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The Heart of Asia Process at a Juncture: an Analysis of Impediments to Further Progress

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AFGHAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES The Heart of Asia Process at a Juncture: An Analysis of Impediments to Further Progress POLICY PAPER Richard Ghiasy Maihan Saeedi JUNE 2014 This Page Intentionally Left Blank AFGHAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES The Heart of Asia Process at a Juncture: An Analysis of Impediments to Further Progress Authors: Mr. Richard Ghiasy, MBA, MPA; and Mr. Maihan Saeedi, M.Phil. Principal Researcher: Mr. Musab Omer, M.A. Research Design Review and Peer Review: ! Prof. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh: Director, Specialization on Human Security at the Master’s of Public Affairs (MPA), Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po, Paris); and consultant for the UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA). ! Dr. Barnett Rubin: Director and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, New York City ! Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva: Chairperson, Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi ! Ms. Rosheen Kabraji: Asia Programme Manager, Chatham House, London Field Advisors: ! Mr. Didier Chaudet: Head of the Programme on Iranian and South Asian Studies, Institute for Prospective and Security Studies in Europe, Paris ! Prof. Emil Dzhuraev: American University of Central Asia, Bishkek ! Mr. Armands Pupols: Political Affairs Officer, UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA), Ashgabat ! Mr. Alexey Yusupov: Head, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Kazakhstan, Almaty With support from This Page Intentionally Left Blank CONTENTS Executive Summary 6 Main Findings 7 Preface 8 Setting the Scene 9 Heart of Common Interests? 15 Impediments to the Process 19 Stances by Country 22 Conclusion 41 Recommendations 42 Annexes: Annex 1: Overview of Activities per CBM and per Country 46 Annex 2: Methodology and Questionnaire Copy 53 Annex 3: Institutions and Experts Consulted 55 Annex 4: Abbreviations and Acronyms 59 Annex 5: Notes and References 61 Annex 6: About the AISS 68 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY basis. The new Afghan administration should appoint a diplomatically seasoned team exclusively to the HoAP to coordinate and monitor with amplified capacity. The complexity of relations among Heart of Considering the security situation in Kabul, relevant Asia Process (henceforth HoAP or the Process) Afghan embassies should be given more responsibility. A participating states, the inner circle, cannot be trust fund for core Process coordination can resolve understated. Brokering discussion on common threats financial impediments, and hone the three-tier and opportunities pertaining to Afghanistan within a single governance structure. An annual rotation system should platform among states that have hitherto had difficulty also be introduced for CBM lead states, so that interacting is a victory in itself. The brief timeframe in responsibility is shared and new ideas are introduced. which it has done so should be underlined. Yet, the The Process has to date received surprisingly few in- Process finds itself at risk of losing momentum. HoAP depth journalistic reflections, and scholarly analysis of the members need to be persuaded that this process will young Process has been limited. The HoAP urgently yield results. What are impediments to further progress? needs the establishment of a parallel track 2. This policy paper attempts to answer this question and provides policy recommendations to HoAP stakeholders To fortify the Process, cooperation with existing to mitigate such impediments. multilateral bodies deserves closer examination and attention. Overlapping objectives can be combined to Based on a wide range of interviews with selected create synergies. Concurrently, participating states with experts on the Process and secondary data, this report’s economic prowess, such as China, should be stimulated findings indicate that the Process’ largest impediment is to take the lead in CBMs to ensure that tangible headway its equivocal objective and corresponding members’ is made. The outer circle of supporting countries and incentives system. Is the HoAP for Afghanistan or the organizations should be stimulated to contribute more. broader region? If it merely serves one state, i.e. Likewise, the United Nation’s (UN) role could also be Afghanistan, it will most likely not evolve into a expanded to encourage wary members. mechanism blessed with longevity. The aspiration of the Process should be to enhance addressing the inner Irrefutably, the region has self-interest in acting to circle’s overlapping interests. These interests are improve regional relations and particularly to work primarily economic connectivity, mitigation of non-state together to prevent Afghanistan from remaining a source actors’ destructive behavior, and curbing illicit drugs of instability, endangering the neighborhood. The Process production and trafficking. An incentives system and allows Kabul to contribute to setting its own agenda and matching feasible action plans to cater these is direly is a useful platform for political dialogue. It should be needed. sustained, and stimulated to address regional opportunities and challenges pertinent to all supporting Impediments to achieving these partially lie in countries, particularly in light of Afghanistan’s triple Afghanistan, stewardship requires qualification and transition and the post 2014/16 security landscape. Much political determination. The Process is prone to will depend on the political will and merit of the new managerial limitations. This is partially the product of a Afghan administration. Its vision of the country’s foreign power vacuum, created by the exit of former drivers of the policy will directly affect the Process. Process. While Kabul is distracted by elections, attention to the Process has plummeted on co-initiator Turkey’s The Process stands at a critical juncture where foreign policy agenda, and supporting states and momentum might be lost. Afghanistan is pivoting down on organizations prefer not to overstep the mark. the international community’s foreign policy agenda. Yet, it should jump up a few spots on the inner circle’s agenda. In addition, there is a deficiency of institutional capacity The Process’ life expectancy will be affected if both hub and human resources in Kabul to act as the Process’ hub, and spokes fall short of meeting the Process’ objective as foremost at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and in a product of disinterest or deficiency of political will. ministries responsible for implementing and coordinating Further institutionalization is recommended to more Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). This translates adequately cater to the interests of members and to into operational and communicational limitations, and address impediments to further progress of the Process. does not empower Kabul to initiate, lead and follow up sufficiently. The current team assigned to coordinate the Process, the Regional Cooperation Directorate (RCD) at the Afghan MFA, has to juggle Process tasks with running responsibilities – the Process cannot thrive on an ad hoc 6 MAIN FINDINGS Heart of Asia Process Achievements • Sole regional process where Afghanistan is in the lead, allowing it to contribute to setting its own agenda. • Brokering discussion within a single platform among states that have hitherto had difficulty interacting. • Ample regional interest, as displayed by China's decision to host the 2014 ministerial conference as well as participation at the senior official level from all participating countries, including Pakistan. • Six CBMs initiated that contribute to building trust and allowing people-to-people exchanges at the technical level. Impediments to Further Progress of the Heart of Asia Process (Geo)Political Impediments • The Karzai administration has not shown adequate political will at the highest levels to fully endorse the Process. • It is not a national process, and there are no drivers of the Process any longer, a power vacuum has grown. The Process has limited national reach in Afghanistan beyond the RCD. • Interest in the Process has plummeted on co-initiator Turkey’s foreign policy agenda, while supporting states prefer not to overstep the mark and leave it a forum led by the Process’ immediate region • The Process’ objective is equivocal: is it first and foremost for Afghanistan or the broader region? • It lacks a convincing incentives system for members to commit devotedly. • Members in both the inner and the outer circle could, generally, display more support. Interest in the Process is slowly waning in certain capitals. • Financial resources are existent but predominately in the outer circle of supporting states and organizations. • It sits in a complex region: the Process’ economically larger participating and supporting states have geopolitical agendas, tensions and mistrust prevail among them, and midst smaller regional powers. • The Process partially overlaps in purpose with several existing political and economic regional mechanisms. Operational Impediments • Kabul does not initiate, lead or follow up sufficiently. This is partially entrenched in RCD financial deficits, Process under-institutionalization and poor protocol channels between the three-tier governance structure. • There is a deficiency of institutional capacity and human resources at the MFA to act as the Process’ hub. • It has no entrenched mechanisms for formulation or implementation of CBMs, the CBMs miss clear labor division, targets and gauges to fuel and measure progress. Frequency
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