The Heart of Asia Process at a Juncture: an Analysis of Impediments to Further Progress

AFGHAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

The Heart of Asia Process at a Juncture: An Analysis of Impediments to Further Progress

POLICY PAPER

Richard Ghiasy Maihan Saeedi

JUNE 2014

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AFGHAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

The Heart of Asia Process at a Juncture: An Analysis of Impediments to Further Progress

Authors: Mr. Richard Ghiasy, MBA, MPA; and Mr. Maihan Saeedi, M.Phil. Principal Researcher: Mr. Musab Omer, M.A. Research Design Review and Peer Review: ! Prof. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh: Director, Specialization on Human Security at the Master’s of Public Affairs (MPA), Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po, Paris); and consultant for the UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA). ! Dr. Barnett Rubin: Director and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, New York City ! Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva: Chairperson, Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi ! Ms. Rosheen Kabraji: Asia Programme Manager, Chatham House, London Field Advisors: ! Mr. Didier Chaudet: Head of the Programme on Iranian and South Asian Studies, Institute for Prospective and Security Studies in Europe, Paris ! Prof. Emil Dzhuraev: American University of Central Asia, Bishkek ! Mr. Armands Pupols: Political Affairs Officer, UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA), Ashgabat ! Mr. Alexey Yusupov: Head, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Kazakhstan, Almaty

With support from

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CONTENTS

Executive Summary 6 Main Findings 7 Preface 8

Setting the Scene 9 Heart of Common Interests? 15 Impediments to the Process 19 Stances by Country 22 Conclusion 41 Recommendations 42

Annexes: Annex 1: Overview of Activities per CBM and per Country 46 Annex 2: Methodology and Questionnaire Copy 53 Annex 3: Institutions and Experts Consulted 55 Annex 4: Abbreviations and Acronyms 59 Annex 5: Notes and References 61 Annex 6: About the AISS 68

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY basis. The new Afghan administration should appoint a diplomatically seasoned team exclusively to the HoAP to coordinate and monitor with amplified capacity. The complexity of relations among Heart of Considering the security situation in Kabul, relevant Asia Process (henceforth HoAP or the Process) Afghan embassies should be given more responsibility. A participating states, the inner circle, cannot be trust fund for core Process coordination can resolve understated. Brokering discussion on common threats financial impediments, and hone the three-tier and opportunities pertaining to Afghanistan within a single governance structure. An annual rotation system should platform among states that have hitherto had difficulty also be introduced for CBM lead states, so that interacting is a victory in itself. The brief timeframe in responsibility is shared and new ideas are introduced. which it has done so should be underlined. Yet, the The Process has to date received surprisingly few in- Process finds itself at risk of losing momentum. HoAP depth journalistic reflections, and scholarly analysis of the members need to be persuaded that this process will young Process has been limited. The HoAP urgently yield results. What are impediments to further progress? needs the establishment of a parallel track 2. This policy paper attempts to answer this question and provides policy recommendations to HoAP stakeholders To fortify the Process, cooperation with existing to mitigate such impediments. multilateral bodies deserves closer examination and attention. Overlapping objectives can be combined to Based on a wide range of interviews with selected create synergies. Concurrently, participating states with experts on the Process and secondary data, this report’s economic prowess, such as China, should be stimulated findings indicate that the Process’ largest impediment is to take the lead in CBMs to ensure that tangible headway its equivocal objective and corresponding members’ is made. The outer circle of supporting countries and incentives system. Is the HoAP for Afghanistan or the organizations should be stimulated to contribute more. broader region? If it merely serves one state, i.e. Likewise, the United Nation’s (UN) role could also be Afghanistan, it will most likely not evolve into a expanded to encourage wary members. mechanism blessed with longevity. The aspiration of the Process should be to enhance addressing the inner Irrefutably, the region has self-interest in acting to circle’s overlapping interests. These interests are improve regional relations and particularly to work primarily economic connectivity, mitigation of non-state together to prevent Afghanistan from remaining a source actors’ destructive behavior, and curbing illicit drugs of instability, endangering the neighborhood. The Process production and trafficking. An incentives system and allows Kabul to contribute to setting its own agenda and matching feasible action plans to cater these is direly is a useful platform for political dialogue. It should be needed. sustained, and stimulated to address regional opportunities and challenges pertinent to all supporting Impediments to achieving these partially lie in countries, particularly in light of Afghanistan’s triple Afghanistan, stewardship requires qualification and transition and the post 2014/16 security landscape. Much political determination. The Process is prone to will depend on the political will and merit of the new managerial limitations. This is partially the product of a Afghan administration. Its vision of the country’s foreign power vacuum, created by the exit of former drivers of the policy will directly affect the Process. Process. While Kabul is distracted by elections, attention to the Process has plummeted on co-initiator Turkey’s The Process stands at a critical juncture where foreign policy agenda, and supporting states and momentum might be lost. Afghanistan is pivoting down on organizations prefer not to overstep the mark. the international community’s foreign policy agenda. Yet, it should jump up a few spots on the inner circle’s agenda. In addition, there is a deficiency of institutional capacity The Process’ life expectancy will be affected if both hub and human resources in Kabul to act as the Process’ hub, and spokes fall short of meeting the Process’ objective as foremost at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and in a product of disinterest or deficiency of political will. ministries responsible for implementing and coordinating Further institutionalization is recommended to more Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). This translates adequately cater to the interests of members and to into operational and communicational limitations, and address impediments to further progress of the Process. does not empower Kabul to initiate, lead and follow up sufficiently. The current team assigned to coordinate the Process, the Regional Cooperation Directorate (RCD) at the Afghan MFA, has to juggle Process tasks with running responsibilities – the Process cannot thrive on an ad hoc

MAIN FINDINGS

Heart of Asia Process Achievements • Sole regional process where Afghanistan is in the lead, allowing it to contribute to setting its own agenda. • Brokering discussion within a single platform among states that have hitherto had difficulty interacting. • Ample regional interest, as displayed by China's decision to host the 2014 ministerial conference as well as participation at the senior official level from all participating countries, including Pakistan. • Six CBMs initiated that contribute to building trust and allowing people-to-people exchanges at the technical level.

Impediments to Further Progress of the Heart of Asia Process (Geo)Political Impediments • The Karzai administration has not shown adequate political will at the highest levels to fully endorse the Process. • It is not a national process, and there are no drivers of the Process any longer, a power vacuum has grown. The Process has limited national reach in Afghanistan beyond the RCD. • Interest in the Process has plummeted on co-initiator Turkey’s foreign policy agenda, while supporting states prefer not to overstep the mark and leave it a forum led by the Process’ immediate region • The Process’ objective is equivocal: is it first and foremost for Afghanistan or the broader region? • It lacks a convincing incentives system for members to commit devotedly. • Members in both the inner and the outer circle could, generally, display more support. Interest in the Process is slowly waning in certain capitals. • Financial resources are existent but predominately in the outer circle of supporting states and organizations. • It sits in a complex region: the Process’ economically larger participating and supporting states have geopolitical agendas, tensions and mistrust prevail among them, and midst smaller regional powers. • The Process partially overlaps in purpose with several existing political and economic regional mechanisms.

Operational Impediments • Kabul does not initiate, lead or follow up sufficiently. This is partially entrenched in RCD financial deficits, Process under-institutionalization and poor protocol channels between the three-tier governance structure. • There is a deficiency of institutional capacity and human resources at the MFA to act as the Process’ hub. • It has no entrenched mechanisms for formulation or implementation of CBMs, the CBMs miss clear labor division, targets and gauges to fuel and measure progress. Frequency of senior official meetings (SOMs) is insufficient. • Media coverage and independent analysis of the Process has been modest so far.

Policy Recommendations for the Heart of Asia Process Strategic Recommendations • Kabul should show unreserved political will to nurture the Process at all government levels. • Reiterate the practical objective of the Process and make sure that it caters to members’ interests and concerns. An improved incentives system and practical initiatives targeting the inner circle’s national interests and red flags should be presented. Dedicate more attention to economic integration projects that increase economic interdependence. All foreign-based Afghan diplomatic channels should be fully utilized. • Kabul should pursue active and creative diplomacy. Drop reactive diplomacy and practice pragmatic neutrality. • Process members should show stronger devotion until the Process has fully fledged.

Tactical Recommendations • Assign a diplomatically seasoned team in Kabul to drive and coordinate the Process – with no other duties – in order to strengthen operational and communication capacity, and monitor implementation. HoAP focal points at relevant ministries should show stronger commitment. Relevant embassies need focal points. • Pass on the baton by introducing an annual rotation system for CBM lead states. There should be a reevaluation of the weight and quantity of the six CBMs. Create CBM metrics demonstrating success, thereby inspiring the Process to produce results. Set up task forces to expedite initiatives. • Strengthen senior official and technical level interaction by refining protocol and meeting more frequently. • Establish a parallel HoAP track 2 with research institutes from participating and supporting countries to feed new ideas into the Process. Regular track 1.5 dialogues pre ministerial conferences are vital.

PREFACE House for invaluable review of our research design and final drafts. The venerable Prof. Frederick Starr also kindly provided us with some reflections. Any With the drawdown of NATO-ISAF forces from inaccuracies in this work are our own. Afghanistan in 2014 and most likely entirely in 2016, and the diminishing role of the international community; an We would also like to express our gratitude to Mr. Didier Afghan-led inclusive regional forum that acts as a Chaudet, Prof. Emil Dzhuraev, Mr. Armands Pupols, and catalyzer for regional security, economic connectivity and Mr. Alexey Yusupov for providing us with counsel and cooperation is most welcome. Ideally, the Heart of Asia opinions on countries that we could not visit. Likewise, we Process should be just that. would like to acknowledge the generous contributions of all consulted experts on the Process, this work would At the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS) in have had little value without them. Most of them are Kabul we had received signals from diplomats and referred to in Annex 3, some preferred not to have their scholars that Process’ members interest in it has names disclosed. We would also like to thank Mr. Musab somewhat waned since its conception and that it is not Omer, our principal researcher, for his diligence. living up to its potential. As we explored existing analyses we were appalled by the lack of quality media coverage of On a final note, we would like to clarify that the findings of the Process, and the limited academic inquiry in it. this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the AISS, Subsequently, we decided to delve into this by means of the FCO, or those of the Embassy of the United Kingdom a scholarly project and analyze impediments to progress to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. of the Process. The Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) of the United Kingdom (UK), through their Richard Ghiasy and Maihan Saeedi embassy in Kabul, kindly provided the monetary means June 2014, Kabul necessary to conduct this project over a period of four months.

We have attempted to make this a comprehensive and cutting-edge analytical policy paper. We hope that this policy paper will provide the new Afghan administration, HoAP members and all other stakeholders with insightful reflections and valuable recommendations that could result in the fine-tuning of the Process and provide improved yields. Much of the latter will depend on the dedication and merit of the new Afghan administration – and members’ support. Correspondingly, much will be determined by large member powers such as China, India and Russia. Many eyes look east to China, as Afghanistan’s economically and geopolitically most influential neighbor.1

Hopefully, the Tianjin ministerial conference this year will reiterate the necessity of the HoAP as a valuable institutional vehicle to address the common challenges that the Heart of Asia region, and more specifically Afghanistan, faces. It is also hoped that it will agree on mitigating some of the impediments that this policy paper has identified.

Our gratitude goes out to the FCO of the UK and their embassy in Kabul for their generous and thoughtful support throughout the entire project, Prof. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh of Sciences Po in Paris and consultant for the UNRCCA, Dr. Barnett Rubin of NYU, Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva of JNU, and Ms. Rosheen Kabraji of Chatham

SETTING THE SCENE and prosperity of Afghanistan, and as an extension of that, the broader region.

In a poem, the renowned Pakistani philosopher The HoAP is essentially designed to bring the region and poet Allama Iqbal (1877-1938) described Afghanistan together to discuss and attempt to solve challenges as the heart of Asia. This phrase depicts Afghanistan’s pertinent to the broader region, but with a distinct focus unique geographic location in this continent. As rightly on Afghanistan. This is predominantly propelled by the accredited in the poem, Afghanistan can be either a destructive conduct of non-state actors. Their conduct centre of prosperity and stability, or a centre of poverty requires new collective security arrangements 4 and and instability. While the poem unquestionably increased political dialogue. It is also driven by the embellishes the weight of Afghanistan on its neighbors, potential of Afghanistan to herald positive externalities on both their development and security, a volatile and economic derivatives upon stability.5 The rationale Afghanistan distresses the broader region, and as the behind it has three major elements: 1) The US-led reaction to 9/11 has demonstrated, the effects are felt international community grasped that Afghanistan’s woes even further afield. require regional support. As a geopolitically vulnerable state with low levels of socio-economic development, Historically, Afghanistan has acted as a land bridge Afghanistan relies much on the goodwill of its broader between South Asia, Central Asia, China and the Middle neighborhood and the agendas of regional powers. East. Protracted conflict has, sadly, turned Afghanistan Brokering exchange and discussions can alleviate distrust from a much-used bridge for civilizational, religious, and potentially result in closer cooperation. 2) Historically, scientific and commercial exchange to a shunned bridge. Afghanistan has often been on the menu rather than at Barely anyone dares to use it anymore. the table. The HoAP allows Afghanistan to lead a process where it sways more authority and permits it to better Following the events of 9/11, the international community determine its own agenda from a regional perspective. 3) – through ample sacrifice – has provided Afghanistan with The challenges that Afghanistan faces do not merely the opportunity to stand tall again. The Afghanistan of affect itself and neither are they solely the produce of today is not the anarchic country that it was in 2001. Yet, Afghanistan. Afghanistan continues to face vast challenges: this year’s political transition, the security transition, and most The Istanbul Process is loosely based on the 2002 Kabul importantly socioeconomic development. There is still no Declaration of Good Neighborly Relations. The indigenous economic engine to speak off. Youth (68 distinguishing feature of this declaration was recognition percent of the population is aged 0-25 years2), will need of certain fundamental issues: the role of the UN in an ecology with proper incentives to opt for international affairs, fighting terrorism (especially (re)construction rather than destruction. Concurrently, dismantling terrorist bases), respect for territorial integrity international aid will diminish, while security running costs in the region, and non-interference policy. The HoAP will remain high, and a deficiency of government revenue finds its origins, however, in the US proposed New Silk will jeopardize institutional stability and effectiveness. As Road initiative,6 and in a partnership between Turkey and the new administration will deal with these challenges, Afghanistan in 2009. Turkey had an assertive foreign Afghanistan’s erratic neighborhood of tensions, mistrust, policy under then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet low levels of political interaction and economic Davutoğlu, he saw Turkey as an emerging power that had interdependence will be the backdrop. On top of this, no problems with neighbors or great powers. Afghanistan will face a post-2016 ‘zero-option,’ whether the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) is signed by the Afghanistan was enchanted by the idea of Turkey as a new administration or not. With challenges and ‘co-steward’ as it was seen as an expansion of Turkey's opportunities ahead, what role is there for the HoAP? role as a broker with Pakistan. The two people whose personal partnership was essential to the Process were HoAP Conception that of Turkish diplomat Burak Akçapar and Afghan The HoAP or the Istanbul Process on Regional Security Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Jawed and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan3 Ludin. 7 They worked with the Center on International was co-initiated by Afghanistan and Turkey in 2011 to Cooperation at New York University and Norway on a encourage the countries in and adjacent to the Heart of track 2 level followed by a track 1.5 process that Asia (henceforth those countries will be referred to as the metamorphosed into the Istanbul Process. At the start of Heart of Asia region) to play a positive role in the stability 2011, the Process’ formation got a new impetus when

Hillary Clinton announced the "diplomatic surge" on US-led intervention in Afghanistan. So far, most of these Afghanistan in her Asia Society speech.8 countries have adhered to an observer stance to avoid stepping on participating countries’ toes. There is indeed In the Process Afghanistan has a permanent seat. It a fine line between active participation and overstepping. annually shares stewardship of the Process on a rotating However, a few key inner circle actors do not accept the basis with a voluntary co-chair. Turkey was followed by role of the US as a mere supporting state, 10 and Kazakhstan, then China and the latter will retire from this suspicions prevail about its precise role in the Process.11 position at the next ministerial conference in Tianjin on August 29, 2014. The RCD, a department at the Afghan Within this outer circle, the Process is buoyed by a set of MFA with supplementary commitments, was designated regional and international organizations which include the as the hub of the Process. The RCD runs daily operations UN, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the and is responsible for overall coordination of the Process. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), The Process’ governance is based on a three-tier the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the South structure: 1) the ministerial tier, meeting annually for high- Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), level political consultation, 2) the diplomatic tier, shaped and the Conference on Interaction and CBMs in Asia by regular senior officials meetings (SOM) and tasked (CICA). Of these organizations, the UN has the largest with coordination and supervision of the six CBMs (these role and convenes the ministerial conferences. Eleven Confidence Building Measures are frameworks to plan, UN agencies support the CBMs. The Process is on a coordinate and implement projects that instill trust and voluntary basis and is rather flexible as to members’ cooperation), and 3) the technical tier, that is responsible commitments. An interesting observation is the ratio of for the implementation of the CBMs.9 These tiers are the inner to the outer circle: the latter has twenty-eight supplemented by a Ambassadors Contact Group. This members, while the inner circle has fourteen members. group is composed of Kabul-based ambassadors of Please see the map at the end of the next section, Heart participating countries. of Common Interests?, for a visual overview of participating and supporting countries. Fourteen countries have committed to the HoAP: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, HoAP Dissected Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, One of the biggest achievements of the Istanbul Turkey, Turkmenistan and the United Arab Emirates conference of 2011 happened at the margins, when (UAE). These countries are also referred to as Turkey and the US incited Kabul and Islamabad to talk to participating countries of the Process. They can be seen each other. Afghanistan accuses Pakistan of being a safe as the inner circle of the Process. It is unique that the haven for Afghan Taliban, while Pakistan considers Process has been able bring about the commitment of all Afghanistan to be allied with India in an anti-Pakistan these states – particularly having India and Pakistan, and policy, and a safe haven for the Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan Iran and the United States (US), the US is a supporting (TTP). There is still a long way to go before these two country in the Process, sit at the same table. The majority countries trust each other, but the Process helps of these participating countries have, interestingly, not Islamabad and Kabul to enter a more constructive phase been closely engaged in US-led intervention in where fewer accusations are heard, and more practical Afghanistan. Afghan neighbor Uzbekistan considered steps are taken to deal with pending issues. According to joining, however after the second ministerial meeting in an interlocutor who has closely followed the Process Kabul in 2012 it indicated that it prefers to work on a since inception. “The Process was designed to facilitate bilateral basis. constructive exchanges of ideas that were hard or impossible to achieve on a bilateral basis.” 12 In that Sixteen supporting states buttress the inner circle: context, the HoAP has accomplished a core target. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Iraq, Japan, Norway, Poland, Spain, Since the Istanbul conference in 2011, the forum was Sweden, the UK, the US, and the European Union (EU) strengthened by two more annual HoAP ministerial as a collective entity. These states, mainly traditional conferences. Specifically, in June 2012 the conference donors to Afghanistan since 2002, are not directly was held in Kabul. At this conference, the roadmap was involved in the Process, but rather play a supporting role laid out for the achievement of targets identified in the in the implementation of the six CBMs and offer counsel previous conference: political consultation, CBMs and and technical expertise on a voluntary basis. The majority greater coherence. The standout of the conference was of these supporting states have actively participated in the agreement on CBMs. These CBMs were initiated to

10 soothe tense ties, and stimulate confidence and trust Furthermore, whereas the first declaration stressed the through collaboration at political and technical levels. Yet, role of Afghanistan, in the second and third declarations these CBMs were in fact an afterthought added to create the tone shifted to regional responsibility, with a ongoing activities, they were never in the HoAP’s somewhat more economic emphasis. This was also blueprint. The main point of the Process was political reflected in amendments to the objective of the Process. dialogue leading to a stability pact, similar to the Helsinki The third HoAP ministerial conference declaration Process leading to the OSCE,13 this was what the US and presented the objective of the Process as: Stability and the EU had envisioned.14 That is why the CBMs have Prosperity in the ‘Heart of Asia’ through Building raised an imperative question: Is it to use technical Confidence and Shared Regional Interests. Outside of benchmarks to achieve political success? Kabul and Ankara most interlocutors spoken to by the authors of this report have pointed out that they find the Of the forty-three CBMs that were identified at the objective equivocal. Irrespective, the HoAP has Istanbul conference seven were prioritized at the unquestionably survived a difficult birth and infancy, and conference in Kabul: Disaster Management, Counter this should be acknowledged. Terrorism, Counter Narcotics, Chamber of Commerce, Commercial Opportunities, Regional Infrastructure, and Who’s Responsibility? Education. Later on, two CBMs, Chamber of Commerce An ostensibly intended byproduct of the HoAP is a and Commercial Opportunities were merged together as gravitational shift that transfers responsibility for the Trade Commerce and Investment Opportunities CBM. Afghanistan’s stability and development away from the These CBMs are currently led by ten participating states, US towards the inner circle of participating countries and on a voluntary basis. Three of these CBMs focus on Afghanistan itself. 18 Hence, the US has always been present menaces facing the region, (natural) disasters, supportive but never pushed too much. terrorism and narcotics, while the other three concentrate on opportunities and (economic) connectivity. To date, This has created complications. Key regional actors such CBM focus has largely been on technical plans, and while as China, Iran, Pakistan and Russia all opposed the implementation plans have been drawn up, no criteria are Afghan-Turkish approach right from the start. In the yielded to discriminate these plans. 15 Please see the context of the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) second last page of this section for an overview of the and then the BSA with the US, they saw the Istanbul CBMs, pertinent states and organizations, and Process as a way for the US to dominate the region overlapping/ relevant organizations. Annex 1 provides an through an Afghan government that was dependent on overview of activities per CBM and per country to date. the US and could be easily shaped. Therefore in all discussions these countries always raised the question of The third ministerial conference, held in April 2013 in US long-term intentions.19 Almaty, Kazakhstan, was dominated by three issues: regional cooperation post-US downsizing in Afghanistan China and Russia saw it as a US project to marginalize in 2014; conflict among states in the region hampering their preferred platform for regional affairs, the SCO. Iran greater coherence, and laxity in implementing the perceived it as an initiative designed to legitimize US previously agreed upon CBMs; and migration, which presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan was reluctant to poses a new challenge to regional security and economic approve an organization centered on Afghanistan and cooperation. At this conference, Iran and Russia clearly including India. Discussions with China, Iran, Pakistan expressed their concerns over the post-2014 situation. and Russia were very antagonistic and the eventual This concern is anticipated to be high on the agenda declaration was very watered down. 20 It also did not again at the 2014 ministerial conference. receive the political support that drivers of the Process such as Mr. Ludin had hoped for: “We were hoping that it Interestingly, at the Almaty conference there was a would become an integral part of Kabul’s foreign policy structural decline in the rank of attending government agenda, it has come to run out of political steam.”21 officials. This signaled diminishing interest, or as one Afghan official closely involved in the Process phrased it: But as 2014 approached, both Beijing’s and Moscow’s “The novelty of it had faded, not the Process itself.”16 All stance changed and they came to prefer a longer three ministerial conferences yielded declarations presence of US forces in Afghanistan. Obama’s recent outlining commitments and general principles.17 While in announcement on the future of US troops post-2016 will the first declaration there was recognition of the role of have undoubtedly rung alarms in regional capitals. 22 the UN, in the second and third declarations there was Observers must realize that the Process was never more focus on the role of the UN Security Council. designed to be linked to the 2014 transition and to absorb

11 possible immediate shocks from this transition, 23 (FES) has embarked on a bold project to unite “Observers often forget this.”24 It was meant to be a ship Afghanistan’s broader region second track to share that could carry the difficult bits [i.e. regional tensions and interests and concerns and shape strategies for common challenges]. 25 The problem is that regional power stability post-2014, resulting in a pioneer joint members have never wanted a political process or a declaration.30 However, it does not solely concentrate on security mechanism, especially not if political ownership the HoAP. Statements of the Afghan MFA have is in Afghan hands. It is impossible that Beijing, predominantly shaped other ‘analyses’ on the HoAP, the Islamabad, Moscow or any member capital would want to bulk of journalistic output is near literal copies of these see Afghanistan as the hub for their security matters. One statements. can, disputably, state that regional expectations of the HoAP do not fully match the blueprint. The odds that this This policy paper has attempted to compensate for this process grows into a security mechanism are therefore deficit of scholarly reflections on the HoAP by analyzing very slim. The incentives to cater to regional common participating countries’ interests in and concerns about interests and the actual potential for cooperation were not Afghanistan. It has also identified and analyzed granted sufficient analysis by the Process’ designers. impediments to the Process to fruitfully address these.

Today, the Process stands at a rather critical juncture: As the authors set the framework, the first step was to members will need to be convinced of the utility of the accurately define the Process, i.e. what has it been Process, and it will have to support Afghanistan in designed for? This has been based on the three tackling the daunting security and economic challenges it ministerial conference declarations given to date and faces. Much hope is pinned on China, there is optimism corresponding stated objectives, and to an extent on a that it can bring the Process to the next level according to number of conversations with interlocutors closely the vast majority of non-Chinese interlocutors spoken to involved in the HoAP. Next, the authors collected data on during authors’ field trips. Yet, members should thirteen selected participating states’ (the main criterion collectively determine if the HoAP will remain a was their involvement in the Process to date) national steppingstone talk shop to established mechanisms, or interests and red flags. These are generally based on whether it should transform into a more institutionalized secondary data.31 The authors also collected views on the platform with stouter practical impact. Stakeholders of the Process itself, these are based predominantly on HoAP should all carry responsibility and ask themselves interviews. Since little academic work has been written on not what they want this forum to be, but what it needs to the HoAP, this report has adhered to a roughly 70/30 ratio be to address Heart of Asia region common red flags and of field/desk research respectively. Primary data is based build on common interests. An overview of these interests on interviews and extensive discussions held with experts and red flags is presented as a diagram at the end of this of reputed think tanks and senior officials in Afghanistan, section. as well as of selected member states, the UN and supporting organizations. Existing Studies and Research Query The Process is a useful institutional vehicle for A flaw of this report is that it only partially covers the role Afghanistan and the Heart of Asia region to address of supporting states and organizations, since they challenges and opportunities pertinent to them all and generally stand at the sidelines, but more so because of deserves to be placed under an analytical lens. project resource limitations. Some minor reflections on Particularly now that Afghanistan is at the eve of a new their role have been interwoven throughout the report. chapter in its young democracy. In presenting findings this paper firstly introduces the Existing analysis on the young HoAP is meager. There Process (this section), then covers the complexities and have been three relatively brief pieces focusing on opportunities of the Heart of Asia region that affect the ailments of the Process by the Afghanistan Analysts Process (Heart of Common Interests?), followed by an Network, 26 and a few concise reflections in scholarly analysis of impediments to the Process. It then presents journals.27 The Process has at times been allocated a findings on the inner circle’s interests, concerns and section in reports analyzing Afghanistan and the region.28 views on the HoAP (Stances by Country). This paper There have been no papers that have extensively finally presents a conclusion, and provision of practical analyzed the Process, and internal and/or external policy recommendations. For further rationale behind data impediments to the progress of the Process. However, collection and analysis, report breakdown and overall commissioned reports with a narrower focus, such as on resources allocation, please refer to the methodology in funding modalities, do exist.29 The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Annex 2.

Overview of the HoAP CBMs and Pertinent States and Organizations

Conﬁdence Building Measures (CBMs)

Disaster Counter Counter Trade, Regional Educaon Management Terrorism Narcocs Commerce & Infrastructure Investment

Lead States Lead States Lead States Lead State Lead States Lead State Kazakhstan Afghanistan Azerbaijan India Azerbaijan Iran Pakistan Turkey, UAE Russia Turkmenistan

Parcipang Parcipang Parcipang Parcipang Parcipang Parcipang States (8) States (11) States (12) States (12) States (11) States (11) Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan China Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Azerbaijan India China China India India India Iran India India Iran Iran Iran Kazakhstan Iran Iran Kazakhstan Kazakhstan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan Pakistan Pakistan Kyrgyzstan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Turkey Russia Pakistan Russia Russia Russia Tajikistan Russia Tajikistan Tajikistan Tajikistan Turkey Tajikistan Turkey Turkey Turkey UAE Turkey Turkmenistan Turkmenistan Turkmenistan UAE UAE

Supporng Supporng Supporng Supporng Supporng Supporng States (10) States (5) States (9) States (7) States (5) States (5) Denmark Australia Canada Australia Egypt Australia Egypt France Denmark Canada Germany Egypt EU Egypt Egypt Egypt Italy Poland France UK EU EU UK UK Japan US France Germany US US Norway Italy UK Poland Sweden US Sweden UK UK US US

Supporng Supporng Supporng Supporng Supporng Supporng Organizaons Organizaons Organizaons Organizaons Organizaons Organizaons (10) (3) (1) (4) (5) (3) ADPC CTITF UNODC UNDP ADB UNDP NATO UNAMA UNECE CAREC UNESCO SDMC UNRCCA UNESCAP UNECE UNICEF UNDP UNSPECA UNESCAP UNISDR UNSPECA UNOCHA UNSPECA WHO WFP World Bank

Overlapping/ Overlapping/ Overlapping/ Overlapping/ Overlapping/ Overlapping/ Relevant Relevant Relevant Relevant Relevant Relevant Organizaons Organizaons Organizaons Organizaons Organizaons Organizaons (5) (5) (9) (6) (4) (7) ECO CICA BOMNAF CAREC ECO AKDN IC ECO CABSI ECO RECCA ECO RECCA OIC CADAP OIC SCO OIC SAARC OSCE CICA RECCA TRACECA OSCE SCO SCO ECO SAARC SAARC CSTO SCO RECCA UNDP UCA OSCE SAARC

Note: the involvement of some supporting organizations is fairly hard to categorize: while some are official Process supporters, others, e.g. the World Bank, are present at meetings and are quite actively involved, yet are not formal supporters. This paper has decided not to distinguish them in this diagram. Source: http://heartofasiaministerial-mfa.gov.af/

Overview of the HoAP Members’ Common Interests and Red Flags*

Heart of Asia Process

Objecve Stability and Prosperity in the Heart of Asia Through Regional Cooperaon

Interests

Afghanistan Common Interests to Member Countries Build On

• Maintain the stability and • A polically stable and secure • A stable and secure regional territorial unity of Afghanistan. Heart of Asia. environment/Heart of Asia. • Increased economic • Reinvigorate the historical role • Increase sustainable economic of Afghanistan as a land bridge. integraon in the Heart of Asia. integraon. • Curb the empowerment and • Use of Afghanistan as a land • Migate illicit drugs producon disseminaon of radical Islam. bridge for trade and energy and traﬃcking. • Curb potenal spillover of • Establish stable polical es transfers. with regional countries. • Curb the empowerment and radical Islam. • Resolve outstanding regional disseminaon of radical Islam.

disputes. • Migaon of illicit drugs • Migate illicit drugs producon. producon and traﬃcking.

Red Flags Common Concern to Red Flag Address • Escalang insecurity in • Escalang insecurity in • Escalang insecurity in Afghanistan aer NATO‐ISAF Afghanistan aer NATO‐ISAF Afghanistan aer NATO‐ISAF scaing down in 2014, and scaling down in 2014, and scaling down in 2014, and possible complete wihtdrawal possible complete withdrawal possible complete wihtdrawal post‐2016. post‐2016. post‐2016. • The return of insurgents to power outside the exisng government framework. • Interference of regional countries in domesc aﬀairs.

• Collapse of democrac

instuons.

HoAP Top Priories • Fostering polical dialogue. • Smulaon of sustainable economic integraon and connecvity. • Curbing the empowerment and disseminaon of radical Islam. • Migaon of illicit drugs producon and traﬃcking.

Relevant CBMs • Trade, Commerce and Investment Opportunies. • Regional Infrastructure. • Counter Terrorism. • Counter Narcocs.

* This diagram provides an overview of selected HoAP participating countries’ common interests and red flags based on findings shared in the next section. Its purpose is to highlight common interests that the HoAP should build on, and common concerns that it should attempt to mitigate.

HEART OF COMMON among Central Asian states and shock absorption strategies to mitigate external intrusion have a INTERESTS? detrimental effect on a united and constructive stance towards Afghanistan. Tajikistan shares porous borders with Afghanistan, and combined with its low standard of The Heart of Asia region is not a single region socioeconomic development there is indeed potential for or a new geographic entity, the HoAP rather borrows spillover of terrorism. A remedy proven quite effective from adjacent regions and clusters them around a for this is economic integration. Sadly, both Central and troubled state with demonstrable development potential, South Asia have some of the world’s smallest interstate Afghanistan. Afghanistan does indeed find itself right at trade ratios. the centre of South and Central Asia, the Middle East, and the western periphery of the Far East; a mosaic of A glance at Afghanistan’s south and southeast ethnically, culturally, linguistically and ideologically underlines the HoAP’s potential to catalyze economic diverse states. The region has been home to ancient connectivity. South Asia is no poster child for regional civilizations, rich cultural traditions, and spiritual collaboration. The most notable mechanism is probably movements. the economically oriented SAARC, which was the first formal regional initiative on cooperation in which rivals Today, many of the states in these regions are prone to India and Pakistan participate. In the HoAP, continued conflict that can be characterized by ethnic enmity, non-cooperation and mistrust between these two communal violence, and tensions at local, national and member states is doing the Afghan-led process no good. interstate levels. The most overlapping commonality is While India has always enjoyed good relations with the poverty. Yet, these countries have a shared concern government and people of Afghanistan, Pakistani ties that could be construed as a common interest, with Afghanistan are tense. Kabul accuses Islamabad of Afghanistan. If insecurity escalates in Afghanistan after sponsoring terrorist activities and interfering in its NATO-ISAF scaling down in 2014, and the feasibility of domestic affairs. Some circles in Pakistan consider complete joint forces withdrawal by the end of 2016, this Afghanistan as its strategic-depth and do not like to see country, at the center of all these regions, presents them India play any role in Afghanistan. India claims that it with a spillover threat of religious extremism and wants to revive centuries old ties with Afghanistan by terrorism. And there is possibly also a scenario of supporting it with aid and investment, while Pakistan increased illicit drugs production and trafficking. This sees Indian presence in Afghanistan as a threat to its situation would also hamper visions of Afghanistan as a western borders and fears to be ‘sandwiched.’ natural resources provider, and as an energy and trade Subsequently, Pakistan does not allow India to use corridor. Both these threats as well as economic Pakistani territory as a transit route to Afghanistan. This integration opportunities are domains that the HoAP has led India to invest in an alternative trading route to could facilitate in mitigating and building on respectively. Afghanistan and the Central Asian markets circumventing Pakistan by use of the Iranian port of Immediate Region Actors Chabahar. This project has not yet been finalized. The set of actors germane to the HoAP can be categorized as the immediate region, extra-regional Chabahar is indicative of the level of interstate tensions actors, and Afghanistan, see also the map at the end of and mistrust in Central and South Asia and the need for this section. Are there ample common interests to build a forum like the HoAP to soothe these. Chabahar is also on? indicative of the aspirations of geopolitical protagonists such as China, India, Russia and extra-regional actor The immediate region actors, the inner circle, can be the US on the one hand, and those of smaller regional clustered as Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, players such as Iran, Pakistan and Turkey on the other. Azerbaijan, China and Russia. As an extension of a lack Precisely because of this power play and deficiency of of political will and limited economic interdependence, sufficient interstate and interregional interaction, Central Asia continues somewhat aloof on matters multilateral institutions are trusted to ease tensions by related to Afghanistan and misses the economic clout to fostering political dialogue and facilitating economic be of much significance. There is fear of extremist integration and exchange. In Eurasia, multilateral spillover, while simultaneously it is not at ease with a mechanisms abound, but the only well-established liberal democracy and free media next door that could forum that incorporates Central Asian, South Asian and inspire political awakening and challenge vested the rest of the region’s geopolitical protagonists is the regimes. Foremost, the blend of asymmetric rivalries SCO. For both Russia and China the SCO is the

15 preferred platform for regional affairs, and is Russia’s main concerns are opium flow from Afghan progressively a vehicle for economic cooperation. The territory and possible extremist spillovers in its sphere. drawback is that the SCO is toothless, it does not serve Russia is particularly concerned about Afghanistan post- as a collective defense mechanism and cannot provide 2014 and has expressed this worry at many HoAP hard security. meetings.33

The role of SCO initiator China, progressively Asia’s Another subject of popular discussion is the role of the largest economy, is, debatably, vital for the success of UN in the Process. Russia, China, and Iran have any regional initiative in South and Central Asia. China insisted on stronger involvement. China’s rationale was unsuccessful in the Great Power Games of the 19th behind this corresponds with its broader and stable century and first half of the 20th century and foreign policy push for stronger UN involvement in squandered the first eight decades of the last century in multilateral affairs. The UN is currently involved in futile efforts to modernize. The China Communist Party convening the ministerial conferences, and eleven UN (CCP) is therefore keen to avoid further costly mistakes. entities have committed to support the implementation China is aware that the world has changed. It makes of the six CBMs. careful geopolitical calculations in which it tries to objectively analyze its geopolitical assets and liabilities. Extra‐Regional Actors It then works out long-term plans to respectively Since the end of the Bush administration extra-regional enhance assets or minimize liabilities. What Beijing’s actor the US has moved away from a military solution precise long-term plans for the HoAP are will be seen as for the Afghanistan dilemma towards a solution that lies the Process evolves. But with tensions mounting with within the confines of a regional approach. This neighbors in China’s east and south, Beijing deems it approach was first characterized by the AfPak strategy, vital to nurture relationships with its north (China’s north and has since shifted to a larger canvas stressing can be labeled secure, as Sino-Russian ties are at a political dialogue and regional economic connectivity. historic high) and immediate west. It thus attempts to The ‘New Silk Road’ vision is the most notable use its growing prowess to realize similar ties with constituent of the latter, but does leave immediate Central Asia, and, expectedly, Afghanistan. region actors not included in its design, such as Iran, agitated. Overall, the New Silk Road did not get enough But while China’s politico-economic clout grows, so buy-in from regional countries. There was little political does India’s. China and India have historically enjoyed will to create trans-national trade.34 The HoAP should millennia of peaceful ties, and despite extensive attempt to identify incentives to instill will. contemporary trade relations both countries are involved in a somewhat low gear rivalry. Moreover, the all- The US military and NATO-ISAF are expected to close weather friendship between China and Pakistan does the Afghan chapter by the end of 2016, 35 leaving not please India as both countries consider the rise of Afghanistan at the ‘mercy of regional powers.’ As this India as a potential hazard. India accuses China of laxity ‘zero-option’ was announced in Washington D.C., on regional issues due to its friendly relations with President Barack Obama stated, “We have to recognize Pakistan. However, the urgency of the situation in that Afghanistan will not be a perfect place, and it is not Afghanistan is an opportunity for these three states to America’s responsibility to make it one. The future of possibly collaborate in the HoAP. Afghanistan must be decided by Afghans.”36

The other influential geopolitical actor in the region, The other influential extra-regional official HoAP Russia, has been left with a bitter aftertaste of its supporter is the EU. While it has become an introverted invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and it is unlikely that it and retired geopolitical power, the EU can generally be will get closely involved again. However, it clings to its considered an actor with good ties with Process sphere of influence, Central Asia. This affects its foreign members. Brussels certainly has its agenda, but policy in the broader region. Moscow and Beijing initially generally attempts to exert its economic clout through both thought that the HoAP was designed to marginalize soft power rather than military force. Considering its the SCO,32 a platform that both prefer to use for regional considerable investment in Afghanistan since US-led affairs. The Moscow initiated Eurasian Union, set for intervention and its continued commitment, it can be inauguration on January 1, 2015, certainly also carries considered a constructive extra-regional actor that has weight in Russia’s calculations on the HoAP. much to gain in seeing the HoAP blossom.

Afghanistan and political cooperation between Afghanistan and Afghanistan’s foreign policy has taken a new direction Pakistan. after US-led intervention and it has become more active in regional and international affairs. In the past thirteen This is not to say that looking down the path ties years Afghanistan has joined, or participated as an between Afghanistan and Pakistan will necessarily see observer member in various regional organizations and substantial changes, both the Karzai administration and initiatives. To mitigate the hazard that countries in the Islamabad have frequently continued to play the blame region meddle too much in internal affairs, foreign policy game. Attempts from third parties such as China to cool makers in Kabul realized that they have to push for heated ties have yet to be proven fruitful. cooperation and integration within the countries of the region. Afghanistan has fought hard to overcome the Common Interests and Concerns For Sale distrust and lack of confidence among the regional While development of any state ultimately comes from countries in order to promote itself as a connectivity hub. within, geopolitically vulnerable Afghanistan needs a political and economic institutional vehicle such as the The vacuum of support and corresponding security HoAP to foster dialogue, and create economic provision post 2014/16 makes it imperative for interdependence. With the triple transition in process it Afghanistan to keep ties with regional players sound, will have to smartly utilize the only multilateral forum that and engage them in solution-seeking strategies for the it leads. Economic integration and interdependence challenges that they collectively face. Kabul will have to might positively impact the Afghanistan’s immediate choose what image and role it wants to project: will it be region’s security architecture. a hub of concern for the region, or a center of opportunity and positive competition? The HoAP has the The Heart of Asia region is expected to remain complex potential to highlight and coordinate opportunity and and volatile in the absence of substantial and inclusive positive competition. socioeconomic development, limited connectivity and trade, semi-functional multilateral institutions and Currently, Afghanistan is ‘sandwiched’ between two ensuing ethnic and religiously motivated rivalry. large neighbors adhering to negative competition: Afghanistan’s (lack of) development and possible Iranian-Pakistani ties suffer from close ties between the subsequent negative spillovers to the region depends, latter and Saudi Arabia. Iran and Saudi Arabia are foremost, on the political will and merit of the new virtually in a protracted cold war that finds its roots in the Afghan administration. The reemergence of China and Sunni-Shia divide and ethnic rivalry.37 Both the civil war India as economic behemoths can be expected to have in Afghanistan between the Taliban and the United Front, positive effects on the region – provided they design and the recent conflict in Syria, is seen as a proxy war their foreign policy agendas on Afghanistan in line with between these two states. Moreover, Pakistan’s close the aims of the HoAP. bonds with the US dissuade Iran from seeking closer ties with Islamabad. The planned full withdrawal of NATO-ISAF forces by 2016 could either ignite new tensions (or fuel old ones), How relations develop between Islamabad and Kabul or conversely bind the region. The HoAP should intend upon the incumbency of the new Afghan administration to pragmatically utilize the distress that a post-2014/16 remains to be seen. One notable achievement is the Afghanistan could cause in the Heart of Asia region, and Afghanistan - Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement find the incentives to have members, foremost the (APTTA) that both states signed in July 2010 in participating countries, commit to the Process and its presence of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. This CBMs. There is common self-interest to do so, the agreement came into full effect on June 12, 2011 and Process’ impediments, as perceived by members, replaced the outdated trade agreement of 1965 between should also be addressed. The next section gives a brief the two countries.38 The agreement allows Afghanistan overview of national interests and concerns, and views to use the port of Lahore to export its goods: mainly dry on impediments to the Process. fruits, carpets, and marble to India, for the first time. Yet, the agreement does not permit Indian goods to Afghanistan go through Pakistan, although it does allow Pakistan to transport its goods to Central Asia via Afghanistan. Even with these restrictions, the APTTA has been a major breakthrough in enhancing economic

Map: HoAP Participating and Supporting Countries

Note: the EU member countries and the European supporting countries of the HoAP were hard to visually distinguish on this map – inaccuracies might show.

IMPEDIMENTS TO THE Another major impediment is that the HoAP is not a national process, awareness of and involvement in the PROCESS Process outside the Afghan MFA’s RCD is negligible. An interlocutor closely involved in the Process since inception pointed out that none of the Afghan While expectations for the HoAP abounded, it parliamentarians spoken to by this person since last is important to be realistic about the intricacies of year had heard of the HoAP.40 For the Process to thrive, relations among the states that the Process the input and support of a broader Afghan base is encompasses both within the inner circle as well as necessary. certain relations between the two circles. Interstate trust is still limited among many of the actors and, in many 2) Kabul’s diplomacy is slow, reactive and not cases, interstate and intraregional comprehension is far sufficiently creative. The incentives to motivate Process from profound. The participating and supporting members are not adequately articulated. This led countries of the Process have disparate levels of Former Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmoud Saikal to socioeconomic development, distinct political systems, candidly say: “We [Kabul] do not think two-way, we just and include a number of geopolitical powers with think about what we can get, how it benefits us, not how dissimilar agendas. Low levels of political and economic it benefits others.”41 Kabul cannot afford members to integration characterize the regions that form the greater lose patience or become disenchanted by lack of active Heart of Asia region. Indeed, large multilateral initiatives, involvement in the Process. “The Process should examples being the SCO and ECO, have needed many provide tangible output, it should not be a briefing forum” years to gain shape and influence (the former disputably Mr. Ludin rightly pointed out. 42 Otherwise, it might has the best track record). CICA took ten years before it contribute to existing Afghanistan aid fatigue. The held its first international conference. When looked at Process, moreover, needs to appropriately address through that lens, the HoAP has done very well. It has urgent issues, e.g. Afghan-Pakistani ties. created a political forum where key countries that have hitherto had little interaction sit at the same table and HoAP participating countries, and supporting countries exchange views on matters relating to Afghanistan and and organizations, will not cease to look at on interests and concerns pertinent to them all, or at Afghanistan’s existing woes and potential troubles post- least the majority. The Process thus creates a much- 2014/16 through their lens of national interest and needed collective role for members to benefit from concern. The HoAP does not satisfactorily cater to their Afghanistan’s reconstruction and unique geographic interests, or concerns. location, and curb threats that an unstable Afghanistan might radiate. However, to build on common interests 3) Some of the HoAP impediments find their root in the and mitigate common threats of predominantly non-state exit of individuals who were a real driving force behind actors, the Process has structural impediments to the Process. At the beginning, the HoAP was driven by further progress and, more fundamentally, for its Turkey with then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet continued existence: Davutoğlu relying on diplomat Burak Akçapar, currently the Ambassador of Turkey to India. Mr. Akçapar did a lot (Geo)Political Impediments of work to convince Pakistan to join. Pakistan’s original 1) The Karzai administration has not shown sufficient stance was that their participation was not possible political will to hone the Process at the highest levels.39 since India was also included in the Process.43 He also The polarization of Afghan politics at individual and did a lot of work to bring in the Iranian government, who ethnic levels has done the HoAP little good. Political were suspicious that the US was behind the unity and determination are key for stewardship of any Process.44 In Afghanistan, Jawed Ludin, former Deputy multilateral initiative, if the hub is weak the spokes might Minister of Foreign Affairs, was very involved. In the US, easily break. This might change depending on the will, Marc Grossman worked the multilateral diplomacy. Now dedication and merit of the new Afghan administration. there is no one to drive the Process, and it is For the Process to thrive, political solidarity in Kabul is languishing. The fact that there was a structural decline key. Kabul also faces the challenge of convincing in attendees’ political rank at the Astana ministerial member geopolitical actors that the Afghan regime is not conference is indicative. under US tutelage. Some participating countries will not endorse the Process if they feel that the US and/or other In addition, co-initiator Turkey is too ‘small’ to co-lead Western powers use this forum to lighten their burden or the Process,45 it does not have sufficient political or shift responsibility. economic clout to pull the cart for Afghanistan. Turkey

19 has also been preoccupied with elections, social unrest the outer circle of supporting states and organizations. and the crisis in neighboring Syria. It is fair to conclude These do not hold decision-making power in the that Afghanistan has plummeted a few notches on Process. In addition, many of them suffer from Ankara’s foreign policy agenda. Afghanistan’s own Afghanistan fatigue and are recalibrating their interest has shifted to security transition, presidential international agenda. and provincial elections. Subsequently, there have been delays and political survival calculations at the MFA and 7) While there unquestionably is a notion of bureaucracy in relevant ministries. and passivity in Kabul, the absence of a secretariat and proper funding has serious implications. 48 Kabul has Supporting state US has generally stood at the sidelines, duly indicated the need for funds at previous because they did not want to overstep and also wanted conferences. 49 The RCD remains seriously under to ensure that the HoAP remains an Asian-led resourced.50 Agreeing on funding has proven a serious initiative, 46 corresponding with D.C.’s policy to challenge to date. Of the fourteen participating states progressively shift the Afghanistan dilemma to the many are still struggling economies. This does not make region to solve. A real driver, i.e. either an individual, a creating a trust fund easy, but larger economies could mechanism or a geopolitical power, of the Process is take the lead. Most of the money and expertise is in the currently absent and this has resulted in a power outer circle of supporting countries and organizations, vacuum. rather than the inner circle. The outer circle will not sign checks if it has too limited influence on decisions.51 And, 4) The actual objective of the HoAP is equivocal.47 Who there are countries that do not want the HoAP to and what is it precisely for? The main point of the become an established regional organization and Process was political dialogue leading to a stability pact, compete with existing.52 They will need to be convinced similar to the way in which the Helsinki Process led to of the urge of a small trust fund that covers core the OSCE. Is the Process for Afghanistan, and/or is it for operational expenses. CBM financing needs a complex the region? Should it facilitate a new security paradigm funding modality, this deserves additional research. or stress economic development? If the objective has been to build trust and catalyze cooperation in the 8) The impediments of the Process are an extension of region to the benefit of all, then what are the parameters the lack of institutional capacity and human resources in of trust, i.e. how does one define and measure it? Part Afghanistan. Kabul has limited capacity to digest the of the problem originates in the initial design of the complexities of regional diplomacy, and the Process. Initially it did not include CBMs. The CBMs corresponding forms and documents. 53 While much were an afterthought added to create some ongoing credit has to be given to the RCD for coordinating such activities. an extensive multilateral forum to date, they are limited in size and in resources. None of the RCD staff is solely 5) The HoAP’s members have not shown sufficient allocated to the Process. This has detrimental effects: political will and commitment. There are reservations Afghan embassies, for example, are often segregated about the true initiator and intentions of the Process. from HoAP related activities. Diverging geopolitical agendas both within the inner circle, and between the inner and outer circle have a 9) The deficiency of clear and timely communication at detrimental effect on the Process. the Process’ hub is a major impediment. Many interviewees referred to inadequate communication, The Process also overlaps with the deliverables of without authors specifically asking about it. Examples various established multilateral bodies in the region. provided to the authors were invitations and briefings Initiators and supporters of these mechanisms do not that are received last minute, and answers to queries want to see the Process gain clout at their expense. that take too long – if returned at all. 54 Also, when This has created a vicious circle in which the Process is information is received it is too formal and full of supported, while being simultaneously held back rather rhetoric. 55 Intra-ministerial communication is also than taken forwards as an entrenched mechanism with impaired: relevant departments that should be kept in pull. the loop on the Process are often uninformed about the latest developments.56 A set of MFA officials subject to a Operational Impediments training course by a Western think tank in spring 2014 6) There is a disconnection between CBM objectives had never heard of the Process.57 and the financial means to attain them. The money, and a great deal of technical expertise, finds itself mainly in

An Afghan MFA official closely involved in the Process prefer not to seem too intrusive. While a flexible support said that the problem is rather the laxity of participating framework and a voluntary nature of commitments and supporting states, some of them simply do not want should be sustained, parameters should be set to some to accept the objective of the Process, or to respond to extent. RCD correspondence.58 12) Protocol in the three-tier structure needs tweaking. Similar communicational deficiency was also identified The large time-gap between the HoAP annual at an inter-ministerial level. Ministries involved in CBM ministerial conference meetings is a major hurdle for a implementation are ill informed and have limited patient, i.e. Afghanistan, which needs quick and communication with the RCD on the Process.59 It is safe continuous treatment and supervision. As major to conclude that the HoAP lacks an effective and decisions are made at the ministerial level only, the efficient governmental communication infrastructure. frequency of these meetings should increase, which is The semi-functional nature of institutions in Afghanistan, unlikely. Therefore decision-making authority should be and in a number of participating states, has a shared with the SOM level. The Heart of Asia region’s detrimental effect. An Afghan official closely involved in problems are too urgent to be dealt with sedately. the Process pointed out that the communication problem is two-way, “We cannot only blame the MFA for lax 13) The pool of HoAP members is too large and this communication, a number of supporting are also leads to the watering down of the effectiveness of the responsible for it.”60 The construction of an information- Process. While reducing the number of members will be sharing platform is in the making and might resolve awkward, initiatives should precisely for this reason these issues, to some extent. focus on core common interests. The speed and efficiency of reaching consensus and initiating 10) Considering the security dynamics in Kabul, confidence building measures and projects in a Afghanistan is not the best candidate to serve as the multilateral body often depends on the lowest common hub. People to people exchange is hampered. For denominator, i.e. in this case, the actor with the least example, it is easier to fly from Kabul to New York City incentive to consent. than to the capitals of its Central Asian neighbors, or to get a visa for most of them. Logistical hurdles such as 14) The Process currently has no scholarly lifeline to deficiency of visa liberalization hamper exchange and speak of. Second track involvement in the Process is progress at track 2 and track 3 levels. modest, 63 it needs agreements between research centers in the interest of scholarly reflections before 11) CBM labor division has not been accurately ministerial conferences and SOMs so that decision defined: 61 none of the CBM lead states, except for makers are better informed. Media coverage in Turkey, thought that their responsibilities and Afghanistan, the broader region and at an international corresponding criteria and timeframes were clear. If lead level has been subpar. The Afghan MFA has not states are not clear about their objectives, how can CBM launched a PR campaign for the HoAP to create buzz. participating and supporting states and organizations be clear on them? Lead states need the guidelines, the In conclusion, the D.R.S. (Direction, Rhythm, Speed) of diplomatic capacity and the economic clout to push for the Process is flawed: the Direction of the Process is not action. clearly defined yet, does it want/need to remain a process or does it need to become a sufficiently If CBM lead states are not comprehensively backed by institutionalized regional mechanism, not withstanding Kabul, their initiatives enjoy lesser enthusiasm from supporting states’ disinterest in the latter? Will CBM participating states, e.g. the Federation of Indian technical achievements be sufficient to claim political Chambers of Commerce and Industry’s (FICCI) success?; the Rhythm, i.e. the methodology to achieve numerous initiatives were ill attended by other its objective does not have a well-defined framework participating states. The preponderance of CBM and protocol; and the Speed is too slow to keep up progress has been bilateral rather than multilateral, e.g. momentum. CBM lead state India’s activities to date. It is also worth asking if Kabul can handle coordinating six CBMs and if all six strongly add value to the objective of the Process.

And what role do supporting states exactly have? 62 Some supporting states await instructions, while others

STANCES BY COUNTRY most successful attempt of many initiatives that have tried to promote regional cooperation over the past decade.”64 Afghanistan Interviewed Afghan officials active in the Process have complained that some of the participating countries are National Interests not very enthusiastic about the Process, and have • Maintenance of the stability and territorial unity of the shown little interest in making it a success.65 They do country not believe in the ability of Kabul to carry forward such • Sustenance of political stability an initiative and doubt its institutional capacity. 66 While • Reinvigoration of the historical role of Afghanistan as the spokes blame the hub of being weak, the hub a land bridge perceives the spokes to be feeble. • Substantial socioeconomic development through regional connectivity According to the Afghan Ambassador to India, • Establishment of good ties with all regional countries Afghanistan understands the importance of the Process, • Curbing the empowerment and dissemination of and will not allow it to fail.67 However, the reality is that radical Islam Afghanistan does face serious challenges in • Combating illicit drugs production and trafficking implementing the CBMs.68 It is time for Afghanistan to • Persuasion of Pakistan that terrorism and extremism move beyond talks and planning and actually start will destabilize the entire region implementing these CBMs on the ground. To serve this, • Implementation of large infrastructure projects like an environment of positive economic competition should CASA-1000 and TAPI be established among regional countries, so that • Resolving regional disputes Afghanistan can play its vital role of a regional land • Making the HoAP a role model for cooperation and bridge for cooperation and integration between South regional integration and Central Asia.

Red Flags While views on the Process amongst the Afghan • Escalating insecurity after NATO-ISAF withdrawal in government are generally positive, some officials 2014 outside the MFA are critical of the Process. One of the • The return of the Taliban to power outside the main reasons that the Process has not shown any existing government framework tangible progress is the lack of funds, according to • Interference of regional countries in domestic affairs Feroz Masjidi, Director of Strategy, Policy and Planning 69 • Collapse of democratic institutions at the Afghan Ministry of Commerce (MoC). He further added that infrastructure is the backbone of cross Expectations from and Reflections on the HoAP border cooperation and vital to the progress of the HoAP. Initially, the international community had no clear-cut Members should devote more resources to regional strategy for Afghanistan and it was only after infrastructure development.70 2007 that the international community started talking about a regional approach for Afghanistan. It was the Of course, Afghanistan takes pride in its position as the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference for focal country in the Process. Yet the lack of capacity Afghanistan (RECCA) that brought countries in the and commitment at the Afghan Foreign Ministry 71 region together to work on Afghanistan. Yet, RECCA jeopardizes efforts to make this initiative a meaningful was too economic-oriented and had no major security, platform for regional dialogue, Afghan ambassador to political and social agenda. Hence the need for a the UAE Najibullah Mojadidi commented.72 His opinion comprehensive regional initiative that could bring on the Process was shared: the non-existence of a clear regional countries together to work on the security and vision and implementation plan will undoubtedly stability of the region. undermine the initial enthusiasm with which this initiative was launched. 73 Mr. Saikal questioned: “Does the Afghanistan does indeed require a regional platform to country [Afghanistan] currently have the capacity to lead interact with countries in the region. Afghan leadership Afghan-related regional processes? The answer is no.”74 has come to realize that without the support of regional However, Afghanistan can and should be the most countries it will be difficult to achieve security in the suitable leader of these initiatives. “What is needed is to country. Former Afghan Foreign Minister, Zalmai increase our capacity so that we better cater for the Rassoul, described the regional initiative as “By far the needs of members, and display effective leadership.”75

Kabul cannot afford to risk losing the Process’ decisions in the HoAP. 78 Russia does not want the momentum at this juncture. HoAP to grow too influential, and this leaves its mark on the Azerbaijani stance. Prof. Mirwais Balkhi of the American University of Afghanistan believes Afghanistan must view the Azerbaijan has expressed further commitment to Process as part of a bigger picture. Afghanistan should Afghanistan, as it is a fellow Muslim state, and because take into account the historical problems that exist Azerbaijan intends to become more involved in among the regional countries and “should not be naïve humanitarian issues, according to Dr. Vugar Bayramov, and hope that this initiative will result in wonders.” 76 Chairman of the Center for Economic and Social That will not happen, he concluded: “We should not talk Development (CESD) in Baku.79 Dr. Bayramov said that of substantial progress expressed in years but in Azerbaijan wants to become more influential in the decades. We will need to be very patient.”77 However, broader region.80 To do so physical connectivity is key. Afghanistan and the immediate region cannot afford to Out of the three land based routes that connect Central wait decades for the HoAP to resolve the menaces that and South Asia with Europe, two cross Azerbaijan. The face them. country, thus, invests heavily in logistics and trade. “In the broader framework, stability in Afghanistan is thus of great relevance to us.”81

Azerbaijan Azerbaijan believes that leadership plays a fundamental role in development and is thus keen to promote stability National Interests in Afghanistan by providing capacity building assistance • Maintenance of a stable position on global and and training programs. Azerbaijan will continue to be a regional issues part of the international efforts in Afghanistan even after • Developing friendly relations with neighboring the 2014 transition. It is committed to remain actively states engaged in the HoAP and will aid Afghanistan in the framework of other regional initiatives.82 • Demilitarization of the Caspian basin

• Ensuring the stability of Afghanistan through With respect to illicit drug trafficking, Azerbaijan is capacity building assistance increasingly becoming a favored transit country for the • Investment in Afghanistan’s petrochemical smuggling of drugs from Afghanistan to Europe, and is industry thus of serious concern to Baku.83 Moreover, Azerbaijan • Linking Azerbaijani-relevant transportation has vocalized its inability to secure international borders routes with Afghanistan in the occupied territories that surround Nagorno- • Examination of the transferability of the Karabakh. 84 Therefore, the development of a strong Azerbaijani development experience network of border control cooperation units to fight drug trafficking is one of Baku’s chief priorities. Red Flags • Recognition of independence of Azerbaijan's While views on the Process are generally positive in Nagorno-Karabakh region by Armenia Baku and support for it is irrevocable, analysts • Escalating insecurity in Afghanistan after interviewed in Baku believe that interest in the Process NATO-ISAF withdrawal in 2014, which could has somewhat waned and that it now finds itself at a have a regional spillover effect critical juncture.85 These analysts agreed that the main problem is that the Process has no clear vision or Expectations from and Reflections on the HoAP roadmap. It is too abstract. 86 They expressed that Diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and another notable limitation is the broad number of Afghanistan stretch back to 1994 and have been honed participating and supporting states and organizations. in the last few years as a result of rising Azerbaijani The Process does indeed comprise forty-two members economic performance and ambitions. Azerbaijan, the and they are at noticeably different positions on the Caucasus’ largest economy and an increasingly more development trajectory. Every single country needs a active actor in the region, is a full-fledged member of the clearly defined commitment and objective. Simply HoAP, leading two CBMs. There are no domestic participating is not sufficient.87 Indeed, if members are complications in Azerbaijan that hinder HoAP not assigned any task(s) attendance becomes rather participation, but on a regional level the running conflict symbolic. Interviewed analysts also concluded that there with Armenia is a distraction, and Azerbaijani-Russian is a deficiency of communication on the exact role and ties are an element in the equation when considering 23 duties of the CMB lead states, Kabul has failed to • Expansion of SCO capacity and reach deliver this.88 Other representatives from other states • A stable and prosperous Central Asia leading CMBs have also supported this view. • Regional infrastructure development and increased economic interaction Azerbaijani interlocutors’ observations shared a strong • Closer ties with Afghanistan, but not at the emphasis on pragmatism, and stated that the main expense of relations with Pakistan limitation of the Process is that it has no secretariat, no • Prevent alarming Moscow over endeavors in budget to speak of, and as a result of these two factors, Central Asia 89 has too few meetings. The Process needs more • Avoid deterioration of ties with the Islamic meetings in order to discuss action plans and progress. World Indeed, Afghanistan’s dire challenges require more frequent gatherings. Baku also felt that Kabul has failed Red Flags to clearly communicate what they want from the Process, • Unstable Pakistan as a result of radical Islamists and what they specifically need per CBM.90 A part of the surge problem is the communication channel. For instance, • Escalating insecurity in Afghanistan after the role of the Afghan embassy in Azerbaijan is NATO-ISAF withdrawal in 2014/2016, which 91 negligible. As a result of such a deficiency of could have a regional spillover effect diplomatic exchange, the Azerbaijani government is • Extremist spillover from Afghanistan relatively unacquainted with the intricacies of the Process. 92 Bearing in mind the security situation in Expectations from and Reflections on the HoAP Kabul, the role of embassies can undeniably not be What potential role is there for China in the HoAP? It understated. can possibly soothe relations between Russia and Iran, devise a role for the SCO and CICA compatible with the Interestingly, according to two interlocutors interviewed HoAP, and become involved in Afghanistan in a fashion in Baku, Azerbaijan also looks into the transferability of that reassures Pakistan about India’s role in Afghanistan. components of its development experience: 93 i.e. It would also need to work out a framework for regional political-economic best practices of its own development cooperation with remaining US-NATO presence until trajectory that could possibly be emulated in other 2016. It is a tall order. developing states’ development trajectories. Although the canvas differs, Afghanistan is seen as a potential As co-steward in 2013-14 China has punched candidate for such transferability and there is scholarly somewhat below its weight in the HoAP so far. It interest in Azerbaijan to delve into the intricacies. If supports three CBMs, but leads none. Considering feasible and partially emulated this would be a Beijing’s belief in infrastructure construction and remarkable display of Azerbaijani soft power, whether economic cooperation as a building block of (regional) displayed through the HoAP or outside of it. development, it is somewhat surprising that it does not participate in the Regional Infrastructure and Trade, Commercial and Investment Opportunities CBMs. Yet, its decision to host the next ministerial conference on August 29, 2014 is politically symbolic and is a sign of China anticipated mounting support to post-2014 Afghanistan.

National Interests Ties between Beijing and Kabul have grown firmer in • Domestic political stability Karzai’s second term as President and there is • National security and territorial integrity progressive interaction at both track 1 and track 2 levels. • Sustainable socioeconomic development President Karzai has already visited China on four • Stable regional environment conducive to occasions since 2010, and the number of scholarly economic growth meetings has also quickly picked up pace. Afghanistan • Stability in its restive Xinjiang SAR and Tibet received observer status at the SCO in 2012, and SAR signed a strategic partnership in that same year. China now has strategic partnerships with all of the five Central • Avoiding military confrontation Asian states, as well as with Afghanistan. • Energy import security

• Strategic expansion of economic and energy To assess China’s current role in the HoAP as co- interests in Central Asia steward and its potential future role, it is essential to

24 briefly examine bilateral ties, and China’s prevalent largest think tank, the Chinese Academy for Social foreign policy, which is generally determined by its Sciences (CASS), stated that China wants to participate broader development objectives and domestic actively in the Process, but it has to fall under China’s challenges. regional collaboration strategy. Lately Beijing has been pursuing a sub-region cooperation approach. 95 Afghanistan and China have enjoyed respectful ties Ultimately, Beijing looks at the HoAP through the lens of since antiquity, and will commemorate sixty years of national interest and prevalent foreign policy strategies. warm diplomatic relations during the modern era in 2015. Beijing has always treated Afghanistan in a consistent, Views in China on the Process, based on interviews by cordial and respectful fashion, leading President Karzai this paper’s authors, ranged from generally positive to to call China a “stable neighbor.”94 Yet, the exceptional somewhat negative.. Chinese reflections were of an Beijing-Islamabad bond is seen as a serious hurdle to intensely realistic and pragmatic nature. Interviewees the next level of trust. Beijing takes Islamabad’s agreed that the Process has not failed, but has simply concerns and wishes in strong consideration as it not attracted enough attention yet. Neighbors have interacts with Afghanistan. This can be considered a concerns post-2014 and view the Process in light of the serious impediment to its ties with Kabul. security situation. “Although there is no clear blueprint, there is potential for the Process.”96 Remarkably, China is a party with strong contacts to both the current Afghan government and the Taliban. As Two Chinese scholars from the China Institute of a sign of goodwill it has initiated a series of trilateral International Studies (CIIS) emphasized that the HoAP meetings with Afghanistan and Pakistan. China is an has managed to reunite regional powers, and called it actor that could cement better ties between Kabul and an admirable achievement.97 The HoAP does not need Islamabad, either diplomatically or by pushing for to emphasize too many principles, it should be about common economic development. concrete plans. This is a deficiency that many interviewees in China have underlined. Afghanistan likes Beijing has to date categorized Afghanistan in the same to label itself as a land bridge, it should create concrete league as its foreign policy on Central Asia: one of plans to materialize it. “And remember, location means mutual respect and economic pragmatism, and nothing without a house.”98 Afghanistan is branding itself characterized foremost by natural resources extraction as an asset to the region, but the Afghan government and export of Chinese goods. China is very interested in has failed to show that by means of economic indicators, Afghanistan’s incredible untapped natural resources. physical and social infrastructure, or security. However, the biggest concerns are security and logistics. Extracting is one thing, getting resources out of the Most Chinese scholars agreed that we should not country another. Beijing has come to realize that the expect too much from the Process if domestic security dynamics of Afghanistan require a different challenges are not solved: they are the main problem.99 approach. China is particularly concerned about Frankly, the HoAP requires preconditions before it can possible radical Islam spilling over into fragile Tajikistan, be effective, such as national reconciliation and political spillover into and backfiring in Pakistan, and possible unity. “The state is currently in cardiac arrest.”100 Kabul training of and influence on separatist Uighurs in its should attempt to allay the security concerns of volatile Xinjiang SAR. The frequency and pattern of investors, “the Taliban you can beat but not recent terrorist attacks in China’s train stations and eliminate.”101 Consequently, Afghanistan needs to start public spaces has underlined the urge to combat the paying more attention to socioeconomic development, roots of terrorism with stronger commitment. President rather than security. Xi Jinping has repeatedly stated that there is zero tolerance towards terrorism. This will have knock-on One critical scholar from Peking University, who effects on its policy to Afghanistan and Pakistan. For the preferred anonymity, looked at the operational design of first time one can see Chinese diplomats focusing the Process: “Little has been done at past ministerial specifically on Afghan security and stability. conferences. Too much time was spent on rhetoric and peripheral issues.”102 This scholar continued: “Some of China respects bilateral and multilateral mechanisms the current CBM lead states were not the most suitable and participates through observation first, before it to commence leading these, and no gauges and renders stronger involvement appropriate. In the HoAP, parameters were set.”103 The interviewee from CASS China is still in an observation phase. Dr. Ye Hailin, accentuated an important point, echoed by other key Head of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at China’s interlocutors: government capacity in Afghanistan is an

25 impediment to progress of the Process.104 Furthermore, the blame game between Afghanistan and Pakistan is an interesting observation of one Chinese scholar was futile, it should stop. It is simply lose-lose.”118 Initiatives that Turkey was too small to co-initiate the Process.105 A to make Pakistan gain more trust should be pursued. close observer of the Process from a supporting organization seconded this.106 The role of the US was articulated too: the US should become more involved, after all they initiated the The Process has fundamental flaws. The objective is not HoAP.119 They also have a strong hand in the country’s fully transparent, it has too many members, the CBMs stability. The future of Afghanistan still largely depends were not part of the original blueprint, and there are no on US attention. 120 Interviewees were vocal about clear roadmaps for cooperation and progress.107 Other China’s own role too: of course China could also do interviewees agreed: there are too many countries and more. The Silk Road Economic Belt proposed by too many organizations in the Process, and foreign President Xi could possibly find overlap with the HoAP ministers only see each other once a year. 108 The and initiate more support from Beijing. Process does not focus too much on current problems, but rather the future. 109 Referring to the absence of There was strong consent among Chinese interviewees substantial CBM progress, Prof. Qian Xuemei of Peking that Afghanistan needs external support or it will University said that the new Afghan government should collapse. Countries with competing interests should find promote one or two concrete and detailed programs with a consensus, the HoAP is a useful mechanism for practical implementation plans for each CBM so that that. 121 However, the survival of the HoAP will be relevant countries can understand the exact needs of determined in the near future, 2014-16 are of vital the Afghan government.110 importance. If there is no progress in these coming three years, members countries might lose their interest in the However, financial support for implementation of CBMs Process all together.122 is lacking. This is the main reason for less than impressive progress on that front. Therefore, a trust fund The revered Prof. Wang Jisi of Peking University must be setup, co-sponsored by all member countries: accentuated that even if China’s foreign policy is the ADB, the UN and/or the World Bank could play a cautious, the political will to support Afghanistan obtain role. 111 Chinese scholars agreed that to convince security and prosperity is absolutely there in Beijing.123 It members to donate to a trust fund, Kabul needs to find a is now up to the new Afghan administration to decide common agenda for the region, it has to identify what it precisely needs and wants. common interests – this should be the goal.112 “If it fails to do that, members should not expect too much from China is expected to play a more active role in the Process in the future, in which case it might serve Afghanistan henceforth. The main focus of Chinese well as a coordination mechanism at best, Chinese foreign policy in the foreseeable future is regional scholars pointed out.”113 Also, rather than focusing on stability.124 “After all, NATO comes and goes, we are large and hard goals, “The HoAP should focus on here forever.”125 proximate objectives first.”114

For these (small) steps there have to be more pre- dialogues before ministerial conferences, and more proposals from Kabul.115 “Kabul should engage more, it should become more proactive. It should clearly tell members what they want and expect.”116 Kabul has to express its voice, particularly at the next conference: “Speak loudly”117 was advised by Prof. Du Youkang, Director of the Center for South Asian Studies & Pakistan Study Centre, of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai.

The aforementioned Peking University scholar who preferred to stay anonymous also sees Afghanistan’s economic weakness and its aligned foreign policy as an impediment. Kabul has to hone its pragmatic skills and focus on strengthening itself: “The finger pointing and

India India is worried about a Pakistani-controlled Kabul, or rather a Pakistani-influenced Kabul. Delhi believes that

Pakistan’s hard power approach has backfired and National Interests earned less support than it was banking on.126 On the • Sustaining and promoting pluralistic democracy • Improvement of relations with Pakistan, China and contrary, India’s soft power approach has earned it a lot Japan of recognition, respect and trust in the Afghan • Strengthening the relationship with Iran and Russia government and among common Afghans.127 to weaken the Pakistan-China nexus • Revival of historical and cultural ties with Publicly, India extended its support to the peace and Afghanistan reconciliation process of the Afghan government, but it • A regional cooperative approach for stabilization of is very much concerned about the possible assimilation Afghanistan of hardcore Taliban members with close ties to the • Expansion of Chabahar port in Iran to gain access to Pakistani establishment. The new Afghan administration Afghanistan and Central Asian markets, bypassing would face the challenge of balancing its relationship Pakistan between New Delhi and Islamabad. Afghanistan holds a • Successful completion of TAPI gas pipeline to import strategic position in the national security arena of both natural gas from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan and countries, and needs support from both for its own Pakistan security and development. One significant common • Support of a democratically elected government in interest is to remove transit dependence on Pakistan. Afghanistan The Zaranj-Dehlaram road built by India intends to do just that and connects Afghanistan to the Chabahar port Red Flags of Iran. This port also permits transportation of iron ore • Control of areas of Pakistan adjoining India and from the Hajigak mine, the mining rights of which have Afghanistan by radical Islamists been granted to the Steel Authority of India (SAIL)-led consortium. This would surely boost the economic • Escalating insecurity in Afghanistan after NATO- connectivity among these three countries. ISAF withdrawal in 2014, which could have a

regional spillover effect According to Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva of Jawaharlal • Return of resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan with the University, New Delhi, the intra-regional trans-boundary clandestine support of Pakistan trade within South Asia is only 5%, while extra-regional • Deterioration of bilateral ties with China, Russia, and trade accounts for 95%. 128 The smaller countries in the US South and Central Asia look for regional integration but

the bigger economies like India look for larger and more Expectations from and Reflections on the HoAP stable markets beyond the region.129 Historically, Afghanistan and India have enjoyed a very close and cordial relationship that is embedded in their history, cultural overlap and political interaction. India Regional countries have been involved in Afghan issues was one of the few countries that actively supported the for a long time, yet unfortunately not many have United Front forces that were the last remaining pockets changed their policies and approaches towards conflict of resistance against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Ever stricken Afghanistan. This makes it difficult for these since the establishment of the Afghan interim countries to come together and work under the umbrella government in late 2001, India has been one of the of the HoAP. Unless South and Central Asian countries staunchest supporters of the new Afghan government, resolve their disputes, it would be naive to expect much and remains one of its major financial contributors. out of this Process. The ingredients of regional cooperation are simply missing in the Process. As of Afghanistan and India share common security now there are no clearly defined agendas and goals. challenges and recognition of this led Afghanistan to Therefore, major projects like Turkmenistan- sign a SPA with India, the first of its kind during Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline (TAPI) or President Karzai’s October 2011 visit to New Delhi. The CASA-1000 need to take off and ignite regional belief in HoAP provides India with the opportunity to have access a common destiny of prosperity and connectivity. If any to Central Asian oil and gas reservoirs through of these two projects actually takes off it will be a game Afghanistan and Iran. The hurdle to India in this context changer for the region. is Pakistan. There is much potential for investment opportunities in Afghanistan. The HoAP could act as a platform for

27 dialogue to intensify investment in Afghanistan. It needs • Curbing any excessive Saudi influence on the to consistently highlight this potential so as to attract neighborhood regional countries and other stakeholders that are • Stable Afghan government interested in the Process. Afghanistan needs a platform • Construction of transport links between Iran, like the HoAP where people can freely express positive Afghanistan and Central Asia developments that have been taking place.130 • Protecting the rights of Hazara (Shia group) in Central Afghanistan, and other Dari/Farsi If the Process wants to regain momentum then the speaking minority groups current political system of Afghanistan has to be • Strengthening ties with selected ethnic groups supported, consolidated and protected. The in Afghanistan constitutional framework that gives legitimacy to the • Repatriation of Afghan refugees from Iran political system in Afghanistan also needs to be strengthened. The other important thing would be to Red Flags 131 increase institutional capacity in Afghanistan. • Return of a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan • Unstable Pakistan as a result of radical Islamists’ Lt. Gen. R.K. Sawhney, Distinguished Fellow at the surge Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) highlighted • Israel’s further belligerence towards occupied that one of the reasons why this Process is not moving Palestinian territories and Lebanon forward as swiftly as expected is due to the lack of • Use of Afghan or Pakistani territory by Israel or institutional capacity in Afghanistan. The government any other Western country, directly or indirectly lacks the resources to engage other states to follow up (through Baloch separatists/jihadist groups), to on previous commitments. 132 Dr. Suba Chandran, destabilize Iran Director of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

(IPCS), New Delhi had similar views and emphasized Expectations from and Reflections on the HoAP that the capacity of the Afghan Foreign Ministry needs to After the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, be enhanced, for it acts as the “de facto secretariat of Iran has played a crucial role in the state-formation and the Process.”133 Mr. Vikram Sood, former Director at the reconstruction process in Afghanistan. Iran was Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) underlined the instrumental in the establishment of the Afghan Interim deficiency in the implementation of the Process and said Authority in December 2001, during its participation in that the lack of effective implementation of the action the Bonn Conference held under the auspices of the UN. plans is the biggest challenge.134 Why would the HoAP Iran opposes the presence of international forces in be effective? 135 The Process seems too complex to Afghanistan and calls for their immediate withdrawal. It survive on its own and will remain limited. To be is the only country in the region to publicly oppose the successful, it has to have clearly defined goals with time BSA. Iran initially had some serious reservations about and target orientation and active support of all the concept and goals of the HoAP because it believes stakeholders.136 Otherwise, it will be very hard for the the Process to be US initiated. HoAP to survive.

One of Tehran’s gravest concerns concerning Afghanistan is that almost 50% of Afghan opium production travels through the country. It is estimated Iran that Iran hosts between 1 - 4 million drug addicts.137 Therefore, the National Drug Control Headquarters of National Interests Iran (DCHQ) has declared drug addiction to be the • Gaining recognition and respect from regional single largest social harm, and the main hurdle for the states and the International Community (IC) country’s development.138 Iran and Afghanistan share • A regionalist approach to maintain peace and 582 miles of border and it is a significant challenge for stability in neighboring countries the security forces of both countries to counter the illicit • Withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and drug trade. In recent years, Iran has invested a lot in reduction of US presence in Central Asia surveillance equipment and in the training of custom • Greater and more active role in Afghan peace officials, as well as border police. Moreover, Iran actively talks engages with Pakistan and Afghanistan in joint • Effectively counter illegal import of drugs from operations and border liaison offices. 139 Iran has Afghanistan coordinated a ‘Triangular Initiative’ with the help of UN sponsorship and has conducted six joint operations

28 between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Overall, in Expectations from and Reflections on the HoAP order to succeed completely in uprooting the drug Astana has realized that great powers come and go, but menace, Iran will have to work closely with its neighbors neighbors stay. 144 Kazakhstan leads the Disaster and needs more support from the international Management CBM along with Pakistan and has also community.140 Iran has succeeded to some extent in its expressed its willingness to participate in the counter narcotic strategy but there is still much to do to implementation of all other CBMs except the Counter combat this problem. The UN Office on Drugs and Terrorism CBM. Kazakhstan has particularly stressed Crime (UNODC) gave credit to Iran for holding back a infrastructure development in Afghanistan and the flood of heroin in 2009. It is estimated that Iran seizes broader region as key to common economic growth.145 nearly 60% of global opiates, 141 such best practices should be shared and applied in the HoAP. Afghanistan and Kazakhstan share cordial relations. The two countries do not share border, and the chance According to Dr. Mohammad Ali Khusrawi of Tehran of instability spillover from Afghanistan to Kazakhstan is University, Afghanistan needs international assistance. negligible. Despite this, Kazakhstan is the most devoted However, the Iranian government does not agree with Central Asian state to Afghanistan’s reconstruction the international approach, nor in the way in which “this process. Much of this is an extension of the growing so called war on terror”142 has been managed. The US Kazakh economy and Astana’s desire to become policies go against the interests of Iran and against the Central Asia’s leading power. In order to tackle regional principles of regional cooperation. Iran has joined the and international threats to global peace and stability, HoAP with an open mind to aid Afghanistan, however Kazakhstan believes that these two areas have to be “the efforts of Iran are being ignored,” Dr. Khusrawi dealt with separately. Therefore, Kazakhstan fully added.143 supports any multilateral efforts that aim at eradicating these threats.146 Kazakhstan has actively participated in all initiatives on Afghanistan, including the Bonn International Conference, Istanbul Process, RECCA, the NATO Summit in Chicago, and the Tokyo Donor Kazakhstan Conference.

National Interests Astana believes that many of Central Asia’s problems • National security, strengthen regional peace are a product of economic underdevelopment and • Stable ties with China, the EU, Russia and the US political mismanagement, and that the region hence • Ensuring Kazakhstan’s entry to the top 30 most needs strong commitment from regional platforms and developed countries the international community, especially the UN, to • Preventing spread of radical ideologies within its address them. It is in favor of a wide-ranging and territory continued international effort led by the UN to bring • A politically stable and economically sustainable lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan, which in turn Central Asia would have a positive effect on the region.147 • Diversification of its economic development • Regional infrastructure development Astana views stability in Afghanistan as necessary to • Curbing illicit arms and drug trafficking by supporting contain the spread of terrorism, religious international efforts fundamentalism and illicit drug trafficking beyond Afghan • Creating stability in Afghanistan through boundaries. It advocates that multilateral institutions infrastructure development in the country should prioritize the creation of a counter narcotics • Resolution of conflicts in accordance with the UN safety belt around Afghanistan to prevent illegal drugs Security Council trafficking.

Red Flags Kazakhstan strongly believes that industrialization is one • Deteriorating ties with China, the EU, Russia and the possible solution to lessen Afghanistan’s dependence US on narcotics and foreign aid.148 Afghanistan can use the • Escalating insecurity in Afghanistan after NATO- HoAP to help it move from an aid economy to a ISAF withdrawal in 2014, which could have a sustainable economy. Kazakhstan has the potential to regional spillover effect become an investor of major infrastructure projects in the region. Kazakhstan strongly supported the New Silk Road Initiative at the HoAP ministerial conferences, and

29 has invested around three billion US dollars so far in its Expectations from and Reflections on the HoAP implementation. 149 The successful completion of this In the Process, Kyrgyzstan has expressed its initiative would allow Afghanistan to export its goods willingness to participate in the implementation of all six through the Western Europe–China transport corridor CBMs. However, it does not lead any particular CBM. It and also ease its dependence on transit via Pakistan. would have been an important diplomatic gesture by Kyrgyzstan to get involved more actively with a leading For Kazakhstan, the biggest achievement of the HoAP role. According to Prof. Dzhuraev of the American has been the cognitive shift in Kabul to decide to initiate University in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan has been insufficiently a multilateral process. 150 According to a Kazakh active in implementing any of its CBM commitments.156 diplomat interviewed in Kabul, there is concern about Hurdles are partially economic: Kyrgyzstan’s economy is the institutional capacity of the Afghan MFA and relevant negligible, and it has very few economic resources to ministries to interact with HoAP members.151 maintain an active international profile. Its political system remains fragile, with the regime’s own survival As the ministerial conferences have not achieved much the key political issue.157 Its public service, including so far, there is an immediate need to build Task Forces diplomatic corps, remains cut off from significant for each CBM.152 Mr. Nurkenov, a Kazakh diplomat in investment and continues to be of poor quality. In a Kabul, pointed out that the Process has to evolve into written interview, Dr. Juraev of the OSCE Academy said something that offers more specific and concrete that he cannot recall a single top state official who would projects to work on.153 The annual gap between the able to clearly explain to its own citizens what the HoAP ministerial conferences is too large to bridge. One is and why Kyrgyzstan is subscribing to it.158 hurdle is the Afghan MFA’s formal approach to diplomacy and overuse of rhetoric, this does not aid the Kyrgyzstan’s foremost concerns are drug trafficking and progress of the Process.154 The other problem is that the export of religious extremism from Afghanistan.159 Its various participating countries are not serious about interests in Afghanistan are in its transit potential and their role and this is having a detrimental effect on the export of electricity to and through Afghanistan.160 advancement of the Process.155 The latter is embodied by the CASA-1000 project that would transfer clean hydropower from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will provide both Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan, energy security Kyrgyzstan and be conducive to warming ties between Kabul and Islamabad. National Interests One of the Process’ most remarkable achievements is • Strengthening and consolidating ties with CIS that it has become a continuous and broadly multilateral countries, China and the West effort, instead of a one-off and/or a few countries’ efforts, • Strengthening ties with regional powers as was the case with certain previous initiatives. 161 • Economic cooperation with the broader region According to Prof. Dzhuraev, the HoAP has become the • Dealing effectively with internal threats resulting from focus of all international discussions, efforts and domestic ethnic tensions awareness when it comes to Afghanistan’s • Reducing drug trafficking and export of religious reconstruction and regional development. Without such extremism from Afghanistan a focal effort, too many initiatives were getting lost in the • Increasing cooperation with Islamic countries multiplicity of often unnoticed events.162 • More active participation in regional organizations like the SCO and CSTO The Kyrgyz Ambassador to Afghanistan, Mr. • Development of Afghanistan’s transit potential and Abdurazakov, underlined that the HoAP is the only export of electrical energy through successful Process led by Afghans and permits them to decide implementation of CASA-1000 which domains of development of regional cooperation have priority. 163 The adoption of confidence building Red Flags work in the HoAP is the key method of proceeding. In • Surge of ethnic tensions within its territory contrast to being tied to concrete projects, amounts etc., • Deterioration of ties with Russia and China the focus on CBMs stands to provide a more long-term • Escalating insecurity in Afghanistan after NATO- and in-depth foundation for further cooperation.164 ISAF withdrawal in 2014, which could have a regional spillover effect.

The biggest achievement of the Process so far remains Pakistan the fact that these CBMs were agreed upon.165 However, the implementation of the CBMs is still in the making, National Interests having not registered any notable accomplishment to • Promotion of Pakistan as a dynamic, progressive, 166 date. This is partially the product of a deficiency in moderate, and democratic Islamic country political stability and domestic security in Afghanistan.167 • A relatively stable and inclusive Afghan government The region is another detrimental factor and Afghanistan with ample Pashtun representation would be better off applying a multi-vector foreign policy • Limiting the role of India to include only development to curb detrimental foreign influence on the Process.168 activities in Afghanistan

• Remaining the largest exporter to Afghanistan Prof. Dzhuarev argues that there is a need to establish • Security of its western border some form of institutional mechanism for regular, day-to- • day monitoring, communication, transparency, and Combatting terrorism within its own territory and stop awareness raising surrounding the Process. Such an the flow of drugs from Afghanistan institutional mechanism could be in the form of a special • Balancing interests between Iran and Saudi Arabia HoAP secretariat under the auspices of the UN • Developing friendly relations, especially with (preferably, directly under the Secretary-General) – the immediate neighboring states and major powers most broadly legitimate entity.169 This way the Process around the world would be able to gain more vibrancy on a continuous • Access to untapped natural resources in Central basis, and “not go up and down from conference to Asia, with the construction of projects like Casa- conference.”170 Ambassador Abdurazakov stressed the 1000 and the TAPI gas pipeline importance of more active behavior of members.171 • Cultivating goodwill among the non-Pashtun minorities in Afghanistan Multilateral initiatives need an incentives system for member to commit. As of now the Process is largely a Red Flags political discussion forum, where states are participating • Lose its influence over Afghanistan simply because there are no alternatives, who would • An Afghan administration unsympathetic to want to publicly claim they do not want to help Islamabad Afghanistan?172 The Process should stop being about • Increase of Baloch nationalism and separatism Afghanistan only, and it must become about other states’ • Rebirth of the ‘Pashtunistan’ idea own interests too. Only if all countries gain something • Use of Pakistan as a scapegoat after 2014 to keep can the Process become successful. Maintaining wide Afghanistan united against a common enemy international consensus is important, but even more so in order to get things done on the groung. The Afghan Expectations from and Reflections on the HoAP government should pointedly work in a bilateral format Pakistan is considered important in the HoAP, simply with major actors who are able and willing to play some because of its sway on Afghanistan’s development. It is role – be it Ankara, Astana, Baku, Beijing, or Delhi.173 important to note that Pakistan has agreed to participate The progress achieved on a bilateral basis may later in a regional process centered on Afghanistan that expand into trilateral and multilateral initiatives. This is includes India. This is a big change. Along with easier to kick-off, rather than attempting to get a dozen Kazakhstan, Pakistan leads the Disaster Management countries to agree ona point.174 CBM and participates in the implementation of all other CBMs in the Process.176 Pakistan has acted dutifully and The HoAP is a highly complex and ambitious initiative seems to want to be as helpful as possible.177 counting on continuous work of all participants for years to come. It is essential that the momentum of the What makes Pakistani leaders distrustful of the HoAP is, Process does not diminish.175 undoubtedly, the strong links between Afghanistan and India. It evokes memories of an old enmity between Pakistan and India, dating back to 1947. For some in Pakistan, Afghan diplomacy never lost a possibility to express their desire to be closer to India rather than to commit to regional friendship with its immediate neighbors. One can remember, for example, a statement from president Karzai while visiting India in November 2012: “We want to welcome you with a red

31 carpet while others will get a grey carpet.” 178 This regional environment feel truly part of the HoAP. The causes frowns in Islamabad, where closer strategic ties Process still appears to be very much influenced by between Afghanistan and Pakistan are preferred.179 external forces. 190 Here one has in mind, first and foremost, Iran, which has felt sidelined even in the Iran- In Pakistan, one does not hear much about HoAP’s led Education CBM. If the HoAP is just seen as a tool for achievements, “empty words” is the sentiment most Western influence, or more precisely American power frequently expressed when one talks about the projection after 2014, Afghanistan’s neighbors will not Process. 180 Expressed more diplomatically, other take it seriously, and it will become another failed interlocutors said that the image inspired by Muhammad attempt for regional dialogue.191 Iqbal, of Afghanistan as the heart of Asia, is indeed beautiful, but far from the truth. Afghanistan can be The new government of Afghanistan should interact with important for its immediate neighbors’ security, but participating countries more closely and secure bilateral analysts do not necessarily see it as all decisive in this as well as multilateral agreements on border regard. 181 Afghanistan is a source of problems for management, eradication of drug trafficking and human regional stability indeed, but among many others for smuggling. It should also try to secure long-term soft- immediate neighbors Pakistan and Iran.182 In a written loans to stabilize its economy. 192 In the meanwhile, interview, Pakistani analysts and officials said that Pakistan could also contribute more, by becoming more Tehran is much more worried by its difficult relationship supportive to intra-Afghan reconciliation and with the US and Israel. For Pakistan, the cold war with reintegration processes.193 Jointly with Afghanistan, it India is what delineates Islamabad’s geopolitical fears, should take steps to secure borders and regulate the Pakistani regional vision stays Indo-centric.183 For economic movement between Afghanistan and China and the Central Asian states, security issues are Pakistan.194 only partly linked to Afghanistan, and can be dealt with by firm internal security policies. For other states in the Maybe the best way to strengthen the HoAP in the HoAP, like Turkey, India, Russia, and the UAE, the link Afghan regional environment is to strongly associate it between security issues coming from Afghanistan and with the ECO. 195 This includes Afghanistan’s entire their territories is murky at best.184 neighborhood and two Turkic states, i.e. Turkey and Azerbaijan. At an administrative level, the ECO is still of Islamabad also doubts the capacity of the institutions interest to the Pakistani foreign ministry, which is not the and officials that manage the HoAP. 185 Of course, case for the HoAP. Even if the ECO is not a success Pakistan prefers the Process to work, as it would create story, it is at least a mechanism that seems free of the a better environment for the entire region, Pakistan diplomatic and geopolitical games associated with the included.186 The problem is that there are too many HoAP.196 diverging interests between regional countries, and between states outside the immediate region and those within. Therefore, the international community, rather than creating an entirely new mechanism, should have Russia strengthened existing regional mechanisms. 187 There is also a practical angle to this. There is fear that the HoAP National Interests might be used as a Trojan Horse, i.e. in the interest of • Securing favorable conditions for overall Russian non-regional actors’ military interests. Ironically, this has development encouraged countries in the region, which were initially • More focus on bilateral ties to defend national doubtful of the Process, to be actively part of it after interests all.188 • Reducing the political and economic influence of the US in Russia’s sphere of influence Yet, not all views on the Process in Islamabad are grim. • Keeping military control over Central Asia and The Process has made Afghanistan’s direct neighbors secure borders of Central Asian states bordering feel that they should respect Afghan sovereignty more Afghanistan than they used to do.189 The HoAP has garned support • Curtailing drug addiction within its own territory by for Afghanistan, not just from its immediate neighbors reducing the flow of Afghan opiates but also from those who are more distant. • Political stability in Afghanistan • Containing movement and activities of Islamic However, for those neighbors to become more actively insurgents in its sphere of influence involved, there is also a need to make the whole Afghan

• Keeping up with China’s economic influence in counter narcotics is Moscow’s top priority in the Central and South Asia HoAP.201 Terrorism cannot be eradicated, while drug • Use of Afghan territory to diversify its energy exports production and trafficking are equally serious threats to South Asia and the Process should focus on practical measures to • Supporting the democratically elected government in deal with narcotics.202 Russia is doubtful of the Afghan Afghanistan government’s ability to prevent drug cultivation in Afghanistan and its flow into Central Asia, which in turn Red Flags reaches Russian cities. 203 Russia has frequently • Escalating insecurity in Afghanistan after NATO- accused the US of failing to tackle the narcotics problem ISAF withdrawal in 2014, which could have a in Afghanistan.204 regional spillover effect, particularly in Central Asia • Loss of influence over Central Asia Russia is seriously concerned about the future of Afghanistan after 2014. It believes that Afghan security Expectations from and Reflections on the HoAP forces might not be ready to counter the challenges that Russia is concerned by the hasty withdrawal of await them. The greatest hindrance to any good international forces from Afghanistan, leaving the prospects in Afghanistan is the rigid stance of the country with an uncertain future that could negatively Taliban.205 The Taliban are not concerned about the impact its regional interests. unity of the state and want to come back into power at any cost, which could make Afghanistan once again a While Russia fully supported the ousting of the Taliban battleground and turn back the progress it has made in from Afghanistan, it remained suspicious of US-led the last decade.206 It is precisely for this reason that it is efforts in Afghanistan and the West’s long-term strategic important that supporting states understand the urgency goals. Some Russian hardliners wished to see the US- of the matter and double their efforts in the Process.207 led forces get bogged down in Afghanistan and suffer How the HoAP will develop will largely depend on the the same fate as the Russians did. More pragmatic Afghan input. Despite all good intentions, other Russians are worried of such a scenario, as it will countries remain in doubt about Afghanistan’s capacity encourage Islamic radicals to strike Central Asia and to run the Process. Kabul should not overplay its hand in export their radical Islam in the region. dealing with principal players.208

Russia, along with Iran and Pakistan, was initially A Russian diplomat in Kabul pointed out that the HoAP’s reluctant to join the HoAP. The argument was that there objectives should overlap more with members’ national are already too many regional initiatives and new interests, it has failed to build on that sufficiently so mechanisms would make regional cooperation more far.209 confusing and scattered.197 Russia prefers to see the SCO as the focal point for regional efforts.198 It does not want the HoAP to become a regional organization competing with the existing ones,199 and has therefore Tajikistan not been very active in the Process. Since prospects of the HoAP evolving into a more permanent and influential National Interests platform have diminished for the time being, Russia has • Extending and strengthening relations with China, not changed its stance at all. 200 The images of the the EU, and Russia disastrous USSR invasion of the country are still fresh in • A non-military resolution to the conflict in Russian minds, so it is happy to take a back seat and Afghanistan watch the HoAP events unfold. • Maintaining relations with Afghanistan based on Russia is well aware of the challenges as well the good neighborly and pragmatic principles opportunities of post-2014 in Afghanistan. The role of • Preventing flow of illicit drugs from Afghanistan regional countries will increase with the withdrawal of • Preventing the dissemination of religious extremism NATO/ISAF forces, and Russia has therefore frequently from Afghanistan discussed the subject with allies in the Collective • Regional approach for the development of Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and in the SCO. Afghanistan Both organizations have special programs in place to • Successful implementation of CASA-1000 electricity counter drug trafficking too. Russia’s main concern in project Afghanistan is probably its illicit drugs production and to

• Continuing cooperation with the US and its allies in Turkey the war on terror • Strengthening ties with states sharing Tajikistan’s National Interests language and culture, e.g. Afghanistan and Iran • Creating a peaceful and stable environment in the region Red Flags • Strengthening its relations with US and European • Escalation in conflict with Uzbekistan countries • Deterioration of relations with Russia • Developing bilateral and multilateral cooperation with • Unstable Afghanistan/ escalating insecurity in Central Asian states Afghanistan after NATO-ISAF withdrawal in 2014, • Preventing the possibility of a regional war with which could spillover to Tajik soil sectarian spillover • Cultural and political integration of all Turkic people Expectations from and Reflections on the HoAP • Strengthening cooperation between Afghanistan and Afghanistan and Tajikistan established diplomatic ties in Pakistan to promote stability in Afghanistan 1992, but subsequent turmoil in both countries • Promotion of regional cooperation for the security prevented the flourishing of close bonds. The Republic and stabilization of Afghanistan of Tajikistan has traditionally been directly affected by • Training of Afghan security forces to fight terrorism instability in Afghanistan. During the Afghan civil war and narcotics and the Taliban regime, Tajikistan experienced a wave of insecurity and instability. Tajikistan has limited military Red Flags capability and may not be able to tackle serious security • Escalating insecurity in Afghanistan after NATO- challenges. Consequently, current stability in ISAF withdrawal in 2014, which could have a Afghanistan needs to be protected at any cost. regional spillover effect

• Division of Syria Tajikistan does not lead any of the CBMs. However, it has agreed to participate in implementation of five Expectations from and Reflections on the HoAP CBMs in the HoAP. Drug trafficking is a serious menace Turkey along with Afghanistan and UAE leads the to Tajikistan, which it would like to see resolved by the Counter Terrorism CBM, and participates in the HoAP. The difficult terrain between Afghanistan and implementation of all other CBMs. Turkey hosted the Tajikistan allows drug lords to establish cross-border first HoAP ministerial conference in Istanbul and later networks. Drug trafficking gives rise to corruption within hosted a senior officials meeting in Ankara on October framework of both states, which in turn endangers 18, 2012.212 stability and security. The HoAP intends to provide

Afghanistan and Tajikistan with a more comprehensive Turkey had a very internationalist foreign policy before platform from which to counter this menace. domestic and regional problems set in. Ankara was also

a very important driver of the Process at first and now There is also potential for economic cooperation. seems distracted and as a result Afghanistan has Afghanistan is keen to import electricity from Tajikistan. plummeted on its foreign policy agenda. Afghanistan, Iran and Tajikistan have reached an agreement to set up a joint commission. This Turkey initiated a trilateral program known as the commission will explore possibilities to transfer Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Summit, the approximately 500KW of electrical energy from purpose of which was to improve relations between Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Iran.210 The other major Afghanistan and Pakistan. The first summit was held in project anticipated, is the export of Tajik electricity to 2007 in Turkey and brought Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Afghanistan and Pakistan through the CASA-1000. leaders together. Since then, six more summits took

place until 2012.213 While not a product of the Process, Prof. Haji Mohammad Umarov of the Academy of Turkey has also invested generously in the development Sciences of Tajikistan said that Tajikistan will play its of Central Afghanistan. Construction is the leading role as a responsible neighbor and will be part of any sector for Turkish investments. From August 2002 to the regional initiative that focuses on promotion of end of 2010, the total amount of contracts by Turkish cooperation and regional integration.211 contracting companies in Afghanistan reached USD2.8 billion, and they have completed 330 projects so far.214

Interlocutors interviewed in Turkey stated that Ankara is “The Process does not need substantial revisions, it is very content with the progress of the Process and does moving along just fine.”224 Indeed, in light of the young not feel at all that interest in it has faded.215 In a number age of the Process, and considering the complexities of of participating states there are domestic issues that the regions it encompasses, the HoAP has performed have required, and still require, closer attention, e.g. relatively well. social unrest and the Syrian refugees crisis in Turkey, elections in India, but this does not mean that the Interviewees in Ankara shed some light on the future of Process is of less interest now.216 Nor has the Process the Process and gave cautionary counsel: Afghanistan’s under-delivered: people should be realistic, advanced immediate neighbors should contribute more, especially economies are used to quicker results and tend to those with more diplomatic and economic clout, like project expectations,217 as expressed by diplomat Ahmet China.225 The HoAP can only succeed if it aligns its Hanoğlu of the Turkish embassy in Kabul. interests with those of the great powers in the region.226 Certainly, without the consent of China, India and High-level political interest in the HoAP in Turkey has Russia the HoAP will have difficulty materializing its somewhat faded, but this has been a result of domestic objectives. and regional challenges. This has not been the product of disbelief in the Process’ capacity to materialize progress or the lack of capacity and vision in Kabul.218 An official at the Turkish MFA underlined that Turkmenistan irrespective of current priorities in Ankara, Turkey and Afghanistan have historically had incredibly close ties National Interests and just like Afghanistan, “We are a fellow-bridge, our • Positive neutrality towards all states in the world dedication to the reconstruction of Afghanistan will • Open door policy to encourage foreign investment 219 remain unaltered.” and export trade

• Economic cooperation with the broader region The HoAP is an opportunity for a broader Turkish • Maintaining good relations with Turkey, and more approach to contribute to conflict resolution, reiterated focus on bilateral relations by Ambassador Alev Kılıç (retd.) currently director of the • Development of transportation routes for easy Center for Eurasian Studies (AVIM) in Ankara: “Our access to new markets close involvement is part of our overall contribution to • Strengthening ties with China to reduce dependency Afghanistan.” 220 The HoAP was a much-welcome of gas export to and via Russia initiative, because there was a strong need for an • Political stability in Afghanistan Afghan-led and regionally supported mechanism to resolve challenges stemming from Afghanistan and the • Successful implementation of TAPI gas pipeline to lack of substantial cooperation in the Heart of Asia export natural gas to Pakistan and India via region.221 Positive reflections on the HoAP were shared Afghanistan by colleagues at AVIM: it has led to fresh thinking, to • Preventing the inflow of drugs from Afghanistan into closer ties with participating states, more frequent and its territory more articulate communication: “It has definitely been a • Counter drug trafficking by taking lead role in very yielding undertaking.”222 Caspian Sea Initiative • Solution to the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline issue Reflecting on claims that the Process lacks a clear objective, there was strong consensus among Turkish Red Flags scholars that the objective is clear and that there should • Deterioration of relations with Russia over the export not be too strong a push to restate objectives and set of natural gas parameters. During an interview with Prof. Selçuk • Any attempt to push for the Trans-Caspian gas Çolakoğlu, Head of the Asia-Pacific Studies Center at pipeline that could lead to confrontation with Russia the International Strategic Research Organization • Escalating insecurity in Afghanistan after NATO- (USAK) and advisor at the Center for Strategic ISAF withdrawal in 2014, which could have a Research (SAM) held in Ankara in April 2014, the HoAP spillover effect on the region does not need a clear definition, the definition will simply evolve organically as the Process does.223 Prof. Şaban Expectations from and Reflections on the HoAP Kardaş, President at the Center for Middle Eastern Turkmenistan leads the Regional Infrastructure CBM in Strategic Studies (ORSAM) seconded Prof. Çolakoğlu: the HoAP and participates in the implementation of the

Trade, Commerce and Investment Opportunities CBM • Resolution of regional and international disputes and the Education CBM. During the second senior according to UN guidelines officials’ preparatory meeting of the Process hosted by • Promoting stability and security in Afghanistan Ashgabat in April 2012, the Foreign Minister of • Opposing violent extremism by promoting a culture Turkmenistan, Mr. Rashid Meredov, clearly stated that of moderation and non-violence Turkmenistan supports any initiative that is aimed to • Training Afghan imams to promote moderate Islam bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. 227 • Actively participating in the reconstruction of Turkmenistan is keen to export natural gas to India and Afghanistan through fund provision Pakistan and stability in Afghanistan is therefore one of • Stability in Egypt and Syria as key to stability in the the Turkmen authorities’ key interests. wider Arab region

Due to security constraints and lack of funds the Red Flags construction of the USD2 billion TAPI gas pipeline did • Escalating insecurity in Afghanistan after NATO- not take off during the mid 1990s. India joined the ISAF withdrawal in 2014, which could have a project in 2008 and things have started to move along. spillover effect on the region The HoAP provides Turkmenistan with an excellent • Return of Afghanistan as a safe heaven for terrorist opportunity to talk with various stakeholders and speed organizations, e.g. Al-Qaeda up the construction of this initiative. The successful • Unstable Pakistan as a result of radical Islamists’ completion of this project would help Ashgabat lessen surge its dependency on Russia and China for the export of natural gas. Expectations From and Reflections on the HoAP The UAE is the only Arab country that has deployed its Turkmenistan’s main concern about Afghanistan is to troops in Afghanistan to assist the US-led international stem the flow of opium from Afghanistan and to counter stabilization mission in Afghanistan. The UAE has drug trafficking. As Afghanistan’s neighbor, supported Afghanistan since Process commencement. It Turkmenistan considers stability in Afghanistan crucial has repeatedly supported talks between the Afghan for its own development. In a written interview with Mr. government and the Taliban. The UAE is one of Armands Pupols of the United Nations Regional Center Afghanistan’s biggest donors from the Arab region, and for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA), he has promised to stand by Afghanistan after 2014 and stated that compared to other regional initiatives, the assist the country in its reconstruction challenge.231 In HoAP has managed to draw higher attention to regional the HoAP the UAE leads the Counter Terrorism CBM engagement and ownership. It clearly underlines that along with Afghanistan and Turkey, and also countries in the region are interested in a stable and participates in the implementation of the Counter prosperous Afghanistan.228 The question is whether the Narcotics CBM and the Trade, Commerce and HoAP should be like a political umbrella for all existing Investment Opportunities CBM. and future regional activities related to relevant CBMs, or that it should cover specific activities based on The UAE has limited political ambitions in Afghanistan, concrete criteria.229 Such questions would be resolved yet is against stronger Iranian involvement in with the greater support and cooperation of the Afghan Afghanistan. In July 2013, the Foreign Ministers of the administration and by strengthening the institutional UAE and Afghanistan agreed to the signing of a long- capacity of the Process.230 term strategic partnership and also signed two separate

agreements on security cooperation and transfer of Please note: Unfortunately we were not able to collect reliable 232 data from Turkmen sources. Instead we referred to Mr. prisoners. Armands Pupols of the UNRCCA who is based in Ashgabat. To develop the Afghan economy, UAE aid to Afghanistan totaled USD267.3 million from 2009 to 2012,233 and included projects such as Kandahar airport, United Arab Emirates as well as the provision of food and aid to orphans and persons with special needs. The UAE is also working National Interests with HoAP member states and other organizations on • Developing closer ties with its neighbors in the joint projects that include the construction of a highway Arabian Peninsula through the GCC which links north and south Afghanistan. • Maintenance of effective, stable and wide-ranging ties with the IC

While outside of the HoAP framework, other support comes through the Dubai Process, now known as the Afghanistan Pakistan Cooperation Process (AFCP), a mechanism for Dialogue between Pakistan and Afghanistan.234 The Dubai Process started in 2007, with the support of the Canadian government, to engage Afghan and Pakistani authorities on better border management. 12 meetings have taken place so far and these have helped Afghan and Pakistani officials to develop trust. 235 This Process has shown some progress and various joint technical working group meetings have taken place discussing customs data exchange and biometric systems. 236 According to the Afghan Ambassador to the UAE, Mr. Mojadidi, the UAE is not a very active participant, but does contribute through low level meetings and channels outside the HoAP such as the AFCP. The problem of this relative inactivity lies with the Afghan MFA, the UAE is passionate to help.237 The UAE also has the funds to invest in Afghanistan and become more active in the Trade, Commerce and Investment Opportunities CBM but will be hesitant without security. 238 Ambassador Mojadidi shared that the UAE has conveyed to the embassy that they are keen and ready to help, all they need are the facilities.

Ambassador Mojadidi further added that Emirati interest has waned because the team that currently leads it in Kabul is weak.239 The Process is slow and the Afghan MFA’s interest lies more with the elections and security.240 When Deputy Minister Jawed Ludin left the Afghan MFA it severely affected the Process: “The Afghan embassy here never receives any reports or briefings on the Process.”241 There are governmental lessons from the UAE to be learnt by Afghanistan: “Learn from us as we have developed through strong leadership and regional cooperation.”242 The UAE hope that the new Afghan administration is somewhat better equipped and carries the vision of the HoAP forth with the same spirit as when it was launched.243

Please note: Unfortunately we were not able to collect data from the Emiratis in the Emirates, instead we referred to the Afghan embassy in Abu Dhabi.

Overview of National Interests and Red Flags per Country

This table provides a schematic overview of the core and secondary national interests and red flags for the thirteen selected participating HoAP states in relation to the Heart of Asia region, and more specifically Afghanistan. Its content is based on a number of reports consulted,244 and on discussions with interlocutors. Core interests are defined here as objectives whose development or outcomes are pivotal to the country’s national interests, while Secondary Interests are of national significance too, only to a lesser extent. Red Flags are concerns whose development or outcomes are so critical that any change would most likely result in vast and direct policy changes.

Country Core Interests Secondary Interests Red Flags

• Maintenance of the stability • Combating illicit drugs • Escalating insecurity after Afghanistan and territorial unity of the production and trafficking NATO-ISAF withdrawal in 2014 country • Implementation of large • The return of Taliban to • Sustenance of political stability infrastructure projects like power outside the existing • Reinvigoration of the historical CASA-1000 and TAPI government framework role of Afghanistan as a land • Persuasion of Pakistan that • Interference of regional bridge terrorism and extremism will countries in domestic affairs • Substantial socioeconomic destabilize the entire region • Collapse of democratic development through regional • Resolving regional disputes institutions connectivity • Make HoAP a role model for • Establishment of good ties with cooperation and regional all regional countries integration • Curbing the empowerment and dissemination of radical Islam • Maintenance of a stable • Investment in Afghanistan’s • Recognition of independence Azerbaijan position on global and regional petrochemical industry of Azerbaijan's Nagorno- issues • Linking Azerbaijani-relevant Karabakh region by Armenia • Developing friendly relations transportation routes with • Escalating insecurity in with neighboring states Afghanistan Afghanistan after NATO-ISAF • Demilitarization of the Caspian • Examination of the withdrawal in 2014, which basin transferability of the could have a regional spillover • Ensuring the stability of Azerbaijani development effect Afghanistan through capacity experience building assistance • Domestic political stability • Expansion of SCO capacity • Unstable Pakistan as a result China • National security and territorial and reach of radical Islamists’ surge integrity • A stable and prosperous • Escalating insecurity in • Sustainable socioeconomic Central Asia Afghanistan after NATO-ISAF development • Closer ties with Afghanistan, withdrawal in 2014, which • Stable regional environment but not at the expense of could have a regional spillover conducive to economic growth relations with Pakistan effect • Stability in its restive Xinjiang • Fear of extremist spillover SAR and Tibet SAR from Afghanistan • Avoiding military confrontation • Regional infrastructure • Strategic expansion of development and increased economic and energy interests in economic interaction Central Asia • Prevent alarming Moscow • Energy import security over endeavors in Central Asia • Avoid deterioration of ties with the Islamic World • Sustaining and promoting • Strengthening the • Control of areas of Pakistan India pluralistic democracy relationship with Iran and adjoining India and • Improvement of relations with Russia to weaken the Pakistan- Afghanistan by radical Islamists Pakistan, China and Japan China nexus • Escalating insecurity in • Revive of historical and cultural • Expansion of Chabahar port Afghanistan after NATO-ISAF ties with Afghanistan in Iran to gain access to withdrawal in 2014 • A regional cooperative Afghanistan and Central Asian • Return of resurgent Taliban in approach for stabilization of markets, bypassing Pakistan Afghanistan with the Afghanistan • Successful completion of clandestine support of Pakistan • Support of a democratically TAPI gas pipeline • Deterioration of bilateral ties elected government in with China, Russia, and the US Afghanistan

• Gaining recognition and • Stable Afghan government • Return of a resurgent Taliban Iran respect from regional states and • Construction of transport in Afghanistan the International Community links between Iran, • Unstable Pakistan as a result • A regionalist approach to Afghanistan and Central Asia of radical Islamists’ surge maintain peace and stability in • Protecting the rights of • Israel’s further belligerence neighboring countries Hazara (Shia group) in Central towards occupied Palestinian • Withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, and other territories and Lebanon Afghanistan and reduction of US Dari/Farsi speaking minority • Use of Afghan or Pakistani presence in Central Asia groups territory by Israel or any other • Greater and more active role in • Strengthening ties with Western country, directly or Afghan peace talks selected ethnic groups in indirectly (through Baloch • Effectively countering inflow of Afghanistan separatists/jihadist groups), to drugs from Afghanistan • Repatriation of Afghan destabilize Iran • Curbing any excessive Saudi refugees from Iran influence on the neighborhood • National security, strengthen • Regional infrastructure • Deteriorating ties with China, Kazakhstan regional peace development the EU, Russia and the US • Stable ties with China, the EU, • Curbing illicit arms and drug • Escalating insecurity in Russia and the US trafficking by supporting Afghanistan after NATO-ISAF • Ensuring Kazakhstan’s entry to international efforts withdrawal in 2014, which the top 30 most developed • Creating stability in could have a regional spillover countries Afghanistan through effect • Preventing spread of radical infrastructure development in

ideologies within its territory the country • A politically stable and • Resolution of conflicts in economically sustainable Central accordance with the UN Asia Security Council • Diversification of its economic development • Strengthening and • Increasing cooperation with • Increase of ethnic tensions Kyrgyzstan consolidating ties with CIS Islamic countries within its territory countries, China and the West • More active participation in • Deterioration of ties with • Strengthening ties with regional regional organizations like Russia and China powers SCO and CSTO • Escalating insecurity in • Economic cooperation with the • Development of Afghanistan after NATO-ISAF broader region Afghanistan’s transit potential withdrawal in 2014, which • Dealing effectively with internal and export of electrical energy could have a regional spillover threats resulting from domestic through successful effect ethnic tensions. implementation of CASA-1000 • Reducing drug trafficking and export of religious extremism from Afghanistan • Promotion of Pakistan as a • Balancing interests between • Lose its influence over Pakistan dynamic, progressive, moderate, Iran and Saudi Arabia Afghanistan and democratic Islamic country • Developing friendly relations, • An Afghan administration • A relatively stable and inclusive especially with immediate unsympathetic to Islamabad Afghan government with ample neighboring states and major • Increase of Baloch Pashtun representation powers in the world nationalism and separatism • Limiting the role of India to • Access to untapped natural • Rebirth of the "Pashtunistan" include only development resources in Central Asia, with idea activities in Afghanistan the construction of projects • Use of Pakistan as a • Remaining the largest exporter like Casa-1000 and the TAPI scapegoat after 2014 to keep to Afghanistan gas pipeline Afghanistan united against a • Security of its western border • Cultivating goodwill among common enemy • Combating terrorism within its the non-Pashtun minorities in own territory and stop the flow Afghanistan of drugs from Afghanistan

• Securing favorable conditions • Political Stability in • Escalating insecurity in Russia for overall Russian development Afghanistan Afghanistan after NATO-ISAF • More focus on bilateral ties to • Containing movement and withdrawal in 2014, which defend national interests activities of Islamic insurgents could have a regional spillover • Reducing the political and in its sphere of influence effect, particularly in Central economic influence of the US in • Keeping up with China’s Asia Russia’s sphere of influence economic influence in Central • Lose influence over Central • Keeping military control over and South Asia Asia Central Asia and secure borders • Use of Afghan territory to of Central Asian states bordering diversify its energy exports to Afghanistan South Asia • Curtailing drug addiction within • Supporting the its own territory by reducing the democratically elected flow of Afghan opiates government in Afghanistan • Extending and strengthening • Regional approach for the • Escalation in conflict with Tajikistan relations with China, the EU, and development of Afghanistan Uzbekistan Russia • Successful implementation of • Deterioration of relations • A non-military resolution to the CASA-1000 electricity project with Russia conflict in Afghanistan • Continuing cooperation with • Unstable Afghanistan/ • Maintaining relations with the US and its allies in the war escalating insecurity in Afghanistan based on good on terror Afghanistan after NATO-ISAF neighborly and pragmatic • Strengthening ties with withdrawal in 2014, which principles states sharing Tajikistan’s could spillover to Tajik soil • Preventing flow of illicit drugs language, culture, e.g. from Afghanistan Afghanistan and Iran • Preventing the dissemination of religious extremism from Afghanistan • Creating a peaceful and stable • Strengthening its relations • Escalating insecurity in Turkey environment in the region with US and European Afghanistan after NATO-ISAF • Cultural and political countries withdrawal in 2014, which integration of all Turkic people • Developing bilateral and could have a regional spillover • Strengthening cooperation multilateral cooperation with effect between Afghanistan and Central Asian states • Division of Syria Pakistan to promote stability in • Preventing the possibility of Afghanistan a regional war with sectarian • Promotion of regional spillover cooperation for the security and • Training of Afghan security stabilization of Afghanistan forces • Positive neutrality towards all • Maintaining good relations • Deterioration of relations Turkmenistan states in the world with Turkey, and more focus with Russia over the export of • Open door policy to encourage on bilateral relations natural gas foreign investment and export • Development of • Any attempt to push for the trade transportation routes for easy Trans-Caspian gas pipeline • Economic cooperation with the access to new markets that could lead to broader region • Strengthening ties with confrontation with Russia • Political stability in Afghanistan China to reduce dependency • Escalating insecurity in • Successful implementation of of gas export to and via Russia Afghanistan after NATO-ISAF TAPI gas pipeline to export • Counter drug trafficking by withdrawal in 2014, which natural gas to Pakistan and India taking lead role in Caspian Sea could have a spillover effect on via Afghanistan Initiative the region • Preventing the inflow of drugs • Solution to the Trans- from Afghanistan into its territory Caspian gas pipeline issue • Developing closer ties with its • Opposing violent extremism • Escalating insecurity in UAE neighbors in the Arabian by promoting a culture of Afghanistan after NATO-ISAF Peninsula through the GCC moderation and non-violence withdrawal in 2014, which • Maintenance of effective, • Training Afghan imams to could have a spillover effect on stable and wide-ranging ties with promote moderate Islam the region the IC • Actively participating in the • Return of Afghanistan as a • Resolution of regional and reconstruction of Afghanistan safe heaven for terrorist international disputes according through fund provision organizations, e.g. Al-Qaeda to UN guidelines • Stability in Egypt and Syria as • Unstable Pakistan as a result • Promoting stability and security key to stability in the wider of radical Islamists’ surge in Afghanistan Arab region

CONCLUSION Process and by addressing impediments outlined in this policy paper, so that it can better build on common interests and concerns that Afghanistan and Process The Heart of Asia region borrows from a members share. number of regions, of which Afghanistan forms the epicenter. This is precisely why the HoAP is a tricky, as The common interests that the HoAP has to concentrate well as promising, institutional vehicle. The majority of on are: 1) Fostering political dialogue among the states in these regions are subject to low standards of members of the inner circle, along with input from the living; ethnic, religious and economic rivalry; limited outer circle, 2) Contributing to sustainable economic economic connectivity; and mistrust. The challenges integration and connectivity in the Heart of Asia region. that Afghanistan faces do not merely affect the country Physical and digital infrastructure is key to support this, itself. However, neither are these problems solely the 3) Curbing the empowerment and dissemination of produce of Afghanistan alone. The region has to radical Islam, 4) Mitigation of illicit drug production and become aware that regional challenges, foremost those trafficking. The existing Regional Infrastructure, and stemming from non-state actors, need a collective Trade, Commerce and Investment Opportunities; approach in order to reach a resolution. Yet, Counter Terrorism; and Counter Narcotics CBMs could stakeholders and observers of the HoAP will have to be serve these interests. It is vital that this happens in a realistic about their expectations of the Process. Swift speedy and efficient fashion. The HoAP should avoid a and vast progress in regions as complex as those that scenario where it is perceived as a steppingstone the Process encompasses is not a given, not even when political talk shop to established regional mechanisms. interests and concerns overlap. Once the Process loses momentum it will not be easy to regain it. RECCA is a living example of this. Whereas A number of participating states argue that the HoAP RECCA missed a political component to push for overlaps with existing multilateral structures. While this economic cooperation, the HoAP will need stronger is undeniable, the HoAP is a useful institutional vehicle commitment to economic cooperation to survive as a for Afghanistan to propagate the concerns and political forum. opportunities it sees for itself and the broader region, particularly in light of the possible post-2016 complete In support of this, it is imperative that the Process is not withdrawal of US-led NATO-ISAF forces. While one impeded by internal restraints. It has to instead focus on chapter closes and another opens, the Process finds dealing with the many external challenges it faces. itself at a juncture. Members will need to be convinced of the utility of the Process, and it will have to support The HoAP finds itself at a juncture. Kabul and all Afghanistan in tackling the daunting security and stakeholders will have to decide which path they want to economic challenges it faces. pursue. Inaction should not be an option. But if in doubt, rather than rigidly molding the Process’ framework and As Kabul co-stewards the Process, it has to better forcing it to institutionalize, the Process should be incorporate the interests and calculations of immediate allowed to organically take shape over time. This does region powers, and to an extent those of extra-regional not imply that the objective, strategies and tactics to powers. That is a reality that Kabul cannot neglect. achieving it should not be clearly pursued in the course Afghanistan is not of interest to small players, but very of it. much of interest to regional and great powers. Among the latter two, what happens in Afghanistan is arguably This paper has attempted to analyze the intricacies of secondary compared to interests of greater importance the Process by shedding more light on its impediments, to their policies on the Greater Middle East and Central and by identifying the common interests and concerns and South Asia. Yet, all members share a common red that the inner circle of participating countries hold. A list flag: fear of escalating insecurity in an independently-led of recommendations to hone the Process has been Afghanistan post 2014/16 that could radiate regionally. included and we advise its consideration.

There is currently a vicious circle where the hub, i.e. The Process still remains relatively under-researched Kabul, and the spokes, i.e. member countries and and is possibly subject to further impediments that this organizations, underline one another’s absence of report has failed to identify. Further academic inquiry is commitment and passivity. This is a zero-sum practice advised. and should be resolved. Kabul will have to initiate resolving this by reiterating its commitment to the

RECOMMENDATIONS contribute more substantially to member states’ foreign policy agenda – quid pro quo is as relevant as it has

always been. The HoAP has to clearly signal that there While the HoAP provides Afghanistan more are no aspirations to forge the Process into a security sway to lead and articulate itself than in any existing mechanism. China, Iran, Pakistan and Russia among multilateral mechanism in which it participates, others undoubtedly do not want an Afghan-centric stewardship comes at a price. The Process is a valuable organization to have any kind of say in their security single platform that can serve both Afghanistan and the arrangements. The post-2016 US-led NATO/ISAF region well. Based on the impediments and the interests forces complete withdrawal might make participating that the previous sections have underlined, below are states at least contemplate soft security coordination. recommendations for the Afghan administration and all This deserves further study. HoAP members and stakeholders. These recommendations are clustered as strategic, i.e. dealing The Process will also need to define its deliverables with the bigger picture and more long-term oriented, and more clearly245 and create projects rather than market tactical, i.e. more operational-oriented. them. Existing efforts and projects should be

supplemented rather than paralyzed. Strategic Recommendations

1) The Afghan administration should show unreserved 3) Re-instill interest in the HoAP by identifying and political vision and will to further hone the HoAP at all proposing initiatives that serve the majority of members government levels. The Process cannot thrive if there is – incentives are a great motivator. Member states will no unity and political determination. This unity has to be always look at Afghanistan through their lens of national forged by top-level government. Kabul should send a interest, therefore Kabul has to pragmatically feed their strong signal to all members that it is capable and desires and mitigate their concerns. Afghanistan has to committed. A multilateral platform’s hub cannot be shift itself from being a threat to being seen as an perceived to be feeble. opportunity.

A neutral stance in Afghanistan’s foreign policy is Shared national interests, of which curbing the essential. It should not align with any of its neighbors or empowerment and dissemination of radical Islam, extended neighbors, rather balance relations with them, mitigation of illicit drugs production and trafficking, and with long-term Western capacity building and financial economic development are the most important, should support. Afghanistan does not need to choose sides as be prioritized. It will be particularly useful to have alignment policy largely failed in its last three decades. members with pragmatic economic foreign policies, e.g. Kabul should rather focus on responsible neutrality China, onboard. China’s ability to finance (through honed by political determination to bring the Process to innovative methods, such as the resources for fruition. The Process’ members will gain more infrastructure (R4I) approach, and construct large confidence in Afghanistan and the Process if it displays infrastructure projects should be given close that it is able to productively co-coordinate it. There consideration. needs to be more focus on practical security measures and economic endeavors that demonstrably benefit 4) The Process should bridge existing multilateral members. The most effective method for the Process to bodies such as CAREC, CICA and the SCO if they have gain more esteem is to build trust through the overlap in purpose, some of their projects could be achievement of real and durable results. To give a promoted within the HoAP discussions as building signal that the Process has a serious commitment to blocks for regional trust. One such initiative could be to common economic development, the economic divert some of the vast flow of money allocated to ministers of the supporting countries could be invited to counter narcotics by international and intergovernmental the annual ministerial conferences. organizations to the HoAP Counter-Narcotics CBM.

2) The practical objective of the Process should be Indeed, at the ministerial conference in Almaty it was reiterated by Kabul. It should remind members why the echoed that the Process does not substitute already HoAP is imperative to the interests of the region. It has existing mechanisms for regional cooperation, but rather to be made sure that it does not solely serve desires to complement them 246 . Simultaneously, Afghanistan. The HoAP cannot be perceived as a participating states with economic prowess such as charity organization that countries participate in to brand China and India should be asked for greater themselves as altruistic towards Afghanistan, or to involvement, so that headway is made. If these major please larger geopolitical powers. The Process has to

42 powers take the lead in pushing the community forwards An intra-government outreach campaign should be by using their individual economic heft, more progress designed to raise awareness in the public and private might actually be made. By throwing their collective sector. A more strict protocol mechanism should be weight behind specific aspects, e.g. funding and designed and monitored. HoAP designated teams initiative deadlines, of the Process, this might generate a should also be stimulated at participating countries’ momentum of its own. Yet, the push by great powers ministries of foreign affairs, this will be conducive like China and India could also backfire: smaller towards coordination and efficiency. Essential to this is a countries could feel sidelined. This scenario should be higher rate of SOM meetings and technical meetings to strictly avoided and delicately handled. address governance and communication deficiencies between the three governance tiers. These two levels Tactical Recommendations cannot passively await the annual ministerial 5) Assign a diplomatically seasoned team an office to conferences to catalyze exchange and activity. The coordinate the Process. This could either continue to be SOM functions as a bridge, it should be held more the RCD at the MFA or designated elsewhere. It is frequently. There should also be better important that the head of this team has a good track planning/anticipation of meeting dates. record of getting things done. The team should not have other commitments, as juggling affects deliverables. 8) It is key that a parallel HoAP Track 2 with research They will have to be sufficiently robust to fill the power institutes from participating and supporting countries is vacuum and tie up loose ends in the Process. A created. This will feed the Process with independent committed and fitting team could replace individual reflections and make sure that policymakers are better drivers and act more efficiently than a mechanism prone informed. It will also keep the discussion alive between to bureaucracy and thus inefficiency. the annual ministerial conferences. Frequent pre- conference dialogues can result in better-prepared and In support of this, HoAP permanent focal points at more action-oriented ministerial conferences and SOMs. relevant ministries should be assigned with no other commitments. These focal points can mitigate Kabul’s Afghanistan’s track 2 should attempt to gain a solid institutional weakness to act as the Process’ hub and understanding of member states’ psyche and primary increase diplomatic interaction hampered by the security foreign policy interests. It is also essential that, impartial, situation in Kabul. Focal points at relevant embassies scholarly reflections on relations with Pakistan are could act as lobbying groups and promote Afghanistan provided to policy advisors and makers. Afghan- as a center of cooperation and development, and the Pakistani ties need to cool down, and should become HoAP as the forum to materialize it. The HoAP team subject to more transparency and accountability. Finger should closely monitor performance at relevant pointing has a detrimental effect and shifts resources ministries. away from self-reflection and development on both sides

6) Push for a trust fund to cover core expenses of the 9) The CBM lead state baton has to be passed on: this Process at the next ministerial conference, as financial will act as a flushing mechanism and introduce new impediments limit competence. This trust fund should ideas. This can be realized by introducing an annual merely cover RCD operational expenses. The sharing rotation system. CBM metrics should be created to out of the funding should be based on members’ demonstrate success thereby driving the Process to economic prowess. Both participating, as well as produce results. In support of this, task forces can be supporting states and organizations should fund, setup to expedite initiatives. Enhanced guidelines although the latter in a more modest scope. If a more should be created to secure that CBM lead states’ sizable fund is green lighted the UN should be initiatives serve in a multilateral way, not just bilaterally. considered to oversee it. The Process cannot be Simultaneously, participating states with economic impeded by internal restraints. It has to focus on prowess, such as China, should be encouraged to take external ones, i.e. restraints to security and connectivity. the lead in certain CBMs, pushing the forum forwards. Criteria have to be set to prioritize CBMs projects. Many 7) The game is big, but capacity in Kabul is little. small steps are better than large but slow steps. It is Therefore, communication and operational channels at important to keep the Process running and not lose the RCD, MFA and in relevant ministries should be momentum. improved. The hub of the Process, without a proper secretariat, does not have the capacity to coordinate six CBMs. A

43 streamlining of the number of CBMs should be considered: the current amount is too many to coordinate and oversee for Kabul. 247 The Regional Infrastructure CBM could be merged with the Trade, Commerce and Investment Opportunities CBM, while the Education CBM is conceivably better served outside the Process on a bilateral basis. The Process is better off concentrating on fewer CBMs, yet with better allocation of resources. Another suggestion worth delving into is to have international organizations co- lead the CBMs. Their expertise and financial resources could make a positive difference.

10) The name of the Process should henceforth be the Heart of Asia Process rather than the Istanbul Process. A multilateral mechanism with forty-two members among which mistrust and rivalry still persist should not carry the name of a single city.

This paper recommends participating and supporting states and organizations specifically to:

11) Avoid a pending scenario where they could be . perceived to piggyback. Members should show more proactivity by bringing more ideas and proposals to the table and should actively support major developmental projects that appear on the Process’ future agenda. While there is surely a fine line between support and overstepping, supporting states and organization could yield their network, experience and deep(er) pockets to hone the Process.

12) Show stronger commitment to make the Process a success. They must avoid initiating and hosting bi- and trilateral meetings on Afghanistan that do not invite Afghanistan to the table. Co-deciding on a state’s fate without that state’s input is indicative of moral flexibility. The whole purpose of the HoAP for Afghanistan was to be a player, rather than a spectator. But to remain in the field, Afghanistan needs stronger support of all members.

The next page offers a table with impediments to the HoAP and recommendations for the HoAP combined.

Overview of HoAP Impediments and Recommendations

Impediments Recommendations

• Absence of drivers to run the • Assign a diplomatically seasoned team a separate Process office from the RCD to coordinate the Process. • Afghanistan’s insufficient neutral • Pursue pragmatic neutrality, practice active and stance creative diplomacy, drop reactive diplomacy. • Inadequate political will at top • The new administration should show unreserved levels of Afghan government to political will, unity, and determination at all fully endorse the Process government levels to nurture and hone the Process. • Equivocal objective of the Process • Reiterate the practical objective in a way that clearly underlines incentives for members. The Process should contribute more substantially to the inner circle’s national interests and red flags. • Insufficiently persuasive incentives • Re-instill interest by identifying and proposing system for participating states practical initiatives for common interests that serve the majority of member states, particularly political dialogue, economic integration, counter terrorism and counter narcotics. The Process should also (Geo)Political/ focus on contemporary problems and tensions, e.g. Strategic Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. • Overlaps with existing regional • Bridge existing multilateral bodies if they have mechanisms overlap in purpose, and strengthen existing cooperative arrangements and mechanisms. MoUs with established regional organizations should be signed and parallel initiatives should be avoided. • Financial resources are available • Incentives should be provided to generate money foremost in the outer circle of flow into the inner circle. supporting states and organizations • Insufficient support from member • Both circles should show stronger commitment to states in both the inner and outer make the HoAP a success and avoid initiating and circle hosting bi- and trilateral meetings that do not invite Afghanistan to the table. • Complex region with generally • A neutral and proactive Afghan foreign policy weak and bureaucratic institutions stance to balance relations with (extended) neighbors with traditional donors’ support. • Absence of a secretariat and • Stress the need for a trust fund to cover core adequate funding Process expenses at the next ministerial conference with larger economies taking the lead. • Deficiency of institutional capacity • A diplomatically seasoned team should and human resources in Kabul to strengthen operational and communication act as the Process’ hub capacity, and monitor activities’ implementation. • Unclear labor division, targets and • Introduce an annual rotation system for CBM lead gauges with regard to the CBMs states, also push for CBM metrics demonstrating endorsed in the Process success thereby stimulating the Process to produce Operational/ results. Set up task forces to expedite initiatives. Tactical • Poor media coverage and • Establishment of a parallel HoAP track 2 independent analysis of the Process connecting research institutes from participating and supporting countries. • Large aperture between annual • Increase frequency of SOM meetings, decision- ministerial conference meetings making authority should be shared with SOM level. • Lack of clear and timely • Improve communication and operational channels communication by the Afghan MFA at the MFA and in line ministries. An intra- government outreach campaign should be designed to raise awareness in the public and private sector.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Overview of Activities per CBM and per Country248

Overview per CBM

DISASTER MANAGEMENT (DM) CBM

O bjectives

• Organizing disaster response seminars among focal points for exchange of information and best practice with a view to the development of joint guidelines. • Creating a mechanism for pooling of knowledge and experience on dealing with the impact of disasters and proven mitigating strategies. • Developing robust regional early warning information and pre-identification system for droughts and other water related threats.

Activities

• A consultation meeting on Lead TFPs and Regional Focal Points (RFPs) was convened on September 20, 2012 in Islamabad, Pakistan, to formulate and agree on a draft implementation plan for the DM CBM. The co-lead countries, Kazakhstan and Pakistan, jointly formulated the draft. The meeting was attended by the representatives of the two lead countries, representatives of five regional TFP countries: Afghanistan, China, India, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey, representatives of three supporting countries: Norway, Poland and Sweden, and representatives of four international organizations: the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the World Bank and the EU. • The second TFP meeting was held in Astana, Kazakhstan on September 4, 2013. • Pakistan organized a training program for the Afghan ‘Search and Rescue Team’ of the Afghan Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA), in January 2014 as part of an activity under the DM CBM. • Pakistan organized a two day international seminar on ‘Sharing Experiences and Developing Regional Hazard and Risk Picture for Action Plan,’ on May 12-13, 2014. • The third regional technical meeting on the DM CBM took place in Islamabad on May 14, 2014.

COUNTER-TERRORISM (CT) CBM

O bjectives

• Contributing to expanding and strengthening the existing CT measures and initiatives and, where needed, enhancing coordination among them. • Taking effective measures for countering the financing of terrorism, including identifying financial sources and preventing their flow to terrorists, terrorist acts, and terrorist organizations. • Enhancing capacities of counter-terrorism institutions of participating states. • Preventing cross-border movement of explosives and lethal devices as well as precursors used for their production. • Furthering effective border cooperation, control and management. • Taking effective measures to understand and mitigate the relevant factors of violent extremism.

A ctivities

• The first technical meeting on the CT CBM took place on September 3, 2012 in Ankara, Turkey. • The second technical meeting on the CT CBM took place in Abu Dhabi, UAE, on September 18, 2012. The meeting was organized by the Hedaya Center. A draft implementation plan for CT in Afghanistan was produced at this meeting. • The third technical meeting also took place in Abu Dhabi on July 26, 2013. • A workshop on C-IED was held in Abu Dhabi in August 2013. • Afghanistan hosted a workshop on Terrorism Financing in Kabul, Afghanistan on February 26-27, 2014. • The second workshop on C-IED was held in Kabul on March 8-9, 2014. Experts from Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey and the UN participated in this workshop.

COUNTER-NARCOTICS (CN) CBM

O bjectives

• Realization of measures on updating the system of control of the legal circulation of drugs and their precursors on the territories of the participating states of the HoAP. • Carrying out task-oriented work on prevention of drug addiction, and lowering the availability of drugs. • Introduction of new methods and means of treatment, social and medical rehabilitation of drug addicts based on existing realities of the participating states. • Working out and introducing modern tools for detection and analysis of drugs and their precursors. • Exchange operative and strategic information on criminal acts and structure, places and methods of production and modus operandi of narcotic traffickers, including concealments, as well as on analysis techniques. • Concentration of efforts of competent agencies in the struggle against transnational forms of trafficking of illicit drugs and their precursors. • Carrying out task-oriented work on the reduction of the scale of illicit production.

A ctivities

• The first regional technical meeting took place at the Russian embassy in Kabul on December 5, 2012. • The second technical meeting on the CN CBM took place on January 25, 2013 in Baku, Azerbaijan. • The third technical meeting took place in June 2013 in Kabul. • An anti-Cannabis seminar was held in Moscow, Russia on March 5, 2014.

TRADE COMMERCE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES (TCIO) CBM

O bjectives

• Set up an information network sharing commercial opportunities in Afghanistan. • Promote trade, foreign investment and joint ventures in promising Afghan economic sectors. • Promote basic physical and financial infrastructure and enable the policies pertinent to foster trade and investment. • Promote greater physical connectivity, particularly surface transport routes and networks. • Put in place dispute settlement mechanisms for trade and investments. • Promote liberalization of bilateral air-services agreements among the regional countries. • Capacity building programs at the Afghan Chambers of Commerce. • Encourage greater interaction among Chambers of Commerce in the region. • Harmonization of quality/safety standards between and amongst Afghanistan and participating countries

of the HoAP. • Establishment of bonded warehouses.

A ctivities

• FICCI has organized four meetings of TFPs in New Delhi on September 20, 2012; April 18, 2013; August 29, 2013; and May 15, 2014. FICCI has also organized training of Afghan Chamber officials and B2B meetings in 2013. • The Indian embassy hosted a technical meeting on the TCIO CBM in Kabul on January 29, 2013. • The India-Afghanistan Partnership Fair was organized in Mazar-e-Sharif on March 4-5, 2013 to promote innovative partnerships between business groups and NGOs of the two countries. • Balkh Chamber of Commerce and Industries (BCCI) organized a fair with the support of USAID, FICCI and nine Northern Chambers of Commerce and Industries. More than forty organizations, twenty from India and twenty from the nine northern Afghan provinces showcased products and services in agriculture, mining, clean energy, education, health and ICT. • FICCI also organized the event, Doing Business with Afghanistan on November 18-20, 2013 in New Delhi, India. The event attempted to uncover Afghanistan’s massive investment potential, and provided an excellent opportunity for Afghanistan and its near and extended neighbors to engage in a sincere dialogue to build confidence and promote economic cooperation at the regional level. In addition to ministers and senior government officials, more than seventy business groups including female entrepreneurs and thirty exhibitors participated in the event. The Indian External Ministry released a paper, Doing business with Afghanistan, and an MoU was signed and exchanged between FICCI and ACCI at the event. • FICCI organized a Road Show on Investment Opportunities in Afghanistan in association with AISA in Mumbai on November 20, 2013. It helped to spread awareness about the investment potential in Afghanistan and acquainted the Indian business community with the legal frameworks, procedure, incentive packages and support services offered by the government of Afghanistan. • Financial Access for Investing in the Development of Afghanistan (FAIDA), a subdivision of USAID and the Indian embassy in Kabul have organized interactive business meetings with the Afghanistan Builders Delegation on January 31, 2014 in New Delhi. • The Afghan MFA and The University of Central Asia hosted the Small and Medium Enterprises and Regional Trade in Afghanistan and the Heart of Asia Regional Symposium in Kabul on February 23, 2014.

REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE (RI) CBM

O bjectives

• Elaboration and implementation of projects aimed at infrastructure development in and around Afghanistan, main ports in the heart of Asia region and linking them via roads and railroads for shipment of goods and energy to and from Central Asia, South Asia, Europe and Asia. • Bilateral and multilateral cooperation on establishment of direct flights between the main cities in the region. • Cooperation on attracting investments for implementation of infrastructure projects, including through holding business fora (in coordination with relevant CBM working groups) by representatives of participating and supporting states of the HoAP and potential investors. • Cooperation on capacity building, by means of seminars, workshops and by holding meetings of scientific research institutions, representatives and centers specialized in the field of economic integration. • Arranging review meetings of representatives of participating and supporting states and relevant international organizations of the HoAP for discussion of ways to further improve regional infrastructure and elaboration on practical strategies.

• Preparation of review meetings of representatives of participating and supporting states and the relevant international organizations of the HoAP for discussion of infrastructure projects and problems in their realization, in order to undertake relevant measures. • Holding regular consultations among the participating states of the RI CBM with the aim to further update the present Action Plan.

A ctivities

• The first meeting of the RI-CBM working group took place in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan on January 24, 2013. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the draft Action Plan for the RI-CBM and identify key activities. • The second working group meeting also took place in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan on September 10, 2013. During this meeting the participants reviewed the implementation of the Action Plan and put forward a series of recommendations on this CBM and the development of RI.

EDUCATION CBM

O bjectives

• Promoting regional understanding and dialogue among the Heart of Asia countries by focusing on historical, cultural and religious commonalities and the mutual benefits gained from such exchanges. • Strengthening connections among the people of the region by promotion of common interests and shared values based on principles of the good neighborhood and mutual respect for national sovereignty, independence, national unity and territorial integrity as prerequisites of peace and stability in the region. • Promoting knowledge and awareness of the rule of law and respect for legal international obligations. • Developing joint cultural exchange programs including art, literature, music, etc. • Providing opportunities for exchange of special talent and expertise in the fields of sport, music, art, literature and language through short, medium and long term training programs. • Holding regional academic debates in the field of sciences, technology, humanities, education, law, journalism, literature, etc. • Organizing educational and training programs to meet the needs of the countries of the region for implementation of their national development strategy when requested for. • Fostering dialogue among regional religious scholars. • Promoting allocation of quotas for Afghan students at educational institutions in the region. • Promoting peace in the region through investment in education programs and the establishment of specialized research institutions. • Promoting tolerance and acceptance of cultural, religious and ethnic diversities. • Developing mechanisms and providing opportunities to national icons and special talents of the Heart of Asia countries to demonstrate their skills and talents at the regional level. • Organizing regional sport events among relevant Heart of Asia Countries. • Developing joint educational/awareness raising programs to discourage the use of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and substances. • Exchanging successful educational methodologies and sharing of tested techniques for developing improved educational curricula. • Preparing refugees for re-integration in their homeland. • Providing educational and training support for one another.

A ctivities

• The Ministry of Human Resources Development of India has nominated the joint secretary of the Central Universities and Languages as the TFP for this CBM. • The first technical meeting took place at the embassy of Iran in Kabul on December 16, 2012. • The second technical meeting took place on April 17, 2013 in Tehran, Iran. • The third technical meeting also took place in Tehran, on September 16, 2013. • A book exhibition was organized in Kabul by Iran in November 2013.

Overview per Participating Country

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN – COUNTER- TERRORISM CBM

• Afghanistan has created organizational structures within its MFA, the RCD and is organizing and coordinating meetings across the region at the technical staff level, senior level and minister level. • Afghanistan hosted the second ministerial conference on June 14, 2012. • Kabul hosted a senior officials meeting on March 25, 2013. • On November 18, 2013, the ACCI and the FICCI signed an MoU to further strengthen business partnerships and economic relations between the two countries. • The MFA of Afghanistan and The University of Central Asia hosted the Small and Medium Enterprises and Regional Trade in Afghanistan and the Heart of Asia Regional Symposium in Kabul on February 23, 2014. • Afghanistan hosted the second workshop on C-IED under the CN CBM in Kabul on March 8-9, 2014. Experts from Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey and the UN participated in this workshop.

THE REP. OF AZERBAIJAN – COUNTER-NARCOTICS AND REGIONAL INFRA. CBM

• Baku hosted the second working group meeting for the implementation plan of the CN CBM in January 2013. • Baku also hosted a SOM on February 6, 2013.

THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

• China does not lead any CBM, however, it has been a co-steward of the Process since the Almaty ministerial conference and will host the upcoming fourth ministerial conference of the HoAP on August 29, 2014 in Tianjin.

THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA – TRADE COMMERCE AND INVESTMENT OPPS. CBM

• The Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), in partnership with the governments of India and Afghanistan and in cooperation with Afghan investment and business organizations, organized the Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan on June 28, 2012 in New Delhi, India. • FICCI organized four meetings of TFPs in New Delhi on September 20, 2012; April 18, 2013; August 29, 2013; and May 15, 2014. FICCI organized training of Afghan Chamber officials and B2B meetings in 2013. • The Indian embassy hosted a technical meeting on the TCIO CBM in Kabul on January 29, 2013. • On April 6, 2013 India removed tariffs on four hundred and sixty Afghan goods to boost bilateral trade. • A capacity building program was organized by FICCI for a delegation of ten ACCI officials from June 17- 24, 2013 in New Delhi. • FICCI in association with the EPAA organized B2B meetings with a Fresh and Dry Fruits’ Traders

delegation from Afghanistan in Mumbai and Hyderabad on June 24-25, 2013. • On November 18, 2013, H.E. Salman Khurshid, Indian Minister of External Affairs, inaugurated the Doing Business with Afghanistan international conference in New Delhi under the HoAP umbrella. During the conference, FICCI organized a series of events to attract business. ACCI and FICCI signed an MoU to further strengthen business partnerships and economic relations between the two countries. • FICCI also organized a Road Show on Investment Opportunities in Afghanistan in association with the AISA in Mumbai on November 20, 2013. • FICCI in collaboration with the FAIDA, a department of USAID and the Indian embassy in Kabul organized interactive business meetings with the Afghanistan Builders Delegation on January 31, 2014 in New Delhi. • New Delhi hosted a SOM on January 17, 2014.

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN – EDUCATION CBM

• Iran has organized three regional technical meetings for the implementation of the Education CBM, two of which took place in Tehran and one in embassy of Iran in Kabul. • Iran organized a book exhibition in Kabul in November 2013.

THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN – DISASTER MANAGEMENT CBM

• Astana hosted the second TFP meeting of the DM CBM on September 4, 2013. • Kazakhstan hosted a SOM in Almaty on April 25, 2013. • The third ministerial conference was held in Almaty, Kazakhstan on April 26, 2013.

THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC

• No specific information on activities of any HoAP CBM could be found on Kyrgyzstan.

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN – DISASTER MANAGEMENT CBM

• A consultation meeting on the Lead TFPs and the RFPs was convened on September 20, 2012 in Islamabad. The objective was to formulate and agree on a draft implementation plan for the DM CBM jointly formulated by the co-lead countries, Pakistan and Kazakhstan. • Pakistan organized a training program for the Afghan Search and Rescue Team from ANDMA, in January 2014 under the DM CBM umbrella. • Pakistan organized a two-day international seminar on Sharing Experiences and Developing Regional Hazard and Risk Pictures for the Action Plan, on May 12-13, 2014. • Pakistan hosted the third DM CBM technical meeting in Islamabad on May 14, 2014.

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION – COUNTER- NARCOTICS CBM

• The Russian embassy in Kabul hosted the first regional technical meeting on the CN CBM on December 5, 2012. • With the sponsorship of NATO, the Federal Drug Control Service of Russia provided training to twenty Afghan CN police officers on October 23, 2013. • Russia hosted an anti-cannabis seminar under the CN CBM in Moscow on March 5, 2014

THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN

• No specific information on activities of any HoAP CBM could be found on Tajikistan.

THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY – COUNTER- TERRORISM CBM

• Turkey hosted the first ministerial conference on November 2, 2011. • Turkey hosted the first technical level meeting of the CT CBM in Ankara on September 3, 2012. • Ankara also hosted a SOM on October 28, 2012.

TURKMENISTAN – REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE CBM

• Turkmenistan hosted two working group meetings on the RI CBM in Ashgabat. The purpose of the first meeting was to discuss the draft Action Plan and identify key activities for this CBM. • During the second meeting, the participants reviewed the implementation of the Action Plan and put forward a series of recommendations on CBMs and the development of RI.

THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES – COUNTER- TERRORISM CBM

• The UAE hosted the second and third technical level meetings on the CT CBM in Abu Dhabi. The second meeting was organized by the Hedaya Center and a draft implementation plan was produced to CT in Afghanistan. • The UAE hosted a workshop on C-IED in Abu Dhabi in August 2013.

Annex 2: Methodology and Questionnaire Copy

Methodology

A number of diplomats whom we met in Kabul prior to project commencement contended that HoAP members’ interest in it has faded, and that it is not living up to its potential. This sparked our curiosity to embark on a research project to assess if the Process indeed is at a juncture where inaction could work detrimental to the Process’ objective.

This report is specifically, but not exclusively, designed for HoAP stakeholders at both policy advising as well as policy- making levels. We believe that this paper will shed more light on impediments to the Process. Hopefully, it will result in policy measures to resolve or at least moderate these, so that the momentum of the Process is not lost. In the interest of broad readership we have attempted to provide our findings in a clear and readable fashion.

For our qualitative methodology we have decided not to allocate resources too much to progress of the HoAP to date, since the Process is relatively young and progress in itself is hard to measure, i.e. what are metrics to assess a Process’ advancement? In addition, in gauging progress it is no easy task to determine what activity falls entirely under the HoAP umbrella. There is overlap with existing bilateral ties’ and multilateral mechanisms’ programs and activities. Rather, we decided to take the Process’ objective, juxtapose it with members’ interests and concerns on regional affairs revolving around Afghanistan, and analyze impediments to the Process to address them. These impediments are categorized as (geo)political and operational. No distinction was made between inner circle members, the participating countries; and the outer circle of extra-regional countries, and regional and international organizations.

As we set the framework, our first step was to accurately define the Process, i.e. what has it been designed for? We based this on the three ministerial conference declarations and corresponding stated objectives. To an extent, we based it on a number of conversations with practitioners closely involved in the HoAP. We next, attempted to identify participating countries’ interests and red flags, generally based on secondary data. We collected views on the Process based predominantly on primary data, i.e. authors’ interviews. For our data compilation we have tried to create a roughly 70-30 percent ratio of field-desk research respectively. This ratio differs per country, the variable was whether fieldwork was an option or not. Existing analyses on the young HoAP is slim: there have been a few relatively brief pieces focusing on ailments of the Process by the Afghanistan Analysts Network, and concise reflections in scholarly journals. The Process has at times been allocated a subsection in reports, e.g. the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) analyzing Afghanistan and the region. None of these pieces have extensively analyzed the Process. Precisely because the current pool of analyses on the Process is small and shallow, we have opted for the aforementioned ratio.

In our collection of primary data we decided to allocate closer attention to interlocutors in (1) the Process’ initiator, Afghanistan; (2) Turkey as a product of their active involvement since early stages of this forum, and Pakistan since Kabul alleges that it obstructs the Process’ progress; (3) countries with a relatively and progressively heavier economic and geopolitical clout in the region: China and India; and (4) CBM lead states in order to obtain (more detailed) views on operational impediments. In our selection of interlocutors we have attempted to refer to a diverse body of (senior) government officials and scholars of both participating states, and supporting states and organizations who are involved in the Process in some capacity. We expected this to provide us a more comprehensive view on the Process and, in our opinion, it has. Logically, the sample size of interviewees per selected country cannot be perceived as fully representative of their respective country’s stance on the Process, yet it is indicative.

Out of the fourteen participating states we have selected all but Saudi Arabia to examine because of its limited activity and participation. This brings our total of selected states to thirteen. We have decided not to include a separate section on the broad supporting body of the HoAP in our analysis due to the limited nature of their involvement in the Process, but more so because of our own capacity restraints. Their role and some of their views have been interwoven throughout the report. We have designed a fourteen-questions questionnaire that we have used for our interviews with interlocutors both in Kabul as well as in visited countries. A copy of the questionnaire that we have used for all interviews can be found in this annex. In the design of this questionnaire we have attempted not to push interviewees in a given direction. Individuals at Chatham House, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New York University, and Sciences Po have reviewed both our methodology and

53 questionnaire, see the second title page for more details on them. These individuals have also kindly provided peer review of the drafts that led to the end product, this report. Their constructive criticism has been addressed, and has undoubtedly enriched this paper. Any flaws in this paper are entirely our own.

Envisioned field trips to eight participating countries were reduced to five as a result of logistical and technical issues. The countries that we have visited to collect primary data are: Azerbaijan, China, India, Turkey and the UAE. China and India were visited in April, all others countries in March 2014. These countries were visited by either of the two authors, Richard Ghiasy or Maihan Saeedi. For four countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan we have referred to field advisors. They have also disseminated our questionnaire to their network and have provided us with supplementary views through email. In Kabul we have held two focus groups. One to exchange insights, assess deficiencies in current analyses on the Process, and one to reflect on the impediments to and recommendations for the HoAP that we have come up with. The first focus group was held in the second week after commencement of the project in February and the second one was held in mid May. Their reflections on our methodology and findings were taken into consideration and led to some amendments.

As for the breakdown of the report we have chosen to (1) introduce the HoAP and share some of our analyses on it and impediments that we have identified, (2) provide the bigger picture of complexities and opportunities in the Heart of Asia region, and (3) presents our findings on selected participating states’ interests and concerns in the Heart of Asia region, and views of selected experts and practitioners on the Process. The report lastly provides a conclusion and recommendations to address the identified impediments.

Questionnaire Copy

On the Heart of Asia Process (HoAP)

1. Why, in your opinion, was the HoAP launched in the first place? 2. What progress has the Process made so far? 3. What have the Process’ biggest achievements been? 4. What are impediments to the Process? 5. Would you say that interest in the Process has faded since conception? 6. If so, what should be done to reinvigorate the Process? By whom?

Country/Organization Specific

7. What are your country’s/organization’s expectations from the Process? 8. What has your country/organization done so far under the umbrella of/as a product of the Process? 9. What domestic/institutional impediments are there to progress of the Process? 10. What more could your country/organization do to contribute to the HoAP? 11. What regional/international impediments are there to progress of the Process? 12. What more could the Afghan government do to hone the Process?

On the 2014 Ministerial Conference in China

13. What do you expect from the next ministerial conference in China? 14. What do you recommend China to prepare for this conference/do for the Process?

Annex 3: Institutions and Experts Consulted

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

• Ambassador Shaida Mohammad Abdali: Afghan Embassy in New Delhi • Ambassador Sultan Ahmed Baheen (retd): Director-General, Third Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs • Prof. Mirwais Balkhi: American University of Afghanistan • Prof. Mansoor Ehsan: Karwan University • Mr. Abbass Farasoo: Deputy Director-General, Regional Cooperation Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs • Mr. Jawed Ludin: Former Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs • Mr. Feroz Masjidi: Director, Strategy, Policy & Planning, Ministry of Commerce • Ambassador Najibullah Mojadidi: Afghan Embassy in the United Arab Emirates • Ms. Roya Rahmani: Director-General, Regional Cooperation Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs • Mr. Fazlullah Reshteen: Counselor, Afghan Embassy in Abu Dhabi • Mr. Mahmoud Saikal: Former Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN

• Mr. Farhad Bayramov: Researcher, Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD) • Dr. Vugar Bayramov: Chairman, Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD) • Prof. Vusal Gasimly: Head, Economic Analysis and Global Affairs Department, Centre for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SAM) • Mr. Rashad Karimov: Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SAM) • Mr. Cavid Veliyev: Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SAM)

THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

• Prof. Du Youkang: Director, Center for South Asian Studies & Pakistan Study Centre, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University • Dr. Hu Shisheng: Director, Institute of South and Southeast Asian & Oceanian Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) • Dr. Lan Jianxue: Associate Research Fellow, Department for Developing Countries Studies, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) • Dr. Li Li: Deputy Director, Institute of South and Southeast Asian & Oceanian Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) • Dr. Li Qingyan: Assistant Researcher, Department for International and Strategic Studies, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) • Prof. Qian Xuemei: School of International Studies, Peking University • Prof. Wang Jisi: President, Institute of International and Strategic Studies (IISS), Peking University • Dr. Wang Shida: Researcher, Institute of South and Southeast Asian & Oceanian Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) • Dr. Wang Xu: Center for South Asian Studies, Peking University • Prof. Yang Cheng: Deputy Director, Center for Russian Studies, East China Normal University • Dr. Ye Hailin: Head, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

THE EUROPEAN UNION

• Ms. Alice Plane: Political Advisor on Regional Cooperation and Economic Development, European Union Delegation to Afghanistan

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

• Ms. Dorothea Gieselmann: Desk Officer, Task Force Afghanistan-Pakistan, German Federal Foreign Office

THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA

• Mr. Vishal Chandra: Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) • Dr. Suba Chandran: Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) • Mr. Goutam Ghosh: Deputy Director, International Wing, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) • Mr. Manoj Joshi: Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation (ORF) • Prof. Nirmila Joshi: Director, Central Asian Studies, United Services Institution (USI) • Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal: former Director General, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) • Ambassador Lalit Mansingh (retd): former Foreign Secretary • Ms. Ashima Marwaha: Focal Point, Heart of Asia Process, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) • Prof. S.K. Pandey: Center for Russian and Central Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) • Mr. Gopalaparum Parthasarathy: Former Ambassador to Pakistan • Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva: Chairperson, Center for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) • Gen. P.J.S. Sandhu (retd): Deputy Director, United Services Institute (USI) • Lt. Gen. R.K. Sawhney: Distinguished Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) • Gen. P.K. Singh (retd): Director, United Services Institute (USI) • Ms. Parveen Swami: Editor-in-Chief, The Hindu Newspaper • Ms. Vikram Sood: Former Director, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) • Prof. K. Warikoo: Dean, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) • Mr. John Wilson: Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation (ORF) • Mr. Niteen Yeola: Political Officer, Indian Embassy in Kabul

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

• Mr. Mohandes Majid Qasimi Faiz Abadi: Professor, Sharif University of Technology • Dr. Reza Jalali: Professor, University of Tehran • Dr. Mohammad Ali Khusrawi: Professor, University of Tehran

THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN

• Mr. Azat Nurkenov: Third Secretary Political, Kazakh Embassy in Kabul • Mr. Zhunus Yergaliyev: Political Counselor, Kazakh Embassy in Kabul • Dr. Sanat Kushkumbayev: Chief Research Fellow, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies Under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

THE KYGRZ REPUBLIC

• Ambassador Avazbek Abdurazakov: Kyrgyz Embassy in Kabul • Prof. Emil Dzhuraev: American University of Central Asia • Dr. Chinara Esengul: Assistant Professor, International Relations Department, Kyrgyz National University and the Academy of Management under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic

• Dr. Shairbek Juraev: Deputy Director, Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) Academy

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN

• Mr. Khalid Aziz: Chairman, Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training (RIPORT) • Air Commodore Khalid Iqbal (retd): Former Assistant Chief of Air Staff

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

• Ambassador Mikhail Alekseyevich Konarovskiy (retd): former Deputy-Secretary General of the SCO; former Ambassador to Afghanistan; and Senior Research Fellow, Institute for International Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs • Mr. Ilya Timokhov: First Secretary, Political Section, Russian Embassy in Kabul

THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN

• Mr. Kholikov Bakhtiyor: Chief Specialist, Foreign Affairs Department, Centre for Strategic Research under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan • Mr. Kholiknazarov Khudoberdi: Director, Centre for Strategic Research under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan • Mr. Iskandarov Kosimsho: Director, Centre on Studies of Afghanistan and the Region • Prof. Muzaffar Olimov: Director, Research Centre Sharq • Prof. Abdul Nabi Starzada: Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan

THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

• Prof. Selçuk Çolakoğlu: Deputy Director, International Strategic Research Organization (USAK), and Advisor at the Center for Strategic Research (SAM) • Mr. Ahmet Hanoğlu: Third Secretary, Political, Turkish Embassy in Kabul • Prof. Şaban Kardaş: President, Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM) • Ambassador Alev Kılıç (retd): Director, Center for Eurasian Studies (AVIM) • Mr. Ümit Alpaslan Kiliç: First Secretary, Center for Strategic Research (SAM) • Ms. Özge Nur Öğütcü: Specialist, Center for Eurasian Studies (AVIM) • Mr. Oytun Orhan: Middle East Researcher, Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM) • Dr. Mesut Özcan: Chairman, Diplomacy Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs • Mr. Aslan Yavuz Şir: Senior Specialist, Center for Eurasian Studies (AVIM) • Prof. Ihsan Sezal: Dean, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, University of Economics and Technology (TOBB) • Mr. Engin Turesin: Head of Section, Deputy Directorate General for Southern Asia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs • Mr. Mehmet Yegin: Head, Center for American Studies, International Strategic Research Organization (USAK)

THE UNITED KINGDOM

• Ms. Joanne Cappa: Political Officer, UK Embassy in Ankara • Mr. Chris Fitzgerald: Political Officer, UK Embassy in Kabul • Mr. Andrew Harvey: Second Secretary Political, UK Embassy in Baku

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

• Mr. Chris Ausdenmoore: Political Officer External Affairs, US Embassy in Kabul • Ambassador Ronald Neumann (retd): Former Ambassador to Afghanistan • Dr. Barnett Rubin: Director and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University (NYU)

• Prof. Frederick Starr: Founding Chairman of the Central Asia - Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, and Research Professor, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University • Ms. Vaida Vidugiris: Political Officer, US Embassy in Kabul

CHATHAM HOUSE

• Mr. Hameed Hakimi: Research Assistant/Project Coordinator, Royal Institute of International Affairs • Ms. Rosheen Kabraji: Asia Programme Manager

FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG

• Ms. Adrienne Woltersdorf: Resident Representative, Afghanistan Office • Mr. Alexey Yusupov: Head of Office, Almaty, Kazakhstan

INSTITUTE FOR PROSPECTIVE AND SECURITY STUDIES IN EUROPE

• Mr. Didier Chaudet: Head of Programme, Iranian and South Asian Studies

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

• Mr. David Gallalee: Director, Office of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative to Afghanistan

ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE

• Mr. Raffaello Pantucci: Senior Research Fellow • Mr. Edward Schwarck: Research Fellow, Asia Studies

THE UNITED NATIONS

• Mr. Fakhrulla Azamov: Research Officer, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) • Mr. Mark Pont: Special Advisor Regional Affairs/Senior Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) • Mr. Armands Pupols: Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA) • Mr. Álvaro Rodriguez: Country Director, Afghanistan Country Office, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) • Prof. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh: Director, Specialization on Human Security at the Master’s of Public Affairs (MPA), Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po, Paris); and Consultant for the UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA). • Mr. Hashim Wahdatyar: National Programme Officer, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

THE WORLD BANK

• Mr. Robert Saum: Country Director for Afghanistan and Bhutan, South Asia Region

Please note, this list does not include a range of additional consulted experts: they preferred complete anonymity for varying motives. A few listed experts did not prefer direct referencing in the text body.

Annex 4: Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACCI Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industry ADB Asian Development Bank

ADPC Asian Disaster Preparedness Center AKDN Aga Khan Development Network ANSF Afghan National Security Forces APTTA Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement BOMNAF Border Management in Northern Afghanistan BSA Bilateral Security Agreement CABSI The Central Asia Border Security Initiative CADAP Central Asia Drug Action Programme CAREC Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation CASS Chinese Academy of Social Sciences CATF Central Asian Trade Forum CBM Confidence Building Measure CCP The Communist Party of China CICA Conference on Interaction and CBM in Asia C-IED Counter-Improvised Explosives Device CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CN Counter Narcotics CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization CT Counter Terrorism CTITF Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force DM Disaster Management ECO Economic Cooperation Organization FCO Foreign and Common Wealth Office FES Friedrich Ebert Stiftung FICCI Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry GCC The Gulf Cooperation Council HoAP Heart of Asia Process HPC High Peace Council IC International Community IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IPSE Institute for Prospective and Security Studies ISAF International Security Assistance Force JNU Jawaharlal Nehru University MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MHRD Ministry of Human Resources and Development MoU Memorandum of Understanding NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDRF National Disaster Response Force OIC Organization for Islamic Cooperation OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe RCD Regional Cooperation Directorate RECCA Regional Economic Cooperation Conference for Afghanistan RFP Regional Focal Point

RI Regional Infrastructure SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SAR Special Autonomous Region SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization SDMC SAARC Disaster Management Centre SPA Strategic Partnership Agreement TAPI Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline TCIO Trade, Commerce and Investment Opportunities TFP Technical Focal Point TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia TTP Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan UCA University of Central Asia UNDP United Nations Development Agency UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe UNESCAP United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction UNOCHA United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNRCCA United Nations Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia UNSPECA United Nations Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia USAID United States Agency for International Aid WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organization WTO World Trade Organization

Annex 5 : Notes and References

1 The majority of experts whom we interviewed stated that the Process’ future capacity and perceived esteem 2 ”National Joint Youth Programme (NJYP),” United Nations Development Programme, April 2009, http://www.undp.org.af/whoweare/undpinafghanistan/Projects/dcse/prj_youth.htm 3 While the Process is also known and more frequently referred to as the Istanbul Process in some states, e.g. China, this paper will adhere to referring to it as the Heart of Asia Process (HoAP). 4 Tadjbakhsh, Sharbanou, “Central Asia and Afghanistan: Insulation on the Silk Road, Between Eurasia and the Heart of Asia,” Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Paper 3, http://openbriefing.org/docs/caadnafghanistan.pdf 5 Ibid. 6 Author’s Skype interview, HoAP interlocutor, May 2014 7 Written interview, HoAP analyst of a supporting state, April 2014 8 Labott , Elise, “Diplomatic Surge to Help End Afghan War, Clinton Says,” CNN, February 19 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/US/02/18/clinton.afghanistan/ 9 We have drawn the Process’ labor division from the Heart of Asia Ministerial Conference Declaration established in 2012 at the Kabul Ministerial Conference. 10 Quie, Marissa, “The Istanbul Process: Prospects for Regional Connectivity in the Heart of Asia,” Asia Europe Journal, April 2014, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10308-014-0385-7 11 Authors’ interviews with interlocutors, February-May 2014 12 Authors’ interview, close Process observer of a supporting organization, Kabul, June 2014 13 Written interview, HoAP analyst of a supporting state, February 2014 14 Ibid. 15 Dr. Middlebrook, Peter and Millswith, Landell, “Study of Funding Modalities for Heart of Asia Confidence Building Measures,” EU commissioned report, p. 12, December 2013, http://www.netlinksdemo.com/hoa/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Report-Study-of-Funding-Modalities-for- Heart-of-Asia-Confidence-Building-Measures-December-2013.pdf 16 Author’s interview, Afghan official involved in the HoAP, Kabul, February 2014 17 See these links for a copy of all three declarations: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/istanbul-process-on-regional- security-and-cooperation-for-a-secure-and-stable-afghanistan.en.mfa, http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/10569, http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/19668 18 Quie, Marissa, “The Istanbul Process: Prospects for Regional Connectivity in the Heart of Asia,” Asia Europe Journal, April 2014, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10308-014-0385-7 19 Written interview, HoAP analyst of a supporting state, May 2014 20 Ibid. 21 Author’s interview, Mr. Jawed Ludin, Kabul, May 2014 22 Lander, Mark, " U.S. Troops to Leave Afghanistan by End of 2016," The New York Times, May 27 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/world/asia/us-to-complete-afghan-pullout-by-end-of-2016- obama-to-say.html?_r=0 23 Authors’ interview, close HoAP observer of a supporting organization, Kabul, June 2014 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ruttig, Thomas, “”Afghanistan Conference in Istanbul: The Clogged Arteries of the ‘Heart of Asia’,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, November 1 2011, http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghanistan- conference-in-istanbul-the-clogged-arteries-of-the-heart-of-asia, Kazemi, S. Reza, “Afghanistan Conference in Kazakhstan: Will the ‘Heart of Asia’ Start Throbbing?,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, April 25 2013, http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghanistan-conference-in-kazakhstan-will-the-heart-of-asia-start- throbbing & Kazemi S. Reza, “Over-promising, Under-delivering: The Outcome of the Afghanistan Conference in Kazakhstan,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, April 30 2013, http://www.afghanistan- analysts.org/over-promising-under-delivering-the-outcome-of-the-afghanistan-conference-in-kazakhstan 27 For example: Quie, Marissa, “The Istanbul Process: Prospects for Regional Connectivity in the Heart of Asia,” Asia Europe Journal, April 2014, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10308-014-0385-7 28 For example: Tadjbakhsh, Sharbanou, “Central Asia and Afghanistan: Insulation on the Silk Road, Between Eurasia and the Heart of Asia,” Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Paper 3, http://openbriefing.org/docs/caadnafghanistan.pdf

29 See Dr. Middlebrook and Landell Millswith’s Study of Funding Modalities for Heart of Asia Confidence Building Measures, December 2013. 30 See: http://www.fes-afghanistan.org/pages/regional-declaration-on-afghanistanrsquos-peace-and-stability- launched.php 31 Brown, Vanda Felbab, “Narco-Jihad: Drug Trafficking and Security in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Brookings, December 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2010/01/12-counternarcotics-felbabbrown; “Mapping the Sources of Tension and the Interests of Regional Powers in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Barcelona Center for International Affairs, December 2012, http://www.cidob.org/es/content/download/33651/537343/file/INFORME+AF-PAK_2012.pdf; Tellis, Ashley J., Mirski, Sean, “Crux of Asia: China, India, and the Emerging Global Order,” Carnegie, January 10 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/10/crux-of-asia-china-india-and-emerging-global- order/f0gw; Raiphea, Yow Peter, “India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership: An Analysis of India, Afghanistan and Pakistan Perspectives,” International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, Volume 3, Issue 4, April 2013, http://www.ijsrp.org/research-paper-0413/ijsrp-p1667.pdf; Campbell, Caitlin, “China’s Core Interests and the East China Sea,” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 10 2013, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China's%20Core%20Interests%20and%20the%20Eas t%20China%20Sea.pdf; Koepke, Bruce, “Iran’s Policy on Afghanistan: The Evolution of Strategic Pragmatism,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, September 2013, p.12, http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRI13wcaBK.pdf; Envisioning Afghanistan post 2014: Perspectives and Strategies for Constructive Conflict Resolution from the Neighbourhood,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, October 2013, http://www.fesasia.org/media/Peace%20and%20Security/FES_Policy_Paper_Central_Asia_102013.pdf; Tadjbakhsh, Sharbanou, “Central Asia and Afghanistan: Insulation on the Silk Road, Between Eurasia and the Heart of Asia,” Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Paper 3, http://openbriefing.org/docs/caadnafghanistan.pdf; Hill, Fiona, Jewett, Pamela, “Back in the USSR: Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy Towards Russia,” Brookings, March 18 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2014/03/back-in-the-ussr-1994-hill-jewett; Nichol, Jim, “Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service, March 31 2014, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33407.pdf 32 Written interview, Process analyst of a supporting state, February 2014 33 “China and Russia Co-host 6+1 Dialogue on Afghanistan Issue,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Sweden, March 7 2014, http://www.chinaembassy.se/eng/wjdt/t1136653.htm 34 Dialogue on Afghanistan, senior official of a intergovernmental organization, undisclosed location, March 2014 35 Landler, Mark, “U.S. Troops to Leave Afghanistan by End of 2016,” New York Times, May 27 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/world/asia/us-to-complete-afghan-pullout-by-end-of-2016-obama-to- say.html?_r=0 36 Ibid. 37 Tisdall, Simon, “Iran and Assad Have Won in Syria, Say Top Tehran Foreign Policy Figures,” The Guardian, May 12 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/11/syria-crisis-iran-assad-won-war-tehran 38 Toner, Mark C., “Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement,” U.S. Department of State official website, June 13 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166078.htm 39 Author’s interview, Ms. Alice Plane, EU Delegation to Afghanistan, and views expressed by Afghan MFA official involved in the HoAP, Kabul, May 2014 40 Author’s interview, interlocutor involved in the Process, location and date undisclosed 41 Authors’ interview, Mr. Mahmoud Saikal, Kabul, May 2014 42 Author’s interview, Mr. Jawed Ludin, Kabul, May 2014 43 Written interview, interlocutor from a supporting state, February 2014 44 Ibid. 45 Author’s interview, Chinese scholar, Beijing, April 2014 46 Authors’ exchanges with supporting state’s officials, February 2014, Kabul

47 Authors’ observations and repeatedly stated by interviewees: we have heard the adjective “abstract” or equivalents many times 48 See Dr. Middlebrook, Peter and Millswith, Landell, “Study of Funding Modalities for Heart of Asia Confidence Building Measures,” EU commissioned report, p. 11, December 2013, http://www.netlinksdemo.com/hoa/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Report-Study-of-Funding-Modalities-for- Heart-of-Asia-Confidence-Building-Measures-December-2013.pdf 49 Author’s interview, Afghan MFA official involved in the Process, Kabul, February 2014 50 Dr. Middlebrook, Peter and Millswith, Landell, “Study of Funding Modalities for Heart of Asia Confidence Building Measures,” EU commissioned report, p. 12, December 2013, http://www.netlinksdemo.com/hoa/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Report-Study-of-Funding-Modalities-for- Heart-of-Asia-Confidence-Building-Measures-December-2013.pdf 51 Author’s interview, member of the international community, Kabul, June 2014 52 Written interview, interlocutor from a supporting state, May 2014 53 Authors’ interview, Mr. Mahmoud Saikal, Kabul, May 2014 54 Views expressed by attendees of the focus group on the HoAP project at the AISS, Kabul, February 2014 55 Ibid. 56 Authors’ observations upon visits to the MFA and talks with MFA officials 57 Views expressed by an attendee of the second focus group on the HoAP project at the AISS, Kabul, May 2014 58 Views expressed by Afghan MFA official involved in the HoAP, Kabul, March 2014 59 Authors’ observations upon visits to the MFA and talks with three ministries’ officials, March 2014 & written interview, interlocutor from a supporting state, May 2014 60 Author’s interview, Afghan MFA official involved in the Process, Kabul, February 2014 61 Authors’ observations and repeatedly stated by interviewees in visited participating countries capitals. 62 Views expressed by a senior official of a supporting country, focus group on HoAP Project at the AISS, Kabul, March 2014 63 Views expressed by Ms. Adrienne Woltersdorf, FES, and Mr. Yergaliyev, Kazakh embassy in Kabul, focus group on HoAP project at the AISS, Kabul, February 2014 64 Kazemi S. Reza, “Over-promising, Under-delivering: The Outcome of the Afghanistan Conference in Kazakhstan,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, April 30 2013, p.2, http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/over- promising-under-delivering-the-outcome-of-the-afghanistan-conference-in-kazakhstan 65 Authors’ interviews, Afghan diplomats, Kabul, February-April 2014 66 Views expressed by diplomat of a supporting state, focus group on HoAP project at the AISS, Kabul, February 2014 67 Author’s interview, Ambassador Shaida Mohammad Abdali, New Delhi, March 2014 68 Ibid. 69 Author’s interview, Mr. Feroz Masjidi, MoC, Kabul, February 2014 70 Ibid. 71 Authors’ interviews, Afghan scholars and officials, February-April 2014 72 Author’s interview, Ambassador Najibullah Mojadidi, Abu Dhabi, March 2014 73 Author’s interview, Prof. Mansoor Ehsan, Karwan University, Kabul, April 2014 74 Authors’ interview, Mr. Mahmoud Saikal, Kabul, May 2014 75 Ibid. 76 Author’s interview, Prof. Mirwais Balkhi, American University of Afghanistan, Kabul, March 2014 77 Ibid. 78 Author’s interview, scholar on the region, Baku, March 2014 79 Author’s interview, Dr. Vugar Bayramov, CESD, Baku, March 2014 80 Ibid. 81 Author’s interview, Prof. Vusal Gasimly, SAM, Baku, March 2014 82 “The Situation in Afghanistan: Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security,” The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the United Nations, June 20 2013, http://www.un.int/azerbaijan/pdf/scstat/52e03e7ec22aa.pdf 83 Author’s interview, Dr. Vugar Bayramov, CESD, Baku, March 2014 84 Ibid. 85 Author’s interviews, scholars on the Process, Baku, March 2014 86 Ibid.

87 Author’s interview, Dr. Vugar Bayramov, CESD, Baku, March 2014 88 Author’s interviews, scholars on the Process, Baku, March 2014 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 Author’s interview, Azeri analyst on the Process, Baku, March 2014 93 Author’s interview, Dr. Vugar Bayramov, CESD and Mr. Rashad Karimov, SAM, Baku, March 2014 94 “Exclusive interview: Afghan President Karzai: China is a Stable Neighbor," CCTV, September 29 2013, http://english.cntv.cn/program/newsupdate/20130928/103388.shtml 95 Author’s interview, Dr. Ye Hailin, CASS, Beijing, March 2014 96 Ibid. 97 Author’s interviews, Chinese scholars, CIIS, Beijing, March 2014 98 Author’s interview, Dr. Ye Hailin, CASS, Beijing, March 2014 99 Author’s interviews, Chinese scholars, Beijing, March 2014 100 Author’s interview, Dr. Ye Hailin, CASS, Beijing, March 2014 101 Ibid. 102 Author’s interview, Chinese scholar, Peking University, Beijing, March 2014 103 Ibid. 104 Author’s interview, Dr. Ye Hailin, CASS, Beijing, March 2014 105 Author’s interview, Chinese scholar, Beijing, March 2014 106 Authors’ interview, close Process observer of a supporting organization, Kabul, June 2014 107 Author’s interviews, Chinese scholars, Beijing, March 2014 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 Written interview, Prof. Qian Xuemei, Peking University, March 2014 111 Author’s interview, Chinese scholar, Beijing, March 2014 112 Author’s interviews, Chinese scholars, Beijing, March 2014 113 Ibid. 114 Author’s interview, Chinese scholar, Beijing, March 2014 115 Author’s interviews, Chinese scholars, Beijing, March 2014 116 Author’s interview, Dr. Ye Hailin, CASS, Beijing, March 2014 117 Author’s interview, Prof. Du Youkang, Fudan University, Shanghai, March 2014 118 Author’s interview, Chinese scholar, Peking University, Beijing, March 2014 119 Ibid. 120 Author’s interview, Prof. Du Youkang, Fudan University, Shanghai, March 2014 121 Ibid. 122 Written interview, Prof. Qian Xuemei, Peking University, March 2014 123 Author’s interview, Prof. Wang Jisi, Peking University, March 2014 124 Author’s interview, Prof. Du Youkang, Fudan University, Shanghai, March 2014 125 Author’s interviews, Chinese scholars, CIIS, Beijing, March 2014 126 Author’s interview, Indian diplomat, New Delhi, March 2014 127 Author’s interview, Ms. Parveen Swami, Editor in Chief, The Hindu Daily, New Delhi, March 2014 128 Author’s interview, Prof. Gulshan Sachdeva, JNU, New Delhi, April 2014 129 Ibid. 130 Author’s interview, Indian diplomat, New Delhi, April 2014 131 Author’s interview, Mr. Vishal Chandra, IDSA, New Delhi, April 2014 132 Author’s interview, Lt. Gen. R.K. Sawhney, VIF, New Delhi, March 2014 133 Author’s interview, Dr. Suba Chandran, IPCS, New Delhi, March 2014 134 Author’s interview, Mr. Vikram Sood, Former Director, RAW, New Delhi, March 2014 135 Author’s interview, Indian diplomat, New Delhi, April 2014 136 Author’s interview, Indian analyst on the Process, New Delhi, March 2014s 137 Laipson, Ellen, “Engaging Iran on Afghanistan,” Stimson Center, March 2012, p.3, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Engaging_Iran_on_Afghanistan.pdf 138 Ibid., p.17 139 Ibid., p.3 140 Ibid., p.18

141 Ibid., p.18 142 Written interview, Dr. Mohammad Ali Khusrawi, Professor, Tehran University, Iran 143 Ibid. 144 Erlan Idrissov, "The Role of Economic Integration in Asia," The Diplomat, May 03 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/the-role-of-economic-integration-in-asia/ 145 Jozjani, Baz Mohammad, “Kazakhstan’s Participation in the Development of Afghanistan,” Daily Outlook Afghanistan, November 25 2013, http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics.php?post_id=8720 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid. 148 “Envisioning Afghanistan post 2014: Perspectives and Strategies for Constructive Conflict Resolution from the Neighbourhood,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p.4, http://www.fesasia.org/media/Peace%20and%20Security/FES_Policy_Paper_Central_Asia_102013.pdf 149 Tadjbakhsh, Sharbanou, “Central Asia and Afghanistan: Insulation on the Silk Road, Between Eurasia and the Heart of Asia,” Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Paper 3, p.53, http://openbriefing.org/docs/caadnafghanistan.pdf 150 Written interview, Mr. Alexy Yusupov, FES, April 2014 151 Authors’ interviews, Kazakh diplomat, Kabul, March 2014 152 Ibid. 153 Views expressed by Kazakh diplomats, focus group on HoAP project at the AISS, Kabul, February 2014 154 Ibid. 155 Ibid. 156 Written interview, Prof. Dzhuraev, American University, Bishkek, April 2014 157 Written interview, Dr. Juraev, OSCE Academy, May 2014 158 Ibid. 159 Zaman, Razmal, “Afghanistan Signs Three Agreements with Kyrgygzstan,” Afghan Zariza, February 02 2014, http://www.afghanzariza.com/article/articledetail/%20afghanistan-signs-three-agreements-with-kyrgyzstan 160 “Envisioning Afghanistan post 2014: Perspectives and Strategies for Constructive Conflict Resolution from the Neighbourhood,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p.6, http://www.fesasia.org/media/Peace%20and%20Security/FES_Policy_Paper_Central_Asia_102013.pdf 161 Written interview, Prof. Dzhuraev, American University, Bishkek, April 2014 162 Written interview, Kyrgyz scholar, April 2014 163 Written interview, Ambassador Abdurazakov, Kyrgyz embassy in Kabul, May 2014 164 Ibid. 165 Written interview, Dr. Juraev, OSCE Academy, May 2014 166 Written interview, Kyrgyz scholar, April 2014 167 Written interview, Dr. Chinara Esengul, Assistant Professor, International Relations Department, Kyrgyz National University and the Academy of Management under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, May 2014 168 Ibid. 169 Written interview, Prof. Dzhuraev, American University, Bishkek, April 2014 170 Ibid. 171 Written interview, Ambassador Abdurazakov, Kyrgyz embassy in Kabul, May 2014 172 Written interview, Prof. Dzhuraev, American University of Central Asia, April 2014 173 Written interview, Dr. Juraev, OSCE Academy, May 2014 174 Ibid. 175 Written interview, Kyrgyz scholar, April 2014 176 “Consultation Meeting of Regional Technical Focal Points to Formulate Draft Implementation Plan for Disaster Management - Confidence Building Measures,” Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority, http://www.andma.gov.af/contents/295/Documents/237/Document16.pdf 177 Written Interview, Pakistani analyst, April 2014 178 “Karzai Woos India to Invest in Afghanistan,” The Hindu, November 11 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karzai-woos-india-to-invest-in-afghanistan/article4085718.ece 179 Written interviews, Pakistani analysts and officials, April 2014 180 Field advisor’s interviews, Pakistani analysts and officials, April 2014 181 Ibid. 182 Ibid. 183 Ibid.

184 Ibid. 185 Ibid. 186 Written interview, Mr. Didier Chaudet, IPSE, May 2014 187 Ibid. 188 Written interviews, Pakistani analysts and officials, April 2014 189 Ibid. 190 Field advisor’s interviews, Pakistani analysts and officials, April 2014 191 Written interview, Mr. Khalid Iqbal, Air Commodore (retd), May 2014. 192 Written interview, Mr. Khalid Iqbal, Air Commodore (retd), May 2014 193 Field advisor’s interviews, Pakistani analysts and officials, April 2014 194 Ibid. 195 Field advisor’s interviews, Pakistani analysts and officials, April 2014 196 Ibid. 197 Yousaf, Kamran, “Pakistan to Attend Istanbul Conference with Low Expectations,” The Express Tribune, October 31 2011, http://tribune.com.pk/story/285361/pakistan-to-attend-istanbul-conference-with-low- expectations/ 198 Written interview, interlocutor from a supporting state, May 2014 199 Written interview, scholar from a supporting state, February 2014 200 Author’s interview, Russian diplomat, Kabul, May 2014 201 Author’s interview, Russian diplomat, Kabul, May 2014 202 Ibid. 203 Balmforth, Tom, “Russia’s Heroin Habit,” Radio Free Europe: Radio Liberty, October 21 2013, http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-moscow-heroin/25143501.html 204 Upadhyay, Dadan, “Post-exit from US Anti-drug Pact, Russia Eyes CSTO to Fight Afghan Drug Threat,” Russia and India Report, February 4 2013, http://in.rbth.com/world/2013/02/04/post-exit_from_us_anti- drug_pact_russia_eyes_csto_to_fight_afghan_drug_22077.html 205 “Interview: Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs S.V.Lavrov,” TV Channel – Russia Today, October 08 2013, Bali, Indonesia, http://www.afghanistan.mid.ru/en/ 206 Ibid. 207 Written interview, Ambassador (retd) Konarovskiy, May 2014 208 Ibid. 209 Author’s interview, Russian diplomat, Kabul, May 2014 210 Ibid. 211 Ibid. 212 “Afghanistan and its International Partners Endorse Plans to Strengthen Cooperation,” United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, February 14 2013, http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=12254&ctl=Details&mid=15756&Itemid=36423&language =en-US 213 Kaya, Karen, “Turkey’s Role in Afghanistan and Afghan Stabilization,” United States Arms Combined Center, May 23 2012, p.25, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130831_art007.pdf 214 “Turkey-Afghanistan Economic and Trade Relations,” Republic of Turkey: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-afghanistan.en.mfa 215 Author’s interviews, Turkish interlocutors, Ankara, March 2014 216 Ibid. 217 Views expressed by Mr. Ahmet Hanoğlu, Turkish embassy in Kabul, focus group on HoAP project at the AISS, Kabul, February 2014 218 Written interview, expert on the Process, participating state, February 2014 219 Author’s interview, Turkish official, Ankara, March 2014 220 Author’s interview, Mr. Alev Kılıç, AVIM, Ankara, April 2014 221 Author’s interview, Mr. Aslan Yavuz Şir, AVIM, Ankara, March 2014 222 Author’s interviews, scholars, AVIM, Ankara, April 2014 223 Author’s interview, Prof. Selçuk Çolakoğlu, USAK and SAM, Ankara, April 2014 224 Author’s interview, Prof. Şaban Kardaş, ORSAM, Ankara, March 2014 225 Author’s interviews, Turkish scholars, Ankara, March 2014 226 Ibid.

227 “The Second Senior Officials Preparatory Meeting For Kabul Conference To Follow Up On The Istanbul Process Held In Ashgabat,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, April 19 2012, http://heartofasiaministerial-mfa.gov.af/pressreleases.html 228 Written interview, Mr. Armands Pupols, UNRCCA, May 2014 229 Ibid. 230 Ibid. 231 Sinclair, Kyle, “UAE Support for Afghanistan Redevelopment ‘Vital’,” The National, February 03 2014, http://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-support-for-afghanistans-redevelopment-vital 232 “Afghanistan and UAE Sign Agreements on Security Cooperation and Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Agree to Sign Long-Term Strategic Partnership Agreement, Emirates to Start Kabul Flights in August,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, August 01 2013, http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/afghanistan- and-uae-sign-agreements-on-security-cooperation-and-transfer-of-sentenced-persons-agree-to-sign-long- term-strategic-partnership-agreement 233 “UAE Reaffirms Long-Term Commitment to Afghanistan in UNGA Statement,” Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations, November 20 2013, http://www.un.int/wcm/content/site/uae/cache/offonce/home/pid/35802;jsessionid=723769B83A6FDF12F3 082E85F2798FF0 234 “Regional Cooperation – The Dubai Process,” Embassy of Canada to Afghanistan, http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/documents/r06_12/border-frontiere.aspx?lang=eng 235 Hay, John B., “The Dubai Process: Lessons Learned and Implications for Third-Party Engagement in Managing Cross-Border Challenges in Other Regions,” Carleton University, May 16 2011, http://carleton.ca/npsia/wp-content/uploads/Dubai-Process-Evaluation.pdf 236 “Progress Report: Implementation Status on Recommendations from the Pakistan-Afghanistan Parliamentarians Dialogues Since 2011,” Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development, September 2013, http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FP/ImplementationStatusonRecommendationsFromThePakis tan-AfghanistanParliamentariansDialoguesSince2011_ProgressReport_Sep2013.pdf 237 Author’s interview, Ambassador Najibullah Mojadidi, Abu Dhabi, March 2014 238 Author’s interview, Mr. Fazlullah Reshteen, Afghan embassy in Abu Dhabi, April 2014 239 Author’s interview, Ambassador Najibullah Mojadidi, Abu Dhabi, March 2014 240 Author’s interview, Mr. Fazlullah Reshteen, Afghan embassy in Abu Dhabi, April 2014 241 Author’s interview, Ambassador Najibullah Mojadidi, Abu Dhabi, March 2014 242 Ibid. 243 Ibid. 244 See endnote 31 245 Authors’ observations and repeatedly stated by interviewees 246 See point 20 of the Almaty ministerial conference declaration, http://www.netlinksdemo.com/hoa/?page_id=430 247 Author’s interview, also suggested by a major international organization’s country director, location and date undisclosed 248 To date.

Annex 6: About the AISS

The Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS) was established in October 2012 in Kabul. It aims to create an intellectual space for addressing strategic issues pertaining to Afghanistan in the wider regional and international contexts. Promoting dialogue between and among different stakeholders is an end as well an integral means in attaining AISS objectives. All AISS’ activities and programs are based on the principles of professionalism, independence, internationalism and progressive values.

AISS is an independent research body, officially registered with the Afghan Ministry of Economy as a not-for-profit research institute dedicated to providing qualitative, non-partisan and policy-oriented research; publication; professional training and policy advocacy with a distinct focus on Afghanistan. Empowering and investing in Afghan youth constitutes the crosscutting priority of the AISS.

AISS permits researchers and authors full freedom of opinion. The responsibility and honor for the findings and views expressed in AISS publications thus rest with the authors themselves.

Board of Advisors " Ambassador Hikmet Çetin (retd), former NATO Senior Representative to Afghanistan; " Ambassador Kai Eide (retd), former Special Representative to the UN Secretary General; " Prof. Radha Kumar, Director General, Delhi Policy Group (DPG); " Mr. Nader Nadery, Head of the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA); " Dr. Barnett Rubin, Director and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, and Professor of Political Science at New York University; " Dr. Sima Samar, Chairwoman, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC); " Dr. Rangin Spanta, Afghanistan’s National Security Advisor; " Dr. Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP); and " Prof. Wang Jisi, President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies (IISS) at Peking University.

About the Authors Richard Ghiasy

Richard Ghiasy, a Dutch national with Afghan roots, holds an MPA in development studies from China’s Tsinghua University. He is currently a research fellow at the AISS where he focuses on China’s foreign policy in Central Asia, Sino- Afghan relations and Afghanistan’s economic development. His publications can be found in The Diplomat and the China Daily among other outlets.

Maihan Saeedi

Maihan Saeedi is Head of the Regional Cooperation Department at the AISS. He completed his M.Phil degree in Russian and Central Asian Studies at the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. In his previous capacity he worked at the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is currently enrolled as a PhD research scholar at JNU.

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The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, or of the Embassy of the United Kingdom to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.