STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 Key Developments in Global Affairs
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Center for Security Studies STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 Key Developments in Global Affairs Editors: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor: Andreas Wenger Authors: Daniel Keohane, Christian Nünlist, Jack Thompson, Martin Zapfe CSS ETH Zurich STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland This publication covers events up to 3 March 2017. © 2017, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich Images © by Reuters ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-58-5 CHAPTER 1 Contested History: Rebuilding Trust in European Security Christian Nünlist Different interpretations of the recent past still cast a negative shadow on the relations between Russia and the West. The Ukraine Crisis was a symptom, but not the deeper cause of Russia’s disengagement from the European peace order of 1990. While the current situation is far from a “new Cold War”, reconstructing contested history and debating missed opportu- nities are needed today to create trust and overcome European insecurity. US President George H. W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev shake hands at the end of a press conference in Moscow on 31 July 1991. 11 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 History is back. Recent developments speak of a “new Cold War” and recom- have made clear that ghosts from the mend a return to a strategy of contain- past still cast a negative shadow on ment, echoing the ghost of US Cold the current political dialogue between War diplomat George F. Kennan.2 Russia and the West. In addition to Others even invoke the image of a tensions arising from the present, the “Second Versailles”,3 criticizing the al- fact that Russia and the West subscribe leged humiliation of Russia after 1991 to diametrically opposed narratives on and the absence of a “new Marshall the evolution of the European security Plan” for Russia in the 1990s.4 On the order after 1990 prevents a common other hand, commentators complain view on the causes and origins of to- about Russia’s neo-imperialist appear- day’s problems. These different inter- ance, the claim for special treatment, pretations of the recent past continue the references to its unique civilization, to shape the world today. and exclusive spheres of influence.5 The Ukraine Crisis was a symptom, These are not purely academic discus- but not the deeper cause of Russia’s sions. The Western narrative is also disengagement from the European contested by the sitting Russian lead- peace order of 1990. The collapse of er. President Vladimir Putin has often a common perspective on European complained that the West promised security originated much earlier. The Moscow it would not accept any of current confrontation between Russia the former Warsaw Pact members and the political West and the broken into NATO in 1990. He therefore re- European security architecture must gards NATO’s expansion as a Western be understood as a crisis foretold. In betrayal. 2014, the “cold peace” between Russia and the West after 1989 turned into a Radically different interpretations of “little Cold War”.1 the steps that led from cooperation to confrontation complicate a return This burden of the past bedevils the back to dialogue, trust, and coopera- current debate about Russia’s role in tion. A high-level Panel of Eminent Europe. Historical analogies are often Persons (PEP) launched by Switzer- invoked in discussions over the nature land, Serbia, and Germany identified of the current state of affairs, or in try- these divergent narratives about the ing to explain how we arrived from the recent past as “a main problem of to- high hopes of 1989 at the hostilities of day’s relations between Russia and the today. On the one hand, some observers West”. Its report “Back to Diplomacy” 12 CONTESTED HISTORY (2015) called for a research project for the descent from cooperation to that would systematically analyze the confrontation. Rather, the newly different views on the history of Euro- available documentary evidence al- pean security since 1990 and examine lows us to better understand ana- how and why they developed.6 lytically the motives, behavior, and actions on all sides and to provide In this sense, the present chapter aims a more nuanced version with more to make a modest contribution to- clarity of what really happened be- wards placing post-1989 events in hind closed doors from the fall of the their proper historical context – with Berlin Wall to the disintegration of a view to the confrontation of our day the Soviet Union. and possible future ways out of the current stalemate. Naturally, the first This chapter is structured around pre- drafts of history are always based on senting three central arguments: First, little empirical evidence. As long as the often-heard historical analogy, official documents are classified (usu- suggesting that the current situation ally 25 – 30 years), studies have to rely should be labeled a “new cold war” is largely on memoirs and testimonies of scrutinized, but ultimately rejected as eyewitnesses. This first phase of his- an inaccurate metaphor which is also toriography often promotes a politi- misleading for shaping current politi- cized history, with former policymak- cal decisions in the West. Second, I ar- ers wanting to put their actions in the gue that the crux of Russia’s sense of best possible light. Recently, however, marginalization within the European archives in the US, Russia, Germany, peace order lies in the failure to im- and elsewhere have been opened, al- plement the Cold War settlement and lowing solid historiographical inter- the common vision of a pan-Europe- pretations of what was going on be- an, inclusive security architecture – hind the scenes in the early post-Cold and in misunderstandings about what War period. Contemporary historians had been agreed upon in the high-lev- can now provide valuable corrections el diplomatic talks between the West to early myth-making (whether inten- and the Soviet Union that ended the tional or unintentional) by adding new Cold War in 1990. Third, I argue empirical, archival evidence and a well- that any renewed effort to deal con- founded historical view to the debate.7 structively with the other side needs to start with understanding previous The aim of this chapter is not to place missed opportunities and learning blame on one side as the main culprit from the past. The deeper causes of 13 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 Russia’s current disengagement from the roots of the current confrontation Europe must be discussed and clari- between Russia and the West. The fied. By exposing myths, reconstruct- missed opportunity for a successful ing contested history may contribute integration of Russia into European towards tearing down the currently security structures after 1989 puts poisoned propagandistic echo cham- into perspective the Western nar- bers and creating trust and confidence rative of the end of the Cold War, in the present situation. An open, in- hitherto often portrayed as a success clusive dialogue similar to the historic story. While the enlargement rounds Helsinki process could be a viable way of NATO and the EU have provided out of today’s crisis. security and prosperity to Central and Eastern European countries, the If it was possible to create the basis failure to find an acceptable place for for peaceful coexistence in Europe in Russia within the European security a cumbersome, multilateral negotia- framework contributed to a new di- tion marathon during the Cold War, viding line in Europe and instability. this should also be possible in the 21st century – despite, or precisely because A more nuanced understanding of the of, the currently difficult conditions. recent past, as advanced in this chap- However, it should also be remem- ter, is in no way meant to justify Rus- bered that the historic Helsinki pro- sia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014. But cess could only be launched ten years it should serve as a reminder that the after the Berlin Wall had been built West and Russia have not yet found a and after West and East had accepted solution to overcome European inse- their respective spheres of influences curity and have yet to realize the vi- in Europe. Today, patience is needed sion of indivisible European security. for setting up a similar multilateral Or in the words of Italian philosopher exercise within the framework of the George Santayana (1863 – 1952): Organization for Security and Coop- “Those who cannot remember the eration in Europe (OSCE). Disputed past are condemned to repeat it.”8 territories and overlapping spheres of influence make the situation today A New Cold War? Characteristics much more complicate. of the Current Confrontation Russia’s land grab of Crimea and its It is opportune now to critically review (initially denied) military interven- the terms of the Cold War settlement tion in Eastern Ukraine brought back in Europe in 1990 to better understand memories of the original East-West 14 CONTESTED HISTORY Cold War versus Today Population in millions USSR Russia USA 1984 274.9 236.4 2016 143.4 324.1 Real GDP per capita in USD 1984 6,700 30,816 2015 11,039 51,054 Defense spending in billion USD 1988 246 293 2015 66 596 Nuclear arsenal 1984 36,825 23,459 2017 7,000 6,800 Sources: The CIA World Factbook 1984; Worldometers; Allen, Robert C., “The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Economy”, in: The Cana- dian Journal of Economics 34, no. 4 (2001); fred.stlouisfed.org; SIPRI; ourworldindata.org; Arms Control Association; multpl.com 15 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 confrontation in Europe.