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Programmheft 2019 Web - 5 Mb 4
Lecture Sunday 2019-09-22 Monday 2019-09-23 Room Time 13:00 15:00 16:30 19:00 09:00 11:00 11:30 12:30 13:45 15:00 17:00 19:00 Foyer Coffee Breaks 10:30 - 11:00, 16:30 - 17:00 KN 1: Paulinum Opening M. Petrova PD Gossen PD PD Audimax Core Con- Award / Central DIW ference Thünen L. Banks Albertina WS WS WS Vortrags- Mentoring Mentoring Econ. saal for Women for Women Consulting Albertina WS Fürsten- DFG zimmer HS 9 HS 13 OM: A01 OM: B01 HS 14 OM: B02 Inv. Session: HS 15 Econ. Theory HS 16 OM: A02 OM: B03 HS 17 OM: A03 OM: B04 HS 18 OM: A04 OM: B05 HS 19 OM: A05 OM: B06 HS 20 S 202 OM: A06 OM: B07 S 203 OM: A07 OM: B08 S 204 OM: A08 OM: B09 S 205 OM: A09 OM: B10 S 210 OM: A10 OM: B11 S 211 OM: A11 OM: B12 S 212 OM: A12 OM: B13 S 213 OM: A13 OM: B14 S 214 OM: A14 OM: B15 S 215 OM: A15 OM: B16 S 220 OM: A16 OM: B17 S 221 OM: A17 OM: B18 S 222 OM: A18 OM: B19 S 223 OM: A19 OM: B20 S 224 OM: A20 OM: B21 S 225 OM: A21 OM: B22 S 226 OM: A22 OM: B23 Jobmarket Jobmarket Jobmarket Jobmarket Jobmarket Jobmarket Jobmarket S 227 Seminar Seminar Seminar Seminar Seminar Seminar Seminar S 228 OM: A23 OM: B24 S 229 OM: A24 OM: B25 Reception Ring-Café Selten Award Restaurant Reception Felix Neues Rathaus WS = Workshop KN = Keynote OM = Open Meeting PD = Panel Discussion Lecture Tuesday 2019-09-24 Wednesday 2019-09-25 Room 09:00 11:00 12:30 13:45 15:00 16:45 19:00 09:00 11:00 11:30 12:30 13:45 15:00 16:15 8:00 - 9:00 Info Event AvH / Breaks 10:30 - 11:00, 16:30 - 16:45 Coffee Break 10:30 - 11:00 Foyer Paulinum PD 18:15 PD KN 2: PD PD KN 3: PD Lokalorg. -
Econ 771.001
ECON 771: Political Economy of Race and Gender Spring 2018 Dr. Elissa Braunstein Department of Economics, Colorado State University [email protected] Office: C327 Clark Office hours: T 1:00 – 2:00 (or by appointment) Overview I define political economy as “the study of the impact of group identity and collective conflict on the organization of economic activity and its consequences.” Political economy traditions tend to focus on class as a source of identity and group conflict. In this course, we will expand that focus to incorporate other sources of group membership, giving you a broad background in economic approaches to inequality and identity based on race/ethnicity and gender. We will focus primarily on the neoclassical, Marxian political economy and feminist literatures. In addition to learning more about the relationship between group membership and economic structures, we will use the prisms of race and gender to better understand and critique various approaches to economic analysis. And while much of the literature focuses on the U.S. context, I will try to broaden the discussion as often as possible, and encourage students to do the same. I welcome students from other social science disciplines. Although we will cover some advanced material that may be difficult for those who have not completed graduate economics courses, the emphasis will be on the main points, rather than the technical detail. The syllabus includes both required readings (*starred) and supplemental readings/sections as I wanted to give you a more complete sense of the literature if you are interested in looking further into a particular topic. -
Knowledge-Bearing Elites and Industrial Performance in France and Germany by J
Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper Series '4.5 Knowledge-Bearing Elites and Industrial Performance in France and Germany by J. Nicholas Ziegler M IT Sloan School of Management E52-581 Cambridge MA 02139 revised December 1993 Abstract Most comparative studies of public policies for competitiveness focus on the links among public agencies and industrial sectors. This paper argues that the professions---or knowledge-bearing elites-that animate these organizational links are equally significant. For public policies to promote technological advance, the visions and self-images of knowledge-bearing elites are par ticularly important. By examining administrative and technical elites in France and Germany in the 1980s, the paper identifies characteristics that enable these elites to implement policy in some cases, but not in others. France's "state-created" elites were well-positioned to initiate and implement large technology projects, such as digitizing the telecommunications network. Germany's state-recognized elites were, by contrast, better positioned to facilitate framework oriented programs that aimed at the diffusion of new technologies throughout industry. The linkages among administrative and technical elites also explain why French policymakers had difficulty adapting policy to changing circumstances over time while German policymakers managed in many cases to learn more from previous policy experiences and to adapt subse quent initiatives accordingly. 1 Knowledge-Bearing Elites and Industrial Performance -
Biases of Professional Exchange Rate Forecasts: Psychological Explanations and an Experimentally Based Comparison to Novices
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Leitner, Johannes; Schmidt, Robert; Bofinger, Peter Working Paper Biases of professional exchange rate forecasts: Psychological explanations and an experimentally based comparison to novices W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers, No. 39 Provided in Cooperation with: University of Würzburg, Chair for Monetary Policy and International Economics Suggested Citation: Leitner, Johannes; Schmidt, Robert; Bofinger, Peter (2003) : Biases of professional exchange rate forecasts: Psychological explanations and an experimentally based comparison to novices, W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers, No. 39, University of Würzburg, Department of Economics, Würzburg This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48447 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu W. -
Kranton Duke University
The Devil is in the Details – Implications of Samuel Bowles’ The Moral Economy for economics and policy research October 13 2017 Rachel Kranton Duke University The Moral Economy by Samuel Bowles should be required reading by all graduate students in economics. Indeed, all economists should buy a copy and read it. The book is a stunning, critical discussion of the interplay between economic incentives and preferences. It challenges basic premises of economic theory and questions policy recommendations based on these theories. The book proposes the path forward: designing policy that combines incentives and moral appeals. And, therefore, like such as book should, The Moral Economy leaves us with much work to do. The Moral Economy concerns individual choices and economic policy, particularly microeconomic policies with goals to enhance the collective good. The book takes aim at laws, policies, and business practices that are based on the classic Homo economicus model of individual choice. The book first argues in great detail that policies that follow from the Homo economicus paradigm can backfire. While most economists would now recognize that people are not purely selfish and self-interested, The Moral Economy goes one step further. Incentives can amplify the selfishness of individuals. People might act in more self-interested ways in a system based on incentives and rewards than they would in the absence of such inducements. The Moral Economy warns economists to be especially wary of incentives because social norms, like norms of trust and honesty, are critical to economic activity. The danger is not only of incentives backfiring in a single instance; monetary incentives can generally erode ethical and moral codes and social motivations people can have towards each other. -
Crises in Europe and Challenges for Economic Education
Journal of Social Science Education © JSSE 2013 Volume 12, Number 2 ISSN 1 61 8-5293 Birgit Weber Editorial: Crises in Europe and Challenges for Economic Education Keywords: economic crisis, European crises, concepts, views and minds about European crises, economic education Since 2009 the European Union is facing a severe At such dynamically changing times, where eco- economic crisis. Does the current crisis reflect the nomy is affected by multiple crises and in which failure of the economic player or markets? Or does it also the discipline of economics critically reflects even reflect the failure of an entire economic system their limitations, it does not belong to the easiest inevitably culminating in speculative bubbles, tasks of economic education to provide with increasing economic inequality, always accompanied orientation, judgment, decision-making and action by severe crises? Or is it more of a failure of the according to economic situations, problems and political institutions that relinquished its power by phenomena. On the one hand, the crises generates the liberalization of financial markets, cancelling the quite considerable interest by their ubiquity, liability of financial institutions, becoming helpless particularly focusing on the other hand only on repair institutions of financial capitalism? Or is the fragments and dominant controversies of the European crisis “only” an extension of the global respective current situations. On the one hand, the financial crisis of 2008, which resulted in the rescue understanding of relationships and developments is of individual states, brought them to stumble complex and on the other hand, considerable themselves? Or does it just bring the design flaws of uncertainty and controversy of experts create the the European Monetary System to light? There is no impression of arbitrariness. -
Beatrice Weder Di Mauro
Beatrice Weder di Mauro INSEAD Ph: +65 6799 5388 1 Ayer Rajah Avenue Email: [email protected] 138676 Singapore CEPR Ph: +44 20 71838801 33 Great Sutton Street Email: [email protected] London EC1V 0DX, UK EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION: INSEAD, Singapore Research Professor, since 2018 DistinguisheD Fellow-in-ResiDence Emerging Markets Institute, since 2016 Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London President, since 2018 Research Fellow, since 2003 University of Mainz, MainZ Professor of Economics Chair of Policy and International Macroeconomics, 2001–2018 German Council of Economic Experts, WiesbaDen Member, 2004–2012 University of Basel, Basel Assistant Professor of Economics, 1998–2001 United Nations University, Tokyo Research Fellow, 1997–1998 The World Bank, Washington Consultant for WorlD Development Report, 1996–1997 International Monetary Fund, Washington Economist Program, European Department 1994-1995, Fiscal Affairs Department, 1995–1996 University of Basel, Basel Lic rer pol 1989, Dr. rer pol 1993 TEMPORARY OR VISITING POSITIONS: INSEAD, Singapore Visiting Scholar, August–December 2015 European Commission, DG ECFIN, Brussels Fellow of Research Fellowship Initiative 2014–15 International Monetary Fund, Washington Research Department, Resident Scholar, April–September 2010 Visiting Scholar, April 1999, August 1999, March 2000, March 2002, October 2002, March 2003, October 2003, May 2006 National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), CambriDge MA Visiting Scholar, March–April 2006 Federal Reserve Board of New -
Behavioral Economics As Applied to Firms: a Primer1
Munich Personal RePEc Archive Behavioral economics as applied to firms: a primer Armstrong, Mark and Huck, Steffen University College London (UCL) January 2010 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20356/ MPRA Paper No. 20356, posted 02 Feb 2010 03:16 UTC Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer1 Mark Armstrong and Steffen Huck Department of Economics University College London January 2010 Abstract We discuss the literatures on behavioral economics, bounded rationality and experimental economics as they apply to firm behavior in markets. Topics discussed include the impact of imitative and satisficing behavior by firms, outcomes when managers care about their position relative to peers, the benefits of employing managers whose objective diverges from profit-maximization (including managers who are overconfident or base pricing decisions on sunk costs), the impact of social preferences on the ability to collude, and the incentive for profit-maximizing firms to mimic irrational behavior. 1. Introduction In recent years there has been a good deal of research investigating how poor or non-standard decision making by consumers might affect market outcomes. In much of this work, the assumption is that firms are fully rational and aim to maximize their profits (and sometimes they do this by exploiting the behavioral biases of consumers). Some of this work points to situations where there is a role for policy which protects consumers from their own failings and from exploitative firms.2 In this article we focus instead on non-standard approaches to firm behavior. Consumers are kept in the background, and are present merely to generate in some fashion a demand curve for the firms' products. -
Gender Differences*
PERFORMANCE INCOMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTS: GENDER DIFFERENCES* URI GNEEZY MURIEL NIEDERLE ALDO RUSTICHINI Eventhough the provision of equal opportunities for men and women has beena priorityin manycountries, large gender differences prevail in competitive high-rankingpositions. Suggested explanations include discrimination and dif- ferencesin preferencesand human capital. In this paper we present experimental evidencein support of anadditionalfactor: women may be lesseffective than men incompetitive environments, even if they are able to perform similarly in non- competitiveenvironments. In a laboratoryexperiment we observe, as we increase thecompetitiveness of theenvironment, a signicant increasein performancefor men,but not for women. This results in a signicant gendergap inperformance intournaments, while there is no gap whenparticipants are paid according to piecerate. This effect is stronger when women have to compete against men than insingle-sex competitive environments: this suggests that women may be ableto performin competitiveenvironments per se. I. INTRODUCTION Allocationsacross genders of high prole jobs remain largely favorableto men, and area majorfactor in thegender gap in earnings.For example, Bertrand and Hallock[2001] found that only2.5 percentof the vehighestpaid executivesin alargedata setof U.S.rmsare women (for areviewon genderdifferences in wages,see Blau and Kahn [2000]). Thenumerous attempts to explain this fact can beclassi ed intotwo broad categories.The rstexplanation restson gender differences in abilities and pref- erencesand hencein occupationalself-selection [Polachek 1981]. Thesecond class ofexplanations relatesto discrimination in the workplace,which leads todifferential treatmentof men and womenwith equal preferencesand abilities [Black and Strahan 2001; Goldin and Rouse2000; Wennerås and Wold1997]. In this paper wepropose and experimentallytest an addi- tional explanation:women may be less effective than menin competitiveenvironments. -
My Reminiscences of Trygve Haavelmo at the Cowles Commission
My Reminiscences of Trygve Haavelmo at the Cowles Commission T. W. Anderson∗ Stanford University August 23, 2012 1 Introduction Trygve Haavelmo was my colleague at the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics at the University of Chicago for a large part of the academic year 1945-46. Since then, we have met frequently in Oslo. Much of my research and writing was stimulated by his path-breaking work, particularly \The probability approach in econometrics," 1944. My doctoral dissertation in mathematics at Princeton University was accepted in June, 1945; World War II was coming to an end in that summer. For several years I had been doing war research (evaluation of weather forecasting methods, analysis of battleship gunfire battles, and sequential methods of sensitivity testing). I was looking forward to getting back to full time academic pursuits: teaching and basic research. I tentatively accepted an instructorship in mathematics at Princeton for the academic year 1945-46 which started November 1st. However, it was understood that I would be excused from this obligation if I was offered a position that was more interesting to me. Because I was interested in statistics and economics, Oskar Morgenstern suggested I talk with Arthur Burns, Director of the National Bureau of Economic Research in New York City. At the end of my interview with Burns he said \The National Bureau has no need for someone as highly trained in statistics as you." ∗Department of Statistics and Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA; [email protected]. The author thanks Olav Bj¨orkholtfor assistance in providing much of the historical material in this paper. -
Boston University Study Abroad London Economic Policy – a British Perspective CAS EC 364 a (Core Course) Spring 2016
Boston University Study Abroad London Economic Policy – A British Perspective CAS EC 364 A (Core course) Spring 2016 Instructor Information A. Name Professor Parvin Alizadeh B. Day and Time Wednesdays and Thursdays (1.15-5.15pm). C. Location Prince Consort, 43 Harrington Gardens, SW7 4JU D. BU Telephone 020 7244 6255 E. Email [email protected] F. Office hours By appointment Overview Since the 1980s successive UK governments have legislated and implemented a series of market- oriented reforms designed to stop the long-term economic decline in the United Kingdom relative to her major trading partners in other industrialized countries. This course provides a microeconomic analysis of these reforms with a focus on aspects of privatization, deregulation of the labour market, trade performance, the UK relationship with the EU, and the current crisis in the Euro zone. The economic analysis includes comparisons, where appropriate, with other European Union economies and the United States. The course examines the roles of the market and government in determining policy outcomes. The level of microeconomics in the course is intermediate and assumes you have completed an introductory one or two semester course in microeconomics. On completion of the course, you should be able to integrate analytical and descriptive material to aid your understanding of the nature and causes of some key contemporary problems in modern advanced economies. In addition you will be familiar with the microeconomic policies used within the UK and have some knowledge of relevant source material. Teaching Strategy The course will be taught by the selective use of lectures and seminars. -
We, the Undersigned Economists, Represent a Broad Variety of Areas of Expertise and Are United in Our Opposition to Donald Trump
We, the undersigned economists, represent a broad variety of areas of expertise and are united in our opposition to Donald Trump. We recommend that voters choose a different candidate on the following grounds: . He degrades trust in vital public institutions that collect and disseminate information about the economy, such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics, by spreading disinformation about the integrity of their work. He has misled voters in states like Ohio and Michigan by asserting that the renegotiation of NAFTA or the imposition of tariffs on China would substantially increase employment in manufacturing. In fact, manufacturing’s share of employment has been declining since the 1970s and is mostly related to automation, not trade. He claims to champion former manufacturing workers, but has no plan to assist their transition to well-compensated service sector positions. Instead, he has diverted the policy discussion to options that ignore both the reality of technological progress and the benefits of international trade. He has misled the public by asserting that U.S. manufacturing has declined. The location and product composition of manufacturing has changed, but the level of output has more than doubled in the U.S. since the 1980s. He has falsely suggested that trade is zero-sum and that the “toughness” of negotiators primarily drives trade deficits. He has misled the public with false statements about trade agreements eroding national income and wealth. Although the gains have not been equally distributed—and this is an important discussion in itself—both mean income and mean wealth have risen substantially in the U.S.