Beyond Karbala: the U.S. Army's Approach to Apache Doctrine
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BEYOND KARBALA: THE U.S. ARMY’S APPROACH TO APACHE DOCTRINE Major P.A. Gautron JCSP 39 PCEMI 39 Master of Defence Studies Maîtrise en études de la défense Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs et not represent Department of National Defence or ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce without written permission. papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la of National Defence, 2013 Défense nationale, 2013. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 39 – PCEMI 39 2012 – 2013 MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE BEYOND KARBALA: THE U.S. ARMY’S APPROACH TO APACHE DOCTRINE By Major P.A. Gautron Par le major P.A. Gautron “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College in stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes fulfillment of one of the requirements of the pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au document, and thus contains facts and cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions, which the author alone considered opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriate and correct for the subject. It appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne does not necessarily reflect the policy or the reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou opinion of any agency, including the l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y Government of Canada and the Canadian compris le gouvernement du Canada et le Department of National Defence. This paper ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. may not be released, quoted or copied, Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de except with the express permission of the reproduire cette étude sans la permission Canadian Department of National expresse du ministère de la Défense Defence.” nationale.” Word Count: 16 948 Compte de mots: 16 948 i TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents…………………………………………………………… i Abstract…………………………………………………………………….. iii List of Acronyms…………………………………………………………… iv Introduction………………………………………………………………… 1 Chapter 1 Development of the Apache Capability…………………….. 1 1.1. Introduction…………………………………………………. 6 1.2. Early Helicopter Development……………………................ 7 1.3. Vietnam – Origin of the Attack Helicopter…………………. 8 1.4. Cold War – Rise of Deep Strike…………………………….. 13 1.5. The Gulf War – Apache Success…………………………… 18 1.6. Summary of the Development of Apache Capability…………. 23 Chapter 2 Post-Cold War Challenges………………………………….. 26 2.1. Introduction………………………………………………… . 26 2.2. Deep Strike’s Fall from Grace……………………………… 28 2.3. Kosovo – Task Force Hawk………………………………… 29 2.4. British Army and the Apache Deep Strike Model………….. 34 2.5. Operation Enduring Freedom – Close Combat Attack.......... 36 2.6. Failed Raid at Karbala……………………………………… 40 2.7 Summary of Post-Cold War Challenges……………………. 45 (Continued on next page) ii Table of Contents (Continued) Chapter 3 Apache Doctrinal Adaptation………………………………. 48 3.1. Introduction………………………………………………… . 48 3.2. Stability Operations………………………………………… 49 3.3. Post Karbala Evolution of Doctrine……………………….... 52 3.4. Libya 2011………………………………………………….. 61 3.5. UAV and Manned Unmanned Teaming……………………. 64 3.6. Summary of Apache Doctrinal Adaptation………………… . 67 Conclusion………………………………………………………………….. 69 Bibliography………………………………………………………………… 75 iii ABSTRACT In the last decade the U.S. Army has faced significant criticism of the AH-64 Apache in the deep strike role. This criticism has largely centered on what were widely perceived to be the failure of both Task Force (TF) Hawk during the Kosovo campaign of 1999 and the deep strike raid on the Medina Armored Division near Karbala, Iraq in 2003. The failures of both Task Force Hawk and the raid on Karbala to achieve any meaningful effects, coupled with the significant costs of both missions, lead many to conclude that the Apache capability had become an expensive relic of the Cold War requirement to fight Soviet Armor in Western Europe. As a consequence of these high profile mission failures, both academics and members of the U.S. defence community have called for the U.S. Army to relinquish the deep strike mission profile. As a counterpoint to the criticism of the Apache in the deep strike role, doctrinal adaptation by U.S. Army Aviation during stability operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan has successfully refocused the capability on the close support mission. While the change in mission focus has muted some of the criticism aimed at the capability, the doctrinal adaptation that supported this resurgence did not necessarily signal the U.S. Army’s intent to abandoned operations in depth. Doctrinal adaptation by U.S. Army has deconstructed both the concept of deep close and rear battlespace and linear and non-linear areas of operation. The subsequent adoption of a new paradigm in which battlespace is divided into only contiguous and non-contiguous areas of operations has refocused U.S. Army Aviation on close support while maintaining the ability to conduct a full spectrum of operations including operations in depth in support of formation maneuver. This paper will demonstrate that doctrinal adaptation by the U.S. Army in response to the pragmatic requirements of the battlefield has occurred episodically throughout the history of the U.S Army Attack Helicopter and that based on current doctrine and emerging technologies, the U.S. Army has postured the Apache capability to effectively support operations across the full spectrum of conflict including shaping operation in depth. iv LIST OF ACRONYMS AAC Army Air Corps AAH Advanced Attack Helicopter AH Attack Helicopter AGF Anti Government Forces AUAV Armed Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle ATACMS Advanced Tactical Missile System ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile ATKHB Attack Helicopter Battalion CAS Close Air Support COIN Counter Insurgency Operations CCA Close Combat Attack DTTP Doctrine Tactics, Techniques and Procedures FCR Fire Control Radar HPT High Pay off Target HVT High Value Target IA Interdiction Attack ISR Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance JAAT Joint Air Attack Team JAM Jaish al-Mahdi FCR Fire Control Radar FEBA Forward Edge of the Battle Area FLOT Forward Line of Own Troops FM Field Manual (Continued on next page) v List of Acronyms (Continued) MANPADS Man Portable Air Defense System MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System MUM-T Manned Unmanned Teaming NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEO Non-combatant Evacuation Operations NOE Nape of the Earth NVA North Vietnamese Army OEF Operation Enduring Freedom OIF Operation Iraq Freedom ROE Rules of Engagement ROI Rules of Interactions RPAS Remotely Piloted Aircraft System RFI Radio Frequency Interferometer SASO Stability and Security Operations SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defense SA Situational Awareness TF Task Force TIC Troops in Contact UAV Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle UAS Unmanned Aircraft System X-FLOT Crossing Forward Line of Own Troops 1 INTRODUCTION In the last decade the U.S. Army has faced significant criticism of the AH-64 Apache in the deep strike role. This criticism has largely centered on what were widely perceived to be the failure of both Task Force (TF) Hawk during the Kosovo campaign of 1999 and the deep strike raid on the Medina Armored Division near Karbala, Iraq in 2003. The failures of both Task Force Hawk and the raid on Karbala to achieve any meaningful effects, coupled with the significant costs of both missions, lead many to conclude that the Apache capability had become an expensive relic of the Cold War requirement to fight Soviet Armor in Western Europe. As a consequence of these high profile mission failures, both academics and members of the U.S. defence community have called for the U.S. Army to relinquish the deep strike mission profile. As a counterpoint to the criticism of the Apache in the deep strike role, doctrinal adaptation by U.S. Army Aviation during stability operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan has successfully refocused the capability on the close support mission. While the change in mission focus has muted some of the criticism aimed at the capability, the doctrinal adaptation that supported this resurgence did not necessarily signal the U.S. Army’s intent to abandoned operations in depth. This paper will demonstrate that doctrinal adaptation by the U.S. Army in response to the pragmatic requirements of the battlefield has occurred episodically throughout the history of the U.S Army Attack Helicopter and that based on current doctrine and emerging technologies, the U.S. Army has postured the Apache capability to effectively support operations across the full spectrum of conflict including shaping operation in depth. 2 In order to explain the context in which both the Apache and associated doctrine has developed, this paper will briefly examine the birth of the nascent operational helicopter during World War II through to the evolution of a helicopter capable of providing fires during the Vietnam War. The development of the attack helicopter (AH) in response to the requirements of both the Vietnam War and Cold War and the interrelationship between these requirements will be explored. The progression of a fully articulated anti-armor helicopter capability designed to address the mismatch of Soviet and Western armor in Europe will be discussed in order to set the stage for an explanation of the development of the Apache and associated doctrine of deep strike battalion sized anti-armor operations. Apache success in the Gulf War will be discussed in order to highlight a number of key assumptions that lead to the post-Cold War configuration of AH doctrine. This paper will demonstrate that U.S.