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Center for Security Studies

STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 Key Developments in Global Affairs

Editors: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe

Series Editor: Andreas Wenger Authors: Daniel Keohane, Christian Nünlist, Jack Thompson, Martin Zapfe

CSS ETH Zurich STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends

Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger

Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland

This publication covers events up to 3 March 2017.

© 2017, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich

Images © by Reuters

ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-58-5 CHAPTER 1 Contested History: Rebuilding Trust in European Security Christian Nünlist

Different interpretations of the recent past still cast a negative shadow on the relations between Russia and the West. The Crisis was a symptom, but not the deeper cause of Russia’s disengagement from the European peace order of 1990. While the current situation is far from a “new ”, reconstructing contested history and debating missed opportu- nities are needed today to create trust and overcome European insecurity.

US President George H. W. Bush and Soviet leader shake hands at the end of a press conference in Moscow on 31 July 1991.

11 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

History is back. Recent developments speak of a “new Cold War” and recom- have made clear that ghosts from the mend a return to a strategy of contain- past still cast a negative shadow on ment, echoing the ghost of US Cold the current political dialogue between War diplomat George F. Kennan.2 Russia and the West. In addition to Others even invoke the image of a tensions arising from the present, the “Second Versailles”,3 criticizing the al- fact that Russia and the West subscribe leged humiliation of Russia after 1991 to diametrically opposed narratives on and the absence of a “new Marshall the evolution of the European security Plan” for Russia in the 1990s.4 On the order after 1990 prevents a common other hand, commentators complain view on the causes and origins of to- about Russia’s neo-imperialist appear- day’s problems. These different inter- ance, the claim for special treatment, pretations of the recent past continue the references to its unique civilization, to shape the world today. and exclusive spheres of influence.5

The Ukraine Crisis was a symptom, These are not purely academic discus- but not the deeper cause of Russia’s sions. The Western narrative is also disengagement from the European contested by the sitting Russian lead- peace order of 1990. The collapse of er. President Vladimir Putin has often a common perspective on European complained that the West promised security originated much earlier. The Moscow it would not accept any of current confrontation between Russia the former members and the political West and the broken into NATO in 1990. He therefore re- European security architecture must gards NATO’s expansion as a Western be understood as a crisis foretold. In betrayal. 2014, the “cold peace” between Russia and the West after 1989 turned into a Radically different interpretations of “little Cold War”.1 the steps that led from cooperation to confrontation complicate a return This burden of the past bedevils the back to dialogue, trust, and coopera- current debate about Russia’s role in tion. A high-level Panel of Eminent Europe. Historical analogies are often Persons (PEP) launched by Switzer- invoked in discussions over the nature land, Serbia, and identified of the current state of affairs, or in try- these divergent narratives about the ing to explain how we arrived from the recent past as “a main problem of to- high hopes of 1989 at the hostilities of day’s relations between Russia and the today. On the one hand, some observers West”. Its report “Back to Diplomacy”

12 CONTESTED HISTORY

(2015) called for a research project for the descent from cooperation to that would systematically analyze the confrontation. Rather, the newly different views on the history of Euro- available documentary evidence al- pean security since 1990 and examine lows us to better understand ana- how and why they developed.6 lytically the motives, behavior, and actions on all sides and to provide In this sense, the present chapter aims a more nuanced version with more to make a modest contribution to- clarity of what really happened be- wards placing post-1989 events in hind closed doors from the fall of the their proper historical context – with to the disintegration of a view to the confrontation of our day the . and possible future ways out of the current stalemate. Naturally, the first This chapter is structured around pre- drafts of history are always based on senting three central arguments: First, little empirical evidence. As long as the often-heard historical analogy, official documents are classified (usu- suggesting that the current situation ally 25 – 30 years), studies have to rely should be labeled a “new cold war” is largely on memoirs and testimonies of scrutinized, but ultimately rejected as eyewitnesses. This first phase of his- an inaccurate metaphor which is also toriography often promotes a politi- misleading for shaping current politi- cized history, with former policymak- cal decisions in the West. Second, I ar- ers wanting to put their actions in the gue that the crux of Russia’s sense of best possible light. Recently, however, marginalization within the European archives in the US, Russia, Germany, peace order lies in the failure to im- and elsewhere have been opened, al- plement the Cold War settlement and lowing solid historiographical inter- the common vision of a pan-Europe- pretations of what was going on be- an, inclusive security architecture – hind the scenes in the early post-Cold and in misunderstandings about what War period. Contemporary historians had been agreed upon in the high-lev- can now provide valuable corrections el diplomatic talks between the West to early myth-making (whether inten- and the Soviet Union that ended the tional or unintentional) by adding new Cold War in 1990. Third, I argue empirical, archival evidence and a well- that any renewed effort to deal con- founded historical view to the debate.7 structively with the other side needs to start with understanding previous The aim of this chapter is not to place missed opportunities and learning blame on one side as the main culprit from the past. The deeper causes of

13 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

Russia’s current disengagement from the roots of the current confrontation Europe must be discussed and clari- between Russia and the West. The fied. By exposing myths, reconstruct- missed opportunity for a successful ing contested history may contribute integration of Russia into European towards tearing down the currently security structures after 1989 puts poisoned propagandistic echo cham- into perspective the Western nar- bers and creating trust and confidence rative of the end of the Cold War, in the present situation. An open, in- hitherto often portrayed as a success clusive dialogue similar to the historic story. While the enlargement rounds Helsinki process could be a viable way of NATO and the EU have provided out of today’s crisis. security and prosperity to Central and Eastern European countries, the If it was possible to create the basis failure to find an acceptable place for for in Europe in Russia within the European security a cumbersome, multilateral negotia- framework contributed to a new di- tion marathon during the Cold War, viding line in Europe and instability. this should also be possible in the 21st century – despite, or precisely because A more nuanced understanding of the of, the currently difficult conditions. recent past, as advanced in this chap- However, it should also be remem- ter, is in no way meant to justify Rus- bered that the historic Helsinki pro- sia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014. But cess could only be launched ten years it should serve as a reminder that the after the Berlin Wall had been built West and Russia have not yet found a and after West and East had accepted solution to overcome European inse- their respective spheres of influences curity and have yet to realize the vi- in Europe. Today, patience is needed sion of indivisible European security. for setting up a similar multilateral Or in the words of Italian philosopher exercise within the framework of the George Santayana (1863 – 1952): Organization for Security and Coop- “Those who cannot remember the eration in Europe (OSCE). Disputed past are condemned to repeat it.”8 territories and overlapping spheres of influence make the situation today A New Cold War? Characteristics much more complicate. of the Current Confrontation Russia’s land grab of Crimea and its It is opportune now to critically review (initially denied) military interven- the terms of the Cold War settlement tion in Eastern Ukraine brought back in Europe in 1990 to better understand memories of the original East-West

14 CONTESTED HISTORY

Cold War versus Today Population in millions USSR Russia USA 1984 274.9 236.4

2016 143.4 324.1

Real GDP per capita in USD

1984 6,700 30,816

2015 11,039 51,054

Defense spending in billion USD

1988 246 293

2015 66 596

Nuclear arsenal

1984 36,825 23,459

2017 7,000 6,800

Sources: The CIA World Factbook 1984; Worldometers; Allen, Robert C., “The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Economy”, in: The Cana- dian Journal of Economics 34, no. 4 (2001); fred.stlouisfed.org; SIPRI; ourworldindata.org; Arms Control Association; multpl.com

15 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 confrontation in Europe. Russian US-Russian confrontation. Today’s Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev said international system is radically dif- in February 2016 in Munich: “We ferent from Cold War bipolarity and have slid into a time of a new Cold rather marked by a transition from War.”9 The cognitive recourse to the unipolarity under Western dominance term “Cold War” has been experienc- towards multipolarity and the emer- ing a revival since 2014,10 but in fact gence of new power centers in Asia the label had already been used in the and the global South. TheUS and media and scholarly publications in Western Europe will remain influen- the aftermath of both the Russian- tial, but they will lose power relative Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006 and the to the emerging powers like China or Russian-Georgian War in 2008.11 India. Russia will also play a more ac- tive role in Europe than in the 1990s The historical analogy, however, is in such a multipolar global order, but misleading when it comes to the char- it is currently stagnating economically. acterization of the current relationship between Russia and the West. Ulti- In contrast to the Cold War era, Eu- mately, it is also dangerous, because it rope is no longer the center of US at- implies that the West should respond tention – US grand strategy is increas- to the alleged “Cold War II” with well- ingly geared towards a strategic rivalry tried strategies of the past. The original with rising China. Russia is a regional Cold War was a global confrontation spoiler, but no longer constitutes the between two ideologically antagonis- principal global challenge for the tic power centers in Washington and US and its allies as the Soviet Union Moscow. The Communist Soviet Un- did during the Cold War. Russia is ion and the democratic, liberal West no longer the hegemon of a strong dominated the international system military pact. In fact, and Ka- between 1945 and 1990 and divided zakhstan even drew the lesson from the world into two camps. None of the Ukraine Crisis to strengthen their three key attributes – orderly camps, independence from Moscow. Increas- ideological contest, global ingly, these two countries see them- character – apply to the current con- selves not so much as partners of Rus- frontation between Russia and the sia, but rather as mediators between West. the West and Moscow.12 Finally, the current confrontation is more limited First, the current global order is no in geographical scope and mainly fo- longer exclusively shaped by the cused on Greater Europe.

16 CONTESTED HISTORY

Second, today, there is no risk of a re- China.16 In the last few years, Russia’s make of an ideological competitive economy has suffered primarily as a global struggle between result of falling global oil prizes as well and – modern Russia is as due to Western sanctions.17 Rus- capitalist as well. Russia is not leading sia’s significant overall inferiority to a global anti-Western camp, although the US and the West is compensated Putin poses as the leader of a Slavic- by its possession of nuclear weapons Orthodox world and likes to speak of and its veto power in the UN Security a war of the “West against the rest.”13 Council, as well as economic strength He sees in Russia the true heritage of in individual sectors such as gas, oil, a conservative European civilization coal, and timber.18 shaped by Christianity.14 Third, many parts of the globe are In addition, Russia is significantly not affected by the current Russian- weaker than the Soviet Union was. Western confrontation. China, India, Compared with the territory and Brazil and others have so far refused population of the Soviet Union, Rus- to take sides in the conflict between sia “lost” 5.2 million square kilom- Russia and the West. After 2014, eters and about 140 million inhabit- Russia and the US continued to coop- ants after 1991. Russia’s armed forces erate when their interests overlap, for were reduced to about a fifth of the example in the of ’s Red Army’s strength during the Cold nuclear program, the stabilization of War. Russia’s defense budget (2017: , the Middle East peace USD 45.15 bn) is over 17 times process, the fight against jihadist ter- smaller than the US defense budget rorism, or climate change. However, (USD 773.5 bn).15 In addition, Rus- the poisoned relations between the sia’s economic power also contradicts US and Russia have already negatively talk of a renaissance of a superpower impacted the international communi- rivalry – even if the US always had a ty’s response to the Syria War. clear upper hand in economy during the Cold War. But the gap widened Structurally, therefore, the current dramatically after 1991. Currently, conflict differs greatly from the Cold Russia is only the 12th-largest econom- War – and might be described rather ic power (USD 1.3 bn), even behind as a regional contest over European Canada and South Korea, while the integration models rather than a glob- (USD 18 bn) is still the al ideological and military rivalry. In world’s top economic power, ahead of contrast to the original Cold War, the

17 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 current conflict between Russia and and the West are becoming more and the West is not yet predominantly mil- more similar to the Cold War era. In itarized, despite Moscow’s occasional the dominant Russian and Western nuclear saber-rattling. It is true that narratives, the other side is blamed for Russia is implementing a multi-year everything and all, and is held respon- modernization program of its armed sible for the erosion of the post-Cold forces, and the West has strengthened War peace order in Europe. A solu- NATO’s eastern flank military. But tion to the conflict is therefore only neither side has the military capacity considered to be possible if the other any longer for launching a major mili- side capitulates or radically changes tary offensive in Europe (on the scale its behavior.21 of Cold War scenarios for a war in ), and no new military The common vision of an undivided, has yet been observed. Mili- inclusive, and cooperative Europe tary scenarios mostly focus on the Bal- seems to be an aspiration from a very tic States, where Russian forces could distant past. However, the renewed embarrass Western forces should Pu- security dilemma actually already tin decide to ignore NATO’s Article 5 originated in the aftermath of the end commitment – which would be a very of the Cold War, when Russia and risky gamble.19 the West failed to implement a mu- tually acceptable European security The current situation can be best char- arrangement. acterized as a fragile and uneasy mix of conflictual elements (dominant The “Western Betrayal of 1990” since 2014), confrontational elements Revisited (not yet dominant), and cooperative The current crisis in European securi- elements (occasional, isolated events). ty needs to be contextualized within a Isolated cooperative events, however, complex historical process that started are only transactional and no longer at the end of the Cold War. In recent transformative. Currently, both sides studies revisiting the descent from co- favor deterrence over cooperative se- operation into confrontation, the fol- curity, and most formal communica- lowing scholarly consensus is slowly tion channels were closed in 2014.20 emerging, based on newly available archival evidence: Both sides are re- And yet, as Robert Legvold has point- sponsible for the fact that the com- ed out in his book “Return to Cold mon strategic vision of 1990 could War”, the behavioral patterns of Russia not be implemented in a sustainable

18 CONTESTED HISTORY matter.22 Mistakes were made on both Russian revanchism in Europe. The sides, but some of the more fatal long- West also felt an obligation to sup- term developments largely resulted port their transition into full-fledged from unintended side-effects of crucial members of the Western security in- decisions that seemed to make perfect stitutions. After the dissolution of the sense for the respective side at the time USSR and the Warsaw Pact, a danger- – for example, the Western desire to ous security vacuum had opened up expand the area of in Europe. and market economy to the East to increase international stability. Not The US and the West still supported unlike to the similarly complex his- Russia in its reform efforts towards a torical process of the transition from Western market economy and democ- World War II cooperation to Cold racy. But there was “no new Marshall War antagonism between the US and Plan”.23 Western support for Russia the Soviet Union after 1945, misper- in the 1990s was “too little, too late”, ceptions, misunderstandings, and self- even if Russia was allowed to join the delusions on both sides complicated G7 in 1997, thus transforming this Russian-Western relations after 1989. exclusive club of the world’s leading industrial powers into the G8.24 In On the one hand, doubts emerged addition, Russia also claimed a spe- early on in the West as to whether Bo- cial status in its relations with NATO ris Yeltsin’s desire to transform Russia and the EU compared to other post- into a democratic market economy Communist states, due to its size, ge- that was integrated into the West ographical extension, nuclear super- could really be fulfilled. Western power standing, and its permanent hopes were dashed by Yeltsin’s military UN Security Council seat. The case assault on the Russian parliament in for Russian membership in NATO or October 1993 and Moscow’s brutal the EU was occasionally put forward, action in the Chechen War in 1994. but Russia was always considered too The parliamentary elections of De- powerful, too special, and too differ- cember 1993 gave evidence of rather ent to be successfully integrated into massive domestic resistance in Russia Western organizations.25 to Yeltsin’s pro-Western reform course. As a result, NATO security guarantees On the other hand, the US could not moved up on the political agenda of resist the temptation to take advan- Central and East European countries, tage of the Soviet Union’s strategic as a safeguard against possible future withdrawal from Central and Eastern

19 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

Europe after 1989. The essence of A close reading of the 1990 state- Russian grievances against the West ments by US President George H. W. is the alleged “betrayal of 1990”: At Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, that time, as Putin underlines to this and German Foreign Minister Hans- day,26 the US had promised in high- Dietrich Genscher, based on recently level negotiations leading to German declassified governmental documents, reunification not to expandNATO however, suggests that NATO’s later further to the East – “not an inch”, in Eastern enlargement indeed “broke” US Secretary of State James Baker’s fa- at least the cooperative spirit of the mous words addressed to Gorbachev Cold War settlement. in February 1990. Therefore, Russia regards NATO’s Eastern enlargement In 1990, Bush and Baker promised as a Western betrayal. The minutes of Gorbachev they would transform the respective bilateral meetings be- NATO from a military alliance into tween US, West German, and Soviet a political organization and reform leaders can now be accessed in archives the CSCE into the main European in Washington, Berlin, and Moscow. security forum. Genscher also prom- They reveal that the West did not of- ised to transform the CSCE into the fer a clear, legally binding promise to dominant security alliance in Europe, Moscow not to expand NATO east- replacing the Cold War military al- wards. These talks focused on German liances NATO and the Warsaw Pact. reunification and the territory of the In 1990, Genscher (and his advi- German Democratic Republic (GDR) sors such as Dieter Kastrup, head of in 1990. A future NATO membership the Political Department, and State of , Hungary, or Czechoslova- Secretary Jürgen Sudhoff) earnestly kia was not discussed. A dissolution of wished to establish a new security the Warsaw Pact was still unthinkable order in Europe, modeled after the at that time. CSCE. To honor Western partnership with Moscow, Genscher was even Later Russian criticism about a “bro- ready to dissolve NATO together ken promise” is thus based on a myth with the Warsaw Pact. His “prom- and not on verifiable documentary ev- ises” to his Soviet counterparts were idence. Non-expansion promises were therefore meant sincerely. Neverthe- only given with regard to the GDR, less, Genscher could speak neither which as part of reunified Germany for Chancellor nor for would become a member of NATO, NATO, let alone for Warsaw, , but with a special military status.27 or Budapest.28

20 CONTESTED HISTORY

French President François Mitterrand organization based on the CSCE. For on 31 December 1989 also offered Washington, the exclusive NATO East Europeans a “Confederation for (without Russian membership and Europe” under ’s auspices as an without a Russian veto) should be alternative to eventually joining the preserved as the most important in- European Community. Mitterrand’s strument for stability and peace in project intended to include the Soviet Europe – and for continued US dom- Union, but to exclude the US.29 In inance in European security. addition, Eastern European countries initially also pointed to the CSCE as Already in the summer of 1990, the the preferred structural design for the possibility of a NATO membership future European security architec- of Eastern European states began to ture. In February 1990, for example, play a role in internal planning and Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel debates in Washington. Bush’s advi- called for all foreign troops to leave sors emphasized that strengthening Eastern Europe and favored the re- the CSCE at the expense of NATO placement of NATO and the Warsaw was out of the question. In July 1990, Pact with a pan-European organiza- Baker bluntly warned Bush that “the tion along CSCE lines. At that time, real risk to NATO is CSCE”.31 Rather Poland also thought a new European than to create a truly new interna- security structure would supersede tional order, the US instead preferred both Cold War alliances – and agreed to perpetuate Cold War institutions with Gorbachev’s plea that the Warsaw that it already dominated.32 Pact should be preserved, since it was needed, in Poland’s view, to guarantee In its diplomacy with Moscow, Wash- its borders.30 ington still assured Gorbachev that the West would limit NATO’s influ- The US, however, resisted these calls ence and instead strengthen the pan- for pan-Europeanism by Gorbachev, European CSCE. In several public Genscher, Mitterrand, Havel, and speeches and in meetings with their others. The Bush administration in- Soviet counterparts, US leaders prom- ternally decided in early 1990 that the ised that European security would new security order in Europe should become more integrative and more not be completely different from the cooperative – and NATO less impor- Cold War order. The future security tant. Talking to Soviet Foreign Min- architecture should not be centered ister Eduard Shevardnadze on 5 May around a new, pan-European security 1990, for example, Baker promised

21 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 to build a “new legitimate European After the collapse of the Soviet Union structure – one that would be inclu- and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact sive, not exclusive.”33 and after war had broken out in the Balkans, the planned transformation From a Western perspective, hopes of NATO from a military pact into a were still high in the early 1990s that political organization was put on hold. Russia could be integrated into the Fear of a return of Russian emerging European security system. and expansionism led Eastern Euro- Russia was no longer treated as an ad- peans in particular to push for NATO versary. At NATO summits in London enlargement. NATO was preserved as (1990) and Rome (1991), the vision an insurance policy against a future of Russia’s future integration into the resurgent Russia. The administration Euro-Atlantic security community of US President Bill Clinton worked was still upheld. Under the label “new hard to have Russia support the West- world order”, the new cooperative ern military intervention and peace- spirit between the former Cold War keeping mission in Bosnia (IFOR) in rivals was successfully implemented in 1995 – 6. Russia joined UN sanctions the against Saddam Hussein against Serbia and Montenegro and in 1991. agreed to suspend the OSCE member- ship of these two countries in 1993. In The informal Cold War settlement the spirit of cooperative security, the reached in 1990, however, did not Kremlin also gave a green light to the last very long. Actually, it collapsed OSCE’s deployment of an assistance already one year later. Instead of the group to Chechnya in 1995.35 Soviet Union, the West was now fac- ing a much weaker Russia. After the NATO’s eastern enlargement was disintegration of the USSR, Moscow sold to Russia as a win-win solution, was no longer an equal partner in the since extending NATO membership debates about shaping the future secu- to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech rity order in Europe.34 In the 1990s, Republic would also increase stabil- the US no longer perceived Russia as ity on Russia’s western border. NATO an ideological or military rival. The expansion, desired by Central and emerging European security architec- Eastern European governments and ture became US-dominated and was strongly supported by the US and largely based on the status quo with Germany, was compensated with a NATO as its central pillar (as desired special NATO-Russia partnership for- by Bush’s advisors in mid-1990). mat – the NATO-Russia Permanent

22 CONTESTED HISTORY

Go East: Stages of NATO’s Enlargement, 1952 – 2016

Canada

USA

Member since: 1949 1952 1955 (incl. territory of former GDR, added in 1990) 1982 1999 2004 2009 Signed but not ratified: 2016 NATO aspirant countries

Iceland

Norway

Estonia

Latvia Denmark

Netherlands Poland Belgium Germany Lux. Czech Rep. Slovakia France Hungary

Slovenia Italy Croatia Portugal Bosnia & Georgia Herz.

Spain Mont.

Mac. Albania Turkey Greece

Source: NATO

23 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

Joint Council (PJC), established in towards NATO membership for some 1997 – as well as with a Western invi- in 1994. As a recently declassified tation for Russia to join the exclusive memorandum of conversation makes G7 club (1997). clear, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher promised Yeltsin on 23 From a Russian perspective, NATO October 1993 in Moscow that noth- expansion led to a European security ing would be done to exclude Russia architecture that was increasingly built from “full participation in the future against, rather than with, Russia – de- security of Europe”. Presenting US spite Western good intentions to sta- plans for a NATO Partnership for bilize Mitteleuropa and despite the es- Peace (PfP), Christopher emphasized tablishment of privileged partnership that PfP would be open for all for- formats between NATO and Russia. mer Soviet and Warsaw Pact states, With each further NATO expansion including Russia, and “there would round, the 1989 vision of a “Europe be no effort to exclude anyone and whole and free” (George H.W. Bush there would be no step taken at this in Mainz) contrasted with the iso- time to push anyone ahead of others”. lated position of Russia. Moscow had When a relieved Yeltsin learned that a voice in European security, but no the US would only offer partnership veto. While Central and Eastern Eu- rather than membership or an asso- ropean states joined NATO and the ciate status to Central and Eastern EU, Russia was left outside of these European countries, he told Christo- security institutions. Europe appeared pher that this was a “really great idea” to be divided again between East and and a “brilliant stroke” that would re- West, with a new demarcation line move all the tension that had existed moved further to the east than the in Russia regarding NATO’s response original – now running to Central and Eastern European alli- from Narva in the Baltic to Mariupol ance aspirations.36 on the Sea of Azov. When Clinton told Yeltsin in Sep- Increasingly, the Kremlin perceived tember 1994 that NATO would soon the evolution of European security as expand, Yeltsin felt betrayed, having zero-sum-game rather than a coopera- been given the promise of “partner- tive undertaking. Russia felt particu- ship for all, not NATO for some” by larly betrayed by the Clinton adminis- Christopher less than a year earlier. tration’s move from a policy of NATO He used a CSCE meeting in Buda- partnership for all (including Russia) pest in December 1994 to warn his

24 CONTESTED HISTORY

Western colleagues that Europe was international contact group with the “risking encumbering itself with a cold US, France, Britain, Germany, and peace”. Emphasizing that Russia and Italy trying to mediate a diplomatic the West were no longer adversaries, solution. Moscow accused the West but partners, he emphasized that the of breaching the Helsinki principles plans to expand NATO were contrary of territorial integrity and inviolabil- to the logic not to create new divi- ity of borders.40 sions, but promote European unity.37 After “color revolutions” in Georgia Throughout the 1990s, Russia ad- (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyr- vanced proposals and ideas for a gyzstan (2005) and under the im- transformation of the CSCE/OSCE pression of George W. Bush’s “free- into a regional security organization dom agenda”, in a speech delivered that was legally incorporated, with a in early 2007 at the Munich Security legally binding charter, and a Europe- Forum, Putin stigmatized the OSCE an Security Council based on the UN as a “vulgar instrument” of the West, model. From the Russian perspec- aiming at advancing Western inter- tive, weakening NATO and the US ests at Russia’s expense. He meant the role in Europe was part of the think- OSCE’s election monitoring missions ing.38 These Russian reform propos- and field missions to verify compli- als were all rejected by the West and ance with human and civil right disappointed Russian hopes that the commitments. These missions were CSCE/OSCE would become the cent- increasingly criticized by Moscow as er of the European security system as an unacceptable interference in in- promised by the West in 1990. The ternal affairs and as violations of state emergence of the weakly-institution- sovereignty.41 The Arab rebellions alized OSCE in 1995 also dashed Rus- and Western military intervention in sian hopes for a new pan-European Libya in 2011 marked another step, security organization.39 in Russian eyes, from cooperation to confrontation. The worldviews of Russia and the West visibly collided in the spring of Then again, Putin’s anti-Western 1999. Yeltsin strongly criticized the volte-face in 2011 – 2 can maybe best unilateral military action of the West – be explained in terms of domestic without a UN Security Council man- policy. Renewed emphasis on Russia’s date – against Serbia in the Kosovo identity as a Eurasian, Slavic, Ortho- War. Russia had been a member of an dox power was an important element

25 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 in Putin’s presidential election cam- the end, the key question of Russia’s paign.42 To avoid mass-protests and a role in European security was avoided regime change in Moscow, Putin ad- and not seriously discussed. By 2008, vanced anti-Western rhetoric for a ral- Russia had given up hope of playing ly-around-the-flag effect and to deflect an active, equal role in Euro-Atlantic domestic attention from structural Security. Putin began looking for economic problems in Russia. Thus, an alternative project where Russia many Russia experts are convinced would be a regional hegemon in the that Putin’s fear of a “color revolution” post-Soviet space.45 Since 2014, the in Moscow, inspired by the “Maidan issue of how to deal with Russia has protests” in Kiyv, was an important returned to the political agendas of motive for intervening militarily in the West in a most dramatic fashion. Ukraine.43 The strengthening of au- thoritarian rule in Russia under Putin, Rebuilding Trust: Thoughts on the in contrast to the values of the Charter Future of European Security of Paris, contributed to the mounting A look back can help us to under- crisis between Russia and the West. stand Russia’s present and future role in Europe. The history of the Hel- In retrospect, the window of oppor- sinki Process and the Conference on tunity for truly cooperative security Security and Cooperation in Europe between Russia and West had already (CSCE, 1972 – 94) encourages hope closed by early 1992, after the Soviet that a new transformation from con- Union had collapsed. European se- flict to cooperation might again be curity now became US-dominated possible in a peaceful way and in an and NATO-centered. The Cold War inclusive, multilateral diplomatic set- settlement of 1990 and the vision of ting – just as it was in the 1970s and an inclusive, pan-European new secu- 1980s, when East and West, despite rity architecture, as promised by the their intense strategic rivalry, were George H.W. Bush administration able to conduct a pragmatic dialogue and German Foreign Minister Hans- to reach consensus on the most im- Dietrich Genscher, never materialized. portant security issues in Europe. No The relations between Russia and the side benefits from a permanent state West deteriorated in stages, and tense of confrontation. Communication relations were interrupted by at least is important for de-escalation, and four “resets” and fresh starts to im- dialogue is an important prerequisite prove cooperation.44 But these “hon- for détente. It needs to be empha- eymoons” never lasted long – and in sized that dialogue is not the same as

26 CONTESTED HISTORY

From Cooperation to Confrontation American opinions of Russia and Russian opinions of the United States, 1989 – 2016

% Fall of the BerlinCollapse Wall of the USSR Dayton Agreement Kosovo War 9/11 Invasion ofOrange Iraq Revolution Russo-Georgian WarArab Spring Invasion of the 100 in Ukraine Crimea 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2011 1991 2015 2013 2012 1997 1995 2014 2016 1993 1992 2010 2001 1994 1998 1989 1996 1999 1990 2007 2005 2003 2002 2004 2008 2006 2009 2000 Favorable view of the United States by Russians Favorable view of Russia by Americans

Sources: Gallup; Levada-Center , and that listening to and of mutual mistrust between Russia trying to understand the other side’s and the West need to be discussed grievances is not the same as taking and clarified. It is essential to under- them at face value. stand the precise reasons for Russia’s long-standing adversarial relationship Much like the CSCE in the Cold War, with the West. The Helsinki Process the OSCE today seems to be the best- – an open, inclusive dialogue among suited forum for such a sustainable, all parties of a conflict – is an interest- permanent exploration of practical ing model for slowly rebuilding trust ways for carefully managing the cur- that was destroyed in the last two dec- rent volatile confrontation with Rus- ades and for returning to a more con- sia, while defending firmly Western structive Western-Russian relation- interests and values.46 The deep causes ship. Such a reconciliation process,

27 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 however, is lengthy and requires pa- again and the initial euphoria in Mos- tience. Instead of ignoring or deriding cow with Trump’s victory is already alternative narratives, they should be evaporating.48 actively tackled and changed. Insights into mistakes made in the past and Achieving consensus among OSCE missed opportunities might help us re- participating States on a new nego- discover a mutually acceptable vision tiation process aimed at formulating for peaceful coexistence in Europe. a “Helsinki II” is currently also unre- alistic. After all, the principles of the At the same time, supposedly attractive 1975 Helsinki Final Act have been alternatives to multilateral, coopera- negotiated between East and West tive security such as a “Yalta II” agree- and are thus universal, not Western ment must be unmasked as mislead- principles. The “Helsinki Decalogue” ing historical analogies. A “Yalta II”, has served its purpose well for over a new great-power agreement like the four decades. In this respect, the Pan- one reached on Crimea in 1945 be- el of Eminent Persons (PEP) report of tween the “Big Three” (, 2015 – employing an apt metaphor Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston – argues that the rules of traffic don’t Churchill) to define and recognize have to be changed just because one boundaries and spheres of interest, driver ran a red light.49 seems an impractical notion. Anyone seriously entertaining the historical However, there is a need to discuss analogy would soon remember that a the different views as to how these new Yalta pact first requires another principles (e.g., non-use of force or world war, and that a new Yalta pact self-determination) must be inter- would be diametrically opposed to the preted in the current situation. Their 1975 Helsinki principles and the spirit interpretation as substantiated in the of the OSCE.47 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe has been overtaken by events. An in- Recently, the idea that US President formal dialogue in the OSCE could Donald Trump might be open to the aim at drafting substantiation of the idea of a “Big Two” deal with Putin – Helsinki principles for the 21st centu- much to the consternation of Amer- ry, a “Paris II”, so to speak, to be for- ica’s (Eastern) European allies, who mally codified again at future OSCE fear an arrangement concluded with- summit, maybe in 2020, celebrating out their participation and at their the 45th anniversary of the Helsinki expense – was put into perspective Final Act.

28 CONTESTED HISTORY

In the meantime, cooperation between in December 2016 at the OSCE the West and Russia will be limited to Ministerial Council with the “man- selective, interest-based, transactional date of Hamburg”.53 Now, in 2017, cooperation. A return to broader co- the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship operation is dependent on a consensus is tasked with organizing an infor- in the Ukraine Crisis and a face-saving mal, structured dialogue on differ- exit strategy for Russia from Ukraine. ent threat perceptions and security This seems to be unrealistic for the issues in Europe. Another innovative time being, because neither the newly possible step for a return to dialogue appointed US President Trump nor was recently proposed by the Panel of Russian President Putin before his re- Eminent Persons (PEP), a wise men election in 2018 can afford to be ac- committee tasked by the OSCE Tro i - cused of weakness or appeasement.50 ka of Switzerland, Serbia, and Ger- The fact that the West insists on penal- many in 2015 to draw lessons from izing Russia for annexing Crimea and the Ukraine Crisis for the OSCE and breaking international law and the European security. In its follow-up Helsinki principles is understandable. report, the PEP in December 2016 However, in the long run, it is more suggested that the OSCE Strategy to important that the Russian annexa- Address Threats to Security and Sta- tion of Crimea (similarly to Kosovo’s bility from 2003 be updated to reflect unilateral declaration of independence the changes in international security – despite all important differences be- since then.54 tween the two cases)51 are regarded as disputed exceptions to the still gener- The aims of such a multilateral dia- ally accepted principle that borders in logue should include a better under- Europe can only be changed by mu- standing of the past grievances of the tual consent of the motherland and other side, i.e., the different views and the regional population, and only interpretations of events in Europe peacefully.52 It is better to have two in- since 1990 and the different views on dividual cases of disputed exceptions the causes of the breakdown of trust. than a generally ignored and violated In learning from the past, a return to core principle. the vision of a commonly shared se- curity community in Europe also re- A first trust-building step on the quires tackling the difficult question lengthy road back from conflict to of Russia’s role in European security. cooperation beyond interest-based A sustainable and stable peaceful Eu- transactional cooperation was made ropean security order should be based

29 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 on the original rationale and spirit of the 19th and 20th century.56 Patiently the Cold War settlement, namely that bringing back Russia to the rules- indivisible security in Europe needs based Helsinki order will not be pos- to be built together with Russia – sible overnight – and it might in fact and not against Russia. In retrospect, only be realized after the Putin and moving up the timetable for exclu- the Trump years. sive NATO enlargement (which upset Russia) rather than sticking to the in- Respectful discussion of facts while clusive Partnership for Peace strategy maintaining divergent opinions has (which was welcomed in Moscow in become more difficult in the world 1993) might not have been the wisest today. In an increasingly fragmented, strategy of the West in the mid-1990s polarized, and politicized media land- – as historians like George F. Kennan scape, facts seem to matter less and cautioned at the time. In 1996 – 7, less, as fake news, the use of trolls, or the 92-year old Kennan warned that automated social media bots prolifer- NATO’s expansion into former Soviet ate. It may seem naïve to hope that territory was the “most fateful error scholarly discourse over the recent of American policy in the entire post- past will contribute to overcoming cold-war era” and a “strategic blunder grievances over the evolution of Eu- of potentially epic proportions”.55 ropean security after 1990. However, particularly to avoid slipping into a History can be a guide towards a “post-truth” world influenced by “al- richer understanding of past policy ternative facts”, European societies decisions; but it should not serve as need to invest in education and media an excuse for Putin’s illegal military literacy.57 A historical understanding intervention in Ukraine in 2014. Rus- of Western policy after 1989, based sia needs to recognize that the notion on available and valuable archival of spheres of influence, demarcated sources, is also highly relevant for to end any further NATO enlarge- Western relations with Russia today ment into the former Soviet space and – to counter harmful propaganda and (semi-)autocratic regimes, contradicts hostile rhetoric on both sides with fundamental, universally accepted realistic judgment, based on a sound ideas of sovereignty, equality, and the understanding of empirical historical freedom of states to choose their alli- facts. ances. Great-power politics and Yalta deals are ghosts from the past that The history of the Helsinki Pro- should remain in history books about cess impressively demonstrates that

30 CONTESTED HISTORY

positive change is possible in the long 5 See e.g. Anne Applebaum, “The Myth of Russian Humiliation”, in: The Washington Post, run, if dialogue with rivals and inclu- 17.10.2014; Michael McFaul, “The Myth of sive, multilateral diplomacy are kept Putin’s Strategic Genius”, in: The New York alive also in times of crisis and tension. Times, 23.10.2015. In addition, Western governments and 6 Panel of Eminent Persons, Back to Diplomacy societies need to be more self-confi- (Vienna: OSCE, 2015), 2. dent in the superiority of their liberal, 7 See e.g. Frédéric Bozo et al., “On the Politics of History, the Making of Deals, and the Way the rules-based international model over Old Becomes the New”, in: Fréderic Bozo et al. illiberal alternatives that envisage a (eds.), : A Multinational History (London: Routledge, 2016), 1 – 11, return to the concert of great powers. here at 1ff. If the past is indeed the prologue of 8 George Santayana, The Life of Reason: Reason the future, this is the most important in Common Sense (New York: Scribner’s Sons, lesson today’s policymakers should 1905), 284. draw from the complicated history of 9 Henry Meyer et al., Russia’s Medvedev: We are how the Cold War was overcome in a in ‘a New Cold War, in: Bloomberg Business, peaceful way. 13.02.2016. 10 See Dmitri Trenin, “Welcome to Cold War II”, in: Foreign Policy, 04.03.2014; “The New Cold War”, in: The Guardian, 19.11.2014; Robert Legvold, Return to Cold War (Cambridge: Pol- 1 Richard Sakwa, “Reflections on Post-Cold War icy, 2016). Trenin later changed his mind and Order”, in: Thomas Frear and Lukasz Kulesa now emphasizes that he does not find the Cold (eds.), Competing Western and Russian Narratives War analogy very useful. See Dmitri Trenin, on the European Order: Is there Common Ground? Should We Fear Russia? (Cambridge: Polity, (London/Moscow: ELN/RIAC, 2016). 2016), 2.

2 See e.g. Alexander J. Motyl, “The Sources of 11 See “Putin’s Cold War: Using Russian En- Russian Conduct: The New Case for Contain- ergy as a Political Weapon”, in: Der Spiegel, ment”, in: Foreign Affairs Blog, 16.11.2014; 09.01.2006; Edward Lucas, The New Cold War Matthew Rojansky, “George Kennan Is Still (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). the Russia Expert America Needs”, in: Foreign Policy Blog, 22.12.2016; Stephen Kotkin, “What 12 Pal Dunay, “The Future in the Past: Lessons would Kennan do?”, in: Princeton Alumni Week- from Ukraine for the Future”, in: Samuel Goda ly, 02.03.2016. et. al. (eds.), International Crisis Management (Amsterdam: IOS, 2016), 162 – 172. 3 Sergey Karaganov, “Time to End the Cold War in Europe”, in: Russia in Global Affairs, 13 See Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The West and 28.04.2014. For a critical discussion, see the Rest (London: Allen Lane, 2011). Patrick Nopens, “Beyond Russia’s ‘Versailles Syndrome’”, in: Egmont Security Policy Brief, 14 Andrew Monaghan, “A New Cold War?”, 25.11.2014. Chatham House Research Paper, 05.2015, 5f.

4 Dmitry Suslov, The Russian Perception of the Post-Cold War Era and Relations with the West, Lecture given at Harriman Institute, Columbia University, 09.11.2016.

31 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

15 “U.S. Military Budget: Components, Chal- 25 Andrey Kortunov, “Russia and the West: What lenges, Growth”, in: The Balance, 26.10.2016. Does ‘Equality’ Mean?”, in: Andris Spruds and However, the GDP share of defense in Russia Diana Potjomkina (eds.), Coping with Complex- (budget 2017: 3.3 percent) is comparable with ity in the Euro-Atlantic Community and Beyond the situation in the US. See “Russian military (Riga: LIIA, 2016), 83 – 90, here at 85f. spending cut significantly”, in: Russia & India Report, 02.11.2016. 26 Vladimir Putin, Address by President of the Rus- sian Federation, 18.03.2014; Vladimir Putin, 16 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion 04.10.2016. Club, 14.10.2014.

17 World Bank, Russia Economic Report 36, 27 Mark Kramer, “The Myth of a No-NATO-En- 09.11.2016. largement Pledge to Russia”, in: Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2009), 39 – 61. 18 Globally, Russia commands over 45 percent of gas reserves, 23 percent of coal reserves, and 28 Kristina Spohr, “Precluded or Precedent-set- 13 percent of oil reserves. Quoted in Levgold, ting? The NATO Enlargement Question in the Return to Cold War, 5. Triangular Bonn-Washington-Moscow Diplo- macy of 1990/1991 and Beyond”, in: Journal 19 David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, of Cold War Studies 14, no. 4 (2012), 4 – 54. “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern In the German political system, the Federal Flank”, in: RAND Research Report no. 1253 Chancellor has the power to determine policy (2016). In all of the invasion scenarios used in guidelines (“Richtlinienkompetenz”), including war gaming the defense of the Baltics, Russian on foreign policy. forces reached Tallinn and Riga within 60 hours, leaving NATO with only bad options. The study 29 Liana Fix, European Security and the End of recommends increasing NATO forces by up to the Cold War: Gorbachev’s Common European seven brigades. Home Concept and its Perception in the West (unpublished manuscript, London School of 20 Wolfgang Zellner et al., European Security: Chal- Economics, 2012), 24. lenges at the Societal Level (Vienna: OSCE, 2016), 18f. See also Dmitri Trenin, The Ukrainian Crisis 30 Vojtech Mastny, “Germany’s Unification, Its and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry (Mos- Eastern Neighbors, and European Security”, in: cow: Carnegie, 2014), 3. Frédéric Bozo et al. (eds.), German Reuni- fication: A Multinational History (London: 21 Legvold, Return to Cold War, 28ff. Routledge, 2016), 202 – 226, here at 210 – 213.

22 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The 31 Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Deal or No Unravelling of the Cold War Settlement”, in: Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Survival 51, no. 6 (2009 – 10), 39 – 62; Samuel Offer to Limit NATO Expansion”, in: Interna- Charap and Jeremy Shapiro, “How to Avoid tional Security 40, no. 4 (2016), 7 – 44 and 31. a New Cold War”, in: Current History 113, Similarly, Bush warned Kohl on 24 February no. 765 (2014), 265 – 271; Levgold, Return to 1990 that if the CSCE would replace NATO, Cold War, 6; Andrew C. Kuchins, Elevation and “we will have a real problem”. Quoted in Mary Calibration (CGI, December 2016). This view is Elise Sarotte, “‘His East European Allies Say also shared by former political leaders and senior They Want to Be in NATO’: U.S. Foreign Pol- officials including Mikhail Gorbachev, Robert icy, German Reunification, and NATO’s Role Gates, and Henry Kissinger. in European Security, 1989 – 90”, in: Frédéric Bozo et al. (eds.), German Reunification: A Mul- 23 Angela E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: tinational History (London: Routledge, 2016), U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First 69 – 87 and 81. Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 11.

24 Kuchins, Elevation and Calibration, 13.

32 CONTESTED HISTORY

32 Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create 43 Hanns Maull,“Die Ukraine-Krise und die Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton: Princeton Zukunft Europäischer Sicherheit”, Lecture, University Press, 2009). For a similar view, see CSS/ETH, 30.06.2015. See also Nicolas Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Bouchet, “Russia’s ‘Militarization’ of Colour Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Revolutions”, in: CSS Policy Perspectives 4, no. 2 Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016), (2016); Dmitry Gorenburg, “Putin Isn’t Chas- 279 – 298. ing After Empire in Ukraine; He Fears a Color Revolution at Home”, in: The Moscow Times, 33 These promises were part of the so-called “Nine 25.09.2014. Assurances” that James Baker delivered to Gorbachev in May 1990 to get Soviet consent 44 As chronicled in Angela Stent’s volume, the to NATO membership of a reunified Germany. first reset was in 1992 between Bush sen. and Shifrinson, Deal or No Deal, 29f. Yeltsin; the second reset (“The Bill and Boris Show”) between Clinton and Yeltsin in 1993; 34 Kuchins, Elevation and Calibration, 13. the third reset between Bush jr. and Putin after 11 September 2001; and the fourth reset 35 James Headley, Russia and the Balkans: Foreign between Obama and Putin in 2009. Periods of Policy from Yeltsin to Putin (London: Hurst, dialogue and partnership always ended in tense 2008). relations and mutual criticism. Stent, Limits of Partnership. 36 James Goldgeier, “Promises Made, Promises Broken? What Yeltsin Was Told About NATO 45 Nopens, Beyond Russia’s ‘Versailles Syndrome’, 3. in 1993 and Why It Matters”, in: War on the Rocks, 12.09.2016. 46 Petri Hakkarainen and Christian Nünlist, “Trust and : The OSCE in 2016”, 37 Ibid. in: CSS Policy Perspectives 4, no. 1 (2016).

38 Elena Kropatcheva, “The Evolution of Russia’s 47 Christian Nünlist, “The OSCE and the Future OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the of European Security”, in: CSS Analysis in Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis”, in: Security Policy, no. 202 (2017). Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23, no. 1 (2015), 6 – 24. On Gorbachev’s vision of 48 , “Putin’s Investment in a “common European home”, see Marie-Pierre Trump Backfires”, in: Kyiv Post, 17.02.2017. Rey, “European is Our Common Home: A Study of Gorbachev’s Diplomatic Concept”, in: 49 PEP, Back to Diplomacy, 5. Cold War History 4, no. 2 (2004), 33 – 65. 50 Matthew Rojansky, “The Geopolitics of 39 Kropatcheva, Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Poli- European Security and Cooperation: The Con- cy, 11. sequences of U.S.-Russia Tension”, in: Security and Human Rights 25 (2014), 169 – 179. 40 Heinz Loquai, “Kosovo: A Missed Opportunity for a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict?”, in: 51 For a discussion of why Kosovo’s declaration of OSCE Yearbook (1999), 79 – 92. independence in 2008 cannot serve as a prec- edent for Russia’s invasion and annexation of 41 Vladimir Putin, “Monopolare Welt ist Crimea in 2014, see, e.g., Christian Weisflog, undemokratisch und gefährlich”, Sputnik “Warum die Krim nicht Kosovo ist”, in: Neue Deutschland, 10.02.2007. On Putin’s “coun- Zürcher Zeitung, 18.11.2014. terrevolutionary obsession”, see Mark Kramer, “Why Russia Intervenes”, in: Carnegie Forum on 52 Rojansky, Geopolitics of European Security, Rebuilding U.S.-Russia Relations, 08.2014. 176.

42 Kuchins, Elevation and Calibration, 19 and 27. 53 OSCE, From Lisbon to Hamburg: Declaration on the Twentieth Anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms Control, 09.12.2016.

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54 Panel of Eminent Persons, Renewing Dialogue on European Security: A Way Forward, 23.11.2016.

55 George F. Kennan, “A Fateful Error”, in: , 05.02.1997; Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoire of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 2002), 220.

56 See Liana Fix, “Time for a Helsinki 2.0?”, in: Intersection, 09.2015.

57 See Munich Security Report 2017 (Munich: MSC, 2017), 42.

34