#263 Maxim M. Litvinov and Soviet-American Relations, 1918-1946 by Hugh Phillips Hugh Phillips is Associate Professor in the Department of History at Western Kentucky University in Bowling Green, Kentucky. The author's research and writing have been greatly facilitated by the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, the American Council of Teachers of Russian (AC1R), and Western Kentucky University. The Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars The Kerman Institute for Advanced Russian Studies is a division of the Woodrow Wlison International Center for Scholars. 1hrough its programs of residential scholarships, meetings, and publications, the Institute encourages scholarship on Russia and the former Soviet Union, embracing a broad range of fields in the social sciences and humanities. 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The views expressed in Kerman Institute Occasional Papers are those of the authors. ©June 1996 Woodrow Wlison International Center for Scholars edited by Kate Moore MAXIM M. LITVINOV AND SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1918- 1946 When historians consider the whose portrait adorned Litvinov's history of Soviet-American relations Kremlin office.3 and the Cold War generally, they Unlike his superiors, Litvinov understandably dwell on the possessed a diplomatic world view hostility and opposing goals and that was apparently unclouded by tactics of both sides. Especially Marxism-Lerunism and visions of prominent is an emphasis on the world revolution. Early on, he ideologically-based hostility of realized the necessity of devising a Soviet leaders toward what they traditional foreign policy designed to derisively called the "bourgeois protect the new Soviet state. Litvinov West." In a recent, fine study of the certainly remained a Marxist and Cold War, R.C. Raack paints a believed that socialism's world­ convincing portrait of Stalin as wide triumph was inevitable. But it rapaciously dedicated to fostering was not an immediate prospect and world revolution.1 The recent Marxism was useless as a guide for "memoirs" of Stalin's Foreign foreign policy. Speaking with the Minister, Viacheslav Molotov, also American journalist Louis Fischer, reveal a regime deeply dedicated to Litvinov declared that the prospects and driven by its Marxist world for world revolution disappeared for view.2 Yet virtually forgotten in the him on 11 November 1918 with the generally dreary tale of conflict and end of the war.4 Even more to the antagonism is the story of Maxim point, no less than Josef Stalin Litvinov, a prominent Soviet remarked that "Litvinov does not diplomat who struggled mightily for see and is not interested in the years to achieve not only normal but revolutionary aspect of policy."5 On even good relations with the West in another occasion, Stalin asserted that general, and the United States, in Litvinov was more "dangerous" to particular. Indeed, Litvinov had a Soviet interests than even the British genuine affection for America and Foreign Secretary, Arthur Henderson.6 especially for Franklin Roosevelt, Thus, at the outset of his diplomatic 1 RC. Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945: The Origins of the Cold War (Stanford: 1995). 2 Albert Resis, ed., Molotao Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics. Conversations with Felix Chuev (Chicago: 1993). 3 Jonathan Haslam, "Stalin and Litvinov," in Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed., Saoiet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991: A Retrospective (London, 1994), 55. 4 Louis Fischer, Men and Politics (New York, 1941),f.l27. As late as May 1922 Lenin was still harping on the "acceleration o the world revolutionary movement" Pravda, S May 1922. 5 Letter from Josef Stalin to Viacheslav Molotov, 29 August 1929 in Lars T. Lih, et al, eds., Stalin's Letters to Molotao (New Haven and London, 1995), 174. 6 Letter from Stalin to Molotov, 9 September 1929, in Ibid., 177. 1 career Litvinov understood the few failures. Stalin held little to no international situation far better than interest in Litvinov's ideas and when Lenin and the other Bolshevik this fact became indisputably obvious, leaders. He embraced a policy of Litvinov broke with the "Great realpolitik, dedicated to the concrete Leader" in a remarkably reckless interests of the government he way. Thus, he became the "first major served for so long? This sense of postwar dissident."9 This article realism often led Litvinov to some offers a brief account of Litvinov's unusual, albeit consistent, positions heroic, if futile, effort to find a for a Soviet diplomat and, in common ground with the United particular, engendered conflicts with States, an effort that lasted from 1918 his long-time boss, Josef Stalin. to 1946. Litvinov frequently looked to the Litvinov dedicated his early years West for help and cooperation. In to Vladimir Lenin's Bolshevik Party, general, he hoped for aid and running guns and propaganda into assistance in the interwar era from the Russian Empire. This dangerous Britain; with World War II, his eyes activity accomplished nothing and turned to the United States.8 To be in 1908 he gave it up and emigrated sure, he did not always agree with to Britain. There he led a Western policies and he had his conventional bourgeois life, own demands vis-a-vis the West. working for the publishing house of Nevertheless, Litvinov ultimately Williams and Norgate and giving saw relations with the West in a Russian language lessons. He fundamentally different light than married an Englishwoman and even Stalin did. The Communist Party became a British citizen. With the General Secretary had nothing but October Revolution, however, suspicion and hostility for the Litvinov returned to his native Western democracies, including the country and entered the diplomatic United States. How these two men service. He nevertheless quickly managed to work together remains a developed into a rather conventional mystery, but this article seeks to diplomat and an astute observer of illuminate what advice and policies international relations. He soon Litvinov suggested regarding Soviet advanced the point of view that policy toward the United States, in Moscow should look clearly at the particular after World War IT, when world as it existed and mold its this relationship assumed global policies in a non-revolutionary importance. It is hardly surprising fashion. Such an approach would that Litvinov faced quite formidable protect and promote Soviet domestic obstacles and suffered more than a interests, which Litvinov knew the 7 For a more extended discussion of Litvinov's career, the reader may consult Hugh Phillips, Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1992). 8 Interview with Tatiana Litvinov, 30-31 March 1981. 9 William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War (New York: 1982), 133. 2 first years of Bolshevism had delivered journalism... calculated to repel to the brink of unprecedented rather than conciliate,"14 Litvinov catastrophe.10 penned his own message to the One of Litvinov's first specific president. He emphasized that Soviet diplomatic proposals underscored his and U.S. public proposals for a understanding of the new importance European settlement had much in of the United States in international common, although the Soviet affairs. In 1918, while serving as the concepts were "more extensive." Soviet representative in London, he Most important, however, was the requested a transfer to Washington need for peace. Foreign powers after it became obvious that British should withdraw from Russia; if officials would not negotiate the intervention continued, it seriously with him. Lenin approved might well lead to a restoration of this suggestion; however, the the monarchy, which would only American government did not and result in "interminable revolutions Litvinov had to wait fifteen years and upheavals" that would be in no before his first mission to America.11 In the meantime, he continued to one's interest. Instead the new Russia seek a normalization of relations. In and the victorious powers should the early phases of this effort, he cooperate in the reconstruction of apparently dashed (not for the last the former "for the benefit of all time) with his superior, Commissar countries badly in need of foodstuffs for Foreign Affairs, Georgii Chicherin. and new materials." Litvinov In October 1918, the latter addressed concluded with the remark: "I a letter to President Woodrow Wilson venture to appeal to your sense of 15 that has been aptly described as justice and humanity." "extremely caustic and insulting."12 Wilson and British Prime Minister Chicherin even went so far as to lloyd George were favorably denigrate directly Wilson's cherished impressed with this opening. They vision of a League of Nations.13 accordingly asked Litvinov formally Litvinov rushed to limit the to elaborate on his letter in a series diplomatic damage. Disgusted with of meetings with the American a letter he thought "propagandistic diplomat, William H. Buckler. 10 In 1921 Utvinov supervised the expenditure of millions of dollars of foreign currency to buy the machinery, grain, and medical supplies Soviet Russia desperately needed.