Maxim M. Litvinov and Soviet-American Relations, 1918-1946 by Hugh Phillips

#263 Maxim M. Litvinov and Soviet-American Relations, 1918-1946 by Hugh Phillips

Hugh Phillips is Associate Professor in the Department of History at Western Kentucky University in Bowling Green, Kentucky. The author's research and writing have been greatly facilitated by the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, the American Council of Teachers of Russian (AC1R), and Western Kentucky University. The Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

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©June 1996 Woodrow Wlison International Center for Scholars edited by Kate Moore MAXIM M. LITVINOV AND SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1918- 1946

When historians consider the whose portrait adorned Litvinov's history of Soviet-American relations Kremlin office.3 and the Cold War generally, they Unlike his superiors, Litvinov understandably dwell on the possessed a diplomatic world view hostility and opposing goals and that was apparently unclouded by tactics of both sides. Especially Marxism-Lerunism and visions of prominent is an emphasis on the world revolution. Early on, he ideologically-based hostility of realized the necessity of devising a Soviet leaders toward what they traditional foreign policy designed to derisively called the "bourgeois protect the new Soviet state. Litvinov West." In a recent, fine study of the certainly remained a Marxist and Cold War, R.C. Raack paints a believed that socialism's world convincing portrait of Stalin as wide triumph was inevitable. But it rapaciously dedicated to fostering was not an immediate prospect and world revolution.1 The recent Marxism was useless as a guide for "memoirs" of Stalin's Foreign foreign policy. Speaking with the Minister, Viacheslav Molotov, also American journalist Louis Fischer, reveal a regime deeply dedicated to Litvinov declared that the prospects and driven by its Marxist world for world revolution disappeared for view.2 Yet virtually forgotten in the him on 11 November 1918 with the generally dreary tale of conflict and end of the war.4 Even more to the antagonism is the story of Maxim point, no less than Josef Stalin Litvinov, a prominent Soviet remarked that "Litvinov does not diplomat who struggled mightily for see and is not interested in the years to achieve not only normal but revolutionary aspect of policy."5 On even good relations with the West in another occasion, Stalin asserted that general, and the United States, in Litvinov was more "dangerous" to particular. Indeed, Litvinov had a Soviet interests than even the British genuine affection for America and Foreign Secretary, Arthur Henderson.6 especially for Franklin Roosevelt, Thus, at the outset of his diplomatic

1 RC. Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945: The Origins of the Cold War (Stanford: 1995). 2 Albert Resis, ed., Molotao Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics. Conversations with Felix Chuev (Chicago: 1993). 3 Jonathan Haslam, "Stalin and Litvinov," in Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed., Saoiet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991: A Retrospective (London, 1994), 55. 4 Louis Fischer, Men and Politics (New York, 1941),f.l27. As late as May 1922 Lenin was still harping on the "acceleration o the world revolutionary movement" Pravda, S May 1922. 5 Letter from Josef Stalin to Viacheslav Molotov, 29 August 1929 in Lars T. Lih, et al, eds., Stalin's Letters to Molotao (New Haven and London, 1995), 174. 6 Letter from Stalin to Molotov, 9 September 1929, in Ibid., 177.

1 career Litvinov understood the few failures. Stalin held little to no international situation far better than interest in Litvinov's ideas and when Lenin and the other Bolshevik this fact became indisputably obvious, leaders. He embraced a policy of Litvinov broke with the "Great realpolitik, dedicated to the concrete Leader" in a remarkably reckless interests of the government he way. Thus, he became the "first major served for so long? This sense of postwar dissident."9 This article realism often led Litvinov to some offers a brief account of Litvinov's unusual, albeit consistent, positions heroic, if futile, effort to find a for a Soviet diplomat and, in common ground with the United particular, engendered conflicts with States, an effort that lasted from 1918 his long-time boss, Josef Stalin. to 1946. Litvinov frequently looked to the Litvinov dedicated his early years West for help and cooperation. In to Vladimir Lenin's Bolshevik Party, general, he hoped for aid and running guns and propaganda into assistance in the interwar era from the Russian Empire. This dangerous Britain; with World War II, his eyes activity accomplished nothing and turned to the United States.8 To be in 1908 he gave it up and emigrated sure, he did not always agree with to Britain. There he led a Western policies and he had his conventional bourgeois life, own demands vis-a-vis the West. working for the publishing house of Nevertheless, Litvinov ultimately Williams and Norgate and giving saw relations with the West in a Russian language lessons. He fundamentally different light than married an Englishwoman and even Stalin did. The Communist Party became a British citizen. With the General Secretary had nothing but October Revolution, however, suspicion and hostility for the Litvinov returned to his native Western democracies, including the country and entered the diplomatic United States. How these two men service. He nevertheless quickly managed to work together remains a developed into a rather conventional mystery, but this article seeks to diplomat and an astute observer of illuminate what advice and policies international relations. He soon Litvinov suggested regarding Soviet advanced the point of view that policy toward the United States, in Moscow should look clearly at the particular after World War IT, when world as it existed and mold its this relationship assumed global policies in a non-revolutionary importance. It is hardly surprising fashion. Such an approach would that Litvinov faced quite formidable protect and promote Soviet domestic obstacles and suffered more than a interests, which Litvinov knew the

7 For a more extended discussion of Litvinov's career, the reader may consult Hugh Phillips, Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1992). 8 Interview with Tatiana Litvinov, 30-31 March 1981. 9 William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War (New York: 1982), 133.

2 first years of Bolshevism had delivered journalism... calculated to repel to the brink of unprecedented rather than conciliate,"14 Litvinov catastrophe.10 penned his own message to the One of Litvinov's first specific president. He emphasized that Soviet diplomatic proposals underscored his and U.S. public proposals for a understanding of the new importance European settlement had much in of the United States in international common, although the Soviet affairs. In 1918, while serving as the concepts were "more extensive." Soviet representative in London, he Most important, however, was the requested a transfer to Washington need for peace. Foreign powers after it became obvious that British should withdraw from Russia; if officials would not negotiate the intervention continued, it seriously with him. Lenin approved might well lead to a restoration of this suggestion; however, the the monarchy, which would only American government did not and result in "interminable revolutions Litvinov had to wait fifteen years and upheavals" that would be in no before his first mission to America.11 In the meantime, he continued to one's interest. Instead the new Russia seek a normalization of relations. In and the victorious powers should the early phases of this effort, he cooperate in the reconstruction of apparently dashed (not for the last the former "for the benefit of all time) with his superior, Commissar countries badly in need of foodstuffs for Foreign Affairs, Georgii Chicherin. and new materials." Litvinov In October 1918, the latter addressed concluded with the remark: "I a letter to President Woodrow Wilson venture to appeal to your sense of 15 that has been aptly described as justice and humanity." "extremely caustic and insulting."12 Wilson and British Prime Minister Chicherin even went so far as to lloyd George were favorably denigrate directly Wilson's cherished impressed with this opening. They vision of a League of Nations.13 accordingly asked Litvinov formally Litvinov rushed to limit the to elaborate on his letter in a series diplomatic damage. Disgusted with of meetings with the American a letter he thought "propagandistic diplomat, William H. Buckler.

10 In 1921 Utvinov supervised the expenditure of millions of dollars of foreign currency to buy the machinery, grain, and medical supplies Soviet Russia desperately needed. Z.S. Sheinis, Maksim Maksimovich Lztvinov: revoliutsioner, dipfomat, chelovek (Moscow: 1989), 181. 11 Ivan Maisky, Journey into the Past (London: 1962), 67. 12 John Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace (Princeton: 1966), 88.

13 Jane ~gras, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (Oxford: 1951-1953), 3 vols., 1. 112-120. 14 Memo by William Buckler, undated, January 1919, William Buckler Papers, Yale University Archives, Box 6. 15 Degras, ed, Soviet Documents, 1: 130-131.

3 Meanwhile, Litvinov had new Russia to undermine the apparently scored a triumph radicals within the regime.18 domestically. At the opening It is quite likely that Litvinov's session with Buckler, he revealed a demarche was an important factor in letter from none other than Chicherin Wilson's acceptance of lloyd confirming the conciliatory position George's plan for a conference of all laid out by Litvinov. In any case, the Russian political factions to be held Soviet representative emphasized on the island of Prinkipo.19 But this Soviet readiness to "compromise on scheme collapsed due to French and all points, including the Russian British hostility to the Bolsheviks. foreign debt repudiated earlier, WJ.lson, however, continued to seek protection of existing foreign ways to meet Litvinov halfway. Thus entetprises, and the granting of new in March 1919 William C. Bullitt, a trade concessions in Russia." In return friend of WJ.lson's close advisor Soviet Russia wanted and Colonel Edward House, arrived in desperately needed "expert Moscow for direct talks with Litvinov assistance and advice, especially in and Chicherin. By 14 March the technical and financial matters."16 three men had hammered out an On the thorny issue of communist agreement.20 propaganda, Litvinov insisted that Germany, not the U.S., was Russia's This document provided for a target and the goal was to fight the ceasefire in Russia with all"existing "militarist spirit of Germany." Indeed de facto governments" to retain the U.S. was not ready for socialist control of territories they controlled revolution and "no amount of as of 11 November 1918. There propaganda can produce such would be a general political amnesty conditions."17 and all fore1r, troops would be Buckler thought Litvinov's withdrawn. LerUn used all his pro-Western sentiments were genuine persuasive powers to gain 22 but also believed that most acceptance of this proposal, but it Bolsheviks lacked such conciliatory came to nothing. Wilson was feelings. He therefore urged a increasingly distracted by the policy of rapprochement with the problem of Germany, and French

16 Thompson, Russia, 90-91. 17 U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, I(ussia,1919, 15-16. Hereafter cited as FRUS. 18 Buckler Papers, Box 6. 19 N. Gordon Levin, Jr., WoodrCJW Wilson and World Politics (Oxford and London: 1968),206. 20 V alerii Shishkin, V.I. Lenin i vneshneekonomicheskaia politika Savetskogo gosudarstva, 1917-1923 gg~ (Moscow: 1977), 160 and William C. Bullitt, The Bullitt Mission to Russia, (New York: 1919), 39. 21 Richard H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations 1917-1921 (Princeton: 1961) 2 vols., ~148-149. 22 Shishkin, V.I. Lenin, 160.

4 hostility to any deal with the Soviets issue. Why not establish a "mixed was unbending. commission to review the claims of As time passed and revolution both sides?" he suggested. Apparently failed to flourish elsewhere, the Bush thought this a useful idea. At Soviet government publicly least he promised to pass along the championed a policy of universal idea to President Warren Harding.24 and complete disarmament. TIUs Again the results were nil. impractical, if often popular, policy Three years later Utvinov was led to the Moscow Disarmament still at it. In February 1926, he told Conference of 1922. Like most I

23 New York Times, 4 December 1922, p. 3 24 Ministerstvo lnnos.trannykh Del SSS~ Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR (Moscow, 1957- ), 6. 340-342. Hereafter a.ted as D. V.P. 25 D. V.P., 9:720, note 30

5 of the whole European economy and the French.27 Neither the Politburo a general disarmament" He was so nor Downing Street cared for a anxious to open talks with America Soviet-British rapprochement and that Litvinov told Rakovskii that if so nothing came of Litvinov's the U.S. ambassador rejected the suggestion. But Litvinov certainly Goodrich formula perhaps "some must have reasoned that good other path" could be found, even if relations with America would through unofficial channels.26 The favorably influence London. U.S. government remained unmoved. More generally, Louis Fischer, What explains Litvinov's dogged who knew Litvinov well, recalled pursuit of U.S. recognition through that Litvinov "wanted Moscow to the 1920s? I regret to say that I was appear on the world stage" and unable to obtain access to his participate fully in international personal papers, but clues are relations.28 More significantly, the available. For one thing, a strenuous American diplomat, John Wiley, effort in 1922 to promote a noted that Litvinov sought to move rapprochement with Britain had Soviet diploma~ "from intrusion to failed. In an extensive 1922 memo to participation."2 Thus his courtship the Politburo, Litvinov, a deputy of Washington fits well into his commissar for foreign affairs, bluntly broader conception of international stated that his government should events. The 1920s demonstrated that orient itself toward London. This the global revolution would not was not because of sentiment or soon save the new state; perhaps because of the well-known fact that diplomacy could. his wife was an English citizen. But there were limits and Rather, the British had the greatest Secretary of State Henry Stimson potential to supply Russia with crossed them in 1929. The desperately needed credits and secretary urged the Russians and technology. He believed the English Chinese to settle peacefully their working class was favorably dispute over the Russian-controlled disposed toward the Soviet Chinese Eastern Railroad in experiment and Litvinov understood Manchuria. In reply Litvinov that part of the electorate could exert expressed "astonishment that significant pressure on the the U.S., which, by its own will, does government. Finally, he noted that not entertain any relations with... the good relations with Britain could Soviet Union, should find it possible serve as a useful counterweight to to address to the latter advice and the virulently anti-Soviet policies of recommendations."30

26 Ibid., 9: 120-121. 27 Ibid., 188--190. 28 Louis Fischer, Men and Politics, 127-128. 29 Wiley to Hull, 17 November 1934, U.S. National Archives Microfilm Publication Number T 1249. 30 F.R.U.S., 1929: 2: 350-351; Ibid., 2:405-406.

6 So matters rested until the election lines of those available in Great of Franklin Roosevelt. The new Britain."33 Litvinov never made such president quickly signaled his an acknowledgement to U.S. officials willingness to end the non and the Soviets continued to insist on recognition policy and Litvinov a "loan." It was not his finest hour, came to Washington in late 1933. even if he "saved" the USSR the These discussions have long been unpleasant task of paying the U.S. $75 the subject of close scrutiny and it is million in compensation for Soviet well known that a major stumbling debt repudiation and nationalized block before genuinely improved properties. relations was the unfortunate use of In the 1930s Litvinov's attention the word "loan" instead of "credit" turned almost entirely toward the in the final agreement.31 When it Nazi threat, while the United States became clear that the U.S. would not grappled with the Great Depression. support Soviet Russia against Litvinov, however, started moving Japanese ambitions, Moscow Russia away from its strong German simply insisted on an outright loan orientation even before Hitler's from America to be spent wherever ascension to power. Thus in 1930, the Russians pleased. Roosevelt and when he took over the Foreign his advisors were aghast, insisting Commissariat from Chicherin, he they had meant a credit to be spent actively sought better relations with in the U.S. under their supervision. France and Britain.34 Hitler's So "no loan was ever ranted, no appointment as chancellor gave a debt was ever paid."3 mighty boost to Litvinov's pro What is not so well known is that Western policy. In December 1933, the at least Litvinov knew that the whole Politburo approved Utvinov's "loan" versus "credit'' imbroglio was proposals for a collective security a sham from the very beginning. The system in Europe to contain Nazi night before he signed the agreement, aggression.35 When collective Litvinov told Walter Duranty that he security failed, Litvinov and French "clearly understood that no 'loan' Foreign Minister Louis Barthou would be available in the United worked out a straight-forward States but that the most that could be defensive alliance that was signed in expected would be credits along the 1935.

31 See Beatrice Farnsworth, William C. Bullitt and the Soviet Union (Bloomington and London: 1967). 32 Louis Fischer, Russia's Road from Peace to War, 1917-1941 (New York: 1%9), 218. 33 Wiley to Secretary of State, 10 December 1938. National Archives Microfilm Publication Number T 1241. It is not hard to imagine why the pro-Soviet Duranty sat on this information for five years. 34 See J.A. Large, "The Origins of the Soviet Collective Security Policy, 1930-1932," Soviet Studies 30 (1978): 212-236. 35 D. V.P., 16:876, note 321. Interview with Professor Vladimir Trukhanovskii, Moscow, 19 October 1982.

7 On paper, at least, this pact person to sign a pact with the appeared as the high point of Nazis?"39 Litvinov's attempt to guide Soviet Litvinov's enforced retirement foreign policy along traditional, ended with the German invasion of non-revolutionary lines. For many June 1941 and he quickly returned reasons, however, nothing ever came to the center of Soviet-American of the alliance. Indeed, military staff relations. Astonished at the almost talks did not occur until the summer effortless rapidity of the German of 1939, the very eve of the war.36 By advance, he concluded that without that time, Litvinov had "retired." substantial foreign aid the Soviet That no agreement of substance Union might well go under.40 When was achieved was hardly Litvinov's American and British representatives fault. Indeed, Stalin's Russian met with Stalin in September 1941, biographer, D.A. Volkogonov, asserts Utvinov was present. Only after he that the General Secretary actually realized that the West definitely became suspicious of Litvinov intended to send the Soviet Union because the commissar "did not trust substantial supplies, did Litvinov's Hitler at all and was ready to do gloom begin to dispel. Leaping to his anything he (Litvinov) could to feet at the end of a lengthy but cordial obtain treaties with the Western session, he exclaimed "Now we shall democracies."37 By 1939, however, win the war!"41 Stalin and Hitler were ready to do Soon Stalin appointed Litvinov business. Litvinov believed that Soviet ambassador to the United the appeasement policy of the States. He arrived in Washington, West necessitated some type of D.C. as Japanese bombs were falling arrangement with Hitler, but not of on the American base at Pearl the sort that came about in Au~t Harbor. His brief stay in America and helped launch World War TI.38 would be challenging and exciting, Litvinov, of Jewish birth, also but ultimately frustrating. His chief understood that he had no place in assignment was to goad the West negotiations with the Nazis. A into opening a second front in student at the Diplomatic Academy Europe, but he also began to develop of the Commissariat for Foreign plans for a positive Soviet-American Affairs asked Litvinov in 1946 about relationship after the war. the pact. The former commissar Although Litvinov did not press replied simply ''Was I the right the issue, he believed that the West

36 Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 2nd ed. (New York: 1974), 224.

37 D.S. Volko~onov, "The Drama of the Decisions of 1939," Soviet Studies in History, (Wmter 1990-91): 13. 38 Interview with Tatiana Utvinov, 30-31 March 1981. 39 Interview with Viktor Israelian, 22 November 1991. 40 Interview with Tatiana Utvinov, 30-31 March 1981. 41 W. Averell Harriman and Eli Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946 (New York, 1975), 94.

8 should recognize the Soviet borders America's attitude regarding the of 1941. The ambassador questioned borders and that Roosevelt's remarks Franklin Roosevelt on this point at a did not "require a response."45 meeting on 12 March 1942 at the Several months later Litvinov White House. No record of the observed to Under Secretary of State discussion had been found in United Sumner Welles that the only chance States archives.42 But according to for a stable postwar order was Litvinovs dispatch to Moscow, "understanding and cooperation Roosevelt quite clearly, if only between Moscow and Washington."46 verbally, accepted the 1941 borders.43 If Stalin's attitude in March 1942 was His spirits high, Litvinov thought any indicator of what the future this concession would facilitate held, Litvinov could not have been the necessary postwar cooperation optimistic. and concluded his report on an In May 1943 Litvinov returned to uncharacteristically jocular note. Moscow. Four months later he wrote Roosevelt had suggested that to his wife, Ivy, that the Politburo had perhaps he could meet with Stalin ordered him to remain in Moscow to "after the war somewhere on the "work on postwar problems.'A7 Aleutian Islands. I jokingly said that Litvinov thought that the work the climate is better in Berlin."44 might be interesting but also "a Nevertheless, Litvinov source of new frictions. ,,48 He was emphasized that Roosevelt expected right. He confided to Ivy that his some sort of response from Stalin mood was "sometimes very gloomy regarding Soviet territorial desires. and hopeless." He hoped her return The ambassador clearly felt that the to Russia might cheer him up.49 president had made a significant Finally he reported a stoic, if concession that warranted Stalin's complete, loss of hope for seeing his personal attention. One can easily ideas implemented. Rebuffed at imagine his disappointment, every turn, Litvinov consoled therefore, when a terse reply came himself with the thought that "I from Molotov, which noted that the had no illusions, and therefore no Soviet leader was indifferent to disappointments." 50

42 Warren F. Kimball, ed. Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, 3 vols. (Princeton, 1984), 1:420. 43 Ministerstvo Innostrannyhh Del SSSR, Sovetsko-amerikanskie otrwsheniia vo vremia Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny, 1941-1945gg, 2 vols. (Moscow: 1984), Litvinov to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel), 12 (March 1942), 1: us: 44 Ibid. 45 Molotov to Litvinov, 23 March 1942, Ibid., 158. 46 F.R.U.S., 1943 (Washington, 1956), 3: 522-23. 47 Joseph Freeman Papers, Box 175, Hoover Institution Archives, Letter from MaXim to Ivy Litvinov, 5 August 1943. 48 Letter from Maxim to Ivy Litvinov, 19 August 1943, Ibid. 49 Letter from Maxim to Ivy Litvinov, 14 August 1943, Ibid.

9 It would have been uncharac ambivalent, considering his futile teristic for Litvinov to have whined efforts before that body. As an about his failure. (His daughter, organization its greatest short Tatiana, said that during his coming was an exaggerated dismissal as conunissar in 1939 he importance given to the principle of had sat silently through a lengthy unanimity. For example, all nations and vicious attack by Molotov on recognized the blatant nature of his policy of collective security, a Italian aggression against Abyssinia, reaction that caused Molotov to lose butnoteveneconomicsanctions his composure entirely). But he could be applied owing to the certainly was disappointed despite objections of Switzerland, Austria, the disclaimer to Ivy. What had he Hungary, and Albania. proposed and what had been the But the "real cause" of the leadership's response? And, finally, League's failures in the 1930s whom did he blame for the advent was neither structural nor of the Cold War after the collapse of organizational. Rather it was the both Nazi Germany and the Grand result of the poor "mutual relations Coalition? between the League of Nations and In 1944-45 Litvinov managed the great powers and in the relations of through a variety of means to the great powers among themselves." elucidate his views on how Both giving a nod to Soviet public international security should be opinion and writing with conviction, established after the war. He Litvinov castigated the great powers published a number of articles and the League not only for ignoring under the ~seudonym of the Soviet Union, but for actually "Malinin," 1 the most complete of being hostile to the new state. This which appeared in 1944 in the was an issue guaranteed to produce Leningrad journal Zvezda. En ti tied more heat than light because the "Regarding an International Soviet government from its Security Organization," it was beginning was hardly friendly considered by the American diplomat toward the "capitalist" states or what George Kennan to be important its diplomats contemptuously and enough for a full translation to be routinely referred to as the "scxalled forwarded to the State Department. League of Nations." This wide-ranging piece traced the Litvinov was on much firmer historical efforts to build international ground in putting great emphasis on peace, but focused on the shortcomings the United States' refusal even to of the League of Nations and the join, let alone actively participate, essentials needed for a successful in the League. America's isolationism postwar order. had been a crippling blow to Litvinov's attitude toward the League. Any international the League was surprisingly arrangement for post-Hitler Europe

50 Letter from Maxim to Ivy Litvinov, Undated (1943}, Ibid. 51 Interview with Tatiana Litvinov, 30-31 March 1981.

10 would clearly require an active difficult to construct, with myriad American role. Another extra "political, geographic, and strategic organizational impediment to an conditions" to be considered. But effective League was the failure of most important, the great powers' Britain and France to coordinate fully readiness to offer "mutual aid to their policies during the crises of the one another in any action for safe 1930s. Probably thinking mainly of guarding peace must be assumed in the 1936 Rhineland crisis that struck one degree or another." But privately, a mortal blow to the Franco-Soviet Litvinov reiterated what he had pact, Litvinov lamented the fact said to Welles: only Soviet-American that France and Britain failed to cooperation could guarantee find harmon{. in dealing with international stability.54 aggression.5 Clearly, Litvinov was Litvinov refused, however, to saying that Soviet-American open the door to unilateral action by relations should not follow the the victorious states. "Because in the Franco-British prewar example. tremendous responsibility which... Thus Litvinov painted a bleak falls to each great power, the picture, one obviously to be avoided decisions of the guiding powers on in the future. To do this, he publicly important questions cannot be taken placed the burden squarely on the otherwise than unanimously." With United States, the Soviet Union, such close cooperation "even the Britain, and China. "Only the great most self-assured maniacs of the powers... are able to act effectively Hitler type," would be forced to against a big aggressor... and they can think hard before risking a "decisive not be replaced by any union of clash with such a bloc." Litvinov small states." The world must "turn concluded with an outline of specific away from the principle of false measures to meet aggression, equality" and accept that the big ranging from a severance of four must play the"genuinely guiding diplomatic and commercial relations and decisive role" in safeguarding the to the possibility of a "naval and aerial peace.53 Thus he emphasized that this demonstration" He added that the enormously important task must "small nations" have a role to play, have its foundation not within the from cooperation with the great general context of the future powers to the possibility of small United Nations, but "on the basis of states themselves crushing "small treaties" concluded among the centers of aggression."55 great powers. This treaty system, Litvinov thus drew upon his essentially outside any international extensive prewar experience and organization, would indeed be advocated the big four as world

52 U.S. National Archives, Department of State Archives, Dispatch of George Kennan to the Secretary of State, 25 July 1944, Record Group 59, SOO.CC/7-2544. 53 Ibid. 54 Interview with Tatiana Litvinov, 30-31 March 1981. 55 Ibid.

11 policemen, although the Soviet friendly relations." Indeed, he wrote Union and the United States would an article in the same year devoted possess supreme power. Only entirely to the anti-Soviet attitudes through their close cooperation and policies of interwar Poland, could international peace be secured. blasting in particular what he called There were, of course, as Litvinov Warsaw's "stupid dreams" regarding recognized, numerous problems to Pan-Poland.58 his scheme, not the least of which Speaking privately with was that Stalin wanted nothing to do Roosevelt's close advisor on foreign with it. affairs, W Averell Harriman, Litvinov, however, was much Litvinov was even more direct. He closer to Stalin in his attitude toward asserted that it was "unreasonable to Poland, a nation that unwillingly consider that the interests of thirty played such an important role in the million Poles should be given equal origins of the Cold War. And on this weight with those of one hundred issue, Litvinov violated his own eighty million Russians. Where the dictum on great power unanimity. interests of the Russians conflicted It is important to remember that with those of the Poles, the Poles Litvinov's experiences with Colonel would have to give way."59 Litvinov Joseph Beck before the war still probably took a certain grim delight rankled. Under Beck, the Poles had in asserting Russia's right to lord it tried to block Soviet membership in over the Poles. But he surely was the League and had cooperated with also trying to warn the United States the Nazis in sabotaging Litvinov's as clearly and as soon as possible plans for a general collective that the future of Poland was not a 6 security system.5 Writing publicly negotiating point. in 1944, Litvinov hinted strongly that Were Stalin and the Politburo Poland must be brought to heel. He aware of Litvinov's generally asserted that no one could possibly conciliatory policy suggestions object "if the Soviet Union... toward the West? Litvinov himself desires to establish especially complained directly to Moscow friendly relations with its nearest during the war that he was shut out neighbors."57 Of course he meant of the policy-making process.60 And primarily Poland and it takes little of course Stalin showed no real imagination to understand just what interest inr,ostwar cooperation with Litvinov meant by "especially the West.6 But Litvinov told Edward

56 Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 193~1939 (New York, 1984), 42, 61. 57 N. Malinin, "K voprosu o sozdanii Mezhdunarodnoy organizatsii bezopasnosti" Voina i rabochii klass, 15 December 1944, p. 194. 58 N. Malinin, "Po povodu stat'i tov. N. Baltiyskogo," Voina i rabochii klass, 15 February 1944, pp. 13-16. 59 Department of State Archives, Harriman to Cordell Hull, 19 September 1944, Record Group 59, SOO.CC/ 9-1944. 60 Litvinov to Molotov, 11 April1942, Sovetsko-ameri.kanskie otnosheniia, 1: 159.

12 Carter, an American he and Ivy met incongruity in his thinking, much during the war, that in a bizarre less a way out of it. Nevertheless, sense he was indeed consulted. After Litvinov certainly deserves the war he said that Molotov had recognition as the lone voice in the asked for his advice and then "he Soviet wilderness crying for some does the opposite."62 way, however full of contradictions, It is clear that Litvinov occupied to preserve at least the appearance of a somewhat ambivalent position. In cooperation between the Bolshevik general he certainly favored the Revolution and the United States. principle of postwar cooperation Soon Litvinov "retired" once and with the United States. Yet he stood for all, as the Cold War deepened. By with Stalin on the issue of Soviet 1946 he looked upon the spectacle control over Poland after the war. of Stalin's expansionist policies with Stalin saw security foremost in nothing but disgust. In an interview terms of territory and on this, he with the American journalist, found Utvinov's support. It is little Richard C. Hottelet, Litvinov bluntly wonder then that Stalin felt no compared Stalin to Hitle~ saying compunction in gobbling up indirectly but unmistakably that both Poland, with the support of the most men believed in security through outspoken Soviet advocate of lebensraum.63 By implication Litvinov postwar cooperation with the West. had apparently modified his earlier But one wonders if Utvinov position on Poland. But it was too realized that the Soviet Union could late. His dream of a positive Soviet not have it both ways. How was American relationship died, not to be cooperation based on the principle revived until the advent of Mikhail of unanimity possible if, at the Gorbachev, and continued in the very outset, the USSR claimed an mid-1990s by Boris Yeltsin. Toward exception for itself, America's the end of his life, he told his objections be damned? There is no daughter Tatiana, "We won the war evidence that Litvinov saw this but lost the peace."64

61 John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, The Soviet Union, and the United States (New York, 1978), 166. 62 "Destruction of a Memoir," 5 January 1946, Joseph Freeman Papers, Box 175. 63 New York World and Telegraph, 29 January 1953, p. 17. 64 Interview with Tatiana Litvinov, 30--31 March 1981.