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Örebro University School of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences Political Science

Why secession?

The will of the people or a threat to democracy

Political Science, Second cycle Independent project, 30 credits, 2020 Author: Jonathan Lehmann Molander Supervisor: Björn Hammar

Abstract

Europe is not as calm as one might think. There are currently several secessionist struggles that are ongoing in the region and in this thesis three of them will be researched. This thesis has investigated the biggest democratically elected actor that wants secession in , Catalonia and Scotland. This has been done by questioning how they argue for their secession and how these arguments relate to different approaches to legitimize secession. These approaches being the remedial approach, the free choice approach, the functional approach, the exit approach and the anti-theory approach. This was performed by using a qualitative content analysis. With this method I created an analytical scheme which was applied to the arguments in order to sort them into the scheme. The arguments used by the actors were pluralistic, relating to democracy, nationalism, administration, governance, economy, grievance and history. This proved that the actors are much more pluralistic than what theory could handle hence, none of the actors fit to either one of the approaches as they argued in a multitude of different ways. In addition to this, I was also able to show that against theoretical assumptions these secessionist actors didn’t favour external legitimacy. Even though this is argued by some to be most important for secessionist groups to gain independence. In the end the implications of this thesis are that secessionist actors are incredibly pluralistic, and it is quite hard for theory to fully capture this plurality. Hence, secessionist theory gives a very incomplete picture of how secessionist actors try to legitimize their secession.

Keywords: Secession. Catalonia. Flanders. Scotland. Legitimacy. . Democracy. Europe.

Contents

1. Introduction ...... 5 1.1 Introduction to the cases ...... 6 2. Purpose and research question ...... 9 3. Systematic research review ...... 10 3.1 Method for systematic research review ...... 10 3.2 Research protocol...... 14 3.3 Ethical considerations ...... 16 3.4 Results ...... 16 3.4.1 The methods and cases ...... 16 3.4.2 How is secession legitimized? ...... 17 3.5 Critical evaluation ...... 19 4. Theory ...... 22 4.1 Internal and external legitimacy in secession ...... 22 4.2 Democracy and legitimacy in secession ...... 23 4.3 Sub-state nationalism and populism ...... 25 5. Method ...... 27 5.1 Qualitative content analysis ...... 27 5.2 Methodological discussion...... 29 5.3 Analytical Categories ...... 30 5.4 Cases and material...... 32 5.5 Ethical considerations ...... 34 6. Results ...... 36 6.1 Junts per Catalunya/Together for Catalonia ...... 36 6.2 Vlaams Belang/Flemish Interests ...... 38 6.3 Scottish Nationalist Party ...... 40 7. Analysis ...... 42 7.1 Junts per Catalunya/Togheter for Catalonia ...... 42 7.2 Vlaams Belang/Flemish Interest ...... 44 7.3 Scottish Nationalist Party ...... 46 8. Conclusions ...... 48 9. Discussion ...... 50

1. Introduction

Europe. A region of the world which by many probably is described as a quiet and calm region where internal squabbles are long forgotten, the borders drawn are eternal and the only thing to be done is to defend it against external threats. But in fact, this is a region that is a little more interesting than what it is believed to be. Perhaps is it that Europe has been cast with the old Chinese curse saying may you live in interesting times or perhaps is it that under the European facade things are not as stable as one would be led to believe.

There are currently a considerable amount of active separatist and secessionist movements in Europe. The European Free Alliance (EFA) is an umbrella organisation for parties that either wish to secede or to gain more autonomy within the . Currently this organization amasses a total of 46 members (EFA. 2020). So perhaps it isn’t as calm in Europe after all, perhaps has history not ended and perhaps are borders just waiting to be redrawn.

Secession is a word that is defined as “The act of becoming independent and no longer part of a country, area or organization…” (Cambridge Dictionary. 2020). Secessionist conflict, conflicts about a group’s sovereignty or independence, are a lot more common both through history and in today’s world than we might think. In the 26 years between 1980 - 2006 almost every other armed conflict was fought between ethnic minorities and the governments of the nations that the ethnic minorities reside in. These have been fights for the right to self- determination and secession (Walter. 2006).

To have the right to self-determination is described as having the ability as a people to freely pursue economic, social and cultural development, in other words the people are entitled to develop their own without any foreign involvement (Tesón. 2016). This makes questions arise, is it always legitimate for a group to conduct these conflicts in the name of self-determination? how do these groups argument for their actions? I ask these questions as I believe it is important to know what drives these secessionists, I ask myself if answering these questions could help ease tensions or solve conflicts between the state and the secessionists. Below I will present three secessionist cases where there has been recent activity and even a secessionist attempt.

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1.1 Introduction to the cases

The following cases that I will be presenting have been chosen there has been recent secessionist activity. The Catalans had their referendum, the Scots reignited after Brexit and the Flemish secessionists have gotten strong results in their regional elections. They’ve also been chosen as they are all in situated in European democracies and are therefore comparable than if they were spread out over the world and in completely foreign political situations compared to each other.

In the Catalan secession attempt of 2017, the separatists declared themselves victorious in what according to Spanish law was an illegal referendum. Alexander and Halpin (2017) make the claim that this attempt rejuvenated other separatists’ groups around the world. The Catalan secessionist movement has a long history that dates back as far as the latter half of the 1800’s and the beginning of the 1900’s when political parties started to demand their independence from Spain. They achieved a small degree of autonomy in 1913, but just twelve years later it was removed. (Rodriguez. 2020).

The autonomy was reinstated again in 1931 when Spain became a republic, only to have Franco abolish it when he came to power in 1939. Franco cracked down hard on the Catalan identity and tried to supress it. This attempt failed and only fuelled the pro-independence sentiment and in 1978 Catalonia was autonomous once again and the declined in intensity (Tasevski. 2017).

The conflict reignited in 2010 when a new court ruling gave more power to the national government, which angered the Catalans. Together with Spain’s economic troubles, this caused pro-secession sentiment to grow. In 2012 this culminated in a demonstration where hundreds of thousands of Catalans go to the streets of Barcelona to protest. The same year the political parties in the Catalan regional parliament which support secession were given a majority of the seats.

In 2014 The Spanish government refused to authorize an independence vote, but this did not stop the Catalans from holding one in 2017 which led to unrest in the region as the police clashed violently with voters. This ends up with Catalonia declaring independence although it is not recognised by any country (Al Jazeera. 2019). The vote that was held was illegal according to the Spanish democratic constitution of 1978, whilst this new constitution gave

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autonomy to the different regions in Spain it also said that the Spanish nation is indissoluble and therefore seceding from the nation is illegal (M.R. 2017).

The Scottish movements for independence stretch back to the 13th century when William Wallace fought the English. In modern times however, the Scottish nationalist party (SNP) took off and continued to build on the momentum from 1974 when oil was discovered outside of north Scotland. First, they took seats in United Kingdom parliament, then in 1999 they created a Scottish parliament which was seen by the SNP as a steppingstone for a fully autonomous Scotland (Solly. 2020).

The current situation in Scotland is a bit different than Catalonia's. In 2014 they held a referendum to become independent where they voted to stay with 55-45%. This seemed as a stable situation until Great Britain voted to leave the European union whilst the scots voted overwhelmingly to stay within the union and hence setting Scotland on a path that they didn’t wish to take. This gave the independence movement new life as this possibly changed the pre- requisitions which caused Scotland to vote against its own independence (McKenzie. 2019).

In recent reports Scotland’s first minister and leader of the Scottish National Party, Nicola Sturgeon, sent a request to prime minister Boris Johnson to hold a new referendum which was subsequently denied. There are no expectations of a Catalan-style referendum, instead the SNP wants to go as what they have described as the lawful democratic way and secure a mandate for independence (Soussi. 2020). The UK constitution allows Scotland to leave if they want to, but they require permission to hold a referendum from the Westminster government (Scottish Government. 2019).

The Flemish independence movement is also an old one. Stemming from the 1800’s and started with the forming of . It is said that this conflict is shaped by language. In a 1846 census it turned out that most of the people in Belgium spoke Dutch whilst a minority spoke French. But the ruling class was overwhelmingly French speakers. This meant that Belgium was ruled by a minority that spoke French, this minority tried to impose French as the main language. This led to conflict with the Dutch speaking north (Vanderstappen. 2018).

The conflict caused misery for the Flemish as they became second class citizens. The use of Dutch was forbidden in political and administrative life for almost 100 years. For the Flemish this turned around when the mines emptied in 60’s and it became one of the poorest regions in western Europe, at about the same time Flanders transformed to one of the richer

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regions. This led to transformation of Belgian political system and constitution which now protects rights of the linguistic communities and have separate governments and parliaments for Flanders, Wallonia and the bilingual capital . In recent times, it is now possible that the Flemish nationalist could gain majority of the as they have been close to it in recent years and what the outcome of that could be, is yet to be seen (Saeedy. 2017).

The Belgian constitution does not regulate on how secession is made, it only regulates that cession, exchange or expansion of its territory can only take place by virtue of law. The Belgian constitution does not seem to either disallow or allow secession (Belgian House of Representatives. 2018). What has happened when Flanders has threatened the Belgian federal with secession. Is that the government has changed their constitution to appease them, which has happened six times so far (Bartunek & Macdonald. 2017).

These three cases are all interesting as they are western democracies, with recent secessionist activity with differing types of constitutions and governments using different solutions to prevent the secessionists. Hence, it would be interesting to investigate how this affects the secessionist movements in how they argue for their secession. How do these arguments relate to secessionist legitimacy theories?

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2. Purpose and research question

The purpose of this thesis is to find out how secession is argued for by secessionist actors´ in western democracies. There will be delimitations as to what kind of actors are included in 5.4. I aim to gain a deeper understanding of the secessionists by investigating what arguments they used in order to justify their secession. I aim to gain a deeper understanding in how their arguments relate to secessionist theory regarding how actors can legitimize their secession. By this I hope to achieve a deeper understanding on how secessionist groups function and how these functions relate to secessionist theory.

Research questions:

How do the biggest democratically elected actors supporting secession in Catalonia, Flanders and Scotland argue for their secession?

How does their arguments relate to different theory-based approaches to legitimize secession?

What are the differences and similarities in the cases?

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3. Systematic research review

In this segment I will present a systematic research review. This review will seek to answer how secessionist have legitimized their struggles.

3.1 Method for systematic research review

For this research review I have followed the systematic approach for reviewing literature. Performing a systematic literature review means that I have aimed to identify, appraise and synthesize all the relevant studies in the topic I have chosen to investigate. (Petticrew & Roberts. 2006). A crucial note is that depending on how big the area is I might not be able to synthesize all the relevant studies as this systematic research review is just a part in a thesis and not the focus. Moving on, a Systematic research review also requires the use of a review protocol in a systematic review which describes what process the author went through when selecting the articles for this review, this process is often modified during the systematic review (Petticrew & Roberts. 2006).

But a little more in-depth, what is a systematic review? A systematic review is a form of method. This method is used to compile large amounts of information. The compiling of this information is then used to make statements about what the current science says about the subject at hand. Systematic research reviews map out areas where little research has been done and could also show us that in some areas, we thought we knew more than we did. Thereby showing knowledge gaps and creating new research problems (Petticrew & Roberts. 2006. p2).

This might sound like a traditional review, but a systematic review tries to solve a major problem in traditional literature reviews and that is the problem of bias. Literature reviews have the problem that they could be made to tell a story that the writer wants to, even if it is an expert in the subject. This is a failure to apply scientific principles to reviews, but this failure is corrected with systematic reviews which adhere closely to a set of scientific methods that has the explicit goal of limiting bias. Hence, a systematic review is contrasted to a traditional review as it applies a methodology to limit bias (Petticrew & Roberts. 2006 p9- 10).

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Moving on to the systematic review that I have done. Starting with the databases I decided to use for this research review. The database I start off with is Social science premium collection, since it was the broadest databases and it allowed me to search through the databases for the whole social science field which I found beneficial as this subject is interdisciplinary at times. This allows me to get a good overview on the subject and ensures I start off with as many hits as possible. When conducting my searches, I always search for peer-reviewed articles that are written in English as those are the ones I’m interested in and can understand.

I started building my search string by searching for the main topic. So, the first search was simply for Secession*. I found this search important in order to see how many articles I had to work with in the topic, it resulted in 2702 articles in total. I then added Legitim* as legitimacy in secession is the main topic in this research review.

The search string Secession* AND Legitim* found a total of 164 hits. I then decided to try and add AND (Motiv* OR Argumen*). The Search string Secession* AND Legitim* AND (Motiv* OR Argumen*) reduced the hits down to only 19 hits, 4 of which were duplicates so the total amount of hits where only 15. After skimming through their abstracts, I concluded that this wasn’t going to be enough material. Also, the articles were not satisfactory in answering the question set out by this research review.

Hence, I reverted to my original search of Secession* AND Legitim* and decided that I have the time to read through 164 headlines and pick out articles and skim through their abstracts.

In this first selection of articles, I decided only to include articles that by headline seemed to discuss how secession and secessionist struggles are made legitimate. This includes both articles that seemed to be theory focused as well as those whom seemed to discuss it in relation to empirical cases. But I would only include articles which use cases that are on a national level, municipalities or organisations seceding are excluded. I decided to not make any exclusions based on publication year as I already had a limited number of articles. After performing this first selection, I ended up with 32 articles. These would go on to abstract reading.

Again, whilst reading through the abstracts I used the same inclusion principle, that is that only articles that discuss how secession is legitimized were included. After the first round of abstract readings I ended up with 18 articles left. Hence, it was made clear that the way I

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include articles was too wide, as I would not have the time to create that big of a research review. I decided to start excluding the articles that only discuss legitimacy in theoretical terms and not in relation to an empirical case, this is because I’m going to dive deeper into theory in the theory part of this thesis. A further reason that I’ve decided to make this exclusion is that the articles that I search for has to include a secessionist group otherwise it will not answer the question, how has secessionist legitimized their secession? After going through the abstracts and being stricter and adding an exclusion principle I only selected 12 articles.

About the articles that I choose to exclude because they were too theoretic, I’m going to give a bit deeper of an explanation as to why they were excluded. I will do this by shortly presenting 2 of them which highlight the main points to why I exclude in this way.

The first one is Thomas Hobbes and John Locke on a Liberal Right of Secession by Lee Ward (2017). This article seeks to shed light on the complex issues in whether a right to secede exists and under what conditions such a right could be used legitimately. Ward (2017) aims to do so by examining works of Hobbes and Locke as they are the philosophical founders of liberalism. Now Ward (2017) does discuss some secessionist movements, but he is not present how these movements have legitimized their own secession. Rather what is discussed is if they can be seen as legitimate or not on the basis of the theory (Ward. 2017).

This present research review does not aim to provide answers to the questions on whether secession can be legitimized with regards to a specific theory but rather on how secessionist groups themselves have done so. I'm not looking for if secession was legitimate or not by some theory, I’m looking for how the groups themselves tried to legitimize their secession.

The other example I will briefly present is Moralism in theories of secession: a realist perspective by Marc Sanjaume-Calvet (2019). Sanjaume-Calvet (2019) argues that in political philosophy regarding secession the most common approach is to use moral reasoning. The two secessionist theories, Just Cause theory and Choice theory, are based on a moral view of political authority and what he aims to do in his article is to create a realist approach. This approach would focus on political disagreement and legitimacy rather than on rights and moral analysis.

In this article Sanjaume-Calvet (2019) sometimes uses empirical cases, but it is used to show weaknesses in theories or to show examples and not necessarily to show what arguments

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secessionist groups used to legitimize their own secession. Whilst I’m interested in reading and learning about theory discussions in secession. For this research review what is of utmost importance is what the secessionist groups argued themselves. Not what theory legitimizes their secession but what they themselves have argued in order legitimize their secession. Here of course secessionist theories can play a part, but it isn’t what is the most important aspect in this research review.

I went on to read through the articles that I selected, and it became clear that 2 of the articles were unavailable to me and hence reduced the number of articles down to 10. Whilst reading through the articles, another 2 of them were excluded as I decided they weren’t as appropriate for this review as the abstract made them out to be. This meant I now only had 8 articles left for the systematic research review, but I decided that would be enough to get a fair picture.

Furthermore, 2 of the articles that I’ve chosen for this systematic research review has used the same cases that I’ve intended to use for my thesis. These articles have used Catalonia and Scotland. The reason I am still able to contribute to this research field even though I use the same cases is that the material they have used for their articles is older than what I’ve intended to use. So, I am still able to potentially say something new about these cases even though they’ve been researched in similar ways before.

To summarize and bring clarity, these were my final inclusion and exclusion principles which gave me these articles.

Inclusion principles:

I have included peer-reviewed articles that are written in English. These articles must discuss how secession is made legitimate. The articles must use real life cases. It must discuss secession on a national level.

Exclusion principles:

The articles I’ve chosen to exclude is those who discuss how secession is made legitimate but only in theoretical terms and not in connection to any empirical material. I’ve also excluded articles that are about municipalities or organisations seceding.

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3.2 Research protocol

What I will be looking for in the articles in this systematic research review is, how did secessionist legitimize their struggle? What method was used? What are the empirical cases? This will allow me to search for the different way’s secession can be legitimized and see the different ways the researchers have gone about researching this phenomenon.

(Table 1: Overview of the articles) Authors Study Topic How did secessionist What is/are What method was legitimize the struggle? the empirical used? case/cases?

Frank The Status of Kosovo – Secession was legitimized Kosovo Dietrich. reflections on the based on the will of the Analysis based on 2010. legitimacy of secession. people through a referendum three theoretical and by citing the history of positions for Milosevic’s and the unjust legitimacy in treatment they endured. secession.

Susana Evidence Struggles: Secession attempt was Narotzky. Legality, Legitimacy and legitimized based on popular Catalonia Analysis of the 2019. Social Mobilizations in support in through evidence for legality the Catalan Political referendums, historical and legitimacy in Conflict. injustices against the Catalans secession. and economically by claiming that the host nation is stealing from them through taxation.

Who, why and how: Slovakia: Legitimized by Slovakia, A three-folded Josette Baer. assessing the legitimacy nationalist arguments as well Macedonia model of 2000. of secession. as disagreement over the and secessionist Federations economic Chechnya legitimacy. transformation, to prevent them from economic discrimination.

Macedonia: Legitimized by self-protection arguments and using the right to secede from the federation.

Chechnya: Legitimized their claim by historic and nationalistic arguments. The wish to self-rule as remedy for unjust ruling in the past.

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Trent Tappe. Chechnya and the state They legitimized their Chechnya Analysis if the 1995. of self-determination in a secession attempt by claiming Chechnyan claim breakaway region of the to be a distinct people in a has right to former Soviet Union: distinct historical territory secession which is evaluating the legitimacy which has a separate then compared to of the secessionist language and culture from the Lithuanian one. claims. the Russians. Also legitimize it through their suffering of systematic human rights abuses by the Russian government. Emmanuel Between a principled and Catalonia: They legitimized Catalonia and Analysis based upon Dalle Mulle & consequentialist logic: their secession by using Scotland the threefold Ivan Serrano. theory and practice of nationalistic arguments, they conventional 2019. secession in Catalonia have their own national typology of and Scotland. character and claim that they arguments for have the right to decide legitimate through self-determination as secession. well as having the people’s mandate for secession.

Scotland: They legitimize their secession by claiming that it would create a better situation for the citizens, it would be a more democratic society and they could improve their citizens wellbeing by creating jobs, growing the economy and helping the vulnerable. They also legitimize it by claiming that the host nation does not care about them.

Andrade Out for the money: a They legitimize their Constantino Legal analysis of the Sampaio, legal analysis of secessionist struggle by states in economic claims for Alexandre economic claims for claiming that they are being south and secession. Vedovato & secession Brazil. economically taken south east Luis Renato. advantage of and that they Brazil. 2016. are still under a colonial rule that they seek freedom from. They also make nationalistic arguments as they claim they have a different cultural identity than the rest.

Rizal G The state-Moro armed They legitimized their Moro Analysis of the Buendia. conflict in the Philippines struggle by with nationalistic (Bangsamoro) history of the Moro 2005. unresolved national arguments, wanting to and their identity. defend their culture, identity,

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question or question of language, ways of life and governance? religion. The also legitimized it by claiming that the government weren’t meeting basic socio-economic needs and that the state systematically discriminated socially and economically against their people.

Alemseged The Historical Orbit of They legitimized their Eritrea A historical analysis Abbay. 2017. Eritrea’s Agony secessionist struggle by based on the history claiming that Ethiopia was a of Eritrea. colonial nation that were politically and culturally oppressing them. The also legitimized it by claiming that secession would bring peace, prosperity and democracy.

3.3 Ethical considerations

None of the chosen articles have discussed any ethical considerations regarding their research. One of the biggest reasons for this according to me is that there were few ethical considerations to make for most of them. They have studied whole groups and not individuals. No personal information has been at risk of leaking in their articles as they have not collected any. They must, of course, adhere to good research praxis overall but that is taken for granted and not discussed or acknowledge by any of the authors.

3.4 Results

The results will be presented in the following way, first I will describe the participants/cases and the methods used in the articles. Then I will discuss the ways that secession has been legitimized by the cases used in the articles.

3.4.1 The methods and cases

As presented, I will start off with a short presentations and discussion about the methods applied and the cases that were used in the articles. The first thing that I noted was that all these articles has been done in a qualitative way, nothing has been counted or measured which is staple for quantitative research.

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Where they have been different is how they have done their qualitative analysis. Two of these applied the same method but described it differently from one another and those where the article from Dietrich (2010) and Dalle Mulle & Serrano (2019).

Otherwise the method used was quite diverse, Tappe (1995) went with a comparative method, Baer (2000) created a three-folded model for legitimacy and the rest applied different viewpoints to analyse this topic (Buendia. 2005; Andrade Sampaio & Vedovato. 2016; Abbay. 2017; Narotzky. 2019).

This heterogeneity I think is positive for this subject as it is show that scientists and researchers are trying to understand secession from a multitude of different viewpoints. There is also diversity in the different cases selected by the researchers, however there is some overlap. Narotzky (2019) and Dalle Mulle & Serrano (2019) both research Catalonia, Baer (2000) and Tappe (1995) both included Chechnya in their research.

Otherwise the rest of the field has no overlap in cases and there are cases from all parts of the world, even though Europe is overrepresented. I still believe this strengthens the result from this review as it will show how secessionist groups all over the world try to legitimize their struggle.

3.4.2 How is secession legitimized?

Democracy

I find the results quite interesting as it is only shown in three of eight articles that the secessionist actors legitimize their struggle by using the people’s will as a factor. Because of an overlap in cases, two of the articles had Catalonia as a case, it is shown that only the Kosovo secessionists and the Catalan secessionists use this way of legitimizing their struggle (Dietrich. 2010; Narotzky. 2019; Dalle Mulle & Serrano. 2019). The Scottish secessionist and the Eritrean secessionists do use democracy as a way of legitimizing their struggle, but they do not describe it as the will of the people. In the Scottish case it is said that secession would bring a more democratic society and in the Eritrean case that it would simply bring democracy (Abbay. 2017; Dalle Mulle & Serrano. 2019)

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Legality

Using legal argument is also a way that secessionist legitimize their struggles. It was shown in two of the articles that the Catalans and Macedonian secessionist legitimized their struggle by claiming that they had they had the legal right to do so. The difference being that the Macedonian separatist claimed the right by law to secede from the federation whilst the Catalans claim comes from the right to self-determination, the Macedonians used existing federation level laws whilst the Catalans appealed to international law (Baer. 2000; Dalle Mulle & Serrano. 2019).

Unjust host-nation.

I’ve pooled legitimization in connection to abuse, injustice, discrimination and oppression into the same headline as I see them as connected to each other. Seven of the eight articles showed that some form of abuse, injustice, discrimination or oppression current or historical was used as a way to legitimize the secessionist struggle in Kosovo, Catalonia, Scotland, Slovakia, Chechnya, Moro and Eritrea (Tappe. 1995; Baer. 2000; Buendia. 2005; Dietrich. 2010; Abbay; 2017; Narotzky. 2019; Dalle Mulle & Serrano. 2019). This could be in the forms of political, social and economic abuse, injustice, discrimination and oppression. The main point is that almost all the articles have secessionist that refers to wrongdoing by the host nation.

Nationalism

Nationalism is a common feature when it comes to legitimizing the secessionist struggle. In five of the eight articles the secessionist makes nationalistic arguments in order to legitimize their secession. This means that they argue that they have a different history than the host nation, a different culture, language, religion or ways of life. According to the articles, this was present in Catalonia, Slovakia, Chechnya, Moro and the Constantino states (Tappe. 1995; Baer. 2000; Buendia. 2005; Dietrich. 2010; Andrade Sampaio & Vedovato &. 2016).

Economy

Another common way that secessionist legitimize their struggle is by claiming that their economic outlook will be better if they were to secede. This was shown in six of the eight articles. They legitimize their struggle by saying that they are economically discriminated against and referring to themselves as colonized as in the case of Constantino and Eritrea

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(Andrade Sampaio & Vedovato. 2016; Abbay. 2017). In other secessionist movements legitimations came from the host-nation taxing too high and general economic discrimination in Slovakia and Catalonia (Baer. 2000; Narotzky. 2019) In the Scottish case they legitimized their struggle from an economic perspective by claiming that secession would bring jobs, grow the economy and help the vulnerable (Dalle Mulle & Serrano. 2019) At last in the Moro case the legitimized their struggle by claiming that the host-nation wasn’t meeting their basic socio-economic needs (Buendia. 2005).

Other ways to legitimize

In one article there was one way to legitimize secession that was not in any other article. In Baer’s (2000) article and the case of the Macedonian secessionist, they legitimized their secession by claiming that if was for self-protection.

Summary

So how is secession being legitimized by secessionist groups? This research review has shown that secession is legitimized in a lot of different ways and the secessionist groups commonly use more than one argument to legitimize their secession. The most prevalent legitimations for secession was relating to an unjust host-nation, nationalism and economy. These ways of legitimizing secession showed up in at least five of eight articles.

3.5 Critical evaluation

In this section I will critically evaluate how the topics have been presented, how the researchers developed their arguments and how theory was used.

Abbay (2017) and Buendia (2005) presents the topic by talking about the cases and how destructive the secessionist struggle has been. They aren’t necessarily picking a side, but they are emphasizing that secession is something that has caused a lot of suffering. Tappe (1995), Dietrich (2010) and Sampaio & Vedovato (2016) has a different focus when introducing the topic. They present it as something with great longevity and as something that stretches far back in history, that there has always been conflict and people have died because of it, but it is not described in the same emotional tone as Abbay (2017) or Buendia (2005).

Dalle Mulle & Serrano (2019) and Narotzky (2019) present the topic in a fairly similar way, which could be expected as their cases overlap. They present the topic as a new wave and a

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revival of something thought to be dead. Differences being Narotzky (2019) presents the topic as something that has a very long history. Dalle Mulle & Serrano (2019) presents that this revival of secessionism goes against the common belief that democracy and economic prosperity would remove nationalist tensions and aspirations.

At last Baer (2000) presents the topic from a theoretic viewpoint which is much more focused on theory than any other article. Baer’s (2000) introduction is longer in comparison to the others as it goes in depth from the beginning explaining some theory of secession as well as presenting some examples of secession and then explaining what cases that has been selected for the article.

Dietrich (2010) builds arguments by connecting dots between theoretical and empirical. The unjust treatment of Kosovans is connected to normative principles in secessionist theory and therefore he argues that the Kosovan secessionist could appeal to this to gain a legitimate claim for secession. Baer (2000) does something similar, the author has criteria for secessionist legitimacy based on theory and the applies these criteria on the empirical cases to argue whether it is legitimate or not.

This is performed in the same way by Dalle Mulle & Serrano (2019) but they instead use a similar method to see if main arguments in secessionist litterature is used by secessionist actors, then on the basis on their empirical material they argue about whether the secessionist actors does this or not.

Tappe (1995) uses historical context related to the empirical case and a comparative case in order to make arguments about his own selected case. Theory does not play a big role in the article itself or in the building of arguments for Tappe (1995). This goes for Narotzky’s (2019) article as well in the sense that theory isn’t of utmost importance. The author collects empirical material which in this case is evidence that either prove that Catalonia is legally able to break free or not. Then based on what has been collected argues whether the evidence of either Spain’s or Catalonia’s side is strong enough to settle the conflict judicially.

Andrade Sampaio & Vedovato (2016) has taken the same route and gone for a legal analysis, they collect arguments from the secessionist and examine how these relate to law, the difference being here is that they specify that it is in relation to international law. Abbay (2017) and Buendia (2005) both use historical analysis on their empirical material. Theory

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isn’t of great importance but rather arguments are built by drawing lines between historical events and the consequences of these events in order to build arguments.

A reflection I had whilst evaluating all of these is that the majority of them seem to not be as critical towards the secessionist cases that they are examining. I’m not saying that they are in support of them and it could be that the cases they’ve selected simply just have the moral high ground in their secessions.

The article from Andrade Sampaio & Vedovato (2016) stood out here as they criticized their selected secessionist group by saying that the selected secessionist group used racist and misleading stereotypes in order to further their cause. Whilst in other articles groups could be described as nationalistic, it never was in the same accusatory negative tone. For example, no other article implied that nationalistic arguments used by secessionist actors where founded in racist stereotypes.

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4. Theory

In this segment the theory that I use in thesis will be presented as well as potentially important scientific backgrounds that couldn’t be covered in the systematic research review.

4.1 Internal and external legitimacy in secession

The starting point for the theory presentation will be on the topic of legitimacy. Legitimacy is a phenomenon that is quite complex and contested. But it is most commonly defined as either as the subjective belief in the validity of an order, i.e. it’s valid because the subjective person thinks it's valid regardless of whether it’s objectively good or not (Weber. 1978; Easton. 1975). But it is also sometimes defined as a criterion that the political authority must meet in order to be a legitimate authority regardless if anyone below the authority approves of it or not (Grafstein. 1981; Schaar. 1981; Habermas. 1996). In other words, this is seeing political legitimacy as either public support of a regime or seeing it as the regime’s ability and success to meet normative standards of democracy, identity, efficiency or performance (Berg. 2012).

The question of legitimacy is in other terms taking the form of an external or internal assessment, this means that legitimacy is either based on if the surrounding political communities find the political authority legitimate or if it's based upon if the citizens that are ruled by a political authority finds it legitimate (Berg. 2012).

Berg (2012) argues that presumably the external view of legitimacy on a political authority should resonate with the internal view, but in real life these views often end up in conflict with one another. The ambiguity in the concept enables legitimacy to be a matter of degree rather than fixed point on a scale, therefore Berg (2012) says that there doesn’t seem to exist a magical line to distinguish regimes that are clearly legitimate or illegitimate.

Whilst on the topic of legitimacy, how independence is made legitimate theoretically is important to discuss. Baer (2000) argues that external legitimacy is probably the most important part and argues that secession, i.e. self-determination via statehood, isn’t a phenomenon that is regulated in any kind of international law. But is in fact regulated by recognition by third states and the United nations.

Coggins (2011) agrees with Baer (2000) and argues that in domestic level theories when it comes to international relations it is said that, it’s the internal outcome that decides whether

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independence will be legitimate or illegitimate. The meaning of this argument is that if an actor has achieved sovereignty internally then they will be legitimately independent i.e. if a secessionist actor gains independence for their host nation and secures their borders, they are a sovereign nation.

Coggins (2011. p435) argues that this is insufficient and says that “Independence projects falter if they cannot secure external legitimacy”. The meaning of this argument is that a secessionist actor hasn’t succeeded in its mission of creating their own sovereign state. Until they have gained the international recognition that confirms that they indeed are a sovereign state.

4.2 Democracy and legitimacy in secession

Reinikainen (2019) investigates four different approaches to secession and shows as Berg (2012) mentions that legitimacy is a difficult concept and it becomes even more so when secession is involved.

The first approach discussed is the remedial approach. This approach views on political legitimacy is that legitimacy is achieved if the state does a credible job of protecting the basic human rights of its citizens. By being able to provide this protection in its processes, policies and actions, the consent of the citizens that the state rules over is not needed. (Reinikainen. 2019). This means that it is difficult for a secessionist group to gain the right to secession, in its hardest version it would only ever happen if human rights were regularly violated and the state is abusing its citizens. Or if there is occupation of a state that used to be independent (Buchanan. 1991). Birch (1984) argues that if a state forcibly tries to integrate a group, it is failing to stand by its explicit or implicit bargain giving the group a right to secession. If it is also unable to secure legitimate interests in a group, then the group gains right to secession. Either way a separatist minority would have a hard time being able to gain a legitimate claim to secede. Since a just state or at least a minimally democratic state would be immune to secession (Reinikainen. 2019; Dalle Mulle & Serrano. 2019).

The functional approach also argues that the source of legitimacy for a state is in its ability to fulfil its terms of upholding justice. For this approach it is specified that it must be liberal justice, it cares more about the consent of the citizens than the remedial approach in this way (Wellman. 2005). This means that this approach would give separatist minorities a legitimate

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claim for secession if they are able to also uphold liberal justice within their newly created state. This approach argues that we should always accept secessionist groups that will establish liberal democracies and reject those who would not do this. This approach does not value whether this would be more democratic or not (Reinikainen. 2019).

The third approach discussed is the free choice approach which argues that freedom of political association is included in political self-determination. A secessionist minority is free to choose if they would like to be associated with a state or not. The theory assumes that the citizens will have both an informed and free choice between the alternatives of staying in the host state or leaving it. So, a secessionist minority always has the right to exit if they want to, as their state is seen as voluntary association (Pavkovic & Radan. 2007). This has potential subversive effects upon the rule of law. This approach allows for unilateral secession of a piece of territory. In theory this can be used as a cancellation of law and the introduction of new law making it possible for any self-defined group (Reinikainen. 2019).

The fourth approach is the exit approach. This approach argues that a state’s legitimacy is based upon the consent of its citizens, they must freely accept their subjection to the state with the presupposition that they have a possibility to secede if they wanted to. This approach calls for a regional secession vote to see if they would like to secede and if a state were to block this opportunity it would undermine its authority against that minority group. There are some flaws to this approach. Democratic secession by using the exit approach would fail to ensure that the ones who want to leave can leave and those who want to stay can stay. If there are border changes the people who voted against secession would live in the place they want to live but they end up on the wrong side of the border (Reinikainen. 2019).

Dalle Mulle & Serrano (2019) criticize looking at legitimacy in secession in the monistic way that Reinikainen (2019) is. They argue that this way of looking at it is only for political philosophers whilst in practice this isn’t how the secessionist groups legitimize their secession. In real life, secessionist actors are pluralist in the sense that they mix and combine different arguments for secession in an untidy way, with little concern for any hierarchy of the arguments.

Dalle Mulle and Serrano (2019) also argues that empirically, actors make legitimacy arguments for their secession which isn’t covered in these normative theories presented above where independence is depicted as an end to itself. The real-life actors in their research argue

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that their independence could be legitimized because they could achieve better welfare and governance for their people, than what the current state is giving them.

4.3 Sub-state nationalism and populism

When discussing the topics democracy and legitimacy and their parts in secession, populism and sub-state nationalism are topics that should be kept in mind. These concepts are tools that secessionist actors, in democracies and non-democracies, could use to further their cause. But it could also help to understand the actors in a deeper way.

The description for populism isn’t very long but it can be defined as an ideology which sees society as divided between the people and the elite, often the evil or corrupt elite. The goal of populism is for politics to follow the will of people rather than having politics follow based upon negotiation between elites (Gamper Sachse. 2018).

The definitions of nationalism and sub-state nationalism aren’t necessarily different as sub- state nationalism. The differences boil down to one having a national state and the other not having a national state. It can be said that both sub-state nationalism and nationalism are representations of three political process linked to identity, interests and mobilization (Lecours. 2011). It is a form of identity politics (Smith. 1991). For sub-state nationalism to exist it generally requires identities to be constructed and cultural markers must be given subjective meaning, for example we speak this language hence we are a different group (Brass. 1991).

The processes make individuals regard the treatment of their group as a reflection of their own, this is the appeal of nationalism. It is also being able to define and articulate group interests that is only based upon your group as a people and lastly it is being able to mobilize a group based on these interests (Lecours. 2011). Furthermore, a sub-state nationalist movement can be defined closer as a movement that attacks the political legitimacy of the state in which it operates. It is a movement that tries to represent the current state as illegitimate and as not representative of the nation (Conversi. 2002).

Barrio, Barberà & Rodriguez-Teruel (2018) points out that populism which usually has been linked with the with a clear nativist dimension has started to change. This has been seen in southern Europe since the economic crisis of 2008 new challenger parties with populist features have emerged, but they aren’t as nativist as they usually are. This new

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populism could be called a regionalist populism that combines regionalist claims with populist claims where for example economic grievances is of bigger concern than nativism.

Van Haute, Pauwels and Sinardet (2018) finds that there are similarities between sub-state nationalism and populism when it is translated into party politics. These phenomena have been characterized by their limited substance where the core concept is constant, it is it’s us vs them or the people vs the elite. Both phenomena allow the political parties that use these tools to define the contours and decide how it is going to be used within their own ideological framework. Danero Iglesias (2015) showed in an article that these can be strategically adapted in order to mobilize their own supporters by using ad hoc content that shifts depending on the actor´s needs.

Lecours (2011) argues against the characterization of specifically sub-state nationalism as a phenomenon with limited substance that it is presented as in Van Haute et.al’s (2018) study. Lecours (2011) argues that sub-state nationalism doesn’t only rely on expressions of collective interests or identity, instead it is so much more. It is something that confronts the existing political, institutional and constitutional order and seeks specific change with in these. Because the sub-state nationalists seek change, they need social support. They therefore articulate political claims on behalf of a specific minority group which is why it could seem that the core concept is always the same us vs them tactic being reused.

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5. Method

In this segment I will present the method and methodology used for this thesis. I will also present and briefly discuss the cases I intend to use and the data I intend to collect and use for this thesis.

5.1 Qualitative content analysis

In this thesis I will be using a qualitative content analysis. This method has hermeneutical grounds but in 5.2 I will perform this method from another point of view. This method is a type of text analysis that is used when things aren’t primarily counted or measured but rather the researcher is trying to describe the meaning of the material that has been collected. This is a method that systematically describes the meaning of the qualitative data by assigning material to categories of a coding frame, this is usually partly inductive (data-driven) (Boréus. 2017). This will be done by creating analytical categories and assigning parts of that material to that analytical category. In this thesis I refer to my categories as approaches, these approaches are built upon ideal types which has their basis in secessionist legitimacy theories. This means that the cases aren’t necessarily meant to correspond perfectly, they just have to correspond well enough to be able to be placed in a specific analytical approach.

The difference between a quantitative and qualitative content analysis is claimed by Boréus (2017) to be relative. If the researcher is more prominent with counting and measuring in its content analysis it is a quantitative method being used but if it instead has less counting and measuring and a bigger focus on complex interpretations it is qualitative method. A complex interpretation is here defined as something that could only be done by humans and only use very simple ways to count or measure something in the text. By using this method, I can analyse expressions, arguments and presences of words (Boréus. 2017). Analysing the content in this way should make me see how these actors argue for their secession.

The qualitative content method is very useful to find patterns in larger bodies of material, for example political party manifestos, it is also quite useful to use content analysis in order to compare for example these manifestations. This is because qualitative content analysis specifically is great at doing what is central to social science, examining and generalizing overall social patterns. Using this method allows me to attain general information about my material that other methods aren’t as capable of doing (Boréus. 2017)

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In this thesis I will make interpretations based upon how the secessionist actors argue for their secession. Then in order to see how this relates to secessionist theories I will sort these into analytical categories that I’ve created based upon the theory I presented earlier

Now that I have described what strengths the method has and why it’s applicable in this thesis, I must also point out that it has its weaknesses, the method is not per. The first problem isn’t in the method itself but with the researcher. This is because I must in some ways make interpretations into what I understand as their arguments for secession as they do not outright say “this is our arguments for secession”. This can then be coloured by my own political beliefs and potentially create non-existing arguments which is a validity issue, but it could also be a problem of reliability as it could mean that this study wouldn’t be repeatable as another researcher coloured by other beliefs could find different arguments potentially. They way to counteract this is by having good analytical categories.

Boréus (2017) discusses the problem above in relation to quantitative content analysis but I find it applicable to qualitative content analysis as well. For example, the implicit meaning of a sentence could be misinterpreted even by a human that is looking for specific words or arguments. Furthermore, Boréus (2017) says that having the analytical categories is also potentially a limitation as it doesn’t let the text speak for itself. The risk being here that I as a researcher only see the text speaking what I have pre-emptively decided for it to say.

This thesis will also apply a comparative framework in order to be able to compare the cases. The research design for this thesis will be a so-called small N-studies. This means that I only use a small number of cases for my analysis. These types of studies are commonly used to uncover causal paths and mechanism and assess specific mechanism identified in theories. By using a small number of cases I am able to test for the existence of key mechanisms in my cases and see if the actors argue in the way that my theoretical approaches assume (Halperin & Heath, 2017).

So, to summarize my method for this thesis. I will collect data, the data in this case being the main arguments from the secessionist actors. This data will then be analysed by using the analytical scheme, which in this case is five different approaches to legitimize secession. The analysis will be performed by taking each argument and putting it under a spotlight, discussing it in reference to internal and external legitimacy but also keeping a look out for keywords that correspond with the approaches. When this has been done to all the arguments,

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I should have a clear picture over what approach each argument belongs to and if the cases have argued in the way that theory assumed. In the end I will be able to make comparisons between the cases to see if they argue in similar or different ways. Furthermore, I will discuss why this method makes methodological sense in 5.2.

5.2 Methodological discussion.

For this thesis I have a positivistic view on science even though this method commonly comes with a more hermeneutic view on science and here I will explain what that means, the positive and negative and why that has made me chose qualitative content analysis as method in this thesis.

Positivists think that data is thing that already exists, the data is out there, and the researcher’s job is to first collect the data and then to systematize the collected data. According to positivist view of science data and facts are observable. The modern twist to positivism added that what is observable is also what could be measured or registered through a kind of instrument. Operationalists which is a sub-group within the positivist field has made the claim that only what could be measured could be a fact. The way that positivists go about measuring a phenomenon within the social sciences is by applying theory, in a survey for example the various variables measured presupposes various social science theories (Alvesson & Sköldberg. 2018). Hence, I use a method which can systematize collected data into theory built analytical categories.

There is of course criticism against seeing the social sciences in this way. Viewing the world in this way is shallow and missing the point, instead one should look at structures, patterns, language and actions which are the basis for our actions in the real world. Investigating these should be done to be able to see the hidden driving forces and mechanism so we can explain why something occurs and not just that it occurs or not. Positivism isn’t asking the right questions according to its critics. Reducing facts and data to what is observable or measurable isn’t justified to its critics for what cannot be seen could still affect us. Instead of conducting large surveys and gathering large amounts of data and using theory to try to see the connections. One could instead conduct small but intensive studies that could detect underlying patterns which could reflect surface structures (Alvesson & Sköldberg. 2018). By applying a comparative framework with a small N-studies design I am at least acknowledging the critique and going for a smaller and more intensive study.

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So why does this method make methodological sense in this thesis even though I’m using a view on science that isn’t common with it? It is because I have no need to do anything else but to observe, collect and systematize in this thesis. I’m not aiming to understand what underlying mechanics that makes these secessionist actors argue for their struggle in any certain way. I am just examining what they are saying and how this connects to theory and not why are they saying this. Qualitative content analysis allows me to do this through collecting arguments from actors and applying my theory grounded analytical scheme.

As said in 5.1 this method is usually partly inductive (data-driven), this means that a researcher starts from broader themes or a research question when analysing material, the text is then coded, and categories grows out of that coding (Boréus. 2017). I’ve have instead taken a deductive route where I’ve already have finished categories that are based on theories with no direct special connection to specific cases that I’ve selected (Alvesson & Sköldberg. 2018).

Why have I gone with a deductive approach with a method that commonly goes together with at least a small inductive part is a question that arises from this. I argue that having an inductive part where categories are somewhat inductive would not allow me to make a fair comparison. I argue that in order to make the fairest comparison between cases you would need to start with objective categories that does not change on the basis on what cases you deal with. If my categories where inductive then they are coloured by the cases and then it is not fit for comparison. The transferability would also be reduced as I could only transfer the results to cases that are very similar to the cases that are in this thesis.

5.3 Analytical Categories

Here I will show how I intend to use the theory presented in my thesis in order to answer my research questions. My main analytical categories that I will use will be based upon four different approaches that Reinikainen (2019) discussed, to these I will add theory of internal and external legitimacy and I will also add one more approach which will be based on Dalle Mulle & Serrano’s (2019) findings. The analytical categories will look like this.

The first analytical category will follow the remedial approach. If the secessionist groups argue for their secession by claiming that the state isn’t just and that the state isn’t doing a credible job of protecting human rights for its citizens and that they want their secession as a remedy for their suffering, it belongs to this approach. They will most likely seek external

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legitimacy as the surrounding political community is the decider of whether a state is just or not and if the claim for secession is legitimate or not. This means that they will argue according to Grafstein (1981), Schaar (1981) and Habermas (1996) that the political authority does not meet a defined criterion that makes it legitimate, the defined criterion here being that the state isn’t doing a credible job of protecting human rights.

The second analytical category is the functional approach. If the secessionist groups legitimize their secession by arguing that the state isn’t fulfilling its terms to uphold liberal justice, and that they will build a liberal state if they were to secede. Then the secessionist group belongs to this approach. Here I’m expecting the secessionist to primarily seek external legitimacy as the surrounding political communities must believe that either the state isn’t upholding liberal justice or that the secessionist will create a liberal state. This means that they will argue according to Grafstein (1981), Schaar (1981) and Habermas (1996) that the political authority does not meet a defined criterion that makes it legitimate, the defined criterion here being the upholding of a liberal state.

The third analytical category is the free choice approach. If the secessionist group argues that they have freedom of political association and can have political self-determination in the sense that they are free to choose whether they would like to be associated with the state or not. Then the secessionist group belong to this approach, here I expect the group to primarily seek internal legitimacy. The group only needs what they would refer to as their citizens to agree to secession in order to secede. This means that they will argue that they simply do not see the current political authority as legitimate not because of criteria but because that is what they subjectively believe as according to Weber (1978) and Easton (1975).

The fourth approach is the exit approach. If the secessionist groups are arguing that they as a group must freely decide whether to belong to a nation. That they want a regional vote to see if they as a group want to belong to the host-nation or not then they belong to this approach. If they are subjugated by a state it is with the presupposition that they have an open possibility to secede through regional vote. Here I expect the secessionist to mainly seek internal legitimacy, they want to have their group on their side and do not care about what surrounding political communities think. If they want to secede by regional vote, they just need in group support. This means that they will argue that they simply do not see the current political authority as legitimate not because of criteria but because that is what they subjectively believe as according to Weber (1978) and Easton (1975).

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I’ve also decided to include a fifth approach which I call the anti-theory approach. This is based on Dalle Mulle and Serrano’s (2019) findings that secessionist theory is to stiff and does not accurately reflect reality. If the secessionist makes arguments that mix and combine the different approaches, then they belong to this approach. They might argue for a regional vote at the same time as they say that the host state isn’t upholding liberal justice for example. Legitimacy wise they might seek both external and internal legitimacy at the same time, trying to make sure that both their group and the surrounding political communities legitimize their secession. They could argue both that they don’t believe in the legitimacy of the political authority and that the political authority does not reach some defined criteria for political legitimacy.

5.4 Cases and material.

In order to answer the research questions, I must first find out who the biggest actors for secessions in the respective countries are. In order to find that out I must first set up an inclusion principle for what constitutes the biggest actor. I have chosen to look at Flanders, Catalonia and Scotland. In these regions there are secessionist political parties. Therefore, I have chosen to research political parties which promotes the idea of secession in the respective regions. I chose to do this because I want to find the biggest actor for secession and the easiest way to do this is by looking at election results. If there were actors outside of the democratic system, it could be hard to see which one were the biggest as they might not display membership numbers and even if they do these might not be accurate. Using election results I can guarantee that I’m researching the biggest actor for secession as I can at least assume that the election numbers are accurate. Furthermore, if there are two, or more, parties that promote the idea of secession. I will use the party which had most votes as a case in this thesis. This is because the actor that had the most votes is the actor in which most people feel represent their way of seeing the issue of secession.

In the Catalan case I will analyse the party Junts per Catalunya (Together for Catalonia) as they with 21.65% of the votes where the biggest actor in Catalonia which seeks secession. Something to note here is that the second largest secessionist party is only 0.2% behind (Generalitet de Catalunya. 2017). This means that there might be quite the division in why and how secession shall be achieved in the Catalonian population but that is outside the scope of the present paper.

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In the Flemish case the first thought was that I would analyse the party as they were the biggest party that seeks secession in the latest elections with 24.83% of votes (Federal Public Services Home Affairs. 2019). But that they are a secessionist party seems to be something that is described by newspapers (Saeedy, 2017; Brzozowski. 2019). But the N- VA describes themselves as a party that does not want to secede Flanders from Belgium but instead, they want to gain enough autonomy until the federal government disappears (N-VA. 2020). So, I decided to go with Vlaams Belang that got 18.5% of the votes last Belgian regional election (Federal Public Services Home Affairs. 2019). I have been unable to find any source where Vlaams Belang, like NVA, says that they do not want secession. Hence, I deduce that this secessionist party wants to secede.

In the Scottish case the Scottish national party is by a quite large margin the most voted for secessionist party with a total of 45% of votes secured in the 2019 election in their region and will hence be used for analysis (BBC. 2019).

The way I aimed to collect the information to answer my research questions, was directly from the respective actors’ own websites. From there I aim to use principle programs, electoral programmes and what they write on their sites as sources. The important thing is that the secessionist parties has created the sources that I am using, if they have their own newspaper or a 200-page written electoral programme that describes how they argue for their secession is not of importance. For this thesis they are of equal value.

I see these as great sources as it is directly from the actors themselves with them using their own words to describe their situation which strengthens the truthfulness of the results. I also aim to collect information that was published as recently as possible. The reason for this is because these independence movements have been studied many times before. By using as material that was published by them recently, I am able to contribute with new knowledge about these movements.

There are of course limitations to this material. This material is how the party expresses themselves in political material, but it will miss arguments made by leaders in interviews, debates and on public forums. The material I would get from interviews and debates would be hard to handle though, possibly too hard because of the language barrier. Therefore, I concluded that there wasn’t a point in trying to find this type of material because I would be unable to use it. One could argue that the question I am able to answer is how secessionist

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argue in their political material and not how they argue overall. In the end though I choose this type of material as it easiest available to me and shows what the current party consensus is which I believe is on point in answering the question of how secessionist argue.

Some important things to mention about the cases and material that I’ve collected is that in the Scottish case the information had to be collected from the Scottish government website as the SNP had made a report about their secession that was only available there. The SNP published the link to the report through their official website.

In the Catalan and Flemish case, the longevity of the result of this study is perhaps not very long. This is because, as presented above, potentially the biggest actors for secession could be different in the next election. As it was quite close between the biggest parties in the Catalan case. In the Flemish case the stance that N-VA have could change as they are losing voters to a secessionist party, which potentially would make them the biggest secessionist actor again.

This thesis encountered difficulties with the Flemish and Catalonian actor. They have their information in their native languages which needs to be translated which is negative for this thesis as it could potentially distort some of the information when translated.

5.5 Ethical considerations

In this thesis it is required to make a reflection on relevant ethical aspects in order to make sure that good research practice has been performed in the making of this thesis. I will do this by shortly reflecting on some of the general rules for research set by the Swedish Research Council (2017).

Beginning by accounting for commercial interests and other associations, my funding comes from the Swedish student aid (CSN) which is a government program. I have during my research gained scholarship from Bröderna Molanders stiftelse, which is a scholarship for students that during their early education years lived in Dalarna. This funding is openly available to students that have lived in Dalarna and has hence not guided my research in any shape or form. I have not been given money to specifically do research, I have been given money to support my education whatever it may be.

When it comes to reviewing the basic premises of this study, they have always been the same. I chose this because it interests me that is the premise of this study. I do not have any

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connections to anyone bound to these secessionist movements. The research that I have used in my theory part has been openly available and is not being used unauthorised.

I have strived as much as I can not to cause harm, partly by not conducting research where personal information could be leaked. But most importantly I state this is because some the material I’ve collected has been in languages that I can’t speak nor read. Hence, it had to be translated which potentially could lead to misrepresentations of ideas because of bad translations. Therefore, I dedicated myself to make sure that the translations where done to the best of my possible ability to ensure that no misrepresentations where made.

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6. Results

In this segment I will present the collected material from the secessionist actors.

6.1 Junts per Catalunya/Together for Catalonia

How does the Catalan secessionist party Junts per Catalunya argue for their secession? Junts per Catalunya argue that they have grievances with the Spanish government throughout history. No matter the form of the government or if it has been left or right wing, the Spanish government with its centralism has never wanted to understand and respect Catalonia with its diversity and plurinationality (Junts per Catalunya. 2019).

It’s argued that the Spanish government has violated the fundamental rights of the people in the Catalan independence movement and its representatives. This is argued to be a constant phenomenon which became worse when Catalans had the independence vote in October 2017. During the vote the police and the civil guard used what was perceived as a disproportionate amount of violence to prevent Catalans from voting. Fundamental rights were breached that day according to the Junts per Catalunya, 155 arrests were made, civilian independence leaders were convicted and the Catalan government were forced into exile. Elected deputies and senators were suspended which violated the right to be represented from those who voted for them. Junts per Catalunya argue that the state has normalized violation of fundamental rights to combat their independence movement, which is incompatible in a strong democratic society. (Junts per Catalunya. 2019).

Junts per Catalunya argues that Catalonia is under threat from increasing centralization from the Spanish government and that the Spanish government is actively working against them. The Spanish government has centralized more power to the state institutions by passing new laws that reduce control and local autonomy, not only for Catalonia but for all autonomous regions. The government has also begun to cut down on freedoms, for example a law that made it so the high court can act in other judicial instances. Another law passed, in practice prohibits and strongly punishes certain manifestations which is a limit to fundamental rights and liberties (Junts per Catalunya. 2019).

The actor also argues that their need for independence and secession is based in economic and administrative terms. The only way for the Catalans to build the future that they want is to create a new state. They want to create the new state through the recognition that they have a

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right to exercise self-determination. They argue that if they were to create a new state, they would get better governance with more legislative and administrative tools. Seceding would also give more economic resources which could promote growth, create employment and give better tools to combat inequalities. (Junts per Catalunya. 2019).

Junts per Catalunya argues that a fiscal deficit turns into a social deficit, their independence struggle is not a means to itself, but it is also a social struggle. In order to create a welfare state that would fight poverty and social marginalization through health services, quality education and pensions they need to form their own state. They also point out that the only way that they can properly guarantee that there is a fight against climate change and for women's rights is by being independent. They argue that national progress is social progress because it guarantees all rights for all people, but in order to get the tools to create a welfare state that acts in this way they have to be independent. Independence is the way to build a democratic society that bases its actions in respect for human rights (Junts per Catalunya. 2019).

On the topic of economics Junts per Catalunya argues that the Spanish government keeps making financial promises to the Catalan region that are never met. For every 100 budgeted euros that are supposed to go to the region only 66 euros is transferred, 1/3 of the approved budget is missing. In the Spanish capital Madrid however, every 100 euros budgeted leads to 114 euros invested, this means that the capital is getting extra money from somewhere. The state collects most of the taxes in the region, the government then regulates the financing of Catalonia, the consequences of this is that Catalonia becomes underfunded and is forced to lend money from the Spanish government. They argue that being within the Spanish tax system is discriminating against Catalonia and draining them on money that could be used in the region (Junts per Catalunya. 2019).

The actor argues that the movement that they have built is one that is democratic, civic and inclusive, it’s a movement which strongly advocates for non-violence. They say that they will stand by these principles and defend them in order to gain their independence. But so far both the former prime minister Mariano Rajoy and the current prime minister Pedro Sánchez has ignored requests for another referendum. Junts per Catalunya says that it’s their responsibility that this secessionist conflict in the end is solved through gaining recognition that they have the right to self-determination and in the end that they are allowed to use this right (Junts per Catalunya. 2019).

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6.2 Vlaams Belang/Flemish Interests

So how does Vlaams Belang argue for their secession? We will begin with how the party describes themselves. Vlaams Belang is described as the interpreter of the , a party that works as an instrument for policy for those whose national or cultural identity belongs in Flanders. They say that what they hope to achieve with this secession movement is that the Flemish should rule an independent Flanders, it is the Flemish people who shall decide the administration and structure of their own state. They argue that since the state is a structure created by people, hence it should be subordinate to the people based on the principle of self-determination. In other words, they argue that secession is needed because otherwise there won't be a Flemish state that is controlled and operated by the Flemish people for the Flemish people (Vlaams Belang. B. 2018).

Vlaams Belang argues that a lot of problems stem from the fact that there are two different communities in Belgium, the Flemish and the French speaking communities. These communities are divided on every other issue which has in turn created a political, social, legal and cultural border. For example, the Wallonia community is more left wing whilst the Flemish is more right-wing. They see this divide between the two communities as too big to be repaired (Vlaams Belang. C. 2018).

Vlaams Belang argue that the current federal situation, that was created in 1970s to keep Flanders and Wallonia together by giving them autonomy, has failed. In its failing it has created a big democratic deficit within the system for both communities. They argue that the current system is not only to complicated and inefficient with its 7 governments and 8 parliaments. There is also the problem that any kind self-governance is quite difficult to achieve and in practice does not exist. This problem exists because the federals states are under strong Belgian supervision and because institutional change can’t happen without the consent of the other community (Vlaams Belang. 2019).

Even though the Flemish are the majority group in the country this is something that isn’t reflected anywhere except on federal level. With the number of political barriers that exist, the Flemish people’s will seldomly shines through. Political disputes on immigration, structural and socio-economic reforms that is in the interests of the Flemish people is blocked by the Walloons. There isn’t a way in the current system to give both the democratically elected

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parliaments what they are entitled to when one can block the other. The only way to solve this democratic deficit is to allow the Flemish to create their own state as the Belgian state simply does not work, it is argued. Only this way the Flemish could be a free people again Vlaams Belang (2019) argues.

The economic situation for Flanders is argued to be improved if they were to secede from Belgium and create and independent state. As Flanders is richer than Wallonia, transfers of wealth is only going one way. Flanders pays around 12 billion euros in solidarity contributions to Wallonia every year. Again, they argue that this is undemocratic as this economic structure does not have democratic legitimacy, is excessive and not transparent (Vlaams Belang. 2019). If they were to keep the money, then they would have Flemish money in Flemish hands and could use it for own needs and requirements. An independent Flanders would be free from Belgian economical obstacles, being able to guarantee prosperity and wellbeing by pursuing their own socio-economic policies, it is argued (Vlaams Belang. C. 2019).

Another argument used by Vlaams Belang is that they want to prevent frenchification and internationalisation in the Brussels Periphery and in . In the Flemish municipalities close to Brussels, Flemish speakers are in minority whilst the majority there are French speaking or non-Dutch speaking. If frenchification and internationalisation won’t stop, then in demographic terms these areas will stop being Flemish areas (Vlaams Belang. 2019).

Vlaams Belang says that Flemish independence would solve these problems presented, but seceding would require breaking Belgian law. Therefore, the Flemish must put their legitimacy against the Belgian law. They argue that therefore the primary task is creating political parties in order to gain a broad public support for their secession thereby gaining legitimacy. It is then argued that there is a growing gap between the Flemish and Walloon democracy and institutional crises will worsen this gap and create momentum for the division of the country. When the time is right, they can declare their independence. This is described as when there is an institutional crisis and when the parliament has the necessary legitimacy, authority and legal basis (Vlaams Belang. 2019)

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6.3 Scottish Nationalist Party

So how does the SNP argue for their secession? The SNP has a document called “Scotland’s Right to Choose” which I will be using as it used to argue for their secession. The document starts off with presenting how Scotland is a nation, and that it’s one of the oldest nations in Europe. In 1707 when they were integrated into the new union state, they argue that they remained as a nation. They argue that the Scottish nationhood reaches further than just through history or into the Scottish institution. Scottish nationhood is a phenomenon that is more than just that, it is also shared values and aspiration which follows from the idea of the scots as a distinct people in a distinct political community. The SNP argues that Scotland is in an association of nations that is voluntary and argue that if the UK sees it that way as well then it must be openly democratic in all its parts. Allowing any nation to leave if they want to, otherwise being a part of the UK would be undemocratic and against the shared values and interests that the Union is based on. They argue that the Scottish view of historic constitutional tradition differs from the UK tradition, which becomes clear in their view of parliamentary sovereignty. The UK claims that they are the only source of sovereignty and whomever has crown-in-parliament can make or unmake laws if they would like to. The Scottish tradition says that sovereignty lies with within the people where the ruler needs consent from the people to earn the right to rule, instead of having an absolute authority (Scottish Government. 2019).

The actor argues that it is on a fundamental democratic principle that the people of Scotland should be the ones who decide whether or not Scotland should be independent. Scotland is in other words entitled to self-determination because otherwise the democratic principle fails. The SNP argues that this is clear through a bill signed in 1989 called A Claim of Right for Scotland. It stipulates that it is the sovereign right for the people in Scotland to decide which form of government is best suited to their needs (Scottish Government. 2019). The Scottish people has voted for parties which in their manifestos pledge to have an independence referendum. The SNP argues that there might be damage to the democracy both in Scotland and in the UK if this is not acknowledged. The SNP don’t believe it is for the UK Government to decide if they are to respect the mandate given from the Scottish people to their government. The SNP still argues that they want in law that it is for the Scottish parliament only to decide if a referendum is to be held or not. If legality for the referendum is

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not achieved, then there isn’t political legitimacy in the UK government the SNP argues (Scottish Government. 2019).

The SNP stress that because the vote to leave the EU was against the will of the people of Scotland since they voted to remain with 62 % to 38%. This means that the UK isn’t as said, a partnership of equals instead Scotland's interests and wishes could be set aside. Furthermore, the UK has made no attempt to accommodate Scotland after the vote instead they approached the EU exit without respecting Scotland's views, even though this change will have a big impact on Scotland. Economically it will have a negative impact on their competitiveness and economic performance, the changes to immigration will affect Scotland’s population in a negative way as well. During the time of the referendum campaign in 2014 Scotland’s place in Europe was an important talking point, if they were to achieve independence the SNP were set to do so as a member of the European union. Already in 2014 before the EU referendum of 2016 the SNP wanted to be independent as it would prohibit Scotland from being taken out of the EU against the people’s will. The SNP argues that The EU referendum is not the only time where it turned out that there’s a democratic deficit in Scotland. In 40 of the 74 years after World War 2, Scotland has been ruled from Westminster by a party that has secured less than half to the Scottish constituencies. Therefore, the SNP want Scotland to be independent so that the votes of Scotland have an effect and Scotland can determine their own future (Scottish Government. 2019).

The SNP point out that they are advocates for human rights, freedom, democracy and rule of law and they will hence commit themselves to a legal process which adheres to those values. They want to adhere by these values because they want their secession to be legitimate not only in Scotland but also in the UK as well as in the international community (Scottish Government. 2019).

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7. Analysis

It is now time to analyse the gathered material. I will do this by going in the order that I presented the results, by starting with Junts per Catalunya, then Vlaams Belang and ending with the Scottish Nationalist Party. The analysis will be presented by showing arguments that the actors have used and analyse them by showing what legitimacy they appeal to. When every argument gathered is analysed, I will have a conclusion of which approach each actor belongs to, based on the approaches presented in 5.3.

7.1 Junts per Catalunya/Togheter for Catalonia

Starting with the first argument. The actor argues that the government has never showed respect or tried to understand the regions diversity and plurinationality. I believe that this argument is an attempt at gaining internal legitimacy, this is because there isn’t a defined criterion for what understanding a regions diversity and plurinationality means. It’s an appeal to the secessionist followers more than anything else with an us vs them tone to it.

The next argument presented is that the government has violated fundamental rights by using a disproportionate amount of violence to prevent people from voting in the referendum and imprisoning leaders of the secessionist movement. These actions are argued to be incompatible with a strong democratic society. There is also an increasing centralization with new laws being passed that reduce autonomy and also new laws that cut down on freedoms and rights. This is quite clearly an argument which appeals to external legitimacy. They are arguing that the government isn’t meeting certain defined criterions that are in line with democratic societies or liberal states.

The next arguments that come are three arguments, but it is mixed into one. It’s an argument that touches economy, administration and self-determination because the problems are connected. If they were independent, they would have more administrative tools give better governance and more economic resources. If they are independent and have self- determination, then they would have new tools and resources which could be used to create a better Catalonia. A Catalonia that isn’t being financially drained by a host-nation, that fights poverty, social marginalization, creates growth, properly guarantees a fight for human rights and against climate change. This argument is legitimacy wise and approach wise very spread

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out. One could argue that these arguments are just for internal legitimacy and they subjectively think Spain isn’t properly guaranteeing human rights and fighting enough against climate change. But that is also a defined criterion through for example the Paris climate agreement and through UN with its definitions of human rights. The argument which is clearly defined legitimacy wise, is the one about being financially drained and being underfunded. It is an appeal to their own political community as this is a subjective view and not after a defined criterion.

The last argument they present is about their movement and its struggles. They are democratic, civic and inclusive movement that wants no violence. They only want their independence and their right to exercise self-determination, seemingly through a referendum as they argue that their tries to achieve a referendum vote falls to deaf ears. This is an appeal to external legitimacy. They show to surrounding political communities that they want to meet the criterion of being democratic as opposed to the Spanish government, which is argued to not be democratic, civic, inclusive and non-violent.

So, what approach does this movement belong to? I believe that it is quite obvious that this belongs to the anti-theory approach. This actor does not conform with any specific approach. This is because this secessionist movement mix arguments from the different approaches and use different types of legitimacy appeals. The arguments about breaches of human rights has a remedial tone, but they also argue with a functional tone as they argue that this state isn’t upholding liberal justice and they seemingly want to build a liberal state that can do so. I also see the free choice approach since they argue that they have the right to self-determination. As well as the exit approach as they want to have a referendum in order to decide if they want to stay or leave the host-nation. It also becomes clear that the four theory-based approaches miss economic and governance arguments.

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7.2 Vlaams Belang/Flemish Interest

Vlaams Belang argues that there is a need for independence by using nationalistic and governance arguments. The only way Flemish people can have self-determination is by being independent so that they can create a state that is by the Flemish for the Flemish. A state that they can decide the structure and administration of. They also say that in Belgium there are two communities, the Flemish and the French, which is creating these problems. Furthermore, there is also the problem of frenchification and internationalisation in the municipalities on the Brussels periphery. Flemish speakers are in minority in the areas close to Brussels and if not stopped then these areas will, in demographic terms, stop being Flemish altogether. This argument is clearly to gain internal legitimacy, it’s trying to appeal to subjective belief in the Flemish community that they the state that they have isn’t working for them and that they are being pushed out of their own areas, pointing out the French as the problem.

The next argument is a democratic and administrative one. It’s about the failed federal situation which has created a complicated system which has big democratic deficits. The democratic deficits are created because the federal systems are under strong Belgian supervision which eliminates self-governance. Even though the Flemish is the majority population in the country political barriers does not allow them to make decision that they want. These barriers allow one democratically elected parliament to block another democratically elected parliament. Legitimacy wise this argument tries to appeal both internally and externally by citing these democratic deficits. A democratic society has defined criterion which it needs to reach to be seen as democratic to surrounding political communities. But they could also just use this argument to subjectively argue that this democratic system isn’t working well to appeal to their own followers.

Another argument made is an economic and democratic one. They argue that the solidarity contributions that go to Wallonia every year is undemocratic as the economic structure allowing this is not democratically legitimate. If they were free from Belgian economical obstacles, they could guarantee prosperity and they could use the money for their own wants and needs. Again, by citing that its undemocratic it’s an appeal to external legitimacy. The other economic argument is clearly for internal legitimacy saying that they could make an economically better society if they could use money for their own wants and needs, is most likely a subjective belief and not a defined criterion.

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They at last argue that in order to gain independence they need to build political parties to gain broad public support so they can have legitimacy. Which is most likely to gain external legitimacy, to show the surrounding political communities that they meet a criterion for being a movement that is democratically supported by the people of Flanders.

Again, here we see a mixture of legitimacy appeals and that the approaches miss a lot of the arguments used. When it comes to the different approaches, we see that the free choice approach is the approach that best applies to this case as they appeal to self-determination and that they should be able to choose to not be a part of the country. This choice doesn’t need to be through a referendum it’s good enough to have parliamentary support which they say is what they seek, therefore they were closest to the free choice approach. The actors also make more of its appeals to internal legitimacy, having subjective claims that the political authority is legitimate through inefficiency in governance, administration and economy but also including the external legitimacy by claiming that the federal system isn’t democratic enough.

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7.3 Scottish Nationalist Party

The SNP begun with a nationalistic and historical argument by arguing that being a Scot is something extraordinary, it is something that is different than being a Brit. Scottish nationhood is something that has existed for a long time throughout history. Being a Scot is being a part of a distinct political community and a distinct people with different views on for example sovereignty. Scots says sovereignty lies within the people whilst the UK claims it’s within the crown. They argue that the union is a voluntary association of nations which they should be free to leave when they please, otherwise the Union is undemocratic. What legitimacy this argument appeals to is both external and internal legitimacy, both trying to set the Scots aside from the Brits by using both objective and subjective criterion for what makes a people distinct. Partially it appeals to external legitimacy as some political communities could argue that the Scots objectively are a different people from the Brits since they have existed for some time and that the union is objectively voluntary. But this argument could also be used as an argument as to why they subjectively believe that they are a different people. That the union is voluntary could be subjective view that gives support within the Scottish community.

Next argument is a democratic argument saying it’s on democratic principle for the Scots to decide whether or not they should be independent. This is also stipulate in a bill from 1989 which says that Scotland has the sovereign right to decide which government form best suits their needs. The Scottish people has voted for parties which pledge to have a independence referendum and it would damage the democracy if this isn’t acknowledge by the UK. Democratic arguments appeal to external legitimacy as democracy is a concept with defined criterions.

The next argument is also democratic and economic. It is about the EU referendum as even though the Scots voted overwhelmingly to stay, they will now leave the EU against their will. The UK has not tried to accommodate the Scots even though this decision will affect the Scottish economy negatively as they will be less competitive and have worse economic performance. With changes to immigration this might affect Scotland's population negatively as well. This isn’t the first time there has been democratic deficit within the UK, in 40 of the 74 years after WW2, Scotland has been ruled from Westminster by a party with less than half of the Scottish constituencies secured. If Scotland is not free, they can’t freely determine their

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own future. This is appeals both internally and externally, showing that the UK isn’t meeting objective democratic criterion but also the potentially subjective beliefs that leaving the EU will hurt Scotland economically and population wise.

At last they point out that their party advocates for human rights, freedom, democracy and rule of law. Hence, they commit themselves to a legal process which adheres to these values, so their secession is legitimate for Scotland, the UK and the international community. This is obviously an appeal for external legitimacy as they want the surrounding communities to know that they can reach defined criterions for a liberal society.

Now, what approach does these arguments put the SNP in? Again, we see a mixture of approaches used and legitimacy appeals made. The SNP through arguing that they are in voluntary association one would think would belong in the free choice approach, but they also say that they want a referendum which puts them in the exit approach. I also see some hints towards the functional approach as point out that they advocate for liberal justice by being advocates for human rights, freedom and democracy. So, all in all this case also belongs to the anti-theory approach. This case does not argue in accordance to any of the theoretical approaches.

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8. Conclusions

So, how does the biggest democratically elected actors supporting secession in Catalonia, Flanders and Scotland argue for their secession?

The Catalan actor uses democratic, economic, administrative and grievance arguments such as fundamental rights being broken, money is sapped from them through taxes and they do not receive money that they are budgeted to have. Lastly that they could create a better functioning state administratively and economically if they were independent.

The Flemish actor uses democratic, administrative, governance, nationalistic and economic arguments. Such as there being a democratic deficit in their federal system, the need to avoid Frenchification and internationalisation and to prevent Flemish money from going over to Wallonia.

The Scottish actor uses nationalistic, historical, democratic and economic arguments. The arguments used where that they were taken out of the EU against their will and that this could have negative impacts economically, that the Scottish people has a long history and that being a Scot is something different from being a Brit. Last but not least there is a democratic deficit in their system, which has existed since long before the EU referendum.

What are the differences and similarities in these cases?

The similarities and differences between the secessionist actors´ where the following. All the cases used a democratic or economic argument at least once, then there is some division amongst the actors.

It was only the Flemish actor’ that shared any arguments with the other secessionists. The Flemish actor shared administrative arguments with the Catalan actor and shared nationalistic arguments with the Scottish actor. But the Flemish where alone in their usage of governance arguments.

The Catalan actor was the only actor whom used grievance arguments in order to legitimize their movement and at last the Scottish actor was alone in using historical arguments to further their cause.

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How do the cases relate to different approaches to legitimize secession?

It was only the Flemish case that was close to arguing in accordance with one of the approaches, the Flemish arguments was closest to the free choice approach. In the theory section it is made clear that they didn’t have to be an absolute perfect match, just be close enough to end up in one of the approaches. But it is difficult to place the confidently in the free choice approach as they did mix their appeals to legitimacy and they did use arguments that are outside of the free choice approach but that didn’t fit any other approach either.

In the Scottish and Catalan case there was a mix of arguments, some of these arguments were disconnected to the approaches but in general all their arguments where applicable to one of the approaches. This has led me to agreeing with Dalle Mulle & Serrano (2019) that these ways of approaching legitimacy in secession is very monistic, it might work for philosophers, but real-life actors are pluralistic in their legitimization of their movements. Even though Vlaams Belang was quite similar to the Free choice approach, this was unable to capture the width of the arguments that the secessionist actor would use.

Another conclusion I am able to make based on the second research question is what type of legitimacy seemed to be most important to the actors, I’m referring here to external and internal legitimacy. Baer (2000) and Coggins (2011) argued that the most important legitimacy for secessionist is external legitimacy as a sovereign state needs the recognition of surrounding political communities to be fully independent. For this reason, I expected this to be something that was reflected in the actors, but as my analysis shows all of the actors have a quite mixed and balanced stance on what legitimacy they seek. No actor is clearly favouring one type of legitimacy over the other.

This brings me to another interesting conclusion; in the theory part it was presented that there seems to be a rise of regional populism where regional claims where combined with populist ones. These results show that even though external legitimacy is argued to be most important to actual independence, the actors still argue in a balanced way. They are often trying to make their own people see that the current elite is illegitimate and gain internal legitimacy. In all these three cases the secessionist actors are pressing the fact that they are subjected to regional injustice by the current national elite be it economically or through other means i.e. as stated by Barrio et.al (2018) regional claims are combined with populist claims.

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9. Discussion

So, what has this thesis contributed with? This thesis has contributed with the secessionist actors’ arguments based on their latest published material. How these relate to secessionist theory, but this thesis is also able to show weaknesses in the theory that has been used. This thesis has shown that even though external legitimacy is seen as most important for secessionist according to Baer (2000) and Coggins (2011), these cases haven’t given it more importance. I’ve been able to contribute to claims by Barrio et.al (2018) in that there seems to be a shift or rise in populism as this is applied by secessionist to gain more internal legitimacy by combining regionalist claims with populist ones. But what are the implications of these conclusions?

I’ve found the same theoretical implications as shown by Dalle Mulle & Serrano (2019), the theory on legitimacy in secession is to narrow and does not account for the depth or width of the arguments that actors use. These legitimacy theories miss economic and governance arguments all together. Theory can’t be perfect, that is something to accept especially in such a contextual phenomenon as secession where a wide range of arguments could be used. But economic arguments were in this case common and a big part of these actors’ arguments, but they couldn’t fit inside any of the frameworks of the theory-based legitimacy approaches which to me shows that there is some theorizing work to be done here.

As stated above Baer (2000) and Coggins (2011) thinks that external legitimacy is the most important factor for secessionist if they want to gain independence, but the actors themselves doesn’t favour this type of legitimacy. So, the implications of my findings are that the theory on secession and idea building doesn’t really correlate very well with real-life cases. But why is internal legitimacy equally important if not more important than external legitimacy? Well to start off these actors are political parties so by default they need voters in the area to be a relevant force. Potentially it might be that it is easier to get people to fight for you by appealing to regional problems and pointing out the national elite as the culprit of these problems. If they can make convincing arguments to their followers that the other side is evil or corrupt it is easier to get more loyal followers I would imagine.

Putting my conclusions in a bigger picture together with my research review I’d say that nothing ground-breaking was found in this thesis. I summarized the research review findings with saying that secessionist use a wide array of arguments and indeed that was true for the

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cases I choose as well. Arguments relating to unjust host-nation, economy and nationalism where shown to be most prevalent in the research review. In my cases I also found prevalence for economic and nationalistic arguments but not for unjust host-nations. Instead they focused more on democratic and administrative arguments.

How is the transferability in this thesis? The theoretic approaches I used were only applied to western democracies and at least two of the approaches presupposes that the country, the region of the world or that the secessionist group has some democratic tendencies. Whilst the method, qualitative content analysis, could be transferable on the condition that other secessionist groups provide information in the same way that these cases have. The theory used for my analytical categories perhaps isn’t transferable to all other secessionist groups because all other secessionist groups aren’t in democracies or democratic themselves.

One thing that I’ve tried to note from the beginning of this work is to see where there are knowledge gaps in this field partly because it’s a part of this assignment but also because it interests me. The conclusion that I have reached is that I can’t defined a specific knowledge gap that needs to be fill because there is so much to analyse within secession. One could make discourse analysis on arguments, legal analysis on arguments, analyse to see if economic arguments hold up to scrutiny and so on and so on. The point here is that the knowledge gap is vast because there is such an immense number of viewpoints too look from at this subject. One secessionist actor could surely have 4-5 studies from different departments of science that have all analysed a different aspect of that secessionist actor.

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