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Political Economy Primer Semestre 2009 Profesor: Mariano Tommasi

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Political Economy Primer Semestre 2009 Profesor: Mariano Tommasi Political Economy Primer Semestre 2009 Profesor: Mariano Tommasi Asistente: Laura Trucco Este curso es una introducción a la literatura conocida en inglés como Political Economy (o Modern Political Economy ) que estudia la determinación endógena de las políticas económicas. El campo se encuentra en la intersección entre Economía y Ciencia Política, y utiliza a la Teoría de Juegos como una herramienta clave. El curso va a transitar paralelamente por tres andariveles complementarios: 1) Ejes conceptuales y áreas de aplicación de Political Economy (tales como instituciones, problemas de agencia en política, política fiscal, redistribución) 2) Modelos o building blocks conceptuales (tales como modelos de votación, median voter, bargaining, juegos repetidos, etc) 3) Aplicaciones a políticas específicas en países específicos, especialmente la Argentina y América Latina. Libros de texto Persson and Tabellini (2000) Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy . MIT Press. Mueller, Dennis (2003) Public Choice III . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Libros de referencia Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson (2005) Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy . Cambridge University Press. (AR) Boix, Carles (2003) Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge University Press, New York Dixit, Avinash (1996) The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective . MIT Press. Drazen, Allan (2000) Political Economy in Macroeconomics Princeton University Press. Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001) Special Interest Politics , MIT Press. McCarty and Meirowitz (2007) Political Game Theory , Cambridge. (M&M) Mueller, Dennis (1997) Perspectives on Public Choice. A Handbook . Cambridge University Press. Spiller and Tommasi (2007) The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy in Argentina . Cambridge University Press. Stein, Ernesto, Mariano Tommasi, Pablo T. Spiller and Carlos Scartascini. 2008. Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies, Washington, DC: InterAmerican Development Bank . Weingast, Barry and Donald Wittman (2006) The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press. (HPE) Basic Models of Politics Grossman and Helpman (2001) “Voting and Elections” Chapter 2 in their Special Interest Politics . MIT Press. See also Chapter 1 Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson (2005) “Democratic Politics”, Chapter 4 in Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy . Cambridge University Press. Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2000) Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy , MIT Press, Cambridge (Chapter 3) Dewan, Torun and Kenneth Shepsle (2008) “Review Article: Recent Economic Perspectives on Political Economy, Part I”, British Journal of Political Science , 38: 363- 382. Dixit, Avinash and John Londregan , “The determinants of success of special interest groups in redistributive politics ” Journal of Politics 58 (November 1996): 1132-55. Coate, Stephen and StephenMorris (1995) “On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests,” Journal of Political Economy , 103, 1210-1235. Matsusaka, J (1995) “The Economic Approach to Democracy,” in The New Economics of Human Behavior , edited by M. Tommasi and K. Ierulli, Cambridge University Press. Legislative Bargaining Baron, David and John Ferejohn (1989) “Bargaining in Legislatures”, American Political Science Review , Vol. 83, No. 4, December, 1181-1206. McCarty and Meirowitz (2007) Political Game Theory , Cambridge. Ch. 10 Morelli, M (1999) “Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining” American Political Science Review 93(4). Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2000) Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy , MIT Press, Cambridge (Chapter 7) Principal-Agent Models and Delegation in Politics (Politicians, Voters and Elections ) Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2000) Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy , MIT Press, Cambridge (Chapter 4) Ferejohn, J. (1986) “Incumbent performance and electoral control”, Public Choice No 1, 50, 5-25 M&M, Ch. 11 “Mechanism Design and Agency Theory” Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) “Separation of Powers and Political Accountability” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol 112, No 4 Snyder, J. and M Ting (2008) “Interest Groups and the Electoral Control of Politicans” Journal of Public Economic , 92, 3-4. Besley, T (2007) Principled Agents. The Political Economy of Good Government . Oxford University Press. Besley, T. (2005) “Political Selection” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(3): 43-60. Caselli and Morelli (2004) “Bad Politicians” Journal of Public Economics 88 pp. 759- 782. Hodler, Loertscher and Rohner (2007) “Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage”, mimeo. Diermeier, Daniel; M. Keane and Antonio Merlo (2005) “A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers”, American Economic Review , Vol. 95, No. 1, March, 347- 373. Mattozzi, Andrea, and Antonio Merlo, (2005b). “Mediocracy” Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania Maskin, Erik and Jean Tirole (2004) "The Politician and The Judge: Accountability in Government", American Economic Review , vol. 94, n. 4, September, p. 1034-1054. Fox, Justin and K Shotts (2008) “Delegates or Trustees? A Theory of Political Accountability” Mimeo, Yale. Martinelli, Cesar (2006) “Analisis Economico de la Conducta de los Votantes” Mimeo, ITAM. Mexico. Alesina and Tabellini (2007) “Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task” American Economic Review March: 169-179. Political Institutions and Economic Policy Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico (2001) “The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives”, American Economic Review , Vol. 91, No. 1, March, 225-239. Personn, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2006) “Electoral Systems and Economic Policy”, Chapter 40 in Weingast, Barry and Donald Wittman The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press. Inter-American Development Bank. 2005. The Politics of Policies. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America and the Caribbean 2006 Report. Washington, DC. Available online at: http://www.iadb.org/res/ipes/2006/index.cfm?language=english Stein, Ernesto, Mariano Tommasi, Pablo T. Spiller and Carlos Scartascini. 2008. Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies, Washington, DC: InterAmerican Development Bank, Harvard Rockefeller Center. Tsebelis, George (2002) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work . Princeton University Press Morelli, Massimo and Michele Tertilt (2004) “Policy Stability under Different Electoral Systems” Mimeo. Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi (2008) “Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work?” Working Paper 645, Research Department Inter-American Bank. Primo and Snyder (2008) “Party Strength, the Personal Vote, and Government Spending” Mimeo. MIT. Citizen Candidate Model and Applications Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,” Quarterly Journal of Economics , 85-114. Osborne, M. and Slivinski, A. (1996) “A Model of Political Competition with Citizen- Candidates”, Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol 11, No 1 Grossman and Helpman (2001) Chapter 2, section 2.2.3 “Endogenous Candidates” in their Special Interest Politics . MIT Press. Le Borgne, Eric, and Ben Lockwood (2002) “Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle” IMF working paper 02/48. Poutvaara and Takalo (2007) “Candidate Quality”, International Tax and Public Finance , vol 14, no 1. Morelli, Massimo (2004) “Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems” Review of Economic Studies 71(3): 829-53. Dhillon, Amrita (2003) “Political Parties and Coalition Formation” Warwick Economic Research Paper No 697. Political Business Cycles Paldam (1997) “Political Business Cycles” Chapter 16 in Mueller Perspectives on Public Choice. A Handbook . Cambridge University Press. Franzese and Long Jusko (2006) “Political-Economic Cycles” ch 30 in HPE. Rogoff, K (1990) “Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles” American Economic Review . 80: 21-36. Shi, M. y Svensson, J. (2006) “Political Budget Cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?” Journal of Public Economics . Brender, Adi and Drazen, Allan (2005), "Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies" . Journal of Monetary Economics , Vol. 52, No. 5, pp. 1271- 1295. Ferrereira and Bugarin (2007) “Political Budget Cycles in a Federation: The Effects of Partisan Voluntary Transfers” Mimeo. University of Brazilia. Streb and Saporiti (2003) “Separation of Powers and Political Budget Cycles” CEMA Working Paper 251. Kaplan, S. (2009) “From Spendthrifts To Misers: Globalization And Latin American Politicians” Chapter 2, PhD Dissertation, Yale University. Department of Political Science”. Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2002) “Do electoral cycles differ across political systems?” Mimeo. Fiscal Politics Gradstein, Mark (1999) “Optimal Taxation and Fiscal Constitution”, Journal of Public Economics , Vol. 72, Issue 3, June, 471-485. Besley, T (2007) Principled Agents. The Political Economy of Good Government . Oxford University Press. Chapter 4. Brender, Adi and Drazen, Allan (2008) “How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? – Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries”. American Economic Review , vol 98, 5. Peltzman, S. (1992) “Voters as fiscal conservatives.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol.107(2), pages 327, 361. Jones, Mark, Osvaldo Meloni y Mariano Tommasi (2007)
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