Franco-Japanese Relations in East Asia from 1932 to 1945 Jean

Franco-Japanese relations in East Asia from 1932 to 1945

Jean-Sébastien Goyette East Asian Studies McGill University

January 2005

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of MA in East Asian Studies

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French Abstract

Ce travail concerne les relations Franco-Japonaises en Asie de l'est entre 1932 et

1945. Afin de réaliser ce but, il examine les comportements français envers les japonais à

Shanghai et en Indochine, la position de la France durant des événements tels que le

Shanghai Incident de 1932, sa politique durant le conflit Sino-Japonais ainsi que son rôle changeant et sa position en Asie de l'est pendant les années 30 et 40, surtout avec les changements apportés par la deuxième guerre mondiale. Ce travail rapporte aussi comment la France, ainsi que d'autres pays occidentaux, voyaient le Japon et l'Asie de l'est, ainsi que comment ça a affecté les relations Est-Ouest durant cette période.

Finalement, ce travail décrit les relations complexes qui existaient entre Vichy France, la

France Libre, l'Indochine ainsi que le Japon. Il termine avec la description d'événements tels que l'attaque japonaise sur Pearl Harbor, ce qui a mené à l'éventuelle occupation complète des territoires français en Asie de l'est et au dommage irréparable à la position de la France en Asie de l'est. 3

English abstract

This paper relates to Franco-Japanese relations between 1932 and 1945 in East Asia. In order to do this, it examines French behavior towards the Japanese in Shanghai and

Indochina, France's position during incidents such as the 1932 Shanghai Incident, its policy during the Sino-Japanese conflict as weIl as its changing role and position in East

Asia during the 1930s and 1940s, especially with the changes brought upon by the

Second World War. This paper also pays attention to how France, as weIl as other

Western nations, viewed Japan and East Asia, as weIl as how it affected East-West relations during this period. FinaIly, the paper describes the complex relations that existed between Vichy France, Free France, Indochina as weIl as Japan. It ends with events such at the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, that led to the eventual Japanese takeover of

French territories in East Asia and the irreparable damage to France's position in East

Asia. 4

Acknowledgements

l would like to thank aIl those who have helped me in completing this thesis. First of aIl, Professor Lorenz Luthi who greatly aided me in identifying and c1arifying the subject of my paper, guided me through the research process as weIl as supervising the writing process. AIso, l would like to thank Professor Margaret Kuo for taking over

Professor Luthi' s role in aiding me to finish my thesis as weIl as agreeing to serve as the internaI examiner in its correction. Furthermore, l would like to thank Professors Peter

Button, Tom Lamarre and Nicholas Dew for accepting to be an external examiner in the correction of my thesis. 5

Introduction

Throughout the past centuries, France had a foothold in Asia but it wasn't until the middle of the 19th Century that it secured acquisitions in the Far East. The most important of these were in Shanghai and lndochina. During the following decades,

France's East Asia policy was one of strict neutrality. This pennitted France to maintain a friendly relationship with Japan, thus delaying Franco-Japanese conflict until the last period of World War II. The pre-conditions of Franco-Japanese relations were simple: in exchange for Japan not advancing on French territory, France turned a blind eye to

Japanese military activities in China and other parts of East Asia. However, in the early

1930s, Japan's efforts to create an East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere put an end to

France's neutrality, shattered its image as a powerful Western nation in the Far East and led to the French ultimately losing territory and power in East Asia.

The main reasons why France didn't stand up to Japan in East Asia are the following. First of all, France maintained a Eurocentric view of East Asia. France's leaders believed that all events of importance would be settled in Europe. For them, the

Far East wasn't considered as a crucial part in French foreign policy and the Japanese were not seen as an authentic power that had to be taken seriously. Therefore, France neglected its assets in China and lndochina.

Another factor that contributed to France's demise in East Asia was the political instability and subsequent war in Europe. During the 1930s, France was more preoccupied with the Spanish Civil War and the increase ofpower in Nazi Gennany than conflicts occurring in East Asia. The rise of Sino-Japanese tension is a prime example of 6

this. This preoccupation with European events led the French government to not pay attention to the Japanese advances in East Asia, neglect its military power in lndochina, and ignore pleas for reinforcements from French nationals in the region.

A third point this paper will examine is the disorganization and lack of communication that existed between Japanese and French officiaIs throughout this period. The biggest problem was that French representatives in East Asia didn't possess real authority to make decisions conceming French policy in East Asia and Franco

Japanese relations. Consequently, the French government in Paris did not support sorne of their local representatives' policies. Other French politicians in East Asia simply acted independently from Paris. Furthermore, in more than one instance, simultaneous Franco

Japanese talks and negotiations were occurring. These multiple agreements often led to contradictory results. This research will demonstrate that for these reasons, France was by no means prepared to deal with Japan in the 1930s and that as a consequence, in Franco

Japanese relations, France desperately tried to retain its territory in East Asia. This struggle to preserve French sovereignty in China and lndochina meant maintaining a peaceful relationship with Japan. However, in most instances, Tokyo dominated Paris.

In order to elaborate on these reasons, this paper will present in chronological order the events that took place between 1932 and 1945 in East Asia. First of all, Franco

Japanese instability in the status quo began in the Shanghai French Concession in the early 1930s. Afterwards, important Franco-Japanese talks continued in lndochina throughout the following decade. In the early 1940s, the focus of negotiations between 7

Paris and Tokyo came back to Shanghai. In 1932, shortly after the Manchurian Incident!,

J apanese o ffic ers claimed J apanese citizens needed protection in Shanghai and consequently occupied Shanghai, including its French Concession. Although Japanese troops soon left the French territory, this Shanghai Incident shattered France's beliefthat it was invulnerable in East Asia. Furthermore, it demonstrated that it didn't have the capability to resist foreign aggression in the Far East. This refusaI to stand up to Japan in order to keep it on its friendly side became France's East Asian policy for the following decade.

Franco-J apanese relations encountered a new obstacle in September 1937. Earlier that summer, the Sino-J apanese conflict had officially begun. In the process of that war,

Japan was expanding throughout Chinese and East Asian territory. Soon, Japan took over the French owned island of Hainan, the Spratly Islands as weIl as the Paracel Islands.

Contrary to French popular desire in France and East Asia, Paris didn't take action against the Japanese aggression. As a result, the French government showed its lack of resolve in defending its territory. The same year, Japanese troops once more occupied the

Shanghai French Concession. France again remained passive to Japanese movements in the metropolis, because it was preoccupied with events happening in Europe and also because it didn't want to provoke the Japanese military.

In 1940, Paris fell to Berlin's army. A new Vichy government was formed and headed by Marshal Maurice Pétain. Nevertheless, it was Germany who made the decisions. A direct consequence of this was the increase of Japan's domination of the

1 In order for Japanese troops to enter and occupy Manchuria, a group of Japanese soldiers organized an attack on a Japanese railway and made it look like Chinese troops had done the deed 8

French in East Asia. This was mainly because since France had lost aU its power in

Europe, it was even more difficult to give the illusion that sorne remained in East Asia.

The absence of French power in the Far East led Japan to enter once again Shanghai's

French Concession and to make increasing demands to lndochina's government. From

1940 to 1945, General Georges Catroux and AdmiraI Jean Decoux served as Governor

General of lndochina one after the other. From the start, Catroux believed that the

Japanese military power in East Asia greatly surpassed that of France. Furthermore, he stated that contrary to his superiors in Paris, he had a closer and more realistic perspective on the matter. For these reasons, he went against Vichy's orders and gave Japan ev en more than what it was asking for. He explained that this was to create a favorable mood for subsequent negotiations.

France reacted to how Catroux dealt with Japan in two ways. First of aU, it sent

AdmiraI Jean Decoux, Commander of the French Naval forces in the Far East, to replace him as Governor-General of lndochina. Nevertheless, it took weeks before Catroux agreed to relinquish his post. During this period, he continued presenting himself to the

Japanese government as France's representative in East Asia. Second, French Foreign

Minister Paul Baudouin took charge of Franco-Japanese negotiations. At the same time,

Arsène-Henry, France's Ambassador to Tokyo, was also having talks with the Japanese government. Because ofthis vast number ofrepresentatives, Japan and France negotiated multiple and contradictory accords.

During the winter of 1941, Japan's successful, although unrequested mediation of the Thai-Indochinese conflict led to Japan's securing a more permanent position in lndochina. Its role as peacekeeper was used as a pretext to increase its number of 9

warships in lndochinese harbors. This was the beginning of the end for Decoux' s tough position on Japan. In the following months, new economic and military treaties were negotiated between France and Japan. These gave Japan access to Indochinese resources, a number of French military bases as well as the right for Japanese troops to be stationed in the French territory and travel on its roads and railways.

The following December when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Japanese troops immediately took the Shanghai International Settlement, mostly inhabited by American and British nationals. As for the French Concession, Franco-J apanese ententes negotiated earlier in Indochina were extended to Shanghai. This part of the metropolis remained in

French hands until 1943 when it was handed over to the mayor of Shanghai, a member of

Japan's puppet govemment in Nanjing. The final steps in handing over the concession were handled in 1946. As for Indochina, the post-Pearl Harbor period was characterized by increasing Japanese demands as well as a renewal of a policy of French neutrality in

East Asia.

During his stay in office, Governor-General Jean Decoux's main goal was to preserve Indochina in French hands. His approach to realizing this objective was to minimize hostilities with the Japanese. Although he was successful for a very long period in doing so, he has been accused by many of collaborating with the enemy. Throughout the war, General Charles de Gaulle, the leader of Free France, was one of those who attacked Decoux's policies the most. He targeted Decoux's passivity towards Japan as weIl as the degree with which he was loyal to the Vichy govemment. These two leaders never saw eye to eye on policies. This mutual hostility reached its peak with the failed organization of a Resistance movement in Indochina. 10

The culmination of Franco-Japanese tensions in lndochina was a Japanese coup de force on March 9, 1945. In a very short period of time, Japan took over the entire administration of lndochina, leaving the French population dead, imprisoned, or on the ron. It was only after Japan's surrender that lndochina went back into French hands.

Nevertheless, the damage do ne to France due to the Japanese presence in lndochina wasn't limited to military or economic losses. In addition, France's credibility and its image of strength were forever altered and would never be rebuilt.

The original goal of this paper was to research Franco-J apanese relations within the backdrop of the French Concession in Shanghai during the 1930s and 1940s.

However, the scarcity ofresources that 1 could access on the subject led to the subject of the research to be extended to Franco-Japanese relations in lndochina and China between

1932 and 1945. The main primary documents that were used for this research were the memoirs of General Maurice Catroux and those of AdmiraI Jean Decoux. Both gave a personal insight to the lack of support from Paris, Indochina's weak military as well as the confusion that existed in Franco-Japanese talks. Additional first hand accounts from individuals such as General de Sabbatier, supreme commander in lndochina and Claude de Boisanger, Decoux's personal aid, supplied valuable information on the circumstances that shaped the future of lndochina and transformed the image of the French in East Asia.

However, it soon became clear that researching the most important years, from 1940 to

1944, would be a problem because Vichy was in power in France. Most post World War

II literature conceming Vichy France describes it as a traitorous and malicious epoch of

French history. Many French historians describe it as a dark period that should be forgotten. Research on this period of French history focuses mainly on an event that 11

occurred within France and does not regard Vichy as a rightful period of France's government. During both these periods, Vichy was the official government of France and its foreign policy decided its relations with Japan. Most of Vichy's documents haven't been published and are locked away in Paris.

Regardless of the fact that only a handful of people have examined France's East

Asian policies during the 1930s and 1940s and that the Vichy govemment is still considered the black sheep of French history, sufficient documentation was available for research. Additional primary sources came mainly from French, Chinese and American newspapers. However, the Japanese occupation of China and as the French surrender to

Germany resulted in a combination of censorship, temporary stoppage of printing and propaganda. For these reasons, in researching the French Concession in Shanghai, the

New York Times contains the most impartial information until December 1941. As for

Indochina, numerous memoirs and secondary literature have been published many years after the fall of Vichy. Therefore, sources have been more varied and numerous. In order to reduce the amount of geographic terms used in this paper, the author has grouped

Indochina, China, Japan, the Philippines as well as many other countries and cities under the term East Asia. 12

The 1932 Shanghai Incident

After China's loss to Britain in the Opium Wars in the mid-19th Century, Western nations in East Asia obtained rights and concessions in China as weIl as signed economic, political and military treaties with this nation. By 1907, France and Japan had signed an entente in which both agreed to support each other' s interests in the areas of China adjacent to those territories in which they held extraterritorial or sovereign rights. As compensation for Japanese help in Europe during the First World War, France was also turning a blind eye to its movements in China as long as Japan maintained China's mtegnty.. . 2

This kind of arrangement in which Western and Eastern powers both stayed out of each other's way had functioned adequately for many decades. Occasionally, a Western intervention would hinder this neutrality. One such example refers to the Triple

Intervention of 1895 in which France, Russia and Germany put pressure on Japan to give back the Liaodong Peninsula to China. However, tolerance between Asian and Western nations didn't necessarily mean peace and pro sp erit y between China and Japan. In the early 1930s, Chinese protest to the presence of Japanese troops in Manchuria led to an anti-Japanese boycott. Consequently, this hurt Japanese trade in Shanghai. As in

Manchuria, Japanese army officers had enjoyed a great deal of independence. The result ofthis was that it often led to altercations with the Chinese. On January 18, 1932, after an incident involving Chinese citizens attacking Japanese nationals in a Chinese factory,

AdmiraI Koichi Shiozawa, Japanese naval commander in Shanghai, moved his troops

2 Dreifort, P.23 13

th into the city. On the 24 , he sent a list of demands to the mayor of the city, one of them to terminate the boycott.3 The Chinese complied on January 28, but Shiozawa still sent his troops into the Chinese suburb of Chapei under the pretext of protecting Japanese nationals living there. When the Chinese resisted this military move, the AdmiraI launched a full-sc ale attack involving almost fi fty thousand Japanese soldiers. This clash of troops lasted five weeks. Contrary to the Manchurian Incident, this incident triggered international public condemnation. Europeans realized that Western interests in the

International Settlement and French Concession were in a precarious situation.4

Japanese forces had taken this opportunity as a pretext to "protect" its Japanese citizens in Shanghai. It is to be noted that Japanese nationals did not inhabit many parts of the city occupied by Japanese soldiers. Without wasting any time, the Japanese troops moved into Chinese and Foreign zones.5 By doing so, they destroyed the property of

6 French Catholic missionaries , harmed Sino-French trade as well as French investments in China. France later protested against this advancement into foreign zones but, unwilling to take sides with China and violate the status quo, it wasn't able to do more than file a protest. 7 The International Settlement and the French concession were outside the "war zone" but the Japanese sometimes struck their buildings by accident. On May 5,

1932, Chinese and Japanese forces declared a suspension of hostilities and Japanese

3 Dreifort, P.58 4 Dreifort, P.59 5 Hsü, P.14 6 France considered itself the protector of all Catholic missionaries in East Asia 7 Buss, P.361 14

forces withdrew from foreign zones. Nevertheless, this incident led to the end of foreign immunity in Shanghai and to insecurity for foreigners. 8

Even though Japanese troops had exited the foreign concessions in May 1932, they remained around Shanghai. Six months later, in November 1932, Japanese forces surrounded the French Concession and the International Settlement. The Japanese asked these two sections of Shanghai to take precautionary measures. Among them was the suppression of Kuomintang (KMT), the Chinese Nationalist party led by Chiang Kai- shek, Communist and anti-Japanese activities, censorship of anti-Japanese literature, newspapers, radio, movies, as weIl as the expulsion of aIl members of the Chinese political and administrative staff. The purpose of these actions was to maintain absolute neutrality. Settlement and French authorities agreed to carry out these conditions insofar as it was possible.9

Ever since it had obtained its concessions in China, France had made a point of not getting involved in East Asian political affairs. This policy of remaining neutral was in more than one way hi ding France's poor military power in East Asia. This lack of strength resulted in France accepting Japan's demands in Shanghai. These led the

Chinese press to curb expression, patriotic societies to dissolve themselves and Chinese officiaIs and government organs to transfer themselves elsewhere. In the following weeks, Chinese daily newspapers suspended their publications or moved inland, Chinese news agencies discontinued their services and Chinese broadcasting stations eliminated war news and other items of a political nature from their programs. Nevertheless, by the

8 Hsü, P.17 9 Hsü, P.61 15

end of November, a Japanese newspaper published that anti-Japanese activities continued in the French Concession and that Japan wou Id arrest the anti-Japanese agents themselves if the French govemment didn't act. French authorities in Shanghai continued to look away, pursuing its nearly-century old policy of neutrality towards East Asia. lO

The Sillo-Japallese cOlljlict

The Sino-Japanese War broke out in July 1937. For the first three years of this conflict, France chose to pursue its policy of neutrality and hope that, as before, this war would pass by and leave the French possessions in East Asia untouched. However,

France's position in the Far East was becoming more and more fragile diplomaticaHy and militarily. The Japanese Empire, on the other hand, was growing in power, size and wealth. Tokyo was looking towards French lndochina for two principal reasons. First of aH, lndochina possessed vast quantities of natural resources. Furthermore, the French owned Yunnan Rai1way was a major means of transporting of weapons for the KMT,

Japan's main adversary in the war in China. 11

Many reasons explain why France wasn't too preoccupied with the conflict between Japan and China. Besides its "wait until it blows over" policy mentioned above, the geographic proximity of the Spanish Civil War and developments in Germany at the same time took most of the French government' s attention. Like before, instead of taking any initiative, the Quai d'Orsay, France's Foreign Office, foHowed British and American initiatives in expressing their concems to the Japanese government. The Quai d'Orsay's hoped that once more everything would soon retum to normal was unfounded. The Sino-

JO Hsü, P.57 16

Japanese War showed no signs of slowing down and a quick end to the conflict didn't seem plausible. With this prospect of an extended war came France's realization that this time, it couldn't remain a passive observer. The Quai d'Orsay had not forgotten the les son learned in 1932 in Shanghai. France's Far Eastern settlements would need addition al protection if the Japanese decided to move in on them. Unfortunately for them,

France could not spare any extra forces to add to their defenses. 12

French indifference in China continued until September 1937 when J apanese troops fired on the Hainan port of Hoihao. Hainan had been under French occupation for fort Y years and was of great economic importance because of the amount of trade that was conducted in it. This sudden violation of their colonial territory took the French in

France and East Asia by surprise. Most expected the Quai d'Orsay to react rapidly against the attack. However, this was not the case. The French press explained that the

Foreign Office had lost sight of the value of past agreements with China and Japan in which France had many economic and political advantages. Franco-Japanese pacts had assured that France and Japan wouldn't interfere with the other's interests in East Asia.

The French population was worried that France was losing its privileged position in East

Asia and that Japan was pressuring French policy for its own benefit. On January 28,

1938, AdmiraI Mitsumasa Yonai, Japanese Minister of the Navy, informed the Quai d'Orsay that Japan had no recourse but to occupy Hainan. 13 Japanese troops landed on

Hainan on February 10, 1939. Japan's main objectives in occupying Hainan were to hinder British naval circulation between Singapore and Hong Kong and to bring

II Levy, P.117 12 Dreifort, P.1 06 17

Indochina even more under Japanese control. Its distance of one-hour flight-time from

Hainan made this easy.14 Nevertheless, Japan's armed forces had no intention of creating naval bases on the Asiatic continent. Soon afterwards, Japan went after the Paracel

Islands, on which the French had built a lighthouse and meteorological station in October

1937. FinaIly, in March 1938, Japan advanced to the French-occupied Spratly Islands. 15

Before this, the French in East Asia had believed they were safe in their zones of influence like they had been in the past. The beginning of Japan's expansion in order to create an Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and the subsequent takeover of French territory changed aIl this. The Japanese forces now possessed naval bases close enough to French

Indochina to launch air strikes to bomb its cities and also destroy the Yunnan rai1way. We shaIllater see the importance ofthis railway connecting China and Indochina. 16

As French politicians feared for many years but hoped would never happen,

Japanese forces decided to take possession of France's main East Asian territory. On

August 13, 1937, Japanese troops arrived in Shanghai. Many foreigners such as Dora

Sanders Carney, a Canadian living in Shanghai at the time, were worried about Japan's intentions: "A truce had been arranged between the Chinese and the Japanese from

11.A.M. to 2 P.M. to allow the foreign women and children to pass down the river. But 1 did not trust this temporary agreement.,,17 Tokyo argued that the main reason it had sent troops in the metropolis was because of a violation of the Shanghai Truce Agreement of

1932. Tokyo stated that the presence of Chinese troops in the demilitarized zone was a

13 Buss, P.368 14 Levy, P.59 15 Buss, P.368 16 Buss, P.371 18

c1ear infraction to the entente and had to be dealt with. Unlike the 1932 Shanghai

Incident, foreign forces didn't immediately dec1are a state of emergency. Nevertheless, they took certain security measures. Even though France supported the British initiative,

Britain was the only one to openly protest Japan's invasion of Shanghai and ask the troops to withdraw. Japan, saying it was impossible to exc1ude Shanghai from the Sino

J apanese war refused this request. The fighting in Shanghai lasted almost three months. 18

In the beginning of the Sino-Japanese conflict, from July to September 1937, the presence of Japanese troops endangered the position of the French Concession in

Shanghai. In August, France followed the British-Ied initiative that demanded both the

Chinese and Japanese govemments to withdraw their troops from the city. Tokyo promptly rejected this. During the same period, France's concession received a massive flow of refugees. This new population consisted of Chinese in search of safety, employment and food. Another group that increased the amount of people living in the

French Concession was the European J ews seeking refuge from the growing power and influence of Nazi Germany. This flow of population towards the French Concession was mainly the result of French authorities in China having successfully negotiated a neutral safe zone with the Japanese. The Japanese forces located in the Chinese city of Nantou couldn't gain access to this part of Shanghai. Japanese nationals still had a seat on

Shanghai' s municipal council and tried many times to gain control of the French

Concession but were refused access by the French Consul General. 19

17 Carney, P.20S 18 Hsü P.23 19 Levy, P.54 19

The League ofNations

In the past, European powers in East Asia had re1ied on their combined power and influence in order to maintain their superior position in po1itica1, military and economic relations. Furthermore, the League of Nations had adequate1y served the purpose of preserving peace and order in the Far East. Neverthe1ess, events such as Japan's withdrawa1 from the League in the early 1930s and the po1itica1 instabi1ity in Europe had

1ed France to worry about the 10ss of power and influence of the League of Nations in

East Asia. In 1937, although it still maintained sorne power in Europe, the League of

Nations had 10st most of its authority in the Far East. With regards to the Sino-Japanese

War, this organization cou1d still intervene but France feared this for two reasons. First of aIl, it cou1d lead Japan to seek revenge against Western possessions in East Asia, namely,

Indochina. Second, France needed the League to maintain its full authority in Europe. If an attempt to intercede in East Asian affairs resulted in a 10ss of power, which Paris believed it certain1y wou1d, then the situation in Europe could worsen. On September 12,

1937, France's concerns increased when Japanese authorities informed Charles-Arsène

Henry, French Ambassador to Tokyo, of Japan's negative reaction to French citizens in

East Asia in the event of the French govemment supporting China in the Sino-Japanese conflict. Later on the 2ih of the same month, France's fears became a rea1ity when the

League of Nations passed the Cranborne Resolution. This resolution condemned the

Japanese bombing of Shanghai during the preceding summer. For Paris, this intervention was strong enough to antagonize Japan but too weak to restrain it. 20 Even with its neutral

20 Dreifort, P.1 07 20

policy and desire not to displease the J apanese government, the French government in

China had to, on sorne occasions, take initiatives against Japan. Two examples demonstrate this idea. In July 1937, French troops in Tianjin refused to let Japanese

soldiers pass through the French concession on their way to destroy Nankai University.

Two years later, on July 7, 1939, the French resisted a Japanese show of force, this time

in the Hankou Concession.21

The Second World War

As soon as the Second World War began in Europe in 1939, its consequences

were felt in East Asia. Although at first it did not involve France's Far Eastern

possessions, the effects of Germany' s later move to occupy France had great effects in

France's East Asian possessions. First of all, it shattered the image of an all-mighty

French empire that France had put much effort into maintaining. This led East Asian

nations to question France's strength in their part of the world. Furthermore, the

European instability gave sorne factions of the Tokyo govemment the impression that

their time for driving the Europeans out of East Asia had finally come. At the beginning

of World War II, France's possessions in East Asia were to play two economic roles in

the French war effort. These were to supply raw materials as well as foreign currency.

Indochina was to be the main source for both of these. 22 When French Resistance in

Europe collapsed against Germany, France's interests in Asia were thrown at the mercy

of Japan. Subsequently, Japanese demands on lndochina increased. 23 An example of the

2\ Buss, P.360 22 Levy, P.l38 23 Buss, P.336 21

changed political situation in Asia goes as follows. When Paris fell on June 14, 1940,

General Georges Catroux, Govemor-General of lndochina, got news that an immediate double Japanese attack was possible. This would come by sea on the coast of Annam and by land at the Tonkin border. A long period of Japanese demands with regards to

lndochina had begun.24

The effects of France's defeat in Europe were also felt in Shanghai. On June 23,

1940, without prior consultation with the other foreign forces in Shanghai, the French- patrolled defense sector adjoining the French Concession was suddenly tumed over to the

Japanese and representatives of Wang Jingwei's Nanjing Govemment, the Chinese

puppet state of Japan. Four days later the local French officiaIs accorded the Japanese

army the right to extradite Chinese citizens arrested in the French Concession and to

participate in military searches for anti-Japanese suspects within the Concession. This

was the opening gun for a campaign against "agents of the Chongqing Govemment,,25,

which lasted throughout the summer. 26

Soon after its initial demands to lndochina and its intervention in Shanghai's

French concession, J apan attempted to force a reorientation of the French political

position in East Asia. Japan's first attack was directed at its foreign concessions in China.

First of all, French nationals were requested to withdraw from these territories. France

accepted these conditions in November 1940, but later negotiations over lndochina

changed the status of Franco-Japanese relations. This will be explored in more details

later in this thesis. Japan also requested a revision of defense regulations of the defense

24 Decoux, P.65 25 Chongqing was the wartime capital of the KMT 22

areas. The second attack was on unoccupied China's links with the outside. This was achieved when Japanese troops captured Nanning on November 24, 1940 and c10sed down the trucking route and halted the railway. With the intensification of the war in

Europe, Japan made a move to gain access to sources of raw material of the French,

British and Dutch colonies in the South China Seas and, if ever these powers' status quo position should change, obtain custody of these areas. When Vichy France had

capitulated to Germany, Japanese expansionists had seen the opportunity to end its

undeclared war with China, decrease Japan's dependence on foreign sources of raw materials and expand into Southeast Asia. An efficient way to do this was to take control

of France's East Asian territory. Taking possession of the French Concessions in Tianjin

and Shanghai was seen as having the double effect of striking a blow at the Chinese

Nationalist forces in the Concessions and eliminating the Western influence and

competition in China. As for Indochina, it would fulfill Japan's need for raw materials

such as rice, iron, coal, rubber and tin. 27

The French military in East Asia

In order to understand better the reasons why J apan felt so confident in advancing

into French controlled territory and why France ceded so much to the advancing troops,

we must examine the Franco-Japanese differences in military power. Japan's land, sea

and air power greatly surpassed Vichy France's East Asian military forces. Even after

three years of fighting against China, Japan's fleet was relatively intact. As for

lndochina's naval power, it consisted of a handful of small and outdated ships. These

26 Levy, P.149 23

could only have been considered significant if they had been co-operating with British

Far Eastern naval forces. Nevertheless, this was not the case. 28 Before Japan had shown any real signs of moving into French territory in East Asia, General Maurice Martin,

Commander of French troops in Indochina, had done a comparison of French and

Japanese military power. According to his conclusions, Japan controlled the seas without

France having the slightest chance of challenging it. Furthermore, Indochina possessed nothing close to what could be considered an airforce; it had little artillery, almost no tanks, and a native infantry with no anti-tank or anti-aircraft capability. Therefore, it couldn't stop a landing in key locations such as Haiphong or bombings of major cities such as Hanoi. In addition, Indochina would have to fight on two fronts. The first of which was Japan's Canton army on the Guangxi border. The second was the Gulf of

Tonkin. Japan simply possessed a much stronger military power than Indochina.29 An explanation for this po or defense situation was that pre-World War II French Colonial

Policy stated that in case of world conflict, the fate of the French empire would be settled in Europe, not in the Far East. Therefore, in 1939, it was out of the question to send troops to Indochina. 3o

Indochinese Railways

Japan's goal of creating an Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere depended upon Japanese control over China. Since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, Tokyo, who referred to the war as "The China Problem" had been concerned about the amount of foreign

27 Levy, P.140 28 Levy, P.147 29 Catroux, P.58 24

weapons that was being sent to China. These could enter the country either by sea to the

East, by Mongolia or through lndochina and Burma. From lndochina, two railroads

served as means of communication with China, the Yunnan Railway and the Langson-

Dong-Dang railroad. 31 The Yunnan Railway was an important means of transportation of these weapons and munitions from lndochina to Nationalist China. This constant import

deeply troubled Japanese forces in East Asia, which would later serve as a pretext for

J apanese troops entering Indochina. 32

The Yunnan Railway had been III French hands for many decades and the lndochinese govemment didn't want to let go of its control. In 1903, an agreement between China and France had stated that France was to build and operate the railway

from Hanoi to Yunnan. AIso, the French were to keep control of aH trade until the end of the lease in 1990. The Railway Company had the power to decide what goods wou Id

enter China, but once in China, they were to be the responsibility of the Chinese

govemment. A subsequent 1930 treaty permitted Chinese military supplies to pass

without interference. This flow of arms and munitions to enemies of Japan provoked

much protest in Tokyo.33

For over three decades, France kept a firm hold on the railways travelling from

lndochina to China and had the final word on what was shipped and who it was destined

for. In October 1937, the French govemment in lndochina realized that the Japanese air

force could easily destroy the Yunnan rai1road. Faced with its helplessness against

30 Decoux, P. 74 31 Levy, P.56 32 Buss, P.363 33 Buss, P.363 25

Japan's military might, lndochina took the decision to limit anns traffic between

lndochina and Yunnan to weapons that had been shipped before October or ordered before the beginning of the Sino-Japanese conflict in June 1937. This decision prevented

Chiang Kai-shek from obtaining weapons from lndochina but the KMT still regularly

received anns and ammunition through Hong Kong and Canton by suppliers such as

Gennany, England and the United States. 34

The key to French diplomacy in East Asia was the negotiations over the anns and

ammunitions traffic on the Yunnan railroad. In exchange for French agreement in

October 1937 to limit the shipment of anns to China, Japan had supposed1y given the

assurance that it wou1dn't advance on Hainan. Neverthe1ess, Japanese troops took

possession of Hainan in February 1939. This Japanese show of force made it easier to

force France to maintain the deal. In protest, French lndochina opened once more its

Chinese border to shipment of weapons but two weeks later, Japanese pressure forced it

to close down again. After this incident, France didn't use the threat of reopening its

border as diplomatie weapon. This missed opportunity to stand up to Japan set the mood

for following Franco-Japanese dealings. 35

June 19,1940, Japanese ultimatum to Catroux

In 1931, with the first incident, J apan had begun its domination of China but it

wasn't until the second incident in 1937 that the Sino-Japanese conflict took on an

international character. Countries such as the United States and Britain became

increasingly concemed with China's independence and Japan's expansion in Asia. As a

34 Levy, P.56 26

consequence, they responded by gIVmg aid to the Chinese Nationalist reglme. For example, the Unites States sent weapons to Chiang Kai-shek's forces. These weapons traveled through French territory in Indonesia to finally arrive in China. Japan protested to the French governrnent for permitting this but France ignored it as long as it could profit from the selling of these weapons. In 1938, Japanese persistence in pressuring

France paid off when France ended the transit of weapons to China through Indochinese territory. Nevertheless, other non-military merchandise could still pass.36

After leaming of the French govemment's decision to sue for an armistice, Japan quickly took steps towards obtaining additional concessions from the French in Asia. On

June 19, 1940, the Tokyo govemment sent an ultimatum to General Catroux regarding that all shipments of weapons, gasoline and trucks to the Nationalist regime of Chiang

Kai-shek through Indochina be stopped. Furthermore, it demanded that Japanese inspectors be admitted to verify that these demands were being complied with. Japan wanted an answer the following day.37

France's surrender in Europe had destroyed the image of an indestructible French

East Asian empire. As soon as Japan realized that France was losing the war in Europe, it made its move on Indochina.38 Still, besides this European defeat, the main reason that motivated the Japanese to present an ultimatum to Catroux was Indochina's weak military forces. Catroux immediately sought to correct this situation. On June 19, 1940, the same day as Japan sent its ultimatum, Catroux asked René de Saint-Quentin, French

35 Levy, P.126 36 De Boisanger, P.SI 37 Hytier, P.2I4 38 De Gaulle, CalI to Honor, P.164 27

Ambassador to the United States, to obtain armament from the American government.

The response from Washington was that it didn't want to get itself involved in a conflict with Japan. In other words, the United States would let Japan invade Indochina. The following day, on June 20, 1940, Catroux contacted AdmiraI Sir Percy Noble,

Commander of British fleet in Singapore, and Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador to

Washington. The purpose was to ask what support Indochina could expect from Britain.

Halifax replied that England would give Indochina diplomatie and political support, but that Indochina's fate, as well as England's, was tied to the defeat of Germany in Europe.

Therefore, England had to put all its efforts into reaching this goal. Halifax agreed with the Americans in saying that conflict in East Asia had to be avoided, and that for now,

Japan was only interested in Indochina to resolve the China conflict.39

Faced with Indochina's poor military capability and its neighboring European colonial powers' refusaI to help it, Catroux believed that everything had to be done to prevent an armed Japanese intervention in Indochina and to reinforce the defense potential of Tonkin. Catroux, as well as Arsène-Henry, considered giving in to the ultimatum as the only option to keep Indochina, even though he knew the consequences it would have on Indochina and its population. These ranged from J apanese exploitation of

Indochina's natural resources to the abuse of its population. In the course of the negotiations, Major General Yuitsu Tsushihashi, chief of the Second Bureau of the

General Staff at the War Office in Tokyo, expressed the reason why Japan insisted on the c10sing down of the Indochinese border. According to him, Tokyo believed that its China

Problem would be resolved more rapidly if the Indochinese border were c1osed.

39 Catroux, P.55 28

Tsushihashi denied that Japan wanted any part of lndochina for itself. Without conferring with his Govemment, Catroux consented to the Japanese ultimatum.40 On June 20, 1940, the Govemor-General accepted to close the borders to shipments of fuel by trucks and rai1way and other materials, i.e. war materials. The closing was to be supervised by

Japanese forces. 41

Without any armed Resistance, Catroux followed Japan's instructions in dealing with its neighboring country. Catroux had acted with the best of intentions to preserve

France's colonial territory in lndochina. However, he had not consulted with the Vichy govemment in France. On June 21, 1940, Albert Rivière, France's Foreign Minister, informed Catroux that the Japanese presence within French territory was unacceptable.

Three days later, on June 24, 1940, Catroux responded to Rivière. His answer contained explanations such as the necessity of maintaining an adequate moral and diplomatic atmosphere in Asia after France's reputation had been tamished by France's capitulation in Europe. Catroux maintained that giving in to Japanese demands was the only way to preserve lndochina. Since France's defeat earlier in that month, Japan had been threatening because of its weak military power but also because of its loss of the British alliance. A few days later, on June 26, 1940, Catroux once more reminded Vichy of

Indochina's military inferiority. lndochinese forces only had twenty-five airplanes, compared to Japan's fleet of two hundred airplanes. He maintained that his actions were meant to buy time in order to obtain additional weapons from the United States and

40 Catroux, P.49 41 Catroux, P.61 29

obtain pilots and airplanes from France.42 Nevertheless, Vichy didn't accept Catroux's

"you had to be there" defense and soon sought to replace him.

Decoux replaces Catroux

Vichy didn't accept Catroux's explanations as to why Indochina had bowed to

Japan but nonetheless realized the extent of its vulnerable position in East Asia and of its minimal military strength. In addition, England and the United States were unavailable to give it support. Furthermore Vichy was unable to send reinforcements to help the

Indochinese forces. For these reasons, many members of the Vichy govemment agreed with Catroux that capitulation was the only way to preserve French sovereignty in

Indochina. Nevertheless, the fact that he had acted without consulting them beforehand was deemed unforgivable. As a consequence, AdmiraI Decoux was sent to take Catroux's place in Indochina. Catroux wasn't willing to give up his post so readily and it took three weeks before Decoux could replace him. Meanwhile, Catroux continued negotiating with the Japanese. 43

While Decoux was trying to have his authority recognized in Indochina, on June

29, 1940, Catroux met with General Issaku Nishihara, head of the Japanese control mission in Indochina. His primary objectives in dealing with the General were to make the atmosphere proper for negotiations. To do this, he granted the Japanese a number of concessions and permitted a military presence on French territory. At the same time, he had to maintain the illusion that he was in charge of Indochina and hide the fact that he

42 Catroux, P.62 43 Hytier, P.2IS 30

was acting independently of Viehy.44 When the Japanese delegation asked to meet with

Deeoux, Catroux simply answered that the AdmiraI had not yet come to power. Nishihara expressed right away his wishes to better Franco-J apanese relations in East Asia then presented his government's demands. The Japanese representative asked that Indoehina give Japanese troops the merchandise from the Chinese transit and provide the Japanese

Guangxi army with food and ammunition throughout Tonkin. In addition, Nishihara asked that this army be allowed to send the wounded and sick to Tonkin hospitals.

Finally, Japanese troops would be given permission to cross Indochina in order to go to

Yunnan.45

Japan's promise to be present in Indochina only to help settle its China Problem was quiekly forgotten with the new demands to give J apanese troops a more permanent foothold in Indochina. Although having been told to step down by the Vichy government,

Catroux kept informing Vichy about the situation in Indoehina. On July 2, 1940, Catroux informed Rivière that the native population was adapting well to the concessions made to

Japan, happy that they would prevent an invasion. After meeting with General Nishihara, he believed that Japan-Indochina relations would get better. The Tokyo representative had informed Catroux that J apan only wanted economic advantages from Indochina.

Nevertheless, he was afraid that the Canton army would not believe that the traffic in the

China-Indochina border was closed and would try to appease the situation. Furthermore,

Catroux got the British to lift the blockade that they had set up earlier. Therefore, French boats could travel freely in the Pacifie. This permitted trade with Hong Kong and

44 Catroux, P.76 45 Decoux, P.67 31

Singapore, the recognition lndochinese money in those British territories as weIl as lndochina's much needed exports. According to lndochina's leader, if aIl these conditions maintained themselves, lndochina would remain French.46

Faced with new demands, Catroux once more gave in to the Japanese without consulting the Vichy govemment in France. As for why he didn't resist the Japanese pressure, Catroux informed his successor that it was an act of generosity towards the

Japanese army that was to create a favorable atmosphere for negotiations.47 On July 7,

1940, the Govemor-General of lndochina closed down the Chinese border to traffic from

China to lndochina for a month. Two days later, on July 9, 1940, he authorized wounded and sick Japanese soldiers to be cared for in lndochinese hospitals. However, Catroux refused to let Japanese troops pass through lndochina but allowed the shipment of victuals for the Japanese Guangxi army. This, as well as the authorization to establish an air liaison and cable liaison between Canton and Haiphong, hinted to possibilities of broader Franco-Japanese military collaboration in East Asia. Catroux's aim was to obtain from Japan a paper guarantee of France's sovereignty over lndochina. Nevertheless,

Japan encroached more and more on French rights.48

Soon after the July entente between lndochina and Japan was reached, Franco-

Japanese negotiations moved towards Tokyo. Nishihara remained on the Japanese side but Arsène-Henry took over for France. On July 10, 1940, Nishihara proposed a Japan-

Vichy alliance in which France would preserve lndochina and other islands it possesses in East Asia. In exchange, J apanese troops could pass through lndochina, use its

46 Catroux, P.78 47 Decoux, P.67 32

aerodromes and military installations as well as the Yunnan railway. Japan's goal in obtaining these privileges from Indochina was to aid its army in the Yunnan. Arsène-

Henry answered Nishihara's proposition by pointing out that giving Japan access to these facilities and ai ding it in its expansion into Yunnan would be considered an act of French aggression towards China. This went against the maintenance of the status quo in

France's East Asian policy.49

Arsène-Henry tumed down Nishihara's offer but the necessity of maintaining friendly Franco-Japanese relations resulted in a series of counter-propositions. First of all,

Indochina was to close offits Chinese border. This would help Japan get c10ser to solving its China Problem. Afterwards, Indochinese roads and railways would be used to transport Japanese material and food as well as evacuate Japanese forces from Kwangsi.

Once more, in exchange, J apan would respect French sovereignty in Indochina and recognize that Yunnan, Sichuan and Guangxi form a zone of economic influence to

Indochina. AIso, J apan would agree to evacuate J apanese troops from Hainan after the end of the Sino-Japanese conflict. In addition, in accordance with Japan-Indochinese economic accords, Japanese merchandise would find a market in the Yunnan-Sichuan-

Guangxi region. According to Arsène-Henry, to ensure the status quo, France had to rapidly come to an agreement with the Japanese military and seek a large economic agreement advantageous to the Japanese. This way, it would be hard for them to later go against it. 50

48 Hytier, P.216 49 Catroux, P.84 50 Catroux, P.84 33

In the summer of 1940, even after Vichy asked Catroux to step down from his post of Govemor-General of lndochina, he had been able to remain in power for over two weeks and negotiate with Japanese representatives through coordinating his efforts with those of Arsène-Henry. Furthermore, Catroux did all this after Decoux had already arrived to replace him. Nevertheless, on July 14, 1940, Vichy informed General

Nishihara directly not to negotiate with Catroux anymore.51 The following week, on July

20, 1940, Decoux replaced Catroux as Govemor-General of Indochina.52 When Catroux finally gave his position up, he advised his successor. First of all, Decoux should stiffen

Indochina's attitude towards Japan. By this, he meant that the Govemor-General should react against the intolerable abuses of the Japanese, both economic and military.

Furthermore, Decoux should confine the Japanese Control Commission, sent earlier by

Tokyo to supervise lndochina, to the strict execution of its duties. According to Catroux, he wasn't the only one to blame for the Japanese presence in Indochina. The Japanese

Empire needed lndochina in more than one way. Furthermore, early on, France had given the impression that it wasn't ready to put on a fight to defend its territory in East Asia. 53

Even with the Indochinese govemment's precautions against a Japanese takeover of the

French colonial territory, the Japanese presence was c1early felt and it was too 1ate to tum back. Japanese expansion from lndochina had begun. On July 15, 1940, AdmiraI Darlan,

Vice-Premier of Vichy France, told AdmiraI William D. Leahy, Roosevelt's envoy to the

Vichy Govemment, that Japan would occupy bases in Southem Indochina to project military operations southward. The Japanese had left the French administrative structure

51 Catroux, P.87 52 Decoux, P.59 34

intact under Decoux but already occupied the railway centres, port installations and airfields in order to stop shipments to Chiang Kai-shek's Chine se Nationalist troops.54

Indochina in 1940 with Decoux

After Catroux' s departure, Indochina had a new Govemor-General who, this time, was to have full authority in representing Vichy France in East Asia. On July 23, 1940, a few days after obtaining his post, Decoux attempted to correct the situation of Japanese abuse in Indochina. Nonetheless, all he could obtain at first was the reopening of traffic from China on August 2, 1940.55 Decoux informed Nishihara that even though the

J apanese could transport food through Indochina, the passage of troops, ammunition as well as war material was not permitted. Furthermore, there would be no J apanese posts in

Indochina. Vichy supported Decoux with his dealings with Tokyo but wamed Decoux to be careful. 56

On the same day, as Decoux negotiated the reopening of the China-Indochina border, Colonel Naotake Sato, Nishihara's subordinate handed the Govemor-General a new ultimatum. This document stated that a Franco-J apanese defensive alliance would be necessary to settle the China Problem. The essence of this agreement was to be the right of passage of J apanese troops through Indochina. In addition, Sato demanded the right to use Indochinese airfields as well as facilities for the transportation of arms, munitions and food. Unlike his predecessor, Decoux replied that he would have to ask his govemment before taking any decision. The new French representative in lndochina faced a dilemma.

53 Hytier, P.216 54 Allan, P.97 55 Hytier, P.217 35

On the one hand, as mentioned earlier, Indochina was almost impossible to defend. On the other, the Japanese demands meant the control of at least Tonkin. If Vichy accepted the ultimatum, it would result in a loss of face. 57 Another of Decoux' s worries was the fact that Colonel Sato was also in charge of the Canton army. Therefore, Decoux didn't know if Sato was talking on behalf of the Japanese government or wanted to further his army's advance into China. 58

Paul Baudouin takes charge

Up to this point in Japanese-Indochinese relations, Vichy France had been content to remain in the background and members of the govemment had been letting their representatives in East Asia handle the negotiations. However, when Paris received news of yet another Japanese ultimatum on August 2, 1940, Paul Baudouin, Vichy's Foreign

59 Minister , took on the responsibility for handling the situation. Right away, he met with

Renzo Sawada, Japan's Ambassador to France. Baudouin informed Sawada that his govemment rejected the ultimatum but was ready to negotiate. Sorne of Japan's demands, although asked for in a sudden and brutal kind of way, could be met. As for what France wanted in exchange, like Catroux, Baudouin wanted a guarantee of French sovereignty in

Indochina. 6o

Franco-Japanese negotiations were being held in France but the Vichy govemment wasn't unanimous on how to proceed. Baudouin wanted to negotiate with

56 Decoux, P.92 57 Hytier, P.2I7 58 Decoux, P.95 59 also once served as Govemor of the Banque d'Indochine 60 Hytier, P.2I8 36

Tokyo but ran into sorne opposition from Henry Lemery, Minister of Colonies. Lemery was opposed to any concessions and instead opted for Resistance. According to him, a defensive war was possible because of Indochina's mountainous terrain. Ironically, this style of fighting was to be successful when adopted by the native Indochinese against the

French after the end of World War II. For the Minister of Colonies, Indochina could and should reply to force by force. In response to Lemery's plans of Resistance, Baudouin emphasized Indochina's weak airforce, its lack of anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, the absence of French tanks, the small amount of ammunition and few troops which the

French possessed in the territory. Baudouin knew that British and American aid was not an option and the best Decoux could have done was guerilla warfare. In the end,

Baudoin's approach won but negotiations were hard. Japanese demands were the same as before and there was no guarantee of French sovereignty in Indochina. Countless talks occurred in both East Asia and France. In Tokyo, Arsène-Henry and Y osuke Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign Minister, were in charge of Franco-Japanese talks. As for Vichy

France, Baudouin and Sawada were able to reach a compromise that was signed on

August 30, 1940. According to this new entente, Japan gave the guarantee of French sovereignty in Indochina. As for France, it recognized the pre-eminence of J apanese interests in East Asia. 61 Furthermore, Vichy agreed to give Japanese troops certain military facilities to settle its China Problem. A military convention was to be he Id in

Hanoi to finalize this accord. 62

61 Hytier, P.2I8 62 Decoux, P.IOO 37

A problem that plagued the 1940 Franco-Japanese relations was the lack of unity and coherence on both sides. Simultaneous negotiations were occurring between France,

Japan, lndochina, as weIl as with Japanese troops around China and lndochina. Before

France and Japan could reach an agreement, other factions of either France's or Japan's govemment would agree to contradictory conditions. The August 1940 dual Paris-Tokyo negotiations are a prime example of this. Before both nations could come to an agreement following two simultaneous negotiations in France and Japan, a new ultimatum had already been sent to lndochina from a third party. On August 30, 1940, General Nishihara informed Decoux that he had until September 2, 1940 to comply with a series of demands. These were to grant Japanese troops the permission to use lndochina's airfields, the right to station troops to protect the Japanese inside the colony and the permission for the passage of Japanese troops through Tonkin. Decoux refused and did so with the support of his govemment. Heated discussions as weIl as threats of attacks followed.

Ultimately, Tokyo representatives apologized to the Govemor-General and negotiations resumed. 63

The following month, Japan's expectations towards lndochina were raised. After the failed August 30, 1940 ultimatum, on September 19, 1940, Decoux received yet another ultimatum. Like before, Tokyo demanded that Japanese troops have the right to enter lndochina and this on September 22, 1940. Nevertheless, unlike in previous demands, this time, J apanese troops would enter the country whether there was an agreement or not. On September 22, 1940, an accord was signed. The French govemment agreed that the Japanese could use three airfields in Tonkin and maintain six thousand

63 Hytier, P.220 38

troops there. The accord also gave J apanese military leaders permission for their troops to travel through lndochina, but no more than twenty-five thousand at a time. The

September 22, 1940, deal also permitted the transit of the Japan's Canton division that was to re-embark at Haiphong. In exchange, the Japanese were to make a public pledge of their support and respect of French sovereignty. This was the official French position, and Decoux, who said that this was the "first manifestation of lasting friendship between the two countries", adopted it. 64

The Langson incident

Decoux's strong approach in dealing with Japanese representatives in lndochina gave him an image of strength his predecessor lacked but as a consequence displeased more than a few J apanese envoys. Therefore, at the demand of both governments of

Vichy and Japan, Franco-Japanese negotiations were moved from lndochina to both

Vichy and Japan. On September 22, 1940, the new Franco-Japanese accord was signed.

According to this new accord, Japan would once more respect French sovereignty in lndochina but France would give Japan access to sorne facilities. Japan agreed to reduce the number of troops posted in Tonkin to six thousand and to take possession of only three aerodromes. Nevertheless, this new agreement wouldn't be signed for an entire day before fighting broke off in Langson. This is referred to as the Langson incident. 65 On the night of September 22, 1940, the Japanese army in Canton clashed with French troops this region of Langson. Fighting lasted for many days and was stopped only when the

Emperor of Japan himself interceded to pull back the Japanese troops. This drastic

64 Hytier, P.220 39

intervention c1early shows the weaknesses that existed in the Japanese chain of command. 66 Once more, lack of coherence with the demands as weIl as the failure to transmit news of agreements reached between Vichy and Japan led to Franco-Japanese tensions. The Japanese Guangdong army, which had the reputation of often acting independently, had not waited for the conclusion of the negotiations. 67 OriginaIly, this had been the original plan if the conditions of the ultimatum were not met. The fighting lasted for a few days and the Indochinese troops suffered the heaviest casualties. Until a resolution of the Langson incident could be reached, Decoux had refused to carry out the rest of the agreement. In particular, he wouldn't let Japanese troops land in Haiphong.

The Japanese expressed their readiness to make a forced landing if the Govemor-General would not reconsider his position. This threat from the Japanese of using force on

Indochina might was not necessary because, as mentioned earlier, the Japanese Emperor ordered the Canton army to stop its hostilities in Langson. As a consequence to the actions of the Japanese military in Langson, the General of the Canton army was recalled to Japan. As for Japan-Indochinese relations, the September 22, 1940, agreement was to be respected. 68 The Langson Incident once more demonstrated the superiority of the

J apanese military in Indochina over the native forces. In addition, further damage was do ne to the image of French strength and superiority in East Asia. One of the additional consequences of the Langson Incident was that it led to outbreaks of hostilities organized by Vietnamese communists and the pro-Japanese Phuc Quoc league, organized in 1939

65 De Boisanger, P.52 66 Folin, P.27 67 Hytier, P.221 68 Hytier, P .221 40

by Prince Cuong De. In October 1940, Decoux put aIl his efforts into ending the disorders. An example ofthese was the January 12, 1941, mutiny in the Vinh province, in northem Annam, by the Garde Indigène. Decoux had them court-martialed within a week. 69

Thai-lndochinese conjlict

While the French and J apanese govemments were negotiating conditions of peaceful co-existence, Japan was encouraging Thailand to make a move against

Indochina. During the summer of 1940, noticing its neighbor's weakened state, Thailand took Japan as a model and made similar territorial and economic demands to Indochina.

As could be expected from the French, they were too proud to answer to those they had conquered in the past. As a consequence, the Indochinese govemment categorically rejected aIl of Thailand's demands. Another reason for this refusaI was the fear that granting concessions to the Thai govemment would once more weaken France's domination of the native Indochinese. Intermittent hostilities that followed became an undeclared Thai-Indochinese war by the beginning of 1941. After the United States and

Britain refused to involve themselves in the conflict, Japan took the opportunity to act as mediator to end the conflict. 70

Although Japan had a part to play in inciting the Thai-Indochinese conflict, both the Thai and Indochinese govemments didn't need much encouragement to participate in hostilities. Since France's defeat in Europe, Thai general Luang Pibul had been searching for an opportunity to take back territory occupied by the French in East Asia. A vast part

69 Thomas, P.195 41

of the Franco-Thai fighting occurred along the Mekong River, the natural border between

Thailand and Laos. Both the Thai and Indochinese armed forces met their share of victories and defeats. On J anuary 16, 1941, French troops launched an offensive but later had to retreat. The next day, on January 17, 1941, the opposite happened when the French navy was victorious over the Thai fleet. On January 20, 1941, Japan gave an ultimatum to

Thailand and Indochina to negotiate peace. 71 René Robin, an ex-govemor general of

Indochina, led the negotiations on the French side. Thai-Indochinese negotiations lasted from February 7, 1941 to March 11, 1941. These negotiations led to two accords. The first one was that Thailand would obtain two additional territories from Laos and

Cambodia. The second one was that Japanese merchants had new rights and privileges in those territories. 72

For Japan, mediating the Thai-Indochinese conflict was more than an opportunity to show its capacity as a keeper of the peace in East Asia. In reality, Tokyo saw another chance to further its rights and acquisitions in Indochina. Nevertheless, the French in

Indochina didn't see it this way. In early January 1941, Decoux denied Japan was making any demands such as sending troops to Saigon, occupying the naval base at Cam Rahn

Bay or obtaining exclusive use of the Langson Railway. Furthermore, even if the

Japanese were making such demands, Decoux said, France didn't and wouldn't want to give up control of Saigon and Cam Rahn Bay. Rather, Japan and Indochina were simply negotiating Japanese economic concessions in the French territory. Nevertheless,

Decoux's denials couldn't hide the fact that Japanese troops were already garrisoned in

70 Dreifort, P.216 71 Folin, P.28 42

the capital city of Hanoi, the chief port of Haiphong anù possessed bases along the northem border of the French telTitory.73 Despite Decoux's denial of Japanese pressure, later in that month, the news of Japanese demands was revealed to the public. As the priee of mediating the Thailand-Indochina con flic t, Japan wanted a monopoly over

Indochina's rice, meaning a minimum of 80% of its export. Furthermore, Japan wanted access to Indochina's natural resources, which it feH that France had not exploited to its full potential. By taking on the role of peace maker, Japan wanted to be able to gain access to the Port of Saigon in Cam Ranh Bay without permitting [oreign powers, in particular the United States, to protest its presence. Japanese warships made their presence felt off of lndochina's coast in order to pressure the French govenm1ent to respond favorably to Japanese demands. 74

Tokyo's intimidation tactics effectively put pressure on Vichy to accept its offer to mediate the Thai-Indochina conflict. 75 On May 9, 1941, an agreement was reached between Thailand and lndochina. As a result of its involvement in the mediation of the conf1ict, Japan's prestige and c1aim to leadership in East Asia increased. 76 ln addition, under the pretext of maintaining the peace, Japanese ships could remain in lndochinese harbors. 77 Nevertheless, Japan made several demands in retum for its services. They consisted of a promise [rom lndochina not to develop economic, political or military relations with any nation which might oppose Japan. By accepting these conditions,

72 De Boisanger, P.54 73 New York Times, January 7, 1941 74 NYT, January 31,1941 75 NYT, March 1, 1941 76 Dreifort, P.216 77 NYT, Febmary 1, 1941 43

lndochina set off (1 new senes of demands as weIl as prolonged Franco-Japaucse negotlatlOns... 78

Although it llad not been requested, Japan's efficient mediation of the Thai- lndochina undeclarcd war brought Vichy and Tokyo once more Lo the negotiating table.

At first, Vichy brou1:~llt delays in signing any Japan-Indochina agreement. This hesitancy from the French incll'ased Tokyo's fears that a third party, namely England or the United

States, might influence Vichy. Not knowing that these nations had already refused to get involved in Franco-Jdpanese relations, more Japanese warships arrived in Saigon Bay.

FurthemlOre, the Japanese armed forces took preventive measures to remove Japanese national s, ordered blackouts, took precautionary measures for air raids as weil as built dugouts and ditches. Ultimately, Vichy informed Japan that it accepted its position in

East Asia. 79 Motivatcd by the des ire to build a stronger relationship with Japan and by fear of its increasing military presence off its lndochinese coast, Vichy accepted aIl of

Tokyo's demands over the Thai border. This decision that would lead the French to lose access to some areas of Cambodia didn't please ail of lndochina's French citizens. The loss of face and tenitory to Japan increased lndochina's anti-Japanese atmosphere. As before, the Japanese sent two additional ships into the Saigon harbor to evacuate ils citizens in case of emergency. Nevertheless, in the end, the y didn't need to and Japan's representatives in Indochina remained.80 Marshal Maurice Pétain, leader of the Vichy govemment in France, later specified that Vichy yielded to Japan, not Thailand.81 Japan's

78 Dreifort, P.217 79 NYT, Mareh 2, 1941 80 NYT, Mareh 3, 1941 81 NYT, Mareh 4, 1941 44

involvement in the mediation of the conflict between Thailand and lndochina had repercussions on two facets of Franco-Japanese relations. These were trade and military concessions in lndochina. France's 10ss of power had shed a light on its weaknesses in

East Asia. The Japanese took this opportunity to advance their position in lndochina as weil as obtain new rights and privileges. Japan's involvement in settling the Thai lndochina conflict was the foot in the door it needed.

1941 Rllsso-Japallese frielldship pact

For many years, Japan was seen as a tlueat by Western nations such as the United

States, England, France as weIl as by Russia. Although aIl knew of Japan's dreams of creating the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, no one reaIly knew how or when it would do it and which country or colonial territory in East Asia it would attack first.

Nevertheless, the elimination of possible Japanese targets gave relief to many leaders but others looked over tiJeir shoulder. On April 13, 1941, Japan and Russia signed the Russo

Japanese friendship pact. This event is significant in examining Franco-Japanese relations because before this entente was signed, many wondered if Japan would invade Siberia in order to launch its expansion of Asia. After this entente was signed, it became clear that this wasn't a possibility anymore. Therefore, the main candidate to play this role of launch platfonn for Japanese expansion was once again lndochina. As a sign of things to come, right after the signing of the Russo-Japanese friendship act, Japan quickly made new demands to Indochina. These included the right to station unlimited Japanese troops in lndochina as weIl as the access of Japanese forces to aIl bases and aerodromes in the 45

French colonial territory.82 On July 14, 1941, Japan gave Vichy a new ultimatum demanding access to the Indochinese territory as a whole for Japanese troops. Months of

Franco-Japanese negoliJtions led to the July 29 1941, Darlan-Kato Accord. According to this deal, Japan guarant.;ed French sovereignty in Indochina in exchange for free access

for J apanese troops in lndochina. The quantity of these troops varied over time. In

November 1941, there \Vere seventy-five thousand Japanese troops in Indochina. Before

the March 9, 1945 takeo ver, there were sixtY thousand troops in Indochina. From 1941 to

1945, there were on average twenty thousand Japanese troops in Indochina at any given

lime. The July 14, 1941 Darlan-Kato Accord also had a common defense clause against

foreign aggression, whether it be American or British.83 ln a very short period of time,

Japan was able to eliminate a possible threat in Russia as weIl as obtain new concessions

from lndochina with a minimum show of force.

1941 Franco-Japallese agreements

ln 1941, the French govemment was preoccupied with events in Europe, Africa

and the Middle East and considered most of them as more important than those occulTing

in East Asia. Therefore, a quick settlement of the Thai-lndochinese conflict was welcome

by most in Paris. Nevertheless, groups of French nationals in Vichy as weIl as in

Indochina protested against the new Franco-Japanese agreement. They accused Japan of

forcing an unjust peace upon Indochina in order to reap benefits. In fact, Japan did come

out of its mediation of the Thai-Indochinese conflict and the following Franco-Japanese

negotiations as successful, mainly because it backed up its diplomacy with a show a

82 De Boisanger, P.55 46

force. The best example of this is the increased presence of Japanese warships in the

Indochinese harbors. 84 In reaction to the pressure of its nationals, Vichy once more delayed in signing the new Thai-Indochina border settlement.85 Matsuoka reminded

Arsène-Henry of Vichy's obligation to maintain friendly relations with Japan. These consisted of making efforts to build a prosperous economic relationship as well as not establishing any ne\v relationship with a third party that might come into political, economic or military competition with Japan. Arsène-Henry assured that France had no intention of doing SO.86 The Japanese-negotiated Thai-French pact was finally signed in

Tokyo on May 9, 1941. Japan informed both sides that it would make sure that the agreement would be definitive. The previously mentioned agreement not to enter any agreements with anti-Japanese powers was the price asked by Tokyo.87

By the beginning of the summer of 1941, Vichy's aggressive attitude in dealing with Japan had remarkably diminished. Without any leverage to negotiate with, the

French govemment wanted to keep Japan satisfied in order to prevent it from going after more in Indochina. The Japanese-mediated peace between French lndochina and

Thailand led to a Franco-Japanese pact which deprived lndochina of aIl political and economic control. This pact contained six articles. First of aIl, Japan would ob tain a virtual monopoly on lndochina's production of rice, rubber and co al. AIso, Japanese interests would get a free hand in the exploitation of French lndochina's natural resources, especially minerais. Furthennore, Japanese military garrisons would be

83 Folin, P.29 84 NYT, Mareh 13,1941 85 NYT, Mareh 5, 1941 86 NYT, Mareh 13,1941 47

established on the border between Indochina and China proper. A fourth article was that

Japanese inspectors would be stationed in all ofIndochina's customs houses. In addition, a Japanese naval base was to be established at Cam Ranh Bay, while the Japanese would also acquire a defense concession at Saigon. Finally, Indochina was to allow Japan the free use of ail its present air bases, while new bases were to be established wherever

Japan thought necessary. This would permit Japan to get a foothold in the South China

Sea and decrease tlte threat to its supply line as weil as get a big quantity of rice and oil,

Japan's previous source having been the Netherlands Indies with 40% of its petroleum imports. Furthermore, Japan could attack the KMT, cut its source of supplies going into

China through the Burma Road, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate. The naval bases in

Southern lndochina and Thailand would facilitate possible moves against Singapore or the Netherlands Indies. 88

Dcspite this increased presence of Japanese military in Indochina, Tokyo once more denied pressuring the Vichy govemment. In mid-July 1941, the Japanese government once more asked Decoux for new concessions in Indochina. Japanese representatives stated that the reason that motivated these demands was the fact that lndochina had been trading with Hong Kong and Singapore. According to Japan, this went against the Franco-Japanese agreement signed after Japan's mediation ofthe Thai-

Indochinese truce. Despite its favored position in Franco-Japanese relations, the Tokyo govemment took evcry opportunity to gain advantages over Paris. Additional Japanese pressure came [rom an ultimatum sent to French authorities with regards to a gunfight

87 NYT, May 9, 1941 88 NYT, Febmary 2, 1941 48

between French Annamese police and a group of J apanese in the Hankou French

Concession on July 15, 1941. Japan demanded that the French take full responsibility and give indemnity for the families of the Japanese nationals killed.89

Incidents such as the one in Hankow did give Japan opportunities to add pressure to the French in Indochina but these were dwarfed compared to Japan's expectations of

Franco-Japanese commercial, political and military relations. In July 1941, Japanese officiaIs in Hanoi criticized the French government for failing to respect the Japanese-

Indochina trade agreement. The Japanese attacked Indochina's restriction in the quantity of rice shipped to Japan. In addition, the Indochinese government was still recognizing

Chongking diplomats who represented the KMT government. The French were giving them preferential treatment to rice shipments and furthermore, refusing to recognize trade agents from the Nanking government. As for French policy inside Indochina, the

Japanese officiaIs pointed out the failure to suppress anti-Japanese articles appearing in

French periodicals. Furthermore, the French authorities were allowing the censorship of all translations of J apanese news broadcasts but permitted the broadcast of Chongking radio reports. A final criticism was the adoption of severe measures against Annamites friendly to the Japanese. Tokyo wamed French Indochina that if this was not remedied,

J apan was ready to take adequate measures to protect its own interests on French soi!. 90

On September 15, 1941, a new debate sparked between French and Japanese representatives over trade agreements. Indochina wanted to maintain trade relations in

East Asia with its neighbors. These consisted of Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Dutch

89 NYT, Ju1y 16, 1941 90 North-China Hera1d, Ju1y 16, 1941 49

East lndies. AIl of these terri tories were dependent on each other because of their geographical positions. On May 6, 1941, Vichy and Japan had signed a trade agreement that had greatly increased the commercial exchange between lndochina and Japan. The new Franco-Japanese agreement gave lndochina political and commercial sovereignty.

This meant that it could trade with any country or nation it wanted while giving priority to Japanese trade. However, Japan was not able to provide food products, fuel, iron, steel and machines to lndochina. Therefore, lndochina needed to obtain it from elsewhere.

AIso, a lack of ships and the diminishing number of naval routes compeIled Hong Kong,

Singapore and the Dutch East lndies to obtain their supplies from the closest source. As a result, there were many products that only lndochina could pro vide to these Western territories in East Asia. An example ofthis was lndochina's export ofrice to Hong Kong.

However, a large portion of lndochina's rice export (roughly 700 000 tons per year) was destined for Japan. As a consequence, lndochina wasn't able to supply Hong Kong with enough rice. As for imports, the lndochina obtained cotton, string and flour from

Singapore as weIl as dried fish and cement from the Dutch East Indies.91 Japan now had a steady supplier for the many primary resources it needed for its expansion in East Asia.

As for lndochina, it became more dependant on J apan as a buyer of its products and was put in an almost impossible situation to find other destinations to export its primary materials. Japan's grip on lndochina was tighter and both sides knew it.

9\ North-China Herald, September 24, 1941 50

1941 Franco-Japanese military agreements

By the summer of 1941, Japan's expansionist drive had been in many ways successful but had also attracted foreign attention and suspicion. Nations such as the

United States and England organized blockades to hinder Japan's war efforts. As a reaction to the Anglo-American interference in Japan's East Asian trade, the rate of

Japanese troops entering French lndochina radically increased. By the end of June 1941, additional Japanese warships had reached lndochina. These also included twelve transports of troops from Hainan to Carn Ranh Bay. By establishing itself there, Japan was securing a position midway between Singapore and Hong Kong, close to the China

Sea, as weIl as the United States naval base of Cavite. This Arnerican military installation guarded the approach to Manila Bay in the Philippines.92

Japanese threats didn't take long to become reality. On July 22, 1941, Japan delivered a new twenty-four hour ultimatum to Vichy France. This time, the Japanese governrnent demanded the complete occupation of lndochina by its troops. Specifie demands of the ultimatum included the use of Campranh Bayas a naval base, the use of

Saigon as an air base as weIl as the landing and garrisoning of troops in Southem lndochina. Once more, Japanese demands were tossed around from lndochina to Vichy

France, resulting in multiple simultaneous negotiations. Vichy refused the demands because AdmiraI Charles Platon, the French Minister of Colonies residing in France, assured that lndochina was fully capable of resisting any arrned occupation. Nevertheless, once more, Vichy was ready to negotiate with Japan. 93

92 NYT, June 25, 1941 93 North-China Herald, July 30, 1941 51

Since the beginning of Japan's expansionist drive in East Asia in the 1930s,

France had been terrified of losing lndochina to the Japanese govemment. With time, as the French recognized Japan's military superiority to lndochina's poor defenses, accords were reached between these two nations. These pacts gave the illusion that France kept its sovereignty in lndochina and that Japan only wanted specifie and temporary privileges and concessions in it. Nevertheless, after France surrendered to Germany and lost

England as an ally, as well as became c10ser with Japan, France's fear of losing lndochina came from new sources. On July 23, 1941, AdmiraI François Darlan, Vice

Premier of Vichy France, met with Kato in order to discuss lndochina's security. France was afraid of England's proximity and power in East Asia. In order to prevent lndochina from falling into British hands, Vichy accepted, in principle, complete military control of

French lndochina by the Japanese. In order to do this, Japan demanded bases in the

French East Asian territory. These were to serve as a temporary military measure to defend lndochina against enemies such as de Gaulle's Free France govemment, British forces, as well as Chinese troops. One of the main reasons Darlan accepted Japan's

"protection" is because Tokyo had not made any territorial demands. Vichy representatives emphasized the word temporary, stating that this was not an ultimatum.94

The following day, on July 24, 1941, General Rashumi Shumida met with Decoux in

Indochina.95 These deliberations led to Vichy announcing a new pact with Japan for the common defense of lndochina. France and Japan stated that a complete unit y of views between the two govemments existed. As before, Japan would respect the territorial

94 NYT, Ju1y 24, 1941 95 L'Action Française, Ju1y 25, 1941 52

integrity ofIndochina and French sovereignty over its territory.96 The French government explained that Japan's reason for being on French soil was to protect Indochina from

Chinese, British and Free French attacks. Since requests for help to other parties, namely the United States, had been refused a year earlier, Vichy said it had no choice but to seek protection from Japan. 97

As soon as the Franco-Japanese Accord for the Common Defense of Indochina was reached, Japanese troops rapidly entered the country. On July 26, 1941, Japanese military presence in Saigon had increased to the point that observers believed that it might move against Russia. Japan saw Siberia as a possible way of obtaining additional primary sources and as an imminent threat to the Japanese East Asian Empire. Major

General Raishiro Sumita, chief of the Japanese mission in Indochina, had already arrived with the first Japanese military trucks. More were to arrive in the following days, followed by additional warships and airplanes later on. 98 FortY thousand Japanese troops disembarked at Nhatrang, just north of Cam Ranh Bay and were to be stationed in southern Indochina. In addition, Japan had the right to use eight airfields in southern

Indochina. The governor of Cochin-China appealed to the population to maintain high confidence in the colony's destiny and to not assume an attitude of revoIt or discouragement. He assured that swift and efficient action would be taken against those who didn't follow these directions. When the Japanese South China Sea's Fleet arrived in 99 Southern Indochina, French authorities greeted them with Rising Sun flags.

96 NYT, July 26, 1941 97 North-China Herald, July 30, 1941 98 NYT, July 27, 1941 99 North-China Herald, July 30, 1941 53

In the week following the Common Defense Accord, Japanese troops spread out across Indochina at a rapid pace. By July 28, 1941, Japanese armed forces had started occupying various bases as well as the eight air bases Vichy had given to them in lndochina. In addition, Vichy had accorded J apan two inland concessions. The first one was in Annam, in the coastal region running most of the length of lndochina. The other one was Cochin China, at the southernmost tip of the peninsula across the Gulf of Siam from Malaya. Japanese troops had already begun occupying these possessions. Japanese officers used lndochina's roads and rai1roads to move their troops already in Northem lndochina, southward to their new bases. Furthermore, Darlan and Kato agreed to larger deliveries ofIndochinese rice to the Japanese armies. 100

J apan' s choice of naval and air bases in lndochina was of strategic importance. In addition to the fort Y thousand Japanese soldiers already situated in five garrison posts, fifteen ships were anchored off Indochina's coast. This combination of Japanese military assets in French Indochina put Japanese planes in range of British Malaya and Burma, covered the South China Sea as well as assured Japanese air domination of lndochina.

Furthermore, from Saigon, Japan could exp and to Cochin China and Cambodia. French authorities in Indochina prepared the citizens of Saigon for the Japanese arrivaI and wamed against anti-Japanese demonstrations. One major point lndochina's government emphasized was that French citizens in lndochina, as well as the natives, were lucky to avoid a bloody war like the one in Syria. 101

100 NYT, July 29, 1941 101 NYT, July 30, 1941 54

France's surrender in Europe had led to Indochina being surrounded by different players in the East Asian fight for domination. These were Japan, the United States,

Britain, China as weIl as Gaullist troops. Japan's clear military superiority and already overwhelming presence in Indochina could not be denied. Furthermore, a change in this situation didn't seem likely. Therefore, the French government sought an alternative to maintain friendly relations with the Japanese and protect its sovereignty in Indochina. As already mentioned earlier, on July 29, 1941, Darlan and Kato, in the presence of AdmiraI

Platon, signed the Japan-Indochina "Protocol for the defense of Indochina" in Vichy.

From the Japanese point of view, if the security of Indochina was threatened, Japan had the right to consider the general tranquility of East Asia and her own security. In short,

Vichy France and Japan agreed to cooperate militarily for the common defense of French

Indochina. This pact recognized that a threat existed from British, Chinese and de Gaulle troop concentrations in East Asia. Nevertheless, the details of this military cooperation were kept a secret. The protocol emphasized two points. First of aIl, once more, Japan recognized the integrity of Indochina and the French sovereignty over it. The second point was that France was without adequate force to defend the Indochinese territory and had no other means of preserving her sovereignty than by accepting the Japanese proposition. In exchange for Japan's protection ofIndochina, it would occupy additional bases Cam Ranh Bay and Saigon, obtain the right to use docks at Haiphong as weIl as

Indochina's means of transportation. Nevertheless, the French maintained civil authority over the district. According to J apanese sources, these conditions would remain the same as long as the circumstances that caused their adoption continued. 102

102 NYT, July 30, 1941 55

Once more, Japanese assistance to Indochina permitted it to secure a stronger military, economic and political position inside the French territory. While it did strengthen lndochina's military power, it also identified lndochina as Japanese key location for resources, troops as well as a launching station for expansion in East Asia.

Nations such as the United States and Britain paid close attention to the French colony.

On September 18, 1941, pressure from the Anglo-American encirclement of the Japanese

East-Asian sphere led Japan to offer Indochina to increase its "help" to the French government in East-Asia. Major General Raishiro Sumita, chief of the Japanese mission in Indochina, sought to meet with Decoux in order to discuss the stationing of additional

Japanese troops in Indochina. Shortly after, additional Japanese transports and supply ships arrived in Indochina. Nevertheless, it is not determined if Decoux had approved of the Japanese plan or not. 103

Shanghai after Pearl Harbor

For most of the period between 1937 and 1941, the majority of negotiations between France and Japan had taken place in France, lndochina or Japan. Although it was the center of Vichy's economy in East Asia, Shanghai's French Concession was left relatively unoccupied by Japan. This also extended to the International Settlement, inhabited mostly by British and American nationals. Nonetheless, the increasing Anglo

American pressure on Japanese expansion in East Asia led to a change in this status quo.

In November 1941, Japanese pressure on Western nationals increased in Shanghai. An example of this lies in the following. In order to assure order and stability in Shanghai,

103 NYT, August 19, 1941 56

the Japanese representatives ordered a census in the French Concession. Foreigners, with the exception of the German, Italian, Portuguese and Swiss nationals, had to register with the police and get a photo LD. Furthermore, the Baojia system was adopted in the

International Settlement and French Concession. The Baojia was a Chinese system in which neighborhoods were divided. In each division, supervisors were assigned to observe questionable behaviour and report it to the proper authorities. A change that came later in 1942 was the dissolution of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps. For decades, the

Shanghai Volunteer Corps had represented foreign independence and military autonomy in Shanghai. Its dissolution strengthened Japan's hold of the metropolis. In November

1942, after consolidating their position, the Japanese began interning enemy diplomats and consular personnel and make them wear armbands. At first these were the citizens of the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, Iraq and Iran. Later on, most of the foreign population of the International Settlement was sent to intemment camps.104 These events surrounding Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor are discussed in a later paragraph.

The fact that France maintained a hold on its concession in Shanghai when other nations 10st theirs and their citizens were arrested is connected to Vichy's relations with

Japan. In 1940, the Vichy government had adopted a pro-Japanese policy and pushed for many changes in Shanghai. For example, the French Concession's general council,

Marcel Baudez, was replaced by a Vichy appointee, Roland de Margerie. The goal of the

Vichy govemment wasn't to preserve the French Concession in Shanghai but to protect

French trade in China. Other important changes occurred during that year. Before 1940,

France had recognized the KMT, China's Nationalist govemment led by Chiang Kai-

104 Ristaino, P.186 57

shek. After 1940, they recognized Wang Jingwei as China's leader. After years ofbeing one of Chiang's top officers, Wang had agreed to lead the newly formed Nanjing government. Even though many nations recognized this govemment as China's only legitimate one, aIl knew that it was only a puppet government and that Japan was the one pulling the strings. Henri Cosme, France's ambassador to China, moved the Vichy government's headquarters in China to Nanjing with the hopes of maintaining good relations with Nanjing, Chongking and Japan. IOS

On December 7, 1941, the Japanese Navy led a massive surprise attack on the

American fleet in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Right after this attack, Japan officially took over the Shanghai International Settlement. In his semi-autobiographical novel, lG. Ballard de scribes the initial shock ofWesterners residing in the foreign concessions. "A crowd of

European and American guests surrounded the lifts. Refusing to take the stairs, they pounded on the metal grilles and shouted down the shafts. They carried suitcases, and wore their hats and overcoats, as if deciding to take the next steamer to Hong Kong."I06

Although Japanese troops entered the French Concession and many incidents occurred in the following days, Japan didn't take possession ofit. This was mainly because Japan had already recognized the Vichy government in June 1940 and had signed numerous agreements with it. After the Japanese takeover of Shanghai, Vichy pledged to support the Japanese in all matters in which French neutrality and the statuses of the Concession were not opposed. \07

105 Henriot, P.264 106 Ballard, P .29 107 Ristaino, P.l85 58

Throughout the month of December 1941, J apanese troops continuously made their way into Shanghai but the French Concession was again preserved because Japan preferred to put diplomatie pressure on Vichy. Since Vichy and Japan were collaborating, this postponed the terms of the retrocession and the abolition of the extraterritoriality rights. Nevertheless, Vichy ultimately gave up its rights and territory in the metropolis.

The French Concession was abolished twice: on July 30, 1943, to the Nanjing government and on February 28, 1946, to the KMT. Before the end of the war, under

Japanese pressure, the French had agreed to renounce its extraterritoriality privileges and to restore Chinese sovereignty over its concessions. The British and American governments had previously agreed to do so. In January 1943, aIl western powers officially renounced their treaty rights. In August 1943, Chen Gongbo, head of the

Special Municipality of Shanghai, became mayor of Shanghai reunified under the control of the Japanese. On February 24,1943, Vichy made a declaration ofprinciple. On May

18, 1943, Vichy signed an agreement in Nanjing. On July 30, 1943, the French

Concession was returned to Wang Jingwei's government. The question of extraterritoriality was resolved only in February 1946. 108

After Pearl Harbor, Japan began putting pressure on Vichy concerning its Foreign

Concession in Shanghai. As a response, Vichy wanted to wait the war out and see if

Japan would leave on its own accord. This was very similar to Decoux's policy in

Indochina. In the French Concession, lack of communications between Europe and

Shanghai led to social problems. For example, many working strikes broke out during the

Japanese occupation. By June 1943, the Japanese had already given Wang Jingwei's

108 Henriot, P.258 59

government control over the International Settlement in Shanghai. On February 23, 1943,

Vichy declared its intention to renounce its rights and privileges it had enjoyed since the signing of the first treaties in the nineteenth century. The most important of these was extraterritoriality. This followed the British and Americans doing the same thing on

January Il, 1943.

Once Vichy agreed to give back its territorial possessions as weIl as give up its rights and privileges in Shanghai and in other cities of China, it took steps to salvage what it could of the vestiges of the French presence in those cities. Between February and

July 1943, the French foreign ministry's Asia Department and the French diplomatic authorities in China prepared the retrocession with the goal of maintaining as long as possible the French influence in Shanghai. To do this, they wanted to transform municipality properties into state property called the French Center to exempt them from the negotiations. Example of these are the French municipal college, the Sino-French school, the Pasteur Institute, the Alliance Française, the Bernez Cambot caserne, cemeteries, a radio station, the charitable institutions fund and the ground of the Cercle

Sportif. The second objective was to assure the re-employment of the Chinese,

Vietnamese, Russian and French employees of the French Concession. On May 19, 1943, the French concessions in Hankow, Canton and Tianjin were transferred to the Chinese but nothing was done for Shanghai. On July 30, 1943, the Shanghai French Concession was handed to the Wang Jingwei govemment. Consul-genera1 Roland de Margerie presided over the official ceremony but not Henri Cosme because he was accredited to 60

the govemment of Chiang Kai-shek 109 Nevertheless, the French remained in Shanghai for many years to come and negotiated from time to time with various govemments the conditions of their departure.

Indochina after Pearl Harbor

Vichy's support of Japan in lndochina c10sely followed its policy in Shanghai.

Nevertheless, this was neither for the same reasons nor from the same source. lmmediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Decoux once more had to decide whether to fight the Japanese posted in lndochina. Not having time to communicate with

Vichy, Decoux took it upon himselfto decide the future ofIndochina. 110 On December 8,

1941, Decoux was in negotiations with one of General Tyo's, leader of the Japanese forces in lndochina, representatives. The common defense accord from the July 29, 1941

Darlan-Kato protocol. Decoux's efforts were to correct aU the concessions that had been given to Japan and to reduce the number of economic accords with the Japanese. To do this, Decoux had to show that while not wanting to fight them, he wasn't afraid of

Japanese troops, to not let the stationing of troops become an occupation. Also, Decoux wanted to remain neutral in the Pacific war. 111 A day later, Japan offered Decoux an ultimatum. After negotiations, Decoux expressed lndochina's neutrality of France and lndochina in the Pacific and refused to participate in any offensive against an enemy of

J apan. As for defensive agreements in case of an Allied landing in lndochina, Decoux infonned Japan that the previous common defense agreement was still in effect but later

109 Henriot, P.264 110 Sabattier, P.51 III De Boisanger, P.55-56 61

told his staffthat French troops wouldn't take part in any operation. Decoux followed this course of action on March 9, 1945. 112 After signing the new accord for the common defense ofIndochina, Japan kept its demands to a minimum for a period oftime. One of the reasons for this was that most of the Japanese troops were fighting the British in

Birmany.l13

Although the J apanese sneak attack on the United States took the whole world by surprise and forever changed the course of the war in the Pacifie, it did not greatly alter

Decoux already existing policy towards the Japanese presence in lndochina. On

December 9, 1941, Vichy and Japan reached a new post-Pearl Harbor accord. The main points were as follows. First of aIl, both nations renewed the July 29, 1941 principle for the common defense oflndochina. In addition Vichy restated the neutrality of France and lndochina in the Pacific conflict and the refusaI to participate in any offensive operation against enemies of Japan. Furthermore, lndochina's military forces were not to be taken over by Japan. This was respected until the March 9, 1945, Japanese coup de force, which we will see in better detail further down. Up to that time, the French in East Asia still had their land, sea and air forces. It is to be noted once more that the combination of aIl these troops, vehicles and weapons was no match for the Japanese army, navy and air force. Therefore, the French military didn't pose a threat to Japan in lndochina. While talking about these agreements, Decoux emphasized that lndochina never collaborated with Japan, rather, it resisted. 114 Like his predecessor, Decoux believed that the 1940-41

112 Folin, P.29 113 De Boisanger, P.27 114 Decoux, P.159 62

accords did not deliver lndochina to Japan, but also prevented the worst. From 1940-45,

France was the only country whose flag floated freely in East Asia. 115

Decoux's preservation ofIn doch in a

From the moment Decoux was appointed governor-general ofIndochina, his main concern was to preserve lndochina under French sovereignty. According to him, maintaining good relations with Japan, of which Vichy was an ally, could only do this.

Therefore, by supporting Vichy completely and without question, Decoux facilitated relations with J apan. 116 After the liberation of France by Allied forces, many criticized

Decoux's seemingly too eager collaborationist approach with Japan. To this, Decoux responded that in the situation lndochina was in at that time, no reasonable alternative was available. According to Sabattier, Decoux kept the appearance of collaboration with the J apanese and gave the impression to respect the common defense accord but in reality, he gave instructions to not help the Japanese war effort. An example ofthis is the

French troops' behavior during Allied air raids. During these, the French troops had to shoot at the airplanes with anti-aircraft guns but they supposedly missed on purpose.11 7

On December 7,1943, Decoux said that hostilities in East Asia changed lndochina's role.

First of all, it forced lndochina to get c10ser with its Asian neighbors, namely Japan.

These c10ser personal, economic and cultural relations with Japan helped settle later disputes. Sabattier believes that Decoux didn't feel this way but had to maintain peaceful

115 Decoux, P.165 116 Folin, P.33 117 Sabattier, P.52 63

Franco-Japanese relations in Indochina. But, as a consequence, this was badly taken by

Anglo-Saxon govemments. 118

One key factor in the policy Decoux adopted towards the Japanese was the poor military situation Indochina. Decoux criticized the French leaders in Europe, saying that if France had the means to provoke Japan by allowing arms traffic through Indochina to

China from 1937 to 1940, then it could have easily built up Indochina's military during that period. If it couldn't contribute to Indochina's military power, then it shouldn't have committed irreparable acts. Decoux's argument, although weIl constructed, didn't consider that during that period, not only France had participated in the arm deals with the KMT. Furthermore, no immediate connection existed between having provided armament to the Chinese Nationalists between 1937 and 1940 and the subsequent

Japanese aggression on colonial territory in East Asia. An example of this are the Dutch territories that were taken over by Japanese troops during the Second World War, ev en if the Dutch had in no way aided the KMT in their war effort. 119

In November 1942, Allied success against Japan in combination with American naval and air superiority forced Japan into a defensive position. Decoux had hop es that he could maintain his Resistance policy until the end of the war and negotiate a Japanese withdrawal from Indochina. He also had hopes that Indochina could be spared from the war, what he referred to as a sort of Asian Switzerland. But in reality, Allied forces wanted the unconditional surrender of Japan. The war zone was getting closer and

American bombings on Indochinese soil were getting more frequent. The main Allied

liS Sabattier, P.44 119 Sabattier, P.2S 64

objectives were the Transindochinese railway, the ports and the buildings contributing to the Japanese supply lines. This led to a radical reduction in the quantity of grain travelling from the south to the north of lndochina and caused a famine in Tonkin during the winter of 1944-45. 120

During the course of the Second World War, Japan was seen as the enemy and the

French in lndochina were buying time until the end of the conflict. Nevertheless, the presence of the Japanese in lndochina brought comfort to sorne. The unstable political situation in China led many French in lndochina to be afraid of a possible attack from their neighbor once the war with Japan was over, or even before. For this reason, they found solace in the Franco-Japanese common defense accord, biased as it may be. A factor that contributed to this fear of lndochina's neighbors was the humiliation lndochinese troops had suffered at the hands of the Thai armed forces, not nearly as powerful as the Chinese military.121

Until March 1945, Decoux had maintained French sovereignty in lndochina, which consisted of control over taxes, maintenance and authority over armed forces, authority over the justice system, administration of the public services (police, customs, transportation and education) and the right to choose civil and military workers. Also, even if J apanese troops co-existed with French troops, these never saluted each other or were posted together. Japan never occupied lndochina because it never lost its sovereignty.122

120 De Boisanger, P.6S 121 Sabattier, P.S4 122 Sabattier, P.SI 65

De Gaulle and Decoux

Throughout most of the Second World War, two different political entities laid claim against the French colonial territory in Indochina. The first one was Pétain's Vichy government. The second was de Gaulle's Free France government. From Indochina's government's point of view, these two leaders were sending contradictory messages conceming the appropriate behavior in reaction to the J apanese presence in Indochina.

Vichy counted as its ally relationship with Japan to preserve its sovereignty on Indochina.

As for the Free France govemment, it urged the French in Indochina to resist the oncoming occupation and fight the Japanese. For most of this period, Indochina's communications with Vichy were getting less frequent. As for those with Free France, they were almost non-existent. Therefore, in many cases, Decoux was free to make his own decisions vis-à-vis the Japanese and act in relative independence. This situation changed when, on August 20, 1944, Allied troops liberated Paris. 123

From the beginning, General de Gaulle was against Decoux's policies in

Indochina and saw it as collaboration with Vichy. In 1940, de Gaulle was in no position to intervene in lndochina. On October 8, 1940, Inspector-General of Colonies Cazaux, director of finance at Saigon, informed de Gaulle of the sympathy of a large part of the population towards the Free French and also that Indochina couldn't act as it desired due to the presence of the J apanese. At the beginning of 1941, no one would or could help

Indochina. Free France didn't have the means. England, although it knew the Japanese would arrive in Singapore one day or another, wanted to buy time so it kept friendly

123 De Boisanger, P.80 66

relations with Indochina. The Americans didn't intend to intervene. 124 On December 8,

1941, de Gaulle's Free France dec1ared war to Japan. After that, any collaboration between Decoux and de Gaulle seemed impossible. Decoux thought that Indochina's survival depended on having a good relationship with Japan. De Gaulle didn't help with this goal. l25 After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, de Gaulle stated that France had dec1ared war with Japan and would reclaim Indochina through force. Decoux on the other hand signed a new common defense accord with the Japanese. Even while Vichy was still in power in Paris, de Gaulle wanted to rec1aim Indochina. In September 1943, de Gaulle formed an expeditionary force in Algiers that had the purpose of regaining Indochina.

Later on, on August 1, 1944, de Gaulle created the "Comité d'action pour la libération de l'Indochine". Nevertheless, it wasn't until the liberation of Paris that de Gaulle could muster the time, energy and resources in rec1aiming Indochina. 126

Although de Gaulle and Decoux had very different ideologies on how best to preserve French sovereignty in Indochina, it was Decoux who decided on how best to deal with the Japanese. For a period of time, Decoux relied on Vichy's friendly relationship with Japan to give him leverage in the Indochinese-Japanese negotiations.

Therefore, he supported the Vichy govemment. Nevertheless, after Pearl Harbor, maritime communication around Indochina was completely cut off and only brief radio messages keep Indochina in contact with France. Still, Decoux followed Vichy's instructions on how to run society and became in a way a smaller version of Pétain's

France. An example of this could be seen in the laws discriminating against Jews,

124 De Gaulle, CalI ta Honar, P.166 125 Thomas, P.199 67

freemasons and de Gaulle supporters. 127 Another example was when, on November 17,

1941, Decoux rounded up the suspected Gaullist sympathizers present in the lndochinese administration. Decoux acted this way in part because he followed closely the Vichy policies but also because he believed Free French propaganda harmed his efforts to contain the spread of communism in Indochina. 128 De Gaulle and Decoux's ideologies also clashed when it came to the relationship with Japan. Vichy characterized the

Japanese presence in lndochina as collaboration. Nevertheless, Decoux was against this term. According to him, economic deals with Japan favored Japan but there was no political collaboration in any way. Decoux never considered lndochina to be a part of the

Japanese Asia co-prosperity sphere. 129

In the spring of 1943, with the increasing Japanese military loses, Decoux decided to try to establish secret liaisons with the Allied forces. On June 3, 1943, the Liberation

Comity was formed in Aigiers. lndochina had to send an emissary there to expose the truth on the lndochinese situation, i.e. the exact nature ofIndochinese-Japanese relations.

This was called "La Mission François", named after M. François. Decoux was worried about seeming disloyal to Pétain but knew that the Allied forces could take lndochina away from the French after the end of the war if it seemed like they helped Japan.

Decoux was open to sending François but had to be sure they wouldn't get caught because they had to get help from the Chinese government to pull it off, which was not an easy thing to do without the Japanese finding out. François was not given any written

126 Folin, P.36 127 Folin, P.30 128 Thomas, P.l99 129 De Boisanger, P.124 68

message but was told to transmit an image of the situation in Indochina, that Decoux hopes to preserve French sovereignty in Indochina by avoiding any provocation with

Japan, but that he was ready to resist them if they didn't respect any prior accord. But,

Decoux didn't say that he would like to join the Liberation Comity. For a long time,

Indochina didn't get any news from Aigiers. Later, a messenger told De Boisanger that they trusted him, but only him, i.e. not Decoux. Decoux was a bit too friendly with Vichy for them. According to Decoux, the François Mission was a failure because the message didn't make it to de Gaulle but rather to General Giraud. This individual didn't take the message seriously and failed to transmit it accordingly. Nevertheless, the Liberation

Comity got an idea of the Indochinese situation. 130

Throughout the time the Japanese were pressuring Indochina for resources and the right to use it as a launch pad to the creation of an Asian empire, de Gaulle frequently criticized Decoux's approach to the Japanese but it wasn't until the summer of 1944 that these two opposing ideologies would confront each other. Although for years, de Gaulle had encouraged the French in Indochina to rise up against the J apanese, his approach on how to best preserve French sovereignty in lndochina slowly took another direction. In

June 1944, de Gaulle was more open to the idea of preserving lndochina without the use of arms. He was still opposed to Decoux's way of goveming lndochina but sent

Commander François de Langlande to me et with him in lndochina. De Langlande shared de Gaulle's mentality that if France had sacrificed a hundred thousand people to rec1aim

France, then lndochina also had to sacrifice sorne of its population. His mission orders have never been revealed but it is known that he was to convince Decoux of supporting a

130 De Boisanger, P.67-72 69

Resistance movement in lndochina. Judging by de Gaulle's later decision to assign a new leader to the war effort in lndochina, we can assume Decoux's answer wasn't to de

Gaulle's liking. De Gaulle's conflicting ideas of preserving lndochina through pacific means and organizing a Resistance may have also contributed to Decoux' s refusai. 131

After the August 20, 1944 liberation of Paris by Allied forces, de Gaulle's temporary openness to the idea of lndochina waiting out the war in the Pacific came to a haIt. The failure of de Langlande's mission was a key factor in this French policy towards

Japan. Before liberation, de Gaulle had been ready to compromise by preserving the status quo in lndochina but at the same time, organizing a Resistance movement. But, on

August 29, 1944, de Gaulle published a declaration stating that since France was at war with Japan, the faith ofIndochina would only be settled through arms. De Gaulle wanted the French to fight in lndochina because even if the casualties would have been great, it would make a strong statement of French rights in lndochina. De Gaulle wanted to create a Resistance movement similar to the one that had helped reclaim France. \32

The news ofFrance's liberation by AUied forces was received in a mixed manner in lndochina. Although Decoux welcomed Germany's withdrawal from France, he had fully supported Pétain's Vichy government. As mentioned earlier, the main reason for this is because it gave lndochina credibility with Japan. 133 After the liberation of France and the end of the Vichy govemment, the lndochinese government considered two possibilities as to their relationship with Japan would become. Either aU Japanese troops would depart from the French colonial territory or there would be a complete takeover of

\3\ Folin, P.36 \32 Folin, P.36 70

the administration by Japan. Most senior officiaIs considered the second alternative as the most probable one. 134

After the liberation of Paris, de Gaulle's objective ofliberating lndochina through force became an active campaign. As soon as he was organized in Paris, de Gaulle started sending emissaries into lndochina. The biggest change de Gaulle brought to lndochina's administration was naming General Mordant as head of the Resistance in lndochina. This led to confusion on who was in charge in lndochina and was felt in the French armed forces. 135 On October 28, 1944, Decoux learned that de Gaulle had named General

Mordant the head of the Resistance and of the general delegate of the action comity for the liberation of lndochina. Contrary to Decoux, de Gaulle trusted Mordant. Decoux was to stay and continue his job, i.e. protect and take care of lndochina. Mordant was in charge of Paris-Indochina communications. Decoux would still deal with Japan but wouldn't make any decisions. Mordant wanted to fight the Japanese troops in lndochina.

Decoux wanted to remain neutral, while Japan is weakening, secretly reinforce French troops in lndochina. For this, they had to be very careful. Decoux and Mordant hated each other. 136

Resistance in Indochina

Since the beginning of the conflict in East Asia and the Japanese presence in lndochina, de Gaulle had been set on rec1aiming the French colonial territory. Contrary to

Decoux, de Gaulle was specifie about his desire of taking arms in lndochina. He didn't

133 Allan, P.97 134 De Boisanger, P.79 135 Allan, P.99 71

want the conflict in Indochina to end without the French having taken military measures to drive out the Japanese. De Gaulle didn't trust Decoux to lead the battle against the

Japanese because Decoux had been very pro-Vichy during the past few years. On August

19, 1944, the Comité d'action nominated General Mordant, high commander of the

French troops in Indochina, as leader of the Indochinese Resistance. 137 Therefore, in

1943, de Gaulle gave General Mordant the task of preparing and eventually leading the battle against the J apanese. Decoux was to stay in office but if in case of any hostile event happening, Mordant would have full control. In the spring of 1944, General Aymé had replaced Mordant as High Commander of the Troops but Mordant remained delegate general. \38 On October 28, 1944, Mordant informed Decoux of the Resistance movement and asked that he not communicate with Paris without it going through him. There were now two leaders in Indochina. On October 30, 1944, Decoux contacted Paris, through

Mordant, to inform them that any confusion on leadership would at a minimum weaken

Indochina's position to negotiate with Japan and could lead to chaos and anarchy in the country. He asked Paris to confirm his power over Indochina in the following three weeks or else he would give his command to General Aymé. On November 2, 1944,

Mordant asked for the exclusion of Decoux in the organization of the Resistance. This was too early for de Gaulle's plans. On November 16, 1944, de Langlade met with

Decoux to transmit France's message, but the damage had been done by Mordant. 139 By the end of 1944, Paris and Mordant had organized the Resistance but most of the

136 De Boisanger, P.92 137 Fo1in, P.37 138 De Gaulle, Sa1vation, P. 189 139 Folin, PA8 72

volunteers weren't discrete about their involvement in the clandestine group. In no time, the Japanese, through their network of spies and informants, knew every detail of the

Resistance. Another problem was that the native lndochinese refused to participate with the French military. On November 6, 1944, Mordant wrote to France that if the Japanese are pu shed too far, they will retaliate on the French. The Resistance didn't have modem weapons, planes, tanks, few trucks and diminishing supplies. In early 1945, General

Blaizot in Ceylon wrote to Mordant to inform him not to expect air support, that

American support wasn't a certainty and that he should adopt a style ofwarfare that had a long-term perspective. On February 23, 1945, Decoux contacted the Ministry of Colonies to express his worries about the lack of organization in the Resistance and to remind Paris that the departure of the Japanese from Indochina is only a question of time. Nobody in

Paris listened to him. 140 Although de Gaulle was determined to regain lndochina through

French arms or in the least leave a bloody mark as a token of France's determination in keeping its colonial territory, he committed the same error as many leaders in France did when they decided policies about lndochina. De Gaulle tried to implement the same system that had been a success in France against the Germans. Nevertheless, in

Indochina, the French were a small minority and didn't have the complete support of the local population. Although it encouraged the Japanese administration to go forward with a takeover of lndochina, Mordant' s failed attempt to build a Resistance network within the colony was but a small factor in the March 9, 1945 Japanese coup de force.

140 Folin, P.54 73

The Mareh 9, 1945 Japanese eoup de/oree

For many years, Franco-Japanese tension had been building up in Indochina. Up to the end of the Vichy govemment, Decoux' s policy of remaining neutral and waiting out the war had worked in part because Japan recognized Vichy's authority over France and all French territories. Another simpler reason was that Japanese efforts were more often than not concentrated elsewhere in East Asia. The end of 1944 altered these two factors that had aided Decoux's policies. In January 1945, word from the Japanese representatives in Indochina was transmitted to French officiaIs. Tt stated that, unofficially, if the Americans captured Manila, which at that time seemed very likely,

Japan would have to revise its policy towards Indochina. Decoux took this message very seriously. The following month, as was expected by many, on February 5, 1945, the

Americans took Manila. Many French officers in Indochina feared that Japan would now simply take what the French operated in Indochina and many, like Mordant, believed that the French should strike first. Decoux nevertheless followed his previous approach in dealing with the Japanese in Indochina. According to him, because of its military situation, the Japanese wou Id have to leave Indochina eventually. Therefore, he didn't want to provoke them in any way.141 On February 24, 1945, Decoux met with

Ambassador Matsumoto, Yoshizawa's successor to discuss the sudden increase in

J apanese military personnel on Indochinese soil. As a response, Matsumoto told Decoux that adequate information would be given to him when they met once more, on March 9,

1945. 142

141 Allan, P.99 142 De Boisanger, P.97 74

The Japanese govemment made its move on lndochina on March 9, 1945 with

Meigo Sakusen, i.e. Operation Bright Moon. 143 On March 9, 1945, Japanese troops in

Tonkin, Annam and Cochin China attacked the French garrisons. The Japanese had been driven out of the Philippines and lndonesia, were pressed in Burma, powerless to reduce

China, and couldn't maintain their communications by sea. Therefore, they couldn't tolerate any longer the presence of the French in lndochina, especially because they could become hostile. Japan feared that the French in Indochina would join the Allies sooner or later. 144 This coup de force had been prepared well in advance. In January 1945, General

Tsuchihashi's 38 th Army had organized special units in three areas, North, South and

Central Indochina. AlI of these were to act when the order was given. In those regions, they collected intelligence on the positions of the French troops, identify anti-Japanese propaganda, secure leading personalities close to Bao Dai, the Emperor of Annam, and make contact with members of the Vietnamese underground independence movement. As for diplomacy, Matsumoto replaced Ambassador Yoshizawa. Contrary to his predecessor,

Matsumoto didn't have difficulty in pressuring Decoux. 145

On the evening in question, Matsumoto met with Decoux to discuss Indochina's contacts with France as well as to express a desire for Indochina and Japan to become closer in case of an American landing. At 19:00, Matsumoto told Decoux of the necessity of strengthening their mutual defense agreement. Matsumoto told Decoux that an

American landing could happen anytime so Japan needs to reinforce its troops.

According ta the July 29, 1941 Darlan-Kata protocol, Japan had the right ta do this. But

143 Thomas, P.21O 144 De Gaulle, Salvation, P. 186 75

it had not been done yet. Matsumoto asked that the French arrny, marine and air force, administrative posts, transportation as weIl as interior and exterior communications, aIl be put under Japanese command. 146 Decoux had two hours to think about it. Matsumoto told Decoux that if by 21 :00, Decoux hadn't corne to a favorable response, Japan would have to take military measures and carry reprisaIs on the French citizens in Indochina. De

Boisanger tried to intervene but soon realized that the memorandum resembled more of an ultimatum. So, De Boisanger tried to gain time in order to alert the French arrny.

French naval captain Robin brought Decoux's answer to Matsumoto but he was late.

Whether this was done on purpose or if the J apanese in sorne way hindered this messenger remains c1assified or unknown to this day.

Decoux had been given two hours to consider the ultimatum but the deadline was not respected. At 21 :00, fighting had already broken out in Hanoi. Since no French envoy had arrived, Tsushihashi decided to take it as a refusaI and ordered the troops to act.

Robin carne by later but the events had already been set in motion. 147 The Japanese took

General Mordant, General Aymé, General Delsuc and AdmiraI Béranger as prisoners. In twenty-four hours, the majority of the French arrny was dismantled. In the north, the

Japanese pillaged and raped. In Langson, Colonel Robert and General Lemonnier were decapitated. In Dong Dan, four hundred soldiers made prisoner were later massacred. In

Saigon, Decoux and his staff were arrested and put in custody. Hundreds of French civilians, government workers and suspected members of the Resistance were arrested,

145 Allan, P.98 146 De Boisanger, P.100 147 Allan, P.I06 76

locked up and tortured. 148 The Japanese massacred the French survivors in Langson and

Dong Dang, in the North. Decoux was arrested and the Kempei, the Japanese military police, rounded up the French suspected of working for the Resistance. The Saigon

Chamber of Commerce became a temporary holding center, but in reality it was used for torture. 149 According to Decoux, no matter what his answer would have been, the

J apanese were determined to take over Indochina because French outposts and garrisons were attacked simultaneously all over Indochina. Decoux blamed all this on Paris having taken sorne ofhis authority away. Word of Mordant's Resistance movement had made its way to the Japanese, which led them to the March 9, 1945 betraya1. 150

Japan caught the whole Indochinese govemment by surprise and used it to full advantage in order to minimize the fighting necessary to secure Indochina. After the

March 9, 1945 Japanese coup de force, fighting died out very quickly in Indochina because of the J apanese military superiority and also because of the advantage of surprise they had. In Saigon, the Foreign Legion, under the command of Commander Sabattier retreated towards China but most of the troops were captured. General Mordant was among them and was arrested on March 10, 1945. Other isolated groups of French and

Indochinese soldiers resisted the Japanese. A noteworthy example is the 3rd Regiment of

Tonkinese tirailleurs who kept a fort in Dong Dang for many days. Nevertheless, the

Japanese took it back on March 12, 1945. AlI of the Indochinese soldiers became prisoners and were later killed. 151 General Alessandri and his Foreign Legion's 5th

148 Folin, P.55 149 Allan, P.I06 150 De Boisanger, P.103 151 Allan, P.I07 77

regiment managed to escape and arrived in Diên Biên Phu on March 24, 1945, after suffering a 10% casualty lost to thirst and hunger. Sabbatier later joined him. De Gaulle sent de Langlade and Colonel Passy to Diên Biên Phu to instruct Sabattier to keep a portion of lndochina soil from which the French forces could send out missions. The

J apanese pressure was too strong so the three thousand French troops had to cross over to

China in May 1945. De Gaulle told Sabbatier to go under Chiang Kai-shek's command because he trusted Chiang Kai-shek. On March 23, 1945, de Gaulle named Sabbatier commander in chief ofIndochina. 152 De Gaulle's reaction to the March 9, 1945 Japanese coup de force in lndochina was to send as much help possible to the troops still fighting the Japanese. On March 12, 1945, Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador in Washington, asked the US government to give support to the French Resistance in lndochina by parachuting arms, medical equipment and food. On March 13, 1945, de Gaulle spoke to

American Ambassador Caffery and told him about the American and British refusaI to send help. De Gaulle threatened to lean over the Russian side once the war was over if nothing was done. A week later, the US sent supplies. The British also sent infantry weapons. Nevertheless, the Japanese forces overwhelmed the French troops and these had no other option than retreat. 153 According to Tsushihashi, the success of the March 9,

1945 takeover was due of the poor quality of French troops in lndochina. These were poorly trained, had bad quality weapons and possessed a very low morale. 154

Japan's goal in organizing a coup de force on March 9, 1945 was to take over the administration ofIndochina. To do this, it relied on military force and strategy but aiso on

152 Folin, P.56 153 Allan, P.l 08 78

destroying France's alliances and support in si de Indochina. When the Japanese took over the colonial territory, they encouraged the native Indochinese to revolt against the French and form a new government. Nevertheless, the Japanese wouldn't give them any control.

In Vietnam, Tran Trong Kim formed a nationalist government, but it wasn't able to stop the famines he had wanted to stop. In Cambodia, the Japanese 2nd Division had been ordered to "protect" King Sihanouk, in order to prevent him from escaping. On March

13, 1945, King Sihanouk declared Cambodia's independence. On March 20, 1945, the

Japanese reached the Laotian capital. King Sisavang-Vong refused to believe the events that had occurred because he had always had a good relationship with France. But, on

April 7, 1945, two Japanese infantry battalions appeared in the capital to convince him.

On April 8, 1945, King Sisavang-Vong also dec1ared independence. All of nations once under France's protectorate had now dec1ared independence from France, but still had to answer to Japan. 155

The March 9, 1945 Japanese coup de force also gave alternative groups the opportunity to rise to power. The Japanese takeover of Indochina gave the Indochinese

Communist Party, led by Ho Chi Minh, an opportunity to negotiate with the French government in Kunming. Ho asked for univers al suffrage for the election of a Parliament, a French governor who would remain until independence as well as a cabinet. AIso,

Indochina should get independence in five to ten years, all natural resources should return to the Indochinese and the sale of opium would be outlawed. After the Japanese surrender, Ho formed the National Liberation Committee of Vietnam on August 13,

154 Allan, P .11 0 155 Allan, P.111 79

1945. His goal was to take power before the Allies could prevent it. On August 20, 1945, the Communists took over Hanoi. On August 25, 1945, Emperor Bao Dai abdicated and accepted the post of supreme adviser to the new administration. On September 2, 1945,

Ho declared lndochina's independence. Although the communist movement in lndochina had a long history and would still have gained power without the Japanese intervention in lndochina, the March 9, 1945 coup de force served as a catalyst for future events in lndochina and the subsequent downfall of the French in East Asia. 156

Until March 9, 1945, the administration of lndochina and its armed forces had remained in Decoux's hands. As for the territories and the economy, these were under

Japanese control. The Kempeitai exercized political control over the population and sought political support from secret societies such as the Hoa hao, Binh Huen and gave asylum to certain lndochinese nationalists such as Ngo Dinh Diem. Nevertheless, the

French claimed to maintain sovereignty in lndochina. 157 After the March 9, 1945 takeover, the political, administrative and military authority of France was passed on to the 38 th Japanese army, led by General Tsuchihashi. Japanese employees replaced all of the French employees. As for the lndochinese employees, these remained in the offices.

The J apanese concentrated all of the French citizens in big cities and instaured a curfew.

As for the senior staff, they were taken away for "protection". 158 On May 4, 1945, the

Japanese took the French prisoners out of Saigon. They were put in isolated small houses.

On September 20, 1945, Decoux was invited by Japanese authorities to go back to France

156 Allan, P.116 157 Folin, P.30 158 Folin, P.78 80

with few people. 159 Sabattier believes Decoux worked hard to slow down the Japanese in obtaining rights and privileges in Indochina. He was in no way responsible for the events of March 9,1945. 160

When examining the economlC, political and military reasons why Japan organized the coup de force on March 9, 1945, the question that cornes to mind is why

J apan, who always had a military superiority and could have organized the takeover at any time since 1940, waited for so long. According to Professor Shiraishi of the

University of Osaka, from 1941 to 1944, Japan was satisfied with its accords with Vichy and Decoux because they got economic rights and advantages without having to send vast numbers of troops to Indochina. Therefore, it could concentrate on fighting the

Allied forces. On January 24, 1944, a conference between the general imperial headquarters and the government decided to maintain as much as possible the status quo in Indochina. But, for the first time, a military option was devised in case of necessity.

After de Gaulle arrived in Paris, the policy towards Indochina changed. On September

14, 1944, three solutions were devised. The first one was for the possibility that the

French maintained the status quo and did not try to modify the Indochinese-Japanese accords. The second was for the possibility that the French refused to collaborate with

Japan, but surrendered peacefully. In this case, Japan would have had to place Indochina under military administration but would have kept the existing infrastructure. The third contingency plan was for the possibility that the French would resist. In this case, Japan would use military force. The Japanese minister of Foreign Affairs wanted the

159 De Boisanger, P.III 160 Sabattier, P.40 81

government to consider the third option only. Nevertheless, the military leaders rejected it because they had to concentrate their troops in the Philippines. In December 1944, the

Japanese lost the Philippines to the Americans. This had the consequence oftransforming

Indochina from a background reserve to an active front. Immediately, Japan sent two additional divisions. On December 30, 1944, Tokyo he Id a conference on the conduct of the war. In January, the military leaders decided on a possible takeover of Indochina. On

January 12, 1945, American air raids destroyed over fort Y Japanese ships in Saigon. This led the Japanese to believe an Allied landing was imminent. On March 9, 1945, the fear of an American landing in Indochina and the French army invading Indochina led to the

Japanese military taking over Indochina. 161

Frequent incidents had often led to more Japanese troops being posted in

Indochina. Under a Japanese rule, the French created a Franco-Japanese relations commission that had the role of avoiding Franco-Japanese tensions that would result of incidents. This was also done to preserve Decoux's superior standing. If the Govemor

General had to contact J apanese officiaIs for every incident in Indochina, the importance of his intervention would have diminished. Decoux only intervened in very important matters. J apan rapidly spread over Asia and won many victories. This once again brings up the question: Why didn't Japan take over Indochina? The main reason is because it had acquired a very large territory in a short time. Therefore, it had to assure public order and the satisfaction of the need of the populations. It would have been an extra burden to add Indochina. In addition, it would have hurt Vichy-Japanese relations. If Japan would have won the war, France would have lost Indochina. Japanese propaganda spread a very

161 Folin, P.59 82

specifie "Asia for Asians" message. If the Allied forces had won, then France would have had a chance of regaining control of Indochina but only if Indochina could prove it had do ne nothing to aid the Japanese war effort and kept a strict neutrality. An important goal during the war was to let the Allied forces know that the Indochinese government had refused to collaborate with J apan and that it had opposed economic demands that surpassed the Tokyo accord. Furthermore, Decoux and his staff had maintained control over the administration of the territory until the Japanese coup de force. Another point they wanted to make was that the Indochinese army had been free to travel across

Indochina and would have fought the Japanese troops with China if Japan had betrayed its agreement with Indochina. Therefore, in a way, Indochina's docility protected it from further Japanese aggression. 162

162 De Boisanger, P.64 83

Conclusion

On July 30, 1943, under Japanese pressure, the French government handed over its Concession in Shanghai to its mayor, Chen Gongbo, a representative of the Japanese

Puppet State of Nanjing. However, no international treaty made this exchange official. It wasn't until February 28, 1946, that Paris signed a treaty with the Chongqing government, renouncing its extraterritorial rights, privileges and its property in China.

France's privileged presence in Shanghai was over. 163 On March 9, 1945, Japan organized a coup de force and took over the entire administration of Indochina. Whatever hope of Franco-Japanese friendship and cooperation had existed before disappeared forever. France would have to wait for Japan to capitulate on August 15, 1945, to regain its East Asian territory.164

During the decades it possessed territory in East Asia, France had made it a point to maintain a strict policy of neutrality. This status quo was applied to Franco-Japanese relations. On one hand, France wouldn't question any Japanese military actions as long as they didn't affect the French in East Asia. On the other hand, Japan would stay c1ear of

French territory in its expansionist drive. However, during the 1930s, events such as the

Shanghai Incident and the Sino-Japanese War forced France to reconsider its role and position in the Far East.

Paris failed to act accordingly to J apanese political and military pressure. As a consequence, its image of a powerful Western nation in East Asia was shattered and

163 http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/archives/dossiers/shanghai/finconcs.htrnl , Ministère des affaires étrangères, France 164 Folin, P.90 84

French sovereignty over its territory in China, lndochina and other possessions was threatened, if not completely eliminated. Three main reasons were behind this inability to resist Japan. First of all, France had not considered its East Asian possessions as having any strategie importance. lnstead, its mentality remained that all events of importance in the world happened in Europe and would be settled in Europe. However, contrary to the

First World War, World War II would ex tend far beyond Europe and a major part would be played in East Asia.

A second reason for France's weak position towards Japan was its concems over events taking place doser to the motherland. The Spanish Civil as well as Nazi Germany took most of France's attention as to its foreign policy. Because it had neglected Japanese military growth in East Asia over the last decades, France didn't see Japan as a threat to its interests. The beginning of the Second World War, France's defeat to Germany and its ruling by the German-controlled Vichy govemment left the French in East Asia at the mercy of Japan. This brings us to the third reason France lost so much in the Far East during the 1930s and 1940s.

A third reason France was powerless towards Japan in East Asia was because its representatives didn't possess full authority in defending French interests. Furthermore,

Franco-Japanese negotiations were spread out in Paris, lndochina and Japan. Because of these multiple representatives of both govemments and the lack of communication between them, insecurity and confusion existed between the two nations. Throughout these years, France desperately tried to maintain its sovereignty in East Asia. To do this, it had to preserve a peaceful relationship with Japan. However, lacking any strong support, French representatives in the Far East could only try its best to please Japan. 85

This attitude led to Japan having an advantage in every subsequent Franco-Japanese negotiation.

Many events are worth mentioning to explain how France lost control over its Far

Eastern territory. During the 1932 Shanghai Incident, Japanese troops entered the French

Concession and occupied it for a certain time. Contrary to how it had acted before when faced with this type of aggression, the French govemment didn't take effective measures to obtain compensation from the Japanese. The increasing size of Japan's military may be a reason why. This passivity towards Japan set the pace for following events.

Five years later, in its effort to expand into China, Japan took the French owned island of Hainan, the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. Faced with this permanent occupation of its territory by the Japanese army, France nonetheless stood by and did nothing. Once again, the desire to remain on Japan's friendly side motivated this decision. However, changes occurring in Europe also had a part to play in France's lack of interests in the fate of its citizens in East Asia.

Indochina was France' s prized possession in East Asia. Its vast resources, large population as well as strategic location gave the French a powerful place in the Far East.

However, the importance of this land also attracted Japanese attention. For them, occupying Indochina would pro vide them with natural resources it needed to fuel its war machine and serve as a doorway into the East Asian mainland. From 1940 to 1945, multiple demands were made to Governor-General Catroux and Decoux. Facing Japan's powerful military that dwarfed the French forces in East Asia, the French representatives had no option but to seek a passive solution. In this case, it meant giving Japan everything it asked for and more. 86

The event of major importance that set the point of no return for Japanese domination over the French was its mediation of the Thai-Indochinese conflict. As payment for its services, Japan obtained the right to occupy certain parts of Indochina, use its ports and air bases as welI as move its troops through the country. After this new

Franco-Japanese position, many trade and military ententes folIowed, aIl of which were advantageous to Japan.

AlI of these Franco-Japanese accords in Indochina extended to the French

Concession in Shanghai. Therefore, it was left relatively untouched by Japanese troops until 1941. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December ofthat year, Japanese troops immediately entered the International Settlement and the French Concession but, because of already existing Franco-J apanese treaties, France maintained sovereignty until 1943.

French foreign policy can be described as weak, indifferent or fearful. Nevertheless, at the end of the Second World War, its flag was still soaring in East Asia. 87

Bibliography

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Catroux, General Maurice. Deux actes du drame indochinois. Hanoï: Juin 1940. Dien Bien Phu: Mars-Mai 1954. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1959.

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Periodicals

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Websites

Ministère des affaires étrangères, France http://www .france.dip lomatie. ft/ archi ves/dossiers/ shanghai/finconcs.html