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China's Reliance on Shipping Crude Oil Through the Straits of Malacca

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China's Reliance on Shipping Crude Oil Through the Straits of Malacca China’s Reliance on Shipping Crude Oil Through the Straits of Malacca Overview Source: Trade Arabia At the heart of maritime security in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) lies a predicament that President Hu Jintao has referred to as “the Malacca Di- lemma.” Put simply, the dilemma is that the Chinese economy relies too heavily on transiting petroleum and other vital goods on oil tankers through the Malacca Strait—a narrow waterway between the Malaysian Peninsula and the Sumatran islands of Indonesia—but has few viable alternatives to it. Over forty percent of global seaborne trade passes through the Malacca Strait, which separates Indonesia’s Sumatra from the Malay Peninsula by only 1.7 miles at its narrowest point. This makes it a vital artery for the world econ- omy. China, which now imports over half of its oil, must transit an estimated 70—85 percent of its imported oil supply through Malacca from Venezuela and oil-rich nations in Africa and the Middle East. China's crude oil imports, by mode of transportation Methodology Graduated symbols were placed over the shipping lanes so that their thick- This map identifies the principal sea-lanes and overland trade routes that ness is proportional to the amount of oil shipped along each route. Ship- Unknown 19% connect Chinese energy consumers to the PRC’s top ten crude oil suppli- ping lanes were traced by georeferencing a paper map and projecting it into Overland routes ers. It is based on 2009 data from the United States Energy Information ArcGIS. 9% Malacca Strait Administration (EIA). 72% The total amount of oil that China ships through the Malacca Strait will al- The map above shows China’s heavy dependence on shipping crude oil most certainly continue to rise as the PRC’s oil consumption increases as Source: Energy Information Administration through the Malacca Strait compared to other routes. Russia and Kazakh- an alarming rate. Although increased pipeline capacity through Russia and stan, China’s fourth and ninth-largest crude oil exporters, send their oil to a new pipeline through Myanmar (Burma), which will be completed in The two alternative routes that unite the Indian Ocean with the China primarily by overland rail and pipeline routes. All of China’s other 2013, could ease some tension on the Malacca Strait, the Malacca Di- South China Sea islands are either notoriously difficult for tankers top crude exporters ship their cargoes across the Indian Ocean. Venezuela lemma will likely continue to be a concern for China for many years to to navigate due to shallow waters (the Sunda Strait), or are too far exports crude oil on Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) that draw too come. much water to transit the shallow Panama Canal and therefore must sail Chinese Crude Oil Imports (barrels) by year, 2003-2009 detoured from the trans-Malacca route to be economical (the Lom- more than half way around the world to reach China. bok Strait). 250,000,000 200,000,000 The PRC’s dependence on Malacca gives rise to security concerns China's oil imports, by country of origin 150,000,000 Kazakhstan Chinese Crude Oil Imports because the surrounding region is vulnerable to disruption that Russia 3% (barrels) could block maritime traffic and a substantial portion of the PRC oil 7% 100,000,000 supply. Acts of piracy, oil spills, and shipping accidents would all 50,000,000 Saudi Arabia disrupt traffic through the Strait. Malacca’s prominence in the Other 22% 19% 0 global economy also makes it a potential target for terrorism or a 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Libya Source: Chinese Customs Data naval blockade. While other East Asian countries such as Japan and 3% Angola 17% South Korea rely on the Malacca route as much as China does, Kuwait 3% those countries can likely depend on their alliance with the US mili- Iraq Iran Source: Energy Information Cartographer: Daniel Brutlag, F’11 4% 12% Administration tary to secure the Strait. As a non-US ally, the PRC feels more un- Oman Sudan Production Date: May 2011 4% 6% Projected Coordinate Frame: GCS_WGS_1984 easy with the Strait’s volatility. Source Data: US Energy Information Administration, US Department of Defense .
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