. They were going in debt paying higher and higher salaries to hold their stars and get new ones.

From APFA to NFL

This section examines the establishment of a pro football league, and the impact this had on the organization of the game. By 1920 pro football was in a state of confusion due to three major problems; dramatically rising salaries; players continually jumping from one team to another following the highest offer; and the use of college players still enrolled in school. A league in which all the members would follow the same rules seemed the answer.

Professional football in Ohio achieved enough success in 1919 to lead observers to encourage the formation of a league which theoretically would provide stability, prestige, interest. 141

and perhaps even profits. In November, 1919, Ohio nevyspapers reported on plans to form a

professional football league in the following season. In 1920 the Cleveland Plain Dealer

maintained that "the professionals will be well organized, play under a set of rules that will

protect the property of each club and go through an official schedule," (in Maltby, 1987, p.338).

It made no mention of a structured league. However, an organizational meeting, at which the

Akron Pros, Canton Bulldogs, Cleveland Indians, and Dayton Triangles were represented, was

held in Canton, Ohio, August 20. This meeting resulted in the formation of the American

Professional Football Conference (APFC) (NFL, 1991).

Members of the APFC arranged a salary cap, a maximum figure for players contracts,

player tampering and prohibited direct bidding for players in the conference, would be

prohibited. Managers, by making such agreements to eliminate bidding wars, would now no

longer be taken advantage of by "avaricious players," as the Cleveland Plain Dealer had referred

to the athletes in 1919. The press reflected the prevalent anti-labor sentiment in the country with

such remarks, but conveniently ignored the fact that most players had little leverage and received

fairly small amounts of money and generally found it impossible to be full-time pro athletes

(Maltby, 1987).

A second organizational meeting was held at an automobile dealership in Canton,

September 17. The teams were from four states-Akron, Canton, Cleveland, and Dayton from

Ohio; the Hammond Pros and Muncie Flyers from Indiana; the Rochester Jeffersons from New

York; and the Rock Island Independents, Decatur Staleys, and Racine Cardinals from filinois.

George Halas recalled, "There were no chairs, we lounged around on fenders and running boards

and talked things over," (in Maltby, 1987, p.343). Representatives of the various clubs immediately decided that "conference" was perhaps too limiting a term, and the name of the league was changed to the American Professional Football Association (APFA). Hoping to capitalize on his fame, the members elected Thorpe the president. A membership fee of $100 per team was charged to give an appearance of respectability, but no team ever paid it.

Scheduling was left up to the individual teams, and there was a wide variation both in the overall 142

number of games played and in the number played against APFA member teams (NFL, 1991).

It was noticeable that this organization was somewhat loosely structured, and had not reached its

contemporary form.

What was needed here for pro football to develop and function as a modem bureaucracy

was a league which interconnected rules, positions, roles, and relationships that constituted the

activities of those involved. For as Blau and Scott (1962) suggest, without an orderly blueprint,

social activity would be chaotic.

In an effort to create an aura of credibility, the managers formed a committee to work

in conjunction with a lawyer to draft a constitution, bylaws and mles for the Association. The

Association attempted to create future stability by making long-range plans to establish each

club’s rights to its players. The managers hoped to establish negotiating rights for the athletes

they used in 1920. The Detroit Heralds joined the League and this gave the APFA 12 members

(Maltby, 1987).

These developments indicated a move by the managers to organize, administer, and

regulate human activity in the context of sport. However, it is doubtful whether this group had

established an organization that was modem in nature, i.e., a rationalization of operations and

relations among positions that envies the objectives of the organization to be implemented

(Leonard, 1984).

While the APFA enlisted many strong pro teams, it had by no means corralled all of the

quality clubs in the east and midwest. Many either received no invitation or chose to compete

outside of the loosely structured league. The League obviously had not sold itself to everyone

as some clubs saw little opportunity for growth or no financial gain by being involved. Lack of

centralization was probably a reason too.

The call for the drafting of the constitution and bylaws was no doubt a good idea, but whether they were actually written and adopted in 1920 remains doubtful. Printing stationary was inconsequential. Players contacted by pro clubs usually met team managers in person or were contacted by telegram. 143

However, pro football was still not a rational financial enterprise. Independent and

informal scheduling made the determination of an Association champion nearly impossible.

Member teams were free to play any club they could find, membership notwithstanding. There

seems to have been little forethought given to the precise actions a league should take. The

managers obviously recognized publicity as a key factor in achieving success on a large scale,

but apparently had little appreciation of the vital aspects of organization and centralization. As

Maltby (1987) writes: "Most managers seemed limited in their conceptions of pro football as a

potential sports industry. For pro football to become a sporting institution, cooperation and

strong leadership were required to promote not only the miscellaneous teams but the game itself.

It was in this area that the pro football managers fell short," ^.357).

Systematic scheduling of games was a rarity. Lack of modem transportation facilities

hindered promoters in their attempts to book games with teams that had any distance to travel.

At a later date, as mobility increased, gate receipts did not warrant bringing in teams from great

distances because the total earnings would be absorbed by travel expense (Govemali, 1951).

As mentioned previously, pro football had difficulty establishing itself in large

metropolitan areas. The small population centers made it difficult for pro football to gain

widespread attention and thrive even within a league setting. National exposure came only with

the arrival sometime later of franchises in the large metropolitan areas.

In 1921 the APFA was reorganized, with Joe Carr of the Columbus Panhandles named

president. Carr moved the Association’s headquarters to Columbus, drafted a league constitution

and bylaws, gave teams territorial rights, restricted player movements, developed membership

criteria for the franchises, and issued standings for the first time, so that the APFA would have

a clear champion. The Associations membership increased to 22 teams, including the Green Bay

Packers, who were awarded to John Clair of the Acme Packing Company.

After admitting to the use of players who had college eligibility remaining during the

1921 season, Clair and the Green Bay management withdrew from the APFA, in 1922. Curly

Lambeau promised to obey league rules and then used $50 of his own money to buy back the 144

franchise. Bad weather and low attendance plagued the Packers, and Lambeau went broke, but

local merchants arranged a $2,500 loan for the club. A public non-profit corporation was set up

to operate the team, with Lambeau as head coach and manager (NFL, 1991).

During this same year, 1922, the APFA changed its name to the NFL, and a year later,

for the first time, all of the franchises (18 of them) considered to be part of the NFL fielded

teams — prior to this time some franchises were unable to field a team, indicating a league in its

infancy. The NFL eventually supplanted the small industrial town teams with representatives

from larger cities, where there was a greater opportunity for larger gates and consequently more profit. By the time of Carr’s death in 1939, only the Green Bay Packers, playing in a town of

43,000 sustained memories of the League’s humble origins (Maltby, 1987).

Expansion and Rivalry

The following explains league expansion and competition between leagues. It appears that while the NFL was far from a sophisticated "set-up," its organizational strength was demonstrated by the failure of its challengers to supplant it. However, rival leagues did affect the operation of the NFL resulting in mergers, competition for college stars and large scale salaries for players who realized the demands for their services.

In 1925 five new franchises were admitted to the NFL, and the League established its first player limit, at 16 players. Late in the season the NFL made its greatest coup in gaining national recognition. All-America halfback Harold (Red) Grange signed a contract to play with the Chicago Bears. A crowd of 73,000 watched the game against the Giants at the Polo Grounds, helping assure the future of the troubled NFL franchise in New York (NFL, 1991).

Starting in 1926, five other leagues challenged the NFL, but only one seriously. The reasons for this could be many, but two spring to mind. First, the NFL at this time had not established itself as an organization of real power that would be difficult to oppose. Second, die

NFL was developed by men of vision who saw the need for structure and planning, and while the League was to experience some lean years early on, rationalization of operation (scheduling 145

and competition structure, draft system to produce equality of competition, and adoption of a

cartel regime) was instrumental and crucial to the League’s strength and survival through the

1930s and 1940s.

The American Football League (AFL) was organized by C. C. Pyle (who at first wanted

to be in the NFL), a promoter, who acted as manager of Harold Grange. Grange, after returning

with the Chicago Bears late in the 1925 season, had led them through a 19-game coast-to-coast

tour which had been a financial lifesaver for all of pro football. Pyle, believed that Grange’s fan

appeal could be strong enough to vitalize a 9-team League and he put a franchise into New York

City with Grange as its star. Other teams were the Boston Bulldogs, Brooklyn Horsemen,

Chicago Bulls, Cleveland Panthers, New York Yankees, Newark Bears, Philadelphia Quakers,

Rock Island Indqiendents and the Los Angeles West Coast Wildcats, a road team with no home

field (Treat, 1986).

Not all teams finished file season although each had a good supply of the top professional

players of the time. The Philadelphia Quakers, under the playing leadership and coaching of

Century Milstead, former Yale All-American and New York Giant, won the championship with

a 7-2-0 record. Grange and his Yankees were second at 9-5-0. However, the AFL disbanded

after one season, with Grange’s Yankees, and Grange, joining the NFL and playing there for two

more years. Players from other squads returned to or were picked up by other NFL teams.

Grange went back to the Bears in 1928 and played with them through 1934 (Treat, 1986).

Two owners, Marshall and Halas pushed through a proposal that divided the NFL into

two divisions, with the winners to meet in an annual championship game (NFL, 1991). This

change in competition structure was economically feasible — a Western and Eastern Division so teams did not have to travel so far, and created rivalries within each division. This type of system had been successful for baseball why not football.

In 1936 another rival league was formed, and it became the second to call itself the

American Football League. The Boston Shamrocks were its champions. Some of its teams lasted two years, the life span of the League as a whole (Treat, 1986). In 1940 a six-team rival league, 146

the third to call itself the American Football League, was formed, and the Columbus Bullies, won

its championship (NFL, 1991).

While the game continued to grow until the war years of the World Warn. The

uncertain times found the League merging some of its teams in order to maintain some standard

of play (Govenali, 1951). The All-America Football Conference (AAFC) began play with eight

teams. The AAFC’s big break to stardom came when Dan Topping team transferred from the

NFL to the neophyte organization, and although his team collapsed he owned Yankee Stadium

and the Yankees and let the AAFC use his stadium. This gave the new League the New York

outlet which was extremely necessary for survival. The AAFC started to build its rosters during

the war. Huge bonuses were advanced for the immediate and binding signatures of college

athletes still in the service (Govemali, 1951).

The battle for talented college athletes resulted in salaries that sky-rocketed three or four

times what players previously received. For the first time since the NFL draft laws to select

college athletes were inaugurated in 1936, football players had a choice in determining for whom

to play. Owners lost money as the two Leagues battled each other with two football attractions

on the same Sunday and within a few miles of each other. Because of saturation the result was

a gradual exasperation at the existing situation and, finally a loss of interest — although attendance was still fairly high. Everyone was losing but the ball player.

However, the AFL folded after only two years. Another rival league was formed in

1940, once again calling itself the AFL, and like its predecessor lasting only two years. It seemed that everyone wanted to get on the "bandwagon" as they saw a market and an opportunity to start up new leagues. However, as they learned it was not a simple task to organize and run a successful league. Also, perhaps the public were not ready for another league. However, I suspect it was more to do with locations, money to promote, and the strength of the NFL in terms of powerful people and organizational structure.

In 1949 only sbc out of seventeen teams made money, with both Leagues (the NFL and the All-American Football Conference, formed in 1946) losing millions. A settlement was 147

needed, therefore, there was a merger which was recognized as a triumph for the NFL, as all its

members remained intact while four of the seven teams left in the AAFC were dissolved, leaving just Cleveland, San Francisco, and Baltimore to be absorbed into the older organization.

Everyone benefited but the player. Their bargaining powers were reduced dramatically. There

were less positions available so even the pros, frozen out of employment in the USA because of

the flooded market caused by the merger of the two Leagues, were seeking and finding football

occupations in Canada (Govemali, 1951).

By 1950 the name NFL was restored after approximately three months as the

National-American Football League (I could not imagine this happening today ~ demonstrating that even as late as 1950 the League was still trying to establish itself). The American and

National conferences were created to replace the Eastern and Western Divisions (NFL, 1991).

Each conference contained six clubs, with Green Bay as the only team not from a major city.

Both New York and Chicago were represented by two teams. This was considered a satisfactory situation due to the size of the cities and the fact that conflicts in dates for home games were resolved by planned scheduling.

The League itself was directed by a commissioner-president who was assisted by a vice-president and treasurer, each title being filled by one individual. Each conference had its own president (yet in fact Bell virtually ran the League). The officers of the league were elected at any annual meeting for a term of not less than one year nor more than ten years. The commissioner was assisted by an executive committee consisting of one representative from each of the 12 teams (Govemali, 1951).

One of the commissioner’s duties was the establishment of a Publicity Department which was under his jurisdiction and control. The business of public relations was seen as a full time job involving the coordinated efforts of the League and every member club, for they understood only too well, even at this time, the importance of developing and maintaining the public interest. This detailed coverage of the country, Govemali (1951) wrote, "is nothing but astute 148

business practice common to any profit making organization operating on a national level and

needful of publicity" ^.81).

It was readily observed, that the NFL commissioner directed a sporting empire, "the

tentacles of which reach almost to every section of the USA," (Govemali, 1951, p.82)). In 1950

an application for new membership into the League entailed an initial outlay of $50,000 for a

franchise if the request were approved by a unanimous vote of the member clubs.

As early as 1950 the NFL began to operate as a cartel, although it could be argued that

evidence of a cartel structure and philosophy had been established as early as 1930. The League

extended to all its member clubs the privilege of territorial rights, which insured a sort of

"squatters rights" to individual clubs competing in certain areas. In effect, no other club was

allowed to play within a certain radius of an individual club, unless the home team approved.

This involved many damaging concessions for the club that impinged on territorial rights, not

only in terms of immediate cash, but also in terms of favorable playing dates. For example,

when Ted Collins moved into New York with his Boston team, he had to receive permission from

the New York Football Giants and the League (Govemali, 1951). These kinds of problems did

not seem important to pro soccer clubs in England. One reason being that there were so many

clubs in such a small area, relatively speaking, so it was almost natural that a rival club would

be situated only a few miles away. The other reason being that it would be unthinkable for a

club to move to another area outside a particular town.

The competition stmcture was organized so that there was uniformity throughout the

League. Each conference member played the same number of games and, with some minor yearly adjustments, met each team in its own conference on a home and home basis. The champions of each conference met for the World Professional Football Championship at the conclusion of the regular season competition. The conference championship was determined on a won and loss basis, tie games not being counted. In the event of a tie, a play-off game was scheduled for which the players received their regular game salary for the extra contest. Clearly 149

this was not a haphazard hit or miss organization. It was an enterprise that was national in scope,

and one whose every move was planned and predetermined.

The owners realized long before the 1950s that competition breeds interest. Some teams

were wealthier than others, yet a selective draft was inaugurated in order to help the weaker

teams, and a player limit of 33 athletes was imposed on each squad. The professional game,

Govemali (1951) wrote:

is more evenly matched, thanks to the sagacity of these owners. Increased patronage depends on spirited competition. Today college squads, powered by 40 and 50 talented players brutally annihilate college teams composed of 15 to 20 capable men. If a comparable situation existed in profession^ football, the sport would die in a matter of years (p.85).

The owners were now more organized than ever before, and their business acumen

seemed to be of the quality that would presage success in any enterprise. There was no employer

organization as such, but it did exist; its coordinating unit was the League, and its bible the

constitution and by-laws. The players did not have any organization, and player protection was

certainly needed. The first sign of this protection came in 1955 when the NFL Players

Association was founded (NFL, 1991).

The AFL

The American Football League (AFL) of the 1960s presented a real challenge to the NFL

and was instrumental to the formation of the league structure as we know it today and the

establishment of the Superbowl. The AFL, the fourth with this name since 1926, elected Lamar

Hunt president in 1960, and at the same time Pete Rozelle was elected NFL commissioner.

There were signs in the early 1960s that the AFL would be a serious rival to the NFL unlike its predecessors (apart from the AAFC). For example, the AFL signed a five-year television contract with American Broadcasting Company (ABC) in 1960, and a year later, end

Willard Dewveall of the Chicago Bears played out his option and joined the Houston Oilers, champions of the AFL. Dewveall became the first player to deliberately move from one league to the other (NFL, 1991). 150

However, it was a rough beginning for the AFL. It began play in 1960 with eight teams, four of which were in cities already occupied by the NFL. The AFL lost an estimated $3 million in its first year, and the undercapitalized New York franchise, essential to the AFL’s potential success, threatened to drive the entire League into bankruptcy. In 1960 Harry Wismer, former sportscaster and eccentric owner of the New York team, persuaded the AFL owners to sell the

League’s television rights to ABC as a package, each franchise sharing equally in the receipts.

Although the AFL contract witih ABC was modest, it helped to keep the League temporarily afloat (Rader, 1990).

The following is an example of memorandums sent to the owners and executives of the

AFL, concerning certain policies of the running of the League. These examples illustrate the bureaucratic nature of a modem sport’s league, i.e., whereby there is little freedom for operation and where the rules and regulation of the institution are laid out in a systematic fashion for all to follow. These examples were taken from the Professional Football Hall of Fame, Canton,

Ohio, and are as follows:

MEMO NO. 67 June 30,1960. TO: Executives of AFL Clubs From: Milt Woodard RE: Exchange of Scouting Movies

Each AFL club may expect to receive from its forthcoming opponent the scouting-type movies of the previous two games played by said opponent, under the following arrangements: The first film to be delivered to an opponent (that played two week before the game with said opponent, or three weeks in the case of a bye) shall be sent by the Thursday afternoon following the playing of the game which is to be scouted. ^ 1 films shall be sent Air Express ......

MEMO NO. 110 October 14, 1960. TO: Members of AFL Executive Committee RE: Territorial "Negotiation List." (Very, very confidential)

At the Executive Committee meeting in New York on September 25 and 26, a territorial "negotiation list" was approved for the AFL, two players to be selected for each team. Here are the ground rules and map for the "negotiation list" arrangement, submitted for your approval: Oakland territory is to be Northern California and (hregon. Los Angeles territory is to be Southern California and Arizona. Dallas territory is to be Northern Texas. Houston territory is to be Southern Texas. New York territory is to be Maryland, Virginia, East Pennsylvania, West Virginia, New Jersey, Southern New York State, Delaware and Washington, D C. Denver...... 151

Boston...... Buffalo...... All other sectors shall be regarded as "open." An AFL club may choose from its own territory or may go into an open territory for its choices. For "territorial negotiation" choices, a club is prohibited from choosing a player from another club’s territory. Two players shall be selected on or before November 14, 1960, to be submitted to the league office in order of preference No changes may be made in the two selectees, once they are finalized ......

MEMO NO. IlOA November 11, 1960. To: Executive Committee From: Commissioner Joe Foss Verv Confidential

The two selections of the territorial arrangement must be submitted to the league office by Tuesday, November 15. Any adjustments, resulting from duplication, will be made that date and on November 16, by telephone Telephonic selections will start at 1 lam EST, 10am CST, 9am MST, and 8am PST. All owners should be at a telephone from that hour on until the selections are completed and should have with them a minimum of necessary staff personnel (such as your talent scout and coach). The club lowest in the standings of the entire league following the playing of the November 13 games will have first choice and selections will be made in reverse order of the standings on that date. If two teams are tied in percentage rating the Commissioner shall toss a coin and his action will be final. The succeeding choices shall be rotated Under no circumstances should a club sign a player who still has college football eligibility remaining, except in cases when his class will be in 1961 ...... (Pro Football Hall of Fame, 1991).

National Broadcasting Company (NBC) a loser in the 1964 bidding war for NFL rights, decided to gamble on the AFL. The AFL signed a five-year, $36 million television contract with

NBC to begin with the 1965 season, assuring each team approximately $900,000 a year from television rights (NFL, 1991).

NBC provided enough money to the AFL so that its clubs could engage in an all-out battle of paychecks with the NFL for college stars. The AFL-NFL war reached its peak, as the leagues spent a combined $7 million to sign their 1966 draft choices. The NFL signed 75% of its 232 draftees, the AFL 46% of its 181 (NFL, 1991).

The rising costs of player talent drove the Leagues to the peace table in 1966. Under terms of the merger agreement, Rozelle became the sole commissioner, the combined league established a conunon player draft to end the bidding war, and the two Leagues (or conferences as they were to be known after 1969) agreed to a NFL championship game (the Superbowl-AFL champion versus the NFL champion) to begin in 1967. Congress quickly passed a law exempting 152

the merger from antitrust action. Senate Whip Russell Long and House Whip Hale Boggs, both

from Louisiana, were chiefly responsible for guiding the legislation through Congress. Not

coincidentally, only nine days after the Football Merger Act became law, the NFL awarded New

Orleans an expansion franchise (Rader, 1990).

The NFL was now operating more as a cartel than at any other time. Coming under one

offlce created uniformity of values and regulations across the board for all of pro football. No

one who chose to participate was exempt from the imposition of the League offlce. What we had

was a nice neat package, a monopoly of sorts.

The NFL and AFL merger agreement would lead to full integration with 28 teams for the 1970 season. However, from 1967 to 1970 there was restructuring and realigning of the league which seemed to demonstrate the point that this was an organization still trying to "flnd its feet." Although the operational structure of professional football had long been reflective of a modem bureaucratic organization, stability and maturity was still somewhat lacking. Does this suggest that stability is absent in the modem process? I do not think so. What it does suggest is that the League was continuing to grow and mature

The NFL announced it would divide its 16 teams into four divisions starting in 1967.

It was realigned for the 1967-69 seasons into two divisions in the Eastem Conference and two divisions in the Westem Conference (Treat, 1970).

In 1969 it was noted that the merger of the NFL and AFL into one League would take place in the 1970-71 season, with 26 teams being divided into two 13-team conferences the AFC

(American Football Conference) and the NFC (National Football Conference). The two conferences were realigned into six divisions: AFC Central Division; AFC Eastem Division;

AFC Westem Division; NFC Central Division; NFC Eastem Division; and, NFC Westem

Division (Treat, 1970). The NFL also agreed on a play-off format that included one "wild-card" team per conference, the second-place team with the best record. This was the beginning of the

"wild-card" system which accounts for a whole weekend of play-off football today. 153 The 1970s on

From 1970 on, the basic structure of the NFL — league structure, AFC, NFC and so on

— has remained intact. However, there have been certain rule changes to make the game more

open and entertaining, as well as team movement and the addition of two teams (Seattle and

Tampa Bay), and some adjustment to the play-off system to allow more teams to qualify.

Obviously, there may be many reasons for these changes but rationalizing the organizational

structure of commercial goals definitely high on the list. A more open and entertaining game was attractive to fans, Seattle and Tampa Bay were perceived as lucrative markets and more play­ off games would mean more TV coverage, larger gates and more publicity. Also, organizations representing the players became more active, the Commissioner’s office became more visible as a result of dealing with a more scrutinizing media and arising problems, and the strength of the

NFL cartel came into question.

In 1978 the NFL expanded its program in the following manner: a 16-game regular season (from 14), and a 4-game preseason; a second wild card team was adopted for the play-offs, with the wild card teams to play each other and the winners advancing to a round of eight postseason series; and, the Seattle Seahawks were permanently aligned in the AFC Westem

Division and the Buccaneers in the NFC Central Division. And, in 1990 the NFL revised its play-off format once again to include two additional Wild Card teams (one per conference) (NFL,

1991).

In the 1980s several events indicated that the long era of unity among the NFL franchise holders was falling apart, and consequently the power of the cartel was brought to question.

Against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of owners and Commissioner Pete Rozelle, A1

Davis moved his Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles. A jury ruled against the NFL in the antitrust trial brought by the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission and the Oakland Raiders. Therefore, the federal courts upheld Davis’s right to defy the League. Shortly thereafter the Baltimore Colts moved to Indianapolis (1984) and the St. Louis Cardinals to Phoenix (1988). Rozelle’s power 154

had diminished, and in 1989 he announced his retirement. Whether the League would continue

to function as an effective economic cartel was in doubt (Rader, 1990).

One thing this does illustrate is that the pioneering spirit of individualism so prominent

in the nineteenth century is still valued today. A1 Davis reflects this spirit of individualism which

is often suppressed in organizations such as the NFL. Also, A1 Davis’ desire to move to a more

lucrative market was viewed by many, and obviously the courts, as within the spirit and realms

of capitalist initiative. In England such a move by a major team would be perceived as

outrageous and unacceptable - although it could and might happen in the future.

However, a Louis poll in 1990 revealed that pro football remained the sport most followed by Americans. The NFL continued to stand strong, once again "defeating" another opponent the United States Football League (USFL) a rival league which emerged and disappeared in the 1980s. The USFL sued the NFL for monopolizing the professional game.

However, the US District Court in New York awarded the USFL one dollar in its $1.7 billion antitrust suit against the NFL. The jury rejected all of the USFL’s television-related claims, which were the self-proclaimed "heart" of the USFL’s case.

The NFL, wanting to broaden their appeal beyond the USA developed the World League of American Football (WLAF) in 1989. Teams were set up in the USA and in Europe. This league would allow those players not good enough for the NFL to have a chance to play pro football and develop into possible candidates for the senior league.

Paul Tagliabue became the seventh chief executive of the NFL, and felt confident that the League was not going to fold at any time in the near future. In 1990 the cartel and structure seemed as strong as ever as Tagliabue announced NFL teams will play dieir 16 game schedule over 17 weeks in 1990 and 1991, and 16 games over 18 weeks in 1992 and 1993. Also,

Tagliabue announced the formation of a Committee on Expansion and Realignment, and a Player

Advisory Council, Comprised of 12 former players (NFL, 1991).

While confronting a number of obstacles and several challenges the NFL has evolved into a powerful cartel. Its rivals have either dissolved or merged with the parent league. The 155 competition structure is clearly defined and seems to maintain interest for the majority of fans throughout the whole season; unlike baseball where teams are often out of the pennant race one or two months before the season’s conclusion. Parity within the League and the draft system have been instrumental in creating this fan interest. CHAPTER V

COMMERCIALIZATION

This chapter examines the commercialization and commodification of professional football in England and America. The goal of this particular section is to see how each sport has been transformed from a recreational activity to a serious business enterprise.

The modem corporate world is a complex one made up of a number of institutions with similar goals, the main one being financial solvency. Does professional football in its most contemporary form exhibit characteristics generally associated with such institutions? And, more cmcially, if it does, what was the process that facilitated such a transformation? These questions are central to the nature of this chapter.

A dilenuna that characterizes contemporary professional sport and much of what is called amateur sport has been described by Roger Kahn (1977): "Sport is too much a game to be a business and too much a business to be a game." Eitzen (1993) says, "the original purpose of sport — pleasure in the activity — has been lost in the process. Sport has become work" 163).

Both these statements are critical toward what highly organized professional sport has become, yet they describe it in its most contemporary form. Contemporary sport is identified by the commercial interests of owners, sponsors, and players, and by the subordination of the players’ participation for their own intrinsic interests to extrinsically motivated goals. This level of sport has popularized the adage. It’s no longer a game, it’s a business (Leonard, 1984).

Sport has become big business: vast amounts are invested in the creation of the sport product and its economic spin-offs; sport superstars earn high incomes, as much from off-field as on-field activities; and sports consumers by the million pay at the gate to watch them play, and even more are secondhand spectators via the printed and electronic media. However this has been no sudden economic miracle: sport became an industry perhaps a century ago. Sports professionalism goes back even further (Vamplew, 1988, p. 11).

156 157

The impression management elites — those controlling advertizing, the mass media, public

relations — have effectively redefined through their influence, both the professional football world

and its place in society. My aim in this section is to examine these developments in more detail.

ENGLAND

Introduction

While the profit motive was established early in the life of pro soccer, directors of soccer

clubs and those on the board had ties to the community and were involved for altruistic reasons

as well. Nonetheless, commercialization o f the game occurred as soon as players earned wages

for playing and spectators paid to watch. Players soon realized their role as workers and a

commodity to the owners. However, with their increasing notoriety through the media and such,

they too wanted a "piece of the pie" and became aware of their value.

Through the 1950s and 1960s British Capitalism and the influence of American economics

encouraged and directed soccer people to exploit the commercial opportunities that pro soccer presented. Resentment to commercial aspects of the sport was exhibited by some working-class

sectors but Thatcherism brought with it a new clientele with new attitudes commensurate with the desires of people involved in pro soccer. From the 1970s on a new type of director was on the horizon. These directors were less concerned about community relations and more worried about how to turn a profit. However, 92 clubs — many operating in the red — in four divisions still exist today, indicating forces other than sheer commercial enterprise operate in the game. This tells us much about stability and traditional values still evident in British society, the relationship between pro soccer and the working-class, and the importance of soccer clubs to the community. 158 Nineteenth Centurv

This section illustrates how soccer first became a business enterprise with spectators

willing to pay to see games. What is critical here is how those organizing the pro game were

motivated by financial concerns as opposed to their amateur forebears, which was instrumental

to legalizing professionalism.

As early as the latter part of the nineteenth century athletes became increasingly governed

by demands of a market economy. Industrialization, which brought about a decline in numerous plebeian recreations by the early decades of the nineteenth century, also helped to extend monetary relationships to popular recreations.

From 1830 on the sports scenario significantly changed. The spread of the railways and a rise in working-class spending power pointed the way to future developments (Vamplew, 1988).

As Tischler (1981) notes:

The business structure which emerged in sports resembled that of other enterprises in late Victorian England. The better football teams, for instance, were financed by shar^olders. The product offered for sale to the public was sporting entertainment which embodW matches among working-class men who specialized in scoring goals against an opponent. That football playing was a highly skilled profession by the 1880s only underlies the degree to which this pastime had become a business (p. 1).

In the 1880s, businessmen club directors introduced a new version of the game which reflected their aims and interests. The metamorphosis of business relations in soccer affected the social profile of team rosters, helped initiate the creation of league soccer, and generated trade union militancy among professional players. The growth of soccer along professional-commercial lines was not a spontaneous occurrence. It was the result of calculated nurturing by entrepreneurs who extended to soccer an ethos which touched numerous endeavors outside of the game.

After the 1880s soccer was organized by nonplaying "officials" and entrepreneurs as opposed to players who controlled plebeian and schoolboy soccer. Also, the distinction between participants and spectators (an example of modernization) was accentuated as soccer became a paying business venture. 159

Limited recreational resources perhaps inadvertently fostered the tendency to watch

soccer. The combination of an appreciation of the soccer player’s art and restricted space for

mass participation created an audience for soccer matches. A distinctive feature of most of West

Ham - where West Ham United arose - was the lack of open space and public recreation

grounds. The majority of children or men who played soccer did so on vacant unenclosed spaces

that separated factories and industrial areas (Korr, 1978).

After 1880, there is substantial evidence that real wages generally rose and this increased

the spending power of large numbers of working people (Vamplew, 1988). These working

people did not mind watching others play, and entrepreneurs were quick to realize, they were

even willing to pay for the privilege. Entrepreneurs invested in soccer grounds, players, and all

the paraphernalia nec^sary to field a team and provide a modicum of facilities for spectators.

This mirrored the contemporary form of commodity sales (Tischler, 1981). "Commercialized

spectator sport for the mass market became one of the economic success stories of late Victorian

Britain. Large crowds at sport fixtures, of course, were nothing new, but now they were being

attracted regularly," (Vamplew, 1988, p.52).

Plebeian and schoolboy soccer each had accentuated and furthered the separation of

classes at play. The commercial-professional version of soccer invited the participation of men from both working-class and bourgeois backgrounds. For the first time, people from different classes were directly and simultaneously involved on a significant scale in the development of soccer, although their different roles served to underline class distinctions. The antagonisms in society that were reflected by soccer being exclusive to plebeian and later patrician participants, were now manifested in employer-employee tensions. "The evolution of labor relations in football became as fundamental to the history of the game as the competition for league and cup championships," (Tischler, 1981, p.4).

Despite some opposition — generally middle-class - to professionalism, more owners, dependent upon gates, came to recognize the obstacles created by adherence to an amateur code, and pressed the FA to legalize professionalism. Both small and large clubs had to pay players 160

to compete athletically and to attract crowds in order to be financially solvent. Pressure from

these clubs, especially those from the North, the press and the public ultimately led to the

legalization of professionalism by the FA in July, 1885 (Mason, 1980).

Team owners and journalists emphasized that the "right class of men" loved soccer and

that these men exhibited an altruistic outlook in their capacity as directors. There was still a

prevailing attitude that sport was sport and not work and should not be treated as such, and only

a lower form of class would approach it in that manner. Yet, Tischler (1981) says, "the same

men also ran their teams as businesses, and it was the commercialization process which would exert an overriding influence on professional football" (p.69).

The "natural order" of the work place found its extension in soccer. Directorates reflected a middle-class constituency. Just as a wage system actualized player-owner relationships, so too did the payment for admission to soccer grounds create consumers out of spectators. Directors gave the impression that they were involved for only altruistic reasons, but, this was not always the case. Many of them saw the opportunity to make money.

What kind of people were these owners and directors? Wholesale and retail was the largest single group followed by professions, the drink trade and manufacturers. Some large manufacturers, traders and financiers were heavily involved with some soccer clubs by the outbreak of World War I (Mason, 1980).

TABLE 1

Occupations of Club Directors 1888-1914

Industrial Alcohol Gentlemen Professionals Working-Class Other Merchant Tobacco 175(38%) 59(12.9%) 16(3.5%) 137(30%) 27(5.9%) 41(9%)

(From Tischler, 1981, pg. 73) 161

It is obvious from Table 1 that entrepreneurs took an extremely active role in the running

of soccer teams, and affluent men actually controlled the larger teams. The process of

incorporation further strengthened the position of a few men who controlled the business — the

cost of shares were often out of reach to the "common man."

Arnold Hills, Director of West Ham United, was one of these affluent men who made

the decision to run his soccer club like a business if there was to be any profit involved. The

Articles detailed die purposes for establishment of the company, the foremost of which was, "to

conduct die business of a football and athletic club in all branches." The company was "to carry on any business which the company thinks fits in with the above and is calculated to enhance the value of the company or to bring a profit to it," (Korr, 1978, p.221).

Hills decided to move West Ham United to the Boleyn Ground in 1904, from the

Memorial Ground. Boleyn Casde was the site of a Catholic school in a neighborhood surrounded by small shops and pleasant residential streets. In most ways it was exacdy the opposite of the squalid conditions that outsiders usually pictured as typical of the East End, but it was much closer to the economic and social reality upon which the future of the club would be based.

The new ground also symbolized a visible break with the Ironworks. "Even though supporters would remember the "Hammer" roots, the new club was making an appeal as a representative of a wider community. The central location of the ground was another way to play up the "new" identity of the club," (Korr, 1978, p.225). In other words, the objective was to make the club iq)pealing and sell it to a larger community.

The great irony involved in the growth of West Ham United is that a move to the Boleyn laid the foundation for its success as a professional club and the move was forced on it by Hills, a man who stood forthrightly against professional sport. This demonstrates the point that economic survival override any kind of philosophical, idealistic notions of participation. Hill was rationalizing his objectives — an illustration of the modernization process taking place.

Interestingly enough, while British fans would not entertain notions of "their" clubs moving to another location, this occurrence has much in common with what occurred in the NFL at a later 162

date. So we ask the question, is there that much difference between an Arnold Hills or an A1

Davis in terms of how they react to market pressures? Probably not.

The rental provisions of the move to Boleyn included die amalgamation of West Ham

United with the Boleyn CasUe Football Club. This meant taking Boleyn’s best players into West

Ham’s reserve team and giving four Boleyn Castie Directors an opportunity to purchase stock

in West Ham, with the understanding that the West Ham Directors would recommend one or

more of them to be elected to their Board. The consolidation arrangements had all the

appearances of the merger of a small business with a much larger and more successful firm, with the net result that the smaller group was subsumed into the larger one. "There was certainly nothing in the arrangements that gave any hint that footbali was a sport or different from any type of business activity where workers were interchangeable, and with Boards of Directors that made decisions for them," (Korr, 1978, p.226).

Expansion and Domination

As attendance increased the League expanded, directors realized the potential of increasing income from revenues other than gate receipts and the wealthier clubs in large cities began to dominate on and off the field.

The expansion of the League and the increased attendance at matches prompted the renovation or complete rebuilding of more than 20 stadia between 1890 and 1914 (Tischler,

1981). Gibson and Pickford (1905) noted during this period:

By 1905 the wealthy brewer and prosperous builder combine to form a company, lay out capital in die provision of a ground that is up-to-date, purchase or otherwise collect together an array of ’talent,’ and take the football world by storm. Where once clubs grew slowly and quiedy, they now spring up like ’mushrooms in a night’ ^.32).

The expansion of grounds and facilities provided additional sources of income for directors and clubs. The most common source of additional revenue for directors was the sale of food and beverages before, during, and after matches. During the 1880s and 1890s, teams often played on grounds owned by brewers who received income from the rent on their land as 163

well as from the sale of their product at matches (Tischler, 1981). In essence while a team was

allowed to make only five percent profit, entrepreneurs could make money in other ways. Maybe

the English sporting moguls were motivated by profit in the same way as their American

counterpart.

Club directors generally attempted to apply sound marketing principles to team

management. The Football League (PL) had from its inception examined each team’s capacity

to draw crowds before granting membership — how different is this to NFL policy of inclusion?.

As the popularity of the game increased, investors from large cities replaced soccer entrepreneurs

from smaller industrial towns (Tischler, 1981). Marketing potential and accessibility to

population centers were becoming important considerations for investors of soccer clubs.

Newcastle, Liverpool, Manchester United, Manchester City, Bristol City, Middlesborough,

Arsenal, and Birmingham City were examples of bigger clubs taking the place of older clubs

which happened to be located in towns of smaller population.

Professional soccer was like other commercial ventures, in that the wealthier firms

dominated smaller competitors. Although team directors united in their dealings with players,

they still competed among themselves for the support of paying public. However, this type of

cooperation (unification) of directors — and later team owners in the NFL — concerning certain

matters separates sport from other business enterprises. Indeed some of the economics of sport

do appear unusual. The ideal market position of a conventional business would be a monopoly, but this is less desirable in sport, "for what use is it to be heavyweight champion of the world but to have no challengers?" (Vamplew, 1988, p. 13). In almost every sport competitors combine to produce a saleable commodity — what Walter Neale (1964) called the "product-joint" as opposed to the joint products of many business enterprises.

There is also a strong school of thought which argues that many sport clubs do not obey the economic rules of the game because they are utility-maximizers rather than profit-maximizers, in that they are willing to sacrifice profits for the sake of winning games and championships

(Vamplew, 1988). This is often the case for soccer club directors in England and to a lesser 164

extent in the USA (owners paying out enormous salaries as an incentive to attain or retain star

players).

The competition for spectators had implications for teams across the country. As a result,

teams were admitted to the FL in part on their ability to draw crowds, and many small cities saw

the elimination of their clubs from the League in favor of wealthier and better situated teams.

The belief that a good team meant a financially successful one stimulated the search for

superior players. During the first decade of the twentieth century, wealthier club directors repeatedly violated the Maximum Wage Rule, in order to attract large crowds and therefore survive. "The line between a club’s athletic and financial achievements became blurred,"

(Tischler, 1981, p.83).

Revenue derived from ticket sales was a primary source of profit for directors. Directors raised entrance fees as the demand for tickets rose. Consequently, ticket prices fluctuated from team to team and game to game. However, this lack of uniformity in entrance fees is still common in professional soccer in England today — in December 1992 I paid 20 pounds to see

Manchester United play at Chelsea and a week later 12 pounds to see Leeds United play at

Crystal Palace, both Premier League games.

Table 2 lists the attendance for regular league games during the 1913-14 season and indicates the popularity of professional soccer. It also indicates how those clubs from the bigger cities attracted large gates, and probably had the most promising fiiture. That notion is reflected today as Manchester United, Liverpool, Aston Villa, Everton, Tottenham Hotspur, and Chelsea are six of the most financially successful clubs in England. 165 TABLE 2

Attendance and Profit for First Division League Teams. 1913-1914

Team Total Attendance Average Attendance Profit

Aston Villa 524,000 27,600 6,777 Pounds Blackburn Rovers 425,000 22,400 2,309 Bolton Wanderers 508,000 26,700 3,773 Bradford City 358,000 18,800 382 Bumley 458,000 24,100 12,883 Chelsea 755,000 39,700 1,739 Derby County 201,000 10,600 -2,043 Everton 489,000 25,700 3,073 Liverpool 480,000 25,300 8,780 Manchester City 509,000 26,800 4,119 Manchester United 536,000 28,200 unavailable Middlesborough 281,000 14,800 3,694 Newcastle United 489,000 25,700 -1,114 Oldham Athletic 268,000 14,100 1,482 Preston North End 294,000 15,500 1,676 ShefGeld United 410,000 21,600 3,008 Sheffield Wednesday 429,000 22,600 3,792 Sunderland 439,000 23,300 4,893 Tottenham Hotspurs 518,000 27,300 5,087 West Bromwich 413,000 21,700 4,583 (Tischler, 1981, pg. 84)

The overriding impression is that a relatively small number of men, entrepreneurs by background, now effectively controlled what was probably perceived as a working man’s pastime. As the soccer business thrived, it increasingly came to be controlled by the same "class of men” who directed other concerns and institutions in English society. In this respect, soccer existed as a microcosm of the larger business environment (Tischler, 1981).

Promotion and Profit

This section discusses the following notions: that many soccer officials were/are just as concerned about promotion of the game as they are making a profit; and, that traditional values entrenched in the soccer milieu and a disdain for working-class attitudes towards winning and 166

gambling , especially among those in the FA, acted as a barrier to changing pro soccer into a

commercially, viable enterprise.

Mason (1980) claims that, professional soccer at the beginning of the twentieth century

was not conceived as purely a money-making machine, and this is somewhat true of the game

since then, apart from the last ten years. Dawson (1984) wrote that the profit motive comparison

between the two cultures (England and the USA) constituted a revealing difference. Profit is the

USA’s raison d’etre, while promotion is the force behind English soccer (success of the National

team, English clubs doing well in European competitions, increase in total attendance with a

reduction of crowd violence, and an improvement in the standard of coaching and play at all

levels). For example, the American owners expect to turn a profit while the Board of Directors

of English clubs hope to finish in the black. However, as we shall see later, American ideology

has become more pervasive within the operation of pro soccer in England.

Mason (1980) and Walvin (1986) concur that even when the profit motive is evident in

English soccer, poor management on the part of directors has attributed to its obscurity. It has

already been stated that many directors did not always run the clubs on the strict business lines

which they applied to their personal commercial activities.

Walvin (1986) asserts that even today English soccer is indicative of cultural lag, as clubs

maintain Victorian and Edwardian values because they are adverse to change. I believe this

adversity to change, in comparison to the transitory nature of American culture and sport, is one

of the main differences between the two cultures and consequently the two sport subcultures.

One reason for this difference concerns the maturity of each culture. England has had many

more years to establish basic values and attitudes, and in many respects is "set in its ways". The

USA is still relatively "young" and transitory in nature. Also, having started so "late" it has probably taken on more contemporary (rational) facets of operation that allow for change to occur more readily. In England, on the other hand, more traditional modes of operation and thinking

are indicative of society and more specifically pro soccer itself. 167

While cricket was the "recreation of the masses," soccer was the "game for the

millions." A study of commercial-professional soccer provides insights into the ways in which

many workers used their leisure time and reveals the techniques employed to preserve existing

class relationships. Tischler (1981) regarded the process by which distinctive working-class pastimes became less threatening to the English ruling class as an expression of the workers’ innate apolitical bent. "Pro soccer serves as an important departure for understanding how mass spectator extravaganzas emerged as entertainment, radier dian as a potentially disruptive or politically threatening phenomenon," (Tischler, 1981, p.87)

Traveling to other cities to attend soccer matches had become part of the working-class culture, and it was facilitated by the increase in the number of railway lines and trains. In 1913,

40 special trains were run from Birmingham to transport 20,000 supporters of the local team to the Cup Final in London (Tischler, 1981).

The enthusiasm for soccer among workers had reached a point in the early part of the twentieth century whereby the production in certain factories was interrupted. This was a special problem for employers with the advent of midweek matches.

The middle and upper-classes were also upset with the appetite the working-class developed for gambling on soccer matches. The pools (similar to the lottery in the USA) for example, helped to lure working men to gamble on the fate of soccer teams in the same way as for dogs and horses. Walvin (1986) states that by the mid-1930s over 16 times as many people bet on soccer as watched it. The pools have remained a traditional pastime, handed down from generation to generation, among the English public over the twentieth century.

A related criticism of soccer, in the early part of the twentieth century, concerned the perceived tendency of workers to watch matches rather than to participate in sport. Advocates of wider participation in games for the purpose of increasing the strength of England’s military manpower also drew on the testimony of medical authorities before Parliamentary committees.

In 1909 many journalists condemned soccer as a pastime that corrupted and weakened the work ethic (Tischler, 1981). 168

The size o f soccer crowds increased dramatically between 1880 and 1914. Ticket prices

were kept at a reasonable level. The FL rule implemented in 1890 standardized terrace admission

prices (i.e., minimum prices) at 6 pence (5 cents) for regular league matches, and this policy

remained until 1914. To insure that employees of league clubs would observe business rules,

clubs installed turnstiles to prevent ticket-takers from pocketing receipts (Tischler, 1981).

These prices compared very favorably (for spectators) with what pro football fans had to pay in the USA at this time (50 cents in 1905), also, they remained stable for a number of years in England while in the USA owners responded more readily (from a business sense) to the demand and popularity of the game by increasing admission prices each year (Maltby, 1987).

At this time pro soccer enjoyed larger crowds than pro football in the USA, which was without a strong governing body, competing with college football, and run by owners who operated on a game-to-game basis. This is characteristic of a game in its infancy, whereas in England commercial procedures were more established and standardized for pro soccer.

Inter-War Years

The professional game was a sign of changing values in sport and society at large, and this transformation was produced by the commercial and professional developments outside and within the game (Walvin, 1986).

During the inter-war years there was a fierce competition for players. Transfer fees became inflated and the first 10,000 pound ($20,000) fee was paid in 1928. It became important for owners to be able to offer players incentives such as club houses, available at minimum rent

(Wagg, 1984).

Hopcraft (1968) writes:

Money became a vital influence on developments in football as soon as families realized that football could pay regular working wages. This was the point at which the game took on its widest significance. The growth of football is not a footnote to flie social history of the 20th century but a plain thread in it (p.22). 169

By the 1920s soccer was an established employer in a community where jobs were

scarce. The clubs had grown up out of pride in athleticism, in local importance, in corporate

endeavor. The stadiums were planted where the supporters lived, in among the industrial mazes

of factories and clustered workers’ houses. The Saturday match became more than mere

diversion from the daily grind, because there was often no work to be relieved.

However, the improved material conditions of the poor urban and industrial groups in

the 1930s and again in the 1950s certainly helped the growth of the game at the professional

level. These changing conditions affected the time spent outside of work. There was a

fundamental change, especially after World War n, in leisure patterns, reflective of a changing modem social life. Nevertheless pro soccer "was somewhat unmoved and less affected by the changes occurring around it. Consequently, it became rather isolated from generations that it once had direct links to," (Walvin, 1986, p. 119).

The pickings for professional players were meager by the standards of today. By the mid-1930s a First Division player could not expect to take home more than 12 pounds a week, even with his bonuses for playing in the senior side and for winning a match; a young player, to take the case of Stan Cullis, who joined Wolverhampton Wanderers in 1934, would get a basic wage of two pounds ten shillings to three pounds (six dollars) in his first two seasons with the club. But there could be material extras, such as a free house for a married man and travel and hotel stops about the country; the local stature the job settled on the player was immense. "He had moved out of the rigid oppressiveness of his class through his gifts in the people’s art. The essence of the people’s obsession with football was that it was far, far better than work,"

(Hopcraft, 1968, p.23). No matter how much pro soccer players made, they were playing a game in front of large crowds and being paid for it. Life could not be better for young men coming from working-class homes where luxuries were scarce.

Perhaps no other organization or group had a greater influence on the development of the game into a commercial enterprise ~ as far as the players, managers, owners and spectators are 170

concerned — than the media and the press. Although there will be a separate chapter on the

media, I felt recognition was necessary here.

In the 1920s broadcasting became a new factor on the English soccer scene. The British

Broadcasting Company (BBC) was created in 1926 — a government owned organization that has

operated for nearly 70 years without any commercial advertizing. The BBC produced its first live nationwide broadcast in April, 1927, and its first Cup Final covered by "running commentary" (i.e., BBC Radio) in 1928. When television (TV) became a viable proposition in the late 1930s, BBC’s interest in soccer extended to the new medium, televising for the first time the FA Cup Final in 1939. The BBC got some support from the FA, as the Chairman at that time, Stanley Rous, decided soccer needed this kind of publicity to expand. Many clubs responded by building special boxes for cameramen. Arsenal being the first (Wagg, 1984).

"Administrators consistently set their face against money making strategy which smacked to them of American-style capitalist vulgarity" (p.36).

The 1930s were also a period of mounting wage militancy. After 1930 agitation against the League’s wage ceiling and its retain and transfer system helped replenish the number of members in the Association Footballers Trade Union (AFTU) which had dropped in the 1920s.

Many of the players were quite poor-only a minority were paid a maximum salary. It was a buyer’s market and clubs had large playing staffs. However, the players knew the money was diere, as 1928 saw the first 10,000 pound ($20,000) transfer deal and a number of top players received large bonuses (Wagg, 1984).

Another factor contributing to the militancy was the growth of media interest and players seeing themselves as entertainers, who were making big money on radio, in newspapers and in front of large crowds. This ill-feeling did not abate with war as players more than ever were aware of dieir importance to the populace, and maintaining morale. When Chelsea lost to

Millwall in the last war-time Cup Final, Millwall made 7,000 pounds ($14,000) but the players received only two to five pounds (four to ten dollars) worth of National Savings Certificates

(Wagg, 1984). 171

Consumer Capitalism

The 1950s saw a series of substantial concessions, including several increases in the

Maximum Wage, wrung from the League. This was probably related to economic trends as

Britain in the latter 1950s entered an era of consumer capitalism. This involved the zealous

promotion of private consumption above public investment, and the upper echelons of the

working-class were encouraged to think in terms of ambitious spending on their homes.

However, the single most important development was the establishment in 1954 of commercial

TV (Wagg, 1984).

These economic trends and developments helped to establish the game internationally as well as nationally. After World War H economic change had a direct effect on international sport. People and teams were able to travel abroad for contests. Moscow Dynamo FC toured

Britain in 1945 beating Arsenal 4-3 and winning most of their matches by a wider margin. What was the importance of these results and this tour? First, it helped to impress the need to modernize English soccer, which could only strengthen the hand of Stanley Rous and the coaching movement. Second, inter-club competitions between Europeans brought greater prestige and revenue to the top clubs.

In the 1950s, there was an increasing interest in European club and international soccer competitions. People were not only content to see their team successful in domestic competition, but they broadened their horizons. Television brought these contests into the home and spectators would associate with an English club (whether they regularly followed them or not) or the

National team. People became familiar with the great teams from the continent; Real Madrid

(Spain), Benfica (Portugal), and Inter Milan (Italy) to name a few.

These European club competitions were very attractive to the directors of successful clubs, as they meant more games, bigger gates, and more exposure on an international scale.

They also set apart teams like Manchester United, Arsenal, Liverpool, Everton and others experiencing success in Europe from the smaller, poorer clubs in all the divisions. 172

The three European club competitions created a dichotomy between the most powerful

and smaller clubs. An elite group was established, and although a promotion and relegation

system of meritocracy characterized the pro soccer competition structure, smaller clubs — the

likes of Millwall, Rotherham, Bradford to name a few — never had a realistic chance of

experiencing the glamour of such competitions, and more importantly, under present conditions,

never will.

After World War n the values and methods of American capitalism was part of the new

order of contemporary Conservative MPs. Impression management, advertizing, public relations,

and broadcasting were central to their agenda for change. Independent TV was very much a part

of their plan, namely. Independent Television Viewing (ITV). Wagg (1984) asserts that FTV had

observed and benefited from American experience in selling "people’s capitalism" in a welfare

state.

By 1962 Britain was second only to the USA in national expenditure on advertizing -

approximately 500 advertizing agencies existed in Britain at that time. Both major political

parties (Conservative and Labour) became aware of the benefits of public relations, advertizing

and dealing with the mass media. Consequently, they also saw the importance of soccer to their

exposure. As Walvin (1986) notes: "Politicians saw the potential of this and from the 1960s

onwards football received more than its fair share of political adulation" (p. 108).

Soccer players began to observe these trends and were attracted to the commercial

possibilities. For the first time many players were aware and acutely conscious of the power of

the press, and of the money involved in soccer, and their ability to attract large TV audiences

(Walvin, 1986).

"The commercialization of football stars was of a piece with the broader commercial

transformation of the game itself," (Walvin, 1986, p.34). Walvin (1986) feels that professional

soccer players have changed more dramatically than any other aspect of the modem game. A turning point for the players and the game’s history was the abolition of the maximum wage in

1961. This came about through pressure from the Professional Footballers Association (PFA) 173

that they would strike if the maximum wage and the retain-and-transfer system were not removed.

There was a huge majority in favor of striking, and players and managers after being interviewed

on TV convinced the public of the seriousness of the players’ mood and their determination to

strike if necessary. "The dominant mood of professional footballers now appeared to brook no

proletarian sentiment," (Wagg, 1984, p. 117).

Players began to realize their commercial potential. The increased attention the press,

and more importantly television -- Match of the Day, the first regularly scheduled soccer program, began in 1964 - gave them facilitated this realization.

These events were qualitatively different from those a century ago when the game grew largely through the medium of the popular press. Television was visual and newspapers devoted more space to dramatic pictures and details of the game. However, only the top players, those in Division I (now the Premier League), really benefited here. Players in the lower divisions did not experience that much change. Nonetheless the end result was the emergence of a player, acutely conscious of his earning capacity on and off the field.

"The commercialization of football stars was of a piece with the broader commercial transformation of the game itself," (Walvin, 1986, p.34). Facilities were changed to accommodate a "superior" clientele with more luxury - new covered stands, all-seated, and private lounges and bars. This coupled with rising wages for star players produced a greater distance between the clubs and the majority of the fans standing on the terraces.

Fan cynicism grew as they felt players were not producing performances equivalent to their income. Older fans related back to the "good old glory days" of the 1930s, 1940s and

1950s. They perceived the new breed of player as inferior. This evaluation of players was facilitated by the close scrutiny of television and the press. "TV coverage of football has done much more than alter the status and the role of players, for it has also created quite different expectations of their performances and abilities," (Walvin, 1986, p.38).

Club directors and managers were aware of the growing distance between the fans and the players and consequently the club itself. As a result, in the 1970s managers made their 174

players more accessible to the public, for example, signing autographs, opening fetes, kissing

babies, judging beauty contests, after dinner speeches, and generally more public appearances.

Clubs and players were putting their names to kids games and toys and publishing songs.

However, the whole commercialization of the pro soccer was still in its infancy.

Nonetheless, as early as the 1960s the FL had a plan to exploit the commercial market,

when under the presidency of Len Shipman it began to look for sponsorship, and the FA

traditionally oriented toward amateurism and patriotism felt the effect of the dictates of publicity.

The World Cup (National) teams of 1966 and 1970 made a record and were on Top of the Pops

(equivalent to American Bandstand) to the dismay of manager Alf Ramsey.

Ramsey’s successor, Don Revie, had no such qualms. Under Revie the FA were able

to sanction unfettered commercialization of the England team. For example, they completed a

deal with Admiral sporting apparel (sponsorship for wearing Admiral clothing), and attached

themselves to show business personalities, such as, Elton John. Also, politicians became part of

this publicity. Harold Wilson posed with the National team after their 1966 World Cup triumph,

and political parties got famous players to support their causes or party campaigns.

Selling Pro Soccer

The following section analyzes how wider patterns of social change — impression

management, material accumulation, PR, advertizing - influenced the way players, managers,

and directors approached the game. Change within the game itself was significantly delayed by

traditional values in pro soccer (internal) and the business milieu at large (external).

In the 1970s many players started to make more money from advertizing than the game

itself, as leading players became standard bearers for new consumer capitalism which catapulted

many of them way beyond their working-class origins. Their lives became set apart from their

working-class heritage, and they began to reflect individualism rather than community ties.

Retired, famous players told stories of how their "legs turned jelly" just prior to playing for England or participating in an FA Cup Final. However, modem players are less likely to 175

worry about this as they have other things to think about, such as, quotes to the press, who they

should talk to after their lap of honor around Wembley, i.e., what press or TV people. These

players are more aware of the power of the press and realize they have to be careftil what they

say.

Developments in commercialization of pro soccer and the emergence of a new ethos of

soccer — expressed in actual practice on the field and in talk about the game - are both parts of

a wider pattern of diffuse cultural change. This in turn has come about because of the growth

in post-war Britain of the mass consumption economy. As Wagg (1984) writes: "In short, the

values of modem football, as well as those of the modem player, are, in essence, the values of

advertizing and public relations, and of a business world less constrained than in the earlier part

of this century by notions of faimess and probity" (p. 148).

The key impression management occupations of advertizing and public relations now

began to acquire size, prestige and influence that they had lacked in Britain before the war. In

the case of advertizing, total expenditure doubled between 1948 and 1954, and more than doubled

again between 1954 and 1964, commercial TV generating new advertizing revenue, rather than

taking business away from the newspapers, as some press barons had feared (Wagg, 1984).

Public relations, although the actual term was not coined until 1924, had begun as an

activity in the USA in the early 1900s when big business combines had used de facto PR men to

deal with press criticism. Public relations people had been employed by candidates in US

elections from the 1930s and, by the end of the 1950s, both major political parties in Britain had

followed suit — Tory Central Office in the late 1940s and Labour in die wake of their election

defeat in 1959. By 1963 there were 34 MPs who had past or present connections with public

relations or advertizing firms. More and more institutions were looking to specialists in this field to "handle" any relationship they might have to the mass media. To leading soccer players, among others, these trends held out attractive commercial possibilities. As figures of established significance in working-class culture they would be ideal vehicles for propagation through advertizing of the new consumerism (Wagg, 1984). 176

However, a number of scholars (Hopcraft, 1968, Tischler, 1981, Wagg, 1984 and

Walvin, 1986) believe soccer clubs have never been conventional commercial institutions. Wagg

(1984) notes that the main pursuit of pro clubs has been to succeed on the soccer field, i.e.,

playing success, and not financial profit (although many would say these two go hand-in-hand,

specially today), and the aim of the local bourgeois families running the clubs has been to

preserve their own stewardship - which has been somewhat true of British business in general.

Walvin (1986) continues by asserting that, "most of the problems football experienced were

brought on by those in the game. Traditional attitudes assisted in the inability or unwillingness

to change the game, hence growing problems" (p. 140).

Writing in the late 1960s Hopcraft (1968) states that the institution of the soccer club

director is the sport’s central contradiction. The amateurs govern the professionals.

The club director is the person in whom the fanaticism of the terraces and the urge for authority fuse. He is imbued with a desire to manage, yet is activated principally by his partisan local involvement and the moral approach he brings to the wider issue. He is principally a committee man in a business which increasingly needs the incisiveness of the singular will ^.140).

Being a director does not make money for a man, at any rate not directly, since he is

prohibited from receiving a salary. Most directors are businessmen, not executives of large

compartmental corporations but heads of local firms, because local commitment goes with

immobility (many of these directors are local men committed to the community and not looking to move on); so the status of the directorship is considerable, and probably brings in business — for their firm outside the game. But that is a variable asset, depending on the business the man is in, the success of the team and the size of the town.

Today the FA limits the dividend a club may pay its shareholders to 7.5 percent gross, which makes any direct profit minimal. In any case some clubs’ trading results, year by year, are as often losses as gains, and even with the most successful clubs money is only relevant in terms of die soccer it can give its supporters (Wagg, 1984). "If professional football were to be run as a thorough going business enterprise the fans would hardly be placated in their 177

disappointment at failure by the knowledge that the shareholders had a good year," (Hopcraft,

1968, p. 141).

The New Order and Thatcherism

This final section analyzes the impact on the game of a new type of director - the product of modem capitalism and Thatcherism - and the developments in society, especially since the 1980s, that had a profound effect on the commercial developments of pro soccer.

There was a new director on the "horizon" in the late 1960s with a more contemporary attitude toward the commercial side of the game. Ken Bates is one of the young, post-war tycoons, impatient with established practice, keenly aware of his own acumen, bold in scope.

He no longer belongs to any class except the successful, and he is frank. He became chairman of Oldham Athletic at the end of 1965. In a dozen years in business. Bates a Londoner, had added a massive land acreage in south Africa and commercial property in the Caribbean to a capital founded on gravel pits in north-west England.

Bates (in Hopcraft, 1968) has some scathing words about the entrenched attitudes of some of the older generation. "What have we got in football? We’ve got a handfiil of people flogging their guts out to raise money to subsidize the game so that other people can buy it at less than production cost. People just don’t appreciate how cheaply they’ve had their football. In South

Africa the poor starving African is paying a minimum of seven shillings to watch a match"

(p. 161). Spectators in 1968 could still watch some First Division soccer in England for four shillings — 40 cents — standing room.

Bates has brought a sharply commercial mind to the game, accepting that the first principle of business success, the making of money, has to be the number one priority. The point he makes is that unless soccer clubs can deal in large sums they cannot possibly expect to reach any major success. To an ambitious club chairman trying to thrust a rundown organization into the top competition profitability must be vital (Hopcraft, 1968). 178

His figures on comparative club finances in the late 1960s give a dramatic impression of

the imbalances in the game (these are more pronounced in the 1990s). The average Third

Division club banked about 1,500 pounds ($3,000) after every home match; the top four or five

First Division clubs regularly banked eight or ten times that figure. Yet even with first-team

wages at Oldham averaging no more than a third of Manchester United’s it still cost 75,000

pounds a year to run Bates’s club; United’s costs were certainly not ten times that (Hopcraft,

1968).

This new type of director that emerged on the soccer scene in the late 1960s to early

1970s, realized the potential for profit and "laid the seed" for the dramatic changes that occurred

20 years later. The contemporary director has been preoccupied with improving ground

conditions, installing private luxury boxes, and raising admission prices to name a few. This has

upset many of the older generation, but appeals to the soccer’s largest consumer group, young

people, who are willing to accept this attitude of consumer capitalism as it is part of their

heritage. Indicating that, since the late 1970s, Britain has taken on values and attitudes common

to American capitalist ideology, i.e., individual ingenuity, free enterprise and a gradual eroding

of class consciousness. Unfortunately for the smaller clubs in the lower divisions the new attitude

will probably widen the gap between themselves and the big Premier League teams.

It is no wonder that the type of club chairman and director operating in the 1990s has

changed in the last 20 years, and some say it is even more recent. While I believe a number of

scholars to be correct in their assessment of those who run the game, i.e., an archaic, traditional

attitude that is not conducive to building a profitable business empire, more recent trends-last 10

to 15 years-have radically altered the commercial structure of professional soccer, and the

mind-set that goes along with it.

I have lived in the USA for 15 years, and in that time the changes in pro soccer I witness

when returning to England are quite remarkable. Some might say it is about time "we" caught up with the rest of the world (especially with the likes of the Italian and Spanish giants, AC

Milan, Inter Milan, Real Madrid and Barcelona) while others would comment, that twelve years 179

under a Thatcher government was bound to facilitate a more elitist, corporate type structure,

where the gap between the wealthier and poorer clubs and the nouveau riche and working man

would widen.

When Trevor Francis became the first one million pound transfer in 1979, moving from

Birmingham City to Nottingham Forest, one could sense the transfer market had reached, in the

words of many soccer fans, "a ridiculous level. " Today, one million pound (two million dollars)

will buy you an average Premier League player, not unlike the major professional sports in the

USA. As a point of reference, when a player transfers to another club for one million pounds

the club selling him usually receives 90% and the player 10% of the fee. Of course, this figure

(percentage allotted) can fluctuate depending on the player and his agent’s ability to negotiate.

English clubs are having to compete with the Italian and Spanish clubs who offer big

contracts for the top players. Lazio of Italy signed Paul Gascoigne from Tottenham Hotspurs for

over five million pounds in 1991. Des Walker received over 35,000 pounds a game in 1992

although he sat on the bench at Sampadoria (Italy) before he transferred back to English soccer.

However, it is not all "one way traffic" as many top English clubs have signed foreign stars to

lucrative contracts. For example, Manchester United have one Dane, a Russian and a Frenchman

- all international caliber players in their own right - on their team at present (Shoot, 1992).

The changes taking place in Britain since the late 1970s were conducive to business

managers from many different companies — large and small - and sport companies becoming

more involved in all facets of sport, especially pro soccer. I do not feel it is a coincidence that

these kinds of developments and the population’s willingness to accept them emerged during the

infancy of Thatcherism. It would be simplistic to say that a single change in government can have such an impact on the culture. Obviously people were ready to accept a pro sport system that reflected and incorporated sound business strategies rather than Just traditional, altruistic principles. However, the influence of Thatcher and the power elite that supported her government cannot be denied. For a considerable period of time the Thatcher government was able to convince the majority of people that the pursuit of material wealth and promotion of a 1 8 0

private economy was in the best interest of the country as a whole. Interestingly enough the basic

philosophy of Thatcherism and Reaganomics had much in common, and in both countries it was

young people that became the major supporters. What effect did this have on pro soccer in

England?

The role of sponsorship has brought a lot of money into the pro game especially for the

FA and FL and the top clubs. Prior to the 1980s teams wore nothing on their uniforms apart

from numbers, club logo and a small logo of the apparel company, i.e., Adidas, Puma, Umbro

and so on. Since then all pro teams wear the name of their major sponsor across their chest so

it is very visible. These sponsors include, finance companies, building societies, electrical

companies, breweries, car manufacturers and food producers to name a few. They are also

sponsored by the companies whose uniforms and equipment they wear and use. Also, players

have their own individual contracts with shoe manufacturers and other groups; star players

receiving more of course.

The FL is no longer just the FL, it is now the Carling Premier League, and the Endsleigh

First, Second and Third Division. Even the semi-pro Leagues are sponsored, for example, GM

Vauxhall Conference, Diadora League and so on. The FL Cup has had three sponsors over the

last 10 years. First it was called the Milk Cup, then the Rumbelows Cup and presently the Coca

Cola Cup. The National team has just signed a five-year deal with Umbro Soccer Company

which will pay the FA 15 million pounds over the next five years (Today, 1993).

Another recent change concerns the capacity of clubs to make money selling products.

It is not only soccer they sell these days, and gone are the days of club shops surviving on the sale of scarves and rosettes. In 1991 Arsenal’s World of Sport store — which is not even located in Highbury (where the stadium is) — had a turnover of 2.5 million pounds, and Leeds United brought in 1.5 million pounds from the sale of more than 400 different Leeds products (Shoot,

1992).

Obviously TV is a major part of this recent change in how teams are presented and sold to the public. Many people in England have acquired British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB) which 181

is similar to cable in the USA. The satellite revolution has brought more soccer into the homes

than ever before. In 1988 BSB and BBC announced a major five-year deal worth 30 million

pounds with the FA (Football Association, 1989). As a result FA Cup matches and the top

international games are seen on BSB’s Sports Channel.

In 1992 British Sky Broadcasting teamed up with the BBC to strike a five-year deal worth

304 million pounds to cover Premier Division matches (Shoot, 1993). These facts, concerning the media, will be alluded to in more detail in the next chapter.

One major development which is indicative of much of the above was the desire of many top clubs to "break-away from die pack" and produce a Premier League. As already noted, this has taken place (1992-93 being the first year of operation). Yet it has not changed that much.

All that has happened so far is that each division has been renamed. Relegation and promotion are the same as before - except for the inception of the play-off system for those teams in

Divisions I, II, and III that do not automatically qualify for promotion — the number of clubs remains the same, and each division still operates under the FL and the FA.

Endsleigh Insurance sponsors the First, Second and Third Divisions. The Premier

League rejected a 10 million pound sponsorship package and operated in its first season without a recognized backer (Shoot, 1992). Now in its second year it has accepted Carling Brewing as its sponsor. If the Premier League was made up of the wealthiest 10 to 12 clubs, as was originally planned, it would have been a major development in the game, but as many scholars have noted (Glanville, 1979, Lynn and Guest 1989, Wagg, 1984, Walvin, 1986) the FA and FL and directors are not organizations and men of vision, and are tied to a traditional structure as a result of their archaic attitudes.

Nevertheless, the developments over the past 10 to 15 years have been somewhat stunning. Many clubs, led by the wealthier ones of course, are attempting to make their grounds all-seated, and Wembley has achieved this already. The cost to see a Premier League game is astonishing when you consider what it was ten years ago. It is equivalent to an NFL game which 182

was far from the case a decade ago — when NFL games were four to live times more expensive

to see.

The new, younger director sees the opportunity for profit and economic growth with the

increasing sponsorship and the exposure on TV. Nonetheless, has the game improved because

of these recent occurrences? Also, the Premier League is really the First Division as it was in the 1991-92 season, so have things really changed that much? These and other questions will be

"tackled" in the final chapter. nsA

Introduction

Pro teams operating prior to the inception of the NFL in 1922, were clubs that were usually started by sponsorship from local businessmen. However, the business structure of the

NFL today never really took shape until the 1930s and 1940s and never reached fruition until the second-half o f the century. With franchises establishing themselves in large cities attendance became less o f a problem and enhanced the opportunity for lucrative deals with TV companies from the 1950s on. Owners, were businessmen with a business acumen, they realized they had a commodity that would sell and exploited the market accordingly. The economic "boom years" of post World War II facilitated this commercial growth for pro football. Also, this attitude was instrumental in the emergence of the cartel structure and the goal to maintain equality of competition as imperative to the survival of the League.

In his 29 years as commissioner of the NFL, Pete Rozelle directed the building of a financial empire the likes of which American sports had never seen. He used his public relations skills and the leverage gained by shrewdly marketing a popular product and using special antitrust concessions to negotiate ever-Iarger contract deals with the television networks. Under Rozelle’s guidance and merging with the AFL, the League grew from 12 teams to 28 and; once half-empty stadiums are now full with consumers willing to play their part in the financial success of the 183

teams they follow. American Football League owners who paid about $25,000 for their

franchises in the 1960s before the merger with the NFL found their investments worüi upwards

of $35,000,000 in 1981 (Berry, 1981), and over $100,000,000 in 1994 (recent sale of

Philadelphia Eagles).

Nineteenth Centurv

Although the potential for pro football to become a business venture was realized during its infancy, instability and a high turnover rate slowed commercial progress. Also, sponsorship and support was only at the local level. Therefore, promotional possibilities were very limited until a league was established and there was competition beyond the state and regional level.

The beginning was uncertain for pro football; for many years instability was pro football’s middle name. There are now 28 financially successfiil teams in the NFL (soon to be two more), but over the years many other teams have begun, stayed a while and then faded away.

Among the short-timers were the Oorang Indians, of Marion, Ohio, with Long Time Sleep playing center. Wrinkled Meat at one of the guard positions and Laughing Gas in the backfield. To pay the players in the early days, NFL teams had to pass the hat among the crowds (Selby, 1966, p. 112).

The potential for pro football to become a business was probably realized as early as

1892. In an era in which football was a major attraction of local athletic clubs, an intense competition between two Pittsburgh-area clubs, the Allegheny Athletic Club (AAA) and the

Pittsburgh Athletic Club (PAC), led to the making of the first professional football player.

Former Yale All-America guard William (Pudge) Heffelfinger was paid $500 by the AAA to play in a game against the PAC, becoming die first person to be paid to play football (NFL, 1991).

That same year, Ben Donnelly became the second known pro football player in history when he received $250 for playing for the AAA against Washington and Jefferson College. The next year three players named Rafferty, Van Cleve, and Wright (their first names are not known) became the third, fourth and fifth when they received contracts to play for AAA for $50 a game-the first pro football contracts in history. The athletic clubs threw caution and their 184

Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) affiliation to the wind and ended forever the pretense that they

were amateur (NFL, 1990).

By 1895 pro football gained acceptance in western Pennsylvania and the sport become

profitable for the clubs that chose to indulge in it. The Duquesne Country and Athletic Club,

despite playing only its first football season, realized a net gain of more than $4000. The PAC

also fared well, making nearly $4,500 from die football team (Maltby, 1987).

Pro teams operating prior to the inception of the NFL in 1922, were clubs that were

usually started by sponsorship from local businessmen. An interested and enthusiastic public

generally leads to expansion and greater profit. Obviously the profit was not that great at the end

of the nineteenth century, but the opportunity existed for another pro sport besides baseball to be a successful business venture.

One reason for this trend concerned the nature, and structure of cities. As America became urbanized, people had to cope with the new complexities of modem life. One of the ways American’s combatted urban alienation was to associate with certain organizations, for example, different clubs. According to Cozens and Stumpf (1953) sport played an integrating role by bringing people together with common interests and common loyalties, and encouraging them to develop an identity with the city and a team.

Local attachment to early pro football teams was also strong for similar reasons. The press often identified closely with the local teams. The local enthusiasm can be seen in an 1895 report on a game played against Greensburg; "Latrobe yesterday was in a tumult of excitement.

Men who had not been on speaking terms for years met, shook hands and joined in yells and scrim s... .It was a great day for Latrobe, for its football team had beaten the famous Greensburg aggregation," (Maltby, 1987, p. 140).

Examples such as this demonstrate that local enthusiasm and identification with the football team could be quite intense. Aided by such enthusiasm, pro football established itself in Western Pennsylvania in the 1890s. Other regions, too, either witnessed traces of professionalism or saw strong local teams emerge that had the potential to turn professional. In 185

the East, a few men with promotional inclinations saw possibilities for this growing sport and

attempted to spread die pro foodiall beyond the confines of western Pennsylvania, despite the

limited stability of the sport.

David Berry, associated with Latrobe football since its inception in 1895, joined forces

with two Philadelphia baseball owners in 1902 to form football’s first pro league. Later that year

another promoter Thom^^ O’Rourke, staged the first of two indoor tournaments in New York’s

Madison Square Garden. Although both ventures were unsuccessfiil, they each brought attention

to the sport and were valuable steps in pro football’s development (Maltby, 1987).

Initial plans for the NFL of 1902, apparenUy the brainchild of David Berry, included two

Philadelphia clubs (Phillies and Athletics), along with teams from New York, Chicago, and

Pittsburgh. However, lack of financial backing left the new League with only three teams for

its initial season. Berry put a great deal of effort into promoting the NFL. He had "National

Football League" printed on each team’s stationary in an attempt to lend the association some credibility and perhaps even create a little prestige. Each club signed well-known athletes, and the two Philadelphia outfits benefitted from their close identity with the more popular baseball teams.

Despite a reasonable amount of local acceptance and his past efforts. Berry could not succeed. With a limited response firom the press and local communities the NFL could not survive. Revenue was in short supply and the multitude of unpaid players soon found other teams in other towns (Maltby, 1987). The NFL collapsed at the close of the 1902 season.

However, by die turn of die century, western Pennsylvania pro teams occasionally met eastern

Ohio colleges and athletic clubs. For example, Latrobe had played a team from Youngstown,

Ohio as early as 1897.

In 1903, Ohio football continued to expand, with Cleveland, Dover, Youngstown,

Canton, Barberton, and Massillon playing regularly. The Ohio teams proceeded much like others, advertizing for potential opponents and even organizing practice sessions through the newspapers. The Massillon amateur teams had played football since the 1890s with varying 186

degrees of success. In 1903 the Massillon Tigers began the season as an amateur team, but soon

paid its players. A.A. Wesbacker played for the Massillon Tigers. "I got $50 a game and

expenses," he recalled.

The crowds were mostly rubber, steel, and factory workers. The games were played on baseball fields with stands on one side and a rope stretched on the other; that was standing room only, where most of the betting took place. The bets were placed on the ground, just inside the rope, anchored with a rock, never to be touched until the game ended. At times some young punk would try his luck at getting the loot, only to be warned with a big juicy spit of tobacco near his feet. It certainly was effective (NFL, 1990, p .11).

While the desire of pro soccer officials may not have been to make any more profît than

their American counterparts in pro football, the process of "taking in" gate money was more

sophisticated, at this time, for the former than the latter.

Pro football in 1904, though increasing in popularity in Ohio, was still rather aimless.

Attendance at most games was not enough to warrant the hiring of relatively high-priced athletes.

Huge margins of victory demonstrated the imbalance of the sport in Ohio. Canton and Massillon

had most of the talent in the East, leaving other teams unable to compete with them.

In 1905 the Latrobe-Canton game drew 2,713 paying 50 cents, grossing $1,356.50.

Visiting team Canton received 40 percent of the gate, $542. The Giant’s (Canton) share,

however, was diminished by car fare, hotel bills, and one officials compensation of $25. This

left their net income for this game at less than $500. Canton’s players, by the standards of the day, were high priced. If 14 players made the trip, this would leave only about $35 per man with nothing left for management. It is fairly safe to say that this short trip to Latrobe lost money for Canton. To survive pro football needed to alter its fiscal practices (Maltby, 1987).

In 1906 the most notable feature of the Canton schedule was that five of the eight games were played on Sunday. For the first time, at least in Northern Ohio, pro teams decided to play when no competition for fans would be met from high schools and colleges. The Canton strategy represented at least one small step toward resolving the problem of low attendance, but also one big step back regarding high salaries. It also represented a rational approach (in terms of making money) to scheduling. 187

As a pro football organization Canton cannot compare to franchises today, yet there were

signs in the early part of the twentieth century that those running the club realized they were

involved in a business venture not just a recreational pastime. Consequently, these people were

committed to the financial success of the club. For example, John Cusack became the

secretary-treasurer of the team in 1912, and a year later quit his job at the Canton gas company

to work full-time for the team. Cusack struggled to make a profit and turned to J.J. Frey of the

Home Brewing Company, who opened a $10,000 line of credit for the team at the Canton Bank.

They added 1,500 seats to the park in 1913 and sold season tickets for the first time in 1914

(NFL, 1990).

Jim Thorpe came to Canton in 1915. Cusack signed him for $250 a game just prior to

the first game of the season against Massillon. Cusack also signed other notables from college

football that year such as Hube Wagner of Pittsburgh, Bill Gardner of Carlisle, Earle (Greasy)

Neale, the coach of West Virginia Wesleyan, and his line coach, John Kellison. It was evident

that Cusack was willing to go outside the state to provide Thorpe with a strong supporting cast.

That year the Canton Bulldogs played before 6,000 fans at Massillon. There was 8,000

fans for the second game at League park in Canton. However, so many fans clamored to get into

the park for the second meeting of the two teams that the Bulldogs sold standing-room-only

tickets in the end zones and the two teams agreed on the ground rule that any player crossing the

goal line into the crowd must be in possession of the ball when he emerged from it (NFL, 1990).

Not quite an exact science!

Pro Football in the Midwest

In an attempt to build a bigger program pro football expanded beyond Pennsylvania and

Ohio to the midwest. This section illustrates this growth, which was instrumental in the establishment of a league. 188

By 1915 pro football began to compete with the collegiate game. However, with local

enthusiasm apparently less than it had been in the past, some teams branched out and played

such distant teams as the Iowa Cords (Des-Moines) and the Peoria Caterpillars (Illinois).

Wisconsin was slower in its pro football development than were Michigan and

Minnesota. In 1919 one of pro football’s most famous teams, the Green Bay Packers, got its

start in Wisconsin. Earl "Curly" Lambeau, after spending one year at the University of Notre

Dame, came back to his home town and began working for the Indian Packing Company.

Lambeau approached his boss, Frank Peck, and proposed that the company sponsor a football team on the premise that such an activity would be good for both the employees and the business. Peck agreed to contribute $500 for the blue and gold uniforms (with the firm’s name emblazoned across the front) and other equipment (Maltby, 1987).

Money was collected at half-time from spectators and at the end of the season it was divided among the players-somewhat simplistic compared to the financial structure of contemporary franchises. In 1919 each man received around $17 for the 11-game season

(Maltby, 1987).

Obviously, pro football in Green Bay was not big business. "Passing the hat" to get their money, the Packers needed to alter their methods of operation considerably before they could realize significant profits.

Farther south, in the Plains States of Iowa, Nebraska, and Kansas, pro football was just emerging and, compared to many areas of the Midwest, was rather primitive. It was fairly advanced and winning a substantial following in Ulinois and Indiana. By 1919 there were enough pro teams to form a "Chicago League," under the direction of Joe Paupa (NFL, 1991).

In Hammond, Indiana, promoters had been working gradually to make the sport successful in the century’s second decade. James "pop" Clabby, Sr. (father of a middle-weight boxer), sponsored a team known, appropriately enough, as the Hammond "Clabbys." In 1916,

Clabby received aid from the owners of the City Fuel and Supply Company, Paul Parduhn and 189

Max Kuhn. The team became quite successful on the field, claiming a "national championship"

in 1917 (Maltby, 1987).

The Hammond Pros (their new nickname) made it possible for pro football as a business

to succeed on a wider basis than it had previously. Hammond played teams from all over the

Midwest — eventually it met the Detroit Heralds (in Chicago) as well as the Toledo Maroons,

Cleveland Tigers, and Canton Bulldogs. They demonstrated that quality football could be played,

perhaps even profitably, in areas outside of Ohio.

In Ohio pro football managers re-grouped after World War I and made plans to be organized and as sensible as they possibly could be in 1919. They made serious attempts to overcome the obstacles to success. In mid-July of that year representatives of three of the strongest clubs (Canton, Massillon, and Akron) met in Canton and made tentative plans to form a league. However, more important than a formal league structure, was the resolution of several key difftculties: "contract rights," offtcials’ pay, scheduling, and player salaries (Anderson,

1985).

Managers agreed, publicly this time, not to tamper with players under contract to another team. Compensation for officials was another matter easily decided. The two other areas, scheduling and player salaries, were not so easily resolved. The major area of disagreement among the managers concerned a salary cap. The managers reached no compromise and did not organize a league (Maltby, 1987).

By 1920 Ohio, and perhaps all of football, had only one sure money maker: Jim Thorpe’s

Canton Bulldogs. Other teams in the state showed at least some promise, but the loss of

Massillon and Youngstown hurt pro football in Ohio, although this setback was by no means insurmountable.

Pro football had spread enough to become fairly strong throughout the midwest. With this enlarged base, a league became more viable. Whatever agreements regarding salaries,

"contract rights," and so forth were made by Ohio professional team managers carried little if any weight outside of the state. If pro clubs were to carry on interstate rivalries, it was 190

imperative that they all be playing under the same ground rules — this would be a critical step

toward creating a modem league. As 1920 approached pro football managers set this task for

themselves. With the formation of the APFC (franchise cost was $25), which was renamed the

NFL in 1922 (franchise cost rising to $100) (Treat, 1970).

Financial Uncertainty

The following section argues that while some owners, teams and individuals (namely

Harold Grange), experienced financial success in the 1920s and 1930s, the NFL was still an

unpredictable "animal" from a business standpoint. External influences — the Great Depression,

competition from baseball — and internal influences - disorganization, lack of parity -

contributed to this instability.

Games were set up where there was a possibility of gate receipts; travel was difficult;

players jumped from one team to another for an extra payday. There did not seem to be a great

deal of preparation or planning that would lead to financial success in the fiiture. It was more

like an attitude of immediate gratification - short-term hedonism. This certainly did not reflect

the practice of a highly rationalized, business empire which the NFL became, but rather the

economic reality of the time, and more specifically the working-class and those that were

associated with the pro game in its infancy.

This haphazard operating method of pro franchises was very evident in the Grange era

of the 1920s. A lot of people became optimistic in what Treat (1970) called the "booming USA"

of 1926. Enthusiasm and gate receipts stirred up by Red Grange helped put 31 pro teams in

action, 22 in the NFL and 9 in the AFL. Grange and his manager C.C. Pyle created the AFL

with Red playing for the New York entry (Treat, 1970).

Grange had his own manager, C.C. Pyle — I suppose an agent would be the term we would use today — who told the Bears that Grange would not play for them unless he was paid a five-figure salary and given one-third ownership of the team. The Bears refiised, which led

Pyle and Grange to start the AFL with eight other teams. However, the League was a financial 191

disaster and folded after one year (NFL, 1991). Nonetheless, this was indicative of a changing

attitude in professional sport. The idea of playing for tun because you loved the game and that

being paid was an added bonus, was fast disappearing. Pyle and Grange obviously saw the

potential for making a great deal of money which in turn controlled their motivations and the way

they perceived their role in professional football. How different is that from the way many pro

athletes and their agents approach the game today?

Pro football evolved during a significant period of American history: the Progressive

Era. Of this period Maltby (1987) notes:

A time of political, economic, and social change, the Progressive Era was characterized by the presence of any number of reformers interested in bringing ’progress’ to American society. They reached for the consciences of their audiences in an attempt to bring about alterations in society, which they saw as characterized by political and corporate corruption (p.365).

These changes were conducive to the evolution and development of pro football, but this

growth was put on hold for the following 20 years - a number of contributing factors could

account for this, for example, the popularity of baseball, the Great Depression and World War

n. Of course, there was some growth and new policies instituted, but the NFL never really

reached ftuition, in a financial sense, until the 1950s, although four franchises were quite

successful by the late 1930s, and others probably made more dollars than they suggested. Until

the mid-1950s, NFL teams rarely made what would be considered "big money." For example,

in 1927 19 teams conceded financial defeat, leaving the NFL with only 12 and the AFL gone.

By 1930 the country was into an historic depression, and one year later the League was down to

10 teams which it would stay at for nearly 20 years, although their numbers did fluctuate during this period. Salaries rose, but even as late as 1934, the average wage of players was only $100 a game (Govemali, 1951). However, at that time this would be significantly more than a pro soccer player received in England. 192

Rader (1990) writes:

During its first 35 years, over 40 franchises joined the NFL, struggled, and then expired. The Great Depression of the 1930s wiped out all the franchises in smaller cities save Green Bay, Wisconsin. Major college games invariably outdrew the pro games.... Yet the NFL somehow survived these handicaps as well as the ravages of the Great Depression and World War n (p.261).

Pro Football and the Big City

It was soon after World War II that the NFL was made up of teams from big cities. This

section examines what this development meant to the prosperity of pro football. Owners realized

for a franchise to succeed it needed to be in a lucrative market fostering attendance and attracting

TV networks.

The complexion of pro football had changed from the days of the AAA and PAC in the

Pennsylvania era, and the Massillon Tigers and Canton Bulldogs in the Ohio era. By the end of

World War II these small-town teams were only remnants of the NFL. The NFL was now represented by a wealthier, more powerful group of franchises, situated in bigger cities, which meant a larger clientele and potential commercial market. There was no room for loyalty or a philanthropic gesture on the part of the League to clubs like Massillon and Canton. In England these clubs would have made-up the lower divisions, in the USA, economic reality prevailed, and they dis^peared.

At the conclusion of World War II, the fortunes of pro football had improved. Superior management accounted for part of the NFL’s success - i.e., the merging of the NFL owners into a single economic cartel — along with the successful marriage to television that was laid down by Bert Bell in the 1950s (NFL, 1991).

In 1952 Ted Collins sold the New York Yanks’ franchise back to the NFL. A new franchise was awarded to a group in Dallas after it purchased the assets of the Yanks. The new

Texans went 1-11, with the owners turning the franchise back to the League in mid-season. For the last five games of the season, the commissioner’s ofRce operated the Texans as a road team. 193

using Hershey, Pennsylvania, as a home base. At the end of the season the franchise was

cancelled (NFL, 1991).

What is significant about this is that it was the last time an NFL team failed. No one

would have predicted in 1950 that pro football would shortly rival baseball for the affection of

the American people. And, in 1959, after Bert Bell had died, Pete Rozelle was named

commissioner, which further boosted the commercialization of the League.

Rozelle had learned the game ftom the vantage point of business rather than as a player

or coach; he had served as both chief publicity man and general manager of the Los Angeles

Rams. He became one of the most remarkable commissioners in the history of professional

sports. In due time, he so won the admiration of the owners that they delegated to him nearly

complete authority to handle television negotiations, relations with the Federal Government, and

controversies among themselves (Rader, 1990).

Embraced by the country as a dynamic sport in tune with the 1960s — action, excitement, gore-pro football had reached the point, in 1965, where the Chicago Bears drew more revenue from eight home games than the Chicago Cubs did from 70 home dates of Major-League baseball. Season tickets to the pros became, like life insurance, a part of the family estate.

George Halas, speaking in 1966, said that half of the Bears’ season ticket-holders of approximately 35,000 had held the same seats at Wrigley Field for the previous 20 years (Selby,

1966).

Writing in 1966, Newcombe (1966) addressed the growth of pro football:

Last fall the NFL drew 4.9 million people to 98 regular-season games-an average of 50,056 per game. In 1946 die league drew 1,732,135 for 55 games, an average of little over 31,000. The young AFL, somewhat cramped by its small seating arrangements did better last year than the NFL of 20 years ago — 1.8 million for 56 games, an average of 31,831. The total attendance for major-league pro football in 1965 was 6.7 million, up nearly a half million ftom the previous year 47).

Selby (1966) writing in the same period concurred with Newcombe:

There is so much money in pro football today that the National and American football leagues together gross $65 million a year ftom administrations, television, hot dogs, programs and other sources (p. 112). 194

There are people who insist that the love affair between pro football and the American

public grew serious only because of TV. Certainly much of the basic drama of this game, if not

all the sidestage maneuvers and subplots, can be captured on film. Television brought the game

back into towns and middlesize cities, spreading the popularity of the sport across the country

much as minor-league clubs and town teams "sold" America on baseball during the first quarter

of the century.

Don Kellett, manager of the Baltimore Colts in 1966, thought that Bert Bell’s policy on

TV coverage and successor Pete Rozelle’s imaginative development of it were the reasons behind

the pro boom. "Pro football was at the crossroads in 1953," Kellett said. "Then Bell negotiated

a contract with the old Dumont TV network to cover Saturday night games. This was the springboard for greater coverage. Fans learned what a great game this is-and we soon had there reaction in the stadium," (in Newcombe, 1966, p.48).

No team benefited more from the Bell-Rozelle TV plan — in which only road games were televised and all teams shared equally in the TV pot - than did Green Bay. In the middle of the

1950s the Packers could only get 10,000 people to support their community project by buying season tickets; ten years later every seat in the 50,000-seat stadium had been sold. "The TV package deal probably saved Green Bay," coach Vince Lombardi said. "TV is the main reason for the big boom in pro football. Sure, the game has improved in recent years, but it is still football," (in Newcombe, 1966, p.48). However, we shall analyze the role TV has played in the game’s development more thoroughly in the following chapter.

Comparing the changes in tiie game from the 1930s to the 1960s Newcombe (1966) said

Lombardi was guilty of understatement.

It is still the blocking-and-tackling game that Lombardi played as a running guard at Fordham in the mid-1930s. But in styling it bears no more resemblance to the football of 30 years ago than today’s Mustang cars do to the Essex and Oakland. The game is sleeker, faster, more polished-a far more exciting game to watch. No major American sport has undergone so many improvements over the years. Only football has moved forward with the pace of our time (p.48). 195

Although TV was a major catalyst for the growth and financial success of pro football,

it was not the NFL’s dominant source of income in the 1960s. Ticket sales exceeded TV revenue

by several millions of dollars each year. Though the New York Giants finished last in 1964, they

nevertheless sold 62,000 season tickets — as many people as their stadium would hold — four

months in advance of the 1965 season. Even selling the season tickets months in advance makes

money; by putting the payments out at interest, the teams made another $15,000 to $30,000 a

year (Selby, 1966).

Fiscal Growth

This section examines the incredible prosperity enjoyed by NFL franchises from the

1960s on. There was/is considerable income generated from sources other than gate receipts and

TV. The following also demonstrates the growth of the NFL as a business first and a game

second, and the realization of this on the part of the commissioners office, owners and players.

By the 1960s all NFL teams shared ownership of two other sources of income —

NFL-Films and NFL-Properties - founded in 1963 (NFL, 1991). NFL-Films, in its first year,

sold 3,412 half-hour prints, giving the teams a full return on their capital investment of $210,000,

and also handsome royalties. NFL-Properties licensed out the League’s name to manufacturers

of clothing, books, athletic gear, even foodstuffs. In 1966 about 1.9 billion packages of cheeses,

pancake mixes and other items bore the NFL label as "official training-table foods."

NFL-Properties rejects many proposals from manufacturers of toys and novelties who did not have the solid image the League wanted to associate with (Selby, 1966).

If anyone did not realize that pro football was a business, in the strictest sense, by the

end of the 1960s, then the following figures would enlighten them. In 1967 the first Superbowl between the Packers and the Chiefs was played in front of 61,946 fans. The winning players’ share was $15,000 each, and the losing players’ share was $7,000 each. The following year

Superbowl n had the first $3 million gate in pro football history, and the Oilers left Rice stadium for the Astrodome and became the first NFL team to play its home games in a domed stadium. 196 In 1970, Superbowl IV brought in gross receipts of approximately $3.8 million, the largest ever

for a one-day sports event, and, by 1973 the average cost of an NFL franchise was listed as $20

million. Not bad when you consider that Curly Lambeau used $50 of his own money to buy

back the Green Bay Packers in 1922, or, that the New York Giants were admitted to the NFL

in 1925 being awarded to Tim Mara and Billy Gibson for $500 (NFL, 1991).

By any measure, the success of pro football from the 1960s to the early 1980s was staggering. However, it was not all "clean sailing" there were a few "hiccups" on the way. Not since 1951 had the NFL experienced a fall off in paid attendance, unless you count an insignificant drop by NFL clubs in 1968. That slight decline was more than offset by a rise in

AFL gates. Since the merger of the two leagues, regular-season attendance climbed steadily from a 1970 total of 9.5 million to a 1973 count of 10.7 million. The NFL had its worst year in at least a decade in 1974, when a record eight teams lost money and ticket sales plunged by $6.6 million. Ticket sales were also down in 1975. The NFL Management Council said nine clubs reported declining season ticket sales, and the League total of advance season ticket sales was down some 50,000 (New York AP, 1975).

It cost the average NFL team $6.1 million to operate in 1974, and nearly $3 million of that was involved in player costs. The Management Council said player compensation rose 18 per cent in 1974 so that the average player made $43,338 in salary and bonuses and $12,883 more in preseason pay, postseason pay and fringe benefits (New York AP, 1975).

All this did not portend a financial crisis in the NFL. NFL officials cited three factors which they believe were behind the sag in attendance. One, a lagging economy; two, the 1973 federal law requiring a lifting of the local blackout for any game sold out 72 hours in advance; and three, public resentment of the 1974 player strike (The Sporting News, 1974).

However, this was a temporary set back and the NFL managed to "weather the storm."

One reason for this was the affluence of its clientele. Based on statistical information compiled by the NFL in 1973, the League did not have to worry about offending anyone when they chose to raise ticket prices. 197

The average pro football fan, according to the report, earned over $10,000 a year, carried

two or more credit cards, owned his own home, had two cars, made business trips regularly on

airplanes and generally lived the good life. "Two out of every three fans own their own home;

98 per cent own televisions, half of which are color; 52 per cent are professional management

and executive types; and 75 per cent have no bank loans other than mortgages," the report states

(Solomon, 1973),

"Our typical fan is very marketable," said Don Weiss, the NFL’s publicity chief.

Solomon (1973) writing on this report said:

It documents a widely held theory that the NFL, with its seven game season ticket, has an extremely warm spot in its heart for the nation’s carriage trade. The romance between the well-to-do and pro football is an accepted fact to American Express Card, which this season will sponsor a weekly instructional half-time show entitled ’NFL Playbook.’

By the 1980 season, the average gross revenues of an NFL club had risen to nearly $13.5 million. Of this total, almost 45 per cent ($5.9 million) was directly or indirectly paid to players; an equivalent amount covered other operating expenses, including payments to stadium and municipal authorities; and club operating profits averaged slightly more than 10 per cent of revenues ($1.4 million) before interest and payment of income taxes (NFL, 1980).

A comparison of these 1980 figures with NFL club average revenues, expenses, and pre-tax profits at the start of the 26-team NFL in 1970, and at the mid-point of the 1970s, is set forth below in Table 3. 198

TABLE 3

NFL Financial Summary: 1970-1980* (in thousands of dollars)

1970 1975 1980 $ % + $ % $ % Revenues: Ticket Sales 2,839 58.9 4,202 56.8 6,206 46.1 Television and Radio 1,541 31.9 2,442 33.0 5,864 43.1 Miscellaneous 445 9.2 755 10.2 1,387 10.3 Tot Operat Revenues 4,825 100 7,399 100 13,457 100

Expenses: Player Expenses— Salaries, (including pre- and postseason) 1,661 34.4 2,887 39.0 5,205 38.7 Player Benefits 202 4.2 250 3.4 718 5.3 Tot Player Expenses 1,863 38.6 3,137 42.4 5,923 44.0 Other Expenses 2,017 41.8 3,406 46.0 6,113 45.4 Tot Operat Expenses 3,880 80.4 6,543 88.4 12,036 89.4

Operating Profit (before interest and taxes) 945 19.6 856 11.6 1,421 10.6 *Based on 26 NFL clubs (1970, 1975), and 28 NFL clubs (1980) + Percentage of total annual revenue. (NFL, 1980),

It must be emphasized that a meaningful understanding of NFL revenues and expenses cannot be obtained by looking at a single year. NFL economic patterns run in cycles, and the cycles themselves, as well as multiple seasons, must be considered in any review of NFL economics.

All NFL clubs from 1970 to 1980 were dependent on the same two primary revenue sources: sales of tickets and luxury boxes, and sales of network television rights, and that is probably the case today, although revenue from NFL Properties has become a major source of income for the League.

In 1970, gate receipts provided nearly twice as much revenue as did television sales; by

1980, the two were virtually equal. The size of network television revenues is explained by various factors, including the League’s policy of televising all NFL games as part of the network contracts. This is in sharp contrast to other professional sports, in which the club shares of 199

national television revenues are generally smaller than receipts from local broadcasting

agreements negotiated by the member clubs.

Looking to the future, the NFL, in 1980, expected television revenues to grow faster than

ticket receipts and emerge as the largest single source of income for NFL clubs. Their prediction

proved accurate. "Increases in gate receipts are likely to be modest because of limiting factors

such as stadium capacity and marketplace pressures to keep NFL ticket prices within the fans’

reach and competitive with other forms of entertainment," (NFL, 1980, p.4).

In 1980, total armual revenues for the NFL were approximately $377 million, with

average club revenues of almost $13.5 million. Growth in NFL revenues in constant dollar terms

was approximately $52.1 million for the period - from $125.5 million in 1970 to an

inflation-adjusted total of $177.6 million in 1980. Most of the increase in NFL revenues, in

both nominal and constant dollar terms, came from the growth in network television receipts,

which increased in nominal terms from almost $45 million in 1970 to $166 million in 1980

(NFL, 1980).

Revenue Sharing and Parity

One of the main reasons for financial success and consequently the attraction of owning

an NFL franchise is the strength of the cartel structure in pro football. This system almost

guarantees commercial success for all owners.

If there is one aspect of modern-day pro football that separates it from its predecessor and

other pro sports it is the cartel structure under which it now operates. NFL member clubs are

economic partners, working together to produce a special and uniquely attractive entertainment product. While the teams clearly are competitors on die playing field, their business relationship is one of co-producing and co-selling the NFL product in the entertainment marketplace. This reality is reflected in the League’s central pattern of revenue sharing. NFL revenue sharing is so extensive that nearly 95 percent of revenues are shared among the clubs. 200

All network television income -- whether for preseason, regular season, or postseason

play — is divided equally among the 28 clubs. In addition, the 28 clubs equally share any profits

from the marketing activities of NFL Films and NFL Properties, which serve league promotional

purposes (NFL, 1980).

What are the effects of revenue sharing? Because of the partnership relationship among

the clubs of any sports league, no club has any interest in seeing other clubs experience financial

difficulties. The NFL’s policies are designed to ensure that geographic and competitive balance

will be maintained and that the NFL will not divide into "have" and "have not" teams. A 1964

Senate report recognized that a successful sports league must achieve this business goal:

The uniqueness of the business of competitive team sports grows out of the public interest in teams which are as competitively equ^ as possible, and the responsibility of the league of teams in maintaining both competitive balance and geographic balance. Without competitive and geographic balance, the leagues and their weak teams are unable to attract and hold the public interest which is necessary for their survival (NFL, 1980, p. 10).

Equal sharing of television revenue provides all 28 clubs with a solid income foundation and makes it possible for teams in smaller areas to compete on the field with franchises in larger metropolitan areas. Equal sharing of television revenue also helps clubs weather the inevitable down cycles and rebuilding years when attendance revenue often declines along with a club’s performance.

The NFL divides gate receipts 60 percent to the home team and 40 percent to the visitor.

Because of the current popularity of NFL football and because NFL clubs today usually operate with comparable gate receipts potentials (average League-wide attendance in 1980 was 92.4 percent of total capacity and 24 of the 28 clubs had average home attendance of over 50,000 per game), the revenue shifting effects of gate sharing are not as evident as they once were. In any one season, many clubs will find that gate sharing has a relatively minimal effect on their revenues because the gate receipts potential for their home and away games is comparable.

Nonetheless, the buffer effect can be quite substantial for clubs having a poor year on the field or experiencing a poor economic cycle (NFL, 1980). 201

The overall buffer effect of gate sharing is quite significant. In 1975, for example, gate

sharing served to reduce differentials in ticket receipts between the top and bottom club in the

NFL by over $850,000 compared to what it would have been in the absence of gate sharing.

Similar effects can be seen for every other year of post NFL-AFL merger operation, including

1980, when sharing of gate receipts reduced the top-to-bottom range in revenues among the 28

clubs by almost $950,000 (NFL, 1980).

NFL revenue and team equalization practices have produced a league where all 28 clubs

can offer comparable employment opportunities to a total of more than 1,500 players, and where

fans in all NFL communities - no matter their size — can know their team has a chance to

qualify for the play-offs. Since the merger took effect in 1970, all 28 teams have qualified for

the postseason play-offs. Perhaps Guttmann (1978) would consider this as an example of the

equality process that is reflective of modem organizations. As far as the NFL is concerned, the draft system along with revenue sharing has certainly helped to facilitate parity within the League

— very few dynasties in the sense of the Yankees in the 1930s and the Celtic in the 1960s.

However, the important question here, which Guttmann (1978) did not consider, concerns the motivations involved. The NFL operates with a balance of centralized control and local incentive at the club level. The purpose of league operating principles, so they say, is not to guarantee that each club fields a successful team, but rather to assure that each team will have an equal opportunity to field such a team. However, this principle is not a philanthropic gesture on the part of the NFL, but rather sound economic practice. The guarantee that no team - simply because of its finances - will dominate year after year preserves fan interest in NFL football, and consequently maintains a high level of attendance at the stadiums and at home.

It has been noted that the FL in England is a cartei (Vamplew, 1988, Wagg, 1984).

However, because of its structure — different divisions with significant variation from Premier

League to Division IE teams - it has a much more difficult time controlling those variables so crucial to the operation of a cartel (raw materials, distribution of product, new members and so forth). The NFL with its 28 teams (and expansion clubs to be incorporated in 1995-96) provides 202

a much "tighter" package for the owners and League Office to keep "track" of. It would be

difficult to imagine revenue sharing in the FL because of the great discrepancies in what each

club can offer, for example, Manchester United compared to Colchester United. The only way

this would be feasible would be if there was a breakaway group of 10-15 of the wealthiest clubs,

not the Premier League as it exists at present.

I believe the present cartel structure of the NFL is an example of an advanced form of

contemporary, commercialized sporting practice. Commercial success is a necessity at this level,

and with each franchise being ffiiancially solvent, the stability of the League is all but ensured.

However, for many English soccer clubs stability is not a matter of economic reality, but rather

is the result of loyalty by fans and local communities, tolerance on the part of the FL to allow

teams to run at a loss, and a willingness on the part of directors and shareholders to lose money

for the sake of maintaining the club. Of course, this has changed somewhat over the last 10-15

years, but I believe it does demonstrate that English professional sport is not based on economic

factors alone, which seems to be the case in the USA, certainly for the NFL. Nonetheless, I do

contend that in the future we may see pro soccer people motivated by the same principles of

commerce as moves NFL officials.

Pete Rozelle and the NFL owners have built an empire and formed a very exclusive

club. Corporations need not apply (they would get the League into public disclosure and federal

regulations), and individuals must be able to finance at least 51 percent interest to qualify to buy

a club. Rozelle said, in 1981, that he may add another two teams to the League someday — and

they have — but they would not be within 75 miles of existing teams. This extraordinary power

to limit competition for markets is spelled out in the NFL constitution (Berry, 1981).

Nonetheless, a decision by A1 Davis, owner of the Oakland Raiders, to challenge the power of the NFL constitution, by moving his team to Los Angeles - thereby becoming the Los

Angeles Raiders — was significant as it was a break from the cartel. The move of the Baltimore

Colts to Indianapolis and die St. Louis Cardinals to Phoenix in 1984 and 1988 respectively, were not as significant as they were not going to a market where another NFL franchise resided. That 203

was not the case with the Raiders as the Los Angeles Coliseum, where the Raiders would play,

was not far from the Los Angeles Rams* new home at Anaheim.

Davis brought a suit against the NFL for trying to block him from moving to the city

where he clearly hoped to reap the rich reward of a huge cable TV market in years to come, and

he won. Davis’ cavalier attitude in abandoning his loyal Oakland fans for a richer market was

in harsh contrast to the image of the NFL that Rozelle had worked so hard to promote.

However, was Rozelle that concerned about the Baltimore and St. Louis fans when he accepted

the relocation plans of these franchises’?

Is this mobility of teams a reflection of the contemporary age, i.e., go where the market

is? In the case of the NFL, where the most profit is available for the League without breaking

the cartel. Briefly stated, the NFL under Rozelle, and now Tagliabue, is a brilliantly conceived,

extremely profitable institution whose club members consciously limit their annual cash returns

to finance what must be history’s most lavish continuing public relations campaign and to help

insure the NFL’s longevity.

NFL Today

This final section examines the various sources of income now enjoyed by the NFL.

What is apparent is that owners have come to rely on income from NFL-Properties and so forth,

as significant to their future success. This illustrates how the NFL is not just about playing

football anymore. Owners and their business managers continually strive to find as many ways possible to exploit the market.

Today, the two biggest and most evident sources of revenue for the team owners are TV and gate receipts. For example, in 1989 NFL paid attendance of 17,399,538 was the highest total in league history. This included a total of 13,625,662 for an average of 60,829 - both NFL records — for the 224-game regular season. And, in 1990, new four-year TV agreements were ratified for 1990-93 for ABC, CBS, NBC, ESPN, and TNT at the NFL annual meeting in

Orlando, Florida. The contracts totaled $3.6 billion, the largest in TV history (NFL, 1991). 204

The League Office has satellites owned by the 28 club executives. These include NFL

Properties Inc., the licensing and publishing organization, the NFL Films Inc., which exclusively

films the games. There are also NFL Charities and the NFL Management Council, an arm of

the owners that negotiates with the players union (Berry, 1981).

Over 30 years ago, licensing in the NFL consisted of team logos on T-shirts a smattering

of hats and "Bobble Heads," miniature dolls dressed in helmets and jerseys with team names

written in block letters across their fronts. Compte (1989) writes; "The caricatures looked more

like modern-day Weebles than professional football players" (p.64).

In the 1960s the primary purpose of licensing was to protect logos and trademarks.

Today, licensing like many other things in sports, is big business. By 1989, total sales of

licensed goods emanating from the major sports leagues and colleges exceeded $3 billion

(Compte, 1989).

Bobble Heads were a big-selling item from the NFL’s 1960 catalog. But they have been

replaced by everything from caps and trading cards to thermometers, picnic baskets, pillows,

calendars, sunglasses, alarm clocks, wastepaper baskets and bowling balls. NFL Properties, the

licensing arm of the NFL, generated more than $1.3 billion in gross retail sales in 1990, roughly

33 percent of all major sports licensing sales and slightly more than the $1.1 billion rung up by

Major League Baseball in the same year (NFL, 1991). From 1980 to 1989, NFL souvenir

revenues increased nearly 400 percent (Compte, 1989).

NFL Properties is divided into three departments — marketing and promotion, which

oversees such activities as the Travelers NFL Player of the Year Award; publishing, which

includes Game Day magazine; and licensing, which oversees the authorization and sale of more than 700 items.

Over the last IS years, due to increasing player salaries, two players’ strikes and flat television income, the NFL owners have looked to Properties for even more revenues, and it has not dis^pointed them. After expenses, NFL teams received close to $1.5 million each from

Properties activities at the end of the 1980s. From 1987 to 1989 all three departments posted a 205

25 percent annual growth rate, and this is expected to continue through the 1990s (Compte,

1989).

So while the owners would have us believe that their profit margin is not as great as reported, due to increasing expenses and the recent inception of free agency, the world is hardly caving in on the NFL. Nonetheless, in an appearance before Congress in 1980 -- although over a decade ago these comments have validity today — Pete Rozelle summarized the revenue position of the NFL:

While professional sports have in the past two decades grown financially and become an important element of public entertainment, professional sports remain, in economic terms, relatively small business. In 1979, the gross revenues annually of the entire NFL from all sources were approximately $350 million, with each of the 28 NFL clubs having average gross revenues of less than $13 million. The gross revenues of all NFL clubs collectively were dius only a fraction of the revenues of businesses not ordinarily regarded as unusually large — for example, one-fourth the revenues of Oscar Mayer or somewhat less than one-half the revenues of the New York Times Company. At the NFL club level, the gross revenues of the Washington Redskins are less than half those of businesses such as George’s discount appliance store chain in the Washington area (NFL, 1980, p.3).

While Rozelle was correct in his comparisons, there is not likely to be too many of us shedding tears for the NFL owners. Perhaps the direction owners should take if they want to be associated with "big business" is to operate alongside such groups. This is not as far-fetched as it may seem. A handful of owners have been dealing with a proposal that, more than any other issue, could change the future of the NFL. Corporate ownership, denied many times in the past, now appears to be the way of the future in the NFL.

"Its time has come, and I for one am going to push real hard for it," says Art Modell of the Cleveland Browns, considered one of the most powerful owners in die league.

And I think many of the other owners feel the way I do. Many times in the past, it has been brought up and defeated. The big thing against it was the fear that some big corporation would come in and out spend everyone and build a dynasty. I think that fear has been eliminated now. The salary cap takes care of that. When the cap kicks in, all of the teams can only pay the same amount of money to the players, so you wouldn’t have to worry about one team trying to dominate by out spending the others (McDonough, 1993, p.6c). 206

The League has had a rule for a number of years that a corporation could not have

controlling interest in any team. Now it is back on the agenda for the owners to consider. If

corporate ownership is voted in, we could look for a flock of teams to be sold within the 1990s.

The last time a new collective-bargaining agreement was made, in 1982, five teams were sold in the next 18 months (Hershey, 1984). At present, it appears that at least as many, under the right circumstances, could be sold within two years — New England, Seattle, the Rams, Tampa Bay and maybe even Cleveland.

With NFL teams reportedly worth $150 million in 1993, it is very difficult under the present rules to make a sale to an individual or a small group. However, the feeling is that there would be many large corporations in America that would jump at the chance to own an NFL team and take advantage of the great marketing opportunities it presents (McDonough, 1993).

If this occurred, what would it mean for pro football in the near future and into the twenty-first century? One could only speculate, but one thing is for certain, the bureaucratic nature of the financial aspects of pro football would become even more complex than at present.

If pro football is not big business right now — and some would argue otherwise — then it certainly would be under corporate ownership. Would this be good for the game? I suppose it depends on your position. If you feel the game needs to become more commercial than it is at present, then you would probably be receptive to this development. However, if you feel pro football has become a commercial enterprise where the nature of the game itself is a priority for only the purist and not the realist, then you would view this move toward corporate ownership with disdain.

Whatever your position the game is certainly more commercial than it was when the PAC and AAA were promoting pro football in Pennsylvania nearly 100 years ago. There now exist so many avenues from which to make money for players, owners and sponsors. And these individuals have learned how to exploit these avenues through the process of commercialization. CHAPTER VI

MEDIA

The media has been very instrumental to the growth of pro football in England and the

USA. This chapter analyzes this relationship in both countries. One aspect of the increasing commercialization of sport is its connection to the media. Although the press and radio have influenced pro football, the medium of television (TV) has radically altered many aspects of the game; the way the public perceive it; the way players and coaches perceive themselves; scheduling, such as, date and time of games; player behavior and notoriety; the way the game is presented to the public; and, economic opportunity.

With the spread of TV to over 90 percent of US and English households by the early

1970s, sports have assumed an important role in English and American life (Horowitz, 1974).

A symbiotic relationship exists between TV and sport that is beneficial to both. Although this relationship may not be equal in nature, both TV and sport serve their own interests by protecting and promoting each other. Professional sport has clearly become a branch of the entertainment industry and the link between the two is stronger than ever (Fynn and Guest, 1989).

In certain respects TV and sport have emerged as two sides of the same coin. The financial support TV provides for sport has become so substantial that American and English football — the latter to a somewhat lesser degree — have been molded and adapted to meet the commercial interests of TV. Similarly, TV has become dependent upon sports to fulfill many of its programming needs. Sport is the one type of progranuning that is able to generate large

TV audiences on the otherwise dead periods of Saturday and Sunday afternoons.

207 208

ENGLAND

Introduction

The print media has been a part of pro soccer since its beginning, TV coverage on the

other hand was not well established until the beginning of the 1960s (Match of the Day). While

this gave greater exposure to the game than ever before and made stars and celebrities out of

players, soccer people never really exploited and utilized TV until the past decade. The FA and

FL as well as individual clubs have lost out on millions of pounds that could have been earned

from a stronger and more lucrative relationship with TV companies. This is indicative of

attitudes alluded to in the previous chapter — unwillingness to venture into the commercial market

— but also that until recently fewer channels and a lack of cable TV presented special problems

not faced by pro football in the USA.

Television has radically altered certain aspects of the game, and eventually may influence

certain rule changes which will effect how the game is actually played — up to now that has not

happened. However, TV has already facilitated change in the following areas: sponsorship;

player, manager and owner status; greater distance between the big and small clubs; and,

scheduling of games.

Print Media - Earlv Davs

One of the main catalysts in the promotion of pro soccer at the end of the nineteenth

century and beginning of the twentiedi century was the print media. This section examines the role newspapers and "football" specials played during this time.

It is clear that an ongoing important symbiotic relationship has existed between the expansion of the game and both the growth of a specialized press and the spread of soccer coverage in newspapers. By 1915 the soccer press was enormous (Mason, 1980). Prior to 1914 press coverage in the form of "football" specials and newspaper articles helped promote interest

(Walvin, 1986). 209

Up to 1880 the Athletic News was probably the only sports paper to include soccer

results and match reports. In 1887 at a penny a paper, and consisting primarily of match reports,

soccer gossip and opinion, it exploited the growing popularity of the game (Tischler, 1981). The

paper sold about 25,000 copies a week during the soccer season in 1883. It doubled this figure

by 1891, and within two years the numbers increased to 128,000 and 180,000 by 1896. The

Athletic News was the country’s leading soccer weekly in the last decade of the nineteenth

century and the first 15 years of the twentieth century (Mason, 1980).

By the 1880s regular Saturday evening sports papers, devoted to publishing results of the

afternoon soccer matches, began to appear in those same areas served by the Athletic News. The

technical basis for the frenetic expansion of the sporting evening paper was the telegraph and later

the telephone and, inside the newspaper machine shop, the web-fed rotary presses and from the

1880s, the linotype machines in the composing room. By 1905 6,000 copies a minute of the

London Football Star were turned out on Saturday afternoons. By the 1890s few towns of any

size in England were without their "football special. " It was as much a part of the cultural scene

as the gas lamp and the fish and chip shop (Mason, 1980).

By the 1880s sport in general and soccer in particular had also become part of the regular

features of both the daily and weekly press. Soccer results were shown in the following

prominent newspapers: The Weeklv Despatch the 1880s; Manchester Guardian the mid-1870s;

The Times the end of the 1870s; Birmingham Dailv Mail 1883; and Sheffield Dailv Telegraph

1881. The publicity all sections of the press gave to the game was in part a stimulus to its

growth and popularity, and part a recognition of its news value and an indicator of its importance

(Mason, 1980).

While the Athletic News was the leading soccer weekly of the day, single page sheets which sold for a half-penny and printed match scores and distributed on Saturday nights were also very popular. The Athletic News attempted to combine a wide and detailed coverage with intelligent and informed critical commentary. It published action photographs by 1911. The rest 210

of the soccer press was much less thought provoking, and the majority of soccer newspapers had

only mixed success, and many were eventually absorbed by other papers (Tischler, 1981).

In general, the sporting press promoted soccer as it was structured and by doing so

reinforced the hierarchy’s position. Many FA officials felt that the role of the press was crucial

to the popularity of soccer. Reporting by the burgeoning "popular" press changed between

World War I and World War n greatly expanding their readership in the 1920s and 1930s especially among the working-class — part of this was making sport stories more attractive. Off the field activities, such as, transfers, became prominent and newsworthy.

Broadcast Media

Radio brought the public closer to pro soccer and it was only a matter of time before TV became the most important vehicle in promoting the game. The following describes the introduction of radio and TV and the obstacles this new medium faced.

During this time, the process of promoting interest in the game was transformed by mass radio ownership. The radio was the first step in redirecting entertainment away from public places and into the home (Walvin, 1986). In the 1920s radio broadcasting became a new factor in the development of a nationwide popularity in professional soccer. The British Broadcasting

Company (BBC) was created in 1926 — government owned and with no advertising - and the first nationwide broadcast was in April, 1927, with the 1928 Cup Final being the first to be covered by "running conunentary." The main conomentators went to the USA to observe

American broadcasters to get ideas and guidelines as the Americans had been working at this form of communication longer than the British, and had developed a more sophisticated and refined technique of presentation (Wagg, 1984).

As early as the 1920s the FL and FA were aware of the financial opportunities to be realized through professional soccer’s relationship with the media. At first the BBC had been permitted to report soccer matches free of charge, but in 1929, with pressure from the FL, the

FA demanded payment. The BBC paid the FA 100 pounds for the 1930 FA Cup Final. Then 211

in 1931 the FL decided that there was to be no broadcasting of league matches, as they were

afraid spectators would stay away. It was obvious that certain soccer officials were thinking

along commercial lines before the promotion of the game, or at least along with it.

However, Gerald Cook, Director of Outside Broadcasts at the BBC in 1931 said this

decision was against "public interest" as invalids - from the war - and old people could not

always go to away games. Consequently, the FA allowed the Cup Final and a few international

matches to be broadcasted, and in 1936 allowed the Cup Draw — equivalent to the pairings for

the college basketball playoffs - to be broadcast. But, there was a general restriction on the

news, and until 1939 no sports reports could be given prior to 6:15 pm. (Wagg, 1984).

When TV became a viable proposition in the late 1930s the BBC’s interest in soccer

extended to the new medium. The first Cup Final to be televised was in 1939. TV transformed

not only soccer but sport in general. People began to develop different perceptions of the game

and millions could share the instant entertainment in the comfort of their homes.

Celebrity Status

Although it was not until the mid-1960s that weekly soccer shows became part of TV,

players took on the role as entertainers and TV personalities, and managers became celebrities.

This development was accentuated by the arrival on independent television.

By the 1950s players had acquired a new reference group, entertainers. They were aware

of the comparison between themselves and radio and TV stars as they played to packed houses

and saw radio coverage of soccer increase through the introduction of the BBC Sports Report

(1949) and Sports Special on TV (1955). This awareness was sharpened by the establishment of the Independent Television Association (TTA) in 1954, and by the decision of Associated

Television Viewing (ATV) in 1956 to offer the FL 50,000 pounds to transmit the second-half of a league match on Saturday evenings (Wagg, 1984). This was further accentuated in 1964 when the BBC started Match of the Day - the most celebrated soccer program in the history of British television (Walvin, 1986). These kinds of developments (certainly the emergence of independent 212

television) had much in common with TV network involvement with the NFL. Also, the 50,000

pound offer in 1956 surprisingly fared favorably with the NBC offer of 100,000 dollars to the

NFL for the title game during the same year.

Players began to realize their commercial potential. This realization was facilitated by

increased attention the press and, more importantly, TV gave them. With the help of their agents

— who began to play a role in pro soccer in the 1950s - players became informed as to the

importance of playing in big media markets, such as, London, and consequently many felt the

need to transfer Aom smaller markets. After the fifties it became more and more difficult for

the smaller clubs outside of the First Division to retain the services of potential star players.

Hence, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.

During the 1960s the relationship between the press and the game became very important,

especially with falling attendances and in smaller towns. Players and clubs became more

accessible to the press. Consequently, soccer began to have its media "celebrities" and news and

publicity became increasingly indistinguishable. Two quotes are appropriate to this development

— in the sense that they capture the crucial role publicity played in England in the 1960s. "There

are two classes in modem society: those that are known and those that aren’t," (John Lennon in

Wagg, 1984, p. 128). "Hierarchy of publicity has replaced hierarchy descent and wealth, " (C.W.

Mills in Wagg, 1984, p. 128). The ubiquitousness of personalities in British popular culture was

greatly enhanced by the growth from the late 1940s of TV.

Soccer players became television personalities, for example. Quiz Ball — question and

answer show with three star players and celebrity supporters on each team — and Match of the

Day on BBC and the Big Match, starting in the late sixties, on TTV. Quiz Ball was presented mid-week. Match of the Day, Saturday evening and the Big Match, Sunday afternoon.

Highlights of mid-week domestic cup and European matches became very popular. The

British public got the opportunity to see the great Real Madrid players (six times’ winners of the

European Cup in the 1960s) and other European stars that they only knew about through books, newspapers, newsreels, and radio. 213

Probably the biggest factor during the 1960s in enhancing the relationship between TV

and soccer was the 1966 World Cup. Of course it did not hurt that the tournament was held in

England and that the host country won the tournament. For over two weeks the country became

mesmerized by this tournament that was shown exclusively on TV. Four hundred million people

saw the Final game "live." The English players became instant household names even for

women who had previously shown little interest in soccer (Wagg, 1984).

The redefinition of soccer as a television show continued unabated through the 1970s.

Soccer media had largely been annexed to media culture ~ it was a show as much as it was a

sports program. Also managers made their players more accessible to the public for signing

autographs and giving speeches and being present at certain functions (Glanville, 1979).

Age of Publicity

The period from the 1960s on could be seen as the age of publicity as far as pro soccer

was concerned. However, this publicity — and consequently the growing commercialization of

the game — in the eyes of many critics, contributed to the deterioration of sportsmanship and

ethical behavior during the game (Walvin, 1986).

Managers and players experienced reporting that was increasingly of an investigative

nature — checking their every move. TV made this reporting more probing than ever before.

Players and managers were under the spotlight — not unlike rock and movie stars, the age of the

Beatles - being held accountable for results and the success of the team. This, in conjunction

with the increased amount of money involved in the game, created an environment where the pressure to win was seen as paramount among the media, players and managers (Hopcraft, 1968).

The working-class attitudes of soccer as hard but fair play survived into the 1960s and even the 1970s - players being horrifred at "play-acting" during international and European contests. However, "grey" tactical judgements, i.e., standing over the ball or kicking it away when there is a free kick against you, taking a quick dead ball and so on, became steadily permissible. 214

"One-upmanship" reflected the changing mores of British business which was increasingly

influenced by United States Commerce. Life began to be seen in competitive terms with fewer

holds barred. Business ethics and gamesmanship was extending from the boardroom to the field

of play. "Cheating fairly," i.e., within the rules of play, became more acceptable. "Going over

the top" — the easiest way to break someone’s leg - was not that rare anymore. Moral codes,

and ideas of virility evident before the 1960s were less distinct (Wagg, 1984)

Were these the reflections of unethical working-class sportsmen? On the contrary Wagg

(1984) says,

they are the ethics of boardrooms, advertising agencies, political parties and TV companies in advanced capitalist societies....Ihe matter of gaining advantage through deception is similarly central in modem Western culture. So when a player convinces the referee he was tripped in the area when he wasn’t, he has no qualms. Why should he? He inhabits the same moral universe as the Prime Minister, the CBI and Independent Broadcasting Authority (p. 154).

The press, TV coverage and growing professionalism have done more than alter the status and the role of players and managers, for they have also created a more intense form of evaluation and expectations. Ungentlemanly conduct has become a common aspect of the game.

The concept of the "professional foul" has crept into the English game illustrating, if nothing else, the modem professional is worlds removed from his sporting forebears. Walvin (1986) concurred: "Today the modem player brought up at a time of professionalism and commercialism is unlikely to be even familiar with the concept of gentlemanly conduct. He has been influenced and socialized by a qualitatively different approach to the game" (p.42). The pre-contemporary pro wanted to win and was serious about his involvement, but the stakes are much higher for contemporary pro athletes and they define their participation as much the same way a lawyer or a businessman does, i.e., it is a job not a hobby. The pro athlete of today rationalizes their approach to sport by not considering it a game but rather a career. 215

Managers and Media

The media has also affected the behavior of managers and accentuated the pressure to

win. Managers improved their standing with players by taking advantage of the publicity process

— defending and praising their players to the press. They also used this vehicle as a confidence

booster and motivation.

Much of the post-war transformation of managers had to do with the market

"emancipation" of soccer players and their changed power position. Now looking after 15-18

very expensive investments, managers became the expendable ones. They started to get into the

lives of these expensive investments and did their homework on them before they bought them.

This goes back to the managers new role of accountability — does not want to buy something that

is worthless. This type of approach by managers, and lack of stability in their job was also

experienced by NFL coaches.

Players became coopted into the process by which the media amplified the accountability

of soccer managers. Much of what happens in soccer is reported through managers - commonly

mentioned over 50 times during a single weeks’ editions of a popular daily newspaper (Wagg,

1984).

Broadcasting media have responded to this sometimes by actually redefining results on

a game in terms of a manager: "Halifax, One. Mr. Tommy Docherty’s Preston Two," (News at

Ten, September 1, 1981). It is not surprising, therefore, if players, and everyone else, blame managers for bad results (Wagg, 1984). In the USA pro football coaches experience the same pressure and responsibility, but to greater degree. One reason for this concerns the nature of the game. Football coaches have more control during the game than soccer coaches, and are therefore more responsible for success or failure. Americans constantly refer to coach’s won/lost record as if he played the game himself.

Managers have learned, especially since the 1950s, that they need to be skilled when dealing with the media if they want to "stay around long." The media hound them into talking about each other and players provocatively. The whole scale induction of the soccer manager 216

into the "being famous" industry has meant that managers are increasingly defined and judged

as a publicist, per se. They are assessed by their quotes nearly as much as by their team’s

results. Therefore, managers become scapegoats not merely for poor results but also for bad

copy.

TV and Fan Violence

While TV transformed the game it also changed the role and behavior of

spectators, nevertheless, a causal link is not a simple matter. As violence became more and more

the center of media sports such behavior infiltrated into the homes via TV. Violence become

a more acceptable feature of TV whether fictional or nonfictional. As Walvin (1986) writes:

"Violent football fans may have become an element, albeit real rather than fictional, in the

continuing saga of TV violence" (p. 84). Also, coupled with this have the TV cameras become

a stimulant and stage for bravado and collective violence?

However, the relationship between TV and violence is more complex than this. Walvin

(1986) recognizes this complexity: "Violent bdiavior may be more a result of conditions other

than the exposure to violent television" (p. 87). I would say this is obvious, yet the influence of

TV cannot be neglected as it has transformed human suffering into popular entertainment. What

made the tragedies of Brussels - where over 30 people were killed as a result of a collapsed wall under the pressure of rioting fans - and Hillsborough — where over 90 people were crushed to death as a result too many people being allowed to enter a stand not big enough to accommodate them — doubly shocking was that TV transmitted these live events to the homes of millions. TV has brought the game into the nation’s firont room. In this respect it is a powerful medium in portraying violence and suffering to people.

These kinds of techniques were common in America, which is not surprising, because these strategies were taken on by the British media after learning them from their American counterparts. One of the reasons for pro football’s attraction, so many believe, is the violent hits 217

that are common to the game, and TV has certainly zeroed-in on this attraction in selling their

product.

Thatcherism. Imoression-Managers. and Satellite TV

This final section examines the dramatic changes that were to take place during the 1980s.

Soccer officials and directors finally realized the commercial possibilities of TV. As a result this

medium produced more money for pro soccer, especially the top clubs, and secured considerable

control of how and when games were to be played. This was a significant break from the way

pro soccer traditionally operated. Social developments facilitated this change.

TV redefined soccer as an exciting mixture of action and expertise which famous people

perform and other famous people deliberate upon. TV coverage improved the financial

opportunities for top clubs, who already derived a substantial income from shirt sponsorship,

stood to treble it once players were allowed to wear their sponsorship motives on TV. Just as

soccer people increasingly assimilated into the media world, so have impression managers gained

credence as part of the soccer world.

It was not until the 1980s that soccer people really utilized TV as a vehicle to promote the game, improve sponsorship, and consequently make more money. Prior to the 1983-84 season regular live matches were a rarity. The only live games up to that point were the FA Cup

Final, European club finals ~ if a British team was playing — and certain important international matches, for example. World Cup and European Nations Cup games. Live league matches on

TV in England did not start just because the clubs thought they were a good thing for the game.

On the contrary, they viewed live television as something to be resisted as it was thought that it would reduce crowds throughout the League. It was also believed that attendances at televised games would suffer adversely. Furthermore, a number of clubs had been approached by companies willing to pay large sums of money for the right to display their names on the shirts of soccer players. TV would not allow these advertisements on screen and the ludicrous situation developed where clubs would wear their sponsor’s iogo only if the cameras were not present, 218

which rather negated the value to the sponsor and seriously retarded the revenue potential of the

sponsorship.

This happened because previous league negotiators had blithely signed away the right to

control their own advertising and by 1983 the shirt advertising ban had become a convention for televised soccer, though all television channels were quite content to display advertising in other sports, particularly motor racing. So FL clubs conceded what in the long term would prove to be their most valuable asset to TV — the principle of live soccer. Even this was achieved only after the intervention of Robert Maxwell, then chairman of Oxford United, who recalled: "I went to see BBC bosses and I said you must allow shirt advertising. They said we can’t under the charter. I showed them that they could do it under the charter. And so they gave in," (in Fynn and Guest, 1989, p. 120). If the process was as simple as Maxwell claims, it is even more remarkable that soccer gave live games to television for such a minor concession.

A compensation scheme was instituted to recompense televised clubs for any loss of spectators, although the knock-on effect, i.e., gates declining at other games because a live match is on television the following day, was never addressed. Cliff Morgan, then the BBC’s head of outside broadcasts, said of the soccer authorities: "When the league offered us 31 matches live, we said "can you deliver?" The answer was "Anything can be delivered so long as the money is right." I was shattered that they could believe that money is more important than the welfare of the game," (in Fynn and Guest, 1989, p. 121).

The 1983 deal, made jointly with ITV and BBC, had been negotiated by the League’s

Television Committee. The contract was eventually agreed amid rancorous publicity which resulted in ominous noises emanating from the television companies to the effect ftiat soccer could not expect regular increases in access fees in future, and that anyway the game was declining in popularity. Summing up television’s view, John Bromley, ITV’s head of sport said : "We want football to tell us exactly what they would like in an ideal world and then, I assume, we will tell them what they can have," (in Fynn and Guest, 1989, p. 121). 219

It was certainly true that by 1983 TV audiences for soccer had been in decline for five

years or more. But the same period had also seen a general downturn in traditional television

audiences for ITV and BBC due to competition from video and the recently established Channel

Four. TV across the board was devoting more and more hours to different sports such as

snooker, darts and American Football which competed for the sporting audience. Furthermore,

criticisms were made of English television’s soccer coverage which many said had become stale

and outdated and had not been substantially changed for 20 years (Fynn and Guest, 1989).

The game was also victim of its own success, having drawn massive audiences in the

1970s — thirty million watched the 1970 Cup Final between Leeds and Chelsea and the BBC

highlights program Match of the Day regularly attracted over 10 million viewers. These figures

clearly could not be sustained forever but it is significant that when audiences started to fall as

TV diversified, those charged with presenting soccer on the small screen did not try to attack the

situation with a new format or a change in presentation but simply attempted to acquire the game

for less money in real terms than had been the case previously. (It is not clear why TV

executives responded this way or so slowly, but the same type of reaction has been indicative of

producers in the USA. Pro basketball suffered for a number of years without a quick response,

and now pro hockey is experiencing similar problems as far as its relationship with TV is

concerned). Moreover, the 1983 deal was due to run out in two years and TV executives,

thinking ahead to the possibility of delicate negotiations in 1985, began a campaign of

denigration, which portrayed soccer as an old-fashioned pastime, one that could no longer bring

in the mass of viewers it had attracted in earlier years.

Fynn and Guest (1989) assert that "the campaign was allied to a deliberate policy of devaluing the product on the part of at least some of the TV contractors by exploitation of the small print in the contract that football’s negotiators had overlooked" (p. 122). The time a soccer program is transmitted, for instance, is crucial to its success. Soccer had left this matter entirely to the TV companies. London Weekend, for example, scheduled its Sunday highlights program, 220

The Big Match, at lunchtime when a large proportion of its target audience was bound to be

otherwise engaged at the local pub.

The onset of live soccer also saw a cut-back in the number of edited highlights programs

which meant that lucrative sponsorship deals would become concentrated more and more on the

small number of teams which TV decided the public wanted to see live. They could do this

because, once again, soccer’s negotiators had failed to ensure either an adequate balance between

edited and live games or any say in the decisions about which teams would be screened. To

listen to those in TV, soccer should have been grateful for any coverage at all.

One of the main problems in the relationship between soccer and TV throughout the

1980s was that representatives from both sides rarely experienced amicable negotiations. One

reason for this was that the two major companies in British TV, ITV and BBC, had negotiated

as a cartel since 1978. Therefore, soccer representatives did not have the power of playing one

against the other to get the best deal. This is certainly not the case in the USA where CBS just

lost its contract with the NFL to present NFC games during the 1994-95 season. The "up-and-

coming" Fox network acquired the contract. Indicating, in the USA, that there is room for many

networks as long as they can demonstrate the ability to pay.

However, a compromise may well have been worked out had not fate and the perennial

problem of hooliganism reared their heads. The terrible rire at Bradford City, in which over 50

died, the appalling riot at an FA Cup game at Luton by Millwall fans, both captured by TV

cameras, and a fatality at Birmingham when a wall collapsed brought home to the public once

again that soccer grounds were unsavory and unsafe places to visit. But it was the 39 deaths at

the European Cup Final between Liverpool and Juventus of Turin at the Heysel stadium in

Brussels that sickened many soccer supporters and dealt a terrible blow to the game’s image,

certainly in England.

It may be harsh judgment, but soccer had contributed to its own demise. Hooliganism

was a problem that had been worsening for many years, and there had been little positive action by the governing bodies to put matters right. Not until the Union of European Football 221

Association (UEFA) imposed a complete ban on English clubs taking part in European

competitions did any soccer authority begin to take any meaningful action to force the English

game to put its house in order.

Following one of the most traumatic periods in English league history the new season

started with no televised soccer, as the head of sport for both BBC and ITV felt other sports

would attract attention and soccer had such a poor image. Also they could not come to any

compromise with soccer officials (Fynn and Guest, 1989). Attendances had been dropping alarmingly in the first half of the 1980s and the vast majority of League clubs carried large debts which made most of them technically insolvent (Wagg, 1984).

In the 1980s, TV had assumed a position of supreme importance to all sports. The medium could make or break an event and had infused into the public the idea that if an event is important enough for the TV cameras to be present, then it is also something worth attending in person. TV can turn a live soccer game into an event of international significance. Indeed, the medium even enhances live games for large numbers of people who want to be able to say

"I was there." By taking the negative approach, that TV can only harm attendances, few clubs have really c^italised on the benefits that being the focus of attention can bring. Gates did not recover, in fact they slipped back further. This is another example of the inability, on the part of club directors and officials of the FL to see the "whole picture" and the long-term benefits of an association with TV. Many of these people, even at this time, were from the "old school" and believed in the notion that live soccer — which many were uncomfortable with in the first place

— would keq) people at home. These conservative, traditional attitudes kept soccer from exploiting the TV market until well into the 1980s. This short sightedness was not indicative of owners and officials of the NFL. They had long realized the commercial benefits of a strong association with TV networks well before the 1980s and were willing to embark on such a relationship.

By December 1985 soccer had been off the screens for half of a season, the big clubs became desperate and the rumblings of discontent from Canon (the official League sponsor at the 222

time) at the lack of exposure led many to conclude, rightly as it turned out, that the company

would not renew its sponsorship at the end of the season. There was no doubt that TV now held

the whip hand. Alternatives to ITV and BBC had not emerged, despite attempts by the soccer

authorities to generate interest elsewhere (Fynn and Guest, 1989).

A TV deal was negotiated for the second half of the 1985-86 season. The complete

capitulation on the part of the League can be seen in the financial terms of the deal. Having

already turned down 4.5 million pounds for the whole season when the clubs voted down the

original offer, the FL now accepted a paltry 1.5 million pounds for the remaining half season.

When the two-year extension was signed the following July for 3.1 million per season, the

debacle was complete. From this weak negotiating position, the FL also had to concede free

access to any league game for edited highlights purposes as and when the TV companies chose,

yet there was no promise of a regularly scheduled highlights program. In fact both channels

began to severely cut back their edited coverage in the mistaken belief that the TV viewer only

wanted to see live action. England is the only European country to have this imbalance between live and recorded programs. In continental Europe, and in Scotland, highlights are the mainstay of soccer coverage. In France, if you want a live league match, you have to pay for it on the subscription channel (Fynn and Guest, 1989). This is now an option for English fans, but once again English soccer authorities were slow to "get on the train."

This kind of static approach, where innovative ideas to exploit the commercial opportunities open to pro soccer clubs are suppressed, is not surprising when we think of where the game came from, and who has continued to be in control. Since the inception of professionalization pro soccer has been a working-class game, run by boards of directors who are more concerned about image, the team, and stability of the club rather than huge profits.

They are not willing to sacrifice all what the club has stood-for over the years for greater profits.

Of course, they want to make money for themselves and the club, but the prestige of winning the

League Championship or the FA Cup overrides that. Mason (1980) and Walvin (1986) have alluded to this attitude and believe it still prevails today. However, a new type of director. 223

wealthy — members of the nouveau riche — and often without any ties to the local community and

bdiolding to Thatcher ideology and aware of the necessities of economic survival, has emerged

to propel Ae game into the twenty-first century. This contemporary director, has had more

impact in the last 10 years on promoting pro soccer as a business that his predecessors have over

the last 80 years.

In 1987 a new satellite service became the first-ever broadcasting body in the country to

recognize the value of soccer to TV and to back its interest with hard cash. British Satellite

Broadcasting (BSB), which had been awarded the contract to launch and manage Britain’s most

powerful civilian communications service, the high-powered Direct Broadcast Satellite system,

expressed serious interest in purchasing exclusive rights to pro soccer. "BSB was planning to

introduce four new channels of which one would be devoted entirely to sports and the company

was of the opinion that without soccer, any sports channel was a non-starter. At last a measure

of competition was to be injected into the process and soccer would soon be wooed in a fieer

market," (Fynn and Guest, 1989, p. 130).

Television companies realized there was a consumer market out there of people willing

to pay to see sport on TV. This growing class of people was part of the new order who were

willing to sacrifice the pub, and other hedonistic practices associated with a traditional working-

class life style, for material wealth, such as, their own house, one and maybe two cars, and

satellite TV.

In 1988 BSB offered a package that included 7.5 million pounds a year, over four million

more than ITV and BBC were paying together. Also, BSB proposed a radical departure from

anything previously offered to soccer in any country. In essence the concept BSB outlined called for the formation of a joint company, owned by the FL, FA and BSB, which would produce soccer programs for the new satellite company and would receive favorable consideration if it were to bid for the hill BSB sports production contract, which was due to be put out to tender in the near future. 224

Trevor Phillips, the League’s commercial director, found the situation almost

unbelievable. For the first time English soccer had the opportunity to control its own destiny,

although there was a small group of clubs (10) who were prepared to put it all in jeopardy

through what he saw as narrow self-interest. ITV had targeted ten clubs based on the biggest

teams in each of the catchment areas of the regional FTV companies. Under this arrangement,

rrV was willing to pay 10 million pounds per season for a four-year deal. When Liverpool and

Everton publicly supported the ITV bid it provoked an outcry that soon led to a bitter split within

the FL ranks. With nothing in the ITV deal for them, the majority of league clubs wanted the

BSB offer to be accepted, while the big ten seemed mesmerized by the money ITV offered to

them (Fynn and Guest, 1989).

The BBC, which did not have to compete with the satellite service for advertising

revenue, disowned the cartel and decided to throw its lot with the BSB and began to work on a

complimentary schedule and a plan for sharing costs. BSB did not take the ITV tactics lying

down, and increased the money it was prepared to pay to 11 and then 12 million pounds per

season.

However, the big ten said they would refuse to allow their games to go to BSB no matter

what the rest of the League wanted. Given this the remaining 82 clubs would have little to sell

and so cracks appeared in the opposition to ITV. The big ten persuaded the rest of the First

Division to accept the ITV offer, as they declared that BSB would not get any viewers.

Sponsorship would dry up, soccer would become marginalised on a minority channel. The pressure was most intense on clubs like Wimbledon and Millwall who had fought hard as small

outfits to get into the First Division. In Millwall’s case, tiie club had waited for over 100 years for the right to face the Liverpools and Arsenals and now they saw it disappearing before their very eyes. As a result the First Division accepted the ITV offer, which annoyed Ron Noades, chairman of Crystal Palace.

All my life I have watched football take the short-term option and grab whatever money is on the table instead of taking the long-term view of what is best for 225

football, and that is exactly what is happening again now (in Fynn and Guest, 1989, p. 141).

What this suggests is not a short-term "get rich" plan as Noades asserts, but rather a

realization on the part of the wealthier clubs that they are in the business of making money,

contemporary pro sport. Club directors and shareholders do not define their participation in pro

soccer in the same way as those generations before them. A separate group (the wealthy clubs)

began to emerge, and while the forming of the Premier League is not a dramatic move in terms

of competition structure, a change in name and attaining a separate sponsor (Carling Brewing)

indicates a departure from the basic ideology that was instrumental in the formation of the four

divisions — "one for all and all for one."

Although the Second, Third and Fourth Divisions tried to rally support for the BSB bid,

the writing was clearly on the wall once the First Division had agreed to go with ITV. Where

did this leave BSB? They secretly decided to pursue a separate deal with the FA and the BBC

for FA Cup and international matches.

In many ways the popular FA Cup package represented a better prospect than League

matches despite the smaller number of games. The FL had no rights over the televising of FA

Cup matches, which the FA handled. The acquisition of these FA-controlled games gave BSB

and BBC some consolation for the loss of league action. Perhaps even more important the FA,

exasperated by the performance of the League, agreed to allow BSB to show some foreign soccer,

something it had resisted for years.

With the ITV deal signed the producers were left with instructions to come up with a

new, exciting format. Thus "The Match,” ITV’s new concept for televised soccer, was bom,

with more cameras and more resources generally devoted to the operation. Over 10 million households watched the Liverpool-Arsenal Championship decider on the last day of the season in 1989, and FTV claimed the ratings were up 20 percent over 1988 (Fynn and Guest, 1989).

This kind of competition has much in common with the system employed in the USA, for example, different networks covering games from different conferences; Roone Arledge technique 226

on Monday Night Football and so forth. Also, the need for each network to be innovative and

develop new programming techniques.

One bonus for armchair fans was the time the BBC devoted to the FA Cup, which now

screened highlights of rounds one and two for the first time and in later rounds put out three

programs over each FA Cup weekend. The ITV deal may have eventually encompassed the

whole league financially but as the first season of "The Match" reached its conclusion it was clear

that when it came to actually choosing which games to screen, the TV network was sticking

almost entirely to the big ten. Eight First Division clubs were not featured at all and Norwich,

who led the table (League) for long periods, was shown only twice.

Although the money the English League now earns from TV is substantially greater than

before, it must be said that the way the negotiations were conducted reflected no credit on the

vast majority of soccer chairmen who wanted a deal that would support the whole League rather

than the elite alone. The contemporary leaders like David Dein of Arsenal and Irving Scholar

of Tottenham, originators of the breakaway big ten and businessmen at heart, thought they were

doing all they could for the game by providing a national showcase for the best in English soccer.

However, there were some dramatic changes from the late 1980s into the next decade,

that put the BBC and BSB back into the picture, so to speak, and saw the development of "cable

TV" along the lines of that in the USA. Not only do people have the opportunity of viewing

sport on the traditional channels, BBC 1, BBC 2, ITV, and Chaimel 4, but, with the purchase

of the Sky dish (much smaller than the American satellite dish), viewers can now see sport on

Eurosport, Screensport and of course Sky sports (BSB).

There now exists in England the increased awareness and independence that had existed for some time in France, Germany, Italy and Spain, where competition has been used to broaden rather than lessen the spread of televised soccer using a variety of formats. Gone are the days when the FL and FA only scheduled games on Saturdays and Wednesday nights, with nearly all these broadcast being just highlight shows. Viewers now have the opportunity to see soccer four or five times a week, and most of it being live coverage. 227

Monday night League games are shown live on BSB, and these are Premier Division

games. On Sunday afternoon FTV presents "The Match, " a live Premier League or First Division

game. Saturday evenings on BBC one can see "Match of the Day," highlights of two League

games plus all the goals from the Premier League. During the week BBC shows FA Cup games,

and ITV covers Coca-Cola Cup games, and they both show European and International contests.

And, as if this was not enough, Channel 4 show Italian soccer. It was reported in Shoot (1992)

that soccer on TV, "reaches saturation level when ITV reveal a 40 million pound deal to cover

Football League games and Coca-Cola Cup ties. BSkyB and the BBC are already showing

Premier League and FA Cup games. Channel 4 prepare to show Italian football" 0?>39).

rrV no longer has a monopoly on League games. BSB teamed up with BBC in 1992 to

strike a five-year deal worth 304 million pounds to cover Premier League matches. ITV failed

in their bid to gain a High Court ban on the deal (Shoot, 1992). For anyone with insight into

other contracts that have emerged during the growth of TV sport in Britain, this is an astonishing

amount of money.

What does all of this say about broader changes in British culture? It certainly indicates

that traditional viewing patterns (sport on weekends, and maybe once during the week) are

beginning to disappear as traditional values start to erode. The American model, of making sport

available to a TV audience seven days a week, as well as outside of "prime time," is being

employed. The question is, why? Either there is a market (demand) for it, or as sometimes is

the case, the media created the demand through subtle manipulation.

In trying to explain this demand (for more TV sport, and TV in general), it is important

to consider that changes that were taking place in the family, the economy, and more specifically,

employment. The traditional working-week of Monday to Friday, 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., was

beginning to disappear for many people. Similar to the USA, people were working many

different hours, at weekends, at night, and dictating their own hours, with some operating out of their own homes - flexibility became the "name of the game. " Also, with an increasing value 2 2 8

put on material wealth, certainly by the younger generation, people were willing to spend more

time "on the job."

Combine the above with the breakdown of the extended family — reducing family visits

— and community networks - the pub was a place to gather after work — the move of many

young couples and families out of the city centers to live in the suburbs, and you have a

disruption in the traditional patterns of English culture and social life. Of course, there was not

a simple cause-effect relationship here, but an insight into these changes and developments do

help to explain the desire of many people to spend a large part of their social life watching sport

on TV. With the congestion on the roads, and the "hustle-bustle" of the work-day people are

more apt to spend non work time at home, in ftont of the TV, especially with the choices the

viewer is now provided with - the video craze is also influential here.

This trend is likely to continue as new generations are being socialized under these

conditions which have changed die fabric of british culture. Impression management strategy,

utilized in the USA for many years, has been incorporated and taken-on by a large section of the

power elite and accepted by the general public.

Consequently, TV today has had quite an effect on pro soccer in England and the fans

who watch it. Not only has TV brought the game from all over Europe into more households

than ever before, but it has also influenced scheduling, i.e., when certain games are played. This

is an important development, which could reflect one or two things. Either soccer people have

realized the importance of TV to the growth o f the game and the financial prospects of such a relationship, or, TV is now able to dictate to pro soccer authorities as to when they should play

certain games, which never used to be the case. Both developments are interrelated, but indicate a change in power as well as symbiosis. This relationship (TV and sport) has been an important factor in die scheduling stmcture of American sport for nearly fifty years.

The FA or FL never altered their scheduling for TV, but the relationship is much closer and more profitable now, and consequendy games are now scheduled throughout the whole week rather than over two days. This way different channels can show important games on Saturday, 229

Sunday, Monday and so on, without conflicting with each other. Also, instead of having both

Semi-Finals of the FA Cup at the same time on the same day, they are currently played at

Wembley (home of the National team, and biggest stadium in England) one after the other. All this has helped certain channels in their quest for larger audiences. This is similar to the way major sports are scheduled in the USA, for example, college football on Saturday and pro football on Sunday.

Another change concerns the way live games are presented. Recent developments in this area are also reflective of American sports coverage. Prior to satellite TV, live games only involved cup finals. World Cup or European Nations Cup, and sometimes there were studio analysts, but not always. There was always the color commentator and usually an expert analyst at the game. The program outside the playing time of the game was usually very short and to the point. Today, even highlight shows have studio analysts being asked questions by individuals equivalent to Bob Costas or Pat O’Brien. BSB’s coverage of a live game can last over three and sometimes four hours, which is amazing when you consider the game is played over 90 minutes.

In watching Manchester United versus Leeds United on BSB, October 3, 1992, 1 was struck by how long the telecast was and the way the program was presented. The program came on the air an hour before kick-off, studio analysts discussed each teams form and what they would have to do to win the game. The viewers also got to see each team warm-up, in their warm-up outfits with the sponsors’ name being very visible. After the game there were post-game interviews with managers and players, and incredibly a phone-in session which lasted an hour. These kind of techniques were unheard of in British sports broadcasting until the last three or four years.

These developments were indicative of how TV has imposed itself on sport, although the latter does not seem to be complaining. I sat there watching this telecast and wondered if I was on vacation or not. Apart from the fact that it was soccer being shown, the structure of the broadcast would have fit in nicely with any NFL telecast. 230 USA

Introduction

The marriage between TV and pro football has been as lucrative as any pro sport

relationship. Football was made for TV and vice-versa. It is no coincidence that pro football’s

"golden years" (to quote Rader, 1990) were post World War H, when most households in the

USA had acquired a TV.

The nature of the game (stop-start, time-outs, and so forth) and the action being condensed into particular plays, was [is] very attractive to TV producers. Owners and NFL officials realized this and soon acquired handsome deals with the main networks, and eventually cable TV. Pro football abided by the laws of TV a lot sooner than pro soccer, i.e., adjusting game times and schedules to accommodate the largest TV audience - Monday Night Football has become an "institution" in and of itself. The relationship with TV was just one aspect, albeit a major one, in the development and growth of pro football into the most powerhil and economically viable sports system in the USA today.

Earlv Struggle

During the first decade of the twentieth century the relationship between the press and pro football was virtually nonexistent. There was very little newspaper space given to athletic club football during this time. Two of the main reasons were the popularity of baseball and college football. Although press coverage in Pittsburgh, where no big-time college football existed, involved daily reports equal in size to those on eastern college teams. However, in

Philadelphia, where the powerful University of Pennsylvania squad completely overshadowed the

PAC and AAA, successhil promotion of the pro game was even more difficult (Maltby, 1987).

Nonetheless pro football continued to expand, and in a strange way newspapers were instrumental in this expansion. As Maltby (1987) notes: 231

The Ohio teams proceeded much like others, advertising for potential opponents and even organizing practice sessions through the newspapers. The All-Cleveland team’s announcement in the Cleveland Plain Deeder typified common football procedures: ’Captain Sidley requests all his men to report to the Alta House early Friday night for practice. Manager Ed Tappe would like to hear from some good fast team for a Thanksgiving Day game’ (p. 176).

However, prior to 1920 the press were never really convinced that pro football was going to succeed. They questioned the practicality of a pro league and were very suspicious of the way pro teams operated, in terms of the intentions of some players and managers, and the way players received money. As a result the majority of the press, writing on the subject, felt pro football would never become popular throughout the country and that the proposed league would never be formed (Noverr and Ziewacz, 1983).

Recognition bv the Press

The following examines the effect on the expansion of pro football from the press and later the broadcast media. By 1920 things had changed to the point where the press were willing to accept that pro football was a viable proposition. In November, 1919, Ohio newspapers reported on plans to form a pro football league in the following season. James Lanyon, sports editor of the Cleveland Plain Dealer, wrote that Ohio squads had decided to establish "a real sure-enough league not entirely unlike the big baseball leagues," and that "in 1920 the professionals will be well organized, play under a set of rules that will protect the property of each club and go through an official schedule," (in Maltby, 1987, p.339).

During its early years, pro football never received the exposure from the press as baseball did. Two main reasons for this concerned how baseball was promoted and where the teams developed. Baseball’s promoters implanted the idea that the sport was truly "American" and that it represented, in the words of historian Melvin Adelman (1973), "the embodiment of the

American temperament." Also, by the time of the formation of the National League of

Professional Baseball Clubs in 1876, professionalism had already been institutionalized in the sport for five years with the creation of the National Association of Professional Baseball 232

Players. Finally, baseball was popular enough in a variety of sizable cities, which was not the

case for pro football during its inception. The press in big cities had a lot more "clout" than

journalists in small towns, in terms of national exposure.

The 1930s saw the expansion of pro football to the major cities. This along with the

emergence of the broadcast media really helped to bring the game to more people than ever

before. In 1934 the Thanksgiving Day game between the Bears and the Lions became the first

NFL game broadcast nationally with Graham McNamee the announcer for CBS radio. Four

years later an NFL game was televised for the first time when NBC broadcast the

Brooklyn-Philadelphia Eagles game from Ebbets Field to approximately 1,000 TV sets in New

York. In 1940, the first NFL championship game was carried on network radio. Red Barber

broadcasted the game to 120 stations of the Mutual Broadcasting System, which paid a nominal

$2,500 for the rights (NFL, 1991).

However, while the game was expanding to larger cities and consequently a bigger

market, the golden age of pro football was yet to be realized. Even in 1927, two years after the

Bears had set new standards for the sport by paying Red Grange $12,000 for his first game as

a professional, Selby (1966) reports that there were only 80 paid admissions to see the Bears play

the Giants in New York. And as late as 1939, the Eagles played in the rain at Philadelphia’s

cavernous municipal stadium (capacity: 100,000) before a crowd so small that the press box could

shelter everybody (Selby, 1966). Obviously Selby is exaggerating here, but his point is well taken.

Pro Football and its "Marriage" to TV

The next section analyzes the role TV played in expanding the game from the 1950s on.

How TV facilitated the public’s understanding of the game and how TV and pro football officials utilized the relationship to exploit the market.

How did this upsurge of pro football come about? Art Modell, owner of the Cleveland

Browns, credits the gladiator aspect — men doing battle in an arena of controlled violence. 233

although this was always there. Sonny Werblin, former boss of the New York Jets, speaks of

the evenness of the competition. Ex-NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle points to the high degree

of sustained action. Though these things may be contributing factors, Selby (1966), says it took

TV to show them off, all at once, to the whole country. Billy Sullivan, former President of the

Boston Patriots and former public-relations man at Notre Dame, marvelled that more people

could see his pro team in one afternoon of national TV in 1965 than saw all the Notre Dame

games during Knute Rockne’s entire coaching career (Selby, 1966).

As early as 1950 people in pro football began to realize the power of TV in how it could

affect not only how the game was to be played but also policies involved in running the NFL.

For example, the Rams became the first NFL team to have all of its games - both home and

away — televised. Attendance fell from 205,109 fans in 1949 to 110,162 fans in 1950 for all

their home games. Consequently, in 1951 the Rams blacked out home games, and attendance

promptly doubled. The results convinced then Commissioner Bert Bell, that his league could

thrive with TV, but only if the coverage were limited to road games. He forced through the

owners’ meeting amendments to the NFL bylaws that made him the virtual dictator of the

league’s TV policy. Although a federal district court judge ruled in 1953 that the new bylaws

violated antitrust law, the judge implicitly upheld home-game blackouts (Rader, 1990). Bell

turned his belief into official NFL policy and then went out and sold the game on TV.

By the mid-1950s televised pro football was attracting millions of new viewers.

Television helped the novice fan to understand and appreciate the intricacies of the game. As one fan put it:

You watched a game on TV and, suddenly, the wool was stripped from your eyes. What had appeared to be an incomprehensible tangle of milling bodies from the grandstand made sense. TV created a nation of instant experts in no time (Associated Press, 1975).

Newcombe (1966) indicated that TV was the main catalyst in the growth of pro football into the 1960s.

There are people who insist that the love affair between pro football and the American public grew serious only because of TV. Certainly much of the basic 234

drama of this game, if not all of the sidestage maneuvers and subplots, can be c^tured on film....Television has brought die game into towns and middlesize cities, spreading the popularity of the sport across the country much as minor-league clubs and town teams "sold" America on baseball during the first quarter of the century. Today, because of TV, pro football is the big game in town (p.48).

Technological breakthroughs contributed to pro football’s growing popularity. The

perfection in the 1960s of instant replays and slow motion shots allowed fans to experience the

game in an entirely different way from that of the spectator in the stands. Instant replay - first used by CBS in 1963 — and slow motion shots could pinpoint a receiver running a pattern, the vicious blocking of an interior lineman, or the batde like steps of the running back eluding would-be tacklers (Rader, 1990). Color TV and artificial playing surfaces radically altered the appearance of the games. The teams donned bright uniforms with the names of individual players on the backs and logos on their helmets — these techniques were not employed in England for pro soccer until the 1990s. More than one viewer shared the judgment of critic Richard

Kostelanetz (1973), who declared that, compared with telecast games, "live games now seem peculiarly inept, lethargic, and pedestrian."

Television producers must have been licking their lips at the prospect of promoting pro football through their medium. One of the main reasons for the success of this relationship, that exploded in the 1960s with two pro leagues, was the nature of the game. The central requirement of the game — that the offense must move the ball ten yards in four plays or give it up to the opposing team — set up recurring crises points that kept the viewers attention riveted to the TV.

The twenty-second or so pause between plays permitted the viewer to savor the drama. Baseball also contains these pauses that allows the viewer to continually second guess the outcome. Both sports are cyclical with extended periods between offence and defence which make them both conducive to TV viewing.

However, pro football prospered more from TV than any other sport, even baseball

(Rader, 1990). An important factor here concerns the number of games played. In baseball with over 160 and basketball over 80 per team, each game does not make or break a season. But, in 235

football each game is crucial as each team plays only 16 (12 into the 1970s) regular season

games. Consequently, each game is more important in the overall process. That is one reason

why most stadia are full on game-day.

Another point that is appropriate here concerns alternative recreation available at the time

of telecasts. Pro football is covered on Sunday afternoon during the cold season, this not the case

for baseball. Basketball and hockey are hurt by their schedules and overlap of many sports. On

Sunday afternoon what else is there to view except football?

One game, the 1958 championship tilt between the Baltimore Colts and the New York

Giants, seemed to trigger the national mania for pro football that would reach unprecedented

proportions in the following decade.

With only seconds left in the game, Steve Myhra of the Colts calmly kicked a twenty-yard field goal to tie the game, 17-17. For the first time in NFL history, the championship game went into a ’sudden death’ overtime. Some thirty million fans watched their screens intently as Johnny Unitas, the Baltimore quarterback, took ’The Thirteen Steps to Glory,’ marching the Colts down the field for the winning touchdown. Television enabled millions to share in the excitement of a classic sporting contest (Rader, 1990, p.263).

The game became so popular that by 1960 Lamar Hunt spearheaded a group of investors,

many of whom had been unable to purchase an NFL team, who organized the AFL. Television’s

thirst for more football, the wide-open style of play in the AFL, and the 1961 Federal

Broadcasting Act - which allowed leagues to sell rights as a package through the League Office,

enticed the ABC network to pick up AFL games (Jebson, 1981).

In 1961 the NFL signed a TV pact with CBS similar to the one that the AFL had made with ABC, but in this instance a federal judge struck it down as a violation of federal antitrust law. Aroused by this adverse decision, professional sports leagues (including major league baseball) turned to Congress for relief. Package or pooled contracts, in which franchises shared equally in the receipts, were essential to the existence of modem sports leagues, the sport magnates argued in congressional hearings. Otherwise, Rozelle testified, the Leagues could not avoid disparities in competition. None of the witnesses, however, noted that increased profits for all franchises would be likely to result from the monopolistic practice of pooled contracts. 236

Congress quickly passed and President Kennedy signed the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961. The

act permitted the professional clubs to negotiate the sale of national broadcast rights as a single

economic unit. The hasty action of Congress and the President clearly exhibited the clout of

professional sport on Capitol Hill (Rader, 1990).

Much of the happiness of the owners sprang from escalating TV contracts that the Sports

Broadcasting Act of 1961 made possible. In 1964 Rozelle signed a $14 million pact with CBS,

nearly three times the contract of 1962. Under the 1964 contract, each NFL franchise received

over $1 million a year. The AFL signed a five-year, $36-million TV contract with NBC to begin

with the 1965 season, assuring each team approximately $900,000 a year (NFL, 1991).

Television contracts for the games of the combined leagues spiraled upward. By 1970

the merged NFL received nearly $50 million from TV. Monday Night Football was signed for

1970, and ABC acquired the rights — which they have never lost — to televise 13 NFL

regular-season Monday night games in 1970, 1971, and 1972 (NFL, 1991). This was to prove

a very fruitful adventure for the network, enjoying enormous ratings over the history of the

program.

Wives of baseball fans in the 1950s "lost" their husbands for a couple of hours a day

while they tuned into games on the radio. While women saw this as a nuisance rather than a

major problem, they were able to interact with their spouse or motivate them to do things around the house while the game was being broadcast. However, in the 1970s pro football — a game particularly fitted for TV and with a schedule suited to leisure activities - demanded more time

("double headers") and attention, and probably did not help in the fight to reduce the divorce rate in America.

Writing in 1973, Laurent said:

In some homes tiie true football nut devotes Saturday afternoon to college games, most of Sunday to professional games and is back at the set on Monday night for still another session of pro football. What this means to professional fbo&all is a lot of money. According to a survey last month by Broadcasting Magazine, the networks and radio and television stations will shell out a total of $69,903,342 this year for the right to put pro football on radio and television Any advertiser who wishes to buy a one-minute spot during a 237

Monday night football game must pay $80,000. One minute during the Superbowl will cost a record $210,000 (p.55).

Those prices were paid rather willingly because advertisers were - and still are -

convinced that the money was well spent. The Monday night games in 1972, for example, were

reaching about 34 percent of all the persons watching TV at the time. On average ABC claimed

the games were reaching 13.4 million homes (Laurent, 1973)

Such audiences demanded sophisticated production techniques, and football coverage has

probably encouraged more innovation on the part of TV networks than any other sport.

Commonplace by the 1970s was the instant replay, the split screen and the isolated camera

(Laurent, 1973). The images and messages we see and hear in pro football today have been

carefully designed to heighten the dramatic content of the event and emphasize dominant

ideologies in the society as a whole (Coakley, 1994). The pregame analysis, the camera

coverage, the camera angles, the close-ups, the slow-motion shots, the attention given to particular athletes, the announcer’s play-by-play descriptions, and the postgame summary and analysis are all presented to entertain the audience and keep the broadcast sponsors happy

(Kinkema and Harris, 1992)

Obviously there is a great deal of money involved in setting up such a production. With a commitment of this magnitude the networks demand some form of control over the proceedings, and that is what they get. As early as 1960 it was evident that TV was to play a major role in the running of a pro football game. This has often been one of the main criticisms from those who felt TV had imposed itself on the game so that "entertainment" aspects become more important than hie sport itself.

The following is a letter sent to all AFL Executives and Publicity Directors in 1960 regarding TV production requirements:

Memo No. 90 Date August 30, 1960 To: All AFL Executives and Publicity Directors From: A1 Ward RE: TV Production Requirement At the August 25 meeting at New York, ABC officials emphasized the need for cooperation from AFL clubs in order to give television fans a smooth, first class 238

production on nationally telecast games. Here follows some of the production requirements: 1. ABC will take the air shortly (about five minutes) before the game time and it is required that both teams be on the field by that time. By "on the field, " it is meant that the squad be out of the dressing room. They need not be wanning up, or running dummy plays, but may be grouped along sidelines, or huddled with coaches — just someùing that cameras can focus on. Individual player introductions will not be done for telecast because of pressure of time. 2. Coin toss should be completed before air time and dummy toss may then be run through for benefit of TV fans. 3. ABC telecast producer must have some control of public address announcements to prevent any announcement that might prove embarrassing to one of the TV sponsors. 4. Time breaks during time-outs, after scoring plays, and between quarters vary at times and will be controlled by game officials working with TV man stationed along sidelines. Generally, the requirements are for 1:10 after a score, 1:30 during called time-outs and 1:30 between end of first period and start of second period. Between the end of the third period and the start of the fourtih period, the fiill two minutes will be taken in order to add a station break to the regular commercial time. 5. At least two time-outs are needed for each quarter and experience has been that there is no problem in second and fourth quarters, but that the problem sometimes arises in first and third periods. Referee is under instructions that if 10 minutes of play elapses during any period, without a time break, referee will signal for "Referee’s Time Out." This is necessary because sponsors buy network time by the quarters. 6. Home team publicity director should mail to ABC production crew, at least five days before the date of the game, a format of pre-game and halftime activity, a list of music to be played, 35 press passes (sent before the start of the season), six copies of team rosters and avail^le statistics, and name, address and home telephone number of public address announcer.

(Official memorandum of the AFL, obtained from Hall of Fame, Canton, Ohio).

From the above memorandum one can see how much control the networks had over pro

football as early as 1960. Today the production is even more complex and sophisticated, as there

is more at stake, financially.

For many, NFL football remains an outstanding value on TV. Since 1960, the NFL has

steadily enlarged its commitment to showing its product on free home TV throughout the country

— although it has been discussed by a number of sport analysts on TV that pay-per-view is in the

near future. Since the mid-1960s, the League has televised outside NFL games into cities even when the local team was playing a home game — thus greatly increasing the number of top games available for home viewing. Beginning in 1970, NFL games have been shown on all three major networks, and pro football is now available on Sunday afternoons and evenings, as well as 239

Monday nights and occasional Thursdays and late-season Saturdays. Cable TV (Entertainment

Sports Programming Network — ESPN — and Turner Network Television — TNT) has recently

become involved with the NFL. In addition, since 1973, the NFL has televised the home team’s

games in its own city, so long as the game was sold out 72 hours in advance of the kickoff (NFL,

1980). While TV has increasingly dictated the demands to pro football, the NFL, in this

example, has demonstrated its desire and ability to operate a league where every club has a

stable, consistent attendance record. Also, this strengthens the structure of the cartel.

These expanding patterns have given every fan more NFL games on TV and a greater chance to see the key games, both locally and league-wide. In 1962, for example, when the NFL as a league first used network TV, a Washington Redskins fan in the Nation’s capital would have seen a season-long total of 10 games on TV, along with 17 AFL games. Nearly 30 years later, the number of games available on network TV to the same Redskins fan had risen just over three-fold, firom 1962’s total of 27 to 90 in 1981 (Berry, 1981).

Since 1970, pro football has regularly ranked among the nation’s most popular programs, and the Superbowl has often set Nielsen and other TV rating records. Superbowl XX in 1986 replaced the final episode of M*A*S*H as the most-viewed TV program in America, with an audience of 127 million viewers, according to Nielsen figures. In addition to drawing a 48.3 rating and a 70 percent share in the USA, Superbowl XX was televised to 59 countries. An estimated 300 million Chinese viewed a tape delay of the game in March of 1986. NBC Radio figures indicated an audience of 10 million for the game (NFL, 1991).

These free home presentations will continue under the NFL’s present TV policy. Other sports, by contrast, have been less successful with their network packages and seem increasingly dependent on alternative TV arrangements, including pay and cable TV, to cope with growing costs. The NFL’s pattern of network telecasts, arranged under the 1961 sports TV law, has thus served both league and public interests (NFL, 1980).

Berry (1981) writes that the NFL has been the most successful pro sport in negotiating

TV contracts. 240

Nowhere is the NFL monolith more effective than in negotiating television contracts...According to an A.C. Nielsen survey, 1.8 billion people watched NFL football on the Aree networks in 1979. And while many sports on TV have suffered a decline in viewers, pro football continues to attract record numbers....According to Broadcasting magazine, sponsors paid $110,000 for each 30-second ad during the 1980 W L season, up from $95,000 in 1979 Certainly, these statistics will be touted by Rozelle when he begins negotiating a new contract with the networks next year. The speculation is that Rozelle wUl seek a $1 billion, four-year package from the networks.

Berry (1981) was right about Rozelle negotiating a new contract, but underestimated the

draw of the NFL. In 1982, in the midst of an all-out battle between the networks for TV rights

to major sporting events, the three major networks paid $14.2 million per team annually, a huge

windfall for each NFL franchise. To put that in perspective, the aimual TV share of the

Washington Redskins under the new contract exceeded the team’s gross revenues for the previous

season. As the teams received far more money from TV than gate receipts, it was little wonder

that some observers conjured up visions of pro football becoming a studio sport. But as Rader

(1990) claims,

in the mid-1980s, as the networks began to economize, the era of escalating television revenues seemed to be over. The NFL’s 1987 contract with the three networks and ESPN called for the retention of the same total revenues that the teams had received from the 1983 agreement (p.267).

However, Rader (1990) like Berry (1981) had underestimated the demand and competition for pro football. In 1990 Commissioner Tagliabue and Broadcast Committee Chairman Art

Modell announced a four-year TV agreement for 1990-93 for ABC, CBS, NBC, ESPN, and TNT at the NFL annual meeting. The contracts totaled a staggering $3.6 billion, the largest in TV history (NFL, 1990).

Pro Football - A Game Made for TV

The following examines how the nature of pro football is conducive to TV production; the structure of the game allows for this. However, it is apparent to some that TV has become too much of a controlling factor, not always for the good of the game or the spectator. 241

No other team sport was quite so responsive to the needs of TV as pro football. "The

product [we] provide is, of course, simply entertainment," Pete Rozelle once confessed to a

congressional committee (Rader, 1990). At first, the NFL had refused to interrupt the flow of

a game for commercials but by the mid-1970s referees received signals from the TV crews to call

no fewer than fourteen time-outs while each game was in progress. Commercials added at least

thirty minutes to the length of each game. Today, an NFL game today usually lasts longer than

three hours.

With the games being so long and the action so short, pro football has become more

convenient for the fan watching at home than the person who actually goes to the game. The

latter has to sit through all the time-outs, half-time, and other stoppages. The fan at home has

the remote control to change the channel to another game or sport, can go to the bathroom,

kitchen for food or a drink, answer the phone, play with the kids, and even take a shower while

the game is going on. The armchair fan knows that if he missed a play, instant replay, the

half-time show, or the game summary will catch him up with all the action. And many times

with two or three games being shown on Sundays TV spectators can go about their daily chores

and still feel they have viewed all the games being aired that day.

While many would argue that there is nothing like being at the game itself, the comfort of your own home and the techniques utilized by networks to bring the game into your own living room, make watching pro football on TV a very attractive proposition. It may sound strange but

TV brings the spectator closer to the player. For example, the helmet creates a distance between spectator and player, to a point they are almost impersonal. TV, however, can zoom into the player and indicate expressions on the player’s face which may create a closer relationship between fan and player. There are so many cameras positioned at different angles so the TV fan is allowed an insight which is not afforded the spectator in the stands. However, the use of TV to illustrate the game has become so popular, and instant replay so commonplace, that nearly all stadiums have two big screens for the fans to view plays they may have missed, which gives them the opportunity to second-guess the referee. 242

Not everyone sees the relationship between TV and pro football as a positive one.

Horowitz (1974) feels that sports broadcasting policies are definitely not in the interest of the

audience as they restrict viewing choice and make the consumer bear the cost of advertising and

make them suffer the consequences of declining competition in the market place.

Horowitz (1974) lists certain consequences of broadcasting policies that have a

detrimental effect on the public interest. First, areas with small broadcast audience have little

chance of "acquiring" a franchise as there is not much potential for broadcast revenues. Second,

since the broadcast is seen as an entertainment and commercial vehicle, rather than an analytical

and factual report - by the owners and sponsors - critical and controversial commentary is

indirectly sensored. Consequently, the emergence of Frank Gifford and Brent Musburger types,

and the decline of the Howard Cossell and Bill Russell types — although this seems to be

changing. Third, the public’s viewing opportunity is limited as the policies allow networks and

leagues to reduce the number of dates games are broadcasted and the number of simultaneous broadcasts in a certain location. Finally, the structure of sports broadcasting increases prices all the way along the line to the consumer, who ultimately has to bear the burden of higher advertising costs that are not completely absorbed by the sponsor.

Let us consider the role of sponsorship briefly. This is one area where English TV companies have a lot of "catching-up" to do if they are to reach the stage at which their American counterparts have in selling time during pro football games. Again this is another place where

Americans have utilized the commercial potential of sport, while in England TV producers have been content to "follow the leader" rather than initiate change.

The networks use sports programming to attract particular types of commercial sponsors who might take their business elsewhere if TV stations did not cover certain sports. For example, games in major team sports, especially pro football, are ideal for promoting the sales of beer, life insurance, trucks and cars, computers, investment services, credit cards and air travel (Coakley, 1994). 243

The people in advertizing departments of major corporations realize these games attract

male viewers. They also realize, says Coakley (1994),

that most business travelers are men and that many men make family decisions on the purchases of beer, cars, computers, investments, and life insurance. Finally, they may also be interested in associating their product or service with the culturally positive image of sport. This is especially important for a product such as beer that has a dubious image in a country where some people have strong prohibitionist sentiments ^.338).

Horowitz (1974) is very critical of sport broadcasting and he is not alone, as many

opponents of TV and sport have argued that TV has altered sport for the worse, in that sport has

become a slave of TV. Although there are often negative sides to all relationships, in this case the benefits may outweigh the drawbacks. As Jebsen (1981) notes: "Television has created more

fans and larger sources of money for owners and players" (p. 102). Television has brought sport to the masses, developing a type of "cafeteria style," where the audience has many choices of different games or sports, which it did not in the past. Harmond (1976) quoting Time Magazine said: "Through TV, millions of Americans have become thoroughly familiar with sports they once knew only through unreliable and overblown prose of sports writers" ^.87).

Television has also been criticized for the change it has brought about in professional sport, especially football; but as Harmond (1976) writes:

If there is a lesson here, it is that change, as much as tradition, has been an integral part of the history of American Sports. TV requires vast quantities of material to fill up the time between commercials. And here sports offer the medium not only hundreds of hours of ready-made entertainment, but also an escape firom the deluge of taped and filmed TV and a return to the sense of immediacy which has always been the medium’s basic fascination. In sum, television seems to need sports almost as much as sports need television (p.94- 96).

Some sports, because of the way the game is played fit the requirements of TV. As Jiobu and Curry (1984) note: "Breaks in the action, and intervals between innings or quarters, provide natural spots for showing advertisements Rules can be altered unobtrusively to create strategically placed breaks," Op. 154). Pro football incorporated a two-minute warning for TV.

Action stops usually just before the most exciting parts of the game, therefore, capturing the 244

audience for the upcoming commercial. And if the rules do not provide suitable breaks officials

can always call "time-out," (Chandler, 1977).

According to Chandler (1977),

football is a superb television sport because of its patterned and recurring succession of crises — four downs to traverse ten yards and time between plays to permit viewers to guess what the next call might be and to allow announcers to set the stage for subsequent action; replay and comment on the last episode via instant replay are squeezed in, and these are then followed by commercial messages ^.296).

There are a number of reasons therefore that allow sport, and in our case pro football, to benefit and prosper from its relationship with TV. Yet some are very critical of the way the game is presented. Hughes and Coakley (1984) would be in this group. They are concerned with the process of "mystification" which they feel the media perpetuates. "As sport developed a mass following, the basis for interest in sporting events has changed from an appreciation of the technical aspects of the game and of the unique abilities of the players to a general concern for titillating excitement and production-oriented action (i.e., scoring)" (p.57).

As far a pro football is concerned the fan is looking for that "big bomb" from the quarterback to a speedy wide receiver, or the crunching tackle from the linebacker on the running back, or the bone shattering hit from the defensive back on the wide receiver. Hughes and

Coakley (1984) would suggest that the spectator is encouraged to look for this by the attention given to these plays by camera angles, broadcasters comments, sports writers and pre-game articles.

What this represents on the part of TV producers is a recognition that this is the type of action the audience wants to see. However, the media is a powerful medium in controlling and perpetuating this desire on the part of the viewer, i.e., social control. In essence the audience are passive recipients, which according to Hughes and Coakley (1984), is a barrier to acquiring knowledge and understanding.

As die media audience for sporting events has grown by millions over the past three decades, there has been an increasing number of viewers who know litde about the sports they’re watching. They have neither a technical nor an experiential sense of what is going on in conjunction with the events. The events 245

are fun to watch, and being in support of a winning team is exciting. However, such viewers have few resources diey can use to understand the game in depth. They often use superficial criteria in distinguishing good from poor performance and they often do not separate failures due to a lack of effort from failures due to simply being outplayed by more highly trained or skilled opponents. Consequently, ftiese viewers are easily impressed by factors extrinsic to die game itself. And they are much more likely to be attentive to style than to substance within the event. These viewers are also quick to call for "improved" and "inspired" performances from those they watch in spite of the fact that from a viewer’s vantage point they have little access to the background factors and the current conditions that influence those performances ^.60).

However, the notion that TV has cormpted sport and that TV is the "root of all evil" in

sports (Rader, 1984), is a somewhat reactionary and simplistic assumption. The idea that TV has

by itself transformed sports does not hold up under careful examination (Gnineau, 1989). Sports

are social constructions and, as such, they have been gradually created through interaction among

athletes, facility directors, sport team owners, event promoters, media representatives, sponsors,

advertizers, agents, and spectators who have diverse interests and backgrounds.

The dynamics of these interactions have been grounded in power relations and shaped by the resources held by different people at different times. Of course, not everyone has equal influence over changes occurring in sports, but media interests are not the only factors producing changes in sports or in die relationship between sports and media. It is unrealistic to think that media people have been able to shape sports to fit their interests alone (Coakley, 1994, p.335).

Besides the notion that individuals have the capacity to create and construct their own reality, Coakley (1994) is suggesting that the media, including TV, do not operate in a political and economic vacuum. For example,

the media in the USA has been and continues to be regulated by various government agencies and policies; therefore it must negotiate contracts with teams and leagues under certain legal constraints. Economic factors also constrain the media by setting limits on the value of sponsorships and advertizing time, and by shaping the climate in which types of programming, such as pay- per-view sports, might be profitable. Finally, the media are constrained by social Actors that inform people’s decisions on whether they will read about, listen to, or watch sports (p.336).

These social factors influence the way images and messages are presented and the way the audience look at and interpret them. Certain themes are selected and emphasized and when people view sports these themes may inform their own ideas about the world. For example, TV broadcasts of sports in the USA emphasize success through competition, hard work, obedience 246

to authority and so forth. The idea that success can also be based on empathy, autonomy,

cooperation, compromise, equality and intrinsic satisfaction gets little attention (Prisuta, 1979).

Chandler (1983) has alluded to the "success theme" underlying images and messages in

American media sports. She noted that in American commentaries there was a heavy emphasis

on competition, dominance and final scores. In England, however, the media downplayed competition, winning, and the final score. Chandler (1983) argues:

(In Britain] where mobility is usually achieved by sponsorship, the importance of competition in all facets of public and private life is played down....TV executives working in Britain and the USA thus have to deal with quite different public attitudes towards the importance of competition. I am not suggesting that the British do not want "their side" to win; but winning is by no means "the only thing." I do not know of the British equivalent of the American term "loser"; the nearest is probably "also-ran." Nor does one speak of "winners"; the equivalent term varies according to the context, but in educational activity it would be "high-fliers." In both soccer and cricket, it is honorable to draw; indeed, to gamble on winning rather than to play for a draw, may be regarded as simpleminded and rash, whatever the outcome (p.21).

Coakley (1994) in interpreting Chandler's (1983) comparison says the emphasis is on winners, losers, and final scores in the USA. Commentators talk of "shoot-outs," and sudden- death play-offs instead of ties; success is defined as dominance over others and "big hits" rather than learning, enjoyment, and competing with others. "Commentators don’t "tell it like it is" as much as they tell it in a way that fits the interests of people with power and influence in society,"

(Coakley, 1994, p.345).

Making these kinds of comparisons is interesting and a valuable addition to sport sociology research. However, this type of dichotomy — English compared to American system

— is not as "clean" as it may seem. The competitive reward structure indicative of American culture and sport in general has also been a facet of English society and sport; and "ties" - while frowned upon — do occur in the NFL, the NHL, and college football.

It is important to understand that Chandler (1983) wrote this over ten years ago, and as it has already been noted changes that have occurred in Britain over the last 15 years have had a considerable impact on behavior in society and especially in pro soccer. I am not stating that 247

"winning" in England is emphasized to same degree as it is in America, but people are beginning

to define their involvement in sport — pro sport particularly — in the same way as Americans do

(the move to three points for a victory instead of two, emphasizing the need to win, is am

example of this). The distance between the values and attitudes of those controlling and involved

on pro sport in England and the USA is beginning to diminish in the drive (especially among pro

soccer people) for success on-and-off the field.

It seems obvious to me, that today the networks put a priority on selling sport as a

commodity rather than the game itself; they are also concerned with quantity rather than quality,

the result being a crude presentation much of the time. Of course, with the number of telecasts

increasing there is a need for more broadcasters. It would seem that many of them do not have

to learn the trade in the way that many of their predecessors did. This could be one of the many

contributing factors to the decline of quality commentating.

In certain respects TV and sports have become two sides of the same coin. The financial

support from TV for sports like pro football has become so substantial that rules, format, and

scheduling have been molded and adopted to meet the commercial interests of TV. Similarly,

TV has become dependent upon pro football, and other sports, to fulfill many of its progranuning

needs. Sport is the one type of programming that is able to generate large TV audiences on the

otherwise dead periods Saturday and Sunday afternoons.

The medium of TV has played a strong role in the growth of pro football, certainly over

the last 30-40 years. It has certainly been the most powerful vehicle in the way the game is presented to the public, and this presentation has had a pronounced e^ect of how the public perceives the game. Nonetheless, while we accept all this, it does not mean the print media has disappeared from the scene. This group of individuals have certainly played their part in the growth of pro football in the twentieth century.

There are probably more magazines devoted to pro football today than ever before.

There are other sports magazines, such as. Snorts Illustrated, that probably devote more print to 248

pro football over the year than any other sport. And, newspapers also allocate a great deal of

space to the game, even out of season.

All these factors above, have culminated to help promote a sport that has now developed more interest and attention, in terms of TV ratings, newspaper and magazine space, than any other sport in the USA. CHAPTER Vn

EMPLOYEE ROLE

This chapter analyzes changes in the role of the pro football player over the last 100 years, and the social context that allowed for and facilitated these changes. Salary increases, notoriety, players’ unions, and the relationship between players and owners, players and agents, and players and coaches/managers are all included in the explanation of the change that has produced the modern-day player.

How has the role of managers and coaches changed? What effect has the press had on the emergence of managers and coaches as central players in the development of the game? And, how has rationalization and technocracy changed the way they approach the task at hand? These are some of the questions pertinent to this chapter.

Finally, although there are numerous inequalities in modern sport, the principle is one of equality. While there is evidence to suggest the existence of racial discrimination in pro sport

(Best, 1987, Coakley, 1994, Edwards, 1973, Eitzen and Yetman, 1977, Lapchick, 1986,

Leonard, 1984), the institution of sport has provided greater avenues to success for the black athlete than most other areas in society. In this particular section reference will be made mainly to the USA rather than England, since the black athlete has played a much greater role in the history of American football than English football. One of the main reasons for this, of course, is that approximately 13 percent of the population in the USA is black, compared to approximately two percent in England.

249 250

ENGLAND

Introduction

As soon as pro soccer became a full-time employer the identity of the players, and eventually the managers, began to change. The advent of unions, agents and the era of PR (TV, press) all affected the relationship between owners and workers (players, managers). These developments had a considerable impact on the modernization of the game and the evolution of the contemporary pro soccer player and manager.

Earlv Professionals

The first pro soccer players were part-timers, but with the emergence of the FL full-time professionalism soon followed. As a result pro soccer players became workers in the labor market, subservient to the owners and under their control. Although pro players received recognition (instant fame), were well paid compared to the majority of working-class employees, and treated well by the wealthier clubs, this was not universal, and their status was questionable among the press and public in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.

It is likely that there was between 300,000-500,000 registered players in Edwardian

England. In 1908 the Athletic News reported that 5,000 professionals were registered with the

FA, then two years later the FA reported a figure of 6,800. In 1914 the Player’s Union listed

158 clubs engaging 4,740 players (Mason, 1980).

What did the first professionals earn? Earnings of early paid players showed a good deal of variation. It was not unusual for players in 1885 to have a job outside of the game. When

West Bromwich Albion won the FA Cup in 1888 their weekly wage bill was only ten pounds.

Before the mid-1890s few clubs employed many full-time professionals (Mason, 1980).

The emergence of the Football League (FL) in 1888-89, and intensified competition between elite clubs and the increased willingness on the part of the public to pay to see games, gradually undermined the role of the part-timer as clubs struggled to obtain the best players. 251

Also, evidence exists of earnings for the favored minority involving player’s names to be used

in advertizing (Mason, 1980).

There are no specific listings that would permit a detailed breakdown of player

backgrounds, but most available evidence overwhelmingly suggests that pro players were drawn

from the working-class. It appears that both skilled and unskilled workers attained soccer

employment, provided they possessed the requisite skills on the field. The first professionals from Scotland and Wales seem to have been skilled artisans prior to their soccer careers. By the

1890s most pro players did not hold a job other than their positions on a team. Hard manual labor in factories jeopardized athletic prowess.

Sunderland Football Club turned the player dependence on nonsoccer work to an advantage. A director explained the success of his team in recruiting players by declaring that

Sunderland was not always able to outbid other clubs, but "we find our men employment and teach them trades," (in Tischler, 1981).

With legalized professionalism, the establishment of the FL, and the subsequent increase in match attendance, directors encouraged their players to concentrate solely on soccer.

Gradually professionals left the mines and factories and worked full-time at the game. This tendency, which the club supported and financed as an attempt to gain a competitive advantage over their rivals, also completed the process of professionalization among England’s better players.

In 1901-2 a new maximum wage came into effect which was four pounds per week or

208 pounds per year. Of course many clubs and players were fined for not adhering to this rule

32 of the FA. How did this compare with the earnings of other industrial workers? The answer is pretty favorably. But the pro player did experience one unique restraint upon his freedom of movement: the retain and transfer system. It was an important but necessary curb on free competition (Mason, 1980).

The transfer system and the Maximum Wage Rule inhibited the exercise of freedom of contract. The objectives of directors and players were comparable to the goals of employers and 252

employees in society as a whole. A primary determinant of labor relations in soccer was the

retreat by owners from a philosophy of laissez-faire. This was restrictive to players and helped

maintain team owner control (Vamplew, 1988).

The position of pro players was set forth by the directors of the Manchester City Football

Club in a manner that typified the relationship elsewhere. Among their powers, directors could

"elect such persons as they shall approve to be playing members of the company upon such terms

as they shall thinkfit," (in Tischler, 1981, p.90).

Labor-coital or master-servant polarities were not merely convenient metaphors

(Tischler, 1981). Team and League legislation was predicated on the need to control labor and the labor market, as the transfer system and the Maximum Wage Rule demonstrate. A pro player negotiated with his employer like any other worker. Yet, while he sold his labor to a team, his job did not consist of operating a machine his employers owned, as it might have in another line of work. In a sense, the soccer player was both the operator and the "machine," and his labor was somewhat different from that of other workers. Still, the player ("machine") was dependent on his employer and was vulnerable to the forces of the marketplace.

Writing on this relationship Tischler (1981) states: ’Master’ and ’servant’ became part of everyday sports writing jargon and juxtaposed in describing the control of the football business. Directors reassert^ the view that they were entitled to complete governance of football whenever players question^ existing power relationships. The pro player was perceived as a replaceable part in the machinery of entertainment production. Because he controlled neither his own labor nor the business that depended on it, he negotiated the best terms possible for the sale of his abilities. In this context he was a ’servant’ who frequently attained an identity only as a ’position’ on a football pitch ^.91).

This type of relationship was a normal part of everyday life. The pendulum of sports power swung towards the employers, men whose notions of industrial relations were dominated by paternalism; employees would be looked after if they behaved themselves and should be grateful for what they were given (Vamplew, 1988).

As far as working conditions were concerned, much depended on the individual club.

Leading First Division and Southern League sides in the Edwardian period looked after their players. Clubs were inclined toward paternalism and leading clubs were generous to players in 253

situations of serious injury. The provision of leisure facilities at the ground, winter employment,

excursions, and the payment of doctors’ and hospital bills, often in excess of what a player

obtained in wages, all testified to that (Vamplew, 1988).

The apparent irony of employing men in an occupation that had once been considered

"play" was not always accepted gracefully — today play and sport are almost polar opposites on

the play-work continuum, however, at this time, the majority of people were not willing to accept

soccer as anything other than play. Although the spread of professionalism ultimately was a

consequence of the growth of the leisure business and was encouraged through a more general development of market relationships, the paradox wherein play became work was used by sports writers to demean die worker. Certainly, some felt, if soccer players were paid to play, their income was ill-deserved. Many believed soccer players spent their time in a "most unsatisfactory manner" when not playing. It was thought that with all the free time they had on their hands they were likely to get involved in gambling and drinking. The image of pro players that emerged from directors, amateur purists, sportswriters and therefore the public, was one of lazy, prone to vice and inferior to the "better sort" who maligned them.

Another criticism that emerged after 1900 was that most pro players were paid several times that of other workingmen. West Ham United serves as an example. By 1905 almost all of the players were professional and had made a job out of the game. In 1906 the average wage for the whole team (a pool of 30 players) was two pounds and ten shillings (five dollars) per week over the whole year. A comparison of players’ wages with other workers in West Ham is instructive. In 1906 casual dockers earned between five shillings and sixpence (50 cents) and one pound two shillings and sixpence (two dollars) for a week’s work. Plumbers’ and joiners’ average wage was two pounds and seven shillings ($4.50) for a forty four hour week. Tram drivers made two pounds and three shillings ($4.25) for a sixty hour week and men employed in the building trades averaged two pounds and eight shillings ($4.50) for a forty four hour week

(Korr, 1978). 254

The wages offered players to join West Ham shows not only that soccer players were paid

well but that the Directors recognized the need to spend money to boost the level of the team.

Between 1904 and 1907 the club purchased or signed on more than thirty new players, which

meant transfer fees, signing on bonuses and higher wages. By 1907 all first team players earned between three and four pounds per week during the season (Korr, 1978).

Although well paid soccer players had more in common with the workingman than the middle-class, whose salary bracket they were in, they had no control over working schedules, conditions or strategies, and made more money for their employers. However, the brevity of a soccer career posed problems — injuries, age - in other words it was not was it was all made out to be.

Factors contributing to personnel turnover were, injuries, transfers, demotions, and retirements. Frequently injuries necessitated an expansion in the number of teams retained.

While the 11 starters and a few reserves constituted the squads of the early 1880s, wealthier teams sometimes employed as many as 25 players by the turn of the century — when the FL expanded to a two division, 40 team format in 1905, member clubs were employing over 1,000 players. Insurance companies as early as the late 1880s became involved and issued policies for injuries (Tischler, 1981).

Poor medical and training facilities and extended time lost to injuries represented another similarity in conditions between industry and the soccer business. Flayers were routinely dismissed or transferred when their skills diminished, and their departure, if at all recognized, was reported in an oH'-hand manner.

Players with five years of continuous service to a team were eligible for benefit

(testimonial) matches, however, these fell primarily to players at the top of their profession.

Most former soccer players were obliged to settle for less rewarding careers once they retired from the field.

The short nomadic careers of pro footballers differentiated players from other workers at the end of the nineteenth century. The separation from families and friends, general uprooting of their lives, and recognition of the realities of pro 255

football work terms and conditions prompted many to return to their native districts. Nevertheless, the practice of recruiting pro players from distant and diverse areas of Great Britain continued through the early part of the twentieth century (Tishler, 1981, p. 100).

The better, more proficient players, gravitated to the most successful teams that offered

the best contracts. The evolution of the soccer business created a contingent of men who worked

at the game to make a living. Baker (1979) felt that soccer provided the working-class player in late Victorian England the opportunity to compete on even terms with the middle and upper classes, and to heighten a sense of self. Soccer was one of the few avenues for young working-class men to receive public adulation and have their claim for self importance internally satisfied. Baker (1979) wrote:

In 1906 George Sims observed urchins kicking paper balls in the back alleys of the East End of London, in the shadow of West Ham United. In Lancashire and Yorkshire, especially, football was apparently played in every street on weekday afternoons and Saturday mornings. For boys in Manchester the term ’outdoor games’ had only one meaning, and that is football, as played under the Association code....Beginning early on Saturday afternoon, they engaged in their own game of soccer for two hours, then went to the stadium to cheer their local club. For amateur and profession^ alike, football transcended the necessities of life (p.247).

Unions and Working-Class Identity

The following illustrates the emergence of a players’ union. The players soon realized they needed to organize themselves as a group if they were to improve conditions of work and salaries. Workers in other occupations led the way for pro soccer players, and like other labor/owner relationships these developments accentuated the dichotomy between the middle and working-class and reaffirmed the identity of the working-class pro soccer player.

After 1880 the framework for labor relations within the soccer business could be defined as managers and directors controlling finances and labor. This owner control contributed to considerable turbulence. However, power relationships in commercialized sports were skewed against the professionals, and there was little to balance the scales of power. Any professional who felt aggrieved could resort to law, though the courts were never really a refuge of the 256

working-class, and few sportsmen seem to have exercised the right. "Footballers may have been

intimidated by the FA rule which forbade any player from taking legal action against his club

without the prior consent of the FA Council," (Vamplew, 1988, p.242). The growth of the

Association Football Players’ Union (AFTU) is interesting in that it throws a little more light on

players’ attitudes to their position in the game if not wider issues. Freedom of contract in

1897-98 prompted the formation of a union in 1907.

Why it began at this time is unclear. What is clear, however, is that in an age when

other workers were joining unions in unprecedented numbers - from 1,559,000 in 1893 to

4,145,000 in 1914 — sports professional demonstrated a marked reluctance to do likewise. Only

in soccer was there an effort before 1914 to establish a permanent union organization (Vamplew,

1988).

The relationship between the club and the players was determined, in great part, by the

unique contractual situation that existed in soccer. Once a player signed an agreement with a club

he was registered on its books with the FA. The player could not sell his services to another club

unless he was released by the club that held the rights of him (Korr, 1978). Also, a season at

a time contract was a concern to the players.

One historian of the Union has speculated that perhaps the establishment of it had

something to do with the adoption of company status and the loss of personal contact with players

by the boards of directors. Yet this was nothing new by 1907 and it is more likely, according

to Vamplew (1988), that it had to do with the passing of the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, which

clarified and publicized the legal status of trade unions, and with the realization that the League

clubs were no longer likely to overthrow the maximum-wage legislation. "The major objective of the AFPU was to promote and protect the interests of the members by endeavoring to come to amicable arrangements with the governing football authorities with a view to abolishing all restrictions which affect the social and financial position of players, and to safeguard their right at all times," (Vamplew, 1988). 257

The Union at first collapsed, but was revived again in 1907. Fears of reprisal for being

associated with unionism and the rapid changes in personnel among players made organization

difficult. The geographical dispersion of clubs and the high rate of labor turnover was

instrumental here, but perhaps the main reason was the lack of community interest amongst

professionals, even in the same sport, "deficiency accentuated by the competitive nature of an

occupation which always has to have winners and losers," (Vamplew, 1988). The pre-emption

of welfare functions by employers and sports authorities could also have weakened moves towards unionization. At the first Annual General Meeting (AGM) in 1908 more than 1,300 players from 70 teams had joined the union. The goal seemed to be the removal of all restrictions, save the right of retention of professionals’. Also, the Union undertook benevolent work — money to widows and destitute former players. It also represented its members in disputes with leagues and clubs (Mason ,1980).

Players received considerable popular support in spite of the efforts of the owner-controlled press to alienate the public from pro players. The trade union support of pros in 1909 was probably a reciprocal response to the money players raised from matches played to help striking union men in other trades. This represents at least some form of solidarity and a working-class consciousness. This association of "togetherness" on the part of workers and union men represented the "US" and "THEM" mentality that was to stay with the British public well into the 1970s.

Flayers saw the structural similarity between the soccer business and other commercial concerns as the dispute brought to light the fundamental issue of control. When owners withdrew their permission for the playing of a match to benefit the players’ benevolent fund in the Spring of 1909, pro players contemplated the possibility of organizing matches by themselves, without directional participation. Tischler (1981) believes that owner resistance to player control was rooted in the desire to retain existing class relationships. Also, as far as the authorities were concerned benevolent activities were fine, but attempts to improve employment conditions merely antagonized those in charge (Vamplew, 1988). 258

As preparations to cancel (strike) opening-day matches were undertaken, owners offered

a truce to players pending the fiilfillment of scheduled matches. After many confrontations the

FA, the General Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU), and the Players’ Union finally agreed to

compromise in July 1909, when the Players’ Union was assured that their basic grievances would

be considered in the course of the negotiations. According to this agreement, the Flayers’ Union

dropped its affiliation with the GFTU (Tischler, 1981).

The events of this period established the validity of the self-perceptions of players as

workingmen. With the formation of a successful players’ union, soccer players grew more

discerning and militant. By 1910 new arrangement were completed. The agreed upon settlement

did at least allow the top players the opportunity to increase their salary (Wagg, 1984).

However, as far as control in general and freedom of contract was concerned, the players had

lost by a wide margin. The retain and transfer system remained as before. Also, only 45 out

of 158 clubs employing professionals had any connection with the union. It became more and

more difficult to organize the players (Mason, 1988).

Nonetheless, as Mason (1980) states, it was not exactly what the players wanted but it

seemed attractive when you considered the alternatives.

However ’cramped and confined,’ the profession was never short of working-class aspirants who, although not necessarily believing that such a life was all beer and skittles, were convinced that it was a qualitative improvement on working for a living, with higher and hopefully more regular earnings, enhanced status in the community, especially among fellow workmen, and the possibility of glory as well. If players played for ten years, invested well, earned close to the maximum wage they could set themselves up in some comfort at the end of their career ^.118).

However, there are a lot of "ifs" here, and the statement only seems to refer to a minority of players.

As mentioned in Chapter Five, money became a vital influence on developments in soccer as soon as families realized that the sport paid regular working wages. By the 1920s soccer was an established employer in a community where jobs were scarce (Hopcraft, 1968). 259

The soccer player as representative of "the people" had become the true working-class

hero. He came from the streets where spectators lived. The soccer stadium was within walking

distance from where he played as a child, kicking at makeshift balls, perhaps just bindings of

rags, against doorways for goals. There was an urgency in this backstreet soccer that Eton and

Rugby had never known. It had nothing to do with indolent elegance and taking hard knocks

with stoical good grace (Glanville, 1979).

The financial status of pro soccer players were well below the standards experienced by

today’s players. By the mid-1930s a First Division player could not expect to take home more than 12 pounds a week, even with his bonuses for playing in the first team and for winning a match. This period had drama, and the huge and roaring crowds, and it had brilliance of performance, but off the field the player was commonly closer to austerity than to flamboyance and luxury.

Wage militancy grew among soccer players during the late 1930s and early 1940s. Up to the late 1930s pro players had made much more than their working-class counterparts in industry, but, after World War n wages rose throughout the country and differences were not that great. By the 1950s many players had acquired a new reference group, entertainers, but their income was below radio and TV stars (Wagg, 1984).

There was widespread abuse of the League’s maximum wage ceiling and illegal payments were rife after World War n. Many entertainers began to command big fees for radio and TV appearances and this, in turn, enhanced their earning power in variety. This left pro soccer players some way behind and many, especially the more successful ones, were not slow to draw the comparison. After all, throughout the "Austerity Years" they had played to packed houses

(Wagg, 1984).

Stan Cullis, beginning his managerial career at that time, notes;

Since I first set my sights on soccer as a career 1 have known almost every type of football fiddle. 1 have been involved in quite a few myself and 1 am not ashamed. 1, like hundreds of other footballers, have been driven to it by the miserly attitude of the authorities in their assessment of fair payment for services rendered (in Wagg, 1984, p. 104-5). 260

These illicit payments — money paid through anonymous donors, gifts of jewellery for

players’ wives and so on — ultimately strengthened the hand of the Players’ Union, precisely

because they were so common. The familiar argument was applied: if they are all doing it why

not get it out in the open (Wagg, 1984).

Its significant that many players went along with wage restriction but called for an end

to the retain-and-transfer regulations, and in 1960 when this came to a head the FL would not

concede to the players or their union. Why did players respond in this way? Through the retain-and-transfer system clubs could still decide for themselves whether players stayed or went

elsewhere and, if they stayed on what terms and if they moved to which clubs. There was also the question of benefits — an accumulated bonus for long service — but this was purely discretionary. Clubs did not have to pay them and many were transferred before they qualified for full benefits.

I believe players’ perception of being controlled and not accepted as equals by the owners and upper echelons of the club was the other reason they sought to abolish the retain-and-transfer system. During the 1950s there were many instances of players being treated as second-class citizens. For example, Willie Watson reported that the FA had once accused him of over charging by 16 shillings and three pence ($1.50) on his expenses for an England match. In 1954, according to Len Shackleton, England players had been given third-class rail tickets for an international match against Germany, while FA officials travelled first-class and, the day after playing for England against Scotland, Wilf Mannion had been obliged to stand in the corridor of the Glasgow to Darlington train. Newcastle United had refused tickets for the 1954 Cup Final to Jimmy Nelson and Jimmy Richardson, both of whom had played for the club in the 1932 Final against Arsenal. Jimmy Greaves (one of the "greats" of English soccer history), who played for

Chelsea in the late 1950s, recalls that he had never once been allowed into the directors’ box at

Stamford Bridge (Chelsea’s ground). On one occasion, the club secretary had led Greaves away from the club offices by the arm, pointing sternly to a notice reading "Office Staff Only"; a few 261

weeks later, Greaves, in front of the rest of the Chelsea team, asked the secretary to leave the

dressing room, drawing his attention to another notice which read "Players Only" (Wagg, 1984).

Of course, this pattern of ritual exclusion was an expression of the economic relationship

between players and clubs, and, in particular, of the retain-and-transfer system. Players were

cognizant of this and wanted to escape from the confines of working-class "serfdom" and be

treated as other entertainers were.

Prosperity and Freedom?

This section discusses wages and the move by players and the players’ union to abolish

the maximum player’s wage and the retain-and-transfer system and the events that surrounded

this.

The years 1960 to 1963 were of crucial importance to British soccer. They marked the

end of the total dominance of the game’s boardrooms over the players. It was an extraordinary

anomaly that although the pro player had for eighty years decided the nature and manner of his

sport only now did he cease to be the voiceless product of its management.

Two events, the first in 1961 and the second two years later, brought the change. First

came the abolition of the League’s stipulation of a maximum player’s wage; then came the High

Court judgement in the case of EASTHAM VERSUS NEWCASTLE UNITED FOOTBALL

CLUB LTD AND OTHERS, which declared the League’s system of retain and transfer of players to be an unjustifiable restraint of trade. The effect of these two events was to make every pro player a firee agent, just like a journalist or an insurance salesman, able to negotiate his pay and his length of service with a club, subject only to the kind of contractual conditions which protect employer and employed against unreasonableness from each other. It sounds a proper and normal enough situation now, but it needed the threat of a strike and Eastham’s stubborn insistence on justice to bring it about (Hopcraft, 1968).

It is interesting to note that similar events were taking place in the USA. What does this tell us? Is it just coincidence or were professional athletes, with the help of their agents, in both 262

countries, beginning to realize their earning capacity and market value. This is one stage in the

commercialization of sport. Athletes are the most important product of pro sport, yet scholars

often ignore their role in the revolution of this institution and write about the commercialization

of sport as if individuals were not involved. Professional athletes in England and the USA at the

beginning of the 1960s were seeking respectability and were aware that they needed to acquire

the most lucrative contract possible for themselves and their families. Reasons for this could

have been agents and sponsors’ role, a changing identity of athletes - becoming entertainers -

and the realization that what they do is a job not a game anymore — rationalization.

Lets first consider the question of wages. The FL had always laid down a maximum rate

to which players could be paid. In 1960 the figures were 20 pounds ($40) during the playing

months and 17 pounds ($17) in the summer close season. But whereas smaller sums paid before

the war had kept pro players generally up alongside the skilled workers of industry - and well

ahead of the unskilled, to say nothing of the legion of unemployed — a wage like this was "small

beer to what could be earned on the production lines of some of the country’s post-war,

streamlined factories," (Hopcraft, 1968, p.40).

Taking these figures, what was the situation at its best — including bonuses - for a

leading pro player? Even in the unlikely event of his being the one which won the League

championship and the FA Cup and got as far as the final tie of the European Cup his pay from his club would not legally rise above 1,500 pounds ($3,000) for the year. Even with a free house

and a good deal of first class travel about Britain and the Continent this hardly added up to a position of affluent abandon.

The players knew they were under paid; so did the clubs. The consequence was that for years under-the-counter payments were made to players. They were whispered, denied, confessed, denied again, but they were irregular in more ways than one, and many leading players thought themselves obliged to cash in on their fame by taking jobs outside soccer to boost their assured incomes. They became car salesmen, typewriter salesmen. The jobs were not sinecures; the value of the players lay in their physical presence alongside the firms’ product. 263

At this time the Professional Footballers Association (PFA) the players’ union, decided

to take action. The pro soccer player’s career was a short one, and so a new way of earning a

living would have to be found at a time when most specially talented men in other fields are still

below the peak of their careers. The PFA appreciated the players predicament. In the middle

of the 1960-61 season the PFA issued their strike notice. They asked for the abolition of maximum wage and for the introduction of three-year contracts for players. The FL capitulated on the question of the maximum wage and apparently accepted the principle that the old retain and transfer system had to go (Hopcraft, 1968).

As a group the clubs’ directors had to be heavily censured, as they were at the time by several newspapers, for their failure to turn the apparent agreement into practice. Some months later the League decided, at its Annual General Meeting (AGM), that it would still apply the retain-and-transfer system. They were defeated in the High Court, and the case of George

Eastham, whose personal dispute with Newcastle United had led to the action in the first place, had already been settled (Hopcraft, 1968).

Eastham was an England international and a key figure in Newcastle United’s team, but he and the club management fell out and he asked for a transfer. The club declined, and put him on a list of retained players at his old wage. The inequity of the retain-and-transfer system was that the clubs were wholly in control. If Newcastle had decided to pay him only the minimum wage of e i^ t pounds a week Eastham would have been forced to stay with them unless he could persuade the League Management Committee to intervene under an appeals rule.

He appealed and the Management Committee decided it had no cause to intervene. The acrimony between the player and Newcastle’s management developed. Eastham did not play soccer for a year. Backed by the PFA he began the legal action which eventually freed all players from a system Eastham’s counsel described as being "like the bartering of cattle and a relic of the Middle Ages," (Hopcraft, 1968, p.44). 264

Aspirations and Opportunities

The following discusses the opportunity for and desire of players to become socially

mobile and improve their status. What factors allowed for this and were they successfiil?

Pro players were now aware of their value and were not afraid to ask for what the market

place allowed, and were seeing themselves above other working-class trades such as miners,

laborers and so forth. The dominant mood of professional soccer players now appeared to brook

no proletarian sentiment or association (Wagg, 1984). However, while the retain-and-transfer

system was declared to be an unreasonable restraint on the player, freedom of contract was not

brought about in legislation by the FA until the end of the 1970s.

Player solidarity was bound to dissipate by the elimination of the maximum wage.

Wealthy clubs now knew that they could not easily hold on to top players against their will, but

players at poorer clubs could not afford court cases, and rely on publicity, therefore, they were

often stuck at a certain club.

From the mid-1960s to the present day many pro soccer players have become

"personalities" - known for their notability as much as their skill. Club administrators realized the importance of the commercial side of the game that their predecessors found so distasteful; soccer would have to "sell itself." They felt their was a need to establish a kind of middle-class legitimacy for the game — get rid of the "cloth cap image." Therefore, they promoted a new breed of soccer player — brains not just feet.

Public relations, although the actual term was not coined until 1924, had begun as an activity in the USA in the early 1900s when big business combines had used de fact PR men to deal with press criticism. Public relations people had been employed by candidates in US elections from the 1930s and, by the end of the 1950s, both major political parties in Britain had followed suit — Tory Central Office in the late 1940s and Labour in the wake of their election defeat in 1959. By 1963 there were 34 MPs who had past or present connections with public relations or advertizing firms (Turner and Pearson, 1966). More and more individuals and institutions were looking to specialists in this field to "handle" any relationship they might have 265

to the media. To leading soccer players, among others, these trends held out attractive

commercial possibilities. As figures of established significance in working-class culture they

would be ideal vdiicles for the propagation through advertizing of the new consumerism. A

number of them were very well aware of this, and so was the Chairman of the Players’ Union,

Jimmy Hill, appointed in 1956 (Wagg, 1984).

Hill’s ambition for pro soccer was clear: as a body they must secure for themselves a

more exalted social position in the world and, with that in mind, they must impose themselves

on and exploit the market place. Hill (1961) expressed these hopes in his book Striking for

Success published in 1961. In it he declares: "I uphold the professional’s prerogative of squeezing every penny out of his situation" (p. 122). A little later he remarks that: "Most pro footballers today have come from poor homes There is no doubt that, as the years go by, football gives them a chance to mix in rather higher social spheres" (p. 134).

The PFA’s campaign in the early 1960s was essentially for greater freedom for the player to follow his game. For some of the star performers in soccer the "new deal" has clearly meant an everyday life transformed from the kind previous generations led. The rewards for successful soccer are now more nearly commensurate with the players’ positions as vastly popular entertainers. A leading player, negotiating his pay and his bonuses with his club, can now assure himself a basic salary of perhaps 5,000 to 10,(XK) pounds a week, and his incentive bonuses are far in excess of the end-of-term prizes the clubs used to hand out.

While this kind of money is only allocated to the star players on the big clubs in the

Premier League, the majority of players can still make a very respectable living out of the game, but the salaries will vary from club to club and division to division. Players in Division H and m make decent money, hut many of them have another job out of season, and in some cases, in season. Some of these players even prefer to play for a top semi-pro team, which is a part-time commitment, so they can make more money from this coupled with another occupation.

While the majority of players make a respectable living today, only a minority could be considered in the superstar bracket, as the term suggests - one aspect of pro sport which has not 266

changed in England and the USA. The difference between salaries and notoriety of the top pros

and those playing in the lower divisions is still great, as it was when all four divisions first came

into being (a similar comparison in the USA would be in pro baseball when comparing minor to

major league players). The standard of player in the lower divisions has dramatically improved,

but the gap between prosperity has not changed that much. For example, Manchester United,

Arsenal, Liverpool, Aston Villa still dominate the game because they offer the largest contracts

and provide players with the best opportunities to play in European competitions and receive

exposure that will increase their chances of selection into the National team.

Managers

This section analyzes the changing role of the manager from obscurity to celebrity status.

It is evident that managers gradually imposed themselves on the running of the club and the make-up of the team

The running of the majority of pro soccer clubs has remained firmly in the hands of amateurs: of directors who are often obsessed soccer fans but who have never known the game from where it really counts, on the field in the toughest competition. These directors, certainly prior to World Warn, have often denied managers the autonomy they needed to run the club.

Only in the last 30-40 years have managers asserted themselves to the point that they alone were responsible for the team line-up, what players should be sold and what players should be bought.

Like players they became celebrities and are aware of their market value. Also, the emergence of the bureaucratic nature of running clubs ironically gave them more freedom to make decisions. Each level of the hierarchy demanded specialists who knew what they were doing. This specialization in knowledge of coaching convinced some directors that managers knew their job, so "leave them alone."

As recent as the 1940s autonomy in team matters was not something directors willingly conceded. Indeed, a number of clubs did not have a full-time manager until after World War II.

Therefore the directors role was usually covert, and they were prepared to employ a manager on 267

the old basis of "Front Man and Office Boy," (Wagg, 1984). However, this became out of sorts

with the media and players after World War II. Players, media, and the general public were

beginning to resent the desk bound manager, and were demanding people who really knew the

game (often ex-players) and were willing to put a tracksuit on and get out in the field.

By the 1950s managers became the center of attention, taking responsibility for losses, tactics, wins, and signings. The assumption existed that the managerial hand alone guided team performance, which was fine as far as directors were concerned and they allocated more autonomy to managers.

During this decade — after a history of quick sackings of managers — managers were given more freedom in the day-to-day workings of the club and "Great Team Managers" were bom - characters like Matt Busby and Stan Cullis became as famous as any player in the game.

Then with the help of the media other managers like Don Revie, Bill Shankly, and Alf Ramsey became the focus of attention. These people have since become legends of the game, not unlike

Vince Lombardi, George Halas, and Paul Brown for pro football in the USA.

One of the most frequently used words in the soccer world since the 1960s has been

"sell" — soccer has got to sell itself — and managers found themselves at the heart of this process. Managers soon found out that there was a price to pay for failure once more and more money became a part of the game.

Writing in 1968 Hopcraft stated:

The turnover in Football League managers is notoriously heavy, and it tells its own story. On average since the end of the Second World War 25 percent of them a year have changed jobs. This reflects the tensions in professional football, the anxiety for success which grips directors. But it reflects too the failure of the managers, as a group, to establish their authority in the sport Cp.97).

Greater prominence and responsibility was also bound up with the changing power position of players. The old-fashioned type manager, wearing suits and trilby hats, and pinning up team sheets without consultation, struggled to comprehend the new militancy among players. 268

By the 1960s it was thought more important to be thought of as a "players manager" and establish

strong personal as opposed to positional relationships with players.

Consequently, the game saw the emergence of this "players manager." Mainly the result

of the growth among players of technocratic "professional" consciousness and the expectation that

the manager is kind of a fellow tactician. And also related to the growing militancy of players

in matters of pay and conditions.

These kinds of developments were also occurring in pro football in the USA. Much of

this can be attributed to the role unions played in supporting and influencing players of both

sports. However, outside pressures also played a role. As noted earlier, players were beginning

to realize their market value and were not willing to take on such a subservient identity as their

predecessors. In England and the USA the age of publicity pushed these athletes to the forefront.

Managers and coaches were aware of this and knew the press would criticize them for losing

superstars because they could not "get on with them." Also, many managers and coaches were

closer to their players because they were often ex-players themselves, and relatively young — in

many cases recently finishing their playing career which accentuates the closeness of the

relationship. Finally, the 1960s was a time in both the England and the USA where younger

people were questioning authority; deference given to older people just because they were older

and authority figures (teachers, bosses, executives) just because they held a certain status was beginning to diminish. It was not uncommon for members of the older generation to say "young people just don’t have any respect for their elders anymore." These kinds of social trends were to have a marked effect on the relationship between coach/manager and player in sport.

All these developments among players suggest a growing pressure on managers in post-war years to redefine their relationships with players in their charge, and to present themselves in a different way - tactical talks in which players participated, overt concern for players welfare, on first name terms with players and not subject to petty restrictions off the field. However, I believe some managers still like their social distance and perceived players as accepting this because of their working-class "subordinate" background. 269

Two other areas which distinguish the manager of today from his predecessors concerns

the time commitment the job demanded and the importance of success over the need to maintain

positive relationships with other managers. Most of a soccer manager’s time is spent being a

manager, with less family or social life than the majority of people. The manager today spends

countless hours away from home, on the road scouting, doing shows and so on. For many the

job totally consumes their lives. In many respects this is similar to the demands of executives

in the business world. However, the manager in pro soccer and the coach in pro football are in

the "spotlight" and it is patently obvious whether he has been successful or not.

Managers’ relationships with each other have changed. In the transfer of players there

are few holds barred, and if a manager did "pull a fast one" it was the fault of the victim, rather

than the perpetrator. He is not likely to be able to sell a player with bad knees or arthritis as

"wily-wheeler-dealer-managers" did in the 1930s and 1940s. As a result of the money involved

in transfers and salaries, toady clubs have exhaustive medical checks before a deal is agreed

upon.

The "only" unwritten law in pro soccer is that the manager does his very best for his own

particular club, just like any other business. Given this ethos it is not surprising,

that the Football League Secretaries and Managers’ Association, fotmded in 1919, has made no noticeable political impact on Ae fooAall world-its privatized subscribers prefer no collectively determined code of practice plus Aere is a constant fluctuation of Aese members (Wagg, 1984, p. 190).

Equality

The final part of Ais section analyzes Ae concept of equality m terms of opportunity for black soccer players. Professional soccer m England has long been associated wiA Ae notion

Aat Ae sport offers an avenue of social mobility for young working-class males. Over Ae last

100 years, pro soccer has provided at best a transitory — more often illusory — form of social mobility for Ae majority of working-class males (Houlston, 1982). Since Ae late 1960s, white working-class males have been joined by Aeir black counterparts. Specific individuals have 270

succeeded, and a number of black Britons currently play at the highest levels in the FL. In fact,

in a recent international — England versus Poland (1994) — four black players started for

England, which is strong representation when you consider there are only 11 players on the field

for your team at one time.

From both existing British research and anecdotal evidence, it is clear that black Britons, especially West Indian males, have made significant inroads in a number of sports, particularly boxing, soccer, and track and field (Cashmore, 1982). Research has found that West Indian males place a high value on achievement in sport and view sport as a central life interest, and an avenue for social mobility (Bale, 1982). In addition the Sports Council, a quasi-state body, is intent on promoting greater ethnic participation in sport (Carrington and Leaman, 1983).

Black West Indians first began to play soccer at the pro level during the late 1960s and early 1970s, but not until the late 1970s did they appear on first team squads in any significant numbers. Those involved were often the sons of West Indians who had come to Britain during the late 1950s. In 1979, amid great publicity, Viv Anderson became the first black Briton to play for England at full international level.

The entry of these players into pro soccer has not been an easy passage. Racist chants and the hurling of bananas have greeted many of them. Such conduct continues to be a feature of spectating at English grounds. Furthermore, the involvement of the National Front, an extreme right wing organization noted for its racist policies, is not unknown. However, with the emergence of more black players as heroes to young fans, coupled with more black people attending the games, this racist approach of spectators is not as evident in the nineties as it was in the eighties. Nonetheless, it still exists.

In addition to these public experiences black players endured more subtle stereotyping.

From anecdotal evidence, it would appear that both managers and players associate black players with particular attributes. For example, according to Jim Smith, manager of Queens Park

Rangers in the eighties, black players "use very little intelligence; they get by on sheer natural ability," (in Cashmore, 1982, p.45), in addition, John Sillet, manager of Coventry City at the 271

same time, noted that "black players have been known more for their speed, grace or flair," (The

People. August 23, 1987). Similar type attitudes exist toward black athletes in the USA.

The importance of managers’ perceptions is underlined by the fact that of the 92

managers in the FL, one is black (Viv Anderson was just hired on at Barnsley); there are no

black assistant managers or coaches.

Maguire (1988) in his analysis of race and position assignment in English soccer, found

that in the 92 clubs examined not one black player was listed as team captain, a role in soccer

associated with qualities of leadership and good decision making. In addition, blacks were

virtually absent from the central midfield position, the position most associated with the capacity

to influence the pattern, flow, and outcome of games; midfielders are seen to require decision-making abilities and intelligence. Maguire (1988) found blacks over represented in positions stressing speed and quickness, that is, fullbacks and forwards. Research on sport in

America has shown that associating blacks with these qualities is part of a more general stereotyping process (Edwards, 1973).

Although there are examples of blacks playing at the top level of pro soccer, this should not be seen as confirming that soccer provides a realistic, long-term opportunity for social mobility. Houlston (1982) examined the occupational careers of former pro soccer players and he emphasized that a significant number experience downward mobility in terms of occupational status and level of income after leaving soccer. Although he did not examine the position of black players in particular, it would seem that their occupational experiences would be at least as bad and, given the experiences of blacks in the labor market in general, would probably be worse than those of whites.

Maguire (1988) says another factor not faced by whites compounds this situation.

Approaching the end of their soccer careers, players can attempt to enter coaching and management positions. At present, however, there are no role models for blacks to follow: There are no black Britons in any managerial positions, and their prospective employers, club owners, are all white. On this basis, young black worWng-class Britons should be skeptical of the claim that soccer is an avenue of social mobility (p.266). 272

USA

Introduction

The rise to fame of the pro football player has been an eventful one. Prior to the 1930s

pro football players had a difficult time being accepted by the press and the general public — they

were constantly competing with the college game and pro baseball. However, players such as

Harold Grange and Sam Baugh demonstrated that this game could produce stars who made a

respectable living. Also, individuals like George Halas, Paul Brown and Vince Lombardi led the

way for coaches to become celebrities and "household" names.

The role of pro football players changed dramatically with the move from the one to the

two platoon system. In the 1950s specialization became central to the game; with players

developing skills for one specific position and sometimes one particular play, and coaches

specializing in defense, offense or one aspect of the game. This specialization produced a more

proficient, polished performer and improved the status of the game.

Finally, with the age of publicity and pressure from the Players’ Union conditions and

wages improved, yet the bureaucratic structure of pro football accentuated the realization that players were a product of the franchise.

The Early Professional

The following discusses the first pro football players, where they came from and what they earned. It is apparent that many of these early pros had no contract, jumped from team to team, and received little respect.

Unlike college football, the early ambience of the pro sport was ethnic. Catholic, and working-class. Some rosters included a few blacks and Native-Americans. For almost a decade,

Jim Thorpe, the hero of the 1912 Olympics and the Carlisle Indian School football great, was the game’s premier attraction. The playing of collegians and sometimes high school athletes under aliases, the practice by players jumping from team to team during the season to maximize their 273

pay, wagering, and charges of game fixing placed the sport outside of respectable circles (Rader,

1990).

The potential of professionalism in the heretofore amateur athletic clubs created much

controversy in 1892. In the following year, though, both the AAA and the PAC hired players

rather frequently. The PAC in 1893 signed at least one player, probably halfback Grant Dibert,

to the first known pro football contract, at the rate of $50 a game for the entire season. The

PAC probably paid others as well. The AAA, too, signed three players in 1893 — James Van

Cleve, Peter Wright, and Ollie Rafferty — also at the rate of $50 per game. In addition it is

likely that the AAA hired Sport Doimelly to serve as its coach. Thus professionalism in

Pittsburgh became more entrenched and soon spread to other athletic clubs in that area and

beyond (Maltby, 1987).

The Latrobe YMCA team at the latter part of the nineteenth century were typical of the

clubs that were instrumental in the emergence of pro football. This team began as an amateur

club staffed with local players, many of whom worked in the town’s steel mills. They practiced

at a vacant lot of the Pennsylvania Railroad, many times at night under the light afforded by

street lamps. The team’s captain was Harry "Cap " Ryan, who served in that capacity for 12

seasons and also played a year professionally in Philadelphia. Ryan created the football program

at Latrobe High School in 1897 and served as the school’s coach. (Ross, 1973).

A number of players involved in these teams were presently playing in college, for

example, Ross Fiscus, who played for the AAA in 1893-94 when he was not performing for

Washington and Jefferson College. Fiscus, though perhaps not receiving payment from the

AAA, by his presence pointed to a future problem for pro teams - that of employing collegiate

amateur athletes (Maltby, 1987). This was not well received by colleges, who many of these

teams played, and by the press.

Clubs that survived by paying ringers '"under the table"" were frowned upon. The image

of these players, who sold themselves to the highest bidder, was that they were "low life. " They were working-class drifters who were looking to make an "easy buck. "" Still, not all these players 274

came from poor working-class backgrounds; many were from well respected middle-class families

and had attended college. This is an early indication that pro football did not, and never would,

have the same attachment to working-class culture as pro soccer has in England. Consequently,

players would be driven and moved by different needs, yet, as will be illustrated, there was a

convergence of these needs.

However, it is not surprising that the public had little respect of these teams or players when there was no central organizing body to curtail certain illegalities. Players did not sign season long contracts, except for one or two, and received their pay on a game-by-game basis.

Players jumped from team to team — there was little loyalty when money was involved, as the case of Ted Nesser illustrated. Within the span of one year Nesser played for three different teams (Maltby, 1987).

In Columbus the most prominent outfit was the "Panhandles. " It was named after the

Panhandle Division of the Pennsylvania Railroad, where most of its players were employed. In

1901, led by blacksmith William Butler, the Panhandles first took the field. Within a couple of years they played a full schedule and met with a good deal of success. But, this type of success and respect was only limited to certain areas of the country (Ross, 1973).

So, during its infancy, pro football had shown potential, but was not well accepted by the powers to be in college football and other established sports, and the press. In many respects the majority of players were not taken seriously as they received little coaching and were employed outside of football. Pro football had a long way to go before it could escape the stigma of blatant commercialism, exploitation, and internal bickering. Pro soccer players in England received the same type of treatment from the "gentlemans" (elite) class and cricket milieu. They were stigmatized because, among other things, their approach to the game - professional, training, win at all costs attitude - while pro football players were criticized for not demonstrating these characteristics. This is indication of the stage of rationalization each sport was experiencing at this time. 275

Noverr and Ziewacz (1983) wrote that only the name of Jim Thorpe, the hero of the 1912

Olympics, gave any real interest to the game. "Competition was uneven, and players shifted

from team to team as money was waved in front of them to lure them away to another club

needing them for the big game. Football players were thought of as roughnecks and toughs, little

better than barroom brawlers" (P.83).

Stardom and Pro Football

This section describes the rise to fame of certain players. The 1920s and 1930s was a period of time when pro football afforded certain athletes the opportunity for fame and prosperity.

However, this was often fleeting and only applied to a few. Nevertheless, people like George

Halas, Joe Carr, Art Rooney, George Marshall and others, brought respectability to the pro game.

The 1920s was an era of hoopla, publicity hypes, and star mania. Red Grange cashed in on his college fame and newspaper-created legend, bringing the big crowds to the pro game

(Govemali, 1951). During this same period, Emie Nevers, an All-American at Stanford and hero of the 1925 Rose Bowl, signed with the Duluth, Minnesota, Eskimos. Nevers commanded the kind of money that Red Grange had demanded and received. In December 1925 he signed for

$25,000 and 10 percent of the gate receipts for two all-star games against the New York Giants in Florida. He was paid $20,000 for the 1926 season (Noverr and Ziewacz, 1983).

However, by the end of the decade the era of the big-name player was over, as was the period of barnstorming and twenty-eight game seasons. Pro football only briefly captured the imagination of a sports hungry public. It pulled players like Grange, Nevers, Joe Guyon, and

George Trafton away from campuses before they could finish college degrees. In 1926 George

Halas helped push through a league rule that prohibited a team from signing a player whose college class had not graduated. But the game in the 1920s did produce players who would later become coaches: Walt Kiesling, Johnny (Blood) McNally, and most importantly, Steve Owen and

George Halas (NFL, 1991). 276

By using players while they were still in college, the game did little to enhance its

tarnished rqxutation in the public’s eye. Players were often perceived as vagabonds, rather than

highly skilled pro athletes. The pressure by George Halas and Joe Carr to prohibit this type of

recruitment by pro clubs, did much to promote respectability for the players and the game itself.

In the 1930s, pro football became truly "professional" (organized along the lines of other

professional organizations, with rules and regulations and a common structure for all to follow,

and people employed on a full-time basis from coaches to players to other helpers), eventually

rivaling baseball for the sports fans’ dollar. The Green Bay Packers, New York Giants, Chicago

Bears and Washington Redskins emerged as the top teams. Yet in the early 1930s, pro football’s

prospects for survival seemed about as good as President Hoover’s prospects for reelection.

During this time the game reflected the philosophy that football was a man’s game played

between the tackle positions. It was a rough, tough game, dominated by the single wing, which

emphasized overwhelming defense combined with blocking manpower. Such an offense required

durable, powerful runners such as the legendary Bronko Nagurski of the Chicago Bears.

However, pro football needed someone who would give the game the aura of durability

and endless duration that would raise it to the level of pro sports fully accepted in the public eye

as a component part of the American scene. Pro football found this man in the person of Sam

Baugh. It is a safe assertion to record that Baugh received more newspaper, radio and TV

coverage, prior to 1945, than any other pro football player. Baugh was a great player and earned

an outstanding salary, but more importantly Baugh gave to pro football what Babe Ruth, Jack

Dempsey, Bobby Jones and Bill Tilden gave to their respective sports-a sense of perpetuity which

the public absorbed (Govemali, 1951). Baugh also gave the fans of pro football their furst real

hero, although some may argue in favor of Grange.

Although the Depression era saw pro football go through a period of retrenchment and

instability, the status of those involved in the game improved. The 1930s brought in the second

wave of "founding fathers." Franchises were held together by determined business promoters like George Marshall, George Halas, Earl "Curly" Lambeau, Timothy J. Mara, Art Rooney and 277

others. The League strengthened its image with the popular College All-Star game, which

showcased college talent in their first true test against the pros.

These developments, and the way the game was played, helped promote the player’s

image. Pro football in the 1930s was played by tough, hardened veterans. The game was

violent, and required a determination to play with injuries. This grim character of the game

appealed to people hardened by the Depression conditions. Pro football players were

individualists, such as George Musso who shunned wearing protective pads. This type of rugged,

hard working, honest individual was well received by the public. By the end of the 1930s with

the development of a new style of play, more open, with an emphasis on entertainment, pro

football, and the players within it, had established itself as one of the premier sporting attractions,

catering to the public’s needs and desires.

Post World War II

This section discusses the following changes that were to occur shortly after World War

n: college played a more important role in the recruiting of pro players; competition for players

among rival leagues improved salaries, but the lack of an organized union affected a player’s

bargaining power; and, players became more specialized under the two platoon system.

It is interesting to note that details about the background of pro players after die war

suggest a change had taken place. During the early days of pro football in Pennsylvania and

Ohio, although a few players were in college, the majority of players were from a working-class

background. Govemali (1951) reporting on post-war figures found that 98 percent of pro players

had received their high school diploma. He also found that the majority of players had received

the apprenticeship of college football prior to entrance into the major league. These are not

starding figures for anyone today, yet they indicate the emergence of a relationship between sport in educational institutions and the pro level - these institutions being utilized as a form of minor league. 278

Pro soccer in England also had a selection system, but instead of going to college athletes

sign on with the clubs at a young age - as early as 15 or 16 years old -- and become apprentices,

playing for youth and reserve teams before selection into the First XI. Differences in these

systems of selection could be attributed to the different class structures of each country and the

background of players. Pro soccer players, while having social aspirations, predominantly came

from working-class backgrounds and traditionally are not encouraged to attend college. Also,

the educational system in England is still based on elitist principles more so than its equivalent

in the USA, and very few people have the opportunity to attend college. Those who do are usually from the upper echelons of the social status system. Consequently, the relationship between college and pro sport, that is crucial in the USA, is relatively insignificant in England.

From 1946 to 1949 pro football fans were treated to a "war" between the NFL and a new rival, the All-American Football Conference (AAFC). Players from both leagues benefited from the competition; it created more teams and therefore more jobs (eight new teams, 30 players per team, 240 new players). Prior to World War U players received an average of about $150 per game. By 1949 the average minimum salary was $5,000 a year and not too many players were earning the minimum (Anderson ,1985).

However, alfliough it may have appeared that pro players were well looked after, the

NFL Players Association was not founded until 1955, and prior to this time player protection was badly needed (NFL, 1991). There was no player organization similar to the one baseball players enjoyed. Consequently, the bargaining powers of the individual were non-existent. As Govemali

(1951) stated:

It is not unfair to say that the owners, businessmen above all else, regard fair employment as a custom to be honored more in the breach than in the observance. This is not to say they are dishonest men, which they definitely are not, but that our economic system, where surviv^ depends upon financial success, ethical malpractices are accepted realities (p.86).

Govemali (1951) indicated that the pro football player at this time was poorly represented, if at all, and was ignorant as to their position regarding status - active or inactive

— waivers, releases, reserve lists and suspensions. "In pro football, the function of determining 279

status is methodically executed in the commissioner’s office, one wall of which is blanketed with

cabinets containing league records and files" ^.86).

Pro football during the 1950s was definitely a growth sport. There were a number of

reasons why pro football became popular. Of course, TV played an important role in the game’s

development and growth, but rule changes also had an effect here. The free substitution rule had

an enormous impact upon the game. Instituted in 1950, it was in direct opposition to the move

that the colleges would make in 1953 when they returned to one-platoon football. With

two-platoon football, the pro teams could utilize specialists better and could concentrate in

training on various facets of execution. The result was a better, more polished game. Finesse

on offense could now be met with finesse on defense. In addition, the platoon system extended the longevity of players’ careers and allowed football to develop perennial stars, as in baseball.

Pro football is a good example of specialization in sport; which is one of the reasons, according to Guttmann (1978), that it is truly a modem sport. He argues that given the internal logic of modem sports, specialization and professionalization are inevitable. "The professional is, in fact, any athlete specialized to the point where some single athletic excellence is for some extended period of time his main purpose in life Specialization results from the characteristically modem stress on achievement" (p.38).

Guttmann’s (1978) main point here is that time not money is the crucial factor distinguishing the professional from the amateur. I believe money does create dichotomies, but his point is well taken. In pro football, during and after the 1950s, the philosophy of coaches and players was one of specialization. Players began to spend long periods of time working on specific plays and developing themselves for specific roles - and these have become narrower.

Coaches began to spend an inordinate amount of time mnning certain plays and specializing on offense, defense, line play, backfield play, special teams (which came later) and so forth. 280

1960s - Stardom. Coaches and Defence

Although TV and the popularity of the NFL made instant stars of certain players, football

is a coaches game and they came to dominate as never before. The nature of the game, unlike

any other sport, provides the opportunity for the coach to be a hero or a villain. As the game

changed it demanded a different kind of coach, in the mold of Paul Brown and Tom Landry

where organization and efRciency were paramount.

Pro football during the 1960s blossomed as never before. At the end of the decade, NFL

attendance climbed to 90 percent of stadium capacity, while the upstart challengers of the AFL

drew well over two million for a season’s play. Much of the happiness of the owners sprang

from the escalating TV contracts that the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 made possible. The

NFL signed with CBS and then NBC provided enough money to the AFL so that its clubs could

engage in an all-out "Battle of the Paychecks" with the NFL for college stars (Rader, 1990).

Both leagues resorted to somewhat secret and sly methods to obtain the contracts of top

college players, but in 1965 the AFL signed the biggest prize of all, Joe Willie Namath, a

quarterback out of the University of Alabama, for the-then-astonishing sum of $420,000 for three

years. Art Modell of the rival NFL hooted that the signing of Namath was merely a "theatrical

stunt." But the high command of the New York Jets, now headed by David "Sonny" Werblin,

recognized the value of a player possessing both athletic talent and charisma. Namath had both.

In the first season with Namath at the helm. Jets ticket sales doubled. Soon other players

received even higher contracts, making Namath’s salary one of the best bargains in pro sports

(Rader, 1990).

Although, up to this point in history, certain coaches had left an impression on the game that would last a lifetime, coaches and defense dominated the pro gridiron game during the 1960s and became the focal point of attention. Coaches and players became symbolic of Americanism and discipline — a haven of traditional American values at a time when long-haired draft resisters were burning American flags and their draft cards. 281

Men like Paul Brown, Vince Lombardi, George Allen, Bud Grant, and Tom Landry all

epitomized the "winning isn’t everything, its the only thing" philosophy. Vince Lombardi was

said to have originated that phrase, but he stated that he had been misquoted and what he really had said was "winning is not everything but making the effort to win is," (in Noverr and

Ziewacz, 1983, p.255).

Perhaps George Allen was the best example of a coach consumed by the "winning is everything" syndrome. He once said, "The winner is the only individual who is truly alive. I’ve said this to our ball club. Every time you win, you’re reborn, when you lose you die a little,"

(in Noverr and Ziewacz, 1983, p.255).

While Lombardi and Allen relied on emotion and rhetoric to whip up their charges, Tom

Landry, coach of the Dallas Cowboys, and Bud Grant of the Minnesota Vikings reflected a new breed of cold, efficient, aloof men, unlike Halas or Rockne, whose-players were simply parts of a machine — illustrating the bureaucratic nature of pro football which reflected other organizations that operated within a rigid structure. If the machinery faltered, the parts were replaced. All played according to the master game plan, and the coach replaced the quarterback as the signal caller. Pro football had truly become a "coaches game."

Critics charged that pro football had become too predictable; coaches seemed determined, above all else, to avoid costly mistakes. Some of the problem stenuned from rapid improvements being made mostly in defense rather than in offense. Since a football field consists of a rigidly defined and limited amount of space, the appearance of larger, speedier, and better-trained defensive players reduced offensive capabilities. Faced with stronger and quicker defensive players and required to keep their hands flat against their chests while pass blocking, offensive linemen, unless they violated the rules against holding, found it difficult to protect quarterbacks from defensive pass rushers. In 1975 alone, defensive players knocked 17 quarterbacks out of action (Rader, 1990).

In England at this time, pro soccer experienced similar developments. The number one goal for pro soccer players was not to lose, with the result that defense tended to dominate. 282

Players with great skill were rare; George Best and Bobby Charlton types, who brought crowds

to their feet in the 1960s, found their particular style of play stifled in the 1970s by athletic,

bruising defenders who thought nothing about hurting players if it meant negating a scoring

chance.

Certainly there are star quarterbacks and running backs, but the game evolves around the

coach, his staff, and their play calling for which the former is ultimately responsible. The

occupational security of the head coach is tenuous at best. As in other pro sports the head coach

is at die whim of the owner, and, in many respects, is hired to be fired. In 1965, 20 percent of

head coaches in pro football were released (Treat, 1970).

As the game plan of coaches demanded more from the players physically, they had to be

better prepared. Vince Lombardi, probably the most respected and famous coach in the history

of American football (along with George Halas, Paul Brown and Don Shula), really initiated the

idea that players bad to be disciplined and superbly conditioned to play the game at the highest

level. Lombardi’s personnel were admirably suited for his offensive and defensive strategy and

tactics.

However, the Packers under Lombardi relied less on finesse and more on sheer power.

Successful coaches over the last two decades have developed a style that reflects both power and finesse. The game has become much more complex than as recent as 20 years ago. Joe Gibbs of the Washington Redskins and Bill Walsh of the San Franscisco Forty Miners epitomized this new approach with hundreds of offensive and defensive plays. These men were part of a system that created a particular type of football that exalted depersonalized bureaucratic America.

If one compares football to baseball, the former as the preeminent team game seems much more an expression of corporate values, while baseball suggests the more admirable individualism of the frontier. In no other sport is teamwork so essential as in football, nor is athletic performance so specialized. Designated hitters seem to baseball purists a violation of the nature of the game, but linemen who only block or tackle and quarterbacks who only pass - not to 283

mention short-yardage specialists, kick-return specialists, third-and-longpass-defense specialists,

and so on - are simply recognized as part of football (Rader, 1990).

Moreover, pads and helmets not only accentuate the masculine features of the players, they disguise individual identity, independence, and self-sufficiency to a corporate enterprise directed by a boss who determines goals and policy for the entire organization. These kinds of trends reflected broader cultural values and attitudes. Huge organizations controlling behavior typifies contemporary USA and other modem societies. In fact, when considering the number, size, and influence of organizations in the modem world, as well as their effect on people’s lives, social scientists sometimes use the term organizational society when referring to the post- industrial society (Leonard, 1984). Yet these more obvious qualities only define one side of football. Against the depersonalization and corporate sameness inherent in the team-oriented sport, individualism exerts a constant pressure.

Individualism. Agents and Unions

The discussion here centers around the issues related to contemporary pro football as a team sport with little room for individual freedom and the role agents play in this freedom and player prosperity. There is also an examination here of the eventual establishment of a players association and the part it played in the power stmggle between owners and players.

Subtle and not-so-subtle alterations in certain players public image accentuated a growing trend, in the 1960s and 1970s, away from corporate anonymity. Joe Namath and Thomas

Henderson’s boasts prior to the 1969 and 1970 Superbowls, and Billy Johnson’s "white shoes," and many other such expressions of individualism all ron counter to the corporate nature of football. As Oriard (1980) writes:

Too much narcissism and individuality would be catastrophic for good football, but die tension between teamwork and individual stardom is central to its appeal. Football does not just embrace corporate capitalistic values, but finds what can be humanly meaningful within that structure, what can offer relief from the limitations that are part of that system (p.27). 284

This illustrates the capacity of sport to work independent of social imposition, the nature

of sport allows for such freedom and in this respect separates it from the "real world," where

innovation, self-actualization and characteristics of play and games have continued to be suppressed by the bureaucratic nature of organizations that make up contemporary societies.

Guttmann (1978) would suggest that this notion of sport supports his thesis of the universalistic capacity of sport.

According to Oriard (1980), "football suggests on a subconscious level that every individual anywhere in the corporate hierarchy or on the assembly line has a value that makes him more than just a replaceable part of a complex machine" ^.27) However, the cliche, "no one is bigger than the game itself," is probably more applicable where football is concerned that any other team sport. There may be room for individual freedom for players, but not much.

From the 1960s to present, players have been fighting this issue of freedom to play the game successfully and be rewarded in kind. With help from agents, TV, and the players’ union, they have come to perceive themselves as businessmen as well as athletes — not unlike pro soccer players during the 1960s in England (Berry, 1981). This changing role for the pro player was not well received by the public in the 1970s, and this attitude still remains today. Most people feel that pro athletes are paid too much.

The following is somewhat typical of how pro football players came to be perceived 20 years ago, as they realized their economic potential to a club and became well represented by agents — who obviously received their cut - and the players’ union.

Ask any old-line, self-made, prosperous football owner and he’ll tell you the trouble with die modem athlete is that the working stiffs have become as capitalistic as the bosses. The modern-day pro-gridder is more money-minded, more security conscious and has infinitely more economic advantages than his predecessors of 10-12 years ago Pro football players have the best of all worlds. They are blessed with a unique God-given talent that commands huge rewards in an open market. And they are protected by a militant "union" in Ae form of Aeir Players Assn. which has helped provide Aem wiA graduation-to-grave welfare benefits Compared to Ae old-time pro who generally livW from season to season, Ae present-day football player is sophisticated, enli^tened and affluent. And even Aough Aere is still an ^parent inequity in Ae range of pay between quarterbacks and offensive linemen, Ae average salary of around $30,000 a year is upper strata of American 285

society. The Bert Bell Fund is one of the best in the country, and the off-season and post-career job opportunities are there for the bright and ambitious (Miller, 1973, p.26)

It was roughly a decade prior to when Miller (1973) wrote his article that the

establishment looked at player agents as the "bad guys." In 1964, when Jim Ringo, an All-Pro

center for the Packers, showed up for a contract negotiations meeting with an agent, Vince

Lombardi excused himself for a moment. When he returned he advised the agent, in effect:

"You are dealing with the wrong team. Jim Ringo has been traded to the Eagles," (in Miller,

1973, p.26).

By contrast, in 1971, Upton Bell, then general manager of the Patriots, insisted that every new player signed by the club should be represented by an agent. Bob Woolf, a well-known sports attorney at this time, estimated that just about every college football player drafted on the first four or five rounds by the NFL had an agent, lawyer or business agent to help negotiate their pro contract. "Joe Louis and Jimmy Fox wound up practically penniless," Woolf pointed out. "Today’s athletes are far more sophisticated than their predecessors. They are genuinely concerned with their fiitures," (in Miller, 1973, p.26).

Like pro soccer players in England, there was a realization of the need to prepare for the future. Athletes from both sports were more aware than their predecessors of the business opportunities afforded to them outside of sport. There was also a desire on their part to improve their social status, especially once they started to mix with elite groups.

The NFL Players Association has certainly been partly responsible for the awareness players exhibited over the last 20 or so years. This trend reflects other major institutions in society where workers have become represented by their unions which has created better working conditions and improved salary and pension plans. It would be naive to believe that these conditions — for players and public in general - are ideal, but they are certainly better than those experienced by workers in the first half of the century. The reasons for this are many: civil rights movement, improved education for all, better opportunities in the economy and so on

(Coakley, 1994). 286

In 1977 the NFL Players Association and the NFL Management Council ratified a

collective bargaining agreement extending until 1982, covering five football seasons while

continuing the pension plan - including years 1974,1975, and 1976 - with contributions totaling

more than $55 million. The total cost of the agreement was estimated at $107 million. The

agreement called for a college draft at least through 1986; contained a no-strike, no-suit clause;

established a 43-man active player limit; reduced pension vesting to four years; provided for

increases in minimum salaries and pre-season and post-season pay; improved insurance, medical,

and dental benefits; modified previous practices in player movement and control; and reaffirmed

die NFL Commissioner’s disciplinary authority. Additionally, the agreement called for the NFL

member clubs to make payments totaling $16 million the next 10 years to settle various legal

disputes (NFL, 1991).

Players now felt they had a voice and this was evident when the NFL Players Association

called a strike in 1982 which lasted 57 days and reduced the 16-game schedule to nine. Play was

resumed following ratification of the Collective Bargaining Agreement by the NFL owners,

which was to run through the 1986 season.

Under the agreement the NFL draft was extended through 1992 and the veteran ftee-agent

system was left basically unchanged. A minimum salary schedule for years of experience was

established; training camp and post-season pay were increased; players’ medical, insurance, and

retirement benefits were increased; and a severance-pay system was introduced to aid in career

transition, a first in pro sports (NFL, 1991).

In 1987 a type of back-dated severance-pay system was introduced. A special payment

program was adopted to benefit nearly 1,000 former NFL players who participated in the League

before the current Bert Bell NFL Pension Plan was created and made retroactive to the 1959

season. Players covered by the new program spent at least five years in the League and played

all or part of their career prior to 1959. Each vested player would receive $60 per month for each year of service in the league for life (NFL, 1991). 287

It is not surprising that pro football players of years gone-by would feel a little envious

of their contemporaries. It would seem that the pro player of today is well looked after.

However, compared to the other major pro sports in America the longevity and average salary

of the football player does not fair well. Also, pro football is a violent game and players put

their bodies "on the line" every week; the potential for life-crippling injury is very real.

Nonetheless, with the new free agency system — incorporated after the 1992 season,

which allows players more freedom to move to other clubs and negotiate a better contract - the

average salary level should start to rise. For example, the following is a list of just a few players

in the NFL, and what free agency has meant to them;

TABLE 4

POS PLAYER OLD TEAM NEW TEAM ’92 SAL. NEW WR Gary Clark Redskins Cardinals 850,000 2.0m S Ronnie Lott Raiders Jets 1.05m 1.8m LB Carlton Bailey Bills Giants 275,000 1.75m RB Rod Bemstine Chargers Broncos 685,000 1.65m G Brian Habid Vikings Broncos 275,000 1.4m T Gerald Perry Rams Raiders 420,000 1.35m WR Mark Ingram Giants Dolphins 550,000 1.33 CB Melvin Jenkins Lions Façons 438,000 1.3m T Don Maggs Oilers Broncos 425,000 1.23m

("Sports Illustrated. March 29. 1993. p.551.

The above list occurred after free agency was only three weeks old in the NFL. Players

already witnessed what they had hoped for: teams bidding aggressively, even outlandishly, for

talent. At this time (March 29, 1993) 25 free agents had changed jerseys, and many had gotten

wealthy as a result (King, 1993).

Equality

One of the major differences between pro football today and the game played in the first half of the twentieth century is the racial background of the players. In the early days of pro 288

football a few black players had been on small-town teams, however, that number has

dramatically changed as blacks account for approximately 60 percent of the players in the NFL

today (Coakley ,1990).

During the growth of the NFL, black players have mostly been ignored until the Los

Angeles Rams signed Kenny Washington and Woody Strode. Black collegiate All-Americans

Paul Robeson of Rutgers, Fritz Pollard of Brown, Jay Mayo "Inky" Williams of Brown, and

"Duke" Slater of Iowa all played in the fledgling NFL in the 1920s. Yet they were token

representatives of their race. Only six blacks dotted the rosters of 18 NFL clubs in 1926, and

annually from 1928 to 1933 only one black player could be found. At the end of the 1933 season, NFL owners informally agreed to ban black players from their teams. When Kenny

Washington, a triple-threat All-American, graduated from UCLA in 1939, he was totally ignored by NFL scouts (Anderson, 1985)

Contrary to popular opinion, Jackie Robinson was not the first black athlete to cross the color line in pro sports after World War H. Two of his teammates at UCLA, Washington and

Strode, broke into the NFL in the autumn of 1946. For a new NFL franchise, the Los Angeles

Rams, Washington and Strode probably were signed as much for their local appeal as for their abilities. Strode lasted one year; Washington played several seasons, but injuries prevented him from ever reaching his earlier All-American peak.

In the wake of the initial breakthrough of black athletes, several emerged in the mid-1950s with the ability to overshadow all their white competitors. In pro football Jim Brown was undoubtedly the dominant player in the NFL for the entirety of his career with the Cleveland

Browns from 1957-1966. He stood a colossus astride the pro football world, and he remains the standard by which the best running backs are evaluated (Lapchick, 1984).

The civil rights movement, along with the acknowledgment of black athletic talent, and the owner’s vision of a black market have indeed opened the doors in the last 30 years (Coakley,

1994). No matter how far right America swings in the 1990s, it is difficult to imagine a decrease 289

in black participation in football, baseball, and basketball. However, increasing racism could

further delay black emergence in other sports and front office positions.

Although pro football, on the surface, may exhibit characteristics that combined typify

what scholars (Adelman, 1986, Guttmann, 1978) have noted as modem sport, when analyzing

equality for blacks this may not be the case. As Guttmann (1978) states: "Exclusion on the basis

of class is clearly an anomaly within the structure of modem sports. Exclusion on the basis of

race is just clearly anomalous. It is, nonetheless, conunon knowledge that racism has hindered

the development of modem sports in the USA, South Africa, and many other countries" (p.32).

Information of salary differences between blacks and whites is difficult to obtain.

However, Dave Meggyesy, NFL Players Association Westem Regional Director, did a

preliminary analysis based on the 1982 NFL season that gives us a clear picture that whites were

— and probably still are ~ earning significantly higher than blacks. League-wide, whites

averaged $100,730 while blacks averaged $91,980. It made no difference whether you played

offense or defense or started or were backup, the gap was consistent across the board.

While Meggyesy’s preliminary study has yet to go into the causal relationships of these

figures, his memo to die NFLPA’s Board of Player Representatives in 1983 went to the heart of

the matter:

Consistent with this historical pattem of racial discrimination, a similar pattem exists today regarding players salaries. Simply put, in the NFL, black professional foodiall players eam less than their white counterparts. Numerous theories have been presented as to why racial discrimination exists in the NFL. These theories are beside the point; Ae real issue is that racial discrimination exists in the NFL, and that it must be eliminated (in Lapchick, 1984, p. 113).

It would appear the salary differential is great below the superstar level. This difference

might be even greater if performance comparisons were used. However, this would be hard to

do since football as played in the NFL is almost totally segregated by position. This notion of

centrality is another aspect of pro football which indicates that racial discrimination still exists, and raises the question of whether there is equality of opportunity in the game even today. 290

There is considerable literature describing the relationship between race and athletic

playing position. Loy and McElvogue (1970) were the first to provide empirical documentation

of positional segregation, and subsequent investigations of positional segregation in American pro

football supported their findings.

A number of scholars have observed that, compared to white players, black players are

less likely to occupy central positions (center, quarterback, offensive lineman) and are over

represented in noncentral positions (running back, wide receiver, defensive back), (Best, 1987).

Eitzen and Yetman (1977) noted that, compared to players in noncentral positions, players in

central positions are likely to have more experience in pro football, which may result in larger

career earnings and which may also enhance their chances to qualify for pension benefits.

Moreover, because the agreement negotiated in 1982 by the NFL Players Association provides

a sliding scale for determining severance pay (whereby the amount paid increases with career

length), black and white players may not receive comparable severance benefits.

Best (1987) attempted to examine positional segregation in light of data documenting

increased participation in professional football by black players (Coakley, 1986) and to describe

file effects of positional segregation on career length, experience, pension benefits, and severance pay. Since pension benefits and severance pay represent the rewards for having a successful tenure in pro football, it is important to know whether positional segregation prevents blacks and whites from sharing these rewards equally.

The results of Best’s (1987) investigation reveal a number of things about positional segregation. First, positional segregation is still quite prevalent in pro football. Although the rate of black participation has increased, three positions (quarterback, center, kicker) continue to be almost exclusively white. The increase in participation by black players has occurred in positions that have been primarily black and at linebacker. Second, white players are likely to have more experience than black players. Third, players occupying white positions are more likely than players in black positions to have long careers. 291

Best (1987) concludes by suggesting that it is possible that future studies with different sampling periods may show that the relationship between positional segregation and career length is only applicable to specific black and white positions. If the number of blacks in pro football continues to increase and those increases continue to occur in black positions, then the relationships between positional segregation and experience and positional segregation and career length will likely become stronger. Similarly, the disparity between blacks and whites in sharing in some of the rewards of the game pension benefits, severance pay) will continue to increase.

Little has been said about blacks in coaching and front office positions. This is because there is little to report. It was not until 1989 that the first black head coach was hired in the

NFL. Art Shell was named head coach of the Los Angeles Raiders making him pro football’s first black coach since Fritz Pollard coached the Akron Pros in 1921 (NFL, 1991). In 1992

Dennis Green was named head coach of the Minnesota Vikings. To date these are the only two black head coaches in a league where approximately 60 percent of the players are black. CHAPTER Vm

ANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes the research presented in the preceding chapters, and compares the similarities and differences of football in each culture, and examines the following questions:

How has Association football developed compared to American football? Are the differences the result of internal influences or external forces? If there are many similarities of the modernization of each sport, which is the case in this study, does this mean that sport sociologists need to give more credence to the notion of universalism in sport, of which Guttmann (1979,

1991) is the main proponent? Each characteristic will be analyzed separately, rather than together as this will be consistent with the way the material has been presented so far.

Rationalization

The pro game established itself a little earlier in England than the USA. In England public schools were instrumental in reforming rough football of the plebeian variety, and as early as 1863 a single football code was instrumental in the formation of the FA. In the USA there was no governing body of this nature until the 1920s (although at the college level rules were national), and the pro game was essentially an outlaw sport.

However, the dividing line between amateurism and professionalism was indiscernible for both games in the early days. Officials realized that for each sport to modernize and expand professionalization had to take place within the game. Whether it occurred earlier in one culture or the other, an improved game — in terms of skilled performance and knowledge - had to take

292 293

place in a professional environment. It is as if it was the "logical path" each sport had to take

to develop, indicating the universal aspect of sport.

In England football was an amateur game dominated by graduates from the public

schools, until several factors taking shape in society contributed to a working-class soccer culture.

The growth of cities was very influential in developing this culture. With cheap transportation

the opportunity arose for the working-class to play organized games and read about soccer in the

press and for spectators to go to games.

Similarly in the USA urban development was a factor — although not in such an

immediate fashion as England - in the rise of organized sports and the rational process they would eventually undertake. There were new complexities of contemporary life and pro sport soon took on the characteristics and shape of complex organizations that combined to make-up modem life (Leonard, 1984).

The move towards professionalism was confronted with some opposition in both countries in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In England opponents said it would develop a business attitude of "win at all costs," and separate the wealthy from the not so wealthy clubs.

People were not ready to accept sport as work or something men did for money or a living.

However, this attitude would soon change (Maltby, 1987). In the USA athletic clubs relaxed their restrictive admission policies and began to hire pro athletes to represent them. While many frowned upon this, those schooled in Social Darwinist competitive ethic were accustomed to this attitude, in England as well as the USA, and saw nothing wrong with it.

The idea of paying players to win because it was more important than just "playing the game" was probably more accepted in the USA than England. Why? Perhaps the answer lies in the notion that America was a young, non-traditional, developing culture — in many respects still is — and flie Protestant Ethic, under which contemporary life was founded and developed. 294

was more pervasive across society than it was in the more "stable" English society where values

and attitudes were well established. The middle and upper-class notion that gentlemen played

soccer for non-utilitarian reasons, though fading fast at the turn of the twentieth century, still

played a role in suppressing the evolution of a "purely" pro sport - where athletes are full-time,

and their job is foremost to win. Sentiments toward amateurism, while evident in the USA

during pro football’s inception, never really acted as a barrier toward professionalism to the

extent it did in England, but this was as much about class as winning in sport.

Critics felt professionalism had eroded the sportsmanship ethic, certainly among the

working-class — they felt the working-class could not understand the middle-class notion of

sportsmanship. The penalty kick rule was a response to players fouling others close to goal.

Working-class attitudes to "the game" were changing from a carefree approach to a more serious

one-reflective of industrialization.

Prior to and some time after the turn of the twentieth century the game in England was

more uniform and structured than pro football in the USA; simply because governing bodies were

formed and established earlier. In England as early as the mid-1880s systems of play (line-up

of a team) were bom and rules were developed with a specific purpose in mind. At this time

Mason (1980) says Association football had more or less reached its twentieth century form. It

was not until 1912 that the scoring system had reached its final form for pro football in the

USA. Also, new rules are constantly being instituted to make the game more open. In England very few rules have been changed since the game was established. This is partly due to the

conservative attitude of the soccer establishment in England, and because they are tied to FIFA rules; it is not as easy to incorporate new rule changes as it is in the NFL. This is not only indicative of traditional rather than pragmatic attitudes being the rule of order (external influences) in England, but that the FA was/is run by the middle and upper-classes who were 295

comfortable with maintaining the game as it existed, and in some respects still believed that

amateur rather than pro was the "way to go" (internal influences).

While NFL owners realize they are selling a product, officials in the FA are not as

willing as the directors of individual clubs to "open themselves up" to the dictates of

commercialism. The move to commercialize the game is just one example of the rationalization process. Pragmatism is the rule of order in the USA and NFL owners reflect this attitude. The game is designed and organized with the goal of making money, so changes are made with this in mind - changes being the means and money being the end.

At the turn of the century the class factor had a much greater influence on the game in

England than the USA. One reason being that social class was more evident in the former than the latter. England was built around class dichotomies, America was not. Obviously, people were s^arated by class lines in America, but the lines were not as rigid as in England. In

England social class was already established, generation after generation. The USA was a young country, built on individual enterprise, individualism, and a pioneering spirit; the perception was that there was opportunity for everyone, especially young people.

How has this class factor influenced the rationalization of each sport? Those governing soccer in England were predominantly the elite; they saw no need for change. This elite was different to the one governing the NFL. Aware of their class position and maintaining that distinction and usually from "old money," soccer directors had little desire to change the way the game was run. On the other hand, NFL owners were more likely to be entrepreneurs, and rationalized change through the desire to make more money. Also, they were not tied to any traditional stipulation of amateur versus professional in the way soccer directors were.

In England the middle and working-classes saw themselves as involved in sport for different reasons, although there was a contingent of middle-class owners and businessmen who. 296

while more altruistic than their American counterpart, sympathized with the working-class

players’ desire to play for money. Yet pro soccer established itself as a working-class game

much more extensively than pro football did in the USA.

However, America is not a classless (generic) society — it may seem that way on the

surface — and it would be a mistake for scholars to interpret the growth of sport in the USA

without considering class as a factor. Class factors were influential at pro football’s inception

with local businessmen sponsoring local workers and teams emerging in working-class mining

communities. Of course, this localism was soon to change, along with association to a particular

class or ethnic group.

Hodges (1964) in his discussion of stratification in twentieth century America notes:

"[Class is] a distinct reality which embraces the fact that people live, eat, play, mate, dress

work, and think at contrasting and dissimilar levels. These levels — social classes - are the

blended product of shared and analogous occupational orientations, educational backgrounds,

economic wherewithal, and life experiences" ^.13). Sites (1975) has argued that there is

considerable evidence Üiat a class system does exist in American society, even though the borders

between classes are blurred. The importance of this is that there is an overlap between classes

which has a significant effect on class consciousness.

While class lines have generally (working-class more bourgeois now) been well defined

in England - accentuating class differences between player and director — this is not the case in

the USA. Warner (1963) in his study of Yankee City (a small city in the eastern part of the

USA) isolated as many as six classes - upper-upper, lower-upper, upper-middle, lower-middle,

upper-lower, and lower-lower — and concluded that there was considerable blurring and

overtyping at the borders of each class. Numerous studies since have supported Warner’s findings. 297

It has already been noted that rigid class dichotomies in England have been responsible

for a static approach to pro soccer while acting as a barrier to change. For pro football this was

only slightly evident during the game’s inception. However, in England it is ironic that the

widespread attitude of the working-class toward the game and winning, aided the formation of

a more general consciousness of class and was conducive to the development of professionalism

(Mason, 1980). After World War I families realized soccer could pay regular wages, at which

point the game took on its widest significance. By the 1920s soccer was an established employer

in a community where jobs were scarce. It was a career for many young men, who then became

heroes to the working-class community. It was as if the working-class saw pro soccer as their

game, and owners and directors were accepted but seen as outsiders who never really appreciated

what soccer was "all about." This attachment to a particular social class is another aspect that

differentiates pro soccer and pro football, yet may not hinder either game in its move toward

modernization.

In the USA the development of professionalism did not rely heavily on a working-class

consciousness. The growth of professional football occurred for similar but also different

reasons. From 1900 to 1920 people witnessed the rise of American imperialism and military

might. The country needed to protect herself and therefore needed a fit nation (Noverr and

Ziewacz, 1983). This period saw a new activism and manly directness. Organized sport,

especially football, "fit the bill" of a nation with an identity that works, sweats and plays hard,

although some colleges were eliminating the game prior to World Warn. This could also be said

of England but not to same extent.

Along with this came an emphasis on efficiency and a scientific way of getting things done. Football, Guttmann (1978) feels, reflected this attitude after World War I - it had become specialized, bureaucratically organized and rationalized as a result of the external pressures above 298

and the desires of those governing to design a hierarchy that accomplishes large scale

administration by systematically coordinating the work of many individuals. However, prior to

the 1920s pro football struggled to find a formula for success, fan acceptance, and organizational

stability. Nonetheless, the organization of the NFL helped to meet this need. The goals of the

organization were rationalized, and the system planned and structured in a bureaucratic fashion,

like other institutions and organizations in society. Weber (1947) said to be efficient and

effective a modem organization requires a bureaucratic authority and a division of labor. He asserted that bureaucracies rather than traditional relations are most suited to rational, modem organizations.

Considering the bureaucracy factor, i.e., the rationalization of the way the system is planned and stmctured, it is necessary to discuss the way the hierarchy (in this example, the means) is developed to fulfill the goal of efficient operation and success (the end). As the game has evolved we have seen the establishment of many levels of authority to counter the problems of ranning a complex organization. Owners relinquished some of their responsibility to presidents, business managers, promotions officers and front office workers. On the "sidelines " head coaches began to recruit more assistant coaches, scouts and other support staff as the game demanded more personnel and sophisticated planning. On the field hierarchy of playing positions has also evolved with the two platoon system and an increasing emphasis on specialization.

While extemal pressures are evident here, it is apparent that the demands of the game itself and the people who control it, have been just as influential in creating this structure.

In England there was also the realization that training, preparation, efficiency and the adoption of a scientific approach — although they would not have used such a term at this time

- was needed. By the twentieth century practice and tactical understanding improved standards of play. 299

Although the changing attitude toward professionalism, which resulted in soccer becoming

a full-time employer, was instrumental in the game making great strides in the early part of the

twentieth century, the FA was slow in its development of the National team. An attitude of "why

do we have to prove to the rest of the world we are good, we already know it," prevailed,

carrying on the superiority complex that developed through the establishment of the British

Empire. Also, the domestic game did not help in this process. For example. League soccer was prospering, playing in front of huge crowds who saw exciting games. Consequently, conservative officials wanted to keep things the way they were. As late as the 1930s these officials saw no need for a coach for the National team.

What is evident here is that although rationalization was occurring at the club level - in terms of the realization that professionalism and soccer as a full-time occupation was the way to improve standards and skill level - soccer officials had not taken on the idea that knowledgeable, qualified coaching was necessary, certainly for the National team. This type of attitude was not considered out of order as some clubs did not even appoint a manager until after World War n.

However, the failure of England and English clubs against foreign opposition prompted the need for a new regime at the FA after 1934. Football Association officials finally saw that England was vulnerable and could be beat. This was a "slap in the face" to a country that invented the

"modem" game.

The manager’s role began to change as they became responsible for the success of the club, and pro soccer was not seen as just a "game" anymore. As the standard of play improved the game demanded knowledgeable (track suit) managers, preferably ex-pros. However, as late as the 1930s the technocrat coach was not well accepted as they were a threat to traditional wisdom and conventiality. American ingenuity, and initiative was yet to be taken on by an

English culture that was stepped in tradition and adverse to any kind of developments that may 300

change the way pro soccer was to operate. Of course, much of this was the result of FA officials

being threatened by new trends and afraid of losing control and power of the situation. However,

change was on the "horizon."

A more scientific approach to soccer occurred because of changes taking place in the FA

in the 1930s, in the League somewhat earlier (internal forces) and in the changing face of British

capitalism (extemal forces). These changes were facilitated by the attempt to build a formal body

of soccer knowledge. This knowledge was in turn linked by the FA to establishing qualifications

for coaches, and associated efforts to rationalize practice at the League clubs in terms of tactical

preparation, elimination of error, and so on — moving the game further away from working-class

culture.

What is crucial here is the effect of extemal forces on internal arrangements that changed

the way soccer people and football people perceived the pro game in England and America.

While not dramatic and immediately noticeable, those involved in the game responded to attitudes

and values prominent in an evolving, rationalized ideology. The changing face of British

capitalism demanded efBciency, productivity, organization and planning (Butler and Stokes,

1969), and if pro soccer was to be part of this it had to adapt accordingly. A haphazard approach to pro sport, evident of years gone-by, was not acceptable anymore. With the opportunity to make money came the need to "get serious." Coaches needed to be qualified, prepared and cognizant of the consequences of failure.

After World War I pro football reflected efficiency and a scientific way of doing things successfully. However, not everyone was in favor of this new formula, and the development of pro clubs in large cities serving the growing urbanization of America in the 1920s. People could not control life in the way they were accustomed, "island communities" began to disintegrate.

Warren (1963) says the dimensions of local autonomy is the degree to which a community can 301

carry out all the activities necessary for its maintenance and the maintenance of its citizens

independently over time. Many of the problems faced by cities resulted from the movement to

the suburbs that accelerated after World War II. Sites (1975) notes that the city lost some of its

local autonomy and identity as it met state or federal "standards," which tended to be

standardized, leaving little room for local differences. At the local level however, supporting the

pro football team helped communities retain their identity. This type of affiliation facilitated

integration and countered, to some degree, alienation. Sport has a similar function at lower levels

also, for example, a town identifying with a particular high school football team.

This function of creating community spirit, identification and relationships is more reflective of pro soccer than pro football. Many clubs outside the Premier League have forsaken certain aspects of rationalized practice, and travelled slower along the modernization continuum than Premier League clubs and NFL teams. It is interesting to note that while many smaller clubs are forced into archaic practice, they also choose to remain loyal to tradition and are unwilling to change the way they operate. This reflects both internal and extemal pressures, especially the former.

Many clubs choose to retain standing-room-only terraces because their fans prefer to stand rather than sit. Many clubs choose to retain the services of older, loyal or young inexperienced players because they are from the local area and fans can relate to them. Many clubs choose to practice at the same time and same way as they have for many years, hiring coaches who were ex-players and have been at the club a long time. And, many directors remain with the club even though they may be losing money and have a poor record. Therefore, many clubs in the FL do not always incorporate rationalized practice in the way they operate; even in the face of such opposition from the FL itself (the wealthier clubs and certain FL officials) and society in general. 302

Obviously, much of this occurs because of the structure of the FL, i.e., accommodating

92 League clubs. A structure and system of promotion and relegation that has not evolved with

the same "speed" as other institutions in society. This prevailing altruistic, paternalistic attitude

demonstrates, among other things, the ability of sport to act independent of many extemal and

internal pressures but not all.

By the 1930s, the NFL, which had long followed the mles of college football, made

significant changes to meet their style and serve their needs. Also, the annual draft was adopted

to produce parity and retain fen interest throughout the whole League. This was a sign of the

emerging cartel structure of the NFL, but more importantly to this discussion, it was an example

of pro football ofRcials continually innovating in response to the demands of rationalization.

These changes were made for a reason — make the game more open, produce parity and control

the distribution of players, and improve fan interest — and not in any kind of haphazard fashion

indicative of a sport in its infancy, or more appropriately, pre-modem sport.

In Britain in the 1940s the transition was from an old economy centered on production

for a new one aimed at marketing and promotion — the implications were clear for soccer (Wagg,

1984). If the sport was to grow and reap potential rewards, it had to enter new competitions

(European and international) and latch onto market opportunities as they became available.

Television was instrumental in this process.

There was a shift in ideology of soccer and sport in England. Pro soccer now acquired

respectability — an efficient scientific enterprise ~ becoming part of "real" life. The public

started to acc^t that the pro game demanded a rational approach — preparation, professional

attitude, serious about winning and losing, qualified coaches ~ and that this was necessary to

attain success. People were aware of the importance and the need for better coaching and a move away from the working-class artistry to a more efficient, effective type of game. 303

Besides the press and a changing economy, other factors contributed to the rise of a

"different" game. Large, efficient bureaucracies were beginning to take over the economy and

the business environment. The emergence of these bureaucracies made it more and more difficult

for small businesses, that were run on a day-to-day basis, to operate. The same could be said

for soccer clubs, especially the smaller ones, and directors recognized that to be successful and

survive they would have to take this approach.

It would only take one or two clubs to employ these tactics and the rest would have to

follow, otherwise they would not be able to compete. While pressures from extemal sources

such as the business world were present here, internal interactions became catalysts for change.

For example, for the big clubs like Manchester United, Liverpool, Arsenal and so on, to succeed

in Europe, they had to hire qualified coaches, buy star players — eventually outside Britain - and

look beyond the FL and the FA Cup. As soon as they employed these methods their domestic

competitors needed to respond or be left behind. Of course, some clubs, even in the lower

divisions, were more capable of responding to these demands to improve standards of play and

operating structure, but not all. Those unable have tended to remain in the lower divisions, or

have been promoted only to be relegated the following season or soon after.

The breakdown of working-class community solidarity was also instrumental in producing

a game in the late 1960s that was far removed from the days when spontaneity and lack of

preparation marked out the players of the highest social status. Even though it was the working-

class who pursued full-time professionalism and accepted the notion and importance of winning,

working-class soccer was characterized by artistry, open attacking play, physical contact, and preparation that often included brisk walks, scrimmages with little or no tactical intervention, and a diet of beer and fish and chips. It is interesting that this attitude was to change somewhat, though not completely, as the working-class searched for new reference groups. 304

Embourgeoisment is a factor here, which is described by Zweig (1962) as shifts in the

occupational distribution of the population - a merging to bridge the gap between "two nations" -

- a reduction of extreme economic inequalities, and the amount and rate of intergenerational

social mobility — more opportunities of social mobility as a result of a more open educational

system. Thus the picture becomes one of a less rigid and extreme strata.

Since World War II a number of scholars (Zweig, 1962, Butler and Stokes, 1969, Parkin,

1971) have claimed that the more affluent members of the working-class are losing their identity

as the social stratum is becoming merged in the middle-class. Therefore, not only are there

economic changes, but also changes in values, aspirations, behavioral patterns and so on. Zweig

(1962) suggests new modes of life and ethos emerging amongst manual workers in England in the 1960s in certain expanding industries (not mines and docks). He isolates a number of new tendencies: rise in security mindedness (pension rights for example); rise in expectations (taste of prosperity, want more); home centered; decline in gregariousness (decline in work centered activity); growing personalization (more interested in personal relationships); and, increase in individualism. However, Parkin (1971) noted that there was still a significant gap between working-class and middle-class education and culture, and that these cleavages are just as important as vanishing economic cleavages. Nevertheless, Parkin (1971) concluded that the working-class will eventually become culturally like the middle-class - recent trends in England would support his predictions.

While change in working-class lifestyle and values were not totally responsible for developments in pro soccer, they certainly were significant. Although there was no immediate cause-effect relationship, many members of the working-class accepted variations in lifestyle, a new way of doing things, and a desire to improve their social and economic position. 305

In pro football a rationalized approach began as early as the 1930s and 1940s when there

was a rigid league structure, and rules and regulations for everyone to follow. By 1950 pro

football began to operate in a way familiar to spectators today — free substitution, two platoons

and specialization, and many teams having their games televised.

Large crowds became accustomed to a high level of performance and would not tolerate

anything less. As a result the coaching profession became more demanding. Coaches worked

long hours, leaving little to chance. Year-round coaching staffe, note books for players, film

sessions, specific pass patterns and so on, became common-place. Detail and preparation became

the road to success. This was probably accentuated more in pro football than other sports in

America at this time. Once again this illustrates internal forces that effectively changed the way

a sport was developed. The nature of pro football demanded such attention to detail in the way

that basketball and baseball did not and never have.

All these changes were considered instrumental in improving the game, especially the

passing attack. The size, strength and speed of players has also been a major change. Players

as well as coaches realized the need for preparing their bodies for action more than ever before

— it was not a game or part-time leisure activity anymore; their bodies were to be used as the

"means" (vehicle) to reach the "end" (success).

Similarly in England, by the 1970s pro soccer became very complex and sophisticated,

but at the same time ruthless — "do what you have to do to win. " Winning became all important

and still is today. As pro sport in England and around the world demanded more commitment

on the part of players and coaches, greater investment on the part of owners, and greater cost for

spectators, the consequences of success or failure became more critical. Pro soccer players were

making a decent salary at this time, and were cognizant of the fact that they were involved in a business not a game. If they failed on the field they would be released just as they would in a 306

factory or another business. They did not always accept this but they recognized it as a fact of

life and the "natural " outcome of their sport; as did the media and the fans. Unfortunately, the

idea of playing not to lose rather than playing to win became all too common.

Teams were designed with defense in mind and it became an acceptable part of the game

to have players whose main job was to take creative players out of the game (somewhat like the

"goon" in pro hockey) utilizing whatever means possible. Training was designed around getting

the ball forward quickly, scoring but not exposing yourself at the back. Defenses were designed

to close down quickly, and big, strong, fast players predominantly reflected the character and

make-up of defenders. Although frustrating for fans time-wasting was employed, especially when

playing away, or when in the lead. The away team was instructed to play for the draw, and try

to "snatch a winner" on the counterattack.

However, with the advent of three points for a win in League matches the attacking team

is rewarded for scoring more goals which does make for a more open game. Therefore,

invention and iimovation in attack is encouraged. This may seem to contradict what has been

stated above, but their was an obvious reason for this change; fan interest. I would suggest that

FL authorities were learning from their American counterparts who had already rationalized these

types of changes in pro football (protecting quarterback and wide receivers, play clock) and

basketball (three point shot, shot clock). Not only was there more incentive to attack, but three

points for a win made a tie (one point) more like a loss, also teams stayed in the "title race"

longer, which has been demonstrated since the inception of the rule. Whether this was intended

to be an economic move on the part of the FL is debatable, what is not is that it makes sense from a business standpoint, and that FL officials have demonstrated that they are not always tied to static traditionalism. However, he is a different type of individual, bom out of a more 307

contemporary generation, who is partly responsible for these changes not the "good-old-boys”

from the FA.

While scoring in pro football has not changed since first established, there is room for

plays that are human and dazzling. Which suggests that technology is still a tool and not a

master. Life, let alone sport cannot be totally rationalized. For pro soccer (invention and

innovation in attack) and for pro football (human and dazzling plays) demonstrates that there is

room for creativity in sport — much like art or dance — and separates it from more predictable,

mundane areas of life. This freedom to perform is one aspect Novak (1976) referred to when

speaking of the joy of sport. This also demonstrates the universality of sport - freedom can be

experienced at one time by all athletes from all sports.

Denny (1951) believes the line between work and play is often obscure in American culture, and football is no exception. Therefore, there is room for elements of playfulness.

However, that room has all but been eliminated - rigid structure, set plays, playing just defense, specialization. Today, the ideology surrounding pro football is one of control, preparation and the elimination of chance. Pro football is a cooperative enterprise in which mistakes are too costly to be left to individual initiative. As pro football has moved along the continuum to become a truly modem sport (Guttmann, 1978) it has exhibited characteristics more common to work than play. Obviously, this is not a recent occurrence, but it is difficult to distinguish between the motivations of people in the everyday running of the economy and people in pro football — it is a matter of survival for both groups.

Similarly in pro soccer, the team’s success comes before individual goals. Therefore, while three points for a win does encourage attacking play, a number of teams still play for a tie, especially away from home. If the rules and structure allow for and encourage teams to succeed utilizing a more defensive team oriented posture that attempts to eliminate innovation, flare and 308

individualism, then owners, coaches, players, media, and even some spectators will accept this

as a "natural" development in the rational process of sport. We only have to look at the recent

World Cup (1994) to see this bdiavior in action. As soon as teams entered the Second Round

(single elimination) they played with less abandon, were more cautious, and committed less

players to the attack unless they were losing. The rule of three points for a win in the First

Round certainly encouraged a more open style of attacking play, but it was apparent that attitudes

changed when the price for failure was a plane trip home. The final was a fascinating battle of

team defense although Brazil did possess the ball more. Even Brazil, known and admired for

their flare and entertaining attacking play, won the World Cup because of disciplined team

defense more than anything else.

For teams to be successful they have to be financially solvent. That usually goes

hand-in-hand with success on the field. Whether in the USA or England, success at the pro level

is measured by your win-loss record on the field and your popularity off the field. While the

NFL teams have taken on a business approach for many years, the top clubs in England have

only recently begun to operate in such a manner - British mentality of being adverse to change, directors altruistic in their outlook, and an FA run by traditionalists with an archaic approach to the game, acted as a barrier to this development. However, they are learning very quickly the way to generate extraneous income as a result of improved impression-management and directors with a business acumen.

Organizations

There were pre-existing institutions instrumental in the emergence of professional football and soccer in the USA and England. In the USA athletic clubs and local businessmen helped 309

popularize the game, while in England churches and chapels, public houses and places of

employment fulfilled this function.

These institutions were influential in producing pro soccer in England in its organized

form significantly earlier than pro football in the USA. They were probably influential in the

development of the most prominent governing bodies for each sport, i.e., the FA founded 60

years earlier dian the NFL. It would seem Üiat a governing body precedes, and is necessary for,

a modem organized sport structure to exist or develop.

Both the NFL and the FA developed for similar and different reasons. Whenever some

form of authority emerges to take control it is often in response to the need for order, and this was certainly the case for pro soccer and football. Both governing bodies were formed because of the desire for all those involved to play each other under the same set of rules. In other words consistency and uniformity was needed. Which demonstrates how modem organizations are an outgrowth of rationalization and that it is difficult to separate the two characteristics in any analysis of social change in society.

The major difference concerns the scope of each organization. The FA was formed to deal and cope with soccer at all levels, while the NFL was concerned only with members of the

League.

In 1882 one set of laws was eventually achieved nationwide as other soccer associations grew and affiliated with the FA; evidence of the growing centralization of a goveming body for soccer. The FA functioned as the dominant authority on how soccer was stmctured, from amateur to pro soccer. Its values prevailed to build a consensus throughout the soccer community.

Although the FA had operated for some time before the NFL was founded, there were signs prior to 1920, of an attempt to stabilize pro football, set up a league structure, and establish 310 a standardized operational procedure for the game. As early as 1897 Latrobe became the first

team to play a full season with professionals only.

Because of the time at which it was founded the FA was mainly concerned with

uniformity and participants following the same rules. While there was need for such uniformity

in pro football, it faced other problems more reflective of modem sport; financial solvency. The

FL, founded over 20 years after the FA, was to face similar problems.

However, pro football had difficulty establishing itself in large metropolitan areas,

baseball had always been far more acceptable. As late as 1920 managers still came from small

and medium sized cities, owned small businesses, and saw the game as the players did - as a

way to make a few dollars on the weekend. Also, the popularity of college football did not help

pro football’s emergence at this time.

The FL, operating under the rules and regulations of the FA, had much in common with

the NFL in terms of its growth and development into a structured sport organization. A great

stimulus to attendance was the decision of the wealthier club owners to establish the FL. The

top clubs played each other, home and away, and these contests were exciting to the public. The

schedules guaranteed engagements and made possible a more exact calculation of revenue. This

is somewhat similar to the NFL, where the more powerful, successful clubs emerged to become

part of a professional organization that demanded fiill-time commitment from players and

coaches alike, and was operated by people cognizant of the relationship between skillful exciting

competitive games, and the size of the crowds.

It is evident here that although there was to be obvious differences between the

organizational structure of the NFL and the FL (a league of two conferences compared to one of four divisional levels), as each one evolved towards its contemporary form there were many similarities in the way each unit was constructed to seek specific goals and accomplish large scale 311

administration by systematically coordinating the work of many individuals. This is also the case

for other developing pro sport leagues — baseball, basketball, cricket and so on — as there are

certain demands that are universal rather than particularistic.

In England the opportunity for making money existed for the successful League clubs.

However, a number of clubs lost money as a result of the way the club was run; eccentric

management was not uncommon at this time, and for many years to follow. A community based,

family type ownership was not always conducive to successful economics. Many of these clubs

were satisfied with their situation and did not want to grow in size and stature — they were "safe"

where they were.

Many of these directors came from "old money," it had been part of their family for many generations; they had a comfortable existence and inherited much of their wealth. Unlike those who earned their wealth (nouveaus) they had not sacrificed much or worked that arduously to get where they were. Consequently, many of them were not motivated to work harder or strive for success. On the contrary, they preferred to retain the present situation as it had always been "good" to them — they had no need to change things. Also, the climate of traditionalism surrounded their social and professional life.

Before 1914, there was no, or little, specialization in operating a pro soccer club which were run almost entirely by a board of directors. These clubs could be seen as a family affair with both shares and directorship being passed down to each generation. This was not unlike other business practices at this time; large business conglomerates were yet to dominate the market, so there was opportunity for small businesses to survive and emerge (Mason, 1980).

However, pro soccer clubs were becoming business enterprises, the development of West Ham

United to pro status reflected this trend. The board of directors of West Ham United saw 312

themselves as employers of soccer players in the same way as directors employed workers in

their business. This was also true for pro football in the Halas, Bidwell era.

As early as 1880 soccer in England was distinctly bourgeois in organization and

structure. A separation emerged between the participants and spectators which was strengthened

by the bureaucratic structure and the evolution of soccer as a paying business venture (Tischler,

1981). Those running the clubs, for example, Arthur Hills of West Ham United, were from a

different background to those coming to see the games. The advent of paying customers also

distanced players from spectators, and facilitated the development of an organization indicative

of hierarchy, in terms of status and income; similar to other professional organizations emerging

in English society.

The same forces that contributed to the demise and decline of schoolboy versions of soccer in England, and unstructured, locally organized pro football in the USA, simultaneously elicited the need for an effective well-trained bureaucracy to manage industrializing societies that were growing more complex. This change called for a more structured, organized game, and the creation of the FA, FL, and NFL reflected this demand.

Conditions were emerging in society that gave rise to bureaucratization. These conditions facilitated the growth of efficiency seeking organizations in society and pro sport. Weber (1947) noted some of these conditions to be money in the economy, size of the population, large scale administrative tasks, special administration problems, capitalist systems, and size of economic enterprise.

For pro soccer and pro football to develop it would have to respond by meeting the demands of a growing complex society. The conditions listed by Weber were reflective of what was happening to each sport. For example, money was becoming an important factor in organizational decisions; the population in each sport was increasing, therefore, increasing the 313

need for administrative expertise and creating more administrative problems; and, each sport

operated in a growing cs^italist economy. What is evident here, is both external and internal

forces were perpetuating the need for bureaucratic structure in each sport.

A major difference between the governing bodies of pro soccer and football concerns the

goals of each organization. This is not surprising when one considers that the FA is responsible

for soccer at all levels played throughout the country, i.e., a national organization, whereas the

NFL, while national in capacity, was [is] responsible for only one league at one level,

professional.

The main goal of the FA is similar to other national governing bodies of sport in

England, i.e., promotion of the game at all levels and success of the National team, other goals involve stability. Certain rules and regulations have been in existence for over 100 years; the

FA believes in "keeping things the way they are." A number o f long lasting institutions in

England are adverse to change. This may have something to do with the "maturity" of the culture.

From professional to amateur level, soccer competitions tend to be structured the same way. Those involved in soccer have produced a societal community - a common culture which legitimates the normative order. From the FL to the amateur leagues, the stmcture of promotion and regulation, and knock-out competitions, are common to all. Such pervasiveness of organizations is not historically unusual in England, for example. National Coal, National Steel,

British Rail, British Telecom and so on. However, since Thatcherism private industry has grown in strength.

The system of competition allows for more than one winner — what Luschen (1970) calls non-zero-sum type competition, which allows for more than one winner or varying degrees of partially winning or partially losing, as opposed to zero-sum type competition where there is only 314

one winner (American system) - and functions as an integrative factor as well as promoting the

game. For example, the early rounds of the FA Cup bring together small and big clubs, and the

relegation and promotion system allows for smaller clubs to enter into Division I and the Premier

League,

This type of system where a top club like Manchester United might be scheduled away

from home against a Division III or semi-pro team really accentuates the notion of a soccer

community. Many small towns all over England at one time or another have had the pleasure

of hosting a major pro club. The FA and FL were first set-up with this in mind and the structure

has been maintained. There have been changes in the organization of English pro soccer, but

few, if any at all, have created a major realignment — if it has worked and been accepted for so

many years why change.

The notion of allowing the "less fortunate" an opportunity at glory is not as evident in

pro football — it would be hard to imagine the San Francisco Forty Niners playing a semi-pro

team in an important competition. First, it would not be economically feasible (the "almighty

dollar" controls behavior — Pragmatism) and second, American people would not consider it

appropriate — they would not even think about it. This is somewhat ironic when we consider that

America is a country where opportunity for social mobility is what motivates many and class lines

are have been interpreted as blurred and almost nonexistent, unlike more traditional societies such

as England.

Economic rationalization is reflected through the organizational structure of sport competition in America, while in England sport is organized to meet needs that are not necessarily economic in nature - community ties, maintaining tradition, promoting the game.

Also, support for the National team, and English clubs in European competitions brings people together with common goals. It is not unusual to see fans from Arsenal, Liverpool or Manchester 315

United, who despise each other during the season, supporting one another as they pursue

European glory. This distinction in organization of leagues and competition is one factor that

places pro football further along the modernization continuum than pro soccer.

The difference between the competition process of pro soccer and pro football really

brings to the forefront a major distinction between the organizational structure of each sport.

This distinction is representative of the sport structures in general for each country. In the USA

pro football, baseball, basketball, as well as college and high school sport are all aligned and

organized to produce one winner and one championship trophy for each sport (zero-sum type

competition). In England the competition structure for pro and amateur sport — soccer, cricket,

rugby and so on — is organized so that teams are allowed the opportunity to win more than one,

and often three or four trophies. For example, Manchester United, in 1994, were one win away from a unique domestic "treble"; they ended up losing in the League Cup Final, but won the

"double," the FA Cup and the League Championship. More importantly though, a team may fail in one competition but have another opportunity elsewhere.

To say that there is some deep lying cultural explanation for this development, related to the idea that England is a more democratic society than the USA where the wealth is spread out among more people, would be speculative at best, but interesting. Another explanation could pursue the idea that America evolved with an attachment to Darwinistic principles — survival of the fittest — which embodied the philosophy of one champion.

Throughout this dissertation it has been noted that England is characterized more by a rigid class structure than the USA, therefore, it would seem somewhat inconsistent to suggest that the former was more democratic — in the sense of sharing the "spoils" — than the latter.

However, where sport is concerned this seems to be the case. Nearly all sports in England are organized around a promotion and relegation system, and teams have the opportunity of winning 316

a trophy in a number of different competitions. This may relate back to the idea of promoting

the game rather than the profit motive -- keeping everyone interested and involved. Yet it could

be argued that more tournaments and trophies equals more money, for example, the recent

inception of the play-off system for promotion for Divisions I, H, and IE, which is based on the

American system of competition (Davies, 1994). The FA Cup certainly allows the smaller clubs

an opportunity to stay "financially alive" if they have a successful run in the tournament. It

might also be suggested that Ais system of competition has little to do with cultural differences

and how modem a society is; in major soccer countries all over the world this type of system

exists — promotion and relegation, numerous cup competitions. The English system, organized first, was probably very influential.

Attending to the second explanation for the difference between competition structure in

England and the USA (attachment to Darwinistic principles), it is necessary to consider historical and external developments. Darwin’s work on evolution, which introduced the principle of survival of the fittest in nature was applied to social life by American sociologist William Sumner

(1840-1910). He added fuel to the fire that burned the poor by proclaiming that laissez faire ideology was "validated" by "science" and therefore was incontestable. The basis for legitimacy in the nineteenth century capitalist economic institution rested in laissez faire ideology - government keep its hands off the economy except to support its "natural" workings in the interests of the dominant economic elite. The laissez-faire model of capitalism was believed by many to be not an ideology but the natural order of things (Sites, 1975).

The typical American is free to sell his/her labor on the market. Polanyi (1957) defines the market economy that developed under laissez-faire ideology as "an economic system controlled, regulated, and directed by markets alone; order in the production and distribution of goods is entrusted to this self-regulating mechanism" ^.68). The economic institution, with its 317

market economy and its free enterprise ideology, is the dominant social institution in American

society. Out of this mentality emerged a system of sport that was consistent with it. The natural

order of things will eliminate the weak as each individual has the freedom to seek glory and

success. I believe this approach to life was a catalyst in the adoption of the "winner takes all"

ethos that exists in contemporary sport in America. There are so many cliches posted on

lockerroom walls around the country that support and perpetuate such an ethos. These cliches

are even used outside of sport in the business world to inspire and motivate.

The above discussion on different structures and ideologies illustrates societal forces

affecting the evolution of sport. There is support here for the particularistic aspects of sport as

there are obvious differences between the organizational structure of competition in England and

the USA.

While the FA, FL, and NFL had much in common the latter took a somewhat different direction in the process toward a modem organization. As early as 1950 the NFL began to operate as a cartel - although this is not to suggest that an organization cannot be modem without being a cartel. The League extended to all its member clubs the privilege of territorial rights — as early as the 1920s — which insured a sort of "squatters rights" to individual clubs, competing in certain areas.

The competition structure was organized so there was uniformity throughout the League.

Each team had to play the same number of games, with the champions of each conference meeting in the World Professional Football Championship; there was only one champion. The

NFL became an enterprise that was national in scope, where every move was planned and predetermined.

The draft system seems to have created parity and consequently increased interest, for fans across the whole League, in the pro game — every team but two have made it to the play­ 318

offs. Owners were aware of this, and their business acumen seemed to be of the quality that

would presage success in any enterprise. The profit motive was, and still is, of utmost

importance, and in many cases the "measuring stick" for success.

What is fascinating about the cartel structure of the NFL is that it is "anti" American in

some respects. As noted above America was "built" around a &ee enterprise system, and while

the cartel makes sense from a business standpoint, it does limit competition of the "classical" kind

espoused by America’s founding fathers and leading pioneers. This is an area where pro sport

does not always reflect trends in other institutions, namely the economy and business

organizations, and demonstrates sports independence from social imposition. It may also

illustrate that sport can be a catalyst for social change. Many manufacturers, commercial and

service industries may look at the NFL cartel and wonder if that is the way of the future.

Conversely, in England we have an example of sport reflecting social trends. While there

is a common bond between structure in sport and the market place that has developed through

the modernization process and the imposition of rational order, directors did not always run the

clubs on strict business lines, like owners in the NFL, and are still guilty of cultural lag. This

was alluded to earlier, and demonstrates how sport in this particular situation tends to reflect

culture, attitudes, and values in society at large. However, although many clubs have been

reluctant to change their mode of operations, they are more aware today than ever before of the

benefits available with new commercial interests — the emergence of a Super League may reflect

this.

The stability of the FA and FL has remained throughout the twentieth century and no one

individual or group has challenged their position. This is not the case for the NFL. All in all there were five leagues which challenged pro football’s most powerful organization. In 1960 there were signs that the AFL would be a serious rival to the NFL. Like the NFL, the AFL was 319

operated along modem bureaucratic lines. If we look at other organizations in America and the

competition they have faced it should not be surprising that the NFL would face opposition from

other groups. However, this has not happened in baseball. One answer for this could be that

pro baseball had been organized and structured a lot earlier than pro football which became the

"new kid on the block." Also, baseball had established itself and teams in major cities and was

more willing to accept other teams into the League, unless they were black.

The rising cost of player talent drove the Leagues to the peace table in 1960. What

emerged was a common draft and an NFL championship game (the Superbowl ~ AFL versus

NFL champion) to begin in 1967. The merger agreement would lead to full integration with 28 teams for the 1970 season. Between 1967 and 1970 there was a restructuring and realigning of the league which demonstrated that this was an organization still trying to "find its feet."

The merger also says something about the nature of organizational stmcture in modem society. The draft, the championship game and the integration of twenty eight teams are just examples of what the realignment created. The NFL was successftil in completing this task

(reorganization) because the bureaucratic stmcture, a characteristic of modem society, had already been set in motion. NFL officials responded to these changes by accentuating the bureaucratic nature of the League. Consequently, the NFL came to represent what Blau (1962) defined as a bureaucracy; an organization designed to accomplish large scale administrative tasks by systematically coordinating the work of many individuals. Blau (1962) noted that the following characteristics of a bureaucratic organization are necessary for it to operate efficiently on a large scale; specialization; hierarchy of authority; system of mles; and, impartiality (no favoritism). With the expansion of the NFL to twenty eight teams these characteristics were adopted and fostered. 320

Weber (1947) would have seen the merger as a typical response to the increasing

bureaucratization of life in the modem world for individual meaning and social ordering. For

Weber bureaucracies were rationally constructed to meet the needs of a growing complex society.

In the case of the NFL and AFL owners, their decision was a power and fiscal one, but were

initiated by rational thought. Concerning fiscal reasons, it was economically more feasible to

have one league as it gave owners greater control over salary increases, it reduced competition

for markets and fans, and it solidified and strengthened the cartel. The power and control aspects

of the merger indicate once again the nature and goals of modem organizations. Although the

merger was not a total victory for any one league the NFL retained control. Whether it be within

or between organizations, modem bureaucracies attempt to control people or groups in order to

operate efficiently. The NFL needed to control the market and Weber (1958) alludes to this type

of control when he states succinctly: "The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic

organization has always been its superiority over any other form of organization" ^.214).

At first it might appear that pro soccer compared to pro football experienced few

alterations over past 25 years. However, there are signs that the FA and FL are not as adverse

to change as once thought. Responding to problems of severe debt in the late 1970s and early

1980s, the FL struck sponsorship deals with a number of businesses outside of sport. This

sponsorship widened the gap between the rich and the poor and broke with tradition, moving

soccer into another commercial venture.

More recent trends, such as the mmor of a Super League of only 10-15 clubs

demonstrates the desire of directors to separate themselves from smaller clubs and reap the profits

in the process. This proposed league would further the gap between the top clubs of the Premier

League (Manchester United, Liverpool, Everton and so on), and the smaller less wealthier clubs in all divisions of the FL. The "super powers" may eventually become a League unto 321

themselves, i.e., not part of the FL and have their own cup competitions, therefore, eliminating

any opportunity non-League or lower division clubs have of competing against them. Obviously,

this would have a significant impact on the game in terms of the way competition was organized

and how spectators, sponsors and TV perceived pro soccer. This type of development would ensure a power elite in pro soccer, which some feel already exists, and would, many believe, be a logical move that has occurred in pro sport all over the world, certainly the Western World.

Perhaps pro soccer in England is destined to follow the organized structure of pro sport in the USA — one winner, profit sharing, acceptance into the league depending on location and financial strength. If this was to occur, and there are signs that it might, would this support the notion that all modem societies will create sport structures that are similar, i.e., universal aspects of sport? It certainly would suggest that organizational demands on contemporary sport may illicit sport forms that are very similar irrespective of culture. However, I believe it is not a matter of pro soccer becoming more like pro football, but rather English soccer as a whole taking on American values and attitudes. So while it might seem that sport is independent of social imposition here, and it has been demonstrated that sport does have that capacity, in fact this illustrates how sport is tied to culture. In other words, this Super League idea would not have been entertained during the 1960s and 1970s. It is only since Thatcherism and the last IS years that such a plan could succeed. Today people are more receptive to this type of development because of social trends more so than sport trends, although the latter can affect the former.

Nonetheless, the smaller, "less attractive" clubs have managed to survive and are still very much a part of the system and soccer culture in England, which says much for the strength of tradition and conviction of these clubs to remain a part of the system. It also demonstrates an altruistic philosophy on the part of all those involved in the game, top to bottom, to allow this process to continue. 322

Commercialization

Pro soccer in England and pro football in the USA now operate along commercial lines

as a result of changes each sport faced in their evolution during the twentieth century. This type

of operation has been evident for football since the 1950s and for soccer more recently. Also,

with four divisions (92 clubs) in pro soccer certain clubs — namely those in the Premier League

and Division I — have been able to exploit commercial opportunities more successfully than

others. Consequently, to say that pro soccer clubs operate as a business first and a sport second, as pro football does, is somewhat misleading, and is probably true of specific clubs only, rather than the League as a whole.

The indication that pro soccer and pro football were going to develop into business ventures occurred at about the same time. This process was facilitated, in both countries, by the growth of cities and effects of industrialization — although the developments were certainly not parallel.

Industrialization helped bring about the elimination of plebeian recreation during early nineteenth century England, and prompted a new version, pro soccer, which reflected the aim and interests of businessmen club directors in the 1880s. After the 1880s the game was controlled by entrepreneurs as opposed to players, and the distance between participants and spectators grew.

The potential for pro football to become a business venture was probably realized as early as 1892. By 1895 the game had become well accepted in western Pennsylvania and profitable for those clubs that chose to participate. By the end of the nineteenth century a small number of entrepreneurs saw there was room for another sport besides baseball.

One reason for diis trend concerned the nature, and structure of cities. A more sophisticated audience — better understanding for the skill involved - and a lack of open space 323

for public recreation created audiences for soccer matches. Through the willingness of people

to pay to see games, entrepreneurs saw the potential of profit and invested in soccer grounds.

This mirrored the contemporary form of commodity sales (Tischler, 1981), and was an indication

that pro soccer was to follow the operating tactics of other businesses at this time. As Americans

became urbanized, teams began to emerge in areas where they could be supported by local

businesses and Ans.

However, the move to professionalism and an organized league was not "plain sailing"

for either sport. At first, class prejudice was a significant factor in the opposition to

professionalism in soccer. Nonetheless, owners realized there was no profit in operating under

an amateur code and pressed the FA to legalize professionalism, which it did in 1885.

Although it experienced some difficulty and had not established a governing body, pro

football spread relatively quickly beyond western Pennsylvania. However, the lack of financial support, poor response from the press and local communities, and the absence of a formal structure of competition, was not conducive to the emergence of a pro league. Attendance at most games was not enough to justify the hiring of relatively high-priced athletes, and huge margins of victory did not help.

The "natural order" of the work place ("us" and "them" dichotomy) found its extension in soccer; those running pro clubs were drawn from the bourgeoisie while the players were drawn from the working-class. The wage system actualized player-owner relationships, and it became apparent that the directors were not only involved merely for altruistic reasons. The process of incorporation further strengthened the position of a few men who controlled the business as the cost of shares were often out of reach of the "common man."

Between 1890 and 1914, with an expanding League and larger crowds, there was the renovation or complete rebuilding of more than 20 stadia. This type of renovation occurred in 324

the USA as well, and was facilitated by improved technology in the construction industry and the

experience of renovating cities in England and the USA. The expansion of grounds and facilities

provided additional sources of income for directors and clubs — sale of beverages and food. In

America the construction of expanding baseball stadia of the first two decades of the twentieth

century pushed men like Tim Carr to look to baseball arenas in big cities where seating was now

30,000 plus.

While stadia were built and renovated in both countries it is interesting to note that they

are significantly different in structure. In America stadia are all-seated, in England seventy to

eighty percent of the fans stand, which is still the case today at many grounds in the lower divisions. One reason for this is concerns availability of land. In America land was plentiful and so organizers did not have to cram people into small spaces. In England, on the other hand, land is a premium, so with a large percentage of the crowd standing on the terraces small stadia could accommodate large numbers. Another reason brings us back to the class issue. The majority of pro soccer fans have always been working-class males who could only afford "cheap" entertainment. It was/is less expensive to stand than sit in the stands, so the terraces were/are always generally full of working-class men. Directors realized that they could accommodate large numbers in the terraces without exorbitant maintenance costs. They felt no need to improve the facility as the working-class accepted and were familiar with such conditions. Therefore, while it might seem that directors in pro soccer compared to pro football officials were slow to catch-on to commercial opportunities, it was more a matter of responding to their clientele and the fans ability to pay.

However, this is an area where the NFL, and sport in general in the USA, is far more advanced — in terms of commercial foresight - than FL officials. The majority of modem stadia in the USA were located outside the city, just off the highway to facilitate easy access. These 325

stadia are all-seated, some covered, and accommodate young, old, men and women, and families.

It has taken directors of pro soccer clubs a long time to realize there are potential fans "out there"

that are not working-class males. Directors started to be cognizant of this in the 1970s when

crowd size dropped dramatically — violence was a contributing factor here (Walvin, 1986).

However, it is only in the last few years that soccer clubs have been renovated to all-seated

status. The top three clubs in England, Manchester United, Liverpool and Arsenal changed their

stadia to all-seated status just recently - last two years. Also, it is difficult to imagine soccer

clubs relocating to another part of the country, as some NFL teams have. The loyalty and

attachment to a community is still paramount. The majority of soccer clubs are situated in areas

that are difficult to reach. Fans have to travel on the bus, train, underground (subway) with the

excursion usually involving a ten to fifteen minute walk. It is almost impossible to park close

to the stadia, and there is very little to no room for parking lots of the type that surround stadia

in the USA.

Many of the smaller clubs in England cannot afford to renovate their ground; the money

just is not there. This reflects the distinction between the poor and wealthy clubs, but also the

willingness of those operating the sport to allow tradition to overcome economic reality. This

attitude was highlighted by Mason (1980) and acted as a barrier to the commercialization of the

game.

Another point that is ^propriate here concerns the awareness of NFL ofRcials to produce

a sport that is presented like other businesses in the service industry. Americans expect to be

treated well, whether in a restaurant, in a store, or a pro football game. They are intolerant of

poor service. In England people are much more willing to sit in the rain, the cold, walk a long

way to the ground and wait in line at a small number of turnstiles. Realizing this directors often feel under no pressure to change. However, with new stadia, a concern for providing quality 326

entertainment, and more things to do on a Saturday afternoon, the English fan will become less

tolerant of poor service than their predecessors. Nonetheless, the above is an example of how

sport reflects norms and traditions in society and how these can retard or accelerate the

modernization process.

In general soccer directors tried to apply sound marketing principles to managing their

club but they were not very good. The FL had from its inception examined each team’s capacity

to draw crowds before allowing membership, a practice that the NFL was to employ in years to

come.

As the game evolved into a business enterprise during the early decades of the twentieth

century and increased in popularity, investors from large cities replaced soccer entrepreneurs from smaller industrial towns. Again, the NFL repeated this trend at a later date.

Marketing potential and accessibility to population centers became important considerations for investors of soccer clubs. The wealthier clubs began to dominate the smaller ones, similar to other business ventures where larger corporations were emerging and this was a sign of things to come in England and the USA.

Publicity and gate receipts stirred up by Red Grange were instrumental in putting 31 pro teams in action, twenty two in the NFL and nine in the AFL by 1926. There was an emerging attitude in pro sport which Grange and his manager, C.C. Pyle, were partly responsible for bringing about. The idea of playing for fun because you loved the game was disappearing fast -

- this attitude had been prevalent in baseball for some time.

Grange toured different cities, taking his "show" on the road. In essence Grange and

Pyle were just like travelling salesmen, their goal was to make as much money as possible for their company (themselves) by selling a product, pro football. The significance of this was; it really set the pro football player apart from the college player; it demonstrated that pro football 327

players could make huge salaries and become famous stars like baseball players; and, it showed how lucrative and successful the player/agent relationship could be, and was probably

instrumental in agents becoming conunonplace in pro sport in the years to follow. Although they probably did not realize it at the time. Grange and Pyle were influential in bringing about changes in pro football that eventually were going to lead it to its most contemporary form — a business enterprise.

While die pro game in England was a working man’s pastime controlled by a small number of men, it did not necessarily exist as a microcosm of the larger business environment.

At the beginning of the twentieth century people involved themselves in the game for reasons other than just making money. Even in recent time there are signs that those investing in the game are concerned with factors other than financial success, although this may be true for other businesses as well, especially those where the profit motive is not the sole motivating force.

Dawson (1984) suggested that profit is the USA’s raison d’etre, while promotion, and more recendy profit, is the force bdiind English soccer.

Walvin (1986) argues that it is not just a matter of investors’ motivation for involvement, but rather poor management and cultural lag that have not produced large profits in pro soccer.

He believes clubs still maintain Victorian and Edwardian values because they are adverse to change. A value indicative of English culture.

There is a large discrepancy between the motivations and goals of the top Premier League teams and those in the lower divisions. While they are all part of the same system, some are creating opportunities for commercial success and others just trying to survive. This latter group has been instrumental in creating a soccer culture where the less fortunate are still part of the "big picture." The promotion and relegation system, and the FA Cup and FL Cup all help to foster and maintain the smaller clubs. It is as if tradition, maintaining this soccer culture and promotion 328

of the game are more important than profit. However, Dawson’s (1984) and Walvin’s (1986)

assertions were made almost a decade ago, and it has been noted that recent developments in pro

soccer may have diminished the desire of promoting the game for the "good of all" among

directors in the Premier League.

In an attempt to make more money a number of directors are changing the way they run their clubs and present the game. Their approach is more commercialized, an "American type" enterprise. Commercial practices that American pro sports leagues have undertaken for a number of decades now are being incorporated into the running of the Premier League and some pro soccer clubs. It is as if pro soccer officials are looking to America for ideas as it selects those aspects that are attractive and workable, but not so radical that basic values and structure have to be undermined. Nevertheless, new practices have facilitated the modernization of pro soccer along the lines of pro sport in America — the latter being the "bench mark" for modem sport.

Pro soccer did not take advantage of all the commercial opportunities available. As new technologies and efficient bureaucracies improved the system of communication and the general operation of a growing economy, the potential for prosperity in pro sport, especially pro soccer, revealed itself. Yet, only those willing to take a chance, or with the foresight to exploit the market, were able to experience significant gains in prosperity. This group, referred to by Wagg

(1984) as the "new order" of entrepreneurs who began to surface between the two world wars, adhered to American capitalistic philosophy and were instrumental in producing consumer capitalism in Britain in the 1940s and 1950s.

These entrepreneurs facilitated the growth of a corporate enterprise system that was bureaucratic and rational in nature, but more importantly for this discussion, those in control were motivated by the "almighty dollar." Individuals from "new" (nouveau riche) rather than 329

"old" money brought with them a new outlook that responded more to the economic reality of

the times and a desire to make money rather than a traditional value system.

However, officials at the FA and FL were not part of this "new order" and were

comfortable with maintaining die system as it already existed - were slow to take advantage of

exposure through the media, sponsorship deals and so forth. Directors of clubs espoused an

ideology of stability and continuity. Success to them was winning the FA Cup, the League

Championship or finishing high in their respective division, and satisfying the fans and local community. If the club was financially successful, so be it, but this was not their raison d’etre -

- driving force — and they were not willing, at this time, to sacrifice stability and continuity for commercial success. Many of these soccer officials were from the "old school," and financially comfortable in the first place, and their position and opinions reflected this.

However, during the inter-war years there was a fierce competition for players, which led owners to offer extra incentives to keep and attract the stars. A change, Hopcraft (1968) says, which would be significant to the development of pro soccer, and in the 1930s and 1950s improved conditions of the poor and industrial groups facilitated the growth of the game at the pro and international level.

Technology improved transportation and the opportunity to travel, media informed people of great, attractive teams across Europe, and people in general had more money than their predecessors. It enlightened authorities in England of the need to modernize the game.

Although there was some growth and new policies instituted, the NFL never reached fruition - in a financial sense — until the fifties. While poor management and cultural lag have been noted as the main reasons for lack of profit and commercial progress in the English game, for football much of this could be attributed to the ravages of the Great Depression and World

War n, and the competition with major college football for publicity and fan support. 330

Nonetheless, the NFL somehow survived, and by the end of World War H small-town

teams were only remnants of the pro game, except for Green Bay. The League was now made

up of wealthier franchises situated in bigger cities with greater access to the conunercial market.

A transition which had already occurred in England for the bigger clubs.

Much of the NFL’s financial success could be attributed to the merging of the NFL

owners into a single economic cartel - along with the successful marriage to TV in the 1950s.

From this kind of position is it difficult to imagine how NFL franchises could fail, and none have

since 1952. In terms of TV ratings and the demand for season tickets, pro football was the most

popular sport in America by the mid-1960s.

This type of support system — profit sharing, not infringing on another team’s market —

of the cartel was unique in some respects and contradicted the philosophy of free enterprise so

central to American economics. While it is often noted, and has been in this study, that pro

football is a business, it is not in the same sense that other businesses are. Wendy’s, Hardees,

and McDonald’s are strictly in competition with each other. Obviously, the Cleveland Browns want to beat the Pittsburgh Steelers on the field, but off the field they are not in competition with each other in the same way fast-food businesses are, or other businesses for that matter. Does this make pro football any less modem than Wendy’s or McDonald’s, on the contrary, cartels could be the way of the future. This illustrates how owners respond to internal needs of the sport rather than following on from what the market dictates in the "business world. "

In England as new generations made up the work force the values and methods of

American capitalism — impression management, advertizing, public relations, and broadcasting -

- were central to their agenda for change. Those promoting this "new order" observed and benefited from American experience in selling "people’s capitalism" in a welfare state. 331

During the 1960s politicians were aware of the benefits of public relations, advertizing

and dealing with die media. They also saw the importance of soccer to their exposure.

Consequently, soccer received a great deal of attention and political adulation. Soccer players

also became aware of the commercial possibilities involved in the game. A turning point for

them was the abolition of the Maximum Wage in 1961.

The commercial transformation of the game brought with it improved facilities to

accommodate a "superior clientele" with more luxury, and the modem player, acutely conscious

of his earnings on and off the field. This transformation produced a greater distance between the

clubs and the majority of fans standing on the terraces. As soccer players realized their

commercial value and were seeking new reference groups, they "crossed the line" that once

separated tiiem and the fans from the owners and middle-class clientele.

These trends reflected a shift for some working-class groups after World Warn. Since

the war some writers (Butler and Rose, 1960, Zweig, 1962, Parkin, 1971) claimed that more

affiuent members of the working-class were losing identity as a social stratum and became

merged into the middle-class. Butler and Rose (1969) were interested in the political implications

of this development by analyzing the increasing Conservative working-class vote. They noted

that the swing to the Conservative Party was the result of long-term, traditional working-class

attitudes being eroded by a steady growth of prosperity.

Pro soccer players did not automatically move from blue to white collar positions and

take on the values associated with a different class, but they were perceived in a different "light"

by the fans and became socially mobile — moved out to middle-class suburbs. While it would

take considerable time for these players to internalize all facets of a middle-class lifestyle, social mobility depends more on the occupational structure than social structure or cultural values

(Parkin, 1971). Therefore, as pro soccer players’ salaries increased and they became more like 332

entertainers their attachment to the working-class began to diminish somewhat. This was also

facilitated by changes within soccer clubs themselves — owners and players saw themselves as

part of the entertainment business and less of a community based venture.

In a move to exploit the commercial market the FL began to look for sponsorship. It was not long before the FA — traditionally oriented toward amateurism and patriotism — sanctioned the commercialization of the England team. These kind of developments in pro soccer were part of a wider pattern of diffuse cultural change, which came about through the growth in post-war

Britain of the mass consumption economy. Impression-management occupations of advertizing and public relations became influential and very visible within a changing economy. These developments were instrumental in creating an ideology within pro soccer that was to strive for commercial success as much as the accumulation of trophies.

Impression management — very much a part of English economy in the 1960s — created a climate that encouraged selling and consumption. Facilitating this process was the emergence of many advertizing agencies, independent TV and radio, and other information organizations.

Learning from the American experience — many advertizing agencies in Britain at this time were

American owned — companies and businesses incorporated advertizing strategies and techniques.

Also, the sports clothing and equipment industry was emerging as a viable business enterprise.

Within this climate it was not long before pro sport teams and players received sponsorship. As with other trends in English soccer though, directors, players and the governing bodies were very slow to exploit the opportunities to make money. In fact they have only realized this within the last decade.

Dunning (1975b) has noted that certain English sports retained an amateur ideology, which had consequences for their approach to the financing and organizing of sport at least until the late 1960s. The result of this was that English sports exhibited a lower level and, in many 333

ways, different forms of commercialization than that exhibited in American sports. He also

suggests that during the early 1970s this previously established system of amateur control was

breaking down and professional sport was becoming increasingly commercialized. By the early

1980s this process had gathered momentum (Maguire, 1988b). It is in the context of this broader

commercialization of English sport and English society more generally that the emergence of

American values needs to be located. With regard to the broader context, Thatcherite Britain,

with its emphasis on an enterprise culture, has provided a highly favorable climate for the spread

of American cultural forms (Maguire, 1990).

Fifteen years of Conservative rule were bound to have some impact on the country.

However, it was more than the presence of a Thatcher government that influenced English culture, English economy, and English people. A "new class" of individual (nouveaus,

"yuppies") emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s in England and the USA. This "new order" (many of which were relatively young, creating a new youth culture) were more conservative and attained a greater business acumen than their predecessors. They were/are driven by material wealth, and Reagan and Thatcher were just what the "doctor ordered."

In England, Thatcher moved to expand private education and privatize nationalized industries - a move that would have been unacceptable in the 1960s, and even the 1970s. What grew out of these developments was a more affluent working-class (although disparities increased in some ares — northern England) and a nation that was driven by personal than group, community needs. Older Labour voters seemed to give-in and, powerless as they were, accept the changes and move on.

Businesses and organizations reflected impersonal, hierarchical structures. Even the education system and schools became bureaucratic and operated on a strict budget, with every pound accountable. Pro soccer clubs seemed to be one of the last "bastions of hope" but even 334

they have changed in response to the pressures of succeeding in such a competitive climate.

Some clubs have had to find new ways to make money (souvenir shops), cut their costs (release

long serving employees — tea ladies, program and confectionery salespeople) and increase the

price of admission. While these changes maybe reflective of contemporary Britain, they

demonstrate that modernization does not always result in progress for all, as Brown (1976) so

aptly notes.

However, a number of scholars (Fynn and Guest, 1989, Wagg, 1984, Walvin, 1986) feel

soccer clubs have never been conventional commercial institutions. They suggest that pro soccer’s main pursuit, rather than financial profit, has been to succeed on the field, develop close community ties and maintain stability. Traditional attitudes and values, and the inability or unwillingness to change, on the part of soccer people, have been central to the continuity of the way the game is played and operated. For many directors of smaller clubs profit is not as important as maintaining the club. If it became a major problem they would see out or have to change their mode of operation. But, at present, many are willing to operate in the red.

On the other hand pro football was a sports business, in the strictest sense, by the end of the 1960s. By any measure, the success of pro football from the 1960s to the early 1980s was staggering. If costs increased, as they invariably would, the League just raised the price of tickets, and pursued other methods of making money (TV contracts and so forth). This did not offend too many, which is not surprising when one considers the affluence of the NFL’s clientele. The typical fan was, and probably still is, middle to upper-class and very marketable

(Rader, 1990). Also, with only twenty eight teams and not much else happening on Sunday afternoon, their is a great demand for tickets.

If there is one aspect of contemporary pro football that separates it from its predecessor and other pro sports it is die strength of die cartel structure under which it now operates. This 335

is reflected in the League’s pattern of revenue sharing, although sky boxes have changed this

somewhat. All 28 teams share equally, network television income and profit from NFL-Films

and NFL-Properties.

Since the merger between the AFL and NFL took effect in 1970 all twenty eight teams

at one point have qualified for post-season play. It would seem that the draft system along with

revenue sharing has certainly helped to promote parity within the League. This is not a

philanthropic gesture on the part of the NFL, but rather sound economic practice — it maintains

fan interest.

It is interesting to consider what motivates NFL officials. The desire is one of presenting

parity so that every game is perceived as exciting and close which is attractive to spectators.

There are dominant teams, but each year fans of all clubs (Tampa Bay and Phoenix, now

Arizona, included) still believe, when they buy their season tickets, that "this could be the year"

for their team. The priority for NFL officials is to achieve this goal of parity (or deception as

some might say), not to produce dynasties or great teams but to create a league that is financially

successful, and is made-up of franchises that are commercially productive. Therefore, while the

game is a priority, commercial factors are more important to those operating the teams.

However, these goals have only been partially fulfilled; the indeterminacy of sport is

simply that, unpredictable. While the NFL has strived to produce parity and create indeterminacy

throughout the whole League, dynasties have persisted. These may not be dynasties in the form

of the New York Yankees in the 1920s, the Montreal Canadians in the 1950s and 1960s, and

Boston Celtics in the 1960s, but they are dominant teams nonetheless - Pittsburgh Steelers in the

1970s, San Francisco Forty Niners in the 1980s, Dallas Cowboys in the 1990s. However, since

1968 as many as eight Superbowl winners failed to qualify for the play-offs the year following their championship season fNews-Sun. 1994). This is another example of how sport can never 336

be totally rational in the sense of eliminating chance, and being able to control what happens

next. This separates sport from the "real world," or does it? If it does, can sport ever be truly

modem? If modem means predictable, and I am not sure it does, then surely sports people

would try to avoid this.

It is obvious that the elimination of chance in sport would be commercial suicide.

Spectators and therefore sport entrepreneurs, want to see a close, competitive match-up before

the game (on paper) and during the actual contest, otherwise boredom sets in and people choose

to go elsewhere or watch another channel, fhistrating the sponsors. However, the goal within

modem institutions has been to control all outcomes by devising a formal, rationally organized

stmcture with clearly defined patterns of activity in which, ideally every series of action is

functionally related to the purpose of the organization.

In pro football, and to a lesser degree pro soccer, it has been noted how and why this rational organization has evolved — planning and preparation, training and practice, strategies and tactics, qualified coaches, a formal bureaucratic stmcture, goveming bodies, a professional approach to the game and so on — within a changing society. Yet even in pro football, probably the most rationalized and stmctured of all sports (a coaches game), the elimination of chance would be unappealing and should never be complete. In this respect how can pro football be truly modem, as noted by Guttmann (1978)? It cannot, and neither can soccer, and spectators should strive to oppose any such thought. This examination leads us to conclude that rationalization in sport, and certainly in the example of a cartel stmcture (no one team monopolizing the league), is different to rationalization in the business world, where elimination of competition is the desired goal.

In comparing pro football and pro soccer in relation to the above discussion, the following question must be asked; does the nature of the game, and particularly scoring, make 337

the sport more modem than the other? To eliminate chance and create a truly modem,

predictable game, would result in the most prepared, skilled and talented team always winning.

In sport this usually h^pens, but, I contend, more-so in pro football than pro soccer because of

the nature of scoring goals and points. Skill level being even, it is "easier" to score a touchdown

in football than a goal in soccer. In soccer you can control ninety percent of the game and still

lose on a counter-attack or a goalkeeping error. If you have an excellent goalkeeper you have

a good chance of stopping the opposition from scoring in an eight yard by eight foot goal.

Consequently, many soccer games end with a 2-1, 1-1, 1-0, or 0-0 scoreline. In football the

space to score a touchdown is the width of the field (fifty yards) and ten yards deep. Also, you

only have to catch the ball, rather than shooting it with your feet, which is more difficult - in

daily use dexterity of the hands is continually demanded and practiced, while our feet are only used for walking and standing.

Football, much more than soccer, is a game of territorial domination, where controlling the ball and not fumbling will "guarantee" victory. If one team dominates another but cannot score a touchdown, they can always kick field goals. The biggest, strongest, fastest team will win. In soccer this is generally the case too, but the complexity of skill involved in scoring is greater than in football.

The above is obviously a subjective evaluation on my part, but I believe there is much credence to this argument. If we accept this premise, does it not demonstrate that pro football is a game where outcome is more predictable than pro soccer and easier to control? If that is the case then the nature of pro football is more receptive to the demands of a modem society?

Probably so, yet like all sport, even pro football cannot be totally rationalized or predictable.

This aspect of sport — indeterminacy — also illustrates the universal nature of it. From culture to culture, sport to sport, skill level to skill level, our fascination and attraction to sport is 338

basically the same; the excitement of competition and the realization that anyone could win or

lose.

The principles and policies of the cartel are central to the way the NFL is governed.

However, the movement of die Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles was a significant break from the

cartel. The mobility and movement of teams (Oakland Raiders, Baltimore Colts, St. Louis

Cardinals) to the most economically viable market is a reflection of contemporary pro sport;

behavior is motivated along business lines.

While taking a longer time to evolve, this type of mentality took control of pro soccer

in England in the latter part of the twentieth century. In the 1960s Hopcraft (1968), pointed out

that the institution of club director is the central contradiction of the sport. The amateurs govern

the professionals. These club directors were motivated by their partisan local involvement, rather

than the potential for profit. However,as noted before, a different type of director came to

govern many soccer clubs in the late 1960s. Impatient with established practice, relatively young,

and a keen awareness of the economic "facts of life," he is part of a new generation that came

to "full bloom" during Thatcherism and internalized and espoused values distant from those held

by the traditional working-class -- material wealth. Today many directors, especially those in the

top clubs, are part of the nouveau riche, having made their money in real estate, marketing, banking, construction, advertizing and so on (Fynn and Guest, 1989). They, more so than their predecessors are filly aware of what it takes to run a profitable business.

These directors have brought a sharp commercial mind to the game — not unlike owners of NFL franchises’. As a result the financial imbalances between the top clubs and those in the lower divisions has been most prominent since the 1970s. The top clubs have renovated their stadia — including luxury boxes — and raised their entrance fees dramatically over the last 10 years. They have been the recipients of lucrative sponsorship deals and recently received huge 339

TV contracts (Shoot, 1992). As a result of receiving more income the wealthier clubs are able

to buy the best players and attract them with large contracts. Consequently, the likes of

Manchester United, Liverpool, Arsenal and Tottenham Hotspur are more successful on and off

the field, qualifying for more competitions and games, especially Europe where they can gamer

large profits. While smaller clubs have survived, the rich get richer and the not so wealthy stay

where they are. Southampton, Norwich, Sheffield United, Swindon Town, and Luton Town are

examples of clubs that have performed relatively well on the field over the past two decades yet

will never reach the heights, financially, of the top clubs listed above. The system in England

allows for inequality while at the same time maintaining continuity (unsuccessful and small clubs

allowed to survive). The FL is a curious amalgam of economic rationalization (American ideology) and altruism (traditional English ideology). Soccer’s largest consumer group, young people, are willing to accept the attitude of consumer capitalism as it is part of their heritage.

They grew up under a system of Thatcherism and Reaganomics.

While signs for such change surfaced in the late 1960s, it is only in the last 10-15 years that the commercial ^proach to pro soccer has been radically altered. However, the restructuring of the FL to a Premier League and three divisions has not changed the way the game is operated. The Premier League still contains the same number of teams, the only difference being its sponsor. Carling Brewing sponsors the Premier League and Endsleigh

Insurance Divisions I, U, and in.

Nonetheless, fiiis is possibly the beginning of a move by certain individuals — the new executive type owner — toward a Super League which would include only the wealthiest clubs, and would widen the gap even further between the "have and have-nots." This kind of development could create a pro soccer league along the lines of the NFL. The teams selected, would only be those that were economically powerful and successfiil. Criteria for entering the 340

league would be similar to those exercised by NFL officials. Clubs outside of this league would

still be professional but would probably take on the status of a minor league franchise if the Super

League did not compete against them anymore. This would be a dramatic departure from the

way pro soccer has operated for the last one hundred years.

This Super League may consist of only English teams, or two to three teams from

powerful soccer nations in Europe, for example, Germany, Italy, England, Spain and Holland.

The creation of this League and the similarities with pro sport leagues in America supports the universality of sport. However, the pro soccer system and the people who govern and play in it are too entrenched in English culture for there to be a complete departure. Demonstrating cultural relativity and supporting particularism in sport. Also, this indicates that traditional barriers to modernization are more evident in England than the USA. What I can foresee is some modification of the Super League, whereby an elite league is established but these teams can compete outside the League — FA Cup, FL Cup and so on.

While it has been stated that today the NFL operates along strict business lines it does not compare, in terms of revenue, to major businesses. A number of owners believe corporate ownership — avoided up to now — will be the way of the future for the League - Radio

Corporation of America (RCA) Just committed ten million dollars to the Indianapolis Colts over the next ten years, in order that the Hoosier Dome be changed to the RCA Dome. They feel this is the avenue a pro sports league should take if it is to operate alongside financially powerfiil organizations. If corporate ownership is voted in, we could see a number of teams up for sale in the 1990s.

There are probably a number of large corporations that would jump at the chance of owning an NFL franchise and take advantage of the marketing opportunities it presents. If pro 341

football is not big business right now — and some would argue otherwise - then it certainly

would be under corporate ownership.

Media

The media has had an enormous impact on the way pro football and pro soccer operate

today. Television, while the most influential, has been one aspect of this media influence. The

print media was more influential for soccer than football at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century.

By the 1890s few towns of any size in England were without their "football special."

Sport in general and soccer in particular had also become part of the regular feature of both the daily and weekly press. Prior to 1920 the press was never convinced pro football was going to succeed in America. Under these conditions it was very difficult for a league to succeed at this time, and it never did.

Why did pro soccer have more support from the print media than pro football? One reason could be the popularity of baseball and college football in America at this time. Also, professionalism, a league, and governing bodies were well established in England at the turn of the century. In other words soccer had a "head start" over football.

With an established league came respect from newspapers — they saw the sport as organized and serious, and therefore significant. This occurred for pro football after 1920 when doubt changed to support, and Ohio newspapers reported on plans to form a pro league.

However, baseball received more exposure, one reason being they were situated in big cities where the press had more "clout." When pro football relocated to the major cities in the 1930s its relationship with the print and then the broadcast media was to reap rewards for both groups. 342

Although the FL and FA as early as the 1920 and 1930s were aware of the financial gain

to be realized through a relationship with the media, Americans had been working at this form

of communication substantially longer than the British (Wagg, 1984). Like other forms of

technology Americans were a "step-ahead" of the English. However, at this period of time it did

not seem to have a dramatic impact on the modernization of each sport in terms of creating major

differences between the two. Hiis is not to say that the media was not influential up to the

1950s, of course it was, but TV was the main catalyst for change. It took the power of TV to

push pro football into its "golden age." As early as 1950 TV affected not only how the game

was to be played but also policies involved in running the NFL.

Television created a nation of "instant experts" and brought the game into the homes.

Technological breakthroughs — instant replay, slow motion — made the game easier to understand

and more exciting and attractive to the general public, and more fans could see than ever before.

Also, the nature of the game was perfect for TV — stop-start, recurring crises points, four downs

to get 10 yards — a medium from which pro football prospered more than any other sport.

While TV had an impact on English social life during the 1950s it was not until the 1960s

that sport began to embrace this medium. The FA and FL officials regarded outside influence

as interference and unnecessary for the development of the game; they were slow to realize the

opportunity for prosperity. Once again tradition and a static approach delayed the inevitable onset of change in pro soccer. On the other hand, officials in pro football were aware, at the beginning of the 1960s, of the potential for lucrative contracts with TV networks. The Sports

Broadcasting Act of 1961, which owners pushed through Congress, made this possible. This act strengthened the cartel structure of the NFL and allowed the League to negotiate the sale of national broadcast rights as a single economic unit even against competing leagues.

Consequently, from the 1960s on the NFL was free to negotiate contracts with any network. Pro 343

soccer officials, on the other hand, did not pursue lucrative contracts until the end of the 1980s.

Incredible, when you consider soccer was organized earlier at the professional level than football.

However, Fynn and Guest (1989) suggest that while members of the soccer establishment

knew they were not receiving enough money from TV they had no idea how to change the

situation — many lacked any kind of business acumen. Also, the two major networks, BBC and

rrv, were not prepared to bid against each other and held a monopoly together that would not

be challenged until well into the 1980s. As long as the two corporations remained solid there

were no other outlets to which soccer could turn . Saachi, the advertizing agency brought in by

Tottenham Hotspur as part of a 100,000 pound marketing plan to boost crowds during the 1983-

84 season, advised the League to complete two objectives. First, the cartel must be broken, and

second, the true worth of the product to TV, based on advertizing revenues, must be worked out

in depth. The company’s analysts later put the value of the game to TV at six million pounds

for the 1985-86 season ^ynn and Guest, 1989).

Another point appropriate here concerns the fear that TV (especially live TV) would

reduce crowds throughout the League. It was also believed that attendances at televised games

would suffer adversely. Furthermore, a number of clubs had been approached by companies who

were willing to pay large sums of money for the right to display their names on the shirts of

soccer players. Television would not allow these advertisements on screen and the ludicrous

situation developed where clubs would wear their sponsor’s logo only if the cameras were not present, which rather negated the value of the sponsor and seriously retarded the revenue potential of the sponsorship (Fynn and Guest, 1989). Surrounded by these events and this type of climate it was not surprising that NFL officials were utilizing and benefiting from TV a lot earlier than pro soccer officials. 344

The NFL has signed enormous contracts with TV networks, which companies willingly

pay because they are guaranteed large audiences. By the 1970s such audiences demanded

sophisticated production techniques, which they got. Football coverage has probably encouraged

more innovation on the part of TV networks than any other sport (Rader, 1990). There is a great

deal of money involved in setting up such a production. Consequently, networks want some form

of control over the game. As early as 1960 it was evident that TV was to play a major role in the running of a pro game (Laurent, 1973). Some critics (Horowitz, 1974, Hughes and Coaldey,

1984) have charged that TV has changed the game so the "entertainment" and "dollar" aspects have become more important than the game itself - TV time-outs, scheduled time and date of games, focus on cheerleaders and sideline behavior. So while pro soccer people were slow to exploit the media market, pro football has paid the price and lost control of its destiny.

However, as we have seen, pro soccer seems to have sold much of its "freedom" since the 1980s.

This was no more illustrated than towards the end of the 1994 season when the "big game" of the Saturday schedule, Manchester United versus Blackburn Rovers, was moved from the traditional kick-off time (3 p.m.) to 5:30 p.m., so fans (at 3 p.m. games) could get home to watch the game on TV. This was unprecedented and demonstrated that soccer officials have

"learned" something from their counterparts across the Atlantic. This also tells us that perhaps pro sport is intrinsically commercial and maybe its destiny is meant to be determined by business managers and the mass media. This is a necessary stage - and I say this with some regret - in the modernization of sport in contemporary society, and is universal.

During the 1960s pro soccer players became TV personalities. Match of the Day and the

Big Match brought players into the home. The coverage of European cup matches and the 1966

World Cup brought an international flavor and knowledge of foreign stars to the English public.

However, being in the spotlight brought with it some problems for players, managers, and certain 345

officials. As the game became more commercialized winning became more important which led

to a deterioration of sportsmanship, and players and managers were held accountable for results.

However, the emergence of this approach of "win at all costs," which had little regard

for the idea of fair-play, was more complex than just a response to the commercialization of

sport. Each succeeding generation of pro soccer player seems to have been well versed in the

art of the "professional foul" — not letting your opponent score no matter what action you had to take — and other tactics outside the laws of the game in order to gain an advantage. Young players learned from their immediate predecessors just as children learn from adults. Besides the fact that there was more money involved in the pro game with each generation, and the consequences of failure being more damaging, other factors surfacing in English culture — and

America for that matter — were instrumental in the rise of this type of behavior and these attitudes. There was less respect for authority — referees became key players in the outcome of games, more so than prior to the 1950s — traditional manners and morals were not instilled or taken on by young people (especially in the 1960s and 1970s), and this helped to create a more cynical, abrasive youth culture. The entertainment world - music, films, books, magazines - perpetuated, and in many respect reflected, these values.

Through economic changes came the emancipation of adolescents as in the 1960s young people became economically ind^endent (Parkin, 1971). As a result they rejected adult society and created one of their own. Therefore, there developed in England and America a commercial youth culture acquiring music and clothes as symbols of the youth status (Turner, 1964).

Eisenstadt (1978) says the youth culture movement has travelled from a communal solidaristic family (ascribed status, Gemeinschaft), into the impersonal, associational world of other institutions (achieved status, Gessellscbaft). 346

For pro soccer players the business of winning became more important than any idealistic

notion of having a clean, close game with many goals. This type of approach "rears its ugly

head" when the stakes are highest -- World Cup and European cup tournaments - and is as prevalent today as anytime in the history of pro soccer.

This type of pressure to win was indicative of British business which was increasingly influenced by United States commerce (Wagg, 1984). Business ethics and gamesmanship was extending from the boardroom to the field of play. The "professional foul," now common in the game, demonstrated how the modem pro was worlds removed from his sporting forebears.

While pro football has been shown on all three major networks since 1970 (and now

Fox), cable TV has recently become involved with the NFL. These expanding TV patterns have given every fan more NFL games to watch.

No other team sport was quite responsive to the needs of TV as pro football. Pro football was willing to adjust schedules and make changes in the game to facilitate TV; a sacrifrce that was worthwhile as it reaped huge financial rewards. And networks were willing to pay the NFL large sums as the nature of the game accommodated the needs and style of TV production. By the mid-1970s referees received signals to call no fewer than 14 time-outs during each game.

Commercials added approximately 30 minutes to each game, which today, often lasts longer than three hours.

The reason why soccer and TV rarely experienced amicable negotiations in the 1980s was that the two major TV companies, ITV and BBC, had negotiated as a cartel since 1978.

Therefore, soccer representatives did not have the power of playing one against the other to get the best deal, a problem the NFL has not faced. Consequently, pro football was able to benefit from the free enterprise system central to American economics. It was, and still is, considered a normal part of the process for teams to negotiate for the best offer and most lucrative contract. 347

It was not that pro soccer did not "fit" TV the way pro football did — a criticism usually coined

by United States media and Americans in general, especially after the 1994 World Cup. But,

rather that the opportunity for negotiation had not surfaced, and when it did soccer officials were

not as skilled or experienced as NFL officials in the bargaining process. This type of mentality

was not part of the "natural order" in England — although this was to change under and after

Thatcherism — as it was in the USA. Therefore, opportunities of playing one bid against another

-- BBC being a nonprofit organization—to get the best ofier were not as plentiful for leagues and

clubs in English sport, or pursued with as much aggression as they were by pro sport officials

in the USA.

Beyond this though is the fact that American TV is generally different to English TV.

The main difference is with presentation and the opportunity to sell products. Glitter, glamour,

and material acquisition are the messages that TV conveys in the USA. Programs, especially

soap-operas and sit-coms, are usually about people who live in nice homes, lead exciting lives,

are well dressed and groomed, and are good looking. These "superficial" values are highly

regarded in American social life. Even those presenting the so-called "serious" shows reflect this

trend. Soap-operas in England are mainly about "real people" from working-class communities -

- accentuating and illustrating the ongoing presence of class divisions.

In America the public are constantly reminded that TV only exists because sponsors pay for programs, for example, "the movie tonight is brought to you by " or "Monday Night

Football is brought to you by " In England BBC and BBC-2 have no commercials, and ITV and Channel-4 show very few commercials compared to American TV networks. Also, commercials are presented only during "commercial breaks" and are separate to the shows. In the USA sponsors are part of the show, not separate, and more importantly, this is accepted as 348

normal by the general public. In England this type of presentation would be perceived as an

inhringement on viewing time.

These kinds of differences affect the way sport and TV interact. Pro football shows, such

as NFL Today, and especially Monday Night Football, are as much about presentation — lead-

in music, pre-game and half-time show, studio discussions — as they are about the game. While pro soccer shows have begun to utilize certain strategies familiar to American sport production, programs are more concerned with the actual game than the glamour and "side stories"

(controversial or not) that surround the event or sport. Little time is spent on anything other than the game. I do not think English viewers are quite ready for NFL style production (the weekly

NFL show on Channel-4 is a condensed version of the top games with very few commercials, a program obviously prepared for a different kind of viewer), but as TV and pro soccer come to depend more and more on each other, the public may be coerced (if not forced) to accept change. For example. Sky TV (a new satellite service) produces soccer shows that have more in common with American TV than traditional English sport production. This development is facilitated by the substantial number of American shows that now appear regularly on English

TV. Therefore, American values are conveyed during a time when the "Americanization of

England" is occurring in other areas of life.

In the 1980s, TV had assumed a position of supreme importance to all sports in England.

However, in taking a negative approach that TV can only harm attendances, few clubs really capitalized on the benefits. And when a TV deal was negotiated for the second half of the

1985-86 season, the FL accepted less than a third of what they could have received if they had signed earlier. Once again soccer authorities were slow to "get on the train," and lacked

American "know-how" of how to exploit the market. This naivety, if it may be called that, could 349

be partly attributed to the notion that pro soccer officials in England were not as versed in

economic reality as their counterparts were in the NFL.

Does this suggest then that the symbiotic relationship between pro football and TV

produced a more modem game than pro soccer? In some respects, yes. NFL officials were able

to secure lucrative deals and make more money for franchises than the FA or FL did for pro

soccer clubs. Therefore, as far as the evolving commercialization of each sport is concerned pro

football did exploit the market earlier. Also, pro football made adjustments in scheduling, added

TV time-outs and a play-clock, and put names on uniforms all to accommodate TV and promote

the game through this medium. Pro soccer officials have begun utilizing these strategies but the

nature of the game (no time-outs, few breaks in the action) and traditional attitudes among

themselves and the public has acted as a barrier to this process.

However, it would be naive to suggest that these kinds of developments in sport as a result of its relationship with TV are progressive in nature. Which attends to Brown’s (1976) point that modem does not necessarily mean progress. Not everyone sees the relationship between TV and sport as progressive or positive. Horowitz (1974) argues tiiat areas with a small broadcast audience probably cannot acquire a franchise, and that analytical and factual reporting has been replaced by a glossy commercialized production. Also, the consumer ultimately has to bear the burden of higher advertizing costs.

Horowitz (1974) continues by addressing sponsorship. He suggests that oligopolies in advertizing only serve to increase the advantage of the giant firms. Certain firms dominate the broadcasts. One only has to look at the sponsors of the Superbowl, Monday Night Football and other major sporting events. Invariably we see the same names appearing — McDonald’s,

General Motors, Ford, General Electric, Coca Cola and so on. This occurs in England where large firms dominate the Premier League and the top team in it, but smaller companies get their 350

"foot in the door" at the lower divisions, and therefore receive less exposure. The names of local

businesses are displayed on the shirts of teams from the lower divisions, the likes of Manchester

United, Liverpool, Everton, Arsenal and Tottenham Hotspur wear the name of national and

international companies.

Hughes and Coakley (1984) talk about the "massifrcation" of sport. They argue that the

media is more concerned with presenting titillating excitement and production-oriented action,

i.e., scoring. The spectators, they suggest, are encouraged to look for this by the attention given

to certain plays.

However, the medium of TV has played a strong role in the growth of pro football, and

while the relationship between TV and football has its critics, many would not have it any other

way. A similar attitude is emerging in England. While the general public are not ready for the

"razzmatazz" and glamour of NFL type production, they do value the relationship between TV

and pro soccer and accept scheduling adjustments as inevitable. Gone are the days when the FL

and FA only scheduled games on Saturdays and Wednesday nights, with nearly all these

broadcasts being highlight shows. Viewers now have the opportunity to see soccer four or five

times a week, with much of it being live coverage. The sports fan seems to enjoy the opportunity

to see a large number of games in England and the USA.

The reason for this development along with a captive audience was alluded earlier in

Chapter VI. With the breakdown in the extended family network, the migration of nuclear families and young couples to the suburbs, coupled with a reduction in local community social life — meeting down the pub — and nontraditional working hours has created a large section of the population who pursue entertainment in their own homes; TV becomes their "savior."

Today an enormous amount of money passes hands as the FA and FL have finally realized the strength of their bargaining position, and the importance of TV to soccer and 351

vice-versa. This relationship has affected scheduling which is a recent phenomena in England,

but something that has a been a part of American sport for over twenty years. Recent

developments in live coverage are also reflective of the way sport is presented in America -

length of telecasts, studio analysts, highlight shows and so on. In other words it is evident from this research, and certainly as far as the media in sport is concerned, that we are beginning to see the Americanization of England.

Maguire (1990) notes that: "Analyses of the culture industries employing critical theory have not overlooked global impact of Americanization on the mass media and popular cultural forms" ^.214). Subsequent work has argued that the media are American (Schiller, 1969;

Tunstall, 1977) and that this Americanization constitutes a form of cultural imperialism

(Mattelart, 1977). By the late 1980s, what Collins (1986) describes as a "moral panic" appears to have developed regarding the dominance of American programs on European TV ^.67). The icon of this dominance, to which the European Commission drew attention when criticizing the impact of non-European TV, was Dallas (Maguire, 1990).

The alleged effects of Americanization, however, have been challenged by a number of writers working within the field of cultural studies. Kaplan (1986), for example, argues that the

Americanization thesis contains within it an undifferentiated and oversimplified view of popular culture. The receptivity of popular to American cultural wares, she maintains, is both active and heterogeneous. Indeed, since these cultural wares contain no "fixed ideological message," they can be reacted to differently by different national audiences. Similarly, Hebdige (1982) rejects the idea of the "homogenizing influence of American culture." In contrast, he argues that

"American popular culture offers a rich iconography, a set of symbols, objects and artifacts which can be assembled and re-assembled by different groups in a literally limitless number of combinations" (p.216). As far as sports diffusion is concerned Guttmann (1991) argiies that 352

modernization is on the whole a more precise term than Americanization to describe these

processes. "Traditional sports are certain to survive into the next century, but their formal-

structural characteristics are likely to undergo changes that make them increasingly modem"

(p. 185).

In relation to this thesis Guttmann’s (1991) suggestion is describing how an understanding

of the universal modernization of sport better prepares scholars for analyzing change in pro soccer and pro football, than settling for the notion that sport in contemporary society reflects

American values, attitudes and institutions. This study has supported Guttmaim’s (1991) thesis but also adds credence to those theorists espousing the Americanization doctrine.

Employee Role

While pro soccer players were more organized and accepted as a group than pro football players at the turn of the twentieth century, both faced similar barriers and experiences in their fight to become an established profession. Both groups were made up mainly of players from working-class backgrounds, although this changed more in football than soccer as a result of the college influence.

Prior to the twentieth century, although professionalism existed for soccer and football, few clubs employed full-time pros and it was not unusual for pro players to have a job outside the game. Many clubs were staffed with local players who worked in the town’s factories, mines and steel mills.

However, with legalized professionalism, the coming of the FL, and an increase in match attendance, the role of the part-timer eventually diminished for pro soccer a few decades earlier than it did for pro football. Gradually pro soccer players left the mines and factories which completed the process of professionalization among England’s better players. 353

While pro football had shown potential, the college game was more accepted and

established and therefore taken more seriously by the press and public in general. Reasons for

this were that some players were drifters who were looking for an "easy buck," and some clubs

paid these ringers "under the table" which gave pro football a bad name. However, the main

reason for this negativity stemmed from the public’s perception of pro football people as a

"renegade bunch" with no central organizing body.

Although it faced less competition in the form of other sports (baseball, college football)

pro soccer also had its problems convincing people to accept it as the "genuine thing." The idea

that men were employed to do something that was once considered "play" was not well accepted

by the public and sportswriters. This attitude was accentuated by the perception of pro players

as lazy and prone to vice in their free time - which was plenty — and that after 1900 most pro players were paid several times that of other workingmen. But it was more complex than that.

The emerging pro game went against all what the amateur/gentleman code held dear. Also, the perception was that these pro players were from a lower form of culture — working-class - and were motivated by greed and winning (a professional trait) rather than upstanding, moral behavior and a love of the game, so important to the amateur ethos.

It is interesting to note that both pro soccer and pro football experienced a stigma in their early years. In many ways the amateur/gentleman code, which had been very much a part of college football in its formative years, was probably taken on as a result of influence from

English sport — football and baseball find their origins in England. However, this code or philosophy, was to disappear fairly quickly once pro soccer and pro football had established their own identity, illustrating and supporting the argument in favor of the universalistic powers of sport. 354

In support of universalism it is ^parent that each game emerged as a pro sport within

the confines of a different social climate. England at the turn of the twentieth century was a very

traditional society (Fishwick, 1989). The classes were clearly divided and the working-class took

on pro soccer as their own sport. Directors and the FL establishment realized this and knew that

they had plenty of paying customers that would make pro soccer very feasible from a commercial standpoint.

Pro football, on the other hand, evolved in a nontraditional society (compared to England) and did not rely on any particular class for support in the way that pro soccer did. There was a change in the composition of the labor force, especially after the beginning of the twentieth century. As the economy matured a major shift in types of jobs occurred, permitting upward social mobility for a significant number of people. Even though these people continued to work for someone else, the nature of their work changed - new machines took the place of most of the backbreaking labor (Sites, 1975).

So two different sports in two "different" societies took on similar ways of playing and operating in their move toward professionalism. While differences were apparent, this demonstrates at least partial support for Guttmann’s (1978,1991) position. However, some may argue that England and the USA were more alike than different and therefore it is difficult to come to any specific conclusion as to whether these discussions support or refute universalism in sport.

After the turn of the twentieth century pro soccer players were paid well compared to other industrial workers, but they did experience restraint upon their freedom of movement, for example, the retain and transfer system. A primary determinant of labor relations in soccer, this system, along with the Maximum Wage Rule, was restrictive to players and helped to maintain team control. 355

Etzioni (1969) suggested that the problem of control in organizations highlights the

question of the strain between needs of the organization and needs of the individual, sometimes

but not often they are complimentary. This could be said for both pro soccer and pro football

players in their fight to receive what they "deserved." Etzioni (1969) asserted that problems of

control is acute in organizations because they are artificial social groups, and are highly

concerned with performance and are highly complex. Therefore, there is the need for a formally

structured distribution of rewards and sanctions. The means of control used are; physical (forced to comply); material (utilitarian power, self-oriented interest in conforming); and, symbolic

(normative power, least alienating, convinced one should conform). The type of power used differs according to rank of members to be controlled, i.e., coercive power applied to lower ranks. Most organizations use more than one kind of power, the question is what is the predominant power used in so far as it is stressed.

It does not necessarily follow that some types of organizations employ the same dominant mode of control, for example, different unions. What is interesting here is that the types of control used for pro soccer and pro football players have changed since the beginning of professionalism. Without a union owners could apply symbolic (and probably in some cases physical) power. Related to this is the fact that athletes were more deferential than their contemporary equivalent. Today, and since the inception of unions, we see material forms of power (contracts, salaries, arbitration) utilized by owners, union reps and agents. From this discussion it is apparent that internal as well as external forces have created change in the way athletes are controlled.

Soccer was one of the few avenues. Baker (1979) argues, where young working-class men had the opportunity to compete on a level playing field with the middle and upper-classes, and to heighten a sense of self. Though not a working-class hero in the same sense as soccer 356

players in England, the status of the pro football player and those involved in the game improved

after the Depression. Owners and players were recognized by the general public as honest, tough

veterans, involved in a violent game (Govemali, 1951).

After World War II players’ unions surfaced for both pro football and pro soccer -

although soccer’s had been founded a lot earlier — and players became aware of the economics

involved in pro sport. However, in comparison to pro football players, soccer players were not

rich men.

During the period after the war wages rose throughout England, but rewards for being

a soccer player were well below that of other entertainers and not as much as some skilled

industrial workers. The Players’ Union became more militant, yet it was not until the early

1960s that the pro player ceased to be the voiceless product of its management. First there was

the abolition of a maximum players’ wage, and second the system of retain and transfer of

players was deemed unreasonable by the High Court. The NFL Players Association was not

founded until 1955; there was no player organization similar to the one enjoyed by the pro soccer players in England or baseball players; consequently, the bargaining powers of the individual were non-existent. Pro players at this time were poorly represented, if not at all.

However, during the 1960s the game blossomed and changes occurred that placed football players in a stronger bargaining position than soccer players. The emergence of another successful league (AFL) created competition for college players and an all out "Battle of the

Paychecks" with the NFL. This competition produced lucrative contracts and more opportunity for players entering the pro leagues. The emergence of a new league and the creation of more competition was not unrelated to societal changes. The prosperity of post-World War n was still in evidence, and many new businesses, organizations and companies were injecting themselves into the marke^lace. A noveau riche, willing to take chances, and aggressive in their approach. 357

challenged well established groups and traditional ideas (Rader, 1990). This climate was

conducive to the emergence and relative success of the AFL.

Nonetheless, once the Leagues merged players lost some of their bargaining power;

certainly in terms of manipulating their worth in dollars. Nonetheless, today NFL players are

paid well compared to pro soccer players. While the majority of soccer players make a

respectable living, only a minority could be considered in the superstar bracket. The difference

between salaries and notoriety of the top pros and those playing in the lower divisions is still

great, as it was when all four divisions came into being.

Since the 1960s pro football players have been fighting for their rights and have been

rewarded in-kind. With the help from agents, TV, and the Players’ Union, they have come to perceive themselves, similar to the way soccer players have, as entertainers and businessmen as well as athletes. In the 1970s just about every college player in the first four or five rounds had an agent help negotiate their pro contract. How had this situation emerged in sport? What pressures brought this to surface?

In the England and the USA, unions, civil rights movement and such, and other special purpose groups (lawyers, social workers) in support of the powerless - or the proletariat as Marx would say — came to the forefront and encouraged people to "fight" for their rights and equality.

For pro athletes this translated into the foliowing: support from the Players’ Union; a gradual decrease in deference shown toward owners and a realization diat they are the most important asset to the organization and as such should be rewarded; and, a desire to be independent so they can sell their "goods" to the highest bidder. I contend these developments for pro athletes were not unlike those faced by other workers struggling to become socially mobile in their particular occupation, and were certainly similar, if not identical, to what other entertainers experienced. 358

The NFL Players Association has been somewhat responsible for the awareness players

exhibited over the last 20 or so years. With support irom this association pro football players

are well looked-after today (pension plans, legal representation, health plans, secure legally

binding contracts). However, compared to other major pro sports in the USA today, the longevity and average life-span of the NFL player does not fair well, and their average salary is still significantly below their equivalent in the NBA and major league baseball.

Concerning longevity and life-span, only players in certain positions (quarterback, field goal kicker) and those injury free, are able to make a considerable career (ten to fifteen years) out of playing pro football. It is a violent and sometimes dangerous game. The average career of an NFL player is approximately three to five years (Coakley, 1994), while history tells us that pro baseball and pro basketball players can look forward to a considerably longer career. The above, coupled with the discrepancy between the average salaries of pro athletes, would lead parents to channel their child’s efforts toward shooting three pointers or hitting curve balls.

A number of reasons can be attended to in explaining this discrepancy, none of which provide a complete answer. First, the pro football union took a long time to surface and has not demonstrated as much power or leverage as the Major League Baseball Players Association.

Second, the NFL owners, under the leadership of Pete Rozelle, have shown more strength and solidarity than their equivalent in Baseball (significantly more turnover in the commissioner’s office) and Basketball; the cartel structure of the NFL is indicative of this. Third, NFL teams have to carry more players and consequently supply more paychecks. Fourth, the average salary in the NFL is somewhat deceiving because many "second" and "third stringers" make well below the average which tends to bring the total figure down - there are many high paid players in this

League whose salary compares favorably to other pro athletes. Fifth, it could be stated with some validity that pro basketball and baseball players are in less supply and generally more 359

skilled than the average NFL player, certainly linesmen. And sixth, free agency has only

recently played a role in NFL salary levels; this development will surely bring the income of pro

football players closer to incomes enjoyed by pro basketball and pro baseball players.

Managers and coaches have experienced a similar rise to fame for both sports. The

opportunity for a career in this area has been greater for ex-pros in both countries. As each sport became more rationalized pro soccer and pro football ofGcials saw the need for experts with

experience to run the programs. Professionalization demanded knowledgeable teachers to continually strive for excellence. Also, players became less tolerant of inept coaches — players by the 1970s were not shy of voicing their criticism of incompetent coaches — as they themselves became more professional, proficient and knowledgeable of the game. They felt more comfortable around, and showed more respect for, ex-pros. Under these conditions coaches and players saw the owners as outsiders, a nuisance, but a necessary part of the operation because they paid the wages. Managers and coaches were held accountable by the owners and fans for their team’s performance once a great deal of money became part of the game. However, the coach has never been as central to soccer - in terms of controlling the game — as he is to football. This is probably due to the nature of the game, Although looking at other sports in

America the coach usually has a great deal of control and is held in high esteem.

This is an area where pro football and soccer are very different. Football is a coaches’ game while soccer is a players’ game. Only in the last 40 years have managers in pro soccer received freedom to make important decisions. Indeed, a number of clubs did not have a full-time manager until after World War II. However, by the 1950s managers became the center of attention, taking responsibility for losses, tactics, and signings. During the 1950s, 1960s and

1970s "Great Team Managers" were bom, who have since become legends of the game, not unlike famous football coaches, such as, George Halas, Paul Brown, and Vince Lombardi. 360

So while coaches of pro football and mangers of pro soccer impose tiiemselves on the

game in a different way, their rise to fame and the responsibility given to them, for winning and

losing, is very similar. The nature of a very visible and popular pro sport in contemporary

society produces similar demands for coaches and managers, leading this study to conclude that

they have much in common.

A major difference between the NFL and the FL (to a lesser degree) today, and pre-1960s

is the racial composition of the players. If we accept Guttmann’s (1978) position that equality

is essential to the evolution of modem sport and that racism hinders its development, can it be

assumed that pro football has demonstrated this quality earlier and more readily that pro soccer?

The black athlete plays a more central role — in terms of visibility and numbers — in pro football

than pro soccer, but it would be naive to accept a simple comparison; it is much more complex

than that. First, blacks make-up a larger percentage of the general and sport population in the

USA than England. Second, blacks in the USA - with an African heritage - had established a subculture much earlier than blacks in England — whose heritage is West Indian where cricket dominates. Third, blacks in the USA established themselves in other pro sports - certainly baseball — before pro football notoriety, which instigated perceptions of blacks as good athletes.

Consequently, it would seem that black Americans, more so than blacks in Britain, were more likely to impose themselves on the pro sports scene, because they developed their subculture earlier, they are a significant section of the population, and they had established themselves in other pro sports. These are more plausible than the notion that America was less racist than

Britain and that there was a greater opportunity for equality. Nonetheless, pro soccer has only recently become an area where black men have experienced success and fame, opportunity and visibility. This has been fairly dramatic over the last 20 years, to the point where they are well represented at the international level. However, as with black athletes in the NFL, their passage 361

to the pro level has not been an easy one — experiencing racist chants, extreme right-wing

organizations, and traditional attitudes.

A number of scholars (Coakley, 1994, Edwards, 1973, Eitzen, 1977, Houlston, 1982,

Lapchick, 1984, Loy and McElvogue, 1970, Maguire, 1988) have argued that, compared to white players, blacks are less likely to occupy central positions, i.e., positional segregation. This subtle

stereotyping acts as a barrier in both the USA and England for black athletes in their quest for equality.

What is apparent here is that tiiis is an example of how sport reflects larger cultural trends — racism in society, racism in sport. If sport is tied to the social milieu, and most would agree there is some connection, then how can sport provide opportunity to all when society does not. However, could sport be a catalyst for social change? It could be argued that sport is more

"open" and, as Guttmann (1978) suggests, more modem than other institutions in society because blacks and other racial minorities have received and taken the opportunities provided them.

Nevertheless, it is important to consider two points, the nature of sport and the power it provides individuals, before jumping to conclusions here. In sport, unlike many other areas of life, it is very clear whether you are good or not and whether you can help your team. Life outside of sport is much more ambiguous, while on the playing field color becomes "unimportant" (if you are good enough you play irrespective of color). Concerning the second point of power, it is evident that sport provides black athletes with lucrative contracts, but how much influence and freedom do they really have? Edwards (1973) asserts that sport is an area where blacks are encouraged to succeed by white elite groups because sport is nonthreatening (Michael Jordan may be the biggest name in sport but he does not have power in the way heads of large corporations and politicians do), it is physical (which fits the stereotype of blacks that still exists today), and it is still just a game (not "real life"). 362

Discussion on this topic has supported the notion that sport does reflect society and

consequently its modernization process is tied to changes in the larger culture - if there is racism

in society there will be racism in its major institutions, of which sport is one. On the other hand,

where the black athlete and equality is concerned sport has demonstrated the capacity through

internal developments (the way people are measured and clarity in performance) to create change,

even if that change is not that dramatic and specific to one group.

Summary

It would seem that pro football and pro soccer have a lot in common concerning the way

each sport has evolved from its inception to the modem form. At the same time there are

differences between the way each sport has experienced the process of modernization and taken

on elements of each culture. What does this tell us? Does it mean that sport evolves differently

depending on the culture in which it exists (a particularistic view of sport), or, does it mean that

sport cuts across all barriers (universalistic view of sport)?

It is too simplistic to say that one sport modernizes faster than another, or, that they

evolved in the same way and at the same rate because they exist in modem cultures. However,

we can make certain inferences from the material contained in this study. It is feasible to argue

in favor of sport as a reflection of society and social change. On the other hand, it could be

asserted that sport has the capacity to operate independently of cultural imposition and can act

as a catalyst rather than just a recipient of social change.

First, to support the former I would suggest that pro football has evolved at a different

rate than pro soccer and has taken on elements of American culture that differentiates it from the

English game. Second, to support the latter I would argue that both sports have much in 363

common and have evolved in a similar way, at a similar rate, taking on and expressing elements

of modem sport.

The first position would seem to support Gruneau’s (1986) assertion that sports are better

understood as shifting social and cultural practices which help to constitute particular ways of

life. And, that we need to appreciate the historical importance of culture as well as commerce

in modem sport, for example, the working-class soccer culture is still central to the pro game in

England. However, Gmneau would probably agree that there is an important bond between the

competition stmcture in sport and the marketplace that has developed as a result of the

modernization process and rational order, for example, the way the NFL and FL have responded,

in terms of their stmcture, to pressures ftom the mass consumption economy in modem westem

cultures.

The second position would seem to support Guttmann’s (1978) thesis that the quest for

records will always overcome cultural imposition. I would argue that it is too deterministic to

say that sport is governed by the market-place, a la Marx. Guttmann (1978) suggests that all

modem cultures, regardless of their political standing, would produce sport structures of a similar

form with similar goals. At times this study has supported this notion, yet there still exist

significant differences between the stmcture of pro soccer (four divisions) and pro football (one

league, one level).

I believe the information in ftont of us supports and contradicts both Guttmann’s (1978)

and Gmneau’s (1986) position. In other words, as far as pro soccer and pro football are

concemed an argument could be developed in favor of universal or particular aspects of sport - they are not absolutely right or absolutely wrong. While it may exist, I know of no research that has provided us with information on a topic of this nature that has proved otherwise. 364

This study demonstrates that there are differences and similarities in the way each sport

has evolved to its most modem form. Are the differences more cmcial than the similarities, and

vice-versa, in this evolutionary process, so that one could argue coherently in favor of one

position rather than another?

While this question is central to our conclusion, should we have to stand on one side of

the "fence" rather than the other? Without being too political it is probably more appropriate to

consider relevant points from both schools of thought in attempting to describe and analyze the

emergence of pro soccer in England and pro football in the USA. This type of approach in

comparative analysis adds objectivity to the research.

Along the modernization continuum pro soccer operated in an organized fashion earlier

than pro football, yet the latter soon "caught-up" and "overtook" the former. Since the 1980s

pro soccer — under the influence of Thatcherism and American values on British society — has

taken on characteristics which have brought it closer to pro football in terms of the way it is run,

from a business and organizational sense, and the goals of those in control.

Urban development in both countries was a factor in the rise of each game in an

organized fashion. Each governing body saw the need for order, and consequently, consistency

and uniformity of rules and regulations was needed. This need was prompted by two societies

that were growing more complex and bureaucratic.

Both the FL and the NFL faced the problems of financial solvency, indicative of sports

in the early stages of development. Their response was similar, they saw the need for a

structured, organized league where spectators could see competitive games. Along with this, the bigger, more famous teams, gravitated to cities where commercial opportunities were greater and large crowds could be accommodated. 365

Consequently, for both sports, industrialization and urbanization facilitated the

development of the commercial game. The structure of cities created an audience for soccer

matches, and owners saw no profît in an amateur game. Teams in the FL (jpredominantly

Division I although some lower division teams had these aspirations) and NFL grew up depending

on their ability to draw crowds — big clubs in big cities.

In the move toward professionalism both sports faced some opposition. However, with

the Protestant ethic more pervasive and entrenched in American culture, winning — as the main

goal — was more accepted than in England. As late as the 1930s and 1940s Britain still held onto

gentlemanly bourgeois values while America discovered new ones. The Protestant ethic derived

firom the theology espoused by John Calvin, who lived in the sixteenth century (Sites, 1975).

Mills (1956) noted: "For Calvin it was necessary to act in the world rationally and methodically

and continuously and hard, as if one were certain of being among those elected. The gospel of

work has been central to the historic tradition of America, to its image of itself, and to the images

the rest of the world has of America," 219). Success in contemporary America came to be

material wealth, and through the sport this was achieved (the means) by winning.

This desire to win and the rationalized approach that was necessary to reach this goal was

an important factor in the move to inject a number of rule changes in pro football to make the

game more open and attractive, and to utilize an efficient scientific approach to playing and

coaching a lot earlier than in England — since pro soccer has been institutionalized few rules have

been changed. The USA was characterized by effîciency seeking institutions, bureaucratic in

nature where specialization and scientific strategy were employed. Professional football reflected this mentality as early as the 1930s.

While there was an acceptance of winning in pro soccer it was more of a working-class orientation (little planning, short-term) taken on by those fiill-time employees who were paid 366

wages to play. In the USA the emphasis on winning was bom out of an ideology central to the

whole culture where long-term goals were achieved through a rationalized approach to the game.

However, with the changing face of British capitalism in the forties and after World War

n there was a shift in ideology. Soccer was affected by values and methods of American

capitalism - impression-management - which resulted in diffuse cultural change and a mass

consumption economy. This change, along with the breakdown of working-class community

solidarity, redefined pro soccer.

Nonetheless, the game has never completely moved away from its working-class heritage,

and traditional attitudes still prevail. Many soccer people were unwilling to change, which is not

the case for those involved in pro football where behavior is motivated along business lines.

Why has pro soccer tended to reflect cultural lag more than pro football, which has faced

fewer barriers to change? Is it that pro soccer reached its modem form sooner than pro football,

or, is it the result of attitudes and values pervasive in the sport subculture and society in general?

I would suggest the latter, rather than the former, is a more plausible explanation. Sport

in modem society is not a completed phenomena, there is always room for change if society

facilitates such a process. England is a culture built around established, traditional values that

have been developed over hundreds of years. In comparison, the USA is a relatively young

society, transitory in nature, dynamic, where social change is more likely to occur, whether in

sport or other major institutions.

An example of this "static approach" in England, is demonstrated when one compares the

structure of the FL and the NFL. One major difference between the two Leagues is that the FL

comprises of 92 pro clubs in four divisions, with a system of promotion and relegation to

determine what level you play at. Four divisions have been operating since the 1950s, with the promotion and relegation rule operating since the FL’s inception. 367

A number of scholars (Fynn and Guest, 1989, Mason, 1980, Wagg, 1984, Walvin, 1986)

have indicated that this type of system with rules and regulations that have existed for over 100

years and the way clubs are run — their mode of operations, old stadia with poor service

facilities, no women allowed in the boardroom and so on — is indicative of an out of date, archaic

value system.

People involved in the NFL soon realized that for the game to succeed it had to operate

as a business, utilizing commercial strategy — the cartel structure of the NFL reflects this

realization. These people also understood that certain rule changes made the game more

attractive, and fliat to really sell the game a strong relationship to TV was in order.

Some of these changes were a response to a rapidly changing society, an evolving sport

subculture, to competition from baseball and college football, and to competition from other pro leagues. No one organization has ever challenged the FA or FL in the way other leagues have competed with the NFL. The FA was the national governing body so it could control the potential or opportunity of another league establishing itself. Also, this was unlikely to happen with ninety two pro clubs in existence. When Division III and IV were created in the 1950s they merely became an extension of the FL. There was no question of competing against the established League which tells us three things: the FA and FL were all encompassing and supremely powerful; the new clubs that entered the League were not wealthy - semi-pro caliber

— and could hardly challenge Division I and II teams; and, traditional values inside and outside of pro soccer restricted competition and the realization of commercial opportunities that would eventually emerge. As a result the FA and FL experienced no internal, and very little external, pressure to change, while the NFL has adjusted to meet the challenge. This only served to strengthen the NFL’s position. 368

Competition in the market place forces businesses to adapt, and competition off the field

did the same for the NFL. The NFL expanded by recruiting teams from disbanded leagues and

realized a merger with the AFL was most beneficial for the growth and strength of the League.

Incorporating teams from major markets, creating AFC and NFC Conferences and the

Superbowl, and procuring lucrative TV contracts as the NFL now had a monopoly over network

relations, the cartel structure emerged stronger and profit sharing benefited the League as a

whole. What resulted was an NFL that exploited commercial conditions because, in a way, it

was forced to. External pressures (changes in the business milieu) and internal pressures (a sport

structure that allowed league rivalry) were responsible for these changes. These kinds of external

and internal forces were not as evident for pro soccer, certainly before the 1980s, and as a result

the organizational structure and commercialization of pro football compared to pro soccer

changed more r^idly.

While the above may seem very critical of the way pro soccer operates and supportive

of the way pro football has evolved, this can be misleading. To say that one sport has taken on

characteristics of modernization faster than another sport does not necessarily indicate one sport

is "better" than another, or, that people in control of that sport are any wiser or demonstrate

more foresight. Pro football and soccer have progressed in some respects but not all.

We have alluded to certain aspects of pro soccer that demonstrate an unwillingness to

change, but pro football has not always responded immediately to social trends surrounding it.

The following is an example of this: there still exists an archaic authoritarian structure and

attitude between coaches and players; the NFL has avoided any form of corporate ownership

(until recently and that is only one franchise) and therefore cannot claim to be part of "big business" in the way the New York Times. General Motors, and General Electric are; players were poorly represented and vulnerable to the whim of the owners until recent legal 369

representation and were not wealthy men until the 1960s; and, black athletes have become more

a part of the NFL, yet positional segregation still exists which acts as a barrier to equality of

opportunity.

The theory of industrial society has been uncritical in assuming that as a sport moves

along the modernization continuum it progresses as a result of positive advances in society. This

type of assumption would lead to the assessment of pro soccer and football as becoming more

skillful, democratic, and rational in response to the ordering of modem life.

To a certain extent this is tme, but not all facets of each game have demonstrated

progress in this fashion. A number of ex-pros and older sports writers would tell us that the game

is less skillfiil and exciting today than forty or fifty years ago — the game has become sterile and

lacks the characters and stars that were responsible for putting the sport on the "map." Some

reasons given for this are that there is too much emphasis on athleticism, defensive strategy has

improved and limits offensive opportunities, and players and coaches are under too much pressure

to win, so they do whatever it takes to reach that goal. Many would argue that these kinds of

changes have led to a more violent game, where moral and ethical behavior on the field is out

of fashion, and the "professional foul" is commonplace. Television has been instrumental in the

growth of pro sport, yet some scholars have argued that this type of exposure has facilitated titillating entertainment rather than sport in its "purest" form.

There are many other criticisms of pro sport and we must be aware of these before assuming that modem equals progress which results in "better" sport. However, considering all the problems that exist today for owners, coaches, piayers, and spectators of pro soccer and football, it would seem that conditions and opportunities have improved.

A major difference in the growth of both sports concerns the goals of the people involved. Theory of industrial society assumes that fundamental characteristics of sports in 370

advanced industrial societies is basically similar (universal position). When one considers the

basic philosophy adhered to by the FA and NFL, since their mention, this assumption does not

seem to hold true.

It has already been noted that the relegation and promotion system in England is

"foreign" to pro sport in the USA. Also, the FA Cup, where small clubs have the opportunity

of playing the wealthier clubs is a process that would not be accepted by NFL officials. Mainly

because there is little financial reward. Consequently, for most of the twentieth century, the

motivations of soccer people have differed somewhat to those of football people.

As early as 1950 pro football people were motivated mainly by economic prosperity. The

cartel structure is geared towards financial survival and success. In England there is still a

philanthropic attitude towards clubs that have operated "in the red" for decades. These

differences reflected social pressures as change did occur in England and pro soccer once

Thatcherism became prominent.

Obviously the profit motive has been important to pro soccer since the beginning of

professionalism, yet it has not always controlled behavior. The FA is mainly concemed with

promotion of the game at all levels and success of the National team. This and the way some

directors have operated their clubs has been described as typical of the English sport system

which has tended to emphasize stability rather than change.

Perhaps it should be described as just a "way of life," a different philosophy. Is it

correct to say one approach to sport is more appropriate than another? However, this "way of

life" has changed over the last 10-15 years in England. There are indications that this is the case,

if not for the FA, certainly for specific clubs. Elite clubs, such as, Manchester United,

Liverpool, Tottenham, Arsenal, and Everton have taken on attitudes and values similar to owners of NFL teams. On some levels dien there are differences and on other levels there are 371

similarities. As a result there is support here for both the universal and particular notions of

sport.

In England poorer clubs are still kept "afloat,” there are still ninety two pro clubs in four

divisions, and financial standing — size of ground, located in a large city — does not preclude promotion or relegation. So, have things really changed that much?

On the other hand there is evidence that pro soccer people over the last 10 to IS years have become more receptive to change. This is probably the result of changes taking place in society (external) as well as contributions made to the game by people with an different philosophy toward pro sport than their forebears (internal). I foresee a Super League including only the wealthiest clubs. Entry into this League will be based on financial considerations, a la

NFL. However, competition (FA Cup, FL Cup) with teams outside the Super League may remain - tradition is hard to break.

Conclusion

This study has demonstrated that utilizing a framework as a heuristic device is a valuable

"tool" in the measurement and analysis of change in sport and society. Accepting that the five characteristics -- rationalization, organization, commercialization, media and employee role — are valid and reliable means of assessing the modernization of sport, then it can be stated that pro football has developed faster and "travelled" further along the modernization continuum than pro soccer. Certain external pressures are responsible for this; social change is facilitated more in one society (USA) than the odier (England). Pro football has taken on certain modem characteristics sooner than pro soccer and this development has been influenced to a large degree by societal pressures external to sport itself. Pro soccer has evolved in a more traditional society, and as a result residual aspects of sporting practice and styles are more evident for it than pro 372

football. These findings support the position that sport reflects society by the way it plays out

particular aspects central to the larger culture.

Internal pressures have also been influential in this process of change and the

differentiation of two sports. The people in control of pro football have been more willing and

ready, for one reason or another, to accept and promote change within the game. Internal forces

can represent, but are not necessarily limited to, larger social trends. This study found many similarities between the evolution of both pro soccer and pro football and the dominant characteristics each sport expressed today. This indicates two things: 1) that similarities between each sport do not automatically support Guttmann’s (1978) thesis of universalism, as there may be a convergence of cultures, or, as this study partially demonstrated, similarity could be the result of the "Americanization of England"; and, 2) that culture alone cannot fully explain the evolution of modem sport. There is a common bond between sports which is derived from aspects peculiar to sport no matter where it is played. This finding supports the notion that sport is universal and has the capacity to cross all social barriers. There are certain nuances and peculiar aspects associated to sport as it is played in one culture and then another, but the basic and fundamental structure, goals, tenets of competition, and meaning of sport remains similar.

Finally, this study depicted the value and need for cross-cultural analysis in sport sociology and sport history. An understanding of unique and similar dimensions of the social system of pro soccer and pro football emerged as each was mirrored by the other. In this way, contrasting cultural relativity of social mechanisms teased out similarities and differences of systems: a basic step toward meaning. More investigations of this type, empirically and theoretically guided, are needed. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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