Enged the Existing International Order As Well

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Enged the Existing International Order As Well HOW RUSSIAN IMPERIAL HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF UNDER PUTIN GIORGI JGHARKAVA 125 EXPERT OPINION ÓÀØÀÒÈÅÄËÏÓ ÓÔÒÀÔÄÂÉÉÓÀ ÃÀ ÓÀÄÒÈÀÛÏÒÉÓÏ ÖÒÈÉÄÒÈÏÁÀÈÀ ÊÅËÄÅÉÓ ×ÏÍÃÉ GEORGIAN FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES EXPERT OPINION GIORGI JGHARKAVA HOW RUSSIAN IMPERIAL HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF UNDER PUTIN 125 2019 The publication is made possible with the support of the US Embassy in Georgia. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the author and do not in any way represent the views of the Embassy. Technical Editor: Artem Melik-Nubarov All rights reserved and belong to Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, including electronic and mechanical, without the prior written permission of the publisher. The opinions and conclusions expressed are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. Copyright © 2019 Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies ISSN 1512-4835 ISBN 978-9941-8-1852-3 It goes without saying that Putin managed to reassert Russia as a hegemonic power once again after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In order to do so, he needed to implement crucial political reforms inside the country.1 However, reforms from a conventional point of view would indicate modernization whereas in the case of Putin’s Russia, it was more about reestablishing order which leads us to the pre-history of the Russian traditional approach to governance. Putin’s choice had historical reasoning behind it and the ways in which this approach was implemented very much resembled the past experience. In order for Russia to reemerge as a hegemon again, Putin challenged the existing international order as well. Taking it as a Western imposed arrangement, Putin has been trying to reassert Russia as not only the legal successor of the Soviet Union but a political successor, too. In order to answer the common question about “why Russia rejects the West?,” one needs to look at this from a historical approach. It is hard to argue if Boris Yeltsin could make the list of Russia’s rulers like Peter the Great, Catherina II and Alexander II - the list of leaders who attempted to modernize the country - but Yeltsin did try to transform the country in terms of democracy and liberal economy. As Padma Desai argues “in only a few years, Russia’s firms were no longer state- owned, its people could own property and firms, its government relied on taxes for collecting revenue and its currency was traded on foreign exchange markets.”2 However, a lesser control of the country which had been centrally governed in indoctrinated terms led to lesser order. The transition from communism to a free market economy did not prove to be easy either. The rise of oligarchs and organized crime gave way to corruption. According to Giorgi Badridze, “the total corruption of his [Yeltsin’s] government and the reign of organized crime and poverty […] discredited democracy in the eyes of ordinary Russians for generations.”3 The above-described reality of the late 1990s Russia offered fertile soil for Putin in order to reject “Western chaos” and get back to Russian basics – order. The main idea of Putin’s policy turn takes us back to one of the main dilemmas about the threat of the West imposing its values on Russia. According to traditional Russian imperial political thought, in order to avoid Western influence (which implies instability), Russia should be governed in an absolutist way. One of the precursors of this approach could be considered Ivan the Terrible who articulated his narrative in his exchange with Andrey Kurbsky. The narrative was strengthened during 3 the years of Smuta (1598-1613, due to the Polish interference). One could argue that even the modernizing tsars of Russia (again, Peter the Great, Catherina II, Alexander II) ruled in absolutist manners. What is more, during Catherina II’s rule, absolutism was pushed even further – in order to deter the ideas of the French Revolution. It would be fair to say that the best articulation of the idea of Russian absolutism belongs to poet, Nikolay Karamzin, author of History of the Russian State, one of the most popular history books in Russia. Karamzin’s main idea is that the Westernization of the state usually harms its integrity. An adjustment of Karamzin’s idea to today’s world would be the following: liberty/freedom can lead to chaos while order in the Russian context can preserve integrity and stability.4 The same reasoning was used (and sometimes still is) by those who do not really favor Peter the Great’s reforms in 18th century Russia. According to this narrative, Peter’s Westernizing reforms led to disparity and separated the elite from the peasants, thus taking away the main advantage which Russia had over Europe. The idea of post-Soviet Russia is that during Yeltsin’s tenure the country experienced another attempt of Westernization and it surely led to chaos in many senses. This very reality gave Putin the legitimacy to reintroduce the old version of the centralized system with different contemporary means: a polarized political spectrum, strong intelligence services, controlled media and the strong presence of the state in the private sector. In order to implement his grand policy, Putin used a lot of different means. One of the interesting approaches which Putin opted for leads us again to Russian historical experience - Oprichnina. Oprichnina is the name for Ivan the Terrible’s policy against the external and internal enemies of Russia. Oprichnina lasted for eight years, from 1565 to 1572. The main idea of the policy was directed against the feudals (known as boyars) in the Tsardom of Russia. The objective of Oprichnina was to neutralize different centers of power in order to enhance the absolutist rule of the Tsar. The terrorizing policy was carried out in the forms of executions and oppressions. The executors of Oprichnina were called Oprichniks who were playing the role of the state police for the Tsar. The Oprichniks played a crucial role in Ivan’s success – after gaining full internal control, the Tsar managed to expand Russia further. At the beginning of his tenure in the 21th century, Putin had the same old objective as Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century – to establish his absolutist rule. In order to reach his goal, Putin used Russian “best practice” – the state police. The state police or security service had 4 also always been an integral pillar of Soviet governance. Starting from the Cheka and continued with the NKVD and eventually transformed into the KGB – it was a main political mean for setting order in the Union. The institution was used for party purges, oppressing religious entities, identifying party enemies, etc. The KGB was transposed to the post-Soviet Russian Federation too, with a new name – the FSB. The traditional role of the intelligence services was not undermined during Putin’s tenure. On the contrary, the role was enriched in forms of incorporating the increasing numbers of former KGB personnel to public institutions. According to the study conducted by Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, the number of former KGB personnel in the governmental sector in Russia is surprisingly high.5 The study argues that Putin’s regime is characterized by “the increasing proportion of the elite that claimed a military or security background.”6 According to authors, Putin tried to gather his trustees around him7 - since the president of Russia was a former member of the KGB personnel and the Director of the FSB his trustees naturally came from the same group. Likewise, the Tsardom under Ivan the Terrible and the Soviet Union, Putin kept the tradition of governing by the police rule and made a new elite out of the special services. Another field where Putin has been challenging the West is international politics. Again, likewise with anti-Western internal politics, Putin’s foreign policy can also be deconstructed in historical terms. When it comes to the reassertion of Russia in contemporary international politics, Putin has been chiefly building his foreign policy on the basis of the Soviet Union’s legacy. Vladimir Putin in his speech in front of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation described the fall of the Soviet Union as a geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.8 The essence of the message is that the Soviet Union used to be a Russian project with a particular ideological context – hence, the dissolving of it deprived Russia of the countries which it controlled and made it vulnerable to external threats. The idea of every staggered power to go forward is to initially come back to a previously held position. In the context of Russia, it would translate to reasserting its influence on its near neighborhood – which would be at least the post-Soviet states. In this context, another idea which has been dominating Russian political discourse is Western betrayal. The notions of the ungratefulness and the selfishness of the West among the Russian political elites can be traced back in earlier times, too. Firstly, the narrative was based on the Mongol invasions which were held back by the 5 Russians (hence, the Mongols could not reach further into Europe). The discourse was later complemented with elements such as saving Europe from Napoleon and eventually from Nazi Germany. However, this time the West’s betrayal was based on an alleged promise to Russia that NATO would not expand further (supposedly the promise was given by George H.W. Bush to Mikhail Gorbachev). Although there is no actual proof of the promise, the later expansion of NATO did stimulate the relevancy of the narrative that the West went for the offensive.
Recommended publications
  • Yalta Conference
    Yalta Conference 1 The Conference All three leaders were attempting to establish an agenda for governing post-war Europe. They wanted to keep peace between post-world war countries. On the Eastern Front, the front line at the end of December 1943 re- mained in the Soviet Union but, by August 1944, So- viet forces were inside Poland and parts of Romania as part of their drive west.[1] By the time of the Conference, Red Army Marshal Georgy Zhukov's forces were 65 km (40 mi) from Berlin. Stalin’s position at the conference was one which he felt was so strong that he could dic- tate terms. According to U.S. delegation member and future Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, "[i]t was not a question of what we would let the Russians do, but what Yalta Conference in February 1945 with (from left to right) we could get the Russians to do.”[2] Moreover, Roosevelt Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin. Also hoped for a commitment from Stalin to participate in the present are Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov (far left); United Nations. Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, RN, Marshal of the RAF Sir Charles Portal, RAF, Premier Stalin, insisting that his doctors opposed any (standing behind Churchill); General George C. Marshall, Chief long trips, rejected Roosevelt’s suggestion to meet at the of Staff of the United States Army, and Fleet Admiral William Mediterranean.[3] He offered instead to meet at the Black D. Leahy, USN, (standing behind Roosevelt).
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise and Fall of the 5/42 Regiment of Evzones: a Study on National Resistance and Civil War in Greece 1941-1944
    The Rise and Fall of the 5/42 Regiment of Evzones: A Study on National Resistance and Civil War in Greece 1941-1944 ARGYRIOS MAMARELIS Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy The European Institute London School of Economics and Political Science 2003 i UMI Number: U613346 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U613346 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 9995 / 0/ -hoZ2 d X Abstract This thesis addresses a neglected dimension of Greece under German and Italian occupation and on the eve of civil war. Its contribution to the historiography of the period stems from the fact that it constitutes the first academic study of the third largest resistance organisation in Greece, the 5/42 regiment of evzones. The study of this national resistance organisation can thus extend our knowledge of the Greek resistance effort, the political relations between the main resistance groups, the conditions that led to the civil war and the domestic relevance of British policies.
    [Show full text]
  • Kingdom of Livonia”
    Acta Historica Tallinnensia, 2009, 14, 31–61 doi: 10.3176/hist.2009.1.02 PRELUDE TO THE BIRTH OF THE “KINGDOM OF LIVONIA” Andres ADAMSON Institute of History, Tallinn University, 6 Rüütli St., 10130 Tallinn, Estonia; [email protected] The article provides an overview of the international situation and the situation in Livonia prior to the emergence of the project of the vassal kingdom of Livonia, and the developments and motives that pushed Duke Magnus of Holstein to overt collaboration with Tsar Ivan the Terrible. It is shown that the creation of the vassal kingdom was predominantly determined by external circumstances, primarily by Muscovy’s hope to achieve a division of Poland-Lithuania between Russia and the Habsburgs, following a normalisation of relations with the Holy Roman Empire and the imperial court after the eclipse of the male line of the Jagiellon dynasty, without relinquishing its conquests and claims of domination in Livonia. The material is presented in the form of a narrative, in view of the failure of previous historiography to effectively focus on the timeline of the events under discussion, the relevant documents, and the general background. By the end of 1568, the Livonian War had come to a standstill. In fact, at that time the Baltic Sea region was a scene of not one but three closely intertwined wars. The Northern Seven Years’ War (1563–1570) between Sweden and the coalition of Denmark, Poland-Lithuania and Lübeck had been virtually brought to a halt by the complete exhaustion and economic bankruptcy of the principal adversaries – Denmark and Sweden.
    [Show full text]
  • Travel Guide
    TRAVEL GUIDE Traces of the COLD WAR PERIOD The Countries around THE BALTIC SEA Johannes Bach Rasmussen 1 Traces of the Cold War Period: Military Installations and Towns, Prisons, Partisan Bunkers Travel Guide. Traces of the Cold War Period The Countries around the Baltic Sea TemaNord 2010:574 © Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen 2010 ISBN 978-92-893-2121-1 Print: Arco Grafisk A/S, Skive Layout: Eva Ahnoff, Morten Kjærgaard Maps and drawings: Arne Erik Larsen Copies: 1500 Printed on environmentally friendly paper. This publication can be ordered on www.norden.org/order. Other Nordic publications are available at www.norden.org/ publications Printed in Denmark T R 8 Y 1 K 6 S 1- AG NR. 54 The book is produced in cooperation between Øhavsmuseet and The Baltic Initiative and Network. Øhavsmuseet (The Archipelago Museum) Department Langelands Museum Jens Winthers Vej 12, 5900 Rudkøbing, Denmark. Phone: +45 63 51 63 00 E-mail: [email protected] The Baltic Initiative and Network Att. Johannes Bach Rasmussen Møllegade 20, 2200 Copenhagen N, Denmark. Phone: +45 35 36 05 59. Mobile: +45 30 25 05 59 E-mail: [email protected] Top: The Museum of the Barricades of 1991, Riga, Latvia. From the Days of the Barricades in 1991 when people in the newly independent country tried to defend key institutions from attack from Soviet military and security forces. Middle: The Anna Akhmatova Museum, St. Petersburg, Russia. Handwritten bark book with Akhmatova’s lyrics. Made by a GULAG prisoner, wife of an executed “enemy of the people”. Bottom: The Museum of Genocide Victims, Vilnius, Lithuania.
    [Show full text]
  • Information to Users
    INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 UNNEGOTIATED TRANSITION . SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME: THE PROCESSES OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN GREECE DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Neovi M, Karakatsanis, B.A., M.A.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rearguard of Freedom: the John Birch Society and the Development
    The Rearguard of Freedom: The John Birch Society and the Development of Modern Conservatism in the United States, 1958-1968 by Bart Verhoeven, MA (English, American Studies), BA (English and Italian Languages) Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Arts July 2015 Abstract This thesis aims to investigate the role of the anti-communist John Birch Society within the greater American conservative field. More specifically, it focuses on the period from the Society's inception in 1958 to the beginning of its relative decline in significance, which can be situated after the first election of Richard M. Nixon as president in 1968. The main focus of the thesis lies on challenging more traditional classifications of the JBS as an extremist outcast divorced from the American political mainstream, and argues that through their innovative organizational methods, national presence, and capacity to link up a variety of domestic and international affairs to an overarching conspiratorial narrative, the Birchers were able to tap into a new and powerful force of largely white suburban conservatives and contribute significantly to the growth and development of the post-war New Right. For this purpose, the research interrogates the established scholarship and draws upon key primary source material, including official publications, internal communications and the private correspondence of founder and chairman Robert Welch as well as other prominent members. Acknowledgments The process of writing a PhD dissertation seems none too dissimilar from a loving marriage. It is a continuous and emotionally taxing struggle that leaves the individual's ego in constant peril, subjugates mind and soul to an incessant interplay between intense passion and grinding routine, and in most cases should not drag on for over four years.
    [Show full text]
  • The Greek Civil War in the Czech Press Konstantinos Tsivos
    The Greek Civil War in the Czech Press Konstantinos Tsivos | Neograeca Bohemica | 15 | 2015 | 65–87 | Abstract The Greek Civil War was the fi rst open confrontation in Europe between the Eastern block and the West aft er the Second World War. This confrontation did not only develop on the battlefront, but also on the propaganda front, inside Greece and abroad. Czechoslovakia was actively involved in the Greek Civil War, mainly by sending military equipment to Greece and by providing asylum to approximately 4,000 child refugees. The Greek Civil War was prominent in the Czechoslovakian press throughout its duration (1946–1949). This article, based on material from the Prague National Archives, analyses the events of the Civil War as presented by Czech newspapers. In addition, this presentation refl ects on the confrontation between the political forces that formed the National Front government of Czechoslovakia, before and aft er February 1948. There is also special reference to the activities of the propaganda machine that the Greek Communist Party had established in Prague at this time. Keywords Greek Civil War, Czechoslovak Press, Cold War, February 1948, polarization, propaganda 67 | Th e Greek Civil War in the Czech Press In March 1945 the Czechoslovak National Front government was formed. All the Czech and Slovak anti-fascist parties were equally represented in it, each by three ministers. The Communist Party, which had the leading role in form- ing the government liberation program, took control of three ministries that played a crucial part in the orientation of the country: these were the minis- tries of Interior, Agriculture and Information.
    [Show full text]
  • STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 Key Developments in Global Affairs
    Center for Security Studies STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 Key Developments in Global Affairs Editors: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor: Andreas Wenger Authors: Daniel Keohane, Christian Nünlist, Jack Thompson, Martin Zapfe CSS ETH Zurich STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland This publication covers events up to 3 March 2017. © 2017, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich Images © by Reuters ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-58-5 CHAPTER 1 Contested History: Rebuilding Trust in European Security Christian Nünlist Different interpretations of the recent past still cast a negative shadow on the relations between Russia and the West. The Ukraine Crisis was a symptom, but not the deeper cause of Russia’s disengagement from the European peace order of 1990. While the current situation is far from a “new Cold War”, reconstructing contested history and debating missed opportu- nities are needed today to create trust and overcome European insecurity. US President George H. W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev shake hands at the end of a press conference in Moscow on 31 July 1991. 11 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 History is back. Recent developments speak of a “new Cold War” and recom- have made clear that ghosts from the mend a return to a strategy of contain- past still cast a negative shadow on ment, echoing the ghost of US Cold the current political dialogue between War diplomat George F.
    [Show full text]
  • The University of Arizona
    Erskine Caldwell, Margaret Bourke- White, and the Popular Front (Moscow 1941) Item Type text; Electronic Dissertation Authors Caldwell, Jay E. Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 05/10/2021 10:56:28 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/316913 ERSKINE CALDWELL, MARGARET BOURKE-WHITE, AND THE POPULAR FRONT (MOSCOW 1941) by Jay E. Caldwell __________________________ Copyright © Jay E. Caldwell 2014 A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 2014 THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA GRADUATE COLLEGE As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Jay E. Caldwell, titled “Erskine Caldwell, Margaret Bourke-White, and the Popular Front (Moscow 1941),” and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ________________________________________________ Date: 11 February 2014 Dissertation Director: Jerrold E. Hogle _______________________________________________________________________ Date: 11 February 2014 Daniel F. Cooper Alarcon _______________________________________________________________________ Date: 11 February 2014 Jennifer L. Jenkins _______________________________________________________________________ Date: 11 February 2014 Robert L. McDonald _______________________________________________________________________ Date: 11 February 2014 Charles W. Scruggs Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate’s submission of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College.
    [Show full text]
  • Merchants of War: Mercenaries, Economy, and Society in the Late Sixteenth-Century Baltic
    Merchants of War: Mercenaries, Economy, and Society in the Late Sixteenth-Century Baltic by Joseph Thomas Chatto Sproule A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of History University of Toronto © Copyright by Joseph Thomas Chatto Sproule 2019 Merchants of War: Mercenaries, Economy, and Society in the Late Sixteenth-Century Baltic Joseph Thomas Chatto Sproule Doctor of Philosophy Department of History University of Toronto 2019 Abstract The polities of the sixteenth-century Baltic competed and cooperated with one another and with local power groups in fluctuating patterns of rivalry and expedient partnership. Mercenarism thrived in this context, as early modern governments were seldom equipped with the fiscal and logistical tools or the domestic military resources needed to wholly meet the escalating challenges of warfare, while mercenaries themselves were drawn to a chaotic environment that afforded opportunities for monetary gain and promotion into the still- coalescing political elites of the region’s emerging powers. This study sits, like the mercenary himself, at the intersection of the military, the economic, the social, and the political. Broadly, it is an analysis of mercenaries in Livonian and Swedish service during the so-called Livonian War of 1558 to 1583. Mercenaries are examined as agents of the polities for whom they fought and as actors with goals of their own, ambiguously positioned figures whose outsider status and relative independence presented both opportunities and challenges as they navigated the shifting networks of conflict and allegiance that characterized their fractious world. The aims of this study are threefold. The military efficacy of Western and Central European professional soldiers is assessed in an Eastern ii European context, problematizing the notion of Western military superiority in a time of alleged military revolution.
    [Show full text]
  • British Perfidy in Greece: a Story Worth Remembering - Ed Vulliamy and Helena Smith
    British perfidy in Greece: a story worth remembering - Ed Vulliamy and Helena Smith An account of the time in 1944 when the British Army, at war with Germany switched their allegiance, opening fire upon – and arming Greek collaborators with the Nazis to fire upon – a civilian crowd in Syntagma Square. “I can still see it very clearly, I have not forgotten,” says Titos Patrikios; “the police firing on the crowd from the roof of the parliament at the top of Syntagma Square in Athens. The young men and women lying in pools of blood, everyone rushing down the stairs in total shock, total panic.” And then came the defining moment: the recklessness of jeunesse, the passion of belief in a justice burning bright: “I jumped up on the fountain in the middle of the square, the one that is still there, and I began to shout: “Comrades, don’t disperse! Victory will be ours! Don’t leave. The time has come. We will win!” “I was,” he says now, “absolutely sure, profoundly sure, that we were going to win”. But there was no winning that day; just as there was no pretending that what had happened would not change the history of a country that, liberated from Adolf Hitler’s Reich barely six weeks earlier, was now surging headlong towards bloody civil war. Seventy years may have passed but time has not diminished how Titos Patrikios felt that day. Nor has it dented his recollection of events. Even now, at 86, when he “laughs at and with myself that I have reached such an age”, the poet can remember, scene-for-scene, shot for shot, what happened on the central square of Greek political life, on the morning of December 3, 1944.
    [Show full text]
  • Report Toward the Great Ocean-6 Pdf 2.59 MB
    Valdai Discussion Club Report Toward the Great Ocean – 6: People, History, Ideology, Education Rediscovering the Identity valdaiclub.com #valdaiclub September 2018 This publication and other Valdai reports are available on http://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/ The views and opinions expressed in this Reports are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Valdai Discussion Club, unless explicitly stated otherwise. ISBN 978-5-906757-77-7 © The Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai Discussion Club, 2018 42 Bolshaya Tatarskaya st., Moscow, 115184, Russia This report was prepared in an unusual way, unlike previous reports. Rather than being written in Moscow, it is the result of close collaboration with academics and public fi gures in the Russian Far East. Its leading contributor, Prof. Leonid Blyakher of Pacifi c National University, wrote it jointly with his Moscow colleagues. The draft version of the report underwent discussion according to the rules of the situational analysis by orientalists, international relations experts, and philosophers from a number of cities in Siberia and the Russian Far East, as well as St. Petersburg and Moscow. Authors made liberal use of their ideas and critical comments and regard them as co-authors. The Valdai Discussion Club and the authors of this report are grateful to the participants of the situational analysis for their substantial contribution to the research: Boris Beloborodov Alexander Druzhinin Associate professor at the Department of Research assistant at the Center for
    [Show full text]