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2004 PIER Pol Econ Participant List 2004 PIER Political Economics Conference Participant List James Alt Scott Ashworth Department of Government Department of Economics Harvard University Princeton University Littauer M-37 130 Corwin Hall Cambridge, MA 02138 Princeton, NJ 08544 Tel: 617 495 2184 Tel: 609-258-2153 Fax: 617 495-0438 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] David Austen-Smith David Baron Department of Managerial Economics & Graduate School of Business Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Stanford University Management, Northwestern University 518 Memorial Way 2001 Sheridan Road Stanford, CA 94305-5015 Evanston, IL 60208-2009 Tel: 650-723-3757 Tel: 847-467-3496 Fax: 650-725-6152 Fax: 847-467-1220 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Marco Battaglini Alessandra Casella Department of Economics Department of Economics Princeton University Columbia University 001 Fisher Hall 420 West 118th Street Princeton, NJ New York, NY 10027 Tel: 609-258-4002 Tel: 212- 854-2459 Fax: 609-258-6419 Fax: 212- 854-8059 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Stephen Coate Arianna Degan Department of Economics Department of Economics 476 Uris Hall University of Quebec at Montreal Cornell University P.O. Box 8888, Downtown Station Ithaca, NY 14853 Montreal, Quebec H3C 3P8 Tel: 607-255-1912 Canada Fax: 607-255-2818 Tel: 514-987-3000 Ext. 2029 Email: [email protected] Fax: 514-987-8494 Email: [email protected] 2004 PIER Political Economics Conference Participant List Daniel Diermeier Avinash Dixit Kellogg School of Management (MEDS) Department of Economics Northwestern University Princeton University 2001 Sheridan Road Princeton, NJ 08544-1021 Evanston, IL 60208 Tel: 609-258-4013 Tel: 847-491-5177 Fax: 609-258-6419 Fax: 847-467-1220 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Allan Drazen Jan Eeckhout The Eitan Berglas School of Economics Department of Economics Tel Aviv University University of Pennsylvania Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 69978 3718 Locust Walk Israel Philadelphia, PA 19104 Tel: 972 3-640-9488 Tel: 215-898-2648 Fax: 972-3-640-9908 Fax: 215-573-2057 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Dennis Epple David Epstein Tepper School of Business Department of Political Science Carnegie Mellon University Columbia University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 420 West 118th Street Tel (412) 268-1536 New York, NY 10027 Email: [email protected] Tel: 212-854-7566 Fax: 360-323-6974 Email: [email protected] Hulya Eraslan Hanming Fang Wharton School, Dept. of Finance Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania Yale University 3620 Locust Walk P. O. Box 208264 Philadelphia, PA 19104 New Haven, CT 06520-8264 Tel: 215-898-9424 Tel: 203-432-3547 Fax: 215-898-6200 Fax: 203-432-6323 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] 2004 PIER Political Economics Conference Participant List Raquel Fernandez Jesús Fernández-Villaverde Department of Economics Department of Economics New York University University of Pennsylvania 269 Mercer Street 3718 Locust Walk New York, NY 10003 Philadelphia, PA 19104 Tel: 212-998-8908 Tel: 215-898-1504 Fax: 212-995-4186 Fax: 215-573-2057 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Jeff Frieden Dino Gerardi Department of Government Department of Economics Harvard University Yale University 1033 Massachusetts Avenue 30 Hillhouse Ave Cambridge, MA 02138 New Haven, CT 06520-8281 Tel: 617-496-2386 Tel: 203-432-6519 Fax: 617-495-8292 Fax: 203-432-6167 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Gene Grossman Keith Krehbiel Department of Economics Graduate School of Business 300 Fisher Hall Stanford University Princeton University 518 Memorial Way Princeton, NJ 08544 Stanford, CA 94305 Tel: 609-258-4823 Tel: 650-723-2855 Fax: 609-258-1374 Fax: 650-725-7570 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Roger Lagunoff Department of Economics Georgetown University 580 Intercultural Center Washington DC 20057-1036 Tel: 202 687-1510 Fax: 202 687-6102 Email: [email protected] 2004 PIER Political Economics Conference Participant List Michel Le Breton Jing Li Université de Toulouse 1 Department of Economics Gremaq and Idei University of Pennsylvania Manufacture des Tabacs, Bat F 3718 Locust Walk 21, Allée de Brienne Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297 31000, Toulouse, France Tel: 215-898-8484 Tel (33) (0)5 61 12 85 77 Fax: 215-573-2057 Fax: (33) (0)5 61 12 86 37 Email: [email protected] Email : [email protected] John Londregan George Mailath Woodrow Wilson School Department of Economics Robertson Hall University of Pennsylvania Princeton University 3718 Locust Walk Princeton, NJ, 08544 Philadelphia, PA 19104 Tel: 609-258-4854 Tel: 215-898-7908 Fax: None Fax: 215-573-2057 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Cesar Martinelli Steven Matthews Department of Economics Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania University of Pennsylvania 3718 Locust Walk 3718 Locust Walk Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297 Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297 Tel: 215-898-7779 Tel: 215-898-7749 Fax: 215-573-2057 Fax: 215-573-2057 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Andrea Mattozzi Antonio Merlo Division of the Humanities and Social Department of Economics Sciences, 228-77 Penn Institute for Economic Research California Institute of Technology University of Pennsylvania Pasadena, CA 91125 3718 Locust Walk Tel: 626-395-3473 Philadelphia, PA 19104 Email: [email protected] Tel: 215-898-7933 Fax: 215-573-2057 Email: [email protected] 2004 PIER Political Economics Conference Participant List Andrea Moro Roger B. Myerson Department of Economics Department of Economics University of Minnesota University of Chicago 1035 Heller Hall 1126 East 59th Street 271 19th Avenue, South Chicago, IL 60637 Minneapolis, MN 55455 Tel: 773-834-9071 Tel: 612-625-8369 Fax: 773-702-8490 Fax: 612-624-0209 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Martin Osborne Thomas Palfrey Department of Economics Department of Economics University of Toronto 112 Fisher Hall 150 St. George Street Princeton University Toronto, M5S 3G7 Canada Princeton, NJ 08540 Tel: 416-978-5094 Tel: 609-258-4031 Fax: 416-978-6713 Fax: 609-258-6419 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Nicola Persico Andrew Postlewaite Department of Economics Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania University of Pennsylvania 3718 Locust Walk 3718 Locust Walk Philadelphia, PA 19104 Philadelphia, PA 19104 Tel: 215-898-7711 Tel: 215-898-7350 Fax: 215-573-2057 Fax: 215-573-2057 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Riccardo Puglisi Ronny Razin STICERD Department of Economics London School of Economics New York University Houghton Street 269 Mercer Street London WC2A 2AE New York, NY 10003 Tel: 44 0 20 7955 7011 Tel: 212-998-8904 Fax: 44 0 20 7955 6951 Fax: 212-995-4186 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] 2004 PIER Political Economics Conference Participant List Jose-Victor Rios-Rull Thomas Romer Department of Economics Woodrow Wilson School University of Pennsylvania Princeton University 3718 Locust Walk 306 Robertson Hall Philadelphia, PA 19104 Princeton, NJ 08544 Tel: 215-898-7767 Tel: 609-258-1857 Fax: 215-573-2057 Fax: 609-258-5533 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Howard Rosenthal Christian Schultz Department of Politics Institute of Economics Corwin Hall University of Copenhagen Princeton University Studiestraede 6, DK 1455 Princeton, NJ 08544 Copenhagen K, Denmark Tel: 609-258-4768 Tel: 45 35323039 Fax: 609-258-1110 Fax: 45 35323000 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Holger Sieg Al Slivinski Tepper School of Business Department of Economics Carnegie Mellon University University of Western Ontario 5000 Forbes Avenue London, Canada N6A 5C2 Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Tel: 519-661-2111, Ext. 85294 Tel: 412-268-6564 Fax: 519-661-3666 Fax: 412-268-7357 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Michael Smart James Snyder Institute for Policy Analysis Department of Political Science University of Toronto Massachusetts Institute of Technology 150 St. George Street 77 Massachusetts Avenue Toronto ON M5S 3G7 Canada Room E53-457 Tel: 416-978-5119 Cambridge, MA 02139-4307 Fax: 416-978-6713 Tel: 617-253-2669 Email: [email protected] Fax: 617-258-6164 Email: [email protected] 2004 PIER Political Economics Conference Participant List David Stromberg Petra Todd Institute for International Economic Department of Economics Studies University of Pennsylvania Stockholm University 3718 Locust Walk S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden Philadelphia, PA 19104 Tel: 46(8)16 30 78 Tel: 215-898-4084 Fax: 46(8)16 1443 Fax: 215-573-2057 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Leeat Yariv Bilge Yilmaz Department of Economics Department of Finance UCLA The Wharton School 405 Hilgard Avenue University of Pennsylvania Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477 2300 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall Tel: 310-825-7116 Philadelphia. PA 19104 Fax: 310-825-9528 United States Email: [email protected] Tel: 215-898-1163 Fax: 215-898-6200 Email: [email protected] .
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